pols 420 final exam w/ Q's from all study guides

what are the three regional postures identified by Vipin Narang, and how do they vary?

1 The catalytic posture is about compelling a third party, usually a major power, to get into conflict to support you. You only need a handful of nuclear weapons, and you don't need nuclear weapons to be combat-ready. 2 The assured retaliation posture is about deterring nuclear use and coercion (nuclear attacks only). You need a survivable second-strike capability, and there is a high degree of civilian control over forces. 3 The asymmetric escalation posture is about deterring conventional conflict and nuclear use. You need first use capabilities. You delegate control over nuclear weapons to local military commanders and engage in more brinkmanship in order to convince opponent that you might do something irrational.

How many states have built nuclear weapons? Who are they?

10 states have built nuclear weapons. They are U.S.A, USSR, U.K., France, China, Israel, India, South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea.

understand the relationship between regime type and nuclear proliferation.

A country's regime type affects the likelihood of countries getting nuclear weapons because of public opinion, institutional constraints, and sensitivity to norms. There is not an overwhelmingly clear trend linking a country's democratic status and whether it gets nuclear weapons. More authoritarian states are getting them recently (even though democratic states did get them at first). Democracies tend to get them if their public wants them because nuclear weapons are stigmatized now. But some non-democratic regimes are different, so not a solid predictor. Personalistic dictatorships are where power is 100% invested in a single person, and there is a cult-like personality around that person. One person dominates uncheck. There is a very strong relationship between being a personalistic dictatorship and seeking nuclear weapons. They are paranoid about internal threats (coups), and the power is constrained to one person (so public opinion doesn't matter), so they are freer to pursue nuclear weapons.

What is the difference between an atom bomb (i.e., A-bomb) and a hydrogen bomb (i.e., thermonuclear weapon)?

An atom bomb is a nuclear bomb whose energy comes from fission of uranium or plutonium (both heavy metals). The energy for a hydrogen bomb comes from fusion of hydrogen. Fission is used to create fusion reaction. They generate explosive power that is orders of magnitudes bigger than what you can do with fission bombs.

Can arms control be used to reduce the costs of war? What are the tradeoffs that come with doing this?

Arms control can make wars less destructive if they occur because you're taking away the option of nuclear weapons causing mass destruction. But reducing costs of war might make war more costly. As something becomes more costly, it becomes less likely to happen. This is why in a world with nuclear weapons it can be scarier, but it can also give you deterrence benefits because it makes war more costly.

What is arms control?

Arms control is restricting military technology by putting limits on numbers (an example is the US and Soviets had a number of deals saying you can have X number of deployed weapons) or total prohibitions (an example is the ban on chemical weapons). It can be unilateral (PNIs- presidential nuclear initiative), bilateral (START 1), or multilateral (NPT and JCPOA).

Understand the connection between normative aversions to military technologies and arms control.

Arms control is sometimes done out of a sense of normative aversion. The OPCW says that the ban on chemical weapons is because of the taboo against them, and they are morally repugnant. Landmines have been banned as well. You disperse them throughout a territory during a time of war, but after the war ends, landmines aren't cleared up, and you have children walking over them and accidentally getting killed. There is a UN ban restricting landmines.

What do we learn from recent survey experiments designed to assess the nuclear taboo?

As the probability of winning with conventional means goes down with probability of winning with nuclear weapons remains the same (high probability of winning), the approval and preference for using nuclear weapons increases. However, the vast majority of people who said no said that because it would set a dangerous precedent. Less people said no because it's "morally repugnant," which is the idea behind the nuclear taboo.

how can members of nuclear bureaucracies such as atomic energy commissions influence the nuclear proliferation process?

Atomic Energy Commissions run a country's nuclear weapons program, and they lobby to get more of what they want. Many times, leaders in the countries where Atomic Energy Commissions have pushed for more nuclear weapons/technology are not ready to take that step, but it gets enacted anyway. We see this in South Africa and India. There is usually someone at the center of nuclear programs that is charismatic and has a lot of influence. They either lobby away from nuclear weapons in order to maintain a large peaceful nuclear program, or they lobby for nuclear weapons in order to get more resources and influence. Either way, they largely influence the government's decision on proliferation.

How can civilian nuclear programs contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation?

Civilian nuclear programs do lead to nuclear weapons program because of dual-use technology, fig leaf, nuclear know-how, and bureaucracies and domestic politics. For dual-use technology, peaceful technology makes getting military technology easier, so they may be more inclined to do it. Fig leaf is where a country uses a commercial nuclear weapons as a front for a weapons program or you're hedging and trying to shorten the time to get nuclear weapons, if necessary. Nuclear know-how suggests that once you develop expertise in nuclear technology, you can apply this expertise to build plants that are intended for weapons production. Bureaucracies and domestic politics lead to nuclear weapons programs because members of Atomic Energy Commissions put pressure on leaders to go down the path to getting nuclear weapons. If they're empowered by a peaceful nuclear program, they could possibly get leaders to authorize more weapons-oriented activities.

understand the relationship between international conflict and nuclear proliferation.

Classical liberalism says that the conditions people live in are responsible for international conflict. If you improve conditions, you can change the likelihood of war and conflict. Emmanuel Kant (liberalism) says that democracy, free trade, and cooperation through international organizations lower risk of conflict. The living conditions of people will determine whether they go for nuclear weapons. If they are in international conflict, they may then want nuclear weapons because they could be under an external security threat.

how does constructivism help us understand the nuclear proliferation process?

Constructivism emphasizes non-material factors such as acceptance and prestige. One reason that countries pursue nuclear weapons is because of prestige. Social realities are constructed, which allows for the possibility that things change over time as beliefs evolve and people try to change certain beliefs. It says that we can't think of individual countries without thinking of their individual leader, and a leader's preferences are closely tied to nuclear weapons program. Countries can learn to downplay the benefits nuclear weapons that they have so other countries don't want them.

Explain the origins of the NPT

Countries have been thinking about how to control nuclear proliferation since 1945, and various proposals were put forward before the NPT. The Baruch Plan came about in late 1940s by the US. They said that the international body through UN would maintain control over a limited amount of fissile material that could be used for research, electricity, generation (later on), etc.; and the US would surrender all of its nuclear weapons. This did no go into effect because it was resisted, especially by countries like Soviet Union that were skeptical of US's intentions. But it gave us a path forward to nuclear disarmament. In the "Atoms for Peace" Plan, Eisenhower thought countries would be less likely to want nuclear weapons by sharing nuclear technology freely. But it became clear from this that a system needed to be put in place so nuclear technology wasn't misused. The IAEA is the UN's nuclear watchdog, which ensures that countries can have peaceful nuclear technology and not misuse it for military purposes. This became critical part of NPT.

From a US perspective, what do you think is the best policy for addressing the challenges posed by Iran's nuclear program?

Countries haven't done any open military acts like Osiraq/Osirak (when Israel attacked Iraqi nuclear facilities). U.S. and Israel have taken a middle ground and done more covert actions - such as cyber attack against Iran's main enrichment facility (pretty successful damage), and assassinations of various scientists. The US has had a consistent view of not wanting to do an overt attack on Iran unless a nuclear attack on the US is imminent because of reconstitution and accelerating demand. If we carried out a strike with military force, they could keep building repeatedly after we bomb it; and they would be even more driven to get a nuclear weapon (which the United States does not want).

What is the difference between deterrence and coercion/compellence? Why is compellence more difficult?

Deterrence is an attempt to preserve the status quo by preventing some other actor from taking an action that changes the way things currently are. Compellence is an attempt to change the status quo, and it is a state telling another state to change behavior in same way, and if they don't, there will be some cost to pay. Compellence is more difficult than deterrence because the stakes are often smaller, loss aversion, and the challenger must act first.

what is Etel Solingen's theory of nuclear proliferation? what cases support her argument?

Etel Solingen's theory says that pursuing the bomb can be costly. There can be economic sanctions, loss of FDI, alliance strains, and encouragement of preventive attacks. Some countries are sensitive to these costs, and other countries are not. Her theory works best when a country is not under existential threat. Case #1: North Korea isn't very sensitive to these costs since they're already experiencing a lot of these costs. They have been getting nuclear weapons. South Korea would be very sensitive to these costs because they are not currently experiencing any of these costs - the costs would be very significant and catastrophic. South Korea has not been getting nuclear weapons. Case #2: East Asia has had a lot of leaders recently who are much more concerned about growing the economy, so seeking nuclear weapons has become more costly. Many leaders and ruling coalitions in Middle East are less connected to international economy and have not had platforms of economic growth, so seeking nuclear weapons is less costly. This could be why more Middle Eastern countries than East Asian countries have expressed interest in nuclear weapons.

What is the dual-use dilemma?

Hedging is when a country pursues dual-use nuclear technology (peaceful and military applications) intentionally to shorten the time it would take you to build a nuclear weapon in the future if necessary. You have nuclear energy, so you could make nuclear weapons. Nuclear energy was not acquired specifically to build nuclear weapons, but the intention is there "just in case" (security motivation).

What is the difference between horizontal and vertical proliferation?

Horizontal nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries that didn't already possess them. Vertical nuclear proliferation is expanding nuclear capabilities in countries that already have them.

having nuclear superiority gives countries an advantage in a nuclear crisis. do you agree or disagree with this statement? cite specific evidence from class materials in your response.

I personally disagree because there is not much evidence to support it. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, multiple factors predicted that the U.S. would win the crisis - including nuclear superiority. The only evidence for it is a correlational relationship between them having nuclear superiority and winning the crisis (and confounds could be in play), and a politician in the government of the Soviet Union saying that the Americans would not be able to do this again to them because they were building up their nuclear arsenal. There is much more evidence to support that nuclear superiority did not matter as much. JFK said that the Soviet Union had enough to blow the U.S. up anyway, so it didn't matter that the U.S. had more superiority. The Soviet Union initiated the crisis and went on the offensive (not the U.S.), even though the U.S. was the one with superiority (not confident even with superiority). Neither country (specifically the U.S.) took more risks because of superiority - it was about equal brinkmanship. Lastly, in 1970, the Soviet Union still backed down easily, even when their superiority was about equal to that of the U.S.

What is the Agreed Framework? Why did it collapse?

In the early 1990s, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT treaty and it triggered a crisis between the US and South Korea over how to respond. There was serious discussion in the US about military strikes. The US drew up plans to bomb nuclear facilities in North Korea. But at the same time, the US would prefer an option where they didn't have to use force. The US presented North Korea with 2 Scenarios. 1. North Korea could continue down the path to nuclear weapons and the US would be prepared to attack OR 2. North Korea stops what they are doing, allow the US to verify that they arent seeking NW, and in exchange, get foreign aid and commercial nuclear power plants from the US and its allies. North Korea ultimately said it would be interested in a deal amongst the lines that the US laid out. The Agreed Framework said that North Korea would stay in the NPT and allow international inspectors to verify and in exchange it would get light water reactors for electricity and humanitarian assistance like food and oil. It initially brought an end to the North Korean nuclear crisis, but only temporarily. After the deal was made, North Korea launched an enrichment program and at the time, it already had a reprocessing program. This was counter to the agreed spirit of the Framework. The US confronts North Korea and contributes to the collapse of the Agreed Framework. Also, when new administration in the US came to power, they didn't like the Agreed Framework and wanted to take a different approach. Under the Bush administration, the US did things to undermine the Framework as well. Both sides took action and it ultimately collapsed — North Korea left the NPT in 2003.

do individual leaders make a difference in the nuclear proliferation process? if so, how?

Individual leaders do make a difference because their preferences are closely tied to nuclear weapons program. Hymans's theory of national identity conceptions give us insight into types of leaders who will pursue nuclear weapons. Nationalist oppositional leaders are those that believe that countries function under "us against them" beliefs, and nations are equal or superior to the "other" (usually another country). These leaders are much more likely to get nuclear weapons because of emotional cocktail of fear and pride. The second individual characteristic of leaders that make them pursue nuclear weapons is rebel experience because they either put a premium on national independence and job security (which makes them more likely to pursue nuclear weapons), or because they have increased risk acceptance and therefore efficacy beliefs (which makes them more likely to pursue nuclear weapons).

would the Middle East be more or less stable if Iran built nuclear weapons? draw on at least one theory about the consequences of proliferation discussed in class to justify your response.

Iran getting nuclear weapons would make the Middle East less stable because of contagion effects. If one state goes nuclear, others follow. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, other countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, etc. will follow. Proliferation cascades such as this is a prominent theory in proliferation pessimism. Organization Theory says that organizational biases will prevent new nuclear states from properly deploying and safeguarding their weapons. Poor civilian control of military in new nuclear states such as those in the Middle East ensures problems won't be corrected. This could lead to accidents at the best and dangerous, intentional nuclear attacks at worst.

Under what conditions is peaceful nuclear assistance most likely to contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation?

It can lead to pursuing the bomb because of peaceful nuclear assistance → nuclear bureaucracies → political pressure on leaders → nuclear weapons program initiation AND peaceful nuclear assistance → dual-use technology and indigenous know-how → reduce expected costs of weapons program → nuclear weapons program initiation. It can lead to successful armament because of peaceful nuclear assistance → build dedicated military facilities → nuclear weapons acquisition AND peaceful nuclear assistance → use civilian technology → nuclear weapons acquisition.

what does a no first use (NFU) policy imply?

It implies that a country WILL NOT use nuclear weapons in a first strike advantage. Only in a retaliation strike or if attacked first, it will use them. (US never signed a first use policy)

what is the always-never dilemma?

It says that whenever you want nuclear weapons to be used, you want policies that will allow them to always be used; whenever you don't want nuclear weapons to be used, you want policies that will never allow them to be used.

What is the Achenson - Lilienthal report?

It was a turning point of the Cold War, providing an opportunity to avoid a nuclear arms race and advocating the sharing of knowledge of nuclear energy and inspections to ensure its development for only peaceful use. These terms were modified into the Baruch Plan. This says that the international body through the UN would maintain control over a limited amount of fissile material that could be used for research, electricity generation (later on), etc. The US would also surrender all of its nuclear weapons (when the US was the only one who had nuclear weapons). This did not go into effect because it was resisted, especially by countries like the Soviet Union that were skeptical of US's intentions. It sort of gave us a path forward to nuclear disarmament.

What are some examples of nuclear brinkmanship during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis? Why do many people think this was the most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age?

Kennedy told Khrushchev to remove the missiles on Cuba or Kennedy would do it for him. Kennedy was threatening nuclear weapons and war (idk if this is brinkmanship or not). There was also an order that the Cuban military would be allowed to use the tactical nuclear weapons on Cuba if the U.S. tried to invade. This was the most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age because both countries were threatening war and nuclear weapons, and the U.S. is at Def-Con 2 because of the missiles they thought were going to be sent at the U.S. (even if they weren't assembled yet). Additionally, a U2 spy plane accidentally flew into the Soviet Union, and the U.S. had to sent two fighter jets (armed with nuclear weapons because of the U.S. being at Def-Con 2) to get it back to the U.S. This didn't result in nuclear war, but it could've if the Soviets saw a spy plane and two fighter planes armed with nuclear weapons in their air space as enough of a threat.

how does the major IR paradigms (realism and liberalism) relate to theories of nuclear proliferation?

Liberalism says that individuals and institutions are important actors, and politics is a struggle for consensus and mutual gain. It is about improving yourself and your own position, regardless of what is happening to others. The conditions that people live i are responsible for international conflict. Neo-liberalism says that states are the most important actors, anarchy can be overcome, absolute gains matter more, fears of cheating stymie cooperation, and institutions facilitate cooperation (identifying and punishing cheaters). The liberal grand strategies are promote democracy, promote free, and promote cooperation through international organizations. Neo-classical realism says that international stimuli are filtered through domestic politics. Some systemic thing happens, and then domestically it is perceived by a leader, then the leader responds with implementing a policy. Neo-realism goes along with nuclear optimism. Realists say that the best option because of anarchical systems is to accumulate military power, including nuclear weapons.

What are the three challenges in using military force to target nuclear programs?

Locating and Destroying facilities is one challenge because countries potentially targeted in these attacks can take measures to protect themselves by concealing their facilities, dispersing their facilities, hardening their facilities, and moving their facilities on short notice. Reconstitution and accelerated demand is another challenge because an attack could increase a country's perceived need for a deterrent, which increases demand for nuclear weapons. Once countries have mastered nuclear technology, they could rebuild technology and facilities fairly quickly. Nuclear demand may increase after an attack to prevent a future attack, to provoke nationalistic fervor domestically, and because of withdrawal from nonproliferation commitments. The last concern is blowback (domestic or international). Attacking a country in a preventive fashion could lead to a retaliatory attack, which could provoke war. There could also be economic blowback by the international community if you strike a place in a way that is not accepted by them (like Israel bombing a declared Syrian nuclear facility).

Know the history of cheating on NPT commitments.

Major cheating is a long-standing effort to deceive the IAEA and to illicitly get nuclear technology with clear intent to get nuclear weapons. The countries that have participated in major cheating are Iraq, North Korea, Iran (evolved over time - now more of hedging than racing for the bomb), and Libya. The countries that participated in minor cheating were Romania and South Korea. Some South Korean scientists did experiments with reprocessing (should have been declared to IAEA but didn't until many years later). There was talk of sanctions for minor infractions, but ultimately no real stiff action was taken. This tells us that rules are not bulletproof. It's possible to cheat if you're determined to, but the record of compliance has been fairly high.

What is mutually assured destruction (MAD)?

Mutually assured destruction says that if you have two countries both armed with nuclear weapons, they each know that attacking each other will result in the destruction of both. Therefore, they don't fight. However, MAD hinges on both countries having survivability.

Is there still a nuclear taboo today, according to Nina Tannenwald? Why or why not?

Nina Tannenwald says that the nuclear taboo is unraveling because of President Trump's willingness to heavily consider nuclear first use. He is not interested in disarmament or arms control. He also embraced the view that nuclear superiority matters. Trump's talks with North Korea and the pro-fighting with nuclear weapons rhetoric he used started to normalize nuclear first strikes. His rejection of the nuclear norms can affect the world as a whole and start to complete disintegrate the nuclear taboo.

How can obtaining nuclear weapons influence a state's foreign policy, according to Mark Bell?

Nuclear acquisition appears to have significantly affected state's foreign policy. State uses their nuclear weapons to bolster allies and respond to challenges more independently and with greater steadfastness. A more discriminating typology allows policymakers to more precisely specify the concerns associated with particular potential proliferants. States have sometimes seen nuclear weapons as "status symbols," and powerful states have often sought them. Even after a state has conducted a nuclear test, there may still be policy options available to limit the effects that nuclear weapons have on the behavior of new nuclear states.

Did nuclear brinkmanship work in the Berlin Crises (1958-59 and 1961)? What about the Vietnam War? Why or why not? Defend your response with specific facts and logic.

Nuclear brinkmanship did not work in the Berlin crises in 1958-59 and 1961. Stalin/USSR tried to raise the possibility of nuclear escalation if United States didn't pull out of Berlin by making himself look more irrational and crazy (applying madman theory). There are two theories about why it didn't work: (1) it is hard to make coercive nuclear threats credible, and (2) the United States had nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. It seems that the fact that it is hard to make coercive nuclear threats credible is why this didn't work. Because both the U.S. and USSR had nuclear weapons, it's even more difficult to be credible because of the game of chicken. The U.S. has survivability, so if the USSR had used nuclear weapons against the U.S., the USSR would have been blown up by the U.S. Nuclear brinkmanship did not work in the Vietnam War. The U.S. tried to alert their nuclear forces in order to get the Soviets to convince Vietnam to come to the bargaining table. However, the Soviets did not realize that the U.S. was trying to do that; they thought that the U.S. was warning them to back down on the Sino-Soviet conflict. So, Vietnam was never brought to the bargaining table since Russia misinterpreted the signal, and the war ended in worse than a stalemate for the U.S.

What is nuclear brinkmanship? How does it work?

Nuclear brinkmanship is the manipulation of risk. If a country thinks the other country that is imposing a risk strategy is engaging in risky actions (even if it's only to introduce in the opponent's mind the risk of disaster), the opponent is more likely to be deterred because of them being nervous about the other country being irrational/risky. There are two ways brinkmanship works: automaticity and/or loss of control over decisions on using nuclear weapons, and rationality of irrationality. Automaticity and/or loss of control over decisions on using nuclear weapons includes nuclear alerts and pre-delegation. Rationality of irrationality when leaders intentionally try to cultivate the perception that they're unstable to their adversary may think there's a chance that the other leaders will use nuclear weapons.

Compare and contrast nuclear coercion theory and nuclear skepticism theory.

Nuclear coercion theories says that nuclear weapons (and nuclear superiority) help states coerce their adversaries. They say that nuclear weapons are very destructive, so states with nuclear advantages run greater risks (brinkmanship). This view emphasizes risk and punishment strategies. Nuclear skepticism theory says that nuclear weapons are poor instruments of coercion because it is very difficult to provide benefits in coercion. However, they are very good for deterrence.

What is nuclear latency?

Nuclear latency is having the capability to have nuclear weapons, but they haven't done it yet. If you have the ability to get the fissile material or already have it, you have nuclear latency. These countries could get nuclear weapons very quickly, even if they don't have them currently.

in what respect is nuclear proliferation analogous to the spread of infectious diseases?

Nuclear proliferation is similar to contagion effects because once one state goes nuclear, others follow. "Proliferation begets proliferation." Adversarial relations heighten countries' insecurity, so they want to be able to match the adversary's capabilities.

what are the symbolic functions of nuclear weapons?

Nuclear weapons serve symbolic functions by saying something about their status in the world, and they are also a symbol of independence. They serve as status symbols because they are rare, seen as technologically difficult, and have a tie to national security.

compare and contrast theories of nuclear proliferation rooted in offensive and defensive realism. which explanation do you find more compelling?

Offensive realism says that nuclear weapons increase military power and therefore enhance security. The only constraint to nuclear weapons is the resources (the ability to get more powerful and get the resources to make nuclear weapons). Defensive realism says that security matters more than power because getting more power could make you worse off (provoking reactions from other countries), so they will try to maximize security. States are aware of proliferation risks, which include preventive war. However, nuclear weapons provide invasion insurance.

What are the main explanations for why nuclear weapons haven't been used in war since 1945? Which explanation do you find most convincing, and why?

One explanation is the nuclear taboo. The other explanations for why nuclear weapons haven't been used in war since 1945 are deterrence, undesirable long-term consequences of use, lack of military utility, practical considerations (lack of organizational readiness, shortage of bombs/DVs), and obsolescence of war. The two strongest are precedent setting and deterrence.

What is peaceful nuclear assistance? What are its origins, and why is it potentially consequential?

Peaceful nuclear assistance is international trade in nuclear materials and know-how. One country is providing nuclear assistance to another country, and this assistance is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. To do this, most countries require a formal agreement that says that the selling country is authorized to sell to another country. The origins of peaceful nuclear assistance are "Atoms for Peace" and the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. In 1953, Eisenhower made the "Atoms for Peace" speech, which said that they would start giving peaceful nuclear assistance widely as an arms control measure - if you freely share nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, it will lower the likelihood that countries want nuclear weapons. The 1954 Atomic Energy Act created 123/Nuclear Cooperation Agreements that says that there needs to be a formal agreement between the countries in place before the US can sell peaceful nuclear technology to another country. This is potentially consequential because atomic assistance can lead to either pursuing the bomb or successful armament.

Which US presidents were the most vocal advocates of nuclear disarmament?

President Reagan was one of the most vocal advocates of nuclear disarmament. He was convinced that the world would be better off if nuclear weapons were eliminated. Some people think this is because he was president during things like Able Archer - opens up reality to danger and how close we can get to accidents. Reagan talked openly about eliminating nuclear weapons, even before the year 2000 (even though this didn't happen). President Obama's historic speech in Prague in 2009 outlined his vision of a world without nuclear weapons and outlined work for achieving this goal in four pillars: (1) preventing nuclear terrorism and promoting nuclear security; (2) strengthening the non-proliferation regime; (3) supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and (4) reducing the role of nuclear weapons

How does the prisoner's dilemma apply to arms races and arms control?

Prisoner's dilemma is mutual cooperation. You don't trust the other country, so you try to put yourself in the best position (unilaterally) in respect to what the other person does. Countries would be better off if nobody really armed. If both countries arm, that's not as good because they are probably spending trillions building up their capabilities rather than other things. The worst outcome is to have your adversary armed and you disarmed because then you are vulnerable to attack militarily and politically. One job of arms control is to help countries shift from both of them arming (not the most rational option when cooperating, but most rational when only considering yourself) to both not arming (the most rational option when cooperating with the best outcome overall) by monitoring, increasing cost of cheating, and quality assurance.

What are sanctions and positive inducements? How do they influence the nuclear proliferation process?

Sanctions (the stick) are policies that increase the costs of changing the status quo of the challenger. You manipulate the costs for the country challenging by threatening to cut of foreign aid, restrict trade, and possibly deploy military force (although it's mainly economic sanctions and non-military force today). Positive inducements (the carrot) are policies that increase the benefits of maintaining the status quo for the challenger. You want to manipulate the benefits (inducement strategy) of not doing something, like offering someone foreign assistance if they stay non-nuclear. It's like "offering someone a goody." Countries use sanctions and inducements frequently (and even together) to stop other countries from proliferating - such as North Korea and Iran.

why does Scott Sagan oppose the international spread of nuclear weapons?

Scott Sagan is part of the nuclear pessimism group, and this group says that nuclear weapons increase danger of nuclear war, preventive war increases, proliferation cascades, terrorism incidents, and accidents/vulnerability. He also says that military officers are biased toward offensive, making weapons survivable is not a highly prioritized military mission, and complex and tightly coupled systems almost inevitably have accidents. Finally, he says that the measures we take to institute redundancy into system to make us safer can actually backfire and make us less safe.

What are three countries that rely on nuclear energy but do not possess nuclear weapons?

South Korea, Canada, Germany

What is the stability-instability paradox?

Stability-Instability Paradox says that nuclear weapons make large wars less likely, but they make low-level conflict more common.

What is strategic stability and when does it exist?

Strategic stability exists when no country has an incentive to attack the other country first. If you enhance strategic stability, you can prevent war. It requires accepting mutual vulnerability.

When are strikes against nuclear facilities most likely to work by delaying nuclear proliferation?

Strikes against nuclear facilities are most likely to work by delaying nuclear proliferation through two windows. Window #1 is during an early nuclear program. This is because there is a higher probability of success because there are fewer facilities to destroy, and the reconstitution problem is less acute. There is also a lower sense of urgency because you are attacking way before a country could have a bomb. Likelihood of success is greatest earliest in the program, but also when attacks are least necessary because you have more time. Window #2 is the terminal nuclear sprint. There is a lower probability of success and a higher sense of urgency. Which window a country attacks in is determined by what a state weighs more: success or necessity.

What is the difference between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons?

Tactical nuclear weapons are small and meant for use on the battlefield. They are specifically for targeting military targets - troops, equipment, adversary, etc. Strategic nuclear weapons are bigger and more powerful. They are used primarily for deterrence (not on battlefield). They could be used to destroy a city, so some leaders threaten to hold a city at risk to gain leverage against adversary.

Has the NPT restrained nuclear weapons proliferation? What are the arguments on both sides of this debate?

The "yes" school says that time trends suggest yes, and there are two logics for those who think that the NPT has been effective. Time trends say that we have gone from a world where many countries are thinking about nuclear proliferation to a world where relatively few are considering outside of those that already possess them. The trend suggests that the NPT has had an impact on reducing countries that are interested in nuclear weapons. There are people that believe the NPT has been effective because of consequences (focus on material costs you may suffer if you try to proliferation) and appropriateness (focus on norms, societal expectations, and standards of appropriate behavior). NPT changed the way proliferation is perceived - proliferation is now "rogue" behavior. You may also worry about consequences of getting nuclear weapons in post-NPT era, which includes economic sanctions, sanctions by individual countries, and being exposed to the world. So the "yes" school suggests NPT → fewer countries wanting nuclear weapons. The "no" school says that the NPT is not responsible for decline in interest in nuclear weapons over time; they say that fewer countries wanting nuclear weapons → NPT. Countries have already decided to not get nuclear weapons, so they ratify it. Treaty is reflective of their policy, it's not a causal force driving their policy. They believe that there is exploitation of the regime the Power-5 may not be following the articles in the NPT. They say that the NPT forced countries to make a decision, but they were already thinking about it. They believe that a negative correlation between non-proliferation and NPT may not mean a causal relationship because NPT could just reflect what the countries have already chosen for their policy. Countries that are more likely to sign a treaty are the ones that don't have to change their behavior at all. However, one study confirms the "yes" school. They compared countries most similar on every dimension except for NPT, and then looked for if they pursued nuclear weapons. They found that the NPT did have a causal and negative effect on pursuing nuclear weapons. The NPT has been effective, on average, but it doesn't always work (cheating)

How are NPT violations enforced?

The IAEA can detect cheating and then refer the case to the UN Security Council, who can then take actions. Usually, the actions include economic sanctions that can increase over time if the country remains out of compliance. Individual countries that enforce the NPT (powerful countries like US) can also take action when they find out about cheating. The US, for example, can use military force in cases where countries have been found to be cheating. However, the NPT is one of the most universally adhered to treaty in history. Only a few countries have not ratified treaty - Israel, North Korea, India, and Pakistan.

Understand IAEA safeguards

The IAEA safeguards article includes the IAEA mandate that says countries should promote the spread of nuclear energy and separate military and peaceful uses of the atom. But there is tension between these mandates because of dual-use dilemma. IAEA's job is to put safeguards in place; inspectors from agency will visit nuclear facilities in a member country and inspect them (inspections regime). Safeguards work because they give timely warning to the international community of cheating (not punishment), deter cheating, and give peace of mind to rivals who may be worried about intentions. The Additional Protocol (1997) gives IAEA much greater inspection powers because it allows inspectors to visit any site in a country, not just the sites that have been declared. But only countries that have ratified the Additional Protocol agree to this.

What is the JCPOA? Why do some people think it was an effective agreement? Why do others believe that it did not serve US interests? In other words, what are the strengths and limitations of the JCPOA?

The JCPOA was the Iran nuclear deal, and its key goal was to limit Iran's breakout time to one year so US had enough time to prepare if Iran raced for the bomb. It capped enrichment at 3.67% for 15 years, only enrichment at Natanz for 15 years, and only 5050 IR-1 machines (1st generation centrifuge) operating for 10 years (rest dismantled). They had to have under 300 kg of 3.67% enriched uranium for 15 years. Iran had to implement Additional Protocol, and there would be continuous monitoring of Iran's centrifuge production plants for 20 years. The UN, US, and EU sanctions that were imposed on Iran would be limited. This is a case where you are combining the carrot and stick. There are two criticisms of this. One criticism of the deal that is true has to do with all of the sunset provisions - everything has a time limit. Some critics didn't like this because after that time ran up, Iran could just race to the bomb. But countries sometimes want a time limit because they understand that their interests can evolve over time, and they don't want to tie their hands forever. Another criticism is that the deal was rewarding bad behavior in the sense that it provided sanction relief to Iran after it had tried to proliferate. This is more of an ideological objection. The US withdrew in 2018, which had some serious consequences for non-proliferation. Their breakout time shrunk to only a couple of days after the US pulled out. Iran rolled back compliance gradually, as well.

Why is the NPT considered by some countries to be discriminatory?

The NPT is considered to be discriminatory by some countries because of the "haves and the have nots." It divides the world into two groups: Group #1 - if you developed NW and tested/ detonated them prior to January 1st, 1967, then one set of rules will apply to you, the biggest one being you can have NW. Group #2 - if you did not detonate/ test prior to January 1st, 1967, then you cannot have NW - this is an obvious element of unfairness.

What is the NPT and how does it work?

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the treaty put forward at first by US and the Soviet Union (although many other countries supported it) to reverse the trend and slow down proliferation. The only nuclear states that are allowed/legal are those that have developed and tested them prior to January 1, 1967 (only the countries in the UN Security Council). The non-nuclear states pledge that they will never obtain nuclear weapons. Because that is discriminatory, nuclear states have to compromise to get non-nuclear states to come on board. They included the Peaceful Uses Article (Article 4) and Disarmament Clause (Article 6). The Peaceful Uses Article says that anyone that ratifies the NPT will not be denied peaceful nuclear technology, and nuclear states will help them develop peaceful nuclear programs. The Disarmament Clause says that the nuclear weapons states will make "good faith efforts" to eventual nuclear disarmament, but this led to a lot of controversy because it is very unclear what "good faith efforts" means. It also included the IAEA Safeguards Article.

Know the key nuclear arms control agreements we discussed in class. What are they, and what did they do?

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) were unilateral arms control measures that dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons the US possessed, hoping that the Soviets would follow (but not necessarily forcing them to). START 1 was a bilateral treaty between the US and the Soviet Union on the reduction and the limitation of strategic offensive arms. It negotiated the largest and most complex arms control treaty in history and its final implementation in late 2001 resulted in the removal of about 80% of all strategic nuclear weapons then in existence. The NPT and JCPOA are multilateral arms control treaties (see other questions for what they did). Nuclear Ban Treaty is a more recent treaty that came about in the last few years that goes beyond the NPT by trying to ban nuclear weapons from the world. It has been signed by many countries but not by the US, any other country with nuclear weapons, or any US NATO allies.

the United States seems to oppose nuclear proliferation, even to close allies (e.g., Israel, South Korea, Japan). why do you think this is the case, based on material covered in class?

The United States is part of the nuclear pessimism group - at least for countries outside of a select few. They believe that nuclear weapons increase danger of nuclear war, preventive war can occur, proliferation cascades, terrorism could occur, and accidents and vulnerability can be common. They do joint military exercises with their allies in order to convince them that their alliance is credible and the U.S. will protect them when they are under a security threat. There is even evidence that the U.S. has made some alliances solely as a non-proliferation strategy, which they have to make credible. This has come with countries that have alliances with other strong countries being less likely to get nuclear weapons.

What is the 2005 US-India nuclear deal, and why does it matter?

The agreement with India was very controversial because the US was providing India with peaceful nuclear assistance, even though India had nuclear weapons and refused to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So, the US was technically going against Article 4 of the NPT. People saw this as bad for non-proliferation because it sent the signal that the US endorsed India's nuclear program, even though they didn't play by the international rules at the time. It was costly from a non-proliferation standpoint, but US did it because leaders thought that this could transform their relationship. India then used the technology the US (and Canada) gave them to carry out their first nuclear test (a "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" seen as a military test by the international community), and the US then implemented many different laws in response to this.

what role (if any) did nuclear superiority play in the Cuban Missile Crisis?

The case for nuclear superiority says that there is correlational evidence that U.S. had overwhelming nuclear superiority and that the U.S. won (although this may not be causational). But it's very hard to find smoking-gun evidence for leaders' decisions because they aren't usually forthcoming about that. The case against nuclear superiority is JFK saying that it doesn't matter that the U.S. has superiority because the USSR had enough to blow them up anyway. The USSR initiated the crisis - the U.S. wasn't more confident with superiority since they weren't the ones who initiated it. It was not clear that superiority motivated U.S. more than USSR in terms of running risks. Lastly, the later 1970 Cienfuegos crisis proved that the Soviet Union reacts similarly in terms of backing down easily, even when the nuclear superiority between the US and USSR was relatively the same.

What is the central challenge of arms control?

The central challenge to arms control is verification is needed, but it can be difficult. There are concerns about cheating; but if both sides have confidence that they can verify what the other side is doing, it makes agreements more credible. But states want to verify adversaries, even though they don't always want their own capabilities verified. Overcoming the verification problem is difficult, which is why arms control agreements are pretty rare. It is very difficult to get countries to agree to the provisions in arms control treaties.

why might a country facing external security threats refrain from building nuclear weapons?

The cost of obtaining them may still not outweigh the benefits. They can still receive status/prestige, profit, energy security, and dual-use equipment through latency, so they may not need nuclear weapons, even under security threats. Additionally, countries that have credible alliances with strong states (such as the U.S.) are less interested in getting nuclear weapons if they trust that the stronger state will protect them.

What is the credibility problem that states face in a crisis where both sides are armed with nuclear weapons?

The credibility problem that states face when both sides are armed with nuclear weapons is the game of chicken. If you have nuclear weapons, you can inflict a lot of punishment on an adversary in the event of war, which SHOULD give you leverage. However, if both countries had nuclear weapons, it's hard to be credible because of mutually assured destruction. You need to be able to convince the other country that there's no way that you wouldn't use nuclear weapons on the other country so that they don't use them back.

Be able to understand how the expected utility of war influences whether or not deterrence is successful.

The expected utility of war is B * Pr(B) - C * Pr(C). B is the benefits you expect from doing something; Pr(B) is the probability that those benefits will occur. C is the costs you expect from doing something; Pr(C) is the probability that those costs will occur. If a country's expected utility of war is negative, deterrence will likely be successful. If a country's expected utility of war is positive, deterrence will likely be unsuccessful.

What are the cases where countries have used military force to delay nuclear proliferation?

The first was in World War II when a heavy water production plant in Norway (occupied by the Nazis) was targeted by the Allies. It was targeted multiple times (British paragliders and then sabotagers tried to blow it up), but it was finally successful when the Allies blew up the boat that the heavy water was on (when the Nazis tried to move it out of Norway by boat). The second was the Iran/Iraq war, when Iraq bombed incomplete Iranian powerplants to erode their industrial capacity. The third was the 6 Day War when Egypt threatened Israel's nuclear facilities, so Israel dropped a bomb on Egypt's reactor. The second and third were not super successful, but worked to an extent. The fourth was the 1991 Persian Gulf War, where the US and (somewhat) the UK were bombing targets in Iraq, including known Iraqi nuclear facilities. The fifth situation was when Israel bombed a reactor in Syria that was close to completion. Israel also attacked Iraqi nuclear facilities (at Osiraq/Osirak).

What is the fundamental problem of causal inference?

The fundamental problem of causal inference is that we can't observe two things to compare at the same time. If someone is currently at war with nuclear weapons, we can't really figure out if they would still be at war if they didn't have nuclear weapons. We can't observe them having nuclear weapons and not having nuclear weapons at the same time, so we can't calculate the causal effect as the difference between the two.

Identify the main implications/tenets of the theory of the nuclear revolution (TNR).

The implications of the theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) are peace (nuclear weapons bolster deterrence and war is too costly, so great powers shouldn't fight major wars); preserving status quo (loss aversion and induces stalemates among major powers because it difficult for anyone to impose change upon the system); crises rare; high credibility unnecessary (costs are so high, so even with the probability that these costs will be imposed low, it should be enough to deter); and nuclear superiority irrelevant (even with just a few nuclear weapons you can inflict so much pain that, in most cases, it should be enough to deter).

What are the limitations of brinkmanship, according to nuclear skepticism theory?

The limits of brinkmanship are the will to do it and difficulty in signaling. Brinkmanship is effective because it's dangerous, so that makes some countries not want to do it. Leaders have to give up control (which they want), so things may spiral out of control. Additionally, the other side may not notice your signal, and the signal could be misperceived.

What are the main motives for investing in nuclear energy, according to class lecture? Which argument do you find the most persuasive?

The main motivations for investing in nuclear energy are energy security, climate change, prestige, and hedging. It helps energy security because it allows for diversification of sources and the problem of foreign dependence decreases (don't want to allow other countries to cut off your other energy). Nuclear power plants don't emit greenhouse gases, so they are seen as attractive for dealing with climate change (but it is controversial because of the amount of nuclear power needed to decrease global temperature at all). It helps with prestige because of the connection of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, so nuclear energy has status attached to it. It helps with hedging because it allows countries to pursue dual-use nuclear technology intentionally to shorten the time it would take them to build a nuclear weapon in the future if necessary.

What are the main risks of relying on nuclear energy?

The main risks of relying on nuclear energy are cost, accidents, terrorism, waste management, and nuclear proliferation. It is a lot more costly up front to build a nuclear power plant (but costs are made up in the long term). Accidents like Three Mile Island and Chernobyl happen, which can damage communities and turn opinions against nuclear energy. Many terrorists try to target power plants in order to get the massive destruction we saw in accidents, too. Nuclear energy creates spent nuclear fuel that needs to be dealt with somehow. More countries having nuclear energy increases potential hedging, and it could lead to nuclear proliferation.

What are the main strategies of deterrence? What what aspect of the expected utility of war do they manipulate?

The main strategies of deterrence are punishment, denial, and risk. Punishment manipulates the Cost variable. Denial manipulates the Probability of Experiencing Benefits variable. Risk manipulates the Probability of Experiencing Costs variable.

What are the grand bargains embedded in the NPT?

The non-nuclear states pledge that they will never obtain nuclear weapons. Because this is discriminatory, nuclear weapons states compromise with Articles 6 and 4. Disarmament Clause (Article 6) says that nuclear weapon states will make "good faith efforts" towards disarmament, but there is controversy because it is very unclear what "good faith efforts" means. Peaceful uses article (Article 4) says that anyone who ratifies treaty will not be denied nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and nuclear states will help.

Have the nuclear weapons states fulfilled their obligations under the NPT?

The non-nuclear states say no, and the nuclear states say yes. It's controversial because it is very unclear what "good faith efforts" in Article 6 means. Non-nuclear states are saying that the time it's been since the NPT is more than enough time to disarm so they are not acting in "good faith." However, nuclear states like the US are saying that they've eliminated a lot of their nuclear weapons, even if they still have them, so they ARE making "good faith efforts." Countries are also arguing that the US is not in compliance with Article 4 because of its agreement with India. They say that the US sharing peaceful nuclear technology with India (who has nuclear weapons and is not in the NPT) goes against what Article 4 says.

What is the nuclear taboo? How do we know if it exists?

The nuclear taboo is the normative prohibition against first use. It says that nuclear weapons are morally repugnant (not something that any normal person would reasonably contemplate), and it delegitimizes nuclear weapons as weapons of war. We know it exists because nuclear weapons haven't been used since 1945, and they are being considered less and less throughout the decades.

What is the simplest design for a nuclear weapon?

The simplest design for a nuclear weapon is a gun type bomb, which is a fission bomb. There are two spheres of Uranium 235, and you detonate a conventional explosion. This rams the two spheres together very quickly, which creates a massive explosion that releases a lot of energy.

What are the two things that make nuclear weapons unique compared to conventional weapons, according to class lecture?

The speed at which they cause mass destruction and the radioactive effects after

Compare and contrast the spiral and deterrence models.

The spiral model says that actions that you take that increase/decrease your adversary's expectation of the probability of cost/benefits will increase conflict. This focuses on escalation happening precisely because of actions taken that are meant to deter. The deterrence model says that actions that you take that increase/decrease your adversary's expectation of the probability of cost/benefits will deter conflict.

What is the supply side of nuclear proliferation?

The supply side of nuclear proliferation includes a constraint and capabilities. The constraint is that it might inhibit a country's ability to achieve some outcome. The capabilities include economic or technological capabilities and foreign assistance in developing nuclear programs.

What are the three problems in nuclear coercion, according to nuclear skepticism theory? When will nuclear coercion work based on this theory?

The three problems in nuclear coercion are redundancy, high costs, and low stakes. Nuclear coercion only works when there is a conventionally weak coercer, high stakes, and reduction in costs of nuclear first use.

What are the three basic steps to building a nuclear weapon?

The three steps are acquisition of fissile material, weapon assembly, and integrating the weapon with delivery system.

What are the two fissile materials that are suitable for use in a nuclear bomb? Explain how each material is produced.

The two fissile materials are weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium. When uranium comes out of the earth, it's more than 99% Uranium 238, so you have to enrich it. After you mine it, you convert the Uranium 238 into gas and put it into a gas centrifuge (or something that works similarly) so that the Uranium 238 and 235 will pull apart at different speeds (which separates them). You are trying to get the concentration of Uranium 235 of the highly enriched uranium to 90% in order to use it for nuclear weapons (although it can be used at a smaller percentage with more of it). If you reprocess spent nuclear fuel, one of the byproducts is plutonium. Plutonium can be separated from the rest of the byproducts in a hot cell.

What are the reasons that elimination of nuclear weapons might make the world safer? Why might doing this make the world more unstable?

There are a lot of people who think that nuclear weapons make the world less safe - nuclear pessimism and emphasizing vulnerabilities and accidents. It might make it more unstable because war would be more likely (less of a deterrent). You can try to eliminate nuclear weapons and move towards disarmament, but not everyone is going to agree to do the same. Unless everyone is on board with disarming, it can make you less secure because then you can be attacked. The Nuclear Ban Treaty proposed by the UN attempted to ban nuclear weapons, but all nuclear weapons states refused to sign it, which continues this problem.

What are the possible costs and benefits of using military force to destroy nuclear facilities in Iran?

There are discussions about whether countries should bomb Iran's nuclear facilities so they can't get nuclear weapons. They haven't done any open military acts like Osiraq/Osirak (when Israel attacked Iraqi nuclear facilities). U.S. and Israel have taken a middle ground and done more covert actions - such as cyber attack against Iran's main enrichment facility (pretty successful damage), and assassinations of various scientists. If you are the attacker, you are doing a preventive attack for three main reasons: destroy critical infrastructure, delay ability to build bombs, and send message to third parties. But there are also potential costs. Iran has an enrichment facility built deep inside a mountain, so it would be difficult to locate and destroy them because they are "hardening." The US is currently the only country that has the capability to destroy Iran's facilities. However, the US has had a consistent view of not wanting to do an overt attack on Iran unless a nuclear attack on the US is imminent because of reconstitution and accelerating demand. If we carried out a strike with military force, they could keep building repeatedly after we bomb it; and they would be even more driven to get a nuclear weapon (which the United States does not want). The country that attacks them could also face domestic or international blowback depending on the circumstances of the attack.

what are the main ways that nuclear weapons can be delivered?

There are three delivery systems - land-based missiles, bombers, and submarines. The U.S. has a nuclear triad, and it is believed to bolster deterrence by increasing survivability. Some people believe that some of the triad should be eliminated (specifically land-based missiles). Of the 3, submarines are relatively less vulnerable than the other two because they're underwater and constantly moving (not as easy to destroy).

What exactly can nuclear weapons deter? Why do scholars disagree about the answer?

There are three views about what nuclear weapons can deter. View #1 says that nuclear weapons can deter anything. View #2 says that nuclear weapons can deter major conventional war. View #3 says that nuclear weapons can deter nuclear use. What view you abide by depends on how easy (or not) you think it is to control escalation.

what is the relationship between military alliances and nuclear proliferation?

There is evidence that countries that have formal alliances with strong states (like the U.S.) are less interested in getting nuclear weapons. The U.S. sometimes forms these alliances as a non-proliferation strategy. But there are problems with the relationship, since both France and the U.K. got nuclear weapons, even as allies of the U.S. So, we look specifically at credible alliances because countries could doubt that their allies will protect them. The U.S. and their allies are doing joint military exercises because they're trying to signal that the U.S. would fight to support those countries.

what are the main things countries can and have attempted to deter with their nuclear arsenals?

They can deter nuclear use against you, chemical or biological attacks, conventional war, and lower-level conventional attacks; do damage limitation (counterforce); protect allies (or even just yourself); compel adversaries; get third party support; and be used as a bargaining chip.

Know the key aspects of North Korea's nuclear and missile testing, as discussed in class.

They have conducted 6 nuclear tests. The first was in 2006, and it was close to 1 kiloton and likely Pu. The second was in 2009, and it was ~2 to 7 kilotons and likely Pu. The third was in 2013, and it was ~7 to 14 kilotons and either Pu or HEU. The fourth was in Jan 2016, and it was deeper than the others, ~7 to 14 kilotons, and the claim of it being an H-bomb is not likely. The fifth was in Sep 2016, and it was ~15 to 25 kilotons; they likely made progress in miniaturization. The sixth was in 2017, and it was over 100 kilotons (possibly 250 kilotons) and possibly a two-stage thermonuclear bomb. Their missiles cover a large range. Kim Jong-un has been increasing missile launches. Nuclear/missile advances led to "hinge points."

what is Debs and Monteiro's theory of nuclear proliferation?

They say that there are three actors - the potential proliferator, the adversary of the proliferator, and the counter-proliferator that is trying to stop them. To be a potential proliferator, there needs to be a high security threat by adversary in order to justify getting nuclear weapons. In order to prevent a preventive war when you're wanting to get nuclear weapons, you have to be a conventionally strong state, or at the very least a conventionally weak state with a strong ally.

what does the incident at Thule Air Base in Greenland illustrate about nuclear weapons, according to class lecture?

This accident illustrates that we can and do have accidents with nuclear weapons - even in the U.S., where we should arguably be the most confident in terms of safely securing nuclear weapons. And yet, a B52 still went down, causing severe radioactive contamination because of the nuclear weapons on the plane.

Know the history of Iran's nuclear program, based on class lectures.

US is assisting Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities from 1953 to 1979 because US - Iranian relations were good under the Shah, even though the Shah said Iran would get nuclear weapons sooner than people think. He wanted reprocessing capability and nuclear powerplant quickly because of the prestige factor and hedging. There was then a revolution in Iran that created the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the nuclear program was still tied to the Shah at the beginning. Because Iran was very anti-Shah, the nuclear program was not prioritized and completely destroyed for a period of time. The Tehran research reactor was supplied by the US because of the "Atoms for Peace" Plan in 1957. The Islamic Republic of Iran wanted an enrichment capability for the same reason the Shah wanted reprocessing capability. The nuclear weapons program in Iran was temporary terminated through early- to mid-1980s because it was still tied to the Shah. However, the Iran - Iraq War started, and the perception of security threats can motivate countries to be interested in nuclear weapons. They decided by 1987 that they needed a nuclear weapons program because of this. Iran gets aid through Pakistan because of the Khan network. Work on enrichment begins in 1987 and others pledge assistance. Although, US obstructs to stop it. Russia then signs a deal to build a nuclear powerplant in Iran at Bashir to complete project that other European countries didn't. Little known about their nuclear program until 2002-2003 after MEK (an Iran dissident group) publicly revealed the facilities Iran had kept in secret. Iran announces Natanz and invites IAEA, try to engage with the US (which is ignored), and have a back-and-forth with the IAEA. They suspend then resume enrichment. President of Iran then publicly says that Iran's nuclear program is "a train without breaks," and they're going full steam ahead to at least make fissile material on a large scale, if not get a bomb. April 2006 was the 1st successful enrichment at Natanz. UNSCR 1696 was put in place, but enrichment continues. There are additional UNSCRs, which became crippling for Iran. In September 2007, NIE concluded bomb program ended in 2003. Sanctions cripple Iran's capability, and they decide to come to the negotiating table → JCPOA.

Understand virtual nuclear arsenals. What are they, and what are their pros and cons?

Virtual nuclear arsenals (or latency) is a disarmament proposal. You can reduce risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear attack with benefits (deterrence). Weaponless deterrence school says that they cut costs, while still reaping benefits of possibly having them. It works through deterrence by proliferation, deterrence by delayed attack, and deterrence by doubt. The weaponless instability school says that "a latent nuclear force is at best a shaky deterrent" because it can't beat nuclear weapons, it invites insecurity, and encourages arms-racing.

In class, we conducted a survey experiment to assess whether nuclear deterrence works. Explain the purpose of the experiment. What did we find?

We were trying to compare answers about whether two groups of people would go into conflict with another country if they had nuclear weapons versus if they didn't have nuclear weapons. We found that the majority of those who were asked if they would go to war with a country with nuclear weapons would choose not to go to war. And the majority of those who were asked if they would go to war with a country without nuclear weapons would choose to go to war.

What is weaponless deterrence, also known as latent nuclear deterrence? Explain the three mechanisms by which it can work.

Weaponless deterrence is using nuclear programs to gain influence internationally without possessing actually assembled nuclear weapons (but you have the capabiltiy to do it). The first mechanism is deterrence by proliferation, which is threatening a country to preserve the status quo by threatening to build nuclear weapons. This threat is costly, even as a policy choice, because some countries do not want other countries to have them. The second mechanism is deterrence by delayed attack. Even if you can't implement a nuclear attack right away, if you can do it in a time that's shorter than the time you expect a war to last, then traditional nuclear deterrence can work. The third mechanism is deterrence by doubt. If you can create uncertainty about what you possess (even if you aren't armed), this could deter.

what are the key dimensions of nuclear strategy?

What are the political objectives? These include all of the different ways you can use nuclear weapons. It also depends on how ambitious your aims are because your credibility problems will be higher as you get more ambitious. How do you design nuclear forces? This includes how many weapons to build, the state of readiness, delivery systems, strategic vs. tactical weapons, and command and launch authority.

explain the process of nuclear command and control in the United States.

Within the US, command and control is who has the authority to launch nuclear weapons, and how the orders are implemented. The president has the sole authority to launch nuclear weapons. The president has a "biscuit" that has codes on it which he types into one of the 3 nuclear footballs. SecDef's role is to verify the identity of the president when they are wanting to launch nuclear weapons. The orders from the president can only be refused if the order is illegal.

What are the main factors that determine whether a military threat will be perceived as credible?

World leaders, when other leaders are making threats, are thinking through the calculation about whether the threat will actually be carried out (depending on expected utility of war). If the other country thinks that there's no way that you'll do what you're threatening, they will not change their behavior based on that threat. The country has to have the capability to do what they're threatening to do (militarily in this case), or they won't be able to successfully deter. You usually need to have survivability in order to deter countries from attacking you since you would be able to attack back. You need reliable command and control because the other country you're threatening needs to believe that the order will be followed through with.

How can members of nuclear bureaucracies such as atomic energy commissions influence the nuclear proliferation process>

You have members of atomic energy commissions who put political pressure on leaders to go down the path to getting nuclear weapons. If they're empowered by a peaceful nuclear program, they could possibly get leaders to authorize more weapons-oriented activities.