SAMS 14-01

Linkages between Operational Art and Design (Swain)

"...design constitutes the essential preamble for the practice of operational art, especially in an era of persistent conflict." Dr. Swain, in citing Svechin, describes operational artistry as being "largely [a] cognitive" goal setting process. Design, he argues, "will enhance commanders' professional talent for creative work in the face of problems that resist [relatively] simple [(i.e., tactical)] experiential response." Further, "searching discourse will allow commanders to draw on the knowledge and understanding of others, viewing the same situation from a variety of perspective, and to test conclusions, their and those of others, in the fire of debate," all of which, he argues, is "vital in confronting complex strategic and operational issues" in both conventional and unconventional conflicts.

Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD)

"A cognitive model intended for use by commanders charged with designing, planning, and executing military campaigns." "A method for commanders to develop a shared understanding of complex operational problems within their commands (commander's appreciation) and design a broad approach for problem resolution that links tactical actions to strategic aims (campaign design). It responds to the need for greater strategic thinking at all echelons when facing complex operational problems." Because "conflicts are inherently more complex than traditional state-based warfare, they demand a different way of thinking." "CACD describes a process to create a systemic and shared understanding of a complex operational problem and to design a broad approach for its resolution. The resulting campaign design must guide the production of operational plans and orders that will, in turn, guide tactical execution."

Clausewitz Paraphrased

"I'm describing war, not defining it--no comprehensive theory of war exists as of yet, but it if did, what you read here is only part of it. I wrote this to try and understand war myself, not because I understand it already. But if I learned anything, it is this: war is nothing but the continuation of policy (politics) by other means."

Sensemaking (Swain)

"Ongoing retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize what people are doing." This is about organizations, collecting evidence and facts, that then helps them develop narrative or story that describes their reality—making sense about what is going on and what can reasonably be expected to occur in the future. It is a process that leads to organizational comprehension through discourse and written narrative that then leads to clearer organizational understanding and resultant actions within a given context. Sensemaking is about the "interplay of action and interpretation rather than the influence of evaluation on choice." This is an action-centric process that has interpretation as its focus.

Social Systems (Axelrod)

"Social systems exhibit dynamic patterns analogous to physical, biological, and computational systems. This is perhaps the fundamental reason we pursue complexity research."

Dr. Gorman on SCOA

"War is politics. Politics is all about interactions. Interactions require humans. Humans are complex."

Consciousness, Historical (Gaddis)

"What is the study of history? It expands our horizons but does not predict the future."

Alignment (Senge)

"When a group of people function as a whole." "Alignment is the necessary condition before empowering the individual will empower the whole team. Empowering the individual when there is a relatively low level of alignment worsens the chaos and makes managing the team even more difficult."

Operational Frameworks (EOA Campaign Analysis)

(ADP 3-0) i.e. Deep-close-security Decisive-shaping-sustaining Main and supporting

Tenants of ULO (EOA Campaign Analysis)

(ADP 3-0, pg. 7) Flexibility Integration Lethality Adaptability Depth Synchronization

Elements of Operational Art (EOA Campaign Analysis)

(ADP 3-0, pg. 9) End state and conditions Center of gravity Decisive points Lines of operation and lines of effort Operational reach Basing Tempo Phasing and transitions Culmination Risk

Elements of Operational Design (EOA Campaign Analysis)

(ADP 3-0, pg. 9) Termination Military end state Objective Effects Center of gravity Decisive point Lines of operation and lines of effort Direct and indirect approach Anticipation Operational reach Culmination Arranging operations Force and functions

Campaign (Doctrine/Kelly/Brennan/Naveh)

(ADRP 3-90, JP 5-0, JP 1-02) A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. An operation is a military action, consisting of two of more related tactical actions, designed to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part. A tactical action is a battle or engagement, employing lethal or nonlethal actions, designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entity.

Key Concepts of Clausewitz (EOA Campaign Analysis)

(On War, CH 2, pg. 183) Moral (psychological qualities and influences) Physical (size and composition of the force, armaments, etc...) Mathematical (angle of lines of operation, convergent/ divergent movement) Geographical (terrain, commanding positions, etc...) Statistical (support, maintenance, etc...)

Complicated Systems

(what the TRADOC Pam 525-5-500 calls structurally complex systems) Have many parts and therefore great structural complexity, but to exhibit almost no interactive complexity, thus such systems demonstrate linearity, because they exhibit proportionality, replication, additivity, and demonstrability of cause and effect. Proportionality means that a small input leads to a small output, a larger input to a larger output. Push down lightly on the accelerator, the car will go slowly, but push down heavily and its speed will increase. Replication means that the system will respond the same way to an input under the same conditions. Replication also allows cause and effect to be demonstrated. Example of complicated: Former Soviet Union and most conventional forces that have a specific doctrine and pattern of employment can be considered complicated. We could, within a margin of error, predict a conventional forces response to direct action. Also, they typically operated and reacted under the direction of a central control.

Discourse Function and Utility in Design

- Fosters exchange of open ideas, especially between commander and staff/subordinates. - Collaboration and dialogue (ADRP 5-0) - Complex problems require open testing of ideas (Red Teams) - Discourse helps create shared understanding (ADRP 6-0, MSN CMD, 1-2)

Narrative Function and Utility in Design

- Helps to understand the actors in the OE (ADRP 5-0). - Summary of an actor's worldview, circumstances, meaning, motivations. - Heart and mind, and when they might disagree (Freedman - SCOA). - Better anticipate behavior, given the understanding above. - Narratives help influence others (soft power and hard power; Nye - SCOA). - Soft power: a well-constructed narrative can help attract others' cooperation. - Hard power: narratives can help identify what coercion methods will work and what ripple effects will be.

Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA, Knox and Murray)

- the creation in the seventeenth century of the modern nation-state, which rested on the large-scale organization of disciplined military power; - the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century, which merged mass politics and warfare; - the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century and after, which made it possible to arm, clothe, feed, pay, and move swiftly to battle the resulting masses; - the First World War, which combined the legacies of the French and Industrial Revolutions and set the pattern for twentieth-century war; - the advent of nuclear weapons, which contrary to all precedent kept the Cold War cold in the decisive European and northeast Asian theaters. MacGregor Knox; Williamson Murray. The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050

Sun Tzu (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (The Art of War)

-(first half of fifth century BC) Chinese commander and author of The Art of War. Based on the premise that war is an evil and emphasizing deceit, arguably the best work on war ever. -war is not just a military endeavor, but also encompasses the political and economic spectrums -quick victory by putting yourself in a position of advantage -victory achieved by understanding your enemy and determining who has the advantage by addressing: leadership, soldier discipline, unit readiness, environmental conditions, and terrain. -the best victory is one where the enemy capitulates without a fight

Jomini, Antoine Henri (The Art of War, 1837-38)

-Banker background in Paris (1798) -French speaking Swiss -Wrote for commanders -Prescriptive, primarily at operational level -War as an art that can be taught/learned -Principles of operations/war -Lines of operations (linear war, interior line focus) -Structure of the battlefield -Clausewitz's main Francophone competitor -Tactics continuously change, strategy is fixed. Theory & operations = what you can affect. -Synthesized the theoretical ideas of the Enlightenment with Napoleonic warfare producing a penetrating and fertile rationale of the new type of operations -Seizure of enemy communications could lead to not just his starvation and withdrawal but also his destruction -Jomini's military writings are frequently analyzed: he took a didactic, prescriptive approach, reflected in a detailed vocabulary of geometric terms such as bases, strategic lines, and key points. His operational prescription was fundamentally simple: mass superior combat power at the decisive point. In the famous theoretical Chapter 25 of the Traité de grande tactique, he stressed the exclusive superiority of interior lines.

Moltke the Elder, Helmut von (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (Instructions, 1869)

-Chief of the General Staff -significantly influenced by (and applied) Clausewitz -importance of railways, telegraphs, firepower, external lines -concentration and deployment -interaction of movement and combat -the need to improvise -"strategy is a system of expedients" (competent science of mobilization) -refrained from issuing any but the most essential orders

Clausewitz, Carl von (On War, 1833)

-Childhood was the world of the Enlightenment and the ancien regime -Audience was statesmen, not junior military personnel -Descriptive -Relationship of policy to state vs state war and other elements of power -Attack enemy's capabilities and/or will -Fog, friction, and uncertainty -Trinity of passion, policy, and probability -Idealist and realist

Guibert, Jacques Antoine (Essai général de tactique, 1770)

-Conscious disciple of Frederick -Foreshadowed revolution in warfare by Napoleon -Republic of the masses -Military science must adapt methods of other sciences -Mathematical foundation -Propounded ideas: mobility, rapidity, and boldness of conduct of operations; movement of formations; logistics from the countryside; flexible maneuvering

Buelow, Adam Heinrich von (Spirit of the Modern System of War, 1799)

-Contemporary of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars -Modern war based on lines of operation and the introduction of firearms -Rationale of operations derived from Lloyd and Tempelhoff -Theoretical notions of Enlightenment combined with strategy of manoeuvre, and military and political radicalism -Mathematical rules and geometrical formations -"It is always possible to avoid battle" -- would define winning as not having to fight at all -Clausewitz criticized Buelow on a variety of points (i.e. relationship between politics and war)

Asclepiodotus (1st Century BC)

-Greek writer and philosopher, and a pupil of Posidonius. According to Seneca, he wrote a work entitled Quaestionum Naturalium Causae. He is one of the earliest military writers whose studies on tactics have come down to us. He was not striped in the Helian nor Arrian's lists of tacticians, but in the earliest manuscript of the Tactics (Téchne taktiké), the work is attributed to Asclepiodotus. Tactics describes the workings of the Macedonian phalanx.

Maizeroy, Paul Gideon Joly de (Cours, 1766)

-History the basis of military thought -Search for the perfect system of tactics -Rules of strategy (military dialectic) -Strategic principles--similar to today's principles of war -Strategy->mechanics (must be applied properly)

Turpin de Crisse (The Art of War, 1761)

-In war, rules and principles are hard to apply -Both genius and study are required -One of the earliest to systematize the conduct of operations

Warden III, John (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, 1988)

-Indirect, systems approach to operational-level airpower for strategic effects -Five Rings model (a.k.a. Warden's Rings) -The "Enemy as a System" (metaphor to human body) --leadership (brain), organic essentials (organs), infrastructure (skeletal-muscular), population (cells), and fielded military forces (self-protection mechanism) -Effects Based Operations -Multiple centers of gravity -Like Jones and Tunner, an innovative Airman that was ousted for his ideas, and to this day his very name inspires both cold contempt and warm affection in defense establishments

Corbett, Sir Julian (Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 1898-1972)

-Influenced by Clausewitz -Sea Power as part of maritime power -Sea Power is relative; local -Joint Operations -Conducting limited land operations in a total war by projecting power

AMSP Program Outcomes

-Innovative leaders, willing to accept risk and to experiment. -Adaptive leaders who excel at the art of command. -Anticipate the future operational environment. -Apply critical & creative thinking skills in order to solve complex problems. -Demonstrate mastery of Operational Art and Doctrine. -Synthesize the elements of US national power in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) operations. -Demonstrate Effective Communications.

Mahan, Alfred (The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783, 1890)

-Jominian -Sea Power as an absolute -Concentrated Fleet -Blockade and decisive battle -Six factors of Sea Power

Vegetius, Renatus Flavius (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (De Re Militari, 1473)

-Lived in late 4th and possibly early 5th century -High ranking Roman and considered a reformer -Forefather of military art and science -De Re Militari was first practical account of military training and discipline (impact of theory on doctrine) -Importance of discipline and recruiting -Problems of conducting limited war -Common sense tactics

Frederick II, of Prussia (Frederick the Great) (Instructions For His Generals, 1761)

-Logistics -Generalship--men should fear officers -Military academies and schools -Leadership -Transformed Prussia into a productive state -Applied thinking always required because experience never repeats itself -"Coup D'Oeil"--great men conceive in a moment all the advantages of the terrain and the use that they can make of it with their army. -Frederick was engaged in total war because of the geography of his territories. Always operating on the other side of the culmination point (assume lots of risk) -Influenced Adolf Hitler significantly

COL Arnold's SAMS Planner Nuggets

-Master of doctrine, not a slave -Comfortable with complexity and ambiguity -Do not expect optimal conditions -Learn how to think vice what to think -Must produce results at the end of the day -Tailor your message to audience -Lead at all levels -Cooperate and collegial atmosphere -Shared understanding is vital in the design and planning process. 75-85% of the time goes into this.

Liddell Hart, Basil Henry (Europe in Arms, 1937)

-Next to Fuller the most famous British strategic writer of the inter-war period (both were pioneers of mechanization) -Critical of Clausewitz -Indirect approach -Advocating "limited liability" (the commitment of the fewest possible troops and ideally none to a European alliance)

Fuller, John Frederick (Lectures on Field Service Regulations, 1932)

-Next to Hart the most famous British strategic writer of the inter-war period (both were pioneers of mechanization) -Critical of Clausewitz -Mental-physical-moral construct -Tanks

Hegel, George W. F.

-Philosopher in Germany, 1770-1831. World is fundamentally rational, understandable. Constant change, the mind identifies opposites. -Hegelian Dialetic: --Thesis--current situation --Antithesis--challenge or change, often the opposite --Thesis and Antithesis clash or compromise --Result: Synthesis, which becomes the new Thesis -Constant violence, tension -Hegel & Clausewitz experimented with non-linear language.

Mao Zedong (Tse-Tung) (Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, 1928-1949)

-Political/ideological role of the military -Protracted, asymmetric warfare -Guerrilla tactics vs. Revolutionary strategy -Insurgency as a means of producing your own conventional forces

Loyd, Henry (History, 1781)

-Rooted in the Enlightenment and influenced by its great thinkers -Principles relate to organizations of armies -Lines of operations -Theory the counterpart of experience in the study of war

Clausewitz Outlined by Beatrice Heuser in Reading Clausewitz

-The Story of the Man and the Book -Clausewitz the Idealist vs Clausewitz the Realist -Politics, the Trinity and Civil-Military Relations -Beyond Numbers: Genius, Morale, Concentration of Forces, Will and Friction -The Defensive-Offensive Debate, the Annihilation Battle and Total War -Taking Clausewitz Further: Corbett and Maritime Warfare, Mao and Guerrilla -Clausewitz in the Nuclear Age -Clausewitz's Relevance in the Twenty-First Century

Montecuccoli, Raimondo

-Theorist of War - first comprehensive analysis; searched for rules or principles -- included moral, psychological, social, economic aspects -Very influential - read by Frederick, Napoleon, others -Favored maneuver warfare - but noted that wars are won by battle -"Key" Concept: Opposite poles in war -Attrition vs. Annihilation

Luttwak

-Three phases of imperial strategy (offensive vs. defensive) -Problems of a mature empire defending its frontiers -Relations with allied/client states

Trinquier (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (Modern Warfare, 1964)

-Western view of torture -Unconditional support of the populace and this support must be maintained at any price -Modern warfare focused on hearts and minds -Population control measures -Those who don't follow the law of war should not be protected by it -Assumes insurgent is coercing population

Machiavelli, Niccolo (The Prince, 1513/1532)

-Wrote for state leaders -Italian Renaissance writer, (in)famous author of The Prince. His work The Art of War was famous in his time, but probably does not deserve to be included among the true classics. -Made the study of war a social science; early thinker in Renaissance -Infantry centric -Morale=patriotism -"Safer to be feared than loved" -Unity of Command (a structure where somebody works for somebody else) -State enterprise

Du Picq, Ardant (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (Battle/Combat Studies, 1903)

-behavior of men in battle (group cohesion and individual soldier morale) -intellectual basis for late-19th century French military doctrine

De Gaulle, Charles (Le fil de l'epee, 1932)

-campaigned for an autonomous, professionally manned, mechanized corps

Lossau, Friedrich Constantin von (Der Krieg, 1815)

-dealt with warrior's intellectual and moral faculties -war as a clash of wills motivated by patriotic and other psychological energies

De Bloch (The Future of War, 1899)

-decisive wars, or wars in which clear victors and losers emerge, are mutually suicidal and therefore impossible due to modern battlefield conditions, as evidenced by the lethality of modern weapons, immensity of mass mobilization, and economic burden of waging modern war.

Adolphus, Gustavus

-discipline, organization, combined arms -tactical integration of infantry, cavalry, logistics -"Father of Modern Warfare" -influenced several 18th century military thinkers, including Napoleon and Clausewitz

Schlieffen, Alfred von ("Schlieffen Plan," 1906)

-favored concrete calculations over abstract speculations -principles of war apply equally to large and small actions -determination to seek the offensive -controlled system of strategy (manoeuvre a priori)

Engels, Friedrich (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (The Communist Manifest, 1848)

-follower of Hegel -friends with Karl Marx -class struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat (or owners of the means of production and workers) -cumulative influence on Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and other revolutionaries

De Saxe, Maurice (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (Reveries/Dreams, 1732-1757; Legion)

-influenced Jomini (De Saxe saw the need but didn't do the work) and Frederick the Great -war is a science (tied to Enlightenment search for rules that govern everything) -merit-based promotions (5 years of service from commoner to noble) -uniforms; discipline; colors and standards -organization (for the legion and combined operations=>division organization) -moral factors of soldiers -"sublime" aspects of war -qualities of a general (courage, intelligence, and health) -German in French service. Studied mathematics. Commanded his own regiment at age 17. Fought against the Ottoman Empire in 1717. Believed a good general could prevail through maneuver without ever having to fight. 50K troops the most handled by a single General. Maneuver around battlefield with no conflict, except as a last resort when victory is guaranteed. Edged weapons were superior to firearms, and fortification of cities was an unnecessary expense. Limited warfare.

Thucydides (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (The History of the Peloponnesian War)

-interpretive history (second and third hand information) -460-455 to 404-400 BC (Greek historian and Admiral-General) -431-404 BC (Second Peloponnesian War) -Melian dialogue--basis for the theory of political realism (i.e. Cold War) -Delian League--naval alliance of Greek city-states led by Athens and aimed to deter further Persian offensive operations. -Military innovation and adaptation -Causes of War -Problems of Democracy (capital D Democracy, direct, one level above "mob rule"), especially strategic continuity -Highlights problems with civil-military relations -Asymmetric Warfare -Effects of war on society

Callwell, Charles (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 1899)

-irregular warfare must be carried out totally different from the stereotyped system -the art of irregular warfare diverges widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare -categories of small wars -tactics favor the regular army while strategy favors the enemy -moral effect in small wars is often more important than material success -European technological supremacy is sometimes an erroneous assumption -intelligence collection is more difficult in irregular warfare

Biddle, Stephen (Military Power, 2004)

-military capability is based on numerical preponderance, technology, and force employment. --of the three, force employment plays a more important role than the other two in modern warfare -believed theorists and strategists depend too much on material variables when predicting future conflicts with force ration computations -similarities to Clausewitz's concept of relative strength [Numbers + Morale & Courage + Education=relative strength (which can be balanced to overcome weaknesses)]

Aeneas the Tactician (4th Century BC)

-one of the earliest Greek writers on the art of war and is credited as the first author to provide a complete guide to securing military communications.

Strategy, Pure (Dolman)

-strategy is not a pure science; it is an idea, or alchemy; a method of transmutation from idea into action -the difference between strategists and tacticians: the tactical thinker seeks an answer, and often this action is also the end of critical thinking --the strategist will search for the right questions. -strategy is an unending process that can never lead to culmination. -continuation is the goal of strategy --not culmination -sciences of chaos and complexity drive home the notion that strategy is about change and adaptation

Kitson, General Sir Frank (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping, 1971)

-unconventional warfare taught to all military personnel to prepare for subversion, insurrection, and peace keeping operations -served in several counter-insurgency and peace-keeping operations --Mau Mau Uprising (1953-1955): Training and organization --Malaya Emergency (1957): Civil-military cooperation --Muscat and Oman (1958) --Cyprus Peace Keeping (1960s): Politics (prevent ethnic cleansing) --Falkland Islands --Northern Ireland (~1960s-1988): Intelligence -influenced FM 3-24 and FM 3-7

McCuen, COL (Ret) John (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter Insurgency, 1966)

-understand/adapt the strategies/principles of revolutionary war and apply them in reverse to defeat them -understand strategy and tactics of the enemy -create conditions that will isolate revolutionaries and protect the populations -revolutionary war has different stages: organization, terrorism, establishment of bases, guerrilla warfare, and mobilization

Puysegur, Francois de Chastenet (Art of War by Principles and Rules, 1748)

-universal theory of war to be derived from history -science of operations based on study of geography and geometry -siege warfare=extension of battlefield

Marx, Karl (see PDF/briefing on our Wiki) (The Communist Manifesto, 1848)

-worked with Friedrich Engels on The Communist Manifesto -class struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat (or owners of the means of production and workers) -cumulative influence on Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and other revolutionaries -socialism--equality and distribution of resources -Marxism--international--does not believe in the state--overthrow the bourgeoise (ends) via a use of the people (means) and boost the proletariat--single class of society--political end state

Seven Learning Disabilities (Senge)

1. "I am my position." People fail to recognize their purpose as a part of the enterprise. Instead, they see themselves as an inconsequential part of a system over which they have little influence, leading them to limit themselves to the jobs they must perform at their own positions. This makes it hard to pinpoint the reason an enterprise is failing, with so many hidden 'loose screws' around. 2. "The enemy out there." There is in each of a propensity to find someone or something outside ourselves to blame when things go wrong. This disability makes it almost impossible to detect the leverage we have on problems that straddle the boundary between us and "out there." 3. The Illusion of Taking Charge All too often, proactiveness is reactiveness in disguise. Whether in business or politics, if we simply become more aggressive fighting the "enemy out there," we are reacting -- regardless of what we call it. True proactiveness comes from seeing how we contribute to our own problems. It is a product of our way of thinking, not our emotional state. 4. The Fixation of Events Focusing on events distract us from seeing the longer-term patterns of change that lie behind the event and from understanding the cause of those patterns. The tendency to see things as results of short-term events undermines our ability to see things on a grander scale. Cave men needed to react to events quickly for survival. However, the biggest threats we face nowadays are rarely sudden events, but slow, gradual processes, such as environmental changes. 5. The Parable of the Boiling Frog We are adept at responding to sudden changes in our environment. We are terrible at assessing slow, gradual changes, even when they threaten our survival. 6. The Delusion of Learning from Experience Practice makes permanent, rather than perfect 7. The Myth of the Management Team

The Five Disciplines of the Learning Organization (Senge)

1. "Personal mastery is a discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively." (p. 7) 2. "Mental models are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures of images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action." (p. 8) 3. "Building shared vision a practice of unearthing shared pictures of the future that foster genuine commitment and enrollment rather than compliance." (p. 9) 4. "Team learning starts with dialogue, the capacity of members of a team to suspend assumptions and enter into genuine thinking together." (p. 10) 5. Systems thinking - The Fifth Discipline that integrates the other 4. "Systems thinking also needs the disciplines of building shared vision, mental models, team learning, and personal mastery to realize its potential. Building shared vision fosters a commitment to the long term. Mental models focus on the openness needed to unearth shortcomings in our present ways of seeing the world. Team learning develops the skills of groups of people to look for the larger picture beyond individual perspectives. And personal mastery fosters the personal motivation to continually learn how our actions affect our world." (p. 12)

Rules to Enable Effective Discourse (Senge)

1. All participants must "suspend" their assumptions, literally to hold them "as if suspended before us" 2. All participants must regard one another as colleagues. 3. There must be a "facilitator" who "holds the context" of dialogue.

Four Steps to Interacting with your Boss (Kotter)

1. Get as much information as possible about boss' goals, strengths, weaknesses, preferred working style and pressures currently weighing on them. 2. Make an honest self appraisal on same topics listed for boss. 3. Create a relationship fitting both need's and styles characterized by mutual expectations. 4. Keep the boss informed, behave dependently and honestly, use the boss' time and other resources selectively.

Steps to Developing Scenarios (Schwartz)

1. Identify Focal Issue or Decision 2. Key Forces in the Local Environment 3. Driving Forces 4. Rank by Importance and Uncertainty 5. Selecting Scenario Logics 6. Fleshing Out the Scenarios 7. Implications 8. Selection of Leading Indicators and Signposts

Four Steps to Leading a Team (Kotter)

1. Identify where all the relevant lateral relationships exist, including those that are subtle and almost invisible. (who needs to be led?) 2. Assess who may resist cooperation, why and how strongly. (Identifying leadership challenges) 3. Develop a good relationship with these people (challenges) to facilitate the communication, education, or negotiation process required to reduce or overcome most kinds of resistance. (Develop the tools needed to lead) 4. If step three fails, select and implement more subtle and forceful ways to overcome the resistance. (Courage to lead)

Detriments Of Scenario Planning

1. Planners can easily misuse this tool. This is not a crystal ball. It generates options for planning—it does not make predictions. 2. It can become a source of anchoring bias; could prevent planners from seeing indicators of differing situations than anticipated. 3. Black Swans are not anticipated. Scenario planning probably only captures white and grey swans (known—unknowns), especially if conducted prior to executing design for an environment.

Broadbent's Method of Design Form (Lawson)

1. Pragmatic (available materials without innovation), 2. Iconic (copy existing solutions), 3. Analogical (analogies), and 4. Canonic (rules) methods.

The 11 Laws of the Fifth Discipline (Senge)

1. Today's problems come from yesterday's "solutions." 2. The harder you push, the harder the system pushes back. 3. Behavior grows better before it grows worse. 4. The easy way out usually leads back in. 5. The cure can be worse than the disease. 6. Faster is slower. 7. Cause and effect are not closely related in time and space. 8. Small changes can produce big results...but the areas of highest leverage are often the least obvious. 9. You can have your cake and eat it too ---but not all at once. 10. Dividing an elephant in half does not produce two small elephants. 11. There is no blame.

Solving Complex Problems (Bar-Yam)

1. You need a complex system to solve a complex problem. Humans are complex systems. Groups of humans and technology working together are an even more complex system. Therefore you can't use a simple or a complex system to solve the problems of these types of systems. Even a single human as complex as he or she is, can't grasp these types of systems. The only way we can solve the problems of these types of systems are with collaborative, creative groups of humans and technology. 2. Systems can appear simple, complicated or complex at different scales. "To solve complex problems we must create effective complex organizations. How do we create organizations that are capable of being more complex than a single individual? The importance of taking a multi scale and multi level view is manifest."

Doctrine (Clausewitz)

A Positive Doctrine Is Unattainable "Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. Whenever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have already alluded to: talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice." Theory Should Be Study, Not Doctrine Critical Analysis The influence of theoretical truths on practical life is always exerted more through critical analysis than through doctrine. Critical analysis being the application of theoretical truths to actual events, it not only reduces the gap between the two but also accustoms the mind to these truths through their repeated application. We have established a criterion for theory, and must now establish one for critical analysis as well.

Fallacy (Gerras, Red Team Guide)

A [logic] fallacy is an argument that uses poor reasoning. Fallacies are common errors in reasoning that will undermine the logic of your argument. Fallacies can be either illegitimate arguments or irrelevant points, and are often identified because they lack evidence that supports their claim. Avoid these common fallacies in your own arguments and watch for them in the arguments of others.

Condition (SAMS Design Guide)

A broad description of actual or potential circumstances. See also end state.

Commander's Intent (JP 3-0) (EOA Campaign Analysis)

A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired result without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.

Deterrence (Freedman)

A coercive strategy.

Bias(es), Cognitive (Gerras)

A cognitive bias is a pattern of deviation in judgment, whereby inferences about other people and situations may be drawn in an illogical fashion. Biases and Heuristics: availability heuristic, representativeness heuristic, sample size bias, regression to the mean, insufficient anchor adjustment, and overconfidence. Other Biases, Traps, and Errors: confirmation trap, fundamental attribution error, self-serving biases.

Population (Axelrod)

A collection of agents, or, in some situations, collections of strategies.

Agency

A collection of properties, strategies, and capabilities for iterating with artifacts and other agents.

Shared Understanding (SAMS Design Guide)

A common appreciation of a problem situation among a group of stakeholders, such as a design team and senior and subordinate commands. Shared understanding does not imply consensus, since the same situation may be interpreted differently from different perspectives, but it does at a minimum require all actors to be aware of the alternative perspectives.

Identity (March)

A conception of self organized into rules for matching action to situations.

Inference

A conclusion reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning.

Operational Problem (TRADOC Pam 525-5-500)

A discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels military action to resolve it.

Grand Strategy (or National Strategy)

A framework for the distribution and application (ways) of all means (DIME) to fulfill the ends for policy objectives for war. Michael Howard defines grand strategy as 'the mobilisation and deployment of national resources of wealth, manpower and industrial capacity, together with the enlistment of those of allied and, when feasible, neutral powers, for the purpose of achieving the goals of national policy in wartime'. Grand strategy applies within war, and should not be confused with routine national security policy-making, diplomacy, mobilization planning, contingency planning and defense policy-making, all of which apply in peace as well as war. Grand strategy is the art of the statesman. It pertains to statecraft as distinct from the military art of strategy.

Frame, Environmental (SAMS Design Guide)

A graphic and narrative description that captures the history, current state, and future goals of relevant actors in the operational environment. The graphics may include both design drawings and presentation drawings.

Clausewitz's Military Genius

A harmonious combination of courage, powers of intellect, and strength of will.

Nation

A large group of people that have something in common.

System

A larger collection, including one or more populations of agents and possibly also artifacts. Or...a number of strategic actors interacting.

Objective (ADRP 3-90/5-0)

A location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort.

Artifacts

A material resource that has definite location and can respond to the action of agents.

Design (verb) (SAMS Design Guide)

A method of critical and creative thinking for understanding, visualizing, and describing complex problems and the approaches to resolve them. See also design (noun).

Induction

A method of reasoning in which a general rule of conclusion is drawn from particular facts of examples.

Deduction

A method of reasoning in which a general rule or principle is used to draw a particular conclusion.

Army Design Methodology (ADP/ADRP 5-0)

A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. Key concepts that underline the ADM include critical and creative thinking, collaboration and dialogue, framing, narrative construction, and visual modeling.

Responsibility to Protect (RTP)

A new international security and human rights norm to address the international community's failure to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Rationality (March)

A particular and very familiar class of procedures for making choices.

Stakeholder

A person, organization or group with an interest in or concern about something. In design, key stakeholders have both high interest and high impact on the problem situation.

Frame (SAMS Design Guide)

A perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon. See also environmental frame, problem frame, problem situation.

Phenomena (Berger/Kuhn/Gaddis)

A phenomenon, plural phenomena, is any observable occurrence. Phenomena are often, but not always, understood as 'appearances' or 'experiences'. These are themselves sometimes understood as involving qualia.

Attractor (SAMS Design Guide)

A point or set of points that attracts all nearby states of a dynamical system.

Policy

A principle or protocol to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes.

Evolution (SAMS Design Guide)

A process of differentiation, selection, and amplification that underpins the emergence of novelty in complex adaptive systems. Evolution is an all-purpose formula for innovation, a formula that, through its special brand of trial and error, creates new designs and solves difficult problems.

Strategy (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, SAMS Design Guide)

A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. Contrast with tactics.

Theory (Maclean, Rosenau, Clausewitz, Hatch, Berger, van Evera, Kuhn)

A reasoned set of ideas that is intended to explain why something happens or exists. Or, an idea that explains or justifies something.

Frame, Problem (SAMS Design Guide)

A refinement of the environmental frame that defines, in text and graphics, the areas for action that will move existing conditions toward the desired end state. Whereas the environmental frame focuses on actors and relationships, the problem frame focuses on tensions.

System (SAMS Design Guide)

A representation of an entity as a complex whole open to feedback from its environment. A set of things working together as a mechanism of network. Also an organized scheme of method by which something is done. Defined by the presence of a large number of interactive components or parts. In spite of the number of elements, such systems are ultimately knowable and their behavior is predictable. Such systems demonstrate linearity, because they exhibit proportionality, repeatability, additivity, and demonstrability of cause and effect. A set of things working together as a mechanism or network, an organized scheme of method by which something is done.

Operation (ADRP 3-90)

A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation.

Major Operation (FM 3-0)

A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational, and sometimes strategic objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially under a common plan and are controlled by a single commander.

Battle (ADRP 3-90)

A set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement.

Quagmire (Freedman)

A situation in which a country with a high stake in the satisfactory resolution of a conflict suffers steady losses without making evident progress.

Sedimentation (Berger)

A small part of human experiences are retained, and saved as recognizable and memorable entities.

Construction(ism), Social (Berger)

A sociological theory of knowledge that considers how social phenomena or objects of consciousness develop in social contexts.

Bandwagoning

A state aligns with a stronger, adversarial power and concedes that the stronger adversary-turned-partner disproportionately gains in the spoils they conquer together. Bandwagoning, therefore, is a strategy employed by weak states.

Interdependence (Kotter)

A state in which two or more parties have power over each other because they are, to some degree, dependent on each other. Contrast with a state of independence.

Statist model [monographic and synthetic] (Tilly)

A statist model describe institutions and political practices in which executive authority gathers increasing levels and varieties of power into its hands. Tilly identified two of the three varieties of economic modernization: "coercion-intensive" and "capitalized coercion."p 6

Narrative (ADRP 5-0)

A story constructed to give meaning to things and events.

Narrative, Organizational (Hatch)

A story of real events with a plot and characters that, when analyzed, will tell us about the organization's culture and distinctive practices.

Assemblage (SAMS Design Guide)

A synthetic whole comprised of contingent relationships between autonomous parts. The theory of assemblages, created by philosopher Gilles Deleuze and elaborated by Manuel De Landa, is similar to the engineers' concept of a system of systems.

System, Closed (SAMS Design Guide, Gharajedaghi)

A system that does not exchange matter, energy, or information with its environment. A closed system is self-contained and is not significantly affected by external influences. Contrast with open system.

System, Open (SAMS Design Guide, Gharajedaghi)

A system that exchanges matter, energy, or information with its environment. An open system changes its structure and behavior over time, so it may respond differently to the same stimuli. Contrast with closed system.

Systems (SAMS Design Guide)

A systems approach equips designers with a framework for synthesizing and organizing complex and often contradictory information. There is an important distinction between the everyday meaning of the word system and the more technical meaning of system as 'taking a systems approach.' We should always remember that it is our thinking that is systemic, not the world itself. Complex systems science shows how distributed networks of adaptive agents are capable of solving problems no agent could solve alone.

Engagement (ADRP 3-90)

A tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelon maneuver forces (JP 3-0). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade level and below. They are usually short, executed in terms of minutes, hours, or days. Engagements can result from one side's deliberate offensive movement against an opponent or from a chance encounter between two opponents, such as a meeting engagement.

Unilateralism

A tendency of nations to conduct their foreign affairs individualistically, characterized by minimal consultation and involvement with other nations, even their allies.

Body of Knowledge (Berger)

A term used to represent the complete set of concepts, terms and activities that make up a professional domain, as defined by the relevant professional association. While the term body of knowledge is also used to describe the document that defines that knowledge - the body of knowledge itself is more than simply a collection of terms; a professional reading list; a library; a website or a collection of websites; a description of professional functions; or even a collection of information. It is the accepted ontology for a specific domain.

Scenario Planning (Schwartz)

A tool for ordering one's perception about alternative future environments in which one's decisions might be played out.

Narrative

A tool used to help in the construction of a story either intentionally or unintentionally. By constructing a narrative, a planner consciously bounds events in time and space to produce a logic to what is understood. Every brief should consist of a narrative that the staff, through discourse attempts to provide to a commander. This is considered a shared narrative created by the staff and in discourse with the commander and receiving his/her guidance creates a more refined shared narrative.

Operational Approach (FM 5-0, SAMS Design Guide)

A visualization of the broad general actions that will produce the conditions that define the desired end state.

Who are the audiences for ADM and MDMP?

ADM - Commanders and planning teams that have longer planning horizons. MDMP - Commanders and staffs that have relatively shorter planning horizons.

Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge

Abstractness, Intersubjectivity, Empirical Relevance.

Win-set (Putnam)

Acceptable outcomes. The larger the win-set, the more probable an agreement will be reached.

Approach of Design (SAMS Design Guide)

Acknowledge uniqueness and complexity, develop shared holistic understanding by drawing and modeling, and respond systemically.

Strategic Interaction

Actions in pursuit of interdependent models.

Double Effect

Actions performed/Actions foreseen.

System-of-action

Actions, behavior, interaction, relationship, or role, largely ignoring the entities that participate and experience them.

Anomalies (Kuhn)

After a period of time, experimental evidence begins to show that the prevailing paradigm is insufficient. Kuhn calls these "anomalies." What happens? The evidence is ignored, and the community of scientists goes along as if nothing had happened. Over time, more and more evidence accumulates, and still it is ignored. A paradigm (perception of reality) occurs when scientists can no longer avoid the anomalies of the current paradigm and therefore establish a new common understanding that causes the reevaluation of the entire scientific system.

ADRP 5-0 Notes

All planning is based on imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future. Planning provides an informed forecast of how future events may unfold. Framing is the act of building mental models to help individuals understand situations and respond to events. In a broad sense, a narrative is a story constructed to give meaning to things and events.

Operational Art (Schneider/Swain/Kelly/Brennan/Naveh/Isserson/Svechin)

All these authors discussed operational art at great length. For example, Naveh defined operational art as the cognitive tension between strategic aim and tactical execution. Naveh goes on to say that operational differs from tactical in "quality and quantity," and from strategic in "substance." Therefore, there is a need to define and understand the three levels of war, particularly the operational level. (Pg 3). According to the Naveh, no theory of operational war has been developed by the west - U.S. (Russia had Deep Operations Theory), rather focused on strategic and tactical (since Napoleon) (Pg 2, 8).

Operations (Kelly/Brennan/Naveh)

All these authors give a unique perspective on military operations. Naveh, for example, focuses on General Systems Theory (GST) to provide a framework for his study on the operational level of war. GST is the transdisciplinary study of systems in general, with the goal of elucidating principles that can be applied to all types of systems in all fields of research. The term does not yet have a well-established, precise meaning, but systems theory can reasonably be considered a specialization of systems thinking and a generalization of systems science. (Pgs 3-8). Operational Art: Operational War differs from the Tactical in "quality and quantity", and from the Strategic in "substance". Therefore there is a need to define and understand the three levels of war, particularly the operational level. (Pg 3). According to the author, no theory of operational war has been developed by the west - US (Russia had Deep Operations Theory), instead focused on Strategic and Tactical (since Napoleon) (Pg 2, 8). Operational Shock: Operational Shock is a Russian term that originated from WWI experience that complete destruction of a military is not possible, so instead, you should focus on putting the opposing military in a state that it can no longer function. (Pg 16-19). Operational Maneuver: Operational Maneuver expressed the ability of a tactical body to perform its mission and success depends on the appropriate combination of three qualities; Protection, Mobility and Firepower. (Pg 20) In Operational Maneuver, maneuver and fire are the same, you can't have one without the other, the operational commander must use these simultaneously. (Pg 21).

Cohesion

Allows the CAS to achieve its goal (compare to Center of Gravity from Clausewitz).

Douhet, Giulio (Command of the Air, 1921-1942)

An Italian general and air power theorist. He was a key proponent of strategic bombing in aerial warfare. He was a contemporary of the 1920s air warfare advocates Walther Wever, Billy Mitchell and Sir Hugh Trenchard.

Correlates of War (COW)

An academic study on the history of warfare started by David Singer in 1963. Concerned with collecting data about the history of wars and conflict among states, the project has driven forward quantitative research into the causes of warfare. Key principles are replication, data reliability, documentation, review, and the transparency of data collection procedures.

Consequentialist

An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable (outcomes). See Teleological Ethics. Based on external effects.

Utilitarianism

An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone.

Deterrence, Strategic (Freedman)

An approach where there is an explicit commitment to take disciplinary action.

Cognitive Space (SAMS Design Guide)

An association of any number of actors bound by a certain shared cognitive element. A cognitive space has a social element and a cognitive element. Cognitive spaces trigger organizing processes. In design, the environmental space, problem space, and solution space are three cognitive spaces that help to organize information about the environment, the problem, and the solution. A cognitive space is broader than a frame.

Tragedy of the Commons (Garrett Hardin)

An economics theory by Garrett Hardin, according to which the depletion of a shared resource by individuals, acting independently and rationally according to each one's self-interest, despite their understanding that depleting the common resource is contrary to the group's long-term best interests. The tragedy of the commons has particular relevance in analyzing behavior in the fields of economics, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, game theory, politics, taxation, and sociology. Some also see the "tragedy" as an example of emergent behavior, the outcome of individual interactions in a complex adaptive system.

Problem (SAMS Design Guide)

An expression of tension between the environment and a sponsors guidance (needs and desires). An operational problem is a discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels action to resolve it. See also discourse.

Nonstate Actors

An increasing number of NSAs are playing important roles in international cooperation, including international organizations, transnational social movements, private industry, and epistemic communities. Much of this work suggests an erosion of the authority of nation-states as the primary unites of analysis at the international level.

Hegemony (Tilly)

An indirect form of government, and of imperial dominance in which the hegemon (leader state) rules geopolitically subordinate states by the implied means of power, the threat of force, rather than by direct military force.

Logic, Inductive

An inductive logic is a system of evidential support that extends deductive logic to less-than-certain inferences. Linked to inductive reasoning.

Function (SAMS Design Guide)

An intended purpose for a design. The functions identified in design are always underpinned by logic, and form follows from function.

Problem (ADRP 5-0)

An issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective.

System, Complex Adaptive (SAMS Design Guide)

An open system that changes its structure and behavior in response to external stimuli in order to increase its fitness. See also adaptation, evolution.

State

An organized political community living under a government.

Discourse (SAMS Design Guide)

An organized way of talking, writing, and acting accordingly. See also narrative, problematization.

Shifting the Burden (Senge)

An underlying problem that generates symptoms that demand attention. The underlying problem is difficult for people to address so people shift the burden of their problem to other solutions. This only treats the symptom and the real problem is unresolved. Be aware of the symptomatic solution. Usually short term benefits and in the long term resurfaces while the fundamental solutions can atrophy. Three clues: problem gets worse over time, overall health of the system gets worse, and there is a growing feeling of helplessness. Look for situations of dependency in which the deeper issue are never quite resolved. Identify the problem symptom (squeaky wheel), then identify a fundamental solution(s) a course of action that would lead to enduring improvement. Then identify one or several symptomatic solutions that might resolve the symptoms for a time. Then identify the negative effects of the symptomatic solutions.

Metaagent

Any agent (or actor) other than an individual that exerts control from the top down. Internal models emerge from the interaction of domestic agents.

Multidimensionality/Emergent Property (Gharajedaghi)

Any unique property that "emerges" when component objects are joined together in constraining relations to "construct" a higher-level aggregate object, a novel property that unpredictably comes from a combination of two simpler constituents.

Operational Framework (ADP 3-0)

Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established framework and associated vocabulary assist greatly in this task. Army leaders are not bound by any specific framework for conceptually organizing operations, but three have proven valuable in the past. Leaders often use these conceptual frameworks in combination. - Deep-Close-Security, Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining, Main and Supporting

Planning Pitfalls (ADRP 5-0)

Attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future, trying to plan in too much detail, using the plan as a script for execution, institutionalizing rigid planning methods.

Theory, Complexity (Dolman)

Based on the observation that individual agents interacting repeatedly on the basis of simple rules or behavioral guides may self-organize to form a structure that exhibits characteristics or properties that cannot be predicted on knowledge of those interactions alone.

Virtuous Consequentialism

Based on the simple insight that each of these theories is partly right but each is profoundly wrong. Consider the intent, the rules involved, the outcomes of the action, and the virtues.

Complexity, Interactive (TRADOC Pam 525-5-500)

Based upon the behavior of the parts and the resulting interactions between them. The greater the freedom of action of each individual part and the more linkages among the components, the greater is the system's interactive complexity.

Complexity, Structural (TRADOC Pam 525-5-500)

Based upon the number of parts in a system. The larger the number of independent parts in a system, the greater its structural complexity.

Change, Paradigmatic (Kuhn)

Before Kuhn's work, the prevailing view of knowledge building in science was that it was a linear process centered on the so-called "scientific method." According to the traditional view of this process, scientists posit hypotheses, test them, and in this way, build knowledge. However, when Kuhn looked closely at what actually happened, he found that this could not be further from the truth. Instead, Kuhn found that knowledge building in science was a process that was marked by occasional great lurches forward. In fact, most science took place within the context of a broad, tacit, explanatory framework that he called a "paradigm." The Aristotelian system that theorized that the sun revolved around the earth is an example of a paradigm. Within a paradigm, science is determined in a way that is consistent with the paradigm. The experiments that count as useful are the ones that support the paradigm, and this typically involves refining and extending it. Kuhn calls this "normal science." The community of scientists forms a culture around the paradigm. They reject experiments and ostracize experimenters who are at odds with it. A prime example is Galileo, who bucked the existing paradigm and narrowly escaped with his life. After a period of time, experimental evidence begins to show that the prevailing paradigm is insufficient. Kuhn calls these "anomalies." What happens? The evidence is ignored, and the community of scientists goes along as if nothing had happened. Over time, more and more evidence accumulates, and still it is ignored. Finally, a scientist will propose a comprehensive new paradigm. This new theoretical framework will be accepted only if it fully explains both everything that the old paradigm explained as well as the anomalies. Moreover, the new paradigm must specify enough detail to be useful as a guide to normal science. Even then, the process of change is profoundly political, not logical, with more open-minded scientists gravitating toward the new paradigm, while others continue to cling to the old. This is what happened when Copernicus's paradigm supplanted Aristotle's, and when Einstein's supplanted Newton's. This is paradigmatic change. Kuhn relates the change process blow by blow.

Kotter's Vital Organizational Leadership Skill

Being able to diagnose correctly who has power.

Moral Absolutism

Black and white. An aggressive form of objectivism.

Analysis (SAMS Design Guide)

Breaking down of complex wholes into their constituent parts in order to improve our understanding of them. It involves taking things apart to see how they work. See also synthesis.

Learning from Military Failure (Clausewitz, Cohen/Gooch)

By conducting a critical analysis of military history including the study of defeat. Clausewitz has a three step process: 1. Discovery of facts 2. Tracing of effects to causes 3. Investigation and evaluation of means Cohen/Gooch map out of military misfortune process: 1. Identify the failure 2. Critical tasks, critical lapses 3. Layered analysis (analytical matrix) 4. Pathways to misfortune

Moral Rationalist

By reason alone, a moral rationalist uses a moral framework.

COL Drew's SAMS Planner Nugget #3 (COAs)

COA1 is always "do nothing."

Methodism (Dorner)

Carl von Clausewitz referred to this tendency--it can impose a crippling conservatism on our activity. Many psychological experiments have demonstrated how people's range of action is limited by their tendency to act in accordance with preestablished patterns. To be successful, a planner must know when to follow established practice and when to strike out in a new direction. (deviation from doctrine?) Recognizing the strategy appropriate to a particular situation-whether methodism or experimentation or some hybrid of the two-will help us plan more effectively.

Case Study (van Evera)

Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame—an object—within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates."

Thinking, Creative (Gerras, SAMS Design Guide)

Challenges existing habits, patterns and paradigms to generate relevant responses to unique situations. See also critical thinking, divergent thinking. Compare and contrast with critical thinking.

The Nature of Traditional War

Characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states.

Satisficing (March)

Choosing an alternative that exceeds some criterion or target. Contrast with maximizing.

Maximizing (March)

Choosing the best alternative. Contrast with satisficing.

Clausewitz's Propensity for Threes

Clausewitz had a propensity for describing in threes throughout the work, highlighted by H. Strachan--was this "consequence of contrivance?" -Groups of three combine to form a whole -The third element gives complexity and depth -Means for defining concepts essential for his understanding of war Examples: --time, space, and manpower --three reasons for having stronger vanguards in the center --three different intellectual activities in the critical approach --three conditions reflecting the establishments of camps --three conditions under which armies could be quartered --three spatially distinct bases of operations --three effects of terrain on war --three types of pursuits --three strategic assets in controlling high ground --three factors that gave the decisive advantage in an engagement: surprise, the benefit of the terrain, and concentric attack --three advantages in mounting a converging attack --three sorts of terrain different from plains --three ways victory was evident --three possible outcomes of battle --three possible effects of battle --three enemy methods of expenditure: wastage of his forces, our destruction of them, and loss of territory--our conquest --three other enemy methods of expenditure: invasion, priority to operations that increase the enemy's suffering, to wear down the enemy --three broad objectives of war: the enemy's armed forces, the country, and the enemy's will --three objectives or targets one might attack in warfare --three factors tend to limit the speed and destructiveness of warfare --three determinants that function as inherent counterweights" to continuous war: 1. "Fear and indecision native to the human mind" - "aversion to danger and responsibility", 2. "Imperfection of human perception and judgment, which is more pronounced in war than anywhere else.", 3. "The greater strength of the defensive" --three factors introduce uncertainties that make it difficult to determine how much force must be used --war suspended between "three magnets" (remarkable trinity)

Assumptions of Design (SAMS Design Guide)

Clear end state unknowable in advance; unexpected discontinuous events will emerge; environment is too complex and uncertain to know which COA is best prior to interacting with the environment; simple, clear, concise, and rect solutions may not exist.

Assumptions of Planning (SAMS Design Guide)

Clearly defined end state is known; events can be anticipated; alternative COAs can be objectively evaluated in advance; simple, clear, concise, and direct solutions exist.

Problem Statement (SAMS Design Guide)

Clearly defines the problem or problem set that commanders must manage or solve. Commanders can determine the problem statement by comparing the existing conditions in the operational environment to the desired end state. It broadly describes the requirements for transformation, acknowledging the anticipated opponents and obstacles.

Centers of Gravity (Strange/Iron)

CoGs are dynamic and powerful physical or moral agents of action or influence that possess certain characteristics and capabilities, and benefit from a given location or terrain.

Three "Faces of Power" (Nye)

Coercive, setting agendas, shaping preferences.

Synthesis (SAMS Design Guide)

Combining of separate elements into complex wholes in order to create something different. It involves putting things together to see how they work. See also system. Contrast with analysis.

Complex Problem

Compare with complicated problem.

Narrative (Freedman)

Compelling story line which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn. More than rhetoric, a narrative is grounded in people's experience, interests, values, possibly giving belonging or purpose.

Narrative Construction (SAMS Design Guide)

Conscious bounding of events and artifacts in time and space, producing an understanding of the logic of what is observed.

Constraint (SAMS Design Guide)

Constraints in design result largely from required or desired relationships between various elements. Counter-intuitively, design constraints are an important source of creative thinking.

Complicated Problem

Contains a large number of convoluted parts. The fundamental difference between complicated and complex is where a complicated problem can be decomposed into simpler problems and solved separately; complex problems contain too many interdependencies to allow the problem to be broken into separate sub-problems. Compare and contrast with complex problem.

Contingency (Gaddis, Linn)

Contingencies are phenomena that do not form patterns, these may include the actions individuals take for reasons known only to themselves. Compare and contrast with continuity.

Continuity (Gaddis, Linn)

Continuities are patterns that extend across time, phenomena that recur with sufficient regularity to make themselves apparent to us. Compare and contrast with contingency.

Berenhorst, Georg Heinrich (Reflections on the Art of War, 1796, 1798, 1788, 1799)

Counter-Enlightenment point of view; harsh criticism of Frederickian systems -Morale of troops, decisiveness of the personality of the leader, and of chance or accidents -War not exact but relied on human spirt, will power and emotions -Rules and principles were dogmatic and artificial -War is a rational activity; moral factors are important

Logic of Design (SAMS Design Guide)

Critical, creative, continuous, circular. "The logic of design, moving between the environmental frame, the problem frame, and the operational approach, is also fundamentally dialectical."

Scope of DOA

DOA teaches the application of conceptual planning in environments that pose unfamiliar, complex military and socio-political problems. The course provides officers with reasoning and critical thinking methods that produce effective and adaptable operational concepts and plans. Using the Army Design Methodology found in ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0, the course fosters the small-group leadership and communication skills that are essential to approaching complex problems in highly fluid environments.

Supreme Emergency (Walzer)

Danger and imminence of a threat compelling and permitting attacks on innocent people so long as no other means of fighting and winning are available. Walzer borrowed the phrase from a speech by Winston Churchhill (Walzer, 251).

Regulations and Directions (Dolman, Clausewitz)

Deal with the mass of minor, more detailed circumstances too numerous and trivial for general laws.

Decomposition (March)

Decision makers attempt to decompose problems, to reduce large problems into their component parts.

Editing (March)

Decision makers tend to edit and simplify problems before entering into a choice process.

Reasoning, Deductive

Deductive reasoning links premises with conclusions. If all premises are true, the terms are clear, and the rules of deductive logic are followed, then the conclusion reached is necessarily true. Deductive reasoning (top-down logic) contrasts with inductive reasoning (bottom-up logic) in the following way: In deductive reasoning, a conclusion is reached reductively by applying general rules that hold over the entirety of a closed domain of discourse, narrowing the range under consideration until only the conclusion is left. Linked to deductive logic.

Logic, Deductive

Deductive reasoning, also deductive logic or logical deduction or, informally, "top-down" logic, is the process of reasoning from one or more general statements (premises) to reach a logically certain conclusion. Linked to deductive reasoning.

Thinking, Critical [context-free and context-dependent] (Gerras, SAMS Design Guide)

Deliberate, conscious and reflective evaluation of facts, assumptions and inferences from multiple perspectives in order to appreciate the consequences of actions and beliefs. See also creative thinking, reflective thinking. Compare to creative thinking.

Duty Theories

Deontology--Nonconsequentialist--Good habits or rules (Plato). Comes from external factors.

Adaptation (Homeostasis) (SAMS Design Guide)

Describes the ability of living systems to change in ways that help them meet the challenges of their complex world. It takes many forms (natural examples include evolution and learning), operates simultaneously over many timescales, and may be implemented via many different mechanisms... The essence of adaptation is deceptively simple- a continuously repeated cycle of variation -> interaction -> feedback -> selection, or in other words: "generate options, try them, see which ones work best and retain them."

Scenarios (Fahey and Randall)

Descriptive narratives about plausible alternative projections of a specific part of the future.

Two Main Patterns of Communication in Design (Lawson/Peng)

Design groups come to develop and share a common set of design ideas. Peng identified structuralist and metaphorist approaches. Structuralist: The design team works under the influence of a major set of rules which are known before the project begins and which serve to generate form while nevertheless allowing for a fair degree of interpretation by the group. Metaphorist: The participants introduce their own ideas and attempt to find ideas which can then be used to embrace these, order them and give them coherence.

Design Traps (Lawson)

Design problems are so complex and "wicked" or tricky it is comparatively easy to make decisions which, with the benefit of hindsight, may seem quite ridiculous: 1. Category Trap, 2. Puzzle Trap, 3. Number Trap, 4. Icon Trap, 5. Image Trap.

A Framework for Theory (Reynolds)

Desirable characteristics of scientific knowledge: 1. Abstractness (independent of space and time) 2. Intersubjectivity (Agreement about meaning among relevant scientists) 3. Empirical relevance (can be compared to "known" evidence)

Proportionality

Desired ends should be proportional to the means used.

Deterrence, Broad (Freedman)

Deterring all means of war. Contrast with narrow deterrence.

AMSP Vision

Develop effective operational planners who are good leaders and great teammates. SAMS graduates: -Are grounded in operational theory, doctrine, and history -Are critical and creative thinkers who can identify problems and propose viable solutions -Can clearly communicate recommendations verbally, graphically, and in writing -Have a firm understanding of peer leadership and team building -Have the courage to lead from above, beside, and below -Are physically and mentally tough -Can collaborate effectively to get the job done -Do not care who gets the credit

Diversity (Kotter)

Differences among people with respect to goals, values, stakes, assumptions, and perceptions.

Discussion (Senge)

Different views are presented and defended and there is a search for the best view to support decisions that must be made at this time. See also Dialogue.

Understanding the Environment (strategically) (EOA Campaign Analysis)

Diplomacy Information Military Economy

Rule (Dolman, Clausewitz)

Directives. A more liberal interpretation of the law, based on a single obviously relevant feature (for which there is always an exception).

System of Systems (SAMS Design Guide)

Distinguished from large but monolithic systems by the independence of their components, their evolutionary nature, emergent behaviors, and a spatial or geographic extent that means information exchange is more important than flows of matter or energy. See also assemblage.

Strategy, Frame Work

Distribution and of application of military means for a war (Liddell Hart).

Compel (Freedman)

Do this or I'll use the force against you (i.e. 82nd Airborne enroute to Haiti on C-141s).

Knowing in Action (Schoen)

Dr. Kubiak's Definition: Professional, tacit information that you already have.

Politics (Kubiak)

Dr. Kubiak's Definition: The strategic interaction between competing narratives to determine causation.

Narrative (Abbott)

Dr. Kubiak's Interpretation: knowing and telling. The representation of an event (action) or series of events (actions). A minimum of one event is necessary. Two major uses: 1. compact and definable 2. loose and generally recognizable. Consists of story and narrative discourse. See also mediation and normalization.

Reflection in Action (Schoen)

Dr. Kubiak's definition: Knowledge comes into play when you still have a chance to affect the outcome. Schoen's definition: The rethinking of some part of our knowing-in-action leads to on-the-spot experiment and further thinking that affects what we do—in the situation at hand and perhaps also in others as we shall see as similar to it. A recent historical example: OIF, where reflection in action drove reframing of the problem and operational approach. Ideally the reframing would have taken place faster.

Bias (Kubiak)

Dr. Kubiak's definition: the absence of objectivity.

Moral Equivalency

Drawing comparisons between different, often unrelated things, to make a point that one is "just as bad" as the other or "just as good" as the other. Also "not as bad as..."

Drawing, Design (SAMS Design Guide)

Drawing produced by designers not to communicate with others but rather as part of the very thinking process itself which we call design. See also presentation drawing and production drawing.

Drawing, Presentation (SAMS Design Guide)

Drawing produced by designers to communicate insights and results from designing to external stakeholders, such as the higher authority or lateral designers. See also design drawing and production drawing.

Drawing, Production (SAMS Design Guide)

Drawing produced by designers to communicate with stakeholders responsible for operationalizing the design, such as planners or subordinate commanders. See also design drawing and presentation drawing.

Scope of EOA

EOA is a course about the practice of operational art—the pursuit of strategic objectives through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. Our goal is for you to develop the capability to evaluate this aspect of conflict by studying historical campaigns and military theory from the late eighteenth century through the beginning of the twenty-first century. The intent of the course is not to show a linear progression in the theory and practice of operational art, but rather to look at a wide variety of circumstances that required thinking about and practicing operational art. Overall, EOA provides SAMS students with a deeper understanding of the burdens, responsibilities, and opportunities for operational artists.

Comprehensive Systems Analysis (Dörner)

Enables the commanders to make a decision with a full understanding of the nuances and interlocking elements of a complex system and not to make decisions on an ad hoc basis (pg. 5).

End states/objectives/effects (doctrinal precision/accuracy)

End states are "attained" or "reached" Objectives are "achieved" Effects are "generated" or "created"

Teleological Ethics

Ethical theories that focus primarily on consequences in determining moral rightness and wrongness.

Applied Ethics

Examines specific controversial issues, such as abortion, infanticide, animal rights, nuclear war, etc.

State, nation-/national (Tilly)

Examining political, social, and technological change in Europe from the Middle Ages to the present, Tilly attempted to explain the unprecedented success of the nation-state as the dominant polity on Earth. According to his theory, military innovation in pre-modern Europe (especially gunpowder and mass armies) made war extremely expensive. As a result, only states with a sufficient amount of capital and a large population could afford paying for their security and ultimately survive in the hostile environment. Institutions of the modern state (such as taxes) were created to allow war-making.

Grand Policy

Examples include Wilsonianism, band-wagoning, racial or religious purity, colonialism, restraint, appeasement, isolationism, and cooperative security. All rise to the level of tradition.

Teleology (Tilly)

Explanation (or action) focused on a purpose (or objective).

Dialectic (Berger)

Externalization, objectivation, and internalization.

How Militaries Fail (Cohen/Gooch)

Fail to: 1. Learn from the past 2. Adapt to the present 3. Anticipate the future There is also the aggregate failure, which combines two or more of the above and create the conditions for catastrophic failure.

Creative Process (Lawson)

First insight (formulation of problem), preparation (conscious attempt at a solution), incubation (no conscious), illumination (sudden emergence of idea), verification (conscious development).

Punishment (Freedman)

Focuses on powerful incentives to choose a particular war.

Denial (Freedman)

Focuses on threats to deny a strategic option; tends toward control.

Operational Factors (EOA Campaign Analysis)

Forces Information Space Time

Structure

Formal and informal institutions. Aspects of the environment that guide agents toward some courses rather than others.

Purpose of Planning (SAMS Design Guide)

Formalize the approach to influencing future events.

Key Components of Design (Lawson)

Formulating, moving, representing, evaluating, and reflecting.

Theater Military Strategy

Framework for distribution and application of military means for a specific area.

Framing

Framing helps to focus on the problem by providing scale and boundaries without constricting potential solutions. Asking the right questions and framing problems carefully is an important part of understanding the environment and defining the problem.

Systems Archetypes (Senge)

Generic structures which embody the key to learning to see structures in our personal and organizational lives. Two archetypes are discussed in the chapter: (1) limits to growth and (2) shifting the burden. The others are explained in Appendix 2: - balancing process with delay - shifting the burden to the intervenor - eroding goals - escalation - success to the successful - tragedy of the commons - fixes that fail - growth and under-investment

Assumptions, [descriptive and prescriptive] (Gerras, Red Team Guide)

Gerras' model (derivative of Paul and Elder): CLARIFY CONCERN, POINT OF VIEW, ASSUMPTIONS, INFERENCES, EVALUATION OF INFORMATION, IMPLICATIONS "Exercising controlled thought involves the deliberate use of elements of critical thinking."

Law

Governance, compliance, punishment.

Facilitation (SAMS Design Guide)

Group facilitation is a process in which a person whose selection is acceptable to all members of the group, who is substantively neutral, and who has no substantive decision-making authority diagnoses and intervenes to help a group improve how it identifies and solves problems and makes decisions, to increase the groups effectiveness. The facilitator's main task is to help the group increase effectiveness by improving its process and structure. Contrast with leadership. Facilitation can improve stakeholder engagement and the quality of design discourse.

Culture of Planning (SAMS Design Guide)

Hierarchical, decisive, objectivity, optimality, and technocratic.

Deterrence, Internalized (Freedman)

Hints and indications that influence the decision-making process of an agent based on probable responses.

History (Gaddis)

History is "scientific" and shares much in common with geology, paleontology, astronomy and other sciences that study phenomena they cannot directly interact with-it is thus a vital component of SAMS' interdisciplinary approach. History embraces complexity and prepares one for the future by developing narrative that enables pattern recognition of past and future without attempting to identify independent variables or establish single causes.

Five Pillars of Design (SAMS Design Guide)

History, theory, doctrine, philosophy, and practice.

Approach (SAMS Design Guide)

Ideas or actions intended to deal with a problem or problem situation. See also operational approach.

Reframing (SAMS Design Guide)

If the current operational approach is failing to meet assessment criteria, or if aspects of the operational environment or problem change significantly, the commander may decide to begin reframing efforts. Factors that may trigger reframing: assessment reveals a lack of progress, key assumptions prove invalid, unanticipated success or failure, a major event that causes "catastrophic change" in the operational environment, a scheduled periodic review that shows a problem, a change in mission or end state issued by higher authority. Alternative framing (or reframing) is seeing the situation in ways that extend beyond our normal expectations in different ways to our default settings. See also frame.

Evoked Potential

If we have an asymmetrical capability that removes risk, the risk is not totally removed. In fact, the capability can drive the enemy to come up with a way to inflict harm on you (risk is just transferred).

Chaos (Gharajedaghi)

In a state of complete confusion and disorder. Systems thinking is the art of simplifying complexity. It is about seeing through CHAOS, managing inter-dependency, and understanding the variables involved in choice. We see the world as an increasingly more complex and CHAOTIC because of the inadequate concepts used to explain it. When we move to understand something, it becomes simpler, we no longer see it as chaotic or complex.

Critical Thinking (SAMS Design Guide)

In design, critical thinking is achieved by focusing on the differences between things, by reflecting on actions, and reflecting on how we think. A reflective approach to history, theory, doctrine, philosophy, and practice enhances critical thinking.

Dialogue (SAMS Design Guide/Senge)

In dialogue, there is the free and creative exploration of complex and subtle issues, a deep listening to one another and suspending of ones own views.

Thinking, Reflective (SAMS Design Guide)

In distinction from other operations to which we apply the name of thought, involves a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty, in which thinking originates, and an act of searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity. See also critical thinking.

Reasoning, Inductive

In inductive reasoning, the conclusion is reached by generalizing or extrapolating from initial information. As a result, induction can be used even in an open domain, one where there is epistemic uncertainty. Note, however, that the inductive reasoning mentioned here is not the same as induction used in mathematical proofs - mathematical induction is actually a form of deductive reasoning. Linked to inductive logic.

Emotivism

In metaethics, emotivism is the view that moral judgments do not function as statements of fact but rather as expressions of the speaker's or writer's feelings. According to the emotivist, when we say "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," we are not expressing any fact beyond that stated by "You stole that money." It is, however, as if we had stated this fact with a special tone of abhorrence, for in saying that something is wrong, we are expressing our feelings of disapproval toward it. Emotivism was expounded by A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and developed by Charles Stevenson in Ethics and Language (1945). Compare to moral realism.

Normalization (Abbott)

In the context of a narrative, bringing a collection of events into narrative coherence can be described as a way of normalizing those events."

Mediation (Abbott)

In the context of a narrative, selecting events for notice. Providing interpretation of another event, story, or narrative.

System-of-entities

Individuals, groups, associations, or aggregations of people--social entities.

Institutionalization (Berger)

Institutionalization refers to the process of embedding something within an organization, social system, or society as a whole.

Constructivism (Idealism)

International politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities. See also Realism and Liberalism.

Designer (Axelrod)

Introduces new artifacts or strategies into the world.

Deterrence, Central (Freedman)

Involves interactions between two primary agents (direct). Contrast with extended deterrence.

Strategy, Consensual (Freedman)

Involves the adjustment of strategic choices without force or threats of force.

Strategy, Controlling (Freedman)

Involves the purposive use of armed force. Preemption and prevention...

Deterrence, Extended (Freedman/Huth-Russet)

Involves third parties (indirect). Contrast with central deterrence.

Personal Mastery (Senge)

It is the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively. The discipline of personal mastery starts with clarifying the things that really matter to us, of living our lives in the service of our highest aspirations.

Justum Bellum

Just War Theory. Relationship between cause and effect.

Jus In Bello

Just and fair ways of waging war. Includes the concept of discrimination and proportionality.

Jus Ad Bellum

Just causes of going to war. Encompasses the right intention to use military intervention as a last resort.

Metacognition (SAMS Design Guide)

Knowledge that takes as its object or regulates any aspect of any cognitive endeavor. See also meta-question.

Change, Pre-paradigmatic (Kuhn)

Kuhn describes three stages in the development of a science. The first stage is called "pre-paradigm science". In pre-paradigm science, people seeking to understand an observed phenomenon share no common stock of background theory. Each inquirer essentially starts from scratch. Under these circumstances, very little progress is made. We have nothing resembling a tradition that can be passed from one person on to her students for further development and investigation. See also normal science and paradigmatic change.

Learning

Learning requires skill in creating an environment wherein the team can think together about difficult, frequently ambiguous, perhaps incomprehensible, issues.

Four Big Ideas of Design (SAMS Design Guide)

Learning, difference, systems, and social creation.

Two-level game (Putnam)

Level 1 is the negotiation between two parties. Level 2 is ratification by domestic entities.

Leverage (Senge)

Leverage lies in the balancing loop, not the reinforcing loop. You must change the limiting factor. Growth will always slow, and new limiting processes develop. Identify what is getting better and establish the reinforcing loop. Then identify the limiting factor (resistance) and the balancing process. Then don't push harder—remove the limiting condition (leverage).

Thermodynamics (Bousquet)

Linked to Mechanism, Cybernetics, and Chaoplexity in the four regimes of the scientific way of war.

Mechanism (Bousquet)

Linked to Thermodynamics, Cybernetics, and Chaoplexity in the four regimes of the scientific way of war.

Chaoplexity (Bousquet)

Linked to Thermodynamics, Cybernetics, and Mechanism in the four regimes of the scientific way of war (centralized, decentralized, or distributed)

Cybernetics (Bousquet)

Linked to Thermodynamics, Mechanism, and Chaoplexity in the four regimes of the scientific way of war.

Coercion (Tilly)

Linked to coercion-intensive, capital-intensive, and capitalized-coercion

Thought, Divergent (Gerras)

Linked to creative thinking; compare to convergent thinking.

Thought, Convergent (Gerras)

Linked to critical thinking; compare to divergent thinking.

Legitimation (Berger)

Linked to institutionalization, externalization, objectivation, and internalization

Postmodernism (Hatch)

Linked to modernism and symbolic interpretivism

Revolution, Scientific (Kuhn)

Linked to phenomena, theory, and paradigm.

Modernism (Hatch)

Linked to symbolic interpretivism and postmodernism.

The context of Irregular Warfare (IW)

Marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for the legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. See our Wiki for IW products derived during EOA.

Frame, Team (Hey)

Members of a newly formed design team have different frames--implicit values, goals and assumptions--each of them hold about what problems are important and how they are best addressed. In the early, informal phases of design projects, these frames, and the degree to which they are shared with the team, have substantial consequences. Design frames are socially negotiated and shared.

Normative Ethics

Moral standards (or framework) that regulate right and wrong conduct. See virtue, duty, consequentialist.

Iteration

Multiple attempts to gain understanding of complex systems, combined with the foresight that one can only gain understanding through multiple interactions with the system, generates a different knowledge of what actions do to generate understanding. Unlike steps in a sequential process, the design method is iterative, flowing back and forth between understanding the environment, problem framing, and developing an operational approach in the operations frame. Hence, when commanders have an idea arise, they can place it in the appropriate activity to address the idea, even if the idea is outside the design team's current frame.

Constructing Threats (Freedman)

Narrow and broad, extended and central, denial and punishment, immediate and general deterrence.

National Strategy

National framework for distribution and application of military means for a specific area.

Theorizing, Creative (Rosenau)

Nine Pre-Conditions for Creative Theorizing: (1) To think theoretically one has to avoid treating the task as that of formulating an appropriate definition of theory. (2) To think theoretically one has to be clear as to whether one aspires to empirical theory or value theory. (3) To think theoretically one must be able to assume that human affairs are founded on an underlying order. (4) To think theoretically one must be predisposed to ask about every event, every situation, or every observed phenomenon, "Of what is it an instance?" (5) To think theoretically one must be ready to appreciate and accept the need to sacrifice detailed descriptions for broad observations. (6) To think theoretically one must be tolerant of ambiguity, concerned about probabilities, and distrustful of absolutes. (7) To think theoretically one must be playful about international phenomena. (8) To think theoretically one must be genuinely puzzled by international phenomena. (9) To think theoretically one must be constantly ready to be proven wrong.

Normal Science (Kuhn)

Normal science, the second of Kuhn's three stages, is carried out within a paradigm. Working within a paradigm, the scientist normally accepts the core elements of the paradigm as dogma. The scientist job in the stage of normal science is to work out the details of the paradigm without calling into question the central laws of the paradigm, or the epistemic standards it presupposes. In the normal stage, we can think of science as puzzle solving. Investigators are not advancing bold new theories, but applying the accepted theoretical framework in new and novel sorts of cases. During normal science, a paradigm gets worked out in detail.

Objective and Subjective Reality (Berger)

Objective: Institutionalization of social processes grows out of the habitualization and customs, gained through mutual observation with subsequent mutual agreement on the "way of doing things". Social (or institutional) objective worlds are one consequence of institutionalizations, and are created when institutions are passed on to a new generation. This creates an objective reality. Division of labor is another consequence of institutionalization. Institutions assign "roles" to be performed by various actors, through typifications of performances, such as "father-role", "teacher-role", "hunter", "cook", etc. Symbolic universes are created to provide legitimation to the created institutional structure. Symbolic universes are a set of beliefs "everybody knows" that aim at making the institutionalized structure plausible and acceptable for the individual—who might othrwise not understand or agree with the underlying logic of the institution. Universe-maintenance refers to specific procedures undertaken, often by an elite group, when the symbolic universe does not fulfill its purpose anymore, which is to legitimize the institutional structure in place. Subjective: Socialization is a two-step induction of the individual to participate in the social institutional structure, meaning in its objective reality. Conversation or verbal communication aims at reality-maintenance of the subjective reality. Identity of an individual is subject to a struggle of affiliation to sometimes conflicting realities.

OODA Loop (Osinga/Boyd)

Observation, orientation, decision, action.

Regimes (Brown/Ainley)

Occur when clearly understood principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which decision-makers' expectations converge in a given area of IR.

Operational Awareness (Naveh)

One has to draw, at every moment of the evolving operation, the systemic implications from his positioning in relation to the logic of the emerging maneuver as a whole--systemic awareness. I mean awareness not in the sense of recent American clichés but a cognitive quality implying synthesis. Therefore, we need to prepare navigation aids, to invest in developing common spaces of understanding in the fighting units, and to design a command architecture enabling dynamic learning in action [Naveh 2005].

Direct Participation in Hostilities

One of the key elements of international humanitarian law is the clear distinction between members of the armed forces and civilians. In contemporary armed conflicts, however, the proximity of civilians to military operations and their increased assumption of traditionally military functions lead to confusion as to the implementation of the principle of distinction. See ICRC document.

Symbolic Interpretivism (Hatch)

One of three perspectives within organization theory. Linked to modernism and postmodernism.

Deterrence, Immediate (Freedman/Huth-Russet)

One side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it. Contrast with general deterrence.

Rational (COL Drew)

One way to determine rationality is to examine for logic and reason.

Openness (Gharajedaghi)

Openess means that the behavior of living (open) systems can be understood only in the context of their environment.

Deterrence, General (Freedman/Huth-Russet)

Opponents who maintain armed forces regulate their relationships even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack. Contrast with immediate deterrence.

Theory, Organization (Hatch)

Organization Theory broadens appreciation of organizations and the world in general and opens ones mind to new ideas and possibilities for change and transformation.

Learning Organizations (Senge)

Organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together.

Objectivism (M&W)

Other worldly. There is an objective standard.

Replicability (Kuhn)

Others must be able to test your findings. Generally in psychology, laboratory experiments can be repeated, provided sufficient detail is included in the published article. Replication in social psychology is more hit and miss. Research reliant on real life observations is not always so easy to recreate. In order to replicate research all details need to be included in the write up, including details about participants, procedures, design decisions and of course the raw results.

Managers (Linn)

Paradigm espouses "modern warfare" based on war as a logical outgrowth of political and economic rivalry demanding the mobilization of the entire nation and its intellectual, cyber, industrial and manpower resources. War becomes an organizational problem. Managers' fixation on future wars made them indifferent to small outbreaks, post conflict operations and unconventional missions. The tradition is grounded in the experience of the U.S. Civil War and the German wars of unification. Gen. George C. Marshall and Gen. Dwight Eisenhower were Managers. See also Heroes and Guardians.

Guardians (Linn)

Paradigm postulated that war is the art of applying military science, primarily to guard the American continent from attack. This view was based on the experience of the attacks on Atlantic coastal cities during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. It dominated war strategy during the nineteenth century. Guardianship was carried through to the present by CJCS Colin Powell's Powell Doctrine and is apparent in Army Vision 2010. This paradigm involves a decisive win through engineering and such techniques as "dominant maneuver", "precision engagement", and "full dimensional protection". See also Heroes and Managers.

Culture of Design (SAMS Design Guide)

Participative, pluralistic, reflective, inter-subjective, holistic improvement.

Patterns of Conflict (Boyd)

Patterns of Conflict was a presentation by Colonel John Boyd outlining his theories on modern combat and how the key to success was to upset the enemy's "observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or loop", or OODA loop. Patterns developed the idea of a "counter-blitz", a blitzkrieg in reverse, with numerous attacks followed by withdrawals to the rear. The aim was to confuse the enemy by presenting no apparent strategy, reveal the enemy's intentions through the strength of the response, and present a misleading picture of the defender's own actions in order to disrupt the attacker's future plan of action.

Reprisal

Payback (deterrence without retribution).

Narrative (and) Discourse (Abbott)

People use narratives to participate in discourse.

Planning (SAMS Design Guide)

Planning helps commanders anticipate events and set in motion the actions that allow forces to act purposefully and effectively...Planning involves projecting thoughts forward in time and space to influence events before they occur.

ADP 5-0 Notes

Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. The Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. N.B. Unfamiliar not defined in text.

Policy and Laws (Dolman, Clausewitz)

Policy: the relationship between things and their effects. Laws come from norms and shared values from over time. Thus, laws are difficult to change.

Understanding the Environment (operationally) (EOA Campaign Analysis)

Political Military Economic Social Security Infrastructure Information Physical Environment Time

Realpolitik

Politics or diplomacy based primarily on power and on practical and material factors and considerations, rather than explicit ideological notions or moral or ethical premises.

Balance of Power Theory

Predicts that rapid changes in international power and status—especially attempts by one state to conquer a region—will provoke counterbalancing actions. For this reason, the balancing process helps to maintain the stability of relations between states. A balance of power system functions most effectively when alliances are fluid, when they are easily formed or broken because of expediency, regardless of values, religion, history, or form of government. Occasionally a single state plays a balancer role, shifting its support to oppose whatever state or alliance is strongest. A weakness of the balance of power concept is the difficulty of measuring power.

Problem Situation (SAMS Design Guide)

Problems that cannot be explicitly stated without appearing to oversimplify the situation, ones in which the designation of objectives is itself problematic.

Shift, Paradigm (Kuhn)

Problems that cannot be solved by known rules and procedures reveal anomalies, which eventually drive the scientific field to a new set of commitments and practices. This is a paradigm shift.

Scharnhorst, Gerhard (Clausewitz's mentor)

Prussian general (1755-1813) that observed that "one has to see the whole before seeing its parts." Reason alone cannot define reality.

Transformation (SAMS Design Guide)

Qualitative and systemic change to a situation. See also transformative thinking.

Metaquestion (SAMS Design Guide)

Questioning the current line of questioning. Meta-questions are used during design discourse to enhance critical thinking. See also reflective thinking, Appendix B, SAMS Art of Design Guide.

Moral Skepticism

Questions whether or not there is an objective standard.

Logic of Planning (SAMS Design Guide)

Rational, rigorous, reductive, repeatable.

Escalator (Freedman)

Reciprocal action or miscalculation metaphor that characterizes war.

Approach of Planning (SAMS Design Guide)

Reduce and rationalize complexity by decomposing and analyzing component parts in detail.

Reification (Berger, Tilly)

Refers to making something real, bringing it into being, or making something concrete...used to represent facts that must then be manipulated in some way. Reification of social reality--The manner in which the institutional order is objectified. The apprehension of human phenomena as if they were non-human. This sort of bear resemblance to Feenberg's argument concerning technical codes. How we do not see the human values therein. Reification as an extreme step in the process of objectivation: fixated as a non-human inert facticity. "Typically, the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in consciousness." Reification of social roles--Roles reified in the same manner as institions. "I am just doing my job". Narrows the subjective distance that the individual may establish between him/herself and his/her role-playing.

Reciprocity (Berger)

Refers to responding to a positive action with another positive action, rewarding kind actions. As a social construct, reciprocity means that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal.

Norms-Based Approach (Freeman)

Reinforcing certain values to the point where it is well understood that they must not be violated.

Exogenous

Relating to an internal cause of origin.

Endogenous

Relating to internal cause of origin.

Systemic (SAMS Design Guide)

Relating to the entire system; holistic; not localized in any one area.

Emergence (SAMS Design Guide)

Relationships between parts of a system give rise to novel properties that are not properties of the parts in other combinations. Emergence is both spatial (emergent properties span multiple parts) and temporal (emergence is dynamic, and as a systems relationships change, new properties will emerge).

Jus Post Bellum

Responsibilities and accountability of just treatment of warring parties after war. Includes rights vindication and punishment.

Heuristics (March)

Rules of Thumb for calculating certain kinds of numbers or solving certain kinds of problems.

Institution

Rules that govern behavior. Rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other.

Scope of SCOA

SCOA provides AMSP students with a deeper understanding of the broader political context in which military force plays a role and, specifically, U.S. military force is employed. While Clausewitz often referred to the different concerns of officers at different ranks, implying that strategic context existed at a level above the operational artist, the current generation of soldier understands that politics with strategic consequence can happen at any rank. The purpose of this course is to develop in the student a sophisticated approach to understanding politics in an abstract, objective manner. It centers on an understanding of politics as the strategic interaction of political actors at various levels of aggregation, and the way that this interaction results in a complex adaptive system. This course, then, is not about the strategic context of a particular war or operation, but rather aims to generate within the students the HABITS OF MIND and PATTERNS OF INQUIRY that will enable them to evaluate the complex political context of a conflict and evaluate the relationship between that context and the use of force.

Discoveries (Kuhn)

Science does not develop by the accumulation of individual discoveries and inventions. Instead, problems that cannot be solved by known rules and procedures reveal anomalies, which eventually drive the scientific field to a new set of commitments and practices. This is a paradigm shift.

Inventions (Kuhn)

Science does not develop by the accumulation of individual discoveries and inventions. Instead, problems that cannot be solved by known rules and procedures reveal anomalies, which eventually drive the scientific field to a new set of commitments and practices. This is a paradigm shift.

COL Drew's SAMS Planner Nugget #1 (Scientist, Technician, Engineer)

Scientist--know Technician--apply Engineer--know, apply, and understand the problem for application (SAMS Planner)

Networks, Centralized/Decentralized/Distributed (Bousquet)

See http://s.mlkshk.com/r/199V for a visual depiction of centralized, decentralized, and distributed networks.

Nationalism (Tilly)

See pg. 116 for Tilly's expanded definition.

Selection (Axelrod)

Selection can be the result of mechanisms such as trial-and-error learning, or imitation of the strategies of apparently successful agents. A major way in which complex systems change is through change in the agents and their strategies.

Realism

Self-interested states compete for power and security. There is deductive logic and empirical evidence. See also Liberalism and Constructivism.

Heuristic (Gerras)

Simplifying strategies, or "general rules of thumb"

Limited Rationality (March)

Since not all alternatives are known, decision makers consider only a few alternatives and look at them sequentially rather than simultaneously, ignoring many of the consequences.

Regimes (Dolman)

Social devices aimed at reducing conflict and/or enhancing cooperation. Regimes facilitate such behavior by pointing agents to acceptable actions. Regimes describe the structure within which the agent operates, and the relationship between regimes and war behavior is fundamental to understanding the role of pure strategy.

Necessity

Something that is required for a certain outcome (have to do it) regardless of competing values.

Policy

Specific as in policy towards an entity (foreign country / people group), i.e. containment of soviet expansionism; protect the state of Israel; deterrence or appeasement to any specific one. When two or more policies are opposed by two different countries, this tension can lead to war, but not always.

Deterrence, Narrow (Freedman)

Specific military operation deterring a particular means of war. Contrast with broad deterrence.

Liberalism

Spread of democracy, global economic ties, and international organizations will strengthen peace. See also Realism and Constructivism.

Norms (Dolman)

Standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.

Strategy

Strategy derives from the Greek word 'strategos', meaning the art of the general. In the classical sense, strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. Given that operations provide the governing logic for engagements, strategy is more accurately the use made of the operation for the purpose of the war. Strategy, therefore, is an art that pertains to the conduct of war. Compare with statecraft.

Hamiltonian

Strong alliance between big government and big business are key to domestic stability and to effective action abroad. Nation needs to be integrated into the global economy on favorable terms. See also Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian U.S. foreign policies.

Ontology (M&W)

Subjective--What there is to know--First person facts.

Discontinuity, Social (Tilly)

Sudden changes of state occur at all levels of society, and have always done so, be they marriages ending in divorce, bankruptcies of industrial enterprises, or the collapse of empires. Some changes move from order to chaos-the more common event-some from disorder to stability.

Supersignals (Dorner)

Supersignals reduce complexity, collapsing a number of features into one. Consequently, complexity must be understood in terms of a specific individual and his or her supply of supersignals. We learn supersignals from experience, and our supply can differ greatly from another individual's. Therefore there can be no objective measure of complexity.

Path Dependence

System development from time t to t+1 is not wholly random and can only fall within limits created by the prior state of the system.

Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)

System requires a single dominant state to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among the most important members of the system. For a state to be a hegemon, it must have three attributes: the capability to enforce the rules of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a system that is perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. A hegemon's capability rests upon the likes of a large, growing economy, dominance in a leading technological or economic sector, and political power backed up by projective military power. An unstable system will result if economic, technological, and other changes erode the international hierarchy and undermine the position of the dominant state. Pretenders to hegemonic control will emerge if the benefits of the system are viewed as unacceptably unfair.

Five Layers of IR (Harrison)

System, state, society, government, and individual.

Ecological (Gaddis)

Systematic breakdown involving all dependent variables. Compare and contrast to reductionism/ist.

Reductionist/ism (Gaddis)

Systematic breakdown involving independent and dependent variables. Reductionism is a philosophical position which holds that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents. This can be said of objects, phenomena, explanation, theories, and meanings. Compare and contrast to ecological/ist.

Complex Adaptive System (CAS)

Systems that in their current status seek to achieve a logical goal for survival (purpose). CAS learn and adapt while in the midst of conflict (adapt to internal negative and external positive feedback).

System, Complex Adaptive (Dolman)

Systems that learn and adapt while in the midst of conflict; systems that display emergent behavior; the unit of analysis in complexity theory.

Metanoia-A Shift of Mind (Senge)

Systems thinking needs the disciplines of building shared vision, mental models, team learning, and personal mastery to realize its potential. Building a shared vision fosters commitment to the long-term. Mental models focus on the openness needed to unearth shortcomings in our present ways of seeing the world. Team learning develops the skills of groups of people to look for the larger picture that lies beyond individual perspectives. And personal mastery fosters the personal motivation to continually learn how our actions affect our world.

Complex Systems

Systems with a logical goal for survival (purpose).

Scope of TOA

TOA provides the student with the knowledge and skills to analyze and assess military theories of war and warfare in order to: define the linkage between THEORY, as a lens for analysis, HISTORY, as warfare unfolds in the modern era from the late 18th century to the present, and DOCTRINE, both at the time of its writing in the era of modern war and today with Unified Land Operations.

Moral Realism

Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common (and more or less defining) ground of moral realism. Moral Realism is subjective and internal. Compare to emotivism.

Narrative (SAMS Design Guide)

Tales that tellers and listeners map onto tellings of personal experience... Narratives situate narrators, protagonists, and listener/readers at the nexus of morally organized, past, present, and possible experiences...A narrative of personal experience is far more than a chronological sequence of events. In his Poetics, Aristotle discerned that narratives have a thematically coherent beginning, middle, and end...Interweaving human conditions, conduct, beliefs, intentions, and emotions, it is the plot that turns a sequence of events into a story or a history...In contrast with paradigmatic thinking, which emphasizes formal categorization, narrative thinking emphasizes the structuring of events in terms of a human calculus of actions, thoughts, and feelings.

Social Creation (SAMS Design Guide)

Teams encourage more diverse perspectives and experiences to be represented during designing. The social nature of design in the military context is a source of great strength, but it also presents significant challenges. Peter Senge identifies four important factors for ensuring social dynamics are healthy and conducive to team learning: dialogue, alignment, a shared language for dealing with complexity, and practice. Social creation requires leaders to manage the level of stress within the design team. John Kotter notes that in an increasingly complex environment, organizations must also become more complex by embracing diversity and interdependence. Understanding and addressing the organizational aspects of design is essential to enabling social creation (Hatch).

Technoscience (Bousquet)

Technoscience is a concept widely used in the interdisciplinary community of science and technology studies to designate the technological and social context of science.

AMSP Mission

The School of Advanced Military Studies educates members of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Interagency at the graduate level to become agile and adaptive leaders who are critical and creative thinkers who produce viable options to solve operational and strategic problems.

Wilsonianism

The U.S. has a moral obligation and important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values throughout the world, creating a peaceful international community that accepts the rule of law. The idea of a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Wilsonianism or Liberal Internationalism is the idea that we can no longer isolate ourselves from the rest of the world. Not only must we not isolate ourselves, but we must become leaders in the spread of democracy to willing nations. Wilsons idealistic internationalism, now referred to as Wilsonianism, which calls for the United States to enter the world arena to fight for democracy, has been a contentious position in American foreign policy, serving as a model for idealists to emulate and realists to reject ever since. See also Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian U.S. foreign policies.

Smart Power (Nye)

The ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies.

Soft Power (Nye)

The ability to effect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcome.

Power (Nye)

The ability to effect the outcomes you want, and if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen.

Discrimination

The act of choice or selection.

Appreciation (TRADOC Pam 525-5-500)

The act of estimating the qualities of things and giving them their proper value. Appreciation allows the commander to design, plan, execute, and adapt his actions within the operational environment, through learning about the nature and context of the problem as the campaign unfolds. Understanding requires framing the problem and mission analysis.

Appreciation (SAMS Design Guide)

The act of estimating the qualities of things and giving them their proper value; understanding the nature, meaning, quality or magnitude of a situation. Whereas facts may be analyzed (see analysis), situations requiring operational art must be appreciated.

Thinking, Divergent (SAMS Design Guide)

The act of extending the boundary of a design situation so as to have a large enough, and fruitful enough, search space in which to seek a solution. See also creative thinking, convergent thinking and transformative thinking.

Argumentation (Gerras)

The action or process of reasoning systematically in support of an idea, action, or theory.

Liberal Internationalism (Brown/Ainley)

The adaptation of broadly liberal political principles to the management of the international system.

Problematization (SAMS Design Guide)

The analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience, or a set of practices which were accepted without question, which were familiar and out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions. Problematization is the search for inconsistencies or incoherence in the logic of the methods or the deeper structures being applied. Problematization is essential in design discourse both for drawing attention to the emergence of a crisis in the current understanding, and for recognizing the discrepancy between the current system and the desired system. See also discourse, reframing.

Strategy (TRADOC Pam 525-5-500)

The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to protect or advance national interests.

Planning (ADP 5-0)

The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about.

Design (noun) (SAMS Design Guide)

The artifacts (drawings and narratives) produced through the act of designing. See also design (verb).

Evidence (Maclean, Gerras, Red Team Guide, Clausewitz, van Evera)

The available body of facts or information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid.

Ontology (Berger)

The belief that the world appears through language and is situated in discourse. What is spoken exists but knowledge is not possible because meanings cannot be fixed. There are no facts, only interpretations.

Interests

The body of literature that seeks to define interests is enormous. In the context of SCOA, an interest is basically a state's action in relation to other states where it seeks to gain an advantage or benefits to itself.

Ontology (TOA)

The branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of being.

Epistemology (Berger, Osinga)

The branch of philosophy that deals with knowledge. Objective--how we know. In short, on learning.

Chaos Theory

The branch of science concerned with the behavior of complex systems in which tiny changes can have major effects.

Discourse (TRADOC Pam 525-5-500, Abbott, Lynn, Linn, Osinga/Boyd)

The candid exchange of ideas without fear or retribution that results in a synthesis and shared visualization of the operational problem. Discourse is essential to narrative creation and refinement, and to producing a common understanding both within the staff and command. Discourse is not simply an exchange of information. It is a technique that intends to establish fact in an event or situation under consideration, and what way of expressing the meaning of those facts is appropriate to an understanding of those facts. Discourse is a continuous process as conflicting narratives confront each other and are modified. An organized way of talking, writing, and acting accordingly. See also narrative, problematization. Compare to reality of war; linked to narratives and relationships.

Objective (JP 1-02)

The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed.

Objective (SAMS Design Guide)

The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military operation should be directed. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commanders plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). See also planning, end state.

Operational Art (JP 1-02/3-0, ADRP 1-02/3-0/5-0)

The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs...supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment...to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.

Exceptionalism

The condition of being exceptional; uniqueness--the study of the unique and exceptional, a theory that a nation, region, or political system is exceptional and does not conform to the norm. In early American history, foreign policy existed to defend, not define what America was.

Shared Image (Gharajedaghi)

The culture, or source of the desired future for a socio-cultural system.

Logic of Appropriateness (March)

The decision maker selects actions matched to situations by means of rules organized into identities.

Logic of Consequence (March)

The decision maker selects the alternative whose consequences maximize his utility.

Morals

The difference between right and wrong. Can be individual or from a group perspective.

Team Learning (Senge)

The discipline of team learning starts with "dialogue," the capacity of members of a team to suspend assumptions and enter into a genuine "thinking together." (Dialogue differs from the more common "discussion," which has its roots with "percussion" and "concussion," literally a heaving of ideas back and forth in a winner-takes-all competition.) Team learning is vital because teams, not individuals, are the fundamental learning unit in modern organizations. "Unless teams can learn, the organization cannot learn."

Cognitive Tension (Naveh)

The dynamism of the reaction of the system as a whole, both to the cognitive imperatives, laid by the commander's plan, and to the imperatives dictated by the randomness of combat. Operational Art is essentially that cognitive tension between strategic aim and tactical execution. The "operational cognitive tension" is based on HUMINT, on common methods of thought and nomenclature, on a clear definition of aims and goals, on an understanding of the factor of randomness, and, above all, on system consciousness.

Tactics (JP 1-02, SAMS Design Guide)

The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Contrast with strategy.

Complex(ity) (SAMS Design Guide, Gharajedaghi, Dolman, Bar-Yam)

The essence of complexity is related to the amount of variety within the system, as well as how interdependent the different components are. Consisting of many different and connected parts. Also difficult to understand; contrast complex with complicated. See also complex adaptive system. Reductionism and analysis are not as useful with interactively complex systems because they lose sight of the dynamics between the components. The study of interactively complex systems must be systemic rather than reductionist, and qualitative rather than quantitative, and must use different heuristic approaches rather than analytical problem solving. The interaction of many parts, giving rise to difficulties in linear or reductionist analysis due to the nonlinearity of the inherent circular causation and feedback effects. See also complex adaptive system and complexity theory.

Agent (Axelrod)

The essential unit of a complex system defined by the inherent discretion in choice of decentralized decision-making behavior in that system (i.e. car driver). Used interchangeably with actor.

Learning (SAMS Design Guide)

The first question for designers required to create an innovative response to a unique problem situation is "How can we learn about this situation?" Before the design team can design a solution, they must first design their own learning system. Getting this learning system right is more important than the initial design product. Learning is a broad theme in design that encompasses reframing, refinement, adaptation and evolution. Learning in design occurs at multiple levels. Learning to learn requires the ability to take a meta-perspective at all levels. The significance of the meta-level is it frees designers from the constraints of any one theory of learning, which allows the design team to reframe when the current paradigm loses relevance in a changing context.

Mapping the Mess (Gharajedaghi)

The heuristic process of defining essential characteristics and the emergent property of the mess.

Critical Analysis (Clausewitz)

The influence of theoretical truths on practical life is always exerted more through critical analysis than through doctrine. Critical analysis being the application of theoretical truths to actual events, it not only reduces the gap between the two but also accustoms the mind to these truths through their repeated application. We have established a criterion for theory, and must now establish one for critical analysis as well.

Potential (SAMS Design Guide)

The inherent ability or capacity for growth, development, or coming into being. The potential reveals how much the propensity of the system can be changed through intervention.

Double Intent

The intent to create good. The intent to avoid evil (i.e. to cause too much killing).

Statecraft

The interactions between group character, group traditions, policies. The use made of the war or the threat of war for the purpose of a policy objective. Statecraft is the domain of the statesman whereas strategy is the domain of the General Officer charged with the conduct of the war (the supreme commander). Compare with strategy. Some historical examples of successful statesmen are Bismarck, Lincoln, Churchill and Thatcher.

Strategic Level of War (JP 3-0)

The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives.

COL Drew's SAMS Planner Nugget #2 (Assumptions)

The most dangerous assumption is the one you didn't know you made.

Jacksonian

The most important goal of the U.S. government in both foreign and domestic policy should be the physical security and economic well-being of the American people. U.S. should not seek out foreign quarrels, but in the case of war, victory is the only way. See also Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, and Jeffersonian U.S. foreign policies.

Emergence (Gharajedaghi, Dolman, Osinga/Boyd, Axelrod)

The movement from low-level rules to higher-level sophistication; relationships between parts of a system give rise to novel properties that are not properties of the parts in other combinations; both spatial (emergent properties span multiple parts) and temporal (emergence is dynamic, and as a systems relationships change, new properties will emerge).

Legitimacy

The normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.

Egoism

The normative ethical position that moral agents ought to do what is in their own self-interest.

Legality

The normative ethical position that morals agents ought to do what is in their own self-interest.

Propensity (SAMS Design Guide)

The organic tendency of the system, which does not account for the influence of external actions. The propensity of a system is not deterministic. It identifies a range of possible futures if the system is allowed to evolve without intervention. See also potential.

Nonlinear (SAMS Design Guide)

The output of a system varies disproportionately with the input. In technical terms, a system is linear if and only if f(a+b)=f(a)+f(b) for all possible inputs a and b; otherwise it is nonlinear. Assuming a system is linear greatly simplifies analysis, however almost all real world systems are nonlinear.

Tolerance (SAMS Design Guide)

The permissible range of variation for a concept, action, or outcome. The concept of tolerance enables designers to evaluate their strategic sponsors guidance and directives in light of what is acceptable and why, and to consider design actions through a lens that encompasses a wider space for action over time. Contrast with objective.

Phenomenology (Berger)

The philosophical study of the structures of subjective experience and consciousness.

Isolationism

The policy or doctrine of isolating ones country from the affairs of other nations by declining to enter into alliances, foreign economic commitments, international agreements, etc., seeking to devote the entire efforts of ones country to its own advancement and remain at peace by avoiding foreign entanglements and responsibilities.

Perspective (SAMS Design Guide)

The position or point of view from which events and experiences are categorized, made sense of and explained. Stakeholders interpret the same problem situation differently because they have different perspectives.

Building Shared Vision (Senge)

The practice of shared vision involves the skills of unearthing shared "pictures of the future" that foster genuine commitment and enrollment, rather than compliance.

Paradigm (Kuhn)

The practices that define a scientific discipline at a certain point in time. According to Kuhn, a paradigm is the most important aspect of a true science. Essentially a paradigm is a framework or central concept around which the science fits. For example, the Laws or Relativity for Physics.

Altruism

The principle or practice of concern for the welfare of others.

Logic

The principles that guide the reasoning of an actor in a particular situation. See also form and function.

Objectivation (Berger)

The process by which the externalized products of human activity attain the character of objectivity.

Leadership (FM 6-22, SAMS Design Guide)

The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Contrast with facilitation.

Coerce (Freedman)

The purposeful use of overt force to influence another's strategic choices. Compellence and deterrence...

Operational Art (ADP 3-0)

The pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. Operational art is how commanders balance risk and opportunity to create and maintain the conditions necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and gain a position of relative advantage while linking tactical actions to reach a strategic objective. It requires commanders who understand their operational environment, the strategic objectives, and the capabilities of all elements of their force. These commanders continually seek to expand and refine their understanding and are not bound by preconceived notions of solutions.

Causation

The relationship between something that happens and the effect it causes.

Tension (SAMS Design Guide)

The resistance or friction among and between actors. Tension arises from differences and can be exploited as a source of transformation.

Context (SAMS Design Guide)

The set of circumstances that surround a particular event, action or system. Link: SCOA focused on building "contextual intelligence," particularly on the strategic (policy) level.

End state (JP 1-02, SAMS Design Guide)

The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commanders objectives.

Global Meliorism

The socio-economic and politico-cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better place. It is based on the assumption that the United States can, should, and must reach out to help other nations share in the American dream. The modal verbs can, should, and must in turn imply the assumptions that the American model is universally valid, that morality calls the United States to help others emulate it, and that the success of the American experiment itself ultimately depends on other nations escaping from dearth and oppression. After all, Wilson just hoped to make the world safe for democracy; Global Meliorists aim to make the world democratic. Whereas Wilsonianism was an institutional and legal response to the challenge of a revolutionary world, and Containment a strategic and military response, Global Meliorism was economic, cultural, and political.

Principle (Dolman, Clausewitz)

The spirit and sense of the law. Two types: objective (universal) and subjective (decision maker).

Thinking, Convergent (SAMS Design Guide)

The stage after the problem has been defined, the variables have been identified and the objectives have been agreed. The designers aim becomes that of reducing the secondary uncertainties progressively until only one of many possible alternative designs is left as the final solution to be launched into the world. See also divergent thinking.

Thinking, Transformative (SAMS Design Guide)

The stage of pattern-making, fun, high-level creativity, flashes of insight, changes of set, inspired guesswork; everything that makes designing a delight. It is also the critical stage when big blunders can be made, when wishful thinking or narrow mindedness can prevail and when valid experience and sound judgment are necessary if the world is not to be saddled with the expensive, useless, or harmful, results of large but misguided investments of human effort. Transformative thinking bridges the gap between divergent thinking and convergent thinking.

Game Theory

The study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent, rational decision-makers.

Sociology (Berger)

The study of the development, structure, and functioning of human society. All knowledge is socially constructed within groups and societies, and over time are institutionalized into vast, complex, and expanding bureaucracies. The sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality.

Metaphysics

The study of the kinds of things that exist in the universe.

Metaethics

The study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. Investigates where our ethical principles come from and what they mean.

International Relations (Brown/Ainley)

The study of the relations of states, and that those relations are understood primarily in diplomatic, military, and strategic terms. Diplomatic-strategic relations focus on issues of war and peace, conflict and cooperation, while cross-border transactions of all kinds...political, economic and social...study trade negotiations or the operation of non-state institutions such as the UN.

Ethics

The systematic study (or framework) of morality.

Science

The systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment. Also an organized body of knowledge on any subject.

Thinking, Systems (Gharajedaghi)

The term "Systems Thinking" is sometimes used as a broad catch-all heading for the process of understanding how systems behave, interact with their environment and influence each other. Systems Thinking has been defined as an approach to problem solving, [this is not a definition of Systems Thinking, it is an application of Systems Thinking] by viewing "problems" as parts of an overall system, rather than reacting to specific parts, outcomes or events and potentially contributing to further development of unintended consequences. Systems Thinking is not one thing but a set of habits or practices within a framework that is based on the belief that the component parts of a system can best be understood in the context of relationships with each other and with other systems, rather than in isolation. Systems Thinking focuses on cyclical rather than linear cause and effect. Five properties: openness, purposefulness, multidimensionality, emergent property, counterintuitiveness

Empiricism

The theory that all knowledge is derived form experience and observation.

Black Swan Theory

The theory was developed by Nassim Nicholas Taleb to explain: 1. The disproportionate role of high-profile, hard-to-predict, and rare events that are beyond the realm of normal expectations in history, science, finance, and technology 2. The non-computability of the probability of the consequential rare events using scientific methods (owing to the very nature of small probabilities). 3. The psychological biases that make people individually and collectively blind to uncertainty and unaware of the massive role of the rare event in historical affairs. Black swan events were introduced by Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his 2001 book Fooled By Randomness, which concerned financial events. His 2007 book The Black Swan extended the metaphor to events outside of financial markets. Taleb regards almost all major scientific discoveries, historical events, and artistic accomplishments as "black swans"—undirected and unpredicted. He gives the rise of the Internet, the personal computer, World War I, dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the September 2001 attacks as examples of black swan events.

Positivism

The use of deductive logic and empirical evidence to back up whatever IR theory one suggests.

Form (SAMS Design Guide)

The visualized physical arrangement of organizations, materiel and actions. Form is the tangible expression of the designs function and logic.

Strategy (Axelrod)

The way an agent responds to its surroundings and pursues its goals.

Is

The way the world is. Compare with "ought".

Ought

The way the world ought to be. Compare with "is".

Dialogue (Senge)

The word comes from the Greek work dialogos. Dia means through, and Logos means the word, or more broadly, the meaning. The purpose of dialogue is to go beyond any one individual's understanding. In dialogue, individuals gain insides that simply could not be achieved individually. Three conditions from Bohm: 1. All participants suspend their assumptions 2. All participants must regard one another as colleagues 3. There must be a facilitator who holds the context of dialogue

Systems Thinking (Senge)

The world IS NOT created of separate unrelated forces. However, individuals have difficulty seeing the whole pattern. Systems thinking is a conceptual framework, a body of knowledge and tools that has been developed over the past fifty years, to make the full patterns clearer, and to help us see how to change things effectively and with the least amount of effort--to find the leverage points in a system.

Nested Systems

The world political system is modeled as a hierarchy of nested sets of subsystems, each embraced by those at the next higher level of analysis and embracing those at all lower levels.

Hegemon(y)

There is one nation-state in charge and all the political, economic, and social institutions are formed to meet the principle nation-state who is the dominant player. Other nations will benefit from the systems as well, but the system is primarily developed to support and keep the principle nation-state in power. Leadership or predominant influence exercised by one nation over others, as in a confederation...leadership, predominance (especially smaller nations), aggression, or expansionism by large nations in an effort to achieve world domination.

Mental Models (Senge)

They are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action. The discipline of working with mental models starts with turning the mirror inward; learning to unearth our internal pictures of the world, to bring them to the surface and hold them rigorously to scrutiny.

Values

Things that one considers important (can change).

Metacognition (Berger)

Thinking about thinking.

Systems Thinking vs. Systems Analysis

Thinking in terms of boundaries, flows, relationships, feedback loops, patterns, and attractors, both between the system and the environment, and between parts of the system. In contrast to Systems Analysis, which breaks apart wholes to understand parts; Systems Thinking provides a way for planners to synthesize a new emergent whole.

Relativism

This worldly. Morality is subjective.

Interest-Based Approach (Freeman)

Those who contemplate harming certain well-defined interests should know the consequences.

Systemic Understanding

Through discourse and narrative construction, a systemic relationship emerges that speaks to the level of systemic and interactive complexity a commander must deal with when attempting to achieve his/her desired end state. Additionally, the process identifies gaps in knowledge, and assumptions that are being made, all of which are refined as the iterative processes of problem re-framing and campaign design continue.

Types of Causal Theories (Stone)

Through narratives, the narrator will essentially try to move the audience to a quadrant of this table to generate a linear nature of causality.

Virtues (Virtue Ethics)

Traits of moral excellence (can't change). Good habits of character. Virtues are not universal, and this drives differences in morality between cultures. Plato emphasized four virtues in particular, which were later called cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Christians use Faith, Hope and Love. Comes from internal factors (intrinsic).

Confirmation Bias

Trying to justify what one finds as true.

Jeffersonian

U.S. foreign policy should be less concerned about spreading democracy abroad than safeguarding it at home; skeptical of Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policies that involve the U.S. with unsavory allies abroad or increased risks of war. See also Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian U.S. foreign policies.

Purpose of Design (SAMS Design Guide)

Understand, learn and adapt to iteratively (re)frame and (re)solve problems.

System, Hierarchical (Brown/Ainley)

Units that are different are organized under a clear line of authority.

System, Anarchical (Brown/Ainley)

Units that are similar in nature, even though they differ dramatically in capabilities, conduct relations with one another.

Difference (SAMS Design Guide)

Unlike or dissimilar. Contrast with identity. Difference is essential to design because adaptation, critical thinking, discourse, divergent thinking, problematization and tension all depend on the presence of difference. Difference is foundational to design. Difference is how we learn. What is different? Why? What are the sources of difference? What is the difference between the environment as I understand it and as I want it to be? Why is there a difference between them and what are the origins of that difference? These questions reveal to the designer sources of opposition within that system, and provide an entry point for reflection on self in relation to the environment and the other. Understanding the practical implications of these differences is where relevant, useful, transformative action can be identified. Appreciating difference is how designers assess whether we are "solving the right problem." The appreciation of difference is the first step of critical thinking.

Scope of FOA

Upon graduation from the School of Advanced Military Studies, AMSP students will "[understand] the complexities of past and future operational environments." To this end, in FOA students draw on previous courses to synthesize elements of future operational art. Since no one commands a monopoly of knowledge on what the future holds, instead of preparing students for a specific future, this course exposes students to a wide range of thought on future warfare, thus teaching them how to think about the future instead of what to think.

Systems Approach, Soft (SAMS Design Guide)

Use of loosely structured methods to investigate a problem situation in human activity systems from multiple perspectives in order to identify interventions that are feasible and desirable from all perspectives.

Systems Approach, Soft (SAMS Design Guide)

Use of loosely structured methods to investigate a problem situation in human activity systems from multiple perspectives in order to identify interventions that are feasible and desirable from all perspectives. Contrast with hard systems approach.

Systems Approach, Hard (SAMS Design Guide)

Use of precise and, when possible, quantitative techniques intended to produce one or more views and a dynamic model of the system of interest. Contrast with soft systems approach.

Deconstruction (Gerras, Red Team Guide)

Value conflicts, prescriptive assumptions, descriptive assumptions, heuristics, how good is evidence, statistics.

Heroes (Linn)

War is an art and it is not susceptible to explanation by fixed formula. Tradition emphasizes the human element, exemplified by "intangibles like military genius, experience, courage, morale and discipline." "This approach encouraged adaptability and innovation and fostered an ability to separate the essential from the trivial..." Heroes could transition easily between types of war. Gen. George Patton and Gen. Tommy Franks were members of this group. In essence the frontier wars taught Heroes that war was a complex and unscientific phenomena and "always contingent on the human element." See also Guardians and Managers.

Clausewitz Many Descriptions of War

War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. Here are a few more of his many descriptions: a. an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. (I:I, p. 75) b. never an isolated act (I:l, p. 78) c. a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy (I:1, para. 23, p. 87) d. merely the continuation of policy by other means (I:1, para 24, p. 87) e. the realm of danger . . . uncertainty . . . chance (I:3, p. 101) f. an act of mutual destruction (III:16, p. 216) g. a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. (VIII:6, p. 605)

Clausewitzian Overarching Description of War

War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. In pure theory it goes to the extreme. However, The Probabilities of Real Life Replace the Extreme and the Absolute Required by Theory. The Political Object is always in play. Therefore, War Is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means. In other words, Policy is the hierarchal social institution through which war is generated.

Clausewitz's Remarkable Trinity (EOA Campaign Analysis)

War suspended between three magnets (paradoxical trinity): Passion (people) Probability/chance (commander and his army) Policy (government) - As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical (remarkable) trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force (people); of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam (commander and his army); and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone (government).

Reframing, Historical Examples

Washington and the Continental Army initially looked to decisively engage British forces in and around New York City in a very and deliberate way. After suffering defeat, Washington seems to have been forced to reframe his and the Continental Army's given problem set, that to an approach, which sought to move into the New Jersey interior for the winter, while luring British forces into areas that afforded little sustainment, extended their lines of communication, and generally made them more vulnerable to attack (c.f., battles in / around Trenton and Princeton). The Soviet Red Army believed that it could wage warfare at the operational level, for example, by massing large numbers of men and material and directly attacking German forces in order to achieve a decisive military and strategic victory. However, Soviet Stavka leadership and Stalin, drawing on earlier concepts promulgated by Alexandr Svechin and Mikhail Tukhachevsky, eventually chose to reframe their military problem albeit at considerable initial cost and loss. Soviet leaders soon realized that their particular problem set (e.g., shortage of men) necessitated a different operational and theoretical approach--deep operations / battle--that took a more indirect route toward attacking German strategic and operational centers of gravity through the alignment of tactical actions into operations, and the alignment of operations into campaigns, that eventually bridged the intended strategic goals sought with tactical actions on the battlefield. The U.S. led Operation Iraqi Freedom began as a conventional state-on-state conflict that eventually morphed into a counterinsurgency that focused more on insurgents and the will of the people versus conventional threats. The United States military shifted its approaches accordingly overtime in order to positively affect change toward a desired end state.

Systemic Approach vs. Systems Thinking (SAMS Design Guide)

We want to take a systemic approach, to construct systems models, and to use those models as a source of questions within design discourse. Often, this systemic approach is characterized as 'systems thinking.' Systems thinking means thinking in terms of boundaries, flows, relationships, feedback loops, patterns, and attractors, both between a system and its environment, and between parts of the system. In contrast to analysis, which breaks apart wholes to understand the parts, systems thinking provides a way for designers to synthesize new emergent wholes.

Cooperation

When actors visibly adjust their behavior, normally through policy. Legitimacy, self-interests, shared values, and coercion may all contribute to cooperation.

Consent (Freedman)

When an agent can be influenced without the use of force. Link to Consensual Strategy.

Control (Freedman)

When an agent is influenced by the coercive use of force. Linked to Controlling Strategy.

Crisis (Kuhn)

When enough significant anomalies have accrued against a current paradigm, the scientific discipline is thrown into a state of crisis, according to Kuhn. During this crisis, new ideas, perhaps ones previously discarded, are tried.

Feedback (Dolman)

Where the output of a system loops back and modifies subsequent inputs to the system. A negative feedback loop stabilizes the system by damping perturbations away from equilibrium. A positive feedback loop destabilizes the system by amplifying perturbations. Feedback is the underlying source of complexity, emergence, and nonlinearity. Adaptation and evolution require both positive and negative feedback loops to generate and retain novelty.

Feedback (SAMS Design Guide)

Where the output of a system loops back and modifies subsequent inputs to the system. A negative feedback loop stabilizes the system by damping perturbations away from equilibrium. A positive feedback loop destabilizes the system by amplifying perturbations. Feedback is the underlying source of complexity, emergence, and nonlinearity. Adaptation and evolution require both positive and negative feedback loops to generate and retain novelty.

Limits to Growth (Senge)

a reinforcing or amplifying process is set in motion to produce growth. It creates a spiral of success along with inadvertent secondary effects (manifested in a balancing process) which eventually slow down the success---don't push growth; remove the factors limiting growth. You experience growth for a time, then plateau, then decline.

Napoleonic System (Chandler/van Creveld/Epstein)

• Corps d' armee • Distributed maneuver • Decentralized command and control • Napoleon as military and political leader • Levee en masse and the popular army • Role of the staff • Still focused on the decisive battle

Moltke's System (Craig/Citino/Wawro)

• Importance of technology, but not over reliance: railways, telegraphs, firepower, external lines • Concentration and deployment • Interaction of movement and combat • The need to improvise • "Strategy is a system of expedients" (competent science of mobilization) • Issued only the most essential orders • Exalted science, maneuver, and innovation IOT win with minimum friction and casualties