Causation

how to deal with willful blindness

- did defendant deliberately take steps to shield themselves from information (federal approach- state V nations used ) - MPC - high probability of knowledge (instead of very very x10 hi )

garcia cont

-Is defendant's behavior proximate cause? Or doctors? -Sole cause test -medical malpractice is the intervening cause (found out after defendants conduct and before victims harm -is intervening cause superseding? (to defendants conduct ) -if intervening cause is not sole cause, it is not superseding Holding: the trial court properly ruled that evidence of malpractice, even if it was outrageous as the defendant's witness testified was inadmissible Reasoning: the intervening act was not normal according to the defendant; it was outrageous and due process demands he be allowed to present it as a defense -the facts of griffen are strikingly similar to the facts in the present case. The malpractice was held not to be the sole cause of death -the Connecticut court held that the trial court properly refused to allow that evidence because no rational fact finder could conclude the intervening medical treatment, even if grossly negligent, was the sole cause of death -no reasonable fact finder could conclude the medical treatment was the sole proximate cause of death. In fact, the defendant's own witness testified it was not Issue: the question is whether garcia's superseding cause defense is one recognized in out law under the facts of this case

Claus roxin causation

-if victim is primarily responsible for conduct, defendant shouldn't be liable •The starting point for my argument is the distinction between helping someone else engage in conduct that risks causing him harm and endangering someone else by engaging in reckless conduct with that person's consent -the former scenario takes place when an actor suffers harm as a result of his own risky conduct -since A's decision to endanger his own life is not punishable, it cannot be criminal for B to help A engage in conduct that does not give rise to criminal liability •We have a different case when an actor consents to being endangered by someone else's conduct -An actor endangers someone else in circumstances when the person that is endangered by the actor's conduct assumes the risk with full knowledge of the dangerous nature of the conduct •Someone endangers another by endangering in reckless conduct with that persons' consent as instances that preclude a finding of legal causation when the actor who consents to being endangered by someone else's reckless conduct is as responsible or more responsible for the reckless conduct than the person who actually engaged in the reckless conduct •According to this approach, the case of someone who encourages an intoxicated driver to give him a ride should be treated differently than the case of someone who si reluctant to ride with the intoxicated driver but eventually yields to the drier's insistent pleas that he ride along with him -If the passenger suffers an accident in the first case, the passenger is as responsible for his own injuries as the driver -In the second case, however, the driver should be held liable, for he is more responsible for the passenger's injuries than the passenger •The passengers were exposed to the consequences of the action taken by the drivers and they lacked the capacity to prevent the drivers from engaging in risk maneuvers -For these reasons, the drivers should be held liable for the death of the passenger -The case would've been differnet if the deceased passenger been as responsible of the dangerous maneuver as the driver

Vera bergelson

-in favor of comparative liability (to what extent is defendant liable ) -respect for victims autonomy requires we acknowledge that if they were engaging in risky behavior •The right not to be harmed is a fundamental human right -I view the right not to be harmed as a bunch of stick-like rights- not to be killed, not to be injured, not to be deprived of liberty, property, etc. -A person's actions may trigger the loss of some of those specific rights and, in this sense, reduce the overall right not to be harmed •Accordingly, a person who, with the owner's consent, destroyed a valuable piece of property, has violated no rights of the owner sand is usually guilty of no offense •And a person who, while acting in self defense, applied more force than reasonably necessary, is responsible only for that "extra" force because the attacker has lost his right not to be attacked at all, but retained a right not to be attacked with a disproportionate amount of force •Conditionality of rights principle- there are 2 relevant inquiries: (I) what rights did the parties possess prior to the criminial encounter? And (ii) has the victim reduced his rights, voluntarily or involuntarily? •If the victim does not possess the relevant right, he may not reduce it either -In that case, the victim's conduct should not affect the perpetrator's liability •Provided the victim had relevant alienable rights, he may reduce or waive them by consent -To be valid , consent has to be freely given and rational -There is a strong argument for not punishing a person who caused harm pursuant to the valid consent of the victim

Larry alexander

-negligence shouldn't lead to blame -in order to be blameworthy -> needs to have consciousness of conduct •Negligence involves inadvertence to a risk that, if adverted to, would render the actor reckless -I have urged that negligence be dropped from criminal codes as a form of criminal culpability •We are not morally culpable for taking risks of which we are unaware -At anu point in time we are failing to notice a great many things, we have forgotten a great many things, and we are misinformed or uninformed about many things -an injunction to notice, remember and be fully informed about anything that bears on risks to others is an injunction no human being can comply with •If inadvertence to risk is merely the nonculpable product of some prior culpable act •When they went downstairs they did not believe they were taking any substantial risk with their child, perhaps no more substantial risk than we believe we are taking when we attend a workshop and leave our children with a sitter -Of course, once sam and ruth became engaged with their guests, the child's situation slipped out of their minds and once the thought was out of their minds, they had no power to retrieve it -They were at the mercy of the fact that they left their child in the bath with the water running to pop back into their mind, which it did not •One is culpable only for acts over which one has control -One is not culpable for one's ignorance unless one is in control of it -And one can be in control of one's ignorance only indirectly, say, by deliberately refraining from learning something while being aware that one is running an unjustifiable risk of dangerous ignorance •The reasonable actor is supposed to be aware of more than the negligent actor but less than god •There is, however, no way to construct the reasonable person Non arbitrarily -But if ignorance is never culpable because we lack direct control over it, then we have no materials from which to construct a nonarbitrary reasonable person •Without a culpable act to mark the beginning of the story of the crime, the choice of when to begin it, and thus whether it is a case of strict liability. or a case of involuntariness purely arbitrary

George fletcher

-says Alexander thinks negligence is an omission, but it is unleashing a danger into the world- an act •No one is liable for an omission unless there is a duty to intervene and prevent the harm from occurring •as the law of negligence evolved, however, the failure to exercise due care- an omission- came to be seen as part of affirmative risks to others -The omission becomes a minor part of the actor's assertive conduct •The idea that the harm was foreseeable means that the actor was out on notice that there might be something risky in his conduct or in the state of the things in his charge -There is warrant for talking to others, for being open to advise about the correct path of conduct -When it is extremely unlikely that anyone would know of the danger, the case falls under the excuse of Unforeseeability •And having the opportunity to correct one's belief and failing to exercise that capacity lie at the foundation of the fault of not knowing •Larry alexander- actors can only be blamed for what they freely choose to do -Criminalizing negligence is unfair, for doing so punishes actors for generating risks that they did not freely choose to create •George fletcher suggests that in order to understand why negligence should be punished it is necessary to focus on what the actor did as opposed to focusing on what the actor failed to do -Once the focus is on the creation of the risk instead of on failing to remember about their child, the relevant question becomes whether they had good reasons to create the risk -Given that they did not have good reasons for creating the risk, their negligent risk creation is culpable

jackowski notes

-subjective offense elements - purposely (likelihood that conduct gives intended outcome is irrelevant ), knowingly (you are very sure this result will happen ), recklessly (it may happen -risk ), negligently -to establish purpose - conscious objective -willful blindness- when you block yourself ffrom obtaining knowledge -> you are on the hook for that knowledge -> mental state is knowingly •Model penal code 2.02 reduces subjective elements to four kinds of culpability, namely: purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negligence •The defendant in jackowski argued that in order to convict her of disorderly conduct as defined in the vermont penal law, the prosecution needed to prove that the purposely caused public inconvenience rather than merely demonstrating that she knowingly caused such annoyance -Vermont adopted the model penal code's approach to subjective offense elements (mens rea) •As the supreme court of vermont explains in jackowski, the term intent is frequently used as synonymous with purpose -NY penal law states: ->The following definitions are applicable to this chapter: 1. Intentionally- when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct 2. Knowingly- when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exists •What happens when the defendant purposely tries to harm juan but his conduct ends up harming mary instead? -This raises the problem of transferred intent. -The issue is addressed in 2.03 of MPC: When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless: a. The accrual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused, or b. The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated

§7.05 model penal code- causal relationship between conduct and result

1. conduct is the cause of a result when: a. It is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and b. The relationship between the conduct and the result satisfies any additional causal requirements impose by the code or by the law defining the offense 2. when purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense the element is not established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless: a. the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or b. The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense 3. when recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which he should be aware unless: a. The actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probably injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or b. The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probably result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense 4. when causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability Is imposed ny law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct

Model penal code- general requirements of culpability

1. min requirements of culpability- except as provided in section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense 2. kinds of culpability defined a. Purposely A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: i. If the element involves nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and ii. If the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist b. Knowingly: A acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: b. If the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and c. If the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result

In re DG, juvenile

Facts: DG appeals from an adjudication of delinquency based on a finding that he recklessly placed another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. DG, who was 14 years old at the time of the events in question entered the bedrooms of two of the other boys and used a lighter to ignite the spray from an aerosol can of deodorant. Both testified that DG was fooling around. DG testified in his own behalf, asserting that he was just fooling around and didn't think I'd actually hurt anybody. He testified further that he was not aware the can could explode and had no intention to hurt anyone. The state subsequently filed a delinquency petition, alleging that DG had engaged in reckless endangerment, under vermont law Defense: DG contends: 1. the evidence failed to demonstrate that he consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of injury. We agree Rule: the reckless endangerment statute applies to any person who recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily harm. We have endorsed the model penal code definition of recklessness, which provides I "a person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct Criminal negligence results when an actor is unaware of the risk which the actor should have perceived. Thus, serious bodily injury, although courts have held that such knowledge may be inferred from circumstances such as the actor's knowledge and experience, or from what a similarly situated reasonable person would have understood about the risk under the particular circumstances Reasoning: all of the record evidence in this case tended to show that DG was unaware of any risk, much less a risk of serious bodily injury or death, and claimed that he did not experience any pain when he sprayed himself with the flame. His playful demeanor as described by the other boys plainly supported his assertion that he did not believe there was any serious risk. Nor was there any evidence suggesting that any reasonable person in DG's circumstances would have known that his behavior created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or serious bodily Injury Holding: the record contains no evidence to support the court's findings that DG knew of, and consciously disregarded, the risks that the can could blow up or otherwise cause death or serious bodily injury

Morisette v. US

Facts: at various places about the range signs read "danger-keep out- bombing range"/ spent bomb casings were cleared from the targets and thrown into piles so that they will be out of the way. Morisette loaded 3 tons of them on his truck. Morisette said he had no intention of stealing but thought the property was abandoned, unwanted and considered of no value to the gov. He was indicted on the charge that he did unlawfully, willingly, and knowingly steal and convert property of the US of the value of $84. Morisette testified taht he took it with no wrongful or criminal intent Rule: 18 USCA- whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts government property is punishable by fine and imprisonment -the question of intent can never be ruled as a question of law, but must always be submitted to the jury Reasoning: many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invastions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to a person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. Legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element State courts of last resort, on whom fall the heaviest burden of interpreting criminal law in this country, have consistently retained the requirement of intent in larceny type offenses. Congress, therefore, omitted any express prescription of criminal intent from the enactment before us in the light of an unbroken course of judicial decision in all constituent states of the union holding intent inherent in this class of offense even when not expressed in a statute Absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them Holding: mere omission from the text of the offense charged of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced -guilty mind that accompanies the act (mens rea) -the lack of mens rea in the statute -determining mens rea is central -did not hold that intent is required constitutionally -there is a distinction between core offenses and public welfare offenses (ex. Tearing tag off mattress. Intent isn't required. Punish behavior that is not immoral)

State v. loeffel

Facts: defendant loeffel appeals his conviction for 3 counts of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. Several officers began calling out to defendant and his girlfriend with a loudspeaker. This prompted defendant to come back out of his house and begin swearing and yelling very loudly at the officers from the enclosed porch. Defendant referred to a gun and said that the officers were fair game if they tried to enter his house. The officers kicked the front door of the house open and hound defendant in the entryway holding what turned out to be a loaded rifle with the safety off, as soon as he began to raise the rifle, the officers opened fire on defendant , hitting him twice Defense: defendant objected to the instruction, arguing that recklessness was insufficient to satisfy the offense mens rea requirement. The court overruled the objection and allowed the instruction. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that aggravated assault can be committed by recklessly threatening to do bodily injury to another Rule: a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he makes (a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or (b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another Under our criminal code, every offense not involving strict liability requires a prescribed culpable mental state. However, if the definition of an offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, then intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility Nothing in the text of either assault provision explicitly prescribes a culpable mental state. Therefore our statutory framework prescribes that section controls and that the mens rea requirement defaults to intent knowledge or recklessness Reasoning: because neither the aggravated assault statute nor the underlying simple assault statute specified a more culpable mental state, section 76-2 controls Holding: the trial court did not err in giving the jury a recklessness instructions -when MPC doesn't say a culpable mental state for a crime, default is recklessness , intent, or knowledge

State v. murray

Facts: defendant was test driving a volkswagen that defendant and harris had modified for racing. Defendant drove the car into a residential neighborhood where the speed limit was 35 mph and accelerated the car to a speed in excess of 90 mph. At that point, defendant lost control of the vehicle, which skidded into a power pole, sheared off the pole, and burst into flames. Harris was severely injured; passersby pulled him out of the burning car There is no question in this case that harris's participation in the test drive of the volkswagen on the night in question was voluntary -whether victims voluntary participation broke the link between harm and defendants behavior Defense: argues that under such circumstances, ni criminal liability can be assigned to either participant -after petersen, a person cannot be said to have legally caused a result to a victim if the victim was a willing participant in the conduct that led to the harm to the victim. As we shall show, however, defendant reads too much into this court's decision in petersen Rule: assault in the 3rd degree is defined in oregon penal law as follows: A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree If the person: Recklessly causes serious physical injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon -the dictionary defines the verb "cause" as follows: 1. to serve as a cause or occasion of: bring into existence: MAKE (careless driving accidents) 2. to effect by command, authority or force Nothing in the foregoing text (or the context) of the statute suggests that the legislature intended to carve out an exception for harm done to willing participants in the conduct. A person commits third degree assault if they recklessly bring about, make, or effect by force the serious injury of another person with a dangerous weapon, no matter the role of the other person in the reckless conduct -as long as all participants do so knowingly and voluntarily, I see no point in holding the survivors guilty of manslaughter if the reckless conduct results in death -the court should not impose legal responsibility for the death of a participant in a race on a surviving racer when his sole contribution to the death is the participation in the activity mutually agreed upon -a person commits third degree assault if, in addition to participation in the reckless activity, that person's own recklessness causes- I.e. brings about, makes, or effects by force- serious physical injury toa another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon, regardless of the other person's willing participation in the reckless activity Holding: the court's holding in petersen does not absolve defendant of criminal liability for his conduct in this case -defendant caused harris's serous physical injuries Reasoning: in petersen, the defendant's conduct did not cause the victim's death; the defendant's contribution was limited to participation in the speed contest. The victim was killed when a different person recklessly chose to speed into a busy intersection -he stipulated that he was driving recklessly and that his reckless driving led directly to the crash that injured harris

State v. garcia

Facts: garcia and four others were hired for $100 each to beat up an individual named daniel hernandez gonzales, who allegedly owed money for drugs. The four of them frove to the victim's home armed with a metal baseball bat, beet bottles and a gun "just in case" herenandez was armed. Garcia, with the gun and baseball bat, broke into the victim's trailer home and pushed him down on the couch. Garcia hit hernandez with the baseball bat, and the others hit him with beer bottles. Garcia shot him four times. As a result of the trauma to his lungs, the victim developed adult respiratory disease syndrome. With this condition , the lung becomes so dysfunctional that oxygen is unable to properly move from the airways to the blood stream, requiring the use of mechanical devices such as ventilators. Prior to his death, the victim's condition was steadily and rapidly deteriorating, with a number of organ systems failing. While he was being shaved by a hospital employee, a tracheotomy tube used to connect him to the ventilator was nicked, and the attending physician decided to change the tube to increase the efficiency of the oxygen getting into the lungs. Due to the victim's swollen neck, as the tube was being changed, his airway closed and the attending physician was unable to replace the tube. As a result, the victim asphyxiated. One doctor believed he victim would have died anyway, notwithstanding the tube change, within 3 or 4 days. It was this doctor's opinion that the gunshot wounds were the proximate cause of the victim's death and that the medical decisions relating to treatment were part of a chain of events set in motion by the wounds. Garcia and the others were charged with first degree murder State: the state filed a motion for audiciation of law points and a motion to exclude evidence that medical treatment, characterized by garcia as grossly negligent was an intervening and superseding cause of the victim's death. The court sustained the state's motion and found as a matter of law that the medical treatment was not a superseding cause of death Defense: garcia argues the district court denied him due process of law by depriving him of a defense to which he was entitled. Garcia argues this creates a jury question as to causation and that the district court erred in ruling prior to trial that he could not prevent this evidence Rule: an act is a cause of an event if two conditions are satisfied: the event would not have occurred without the act; and the act made the event more likely. The first condition is necessary to distinguish the attempted from the completed crime, the second to rule out cases in which while the event in question would not have occurred but for the act, the act did not create the kind of dangerous condition that would make such events more likely to occur A defendant can be relieved of criminal responsibility if an intervening act breaks the chain of causal connection between the defendant's actions and the victim's death. However, for an intervening act to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility for homicide the intervening act must be the sole proximate cause of death. In deciding whether medical treatments are superseding causes, we have stated: the intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which such conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about. -medical care furnished a crime victim cannot be a superseding cause of death but distinguishes them on the basis they involved ordinary negligence, not gross negligence as he claims here. If victims; deaths were prematurely pronounced due to a doctor's negligence, the subsequent procedures (removal of organs for transplant_ may have been a cause of death, but that negligence would not constitute a superseding cause of death relieving defendants of liability. If, however, the pronouncements of death were premature due to the gross negligence or the intentional wrongdoing of doctors, as determined by a grave deviation from accepted medical practices or disregard for legally cognizable criteria for determining death, the intervening medical procedure would interrupt the chain of causation and become the legal cause of death. Thus, the propriety of the chain of the medical procedures is integral to the question of causation the chain of causation and become the legal cause of death. Thus, the propriety of the cha -the test fir relief from criminal responsibility for a death applicable to the facts of this case remains whether the death can be attributed solely to the negligent medical treatment -even gross negligence will not relieve a criminal actor of liability unless it is the sole cause of death -negligent treatment or neglect of an injury will not excuse a wrongdoer unless the treatment or neglect was the sole cause of death; gross maltreatment by attending physicians or surgeons which was the sole cause of the victim's death is a good defense ot a charge of homicide. In order to avoid liability, the defendant must show that erroneous or unskilled medical care because the efficient intervening cause of death and superseded the effect of the wounds inflicted by the defendant so as to become toe proximate cause of death

People v. hall

Facts: hall flew off a knoll and collided with allen cobb who was traversing the slope below hall. Cobb sustained traumatic brain injuries and died as a result of the collision. The people charged hall with felony reckless manslaughter Rule: the charge of reckless manslaughter requires that a person recklessly cause the death of another person. For his conduct to be reckless, the actor must have consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death could result from his actions. For the purpose of determining whether a person acted recklessly, a particular result does not have to be more likely than not to occur for the risk to be substantial and unjustifiable. a risk must be assessed by reviewing the particular facts of the individual case and weighing the likelihood of harm and the degree of harm that would result if it occurs. Whether an actor consciously disregarded such a risk may be inferred from circumstances such as the actor's knowledge and experience, or from what a similarly situated reasonable person would have understood about the risk under the particular circumstances -to determine whether a risk is substantial an unjustified, a trier of fact must weigh the likelihood and potential emgnitife of harm presented by the conduct and consider whether the conduct constitutes a gross deviating from the reasonable standard of care. Whether a person consciously disregards such a risk may be inferred from either the actor's subjective knowledge of the risk or from what a reasonable person with the actor's knowledge and experience would have been aware of in the particular situation -in the case of manslaughter, the prosecution must show that the defendant's conduct caused the death of another and that the defendant: 1. consciously disregarded 2. A substantial and 3. Unjustifiable risk that he would 4. Cause the death of another -(1) substantial and unjustifiable risk- whether a risk is substantial must be determined by assessing both the likelihood that harm will occur and the magnitude of the harm should it occur. A risk does not have to be "more likely than not to occur" or "probable" in order to be substantial A risk may be substantial even if the chance that the harm will occur is well below 50% a relatively high probability that a very minor harm will occur probably does not involve a substantial risk We hold that whether a risk is unjustifiable must be determined by assessing the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct relative to how substantial the risk is -the concept of a substantial and unjustifiable risk implies a risk that constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable law abiding person would exercise under the circumstances -(2) conscious disregard- a person acts with a conscious disregard of the risk created by her conduct when she is aware of the risk and chooses to act despite that risk. The actor does not have to intend the result or be practically certain that the result will occur, he only needs to be aware that the risk exists

People v. acosta

Facts: officers salceda and francis saw acosta in elvira salazar's stolen nissan puslar parked on the street. Acosta inched the pulsar forward, then accelerated rapidly. During the chase, acosta engaged in some of the most egregious driving tactics imaginable. The pilots agreed the newport beach craft should take the lead. The normal procedure for such a maneuver is for the lead helicopter to move to the right and swing around clockwise behind the other craft while climbing to an altitude of 1000 feet. Shortly after commencing this procedure, the costs mesa helicopter, having terminated ratio communication, came up under the newport beach helicopter from the right eaar and collided with it, both helicopters fell to the ground, three occupants in the costa mesa helicopter died as a result of the crash. Menzies turner, a retired federal aviation admin investigator, testified as an expert and concluded the accident occurred because the costa mesa helicopter, the faster of the two aircraft, made a 360 degree turn and closed too rapidly on the newport beach helicopter. He opined the costa mesa helicopter's pilot violated an FAA regulation prohibiting careless and reckless operation of an aircraft Defense: acosta claims there was insufficient evidence of 2 elements necessary to support the convictions for second degree murder; that he proximately caused the deaths of the victims and that his state of mind constituted implied malice. He is correct on the latter claim. As to the proximate cause issue, acosta argues that although a collision between ground vehicles was a foreseeable result of his conduct, one between airborne helicopters was not. He also contends the costa mesa helicopter polit's violation of FAA regulations was a superseding cause Issue: whether acosta's conduct was not, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of death of the costa mesa helicopter's occupants Rule: the threshold question in examining causation is whether the defendant's act was an actual cause of the victim's injury. It is a sine qua non test: but for the defendant's act would the injury have occurred? Unless an act is an actual cause of the injury, it will not be considered a proximate cause. The next inquiry is whether the defendant's act was a substantial factor in the injury. Considerations in determining whether a factor is substantial: 1. the number and extent of other factors contributing to the harm; 2. whether the forces created by the actor are continuous in producing the harm or merely create a condition upon which independent forces act; and 3. any lapse of time between the act and the harm -an intervening cause is dependent if it is a normal or involuntary response to, or result of, the defendant's act Even where such responses constitute negligent conduct, they do not supersede the defendant's act; I.e. they are nevertheless considered proximate causes of the harm -conversely, when the defendant's conduct merely places the eventual victim in a position which allows some other actions to cause the harm, the other action is termed an independent intervening cause. It usually supersedes the defendant's act; I.i. precludes a finding of proximate cause -an independent intervening variable will not be superseding in 3 instances: 1. where it is merely a contributing cause to the defendant's direct cause; 2. where the result was intended; or 3. where the resultant harm was reasonably foreseeable when the act was done. As to the third exception "the consequence need not have been a strong probability; a possible consequence which might have reasonably been contemplated is enough. The precise consequence need not have been foreseen; it is enough that the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of some harm of the kind which might result from his act -foreseeability is employed in the sense of appreciable probability. It does not require such a degree of probability that the intervention was more likely to occur than not; and on the other hand it implies more than that someone might have imagine it as a theoretical possibility. It does not require that the defendant himself actually thought of it. For the purposes of proximate cause an appreciable probability is one which a reasonable man is ordering his conduct in view of his situation and his knowledge and means fo knowledge, should, either consciously or unconsciously take into account in connection with the other facts and probabilities then apparent -the highly extraordinary result standard foes not involve the defendant's state of mind, but focuses upon the objective conditions present when he acts. The highly extraordinary result analysis is: 1. was the defendant's conduct the actual cause of the harm (but for his actions would it have occurred as it did? 2. was the result an intended consequence of the act? 3. was the defendant's action a substantial factor in the harm? And 4. was the result highly extraordinary in light of the circumstances -> if the first question us answered no, proximate cause is lacking. if answered yes, the next question must be examined. If the second question is answered yes, proximate cause is established. if answered no, the next question must be examined. If the third question is answered no, proximate cause is lacking. if answered yes, proximate cause is established unless the fourth question is answered yes, in which case it is lacking. the analysis does away with the need to consider the distinction between direct, concurrent, contributory and dependent and independent intervening causes -highly extraordinary result standard -> was harm highly extraordinary in light of defendant's behavior

Commonwealth v. moyer

Facts: peter moyer appeals from the lehigh county court of common pleas order which dismissed his petition for habeas corpus. The court determined tha the commonwealth had presented a prima facie case on the charges of involuntary manslaughter and operation ga watercraft under the influence The commonwealth's sole eyewitness, robert Williams, established that appellant was operating a runabout on the lehigh river. Mr. Williams stated that while he had observed appellant drink one beer while cooking on the beach earlier in the Day, he had observed nothing about appellant's behavior to indicate that he was intoxicated. Uncontradicted eyewitness testimony established that after moore swung the stick at the victim, the victim turned sharply to the left, lost control of the jet ski. Mr williams admitted that he told appellant's craft that appellant could not have avoided the accident The victim was pronounced death3 hours alter at lehigh valley hospital. The autopsy determined that the victim died as the result of multiple traumatic injuries. Appellant took the breathalyzer test at 9:05 pm, 2.5 hours after the incident. The results were recorded at .18% Defense: the commonwealth failed to establish that he operated his motorcraft under the influence of alcohol, and maintains that there is insufficient evidence that his conduct caused the death of the victim -he argues that he was operating his boar in a straight line at a safe speed and distance from the victim. Further, appellant maintains that he did nothing to cause the victim to swerve into his path, but it was the victim's evasive action with respect to moore which caused the collusion. He alleges that the commonwealth's evidence wholly fails to establish that he could have avoided the collision. Therefore, appellant asserts that the commonwealth failed to show that his conduct caused the victim's death. We agree Issue: the commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of proof with regard to the element of causation on the involuntary manslaughter charge Rule: involuntary manslaughter- conduct was directly and substantially linked to the victim's death. We have determined that in order to sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, a defendant's conduct must be the antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred. Specifically, it would be unfair to hold an individual responsible for the death of another if his actions are remote or attenuated and the victim's death was attributable to other factors Reasoning: there was no evidence that appellant could have avoided this tragic accident. The commonwealth presents no support for his conclusion that appellant could have swerved to avoid striking the victim. While traveling at 25 miles per hour, a vehicle travels at 36 feet per second. Eyewitness testimony also established that the victim was located 10-40 feet to the right of the appellant's motorboat when moore struck him with the stick. The commonwealth presented no testimony on reaction time to support its claim that any person could have swerved their boat Holding: the evidence it presented, however, is inadequate to demonstrate that this inaction caused the victim's death due to the fact that there is serious doubt as to whether any reasonable person could have avoided the unfortunate collision. We are constrained to conclude that the commonwealth failed to establish a prime facie case to sustain the charges of involuntary manslaughter, reckless operation of a watercraft and homicide by watercraft under the influence -outcome would not be different had the defendants swerved the boat

State v. muro

Facts: susana muro was convicted by the district court for dawson county of child abuse resulting in the death of a child and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Jose was holding vivianna but the child was not crying as she usually did when held by jose. Vivanna was unresponsive and appeared "dazed" and her eyes were half opened, half closed. Muro observed that vivianna was limp, kind of like a rag doll. A nurse testified that she advised the unidentified callers to bring the baby to the emergency room if they had any concern or uncertainty regarding her condition. Muro and jose then took vivianna to tri county hospital. CT scan was performed which revealed a slightly displaced skull fracture in the left patieal area with an overlying hematoma, as well as other signs of brain injury. Parys explained vivianna's condition to muro and jose and they made the decision to discontinue life support. Autopsy was indicative of trauma. Roffamn ultimately opined that the cause of death was a "fracture of the left parietal skull, which resulted in cerebral edema (swelling_, which resulted in brain death. There is no contention fr evidence that muro inflicted or witnessed the infliction of the fatal injuries. There is evidence that the injuries occurred during the period when muro was away from the family home on oct 27, 2002 Issue: viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the court was clearly erroneous in finding that muro's failure to a\seek medical treatment for vivianna was a cause of her death Rule: class 1B felony child abuse, which provides in relevant part: a person commits child abuse if they knowingly, intentionally, or negligently cause or permit a minor child to be Deprived of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or care Child abuse is a class 1B felony if the offense is committed knowingly and intentionally and results in the death of such child -conduct is a cause of an event if the event in question would not have occurred but for the conduct; conversely conduct is not a a cause of an event if that event would have occurred without such conduct Defense: muro argues in this appeal that the state failed to prove that the deprivation of care resulted in the death of vivianna Holding: we conclude that while the evidence in the record in sufficient to support the finding that muro knowingly and intentionally caused or permitted vivianna to be deprived of medical care, it is insufficient as a matter of law to establish that such deprivation caused the child's death -we agree with the dissenting judge that the state did not meet this burden -a finder fo fact could not reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that but for muro's lawful conduct, vivianna would have survived. Accordingly, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that vivianna;s death resulted from the conduct in question

State v. strescino

Issue: the issue in this case is whether or not the 2 indictments against the defendant- charging him with second degree manslaughter are sufficient as a matter of law Rule: the second degree manslaughter statute reads as follows: every killing of one human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, which is not murder, nor excusable nor justifiable homicide, nor manslaughter of the first degree is manslaughter of the second degree -culpable negligence- something more than mere negligence is required however -negligently is defined as follows: a person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists of will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation -any complaint or indictment should be considered adequate if it informs the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation with sufficient definiteness so that he can prepare for trial Defense: the allegation in the indictment constitutes mere simple negligence and therefore is insufficient as a matter of law Holding: as far as the indictment is concerned it alleges conduct which could be found to constitute culpable negligence by a court or a jury within the meaning of the manslaughter statute •The court in strescino- held that the criminal negligence means something more than negligence sufficient as a basis for the recovery of damages in a civil action •It is not clear what exactly "something more" means

people v hall cont

Issue: whether hall committed the crime of reckless manslaughter -we focus on describing the mental state of recklessness and determining whether hall's conduct meets that definition -(1) substantial and unjustifiable risk? -(3) whether hall's conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable law abiding person (in this case, a reasonable law abiding trained ski racer and resort employee) would have observed in the circumstances -(2) whether a reasonably prudent person could have entertained the belief that hall consciously disregarded that risk Reasoning: a reasonable person could infer that the defendant, a former ski racer trained in skier safety, consciously disregarded that risk -because the district court applied a flawed interpretation of the law, we hold that the district court's assessment of probably cause was in error -(1) allen and the other eyewitnesses all said that hall was traveling too fast for the conditions, at an excessive rate of speed and that he was out of control. Hall was travelling straight down the slope at such high speeds that because of his lack of control, he would not have been able to stop or avoid another person. Hall must have been travelling with a significant amount of speed to generate sufficient force to cause a basal skull fracture and brain injuries like cobb's Hall's excessive speed, lack of control and improper technique for skiing bumps significantly increased both the likelihood that a collision would occur and the extent of the injuries that might result from such a collision, including the possibility of death -unjustified- hall was serving no direct interest other than his own enjoyment -(3) the general assembly imposed upon a skier the duty to avoid collisions with any person or object below him. It establishes the min standard of care for uphill skiers. A violation of a skier's duty in an extreme fashion, such as here, may be evidence of conduct that constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care imposed by statute for civil negligence -(2) hall is a trained ski racer who had been coached about skiing in control and skiing safely. Further, he was an employee of a ski area and had a great deal of skiing experience Holding: the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to show probable cause that the defendant recklessly caused the victim's death -(1) hall created a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he ouwld cause another's death -(3) a reasonable person could have found that hall's creation of a substantial risk was unjustifiable -a reasonable person could conclude that hall's conduct was a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable -(2) both hall's subjective knowledge and the awareness that a reasonable person with hall's background would have had support the inference that hall consciously disregarded the risk he created by acting despite his awareness of the risk -we hold that a reasonably prudent and cautious person could have entertained the belief that hall consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that by skiing exceptionally fast and out of control he might collide with and kill another person on the slope We hold that the people presented sufficient evidence to establish probably cause that hall committed reckless manslaughter, and the court should have bound hall's case over for trial -MPC requires recklessness be substantial an unjustifiable -a very low risk for a very big harm can be substantial

Model penal code 2.02- negligence

Negligently: A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation

acosta cont

Reasoning: but for acosta's conduct of fleeing the police, the helopopters would never have been in position for the creash. However, there was no evidence he intended the harm, so I must examine questions 3 and 4. acosta's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the crash. He was fleeing when the accident occurred, and there was no lapse of time between his flight and the crash. Although acosta's horrendous driving did not cause the helicopter's improper maneuver, his flight undoubtedly infused excitement and tension into the situation, which can be considered to be a substantial factor. The result was not highly extraordinary. A 2 helicopter collision was a possible consequence which reasonably might have been contemplated. There is an appreciable probability that one of the pursuers, in the heat of the chase, may act negligently or recklessly to catch the quarry. Neither concurring opinion offers case law "on all fours" suggesting this case is unique and presents a close question Holding: a finding of proximate cause is appropriate. The judgment is reversed on the murder courts and is affirmed in all other respects Crosby concurring The law does not assign blame to an otherwise blameworthy actor when neither the intervening negligent conduct nor the risk of harm was foreseeable The occupants of these helicopters were surely not "within the range of apprehension" of a fleeing criminal on the ground To the extent that responsibility to persons in the air, whose role was merely to observe his movements, a simple enough task in far speedier helicopters, defies common sense This was a highly extraordinary result by any measure

state v muro cont

Reasoning: in state v. doyle, we reasoned that there was no evidence offered by the state that had the defendant done something, which she did not do, the infant would have lived; nor that had she not done anything, which she did do, the infant would have lived -parys, the pediatrician who treated vivianna did state "if treatment was sought earlier, then there would've been a chance of survival" but he could not say it was probably. Dr. Alexander, a pediatrician testified that because of the delay in seeking treatment, viviannas's survival was hopeless, but that there may have been a small amount of hope if prompt treatment had been sought. He testified that there was an opportunity to save vivianna if treatment had been sought earlier and that if 100 children survived this type of injury for 4 hours -alexander admitted the possibility that doctors may not have been able to save vivianna even if muro had sought immediate treatment. He stated that the long delay in seeking treatment and the fact that most children would have died within 2 hours of the injury suggested that if vivianna's injury was not invariably fatal. Thus, he opined that the delay in treatment may have contributed to her death -to establish that muro's unlawful conduct was a cause of vivianna's death, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that but for muro's delay in seeking medical treatment, vivianna would have survived her preexisting traumatic head injury. The state proved only the possibility of survival with earlier treatment State: attempted to prove through the testimony of two physicians that muro's conduct was a cause of the death

Model penal code 2.02- general requirements of culpability

Recklessly: -a person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would otherwise observe in the actor's situation Culpability required unless otherwise provided: when the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly with respect thereto

Two causal inquires

Two causal inquires -But for causation (if yes - is it proximate? )and proximate cause Proximate causation test -often apply foreseeability test . was harm suffered by victim foreseeable from defendants conduct causation -can have multiple concurrent causes -each one is actual because if each is enough on its own to cause harm

conduct

conduct - act, omission, possession objective offense elements - conduct, circumstance (act itself, description of facts ), result -causation - actual /but for causation( result wouldn't have happened but for defendant's conduct ) and proximate / legal (is it fair to say this result is primarily from defendant's conduct. Forsey ability test . Highly extraordinary test - if yes, not proximate cause . problem of intervening causes -before result, after defendant's conduct. Breaks the causal link ) -prosecution must prove offense elements beyond a reasonable doubt -must prove actual and proximate causation beyond a reasonable doubt

Vermont v. jackowski

facts: defendant rosemari jacjowski appeals her conviction for disorderly conduct. Police officers repeatedly asked defendant to leave the intersection, and when she refused, she was arrested. The state charged them with disorderly conduct, alleging that defendant and the other protesters "with intent to cause public inconvenience and annoyance, obstructed vehicular traffic" in violation of 13 VSA. Defendant took the stand, admitting to blocking traffic, but stating that her only intention in doing so was to protest the war in iraq, not to cause public inconvenience or annoyance. The court first instructed the jury that the state could establish defendant's intent to cause public inconvenience or annoyance by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that she acted with the conscious object of bothering, disturbing, irritating, or harassing some other person or persons. The court then added, "this intent may also be shown if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was practically certain that another person would be bothered, disturbed, irritated, or harassed" Issue: intent? Defense: the trial court improperly instructed the jury to consider whether defendant was "practically certain" that her conduct would cause public inconvenience or annoyance -the jury charge was improper because the trial court failed to instruct the jury to consider whether defendant acted with the requisite criminal intent. Defendant relies on state v. trombly to draw a distinction between offenses that require purposeful or intentional misconduct and those that require only knowing misconduct -trombly controls here. The state attempts to distinguish trombly based on differences in the language of the aggravated assault and disorderly conduct statutes. Unlike the aggravated assault statute, the disorderly conduct statute contains the words "with intent" and not purposely Reasoning: the code does not differentiate between "with intent" and "purposely"; instead, it uses the terms interchangeably. The state cites several cases supporting the proposition that both "purposely" and "knowingly" causing harms involve some element of intent and thus that trombly's distinction between "purposely" and "knowingly" is illusory. Each of the cases cited by the state predates our decision in trombly, however, and each adheres to an outmoded distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes- the distinction that the legislature rejected in adopting the code's approach to mens rea. These cases provide no basis for distinguishing or limiting trombly here Rule: a person acts purposely when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts knowingly when he is aware that is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result Holding: it was therefore error for the trial court to charge the jury to consider whether defendant was practically certain that her actions would cause public annoyance or inconvenience

Eugenio raul zaffaroni

•A person acts with dolus eventualis when he accepts the causation of harm as a possible outcome of his conduct and acts in spite of such awareness -nonetheless, an actor who is aware that his conduct may bring about a legally proscribed harm but trusts that he will be able to prevent the harm acts with conscious negligence rather than with dolus eventualis -it should be noted that merely leaving the outcome to chance in the infounded hope that the harm will not ensue is not enough to preclude a finding of dolus eventualis •In order for a defendant to act with dolus eventialis he must be aware that his conduct creates a risk of harm -In addition to awareness, however, acting with dolus eventualis has traditionally required a certain kind of attitude with regard to the risk created -There is no consensus regarding the kind of attitude that is relevant -An actor who is unaware that his conduct creates a risk of harm acts with that european continental scholars call "unconscious negligence" -dolus eventualis- requires knowledge of risk an indifference to risk -conscious negligence - awareness of risk but not indifference to it Russian beggars - names children for money an accidentally killed one period continuing to maim in spite of awareness of risk is enough for dolus eventualis Pueblo v colon Soto - accidentally shot friend when trying to shoot a bottle of his head ->recklessness ->in Europe, could be conscious negligence

people v. hall notes

•A person who lacks such awareness does not act recklessly, although he acts negligently fi his conduct creates a significant risk of harm •As 2.02 of MPC and state v. loeffel illustrate, that default mental state is typically recklessness. -The practical import of this default rule is that offenses may not be committed negligently, unless the definition of the offense expressly states that negligence suffices for the imposition of criminal liability •The court held that the defendant may be held liable for reckless manslaughter even if the risk of death created by his careless skiing was "slight" in spite of the fact that recklessness is defined by law as conduct that creates a substantial risk of harm

moorisette notes

•As justice jackson famously asserted in moorisette, "the contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion". -The requirement that there can be no punishment without proof of a subjective element of mens rea (guilty mind) is thus deeply ingrained in american crim law -Note that the court did not hold that it is unconstitutional for congress to criminalize conduct without making reference to subjective elements •Public welfare offenses are mostly crimes that are enacted to regulate certain industries or to promote public safety or order •A crime is malum prohibitum if the act it proscribes is not immoral or evil in itself -An offense is malum in se when the act that it prohibits is immoral or evil in itself (murder, rape, assault) -As a general rule, courts frown upon punishing defendants for malum in se crimes without proof of mens rea -On the contrary, imposing strict liability (liability without proof of mens rea) is generally acceptable when the crime charged is malum prohibitum and the legislature omitted reference to a mental state that must be proved in order to hold defendant liable •A defendant may act with malice even if he does not have the purpose of causing harm and regardless of whether he has evil motives or a wicked intent -The word malice is thus a legal term of act that is currently defined by the queen's bench in regina v. cunningham -subjective offense elements - purposely (likelihood that conduct gives intended outcome is irrelevant ), knowingly (you are very sure this result will happen ), recklessly (it may happen -risk ), negligently -to establish purpose - conscious objective -willful blindness- when you block yourself ffrom obtaining knowledge -> you are on the hook for that knowledge -> mental state is knowingly -The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant could be deemed to have acted maliciously if his intent to steal the fas meter was wicked and even if he was not aware that stealing the meter could endanger the life of the victim. Queen's bench reversed ->Court held that: in any statutory definition of a crime "malice" must be taken not in the old vague sense of wickedness in general, but as requiring either (I) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done, or (ii) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (ie. The accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, and yet has gone on to take the risk of it). It is neither limited to, nor does it indeed require, any ill- will towards the person injured. In our opinion, "maliciously" in statutory crime postulates foresight of consequence -Malice thus requires conscious awareness that the act creates a risk of harm -It does not require that the defendant act with purpose to cause the harm or that he know that the harm is practically certain to take place

Bergelson causation cont

•Assumption of risk is a form of consent -The less conscious the victim's decision to engage in a dangerous activity is, the more appropriate it may be to treat his behavior as an involuntary, rather than a voluntary, reduction of rights •Commonwealth v. peak- 3 buddies, after discussions in 2 barrooms, agreed to race their cars -Young lost control of his car and was killed in an accident. Ramsey and peak were found guilty of involuntary manslaughter of young •A more realistic and fair approach would be to apportion responsibility among all parties who have contributed to the criminal outcome (to hold ramsey and peak liable for the death of young but reduce their level of liability) -Section 211 of MPC prohibits reckless conduct that places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury •crim law attributes the entire responsibility for harm to one who was a "but for" cause and a proximate cause of the victim's injury or loss -To overcome this simplistic model, the law needs to adopt a comparitive approach to causation, not stay with a black and white dichotomy •can the causative importance of various events ever be compared? -There is a vie that denies that possibility ->Under that view, causation is not a relative concept; it either exists or it does not, and if It does exist, one may not speak of degrees of causation ->If certain events were necessary to product a result, it is impossible to know which event was more necessary •We measure the importance of a cause by (I) the difference it makes and (ii) the legal and moral weight we assign to different types of behavior •Madge oberholtzer took poison after being kidnapped , beaten, humiliated and nearly raped -She was denied medical help by her kidnapper and eventually died -The jurors would be instructed to evaluate all evidence in order to determine (a) whether madge's death would have occurred in the absence of (I) her actions and (ii) the defendants actions and (b) who is more accountable for her death -The jurors would have to include into the calculation the fact that stephenson had not just the moral but also the legal duty to rescue his victim- he was the one who created peril and who took her to a place of isolation where other people could not help her ->If the question of causation were regarded this way, the supreme court of indiana would have a much stronger legal basis to affrim the convicti

claus cont

•He argues that cases in which an actor helps another to engage in risky conduct should be distinguished from cases in which an actor endangers another by engaging in reckless conduct with that person's consent •Roxin argues that defendants in the first type of cases should be exonerated, given that the harm suffered by the victim in these instances should be entirely attributed to the vitim's freely willed decision to engage in the risky conduct -This would lead to acquitting the defendant in atencio -On the contrary, roxin argues that defendants in the second group of cases should be convicted, but only if they heavily infuenced the victim's deicison to acquiesce to being endangered by the actors' risky conduct -Thus, he would convict the defendant in murray only if the passenger's decision to ride in the car was prompted by the defendant's insistent pleas that he do so -In contrast, roxin would acquit the defendant if the victim convinced the defendant to engage in the dangerous conduct -He would also oppose liability when the defendant did not encourage the victim to consent and the victim nevertheless freely acquiesced to being endangered by the defendant's conduct

state v muro notes

•In anglo american jurisdictions, the subjective element of the crime is usually called "mens rea" (latin for guilty mind). -In contrast, the objective elements of crimes are frequently referred to as the actus resus (guilty act) -The felony child abuse offense charged in state v. muro, for example, has both subjective (intentionally or knowingly) and objective elements (failing to provide food, clothing, shelter or care to a minor child and death resulting as a consequence of such failure) •the objective elements can be subdivided into conduct, circumstance and result elements -The conduct element of the child abuse offense in muro is failing to provide food, clothing, shelter or care to a child. -Circumstance elements describes things, beings or states of affairs that are neither acts not results -In the case of the felony child abuse offense, the circumstances element is "minor child" -The result element of an offense describes a harmful consequence that the actor must bring about in order to be held liable. -The result element of the felony child abuse statute is the death of the child •Legal causation studies the connection between the conduct and result elements of the offense -Offenses that lack result elements do not raise causation issues •In order to determine whether the defendant's conduct is linked to the resulting harm in the special kind of way that criminal liability demands, courts engage in a 2 step analysis -First, courts ask if the defendant's conduct was the "actual" or "But for" cause of the harm that resulted ->Conduct is an "actual" or "but for" cause of a harm when the harm would not have taken place but for defendant's conduct -The law requires that- in addition to being an actual cause- the defendant's conduct be a legal or proximate cause of the harm ->Actual or but for causation is thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition for criminal liability •The court concluded that the defendant could be punished for the lesser offense of depriving a child or needed medical care -Note that this offense is comprised solely of conduct and circumstance elements -Since a result element is lacking, the state did not need to prove causation in order to hold the defendant liable for the lesser offense •The prosecution has the burden of proving the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt -The court pointed out in muro that this burden also applies to proof of but for causation •Sometimes multiple actors engage in conduct against the victim in circumstances in which the contributions of any of the actors would have been sufficient to cause the harm suffered by the victim -The contributions of any individual member of the firing squad are not a "but for" cause of the victim's death because the victim would have died anyway from wounds suffered as a consequence of the shots fired by the other squad members -Courts and scholars refer to this as the problem of concurrent or alternative sufficient causes •Causation may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant operant either alone or concurrently with another cause unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the defendant clearly insufficient •According to the statute cited in cox, the defendant's conduct will be considered a cause of the victim's harm in a case that presents the problem of multiple concurrent causes as long as it was sufficient by itself to cause the harm

acosta notes 2

•In order to determine whether the defendant's conduct is a proximate cause, courts also frequently assess whether there are intervening causes of sufficient causal force to break the link between the defendant's conduct and the resulting harm -An intervening cause is a causal force that intervenes after the defendant's conduct but before the harm takes place. -The intervening cause in acosta was the pilot's careless operation of the helicopter •Intervening causes that have enough causal force to break the link between the defendant's conduct and the harm that ensued are usually called "superseding causes" -The existence of a superseding cause precludes a finding of proximate cause and therefore, exonerates the defendant of liability for the resulting harm •Although there is no fixed test for determining whether an intervening cause ought to be considered superseding, courts frequently assess whether the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable in light of defendant's conduct -If the intervening cause is reasonably foreseeable, courts often conclude that it does not break the causal link between the defendant's conduct and the resulting harm

Moyer cont

•Instead of focusing on whether the treatment is the sole cause of death, some jurisdictions focus on whether the medial treatment was reasonably foreseeable •People v. shaefer- if an intervening cause did indeed supersede the defendant's act as a legally significant causal factor, then the defendant's conduct will not be deemed a proximate cause of the victim's the victim's injury -The standard by which to gauge whether an intervening cause supersedes, and thus severs the causal link, is generally one of reasonable foreseeability -Gross negligence or intentional misconduct by a treating physician is not reasonably foreseeable and would thus break the causal chain between the defendant and the victim ->Objective standard of reasonableness. -If it was reasonably foreseeable, then the defendant's conduct will be considered a proximate cause

acosta notes

•Regardless of the name given to the test for determining legal (proximate) causation, courts usually approach the causation inquiry by asking whether the harm suffered by the victim was "reasonably foreseeable" in light of the defendant's conduct -It is often stated that the defendant's conduct should not be considered the proximate cause of unforeseeable results •According to the Highly extraordinary, defendant's conduct will not be considered a proximate cause if the harm that resulted is deemed a highly extraordinary consequence of the defendant's act •Justice crosby's dissent discusses a risk based or zone of danger focused analysis of proximate cause that he borrows from justice cardozo's famous palsgraf opinion -According to this approach a finding a legal causation requires a comparison of the danger that reasonable person observing the cause of conduct would believe that the defendant's act created with the danger that ended up bringing about the result -If the danger created by the defendant's conduct is the same danger that brought about the result, then a finding of proximate causation is appropriate -On the contrary, if the danger created by a the defendant's act is different than the danger that produced the harm, then the court should hold that the defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the result -The defendant's conduct should not be considered a proximate cause because the danger created by his conduct (threat to those using the road) as different from the danger that brought about the death of the pilots (threats to those travelling in the air) •That these kinds of inquiries may not be as objective as they appear at first glance, for the answer to the query is (at least partially) dependent on the degree of specificity with which the facts are described -The more specific the description of the facts is, the easier it is to find that the resulting harm was RF, NHE or within ZOD (in this case, description B is more specific than description A)

jackowski notes 2

•State v. higgins- several courts have concluded that a defendant may be convicted under the doctrine of transferred intent of a more serious offense than that of which he would have been convicted had he committed the intended harm -The wright of authority supports the proposition that the common law doctrine of transferred intent may be applied when the defendant's actual mental state and wrongful conduct are equivalent to the mental state and wrongful conduct that must be proved under the offense with which he is charged, even if that offense is more serious than the contemplated offense •As a general rule, defendant may not be convicted because the subjective offense element of knowledge is missing -Willful blindness- state v. nations -Willful blindness is not sufficient for knowledge - requires actual knowledge -for willful blindness, MPC makes burden to prove knowledge lower ->At best, the prosecution proved that defendant did not know or refused to learn the child's age ->The court concluded that ignorance of the child's age- even if coupled with a refusal to learn the child's age- was not sufficient to establish that defendant had knowledge of the child's age. Consequently, defendant's conviction was reversed ->This definition of "knowingly" or "knowledge" excludes those cases in which the fact in issue would have been known had not the person willfully shit his eyes in order to avoid knowing ->MPC, the source of our criminal code, does not exclude these cases from its definition of "knowingly" ->Instead the MPC proposes that "when knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence" ->MPC simply proposes that willful blindness to a fact bee viewed as one of acting knowingly when what is involved is a matter of existing fact •US v. heredia- defendant admitted that she suspected there might be drugs in the car -"knowingly" in criminal statutes is not limited to positive knowledge, but includes the state of mind of one who does not possess positive knowledge only because he consciously avoided it -Heredia argues that the motive prong is necessary to avoid punishing individuals who fail to investigate because circumstances render it unsafe or impractical to do so -We believe, however that the second prong of instruction, the requirement that defendant have deliberately avoided learning the truth, provides sufficient protections for defendants in these situations -A deliberate action is one that is "intentional, premeditated, fully considered" •The court in heredia emphatically stated that the deliberate ignorance approach to acting "knowingly" does not redefine the concept in a way that makes it indistinguishable to acting recklessly

murray notes 2

•State v. mcfadden- where the supreme court of iowa rejected defendant's argument that he should not be held liable because competitors in a drag race assume the risk of their own death •In commonwealth v. root- another drag racing case- the supreme court of pennsylvania absolved the defendant of liability because: -The deceased was aware of the dangerous condition created by the defendant's reckless conduct in driving his automobile at an excessive rate of speed, but he recklessly chose to swerve his car to the left and into the path of an oncoming truck, thereby bringing about the head-on collusion which caused his own death -A dissenting opinion in root- if the defendant did not engage in the unlawful race and so operate his automobile in such a reckless manner, this accident would never have occurred -> He helped create the dangerous event. He was a vital part of it •Note that the harm of a participant in a drag race is clearly a reasonably foreseeable consequence of engaging in the drag race -Therefore, if the drag racing cases (and the russian roulette cases) are approached form the perspective of foreseeability, the arguments in favor of holding defendants liable is powerful -Nevertheless, those who argue in favor of exonerating defendants in these types of cases -What explains this position is respect for the victim's autonomy -On the other hand, punishing defendants in cases such as these may deter others from engaging in similarly foolish activities

MPC causation notes

•Subsection 1 of the excepted model penal code provision that the defendant's conduct be a "but for" cause of the victim's harm -The remaining is a problem of "transferred intent" •The code precludes liability when the actor's conduct is "too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the actor's liability" -That the question to be faced is whether the actual result is too accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense -In robertson v. commonwealth , the code's causation provision operates to exclude criminal liability in cases where the defendant would otherwise have committed an offense, but common sense notions of responsibility for the occurrence of results dictate that the imposition of criminal liability is inappropriate ->The approach to legal causation adopted in the code is eminently normative in nature, focusing on whether it is fair or just to hold the defendant liable for the resulting harm rather than on factual questions regarding scientific causation or doctrinal inquiries regarding foreseeability or superseding causes •The determinative question is whether it is fair or just to hold the defendant liable for the victim's harm in spite of the "outrageous" medical treatment or despite the victim's decision to risk suffering harm -This is not to say that foreseeability, the victim's autonomy or any of the other factors typically considered by courts are irrelevant under penal code ->Just means none of these factors is determinative

Murray notes

•Take the case of an actor who successfully encourages another to commit suicide -According to the conventional foreseeability based analysis of proximate cause, this militates in favor of finding that the victim's decision to commit suicide is not a superseding cause that severs the nexus between the defendant's conduct and the resulting harm •The standard approach to these cases is illustrated by people v. kevorkian -The michigan supreme court held that the defendant could not be held liable for murder because the victim's decision to commit suicide was the true cause of the death and therefore severed the link between the defendant's conduct and the death of the victim ->In the context of participation in a suicide a conviction of murder is proper if a defendant participates in the final overt act that causes death -not convicting kavorkian ensures victims autonomy (reason behind conviction ) •The preceding analysis does not apply when the victim's decision to suffer harm is not voluntary -In stephenson v. state, for example, the defendant kidnapped the victim and subjected her to physical and emotional abuse ->Desperate to escape the abuse, the victim committed suicide by ingesting poison ->Defendant was charged and convicted of murdering the victim •In people v. campbell, defendant and victim were drinking heavily at a bar -Defendant then suggested that the victim kill himself and provided him with the gun to do so -Fater defendant left the bar, the victim committed suicide -The court rules that defendant could not be held liable for homicide •Commonweakth v. atencio- the defendants were convicted of manslaughter for the death of the victim who shot himself while playing russian roulette with the defendant's -Reckless conduct could be found in the coinverted action and cooperation of the defendants in helping to bring about the deceased's foolish act -There may have been no duty on the defendants to prevent the deceased from playing -But there was a duty on their part not to cooperate or join with him in the game

moorisette notes 2

•The common law also distinguished between general intent and specific intent crimes -The distinction is often relevant to determine whether the defendant may present evidence of voluntary intoxication in order to negate a subjective element of the offense charged -The traditional common law rule was that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to negate specific intent but inadmissible to negative general intent -Frey v. state- the most common usage of specific intent is to designate a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reas of the crime -The court applied this definition of specific intent to determine whether the offense of resisting arrest with violence was a specific or general intent crime ->Plain language of the statute: resisting officer with violence to his person- whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs or opposes any officer ->The statutes plain language reveals that no heightened or particularized (no specific) intent is required for the commission of this crime, only a general intent to knowingly and willfully impede an officer in the performance of their duties •Justice anstead wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in the frey case cited above arguing that the court should abolish the general/ specific intent distinction -Lack of a principled and useful basis for maintaining this distinction -Out time would be better spent giving effect to the legislative intent behind a particular statute and focusing on the degree and culpability along the lines clearly delineated in the model penal code -State v. stasio- distinguishing between specific and general intent gives rise to incongruous results by irrationally allowing intoxication to excuse some crimes but not others -Liparota v. US- this ambiguity in the terms specific intent and general intent has led to a movement away from the traditional dichotomy of intent and toward an alternative analysis of mens rea