Con Law MBE

A state required its political parties to allow every registered voter in the state to vote in party primaries. A newly-formed state party wanted to hold a primary to pick its presidential electors, but the national party with which the state party was affiliated required that electors be chosen only by party members. A neighboring state prohibited independents from voting in party primaries. A long-established third party hoped to finally secure the governor's mansion, which it felt hinged on the ability to attract a large percentage of the independent voters. Both the newly formed state party and the established third party challenged their respective states' primary regulations in federal court as unconstitutional. What will be the outcome of these lawsuits? (A) Both the newly-formed state party and the established third party will prevail. (B) The newly-formed party will prevail, but the established third party will lose. (C) The established third party will prevail, but the newly-formed party will lose. (D) Both the newly-formed party and the established third party will lose.

(A) Both the newly-formed state party and the established third party will prevail. Newly-Formed State Party: A state cannot require a local party to participate in an open primary (i.e., a primary in which any voter in the state may vote in a political party's primary) to choose presidential electors where the national party has required that electors must be chosen only by party members. Third Party: A state may not prohibit a political party from allowing independents to vote in its primary.

Congress enacted a statute that awards federal funds to school districts that provide adequate educational services to children with special needs. The statute grants a cause of action to parents against a school district that fails to provide adequate services to their children in accordance with the statute, and contains an inseverable condition requiring the award of attorney's fees to parties that prevail in lawsuits based on violations of the statute. However, the statute is silent about whether expert fees must be awarded to parties that prevail in these lawsuits. The parents of a child with special needs successfully sued their local school district for violating the federal statute. The court awarded damages, including attorney's fees and expert fees. Which argument provides the strongest constitutional basis for the school district to challenge the court's award of expert fees? (A) Conditions imposed by Congress in the exercise of its spending power must be set out unambiguously. (B) Congress can only exercise its spending power to carry out another enumerated power. (C) The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits by private citizens against local governmental entities. (D) The Ten

(A) Conditions imposed by Congress in the exercise of its spending power must be set out unambiguously. The spending clause gives Congress broad power to spend for the general welfare (i.e., for any public purpose) (Choice B). Congress may use its spending power to incentivize state or local governments to act in certain ways by placing conditions on their receipt of federal funds. But those conditions are binding only if they: (1) are clearly stated & unambiguous so potential recipients can make informed decisions; (2) are reasonably related to federal interest in funded program; (3) do not require states to engage in unconstitutional activity; and (4) do not unduly coerce states into accepting. Here, Congress enacted a statute that awards federal funds to school districts that provide educational services to children with special needs. The statute is silent about whether the receipt of those funds is conditioned on the awarding of expert fees to parties that prevail in lawsuits for violations of the statute. Since conditions imposed by Congress in the exercise of its spending power must be unambiguous to be binding, this is the strongest constitutional basis for the school district to challenge the court's award of expert fees.

In order to discourage the transfer of electrical products that could threaten national security and to raise revenue, Congress enacted a statute that imposed a tax on the export of electrical products containing military-grade technology to countries that were determined to be hostile to the United States. Is the federal tax likely constitutional? (A) No, because Congress does not have the power to tax exported goods. (B) No, because the tax unduly burdens foreign commerce. (C) Yes, because the commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce. (D) Yes, because the taxing and spending clause gives Congress the power to tax for any public purpose.

(A) No, because Congress does not have the power to tax exported goods. The taxing and spending clause gives Congress broad power to tax and spend for the general welfare (i.e., any public purpose). However, this power is not unlimited and must be exercised in compliance with other constitutional provisions—including the export clause. The export clause prohibits federal taxation of: (1) exported goods, which are goods leaving the U.S. and shipped to foreign countries; and (2) services and activities closely related to the export process. Here, Congress enacted a federal statute that imposed a tax on any product containing military-grade technology that was shipped to foreign countries hostile to the United States. Although the purpose of the tax was to protect national security and raise revenue, it is not within Congress's power to tax exported goods. Therefore, the federal tax is unconstitutional.

A federal law provides that a U.S. citizen who votes in a foreign election forfeits U.S. citizenship. An individual who is a naturalized citizen of the United States votes in a national election held in her birth country. Based on the law, the State Department has refused to renew the individual's passport. The individual has filed an action in federal court for a declaratory judgment that the law is unconstitutional because it deprives her of U.S. citizenship. Is the court likely to find that the law is constitutional? (A) No, because Congress may not revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen that is obtained in good faith and without fraud. (B) No, because the law violates the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV. (C) Yes, because Congress has exclusive authority over naturalization. (D) Yes, because of the elections clause in Article I, Section 4.

(A) No, because Congress may not revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen that is obtained in good faith and without fraud. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress plenary (i.e., exclusive) authority to enact laws that regulate naturalization—i.e., the process through which any noncitizen may obtain U.S. citizenship. But Congress must comply with other constitutional provisions when exercising this authority. This includes the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits Congress from revoking the U.S. citizenship of any U.S. citizen without his/her consent unless that citizenship was obtained by fraud or in bad faith. Here, the federal law requires U.S. citizens who vote in foreign elections to forfeit their U.S. citizenship. As a result, the State Department refused to renew the individual's passport because she had voted in an election in her birth country. The individual did not consent to her citizenship being revoked, and there is no indication that it was obtained by fraud or in bad faith. Therefore, the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and the court will likely find that it is unconstitutional.

The District of Columbia government has the power to levy an income tax. In an effort to encourage nonresidents to conduct business in the District of Columbia, Congress enacted a federal statute that prohibits the District of Columbia from imposing an income tax on individuals who work there but reside elsewhere. Is the statute likely to be found constitutional? (A) No, because it violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. (B) No, because it violates the uniformity clause of Article I, Section 8. (C) Yes, under the enclave clause in Article I, Section 8. (D) Yes, under the Sixteenth Amendment.

(C) Yes, under the enclave clause in Article I, Section 8. Congressional legislation must stem from Congress's enumerated powers. The enclave clause gives Congress plenary (i.e., exclusive) legislative power over the District of Columbia. As a result, a federal statute that prohibits the District of Columbia from imposing an income tax on persons who work there but reside elsewhere is likely to be found constitutional.

Concerned with the federal budget deficit, Congress sought to raise $100 million in revenue by enacting a tax on all real-property interests within the United States. A fixed rate is applied uniformly throughout the United States to the fair market value of these interests. Is this tax constitutional? (A) No, because it was not apportioned proportionately among the states based on each state's population. (B) No, because taxes on real-property interests are historically a matter left to state and local governments. (C) Yes, because it was uniformly applied throughout the United States. (D) Yes, because of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

(A) No, because it was not apportioned proportionately among the states based on each state's population. The taxing and spending clause gives Congress plenary (i.e., exclusive) power to raise federal revenue by imposing taxes. But Congress can impose a direct federal tax (e.g., a tax on real property) only if it is: (1) apportioned proportionately among the states based on each state's population and (2) reasonably related to revenue production (i.e., no provision extraneous to tax purposes). Here, Congress enacted a tax on all real-property interests in the United States. This direct tax was reasonably related to raising $100 million in revenue to reduce the federal budget deficit. However, the tax was applied uniformly throughout the United States based on the fair market value of the taxed property. As a result, the tax was not apportioned proportionately among the states based on each state's population—e.g., it required a state with twice the population of another state to pay twice the tax amount. Therefore, the tax is unconstitutional.

The dean of the architecture department at a state university informed a graduate-level architecture student that if she did not improve her academic performance, she would not be allowed to remain a student at the university. When the student's grades did not improve the following semester, a faculty committee recommended that she be dismissed after careful review of her academic record. The student was not allowed to present evidence to the committee or attend the committee meeting. The dean accepted the committee's recommendation and subsequently dismissed the student. The student filed a constitutional challenge to her dismissal in federal court, contending that she had been deprived of her procedural due process rights. Is the court likely to rule in favor of the student? (A) No, because she was not entitled to a hearing since she was dismissed for academic reasons. (B) No, because the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states plenary authority to regulate public education. (C) Yes, because she was denied the right to present evidence to the committee and to attend the committee meeting. (D) Yes, because the dean deprived the student of her education when he dismissed her.

(A) No, because she was not entitled to a hearing since she was dismissed for academic reasons. The student's claim raises the right to procedural due process, which requires public colleges and universities to follow certain procedures before they intentionally deprive students of their education by dismissing them. To determine the process due, the court must determine whether the dismissal was for disciplinary or academic reasons. Due process requires public colleges and universities to provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before dismissing a student for disciplinary reasons. However, due process does not require a public college or university to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard when a student is dismissed for academic reasons Here, the committee recommended the student's dismissal because she failed to improve her grades despite being given notice that her academic performance must improve. The dean then deprived the student of her education when he dismissed her. And though the student was not allowed to present evidence to the committee or attend the committee meeting, she was not entitled to a hearing because her dismissal was for academic reasons. Therefore, due process was not violated, and the court is unlikely to rule in her favor.

A defendant in a criminal trial wore a shirt depicting a political symbol. The judge ordered the defendant to remove the shirt and wear it inside out, explaining that the clothing constituted a political statement that could improperly influence the jury and thereby undermine the fairness of trial. When the defendant, contending that he had a right to make a political statement, refused, the judge held the defendant in contempt. Can the defendant successfully challenge the contempt order on the grounds that the court's order to remove his shirt violated his First Amendment Free Speech Clause? (A) No, because the courtroom is a non-public forum. (B) No, because the wearing of clothing is not protected by the First Amendment Free Speech Clause (C) Yes, because the order to remove the shirt was based on the content of the speech on the shirt. (D) Yes, because wearing the shirt constituted political speech.

(A) No, because the courtroom is a non-public forum. A nonpublic forum is essentially all public property that is not a traditional or designated public forum, and encompasses government offices, schools, jails, military bases, and polling places. The government may regulate speech-related activities in nonpublic forums as long as the regulation is (i) viewpoint-neutral and (ii) reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. Here, the courtroom is classified as a nonpublic forum for purposes of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause. While the judge specifically banned the defendant from wearing the shirt because of its political content, the judge did not ban the shirt on the basis of its specific political point of view. Therefore, the decision was content-based, but was also viewpoint-neutral. In addition, the judge banned the shirt because its political statement could undermine the fairness of the trial, which is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.

A patient at a government-licensed, private nursing facility received financial assistance from the government for the medical care he received. The patient's status was reviewed by a committee of physicians working at the facility to determine whether his level of care was appropriate and whether his continued stay in the facility was justified. The committee determined that the patient no longer needed the level of care provided by the facility and ordered his transfer to another nursing facility that offered a lower level of care. Since the patient received financial support through a government-funded program, the committee notified the appropriate governmental official who administered the program. The official in turn contacted the patient and informed him that due to the decision of the committee of physicians, his medical financial assistance would be terminated unless he accepted the transfer. The patient was properly notified of an administrative hearing by the governmental agency that administered the program, and the hearing confirmed the official's decision to terminate the patient's medical financial assistance unless he accepted the transfer. The patient sued the nursing f

(A) No, because the decision was made by a committee of physicians working at a private nursing facility. Under the state-action doctrine, private actors are treated as government actors when they perform a traditional government function or the government is significantly involved in their activities. But government funding (however substantial) or licensing does not trigger this doctrine. The patient can only challenge the private nursing facility's decision to transfer him to another facility on procedural due process grounds if the state-action doctrine applies. Here, the nursing facility does not perform a traditional and exclusive government function since residential elderly care has long been undertaken by private entities. Additionally, the state's licensing and funding of the nursing facility do not involve the state in the committee's decisions to continue care. Even if they did, state funding (however substantial) or licensing does not make private conduct state action. Therefore, the court will deny the patient's request for injunctive relief because the state-action doctrine does not apply.

A state legislature enacted a statute that required land-based casinos and riverboats to pay a 35 percent tax rate on the revenue generated by the slot machines they operate in the state. Several years after the statute was enacted, the state's riverboat industry suffered a severe financial depression. In an effort to aid the riverboat industry, the legislature lowered the revenue-tax rate on slot machines operated by riverboats to 20 percent because the revenues from slot machines represented a significant portion of the industry's income. An owner of a land-based casino has filed an action in federal court that challenges the statute's constitutionality. Is the owner likely to prevail? (A) No, because the different tax rates are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (B) No, because the subsidy exception to the dormant commerce clause applies. (C) Yes, because the statute violates the geographic uniformity requirement of Article I. (D) Yes, because the tax discriminates against intrastate commerce.

(A) No, because the different tax rates are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Under the equal protection clause, discriminatory government actions are usually subject to minimal scrutiny under the rational basis test. Since this test presumes that the government's actions were constitutional, it requires the challenger to show that the law has no rational relation to any legitimate government interest—i.e., that the law is arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory. Here, the legislature lowered the revenue-tax rate paid by riverboats on the slot machines they operate to 20 percent. This modification of the tax rate was discriminatory because on-land casinos were still required to pay a 35 percent revenue tax on the slot machines they operated. However, since the riverboat industry was in financial peril and the slot revenue represented a significant portion of its income, the different tax rates were rationally related to the state's interest in aiding the riverboat industry. Therefore, the owner is unlikely to prevail. Why is it not C? Under Article I, the taxing and spending clause gives Congress the power to impose indirect taxes (e.g., sales tax), so long as they are uniformly applied in every state (i.e., geographically uniform) and reasonably related to revenue production. But here, it is the state legislature—not Congress—that has imposed the revenue tax, so Article I does not apply.

A collector of antiques traveled across the country from his home in State A to State B to pick up an antique lead opium pipe that he purchased through an online auction. As he drove back across the country to return home, the collector stopped at a bar in State C. While he was there, a nearby police officer heard him bragging to the waitress about his newest acquisition. Because the officer knew that State C criminalized the possession of any opiate paraphernalia, the officer arrested the collector. The collector was charged under a State C statute criminalizing the possession of opiate paraphernalia, and the pipe was confiscated. A valid federal rule regulates the design of all pipes and other smoking paraphernalia by banning the use of lead in their construction. The federal rule was intended to prevent accidental lead poisoning. Does the federal rule preempt the State C statute? (A) No, because the federal rule and the state statute have different purposes. (B) No, because the state statute regulates conduct within the state's exclusive police power. (C) Yes, because the federal rule regulates the field of opium pipes and smoking paraphernalia. (D) Yes, because the legality of the

(A) No, because the federal rule and the state statute have different purposes. The federal government and the states can regulate the same subject matter. But the Article VI supremacy clause renders a state law voidwhen a federal law expressly or impliedly preempts it. Here, the federal rule does not expressly preempt the state statute since neither the Constitution nor any federal law explicitly forbids a state from regulating the ownership of opium pipes and smoking paraphernalia. And there is no implied preemption because: --Congress only intended to occupy the design of all pipes and smoking paraphernalia—not the entire field of pipe and smoking paraphernalia ownership (no field preemption) --Persons can comply with both the federal rule and the state statute (no direct conflict preemption) and --The federal rule and the state statute have different purposes, so the state statute does not interfere with the achievement of the federal rule's purpose of preventing accidental lead poisoning (no indirect conflict preemption). Therefore, the federal rule does not preempt the state statute.

A long-standing state statute dictated that, if a cause of action accrued while an individual was a minor, the individual could bring a civil action within three years of turning 18 years old. The legislature later amended the statute to retroactively extend the period to seven years if the cause of action was based on sexual abuse that occurred while the individual was a minor. The legislative history for the statute shows that the legislature found that, although the change would not prevent such abuse, it would provide remedies for more victims. Within a month after the enactment of this amendment, a defendant was sued by a 23-year-old plaintiff who alleged that she had been sexually abused when she was 12 years old. The defendant contends that he cannot be sued because the amended statute violates his constitutional rights. Is the defendant likely to succeed? (A) No, because the retroactive application of the amended statute is rational. (B) No, because the retroactive application of a law is subject to strict scrutiny. (C) Yes, because the amended statute constitutes an ex post facto law. (D) Yes, because the amended statute violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendm

(A) No, because the retroactive application of the amended statute is rational. The Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process clause prevents states from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without adequate justification. Civil laws that retroactively impair an ordinary right—e.g., the right to raise the statute of limitations as a defense—must undergo rational basis scrutiny. Under this test, the law is presumed valid until the challenger shows that the law's retroactive application has no rational relation to any legitimate government interest. Here, the retroactive application of the amended statute will deprive the defendant of a statute-of-limitations defense by extending the statutory time limit for filing civil actions based on sexual abuse. However, the retroactive application of the amendment does not violate the defendant's due process rights because it is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in providing remedies for sexual-abuse victims. Therefore, the defendant will likely fail.

A state statute was recently enacted prohibiting any grocery store or market within one mile of a school from displaying any posters advertising items for sale. The goal of the statute was to discourage minors from illegally purchasing alcohol or soliciting others to purchase alcohol for them after seeing posters advertising that it was for sale. Before the regulation, many affected stores that did not sell alcohol also advertised in this manner, and the stores that did sell alcohol often advertised non-alcoholic items for sale with posters as well. Is the statute constitutional? (A) No, because the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve the government's goal. (B) No, because the statute was not the least restrictive available means to achieve the government's goal. (C) Yes, because restrictions on commercial speech are not subject to protection by the First Amendment. (D) Yes, because the government's interest is rationally related to the restriction.

(A) No, because the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve the government's goal. Commercial speech is entitled to intermediate First Amendment protection when it concerns lawful activity and is neither false nor misleading. Restrictions on such speech are valid if the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. In this context, narrowly tailored does not mean the least restrictive means available; rather, there must be a "reasonable fit" between the government's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. Here, the ban on all posters is not a reasonable means to achieve the government's goal of discouraging minors from illegally acquiring alcohol. Although the governmental interest here is substantial, the ban on all posters does not directly or efficiently advance this interest.

A student joined a small national organization during her freshman year of college after several of her friends, who were active in the organization, told her about the organization's annual all-expenses paid ski trip for its card-carrying members. The student attended a recruitment drive, signed a pledge of loyalty, paid her annual dues, and received an organization pin. The student later joined other members of the organization at the ski resort. During a meeting around the ski lodge fireplace, the student learned for the first time that the organization was a radical organization. The organization's members were preparing to use subversive means to achieve their objective of installing the organization's spiritual leader as Supreme Dictator of the United States. To this end, the organization was stockpiling mind-control serum and planned to poison the nation's water supply. After returning home, the student consciously avoided members of the organization and never participated in the organization's activities again. However, the student's name remained on the organization's active-member roster, and she did not report the organization's illegal objectives to the authorities. Three yea

(A) No, because the student did not intend to install the organization's spiritual leader as Supreme Dictator of the United States. The First Amendment protects against government interference with a person's right to associate with any group or organization. But since this right is not absolute, the government can punish (i.e., deny public employment to or criminally prosecute) persons who: (1) are active members of a subversive organization, (2) know of the organization's illegal objectives, and (3) specifically intend to further those objectives. ere, a background check revealed that the student was listed as an active member of the subversive organization. The student knew of the organization's illegal objective to install its leader as the Supreme Dictator of the United States. However, she never specifically intended to further that objective since she ceased participating in the organization upon learning about its subversive nature. Therefore, the federal agency's rescission of its employment offer to the student was unconstitutional

A professional football player was accused of lewd conduct in a local bar. The prosecution refused to divulge the name of the other individual involved in the incident. Nevertheless, a reporter determined the individual's identity through interviews of eyewitnesses present at the scene. The reporter's newspaper published an article about the incident that included the individual's name. The publication of the article caused the individual extreme embarrassment. The individual sued the newspaper and the reporter for violating a state statute that prohibits public disclosure of private facts. Can the individual recover damages? (A) No, the individual cannot recover from the newspaper or the reporter. (B) Yes, the individual can recover from the newspaper. (C) Yes, the individual can recover from the reporter. (D) Yes, the individual can recover from the newspaper and the reporter.

(A) No, the individual cannot recover from the newspaper or the reporter. The First Amendment—applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment—shields the media from criminal and civil liability for publishing lawfully obtained private facts and other truthful information involving matters of public concern (i.e., newsworthy events). Here, the individual sued the newspaper and its reporter for publishing an article that included the individual's identity, a private fact that was lawfully obtained by the reporter through eyewitness interviews. The article involved a matter of public concern since a professional football player engaging in lewd behavior in public is a newsworthy event. Therefore, the First Amendment shields the newspaper and its reporter from liability, and the individual cannot recover damages from either of them

A defendant was on trial for the murder of a police officer, which was allegedly ordered by the kingpin of a drug cartel known to be operating in the city. Because of the highly publicized nature of the case, the prosecution requested that the trial court issue a gag order that prohibited the publication of information about the proceedings. The purpose of the gag order was to prevent the release of sensitive information that might impair ongoing undercover investigations of other cartel members. The prosecution also requested that the court issue an order for a closed trial to protect the identities of witnesses, who feared violent repercussions if they testified. After hearing arguments by the prosecution and the defense, the trial court issued the requested gag order and order for a closed trial. The court issued findings on the record and concluded that the publication of information about the proceedings might impair undercover investigations and that public attendance would endanger the lives of those witnesses who testified at trial. Several newspapers that sought to attend and report about the trial appealed the orders, arguing that they were unconstitutional. How should the app

(A) Overturn both orders. The First Amendment freedom of the press generally prohibits the government from restricting the right to publish lawfully obtained, truthful information about matters of public significance. A government action that abridges this right is presumptively unconstitutional and must survive strict scrutiny. This requires the government to prove that its action was the least restrictive means (i.e., narrowly tailored) to achieve a compelling government interest. Here, the trial court issued a gag order that prohibited the press from reporting about court proceedings, which abridged the freedom of the press. The court likely had a compelling interest in preventing the release of sensitive information that might impair ongoing undercover investigations, but it had less restrictive means available to achieve this interest—e.g., postponing the trial. Therefore, the appellate court should overturn the gag order because it cannot survive strict scrutiny and is likely unconstitutional. Additionally, the First Amendment generally guarantees the press and the public the right to attend every stage of a criminal trial. However, this right is not absolute, and a court can order that trial proceedings be closed if the court's findings on the record demonstrate that the closure withstands strict scrutiny. Here, the court prohibited the public from attending the trial to protect the identities of witnesses, who feared violent repercussions if they testified. Although this promoted the compelling interest of protecting witness safety, less restrictive means were available to serve this interest—e.g., allowing witnesses to testify outside the presence of the public. Therefore, the appellate court should overturn the order for a closed trial because it cannot survive strict scrutiny and is likely unconstitutional

A city police officer sought and received an anticipatory warrant to search the defendant's premises for evidence of a crime. The defendant sought to suppress the evidence seized by the officer during the search. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrant on the basis that it violated the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and a similar warrant provision of the state constitution. The state's highest court noted that the U.S. Constitution permits anticipatory search warrants, while the state constitution clearly does not. The state has appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. Which of the following actions must the U.S. Supreme Court take? (A) Refuse to hear the appeal. (B) Reverse the state court decision, because the U.S. Constitution permits anticipatory warrants. (C) Uphold the state court decision, because the issue involves a criminal matter, an area traditionally left to the states under the Tenth Amendment. (D) Uphold the state court decision, because the U.S. Constitution does not require anticipatory warrants.

(A) Refuse to hear the appeal. SCOTUS may exercise appellate jurisdiction over final state-court decisions that present a federal question—unless they are based on adequate and independent state grounds. Adequate grounds exist when state law fully resolves the matter, and independent grounds exist when no federal precedent was used to reach the decision. Here, the state's highest court ruling rests on an adequate state ground because the court found that the warrant was invalid under the state constitution. So even if SCOTUS reversed the state court's ruling based on the U.S. Constitution, the case's outcome would remain the same because the warrant would still violate the state constitution. The ruling also rests on an independent state ground because the state court did not rely on federal law to decide the state constitutional issue.* SCOTUS must therefore refuse to hear the appeal. *A state court ruling is not independent if the state court relied on an "identical" federal provision to rule on the state provision. Here, the federal and state warrant clauses are similar but not the same, so the ruling rests on an independent state ground.

State A derived much of its business from tourism based upon privately owned cruise lines incorporated in State A. State B, which is located just north of State A, recently enacted a statute creating an annual licensing requirement for any cruise line not incorporated in State B that uses State B's ports. The licensing process was costly, and the licenses were difficult to obtain. There was no similar licensing requirement for State B cruise lines using the ports in State B. The cruise lines in State A typically travel north and must use the State B ports in order to maintain the facilities and services they offer. Congress has not enacted legislation regarding the regulation of cruise lines using out-of-state ports. If a cruise line located in State A challenges the constitutionality of the State B licensing requirement, which of the following would provide the strongest argument against the requirement? (A) The Article I commerce clause. (B) The Article IV privileges and immunities clause. (C) The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. (D) The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause.

(A) The Article I commerce clause. The Article I commerce clause empowers Congress to regulate interstate commerce. It also carries a negative implication (i.e., the dormant commerce clause), which prohibits states from (1) discriminating against out-of-state commerce or (2) otherwise unduly burdening interstate commerce. A discriminatory state law—i.e., one that favors in-state over out-of-state interests—will be deemed unconstitutional unless the state proves that: (1) the law furthers an important or legitimate noneconomic state interest (e.g., health, safety) and (2) there is no reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternative to achieve that interest. Here, the State B statute discriminates against out-of-state commerce by imposing an annual licensing requirement on cruise lines that are not incorporated in State B but use its ports. And there is no indication that the statute furthers a legitimate noneconomic interest—e.g., ensuring the competency and safety of cruise lines that operate in State B. Therefore, the Article I commerce clause provides the strongest argument against the constitutionality of the State B licensing requirement.

A federal act seeks to encourage the conservation of migratory nongame birds by providing funding to private organizations for conservation activities. The act serves to implement a non-self-executing treaty entered into by the President that has been ratified by the Senate. Which of the following statements about the act is accurate? (A) This act is constitutional, because Congress can enact laws that are necessary and proper to carry into effect a treaty. (B) This act is constitutional, under Congress's general police power. (C) This act is unconstitutional, because Article I of the U.S. Constitution does not authorize Congress to legislate with respect to treaties. (D) This act is unconstitutional, because Congress cannot allocate federal funds to private organizations.

(A) This act is constitutional, because Congress can enact laws that are necessary and proper to carry into effect a treaty. Article II grants the President certain express powers, including the power to negotiate and enter into treaties with foreign nations provided that the Senate consents (as seen here). And the Article I necessary and proper clause gives Congress the power to enact laws that are reasonably appropriate to carry out the President's express powers—e.g., providing funding for conservation activities to carry into effect a treaty. Therefore, the act is constitutional.

The director of a community outreach program operated by a local government agency uncovered information that an employee of the program who was also a public official was grossly over reporting the number of hours she worked on her time sheets. The director fired the employee. Consequently, the employee became the subject of a criminal investigation that lead to her being charged with fraud and theft. In response to subpoenas, the director, who himself was an at-will employee, truthfully testified under oath both before a grand jury and at trial about the dismissed employee's falsified time sheets. Shortly thereafter, the director was fired in retaliation for his testimony. Can the director successfully seek reinstatement? (A) Yes, because the director was fired in retaliation for speech made as a citizen about a matter of public concern. (B) Yes, because the director testified pursuant to subpoenas. (C) No, because the director was speaking as a public employee pursuant to his official duties about matters learned in the course of his employment. (D) No, because the director was an at-will employee who may be dismissed without cause.

(A) Yes, because the director was fired in retaliation for speech made as a citizen about a matter of public concern. When a government employee contends that his rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment have been violated by his employer, the employee must show that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern. In determining whether a government employee is speaking pursuant to his official duties, the critical question is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee's duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties. When a public employee is speaking about a matter of public concern as a citizen rather than as employee, the First Amendment interest of the employee must be balanced against the interest of the state, as an employer, in effective and efficient management of its internal affairs. Here, the director was compelled to testify and did so truthfully. There is no evidence in the fact pattern to suggest that testifying in this manner was ordinarily within the scope of his duties. Rather, the testimony merely concerned information he learned in the course of his duties. Moreover, the fact pattern explicitly provides that his firing was done in retaliation for that testimony rather than on the basis of the government's needs as an employer. Consequently, the director can successfully seek reinstatement.

A large utility company was located inside State A. The company burned coal to produce electricity, some of which was used within the state, but the majority of which was provided to neighboring states. In order to fund clean-up efforts made necessary as a result of burning coal, State A taxed the electricity the utility provided to its customers based on the amount used. Accordingly, even though some tax revenue came from electricity provided to State A residents, most of the tax revenue came from out-of-state residents. Residents of neighboring State B challenged State A's tax as unconstitutional, claiming that the tax disproportionately affected nonresident individuals. Assuming that Congress has not directly acted in the area, is the court most likely to find the tax constitutional or unconstitutional? (A) Constitutional, as a proper ad valorem tax. (B) Constitutional, as a proper state tax that comports with the Commerce Clause. (C) Unconstitutional, as a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. (D) Unconstitutional, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(B) Constitutional, as a proper state tax that comports with the Commerce Clause. States may tax interstate commerce if Congress has not already acted in the particular area and if the tax does not discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce. The Supreme Court applies a four-part test to determine whether a state tax comports with the Commerce Clause: (1) there must be a substantial nexus between the activity taxed and the taxing state (here, that requirement is satisfied as the taxing state is both supplying the electricity and paying for clean-up), (2) the tax must be fairly apportioned according to a rational formula (here, tax is calculated by usage), (3) the tax may not provide a direct commercial advantage to local businesses over interstate competitors (nothing in the fact pattern indicates that this factor is present), and (4) there must be a fair relationship between the tax and the service provided (here, the tax is calculated in direct proportion to usage and is used for clean-up efforts related to production of electricity).

Concerned with the proliferation of signs about upcoming events and the failure to remove those signs after the event, a city enacted an ordinance specifying that "all signs concerning upcoming events may not be placed more than 14 days before the event and must be removed within 7 days after the event; no more than 10 signs per event are allowed on city property." A social organization wants to display signs about its monthly dinner, which is held to attract new members, in greater number and for a longer period than permitted by the ordinance. The organization has filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. Of the following, by which standard will this ordinance be judged? (A) It must be narrowly tailored to further a significant government interest and leave open alternative channels of communication. (B) It must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest. (C) It must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. (D) It must not have a negative impact on the organization's freedom of assembly.

(B) It must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest. The First Amendment free speech clause protects the right to freely communicate and receive information and ideas. To ensure such protection, content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutionaland subject to strict scrutiny. This means that the government can restrict speech based on what is being said (i.e., its messages or ideas) only if it can prove that the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest—a nearly impossible task. Here, the ordinance restricts the time period during which signs about upcoming events may be placed. It also restricts the number of those signs that may be placed on city property. Since the ordinance imposes these restrictions on one subject (upcoming events) but no others (e.g., candidacy for public office), it is a content-based restriction that is subject to strict scrutiny review. Therefore, the city must prove that the ordinance is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

In general, the beef industry has been gravitating toward grass-fed cows instead of corn-fed cows, for reasons of health and taste. Grass fields that grow hay to feed grass-fed cows are currently located in only 10 states. In order to capitalize on this growing market as a source of revenue, Congress recently enacted a statute placing a high per-unit sales tax on the type of grass used for hay. The tax will discourage cow farmers from feeding their cows grass instead of corn because of the significant increase in the cost of grass over corn. Additionally, the increased cost will eventually be passed on to consumers, who analysts predict will be less inclined to choose expensive grass-fed beef over cheaper corn-fed beef. If the farmers who harvest and sell this grass file a lawsuit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of this sales tax, are they likely to succeed? (A) No, because Congress can enact any legislation that is necessary and proper to regulate property for the general welfare. (B) No, because Congress has power to impose and collect taxes if they are reasonably related to revenue production. (C) Yes, because application of the tax will not be apportioned properl

(B) No, because Congress has power to impose and collect taxes if they are reasonably related to revenue production. The Article I, Section 8 taxing and spending clause gives Congress plenary (i.e., exclusive) power to raise federal revenue by imposing and collecting taxes. This allows Congress to impose an indirect tax (e.g., sales tax) so long as the tax is: (1) imposed identically in every state where the taxed goods are found (i.e., geographically uniform) and (2) reasonably related to revenue production (i.e., no provision extraneous to tax purposes). Here, Congress imposed a sales tax on each unit of grass that is used to grow hay to feed grass-fed cows. The tax is applied in a geographically uniform manner because it is imposed in every state where the grass is located. Additionally, the tax is reasonably related to revenue production because it does not contain provisions that are unrelated to the need for revenue production. Therefore, the farmers are unlikely to succeed in challenging the tax's constitutionality because it complies with the taxing and spending clause.

Last year, Congress enacted legislation providing for funding opportunities to eligible secular and religiously affiliated colleges and universities. The funding will be available through individual counties as each county's funding limitations allow. The legislation does not require that each county apply standard guidelines nor does it provide any suggested guidelines other than a statement that "all counties should track funding and compile guidelines in the event of a federal audit."A county awards a large grant to a religiously affiliated college that employs a substantial number of residents. The grant contract, signed by representatives from both the county and the college, states as follows: "All grant monies must be used in compliance with county regulations. Further, the college must track the allocation of grant monies throughout the grant term." Is the county's award of the grant constitutional? (A) No, because the county provided grant monies to a religiously affiliated college. (B) No, because it does not require that the aid be used only for nonreligious purposes. (C) Yes, because the college is required to track funding. (D) Yes, because the college may be the subject o

(B) No, because it does not require that the aid be used only for nonreligious purposes. Governmental financial assistance to religious institutions is permitted if the aid is secular in nature, used only for secular purposes, and, when the aid is distributed among secular and religious institutions, the distribution criteria must be religiously neutral. Why is (C) incorrect? Tracking funding is insufficient; the government must explicitly require that funds not be used for religious purposes. There is no indication that the county requires that the aid be spent for nonreligious purposes only.

Congress enacted a statute authorizing states to regulate and tax the financial services industry, even if the regulation or taxation otherwise discriminates against out-of-state commerce. A state enacted a statute that taxed all out-of-state financial services entities doing business in the state but did not tax in-state financial services entities doing business in the state. The purpose of the tax was to encourage the growth of the in-state financial services industry. Assuming that the state statute is consistent with federal statutes regulating the financial services industry, is it constitutional? (A) No, because it violates the dormant commerce clause. (B) No, because it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (C) Yes, because a state may tax a corporation doing business in the state. (D) Yes, because Congress specifically permitted this type of statute.

(B) No, because it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the state statute discriminates against interstate commerce by imposing a tax on out-of-state financial services entities but not on in-state financial services entities that do business in the state. But this state statute was adopted after the enactment of a federal statute that explicitly authorizes such a tax, so the state statute does not violate the dormant commerce clause. However, even when Congress has authorized conduct that would otherwise violate the dormant commerce clause, states must comply with other constitutional provisions when engaging in that conduct. This includes the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, which subjects discriminatory state taxes to rational basis review. This level of review requires that the discriminatory state tax rationally relate to a legitimate government interest. Here, the state enacted the discriminatory tax to encourage the growth of its financial services industry. Encouraging the growth of an industry within the state is a legitimate government interest. However, promoting domestic business (i.e., in-state business) by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate government interest. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause.

A defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute under state law after he was arrested with a large amount of marijuana that was packaged in numerous baggies. The defendant was also in possession of a large amount of cash in small denominations at the time of arrest. The defendant claimed that the evidence was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and seeks to bring a suit against the state, of which he is a citizen, in federal court. The defendant has not yet been convicted of the crime in state court. Is the federal court likely to hear this case? (A) No, because the Pullman abstention doctrine counsels deferring the exercise of jurisdiction. (B) No, because the Younger abstention doctrine prevents the federal court from hearing the case. (C) Yes, because a federal court has jurisdiction over a case between a state and its citizens. (D) Yes, because the defendant's Fourth Amendment claim arises under the U.S. Constitution.

(B) No, because the Younger abstention doctrine prevents the federal court from hearing the case. Under the doctrine of abstention, a federal court may abstain from deciding a claim when strong state interests are at stake. Under the Younger abstention doctrine, a federal court will not enjoin a pending state criminal case in the absence of bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute. Here, the defendant has not yet been convicted of a crime, and there is no evidence of bad faith, harassment, or a patently unconstitutional state statute. Thus, the federal court is unlikely to hear the defendant's case against the state. Under the Pullman abstention doctrine, a federal court may refrain from ruling on a federal constitutional claim that depends on resolving an unsettled issue of state law best left to the state courts.

To address a budgetary shortfall in the judiciary, a state legislature passed a statute that increased various court fees, including the fee to file an appeal. The statute provided that the filing fee could only be waived for defendants who have been convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death. A defendant who was convicted and imprisoned for a noncapital criminal offense has filed an appeal with the state's appellate court. At the time the appeal was filed, the defendant requested that the court waive the filing fee because he was unable to pay it. The appellate court denied the defendant's request on the basis that the state statute limited the waiver to defendants who had been convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death. The appellate court then dismissed the defendant's appeal because he had not paid the filing fee. The defendant has properly filed suit in a federal court to challenge the constitutionality of the state appellate court's ruling. Should the federal court uphold the state appellate court's ruling? (A) No, because a state may not prohibit a prisoner from exercising a fundamental right. (B) No, because the defendant was indigent. (C) Yes, because state l

(B) No, because the defendant was indigent. State laws that discriminate against individuals based on wealth (e.g., ability v. inability to pay a court fee) can be challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. Since an individual's wealth is not a suspect class or quasi-suspect class, such laws are generally subject to rational basis scrutiny and upheld. However, courts will depart from this test and apply strict scrutiny when a state law prohibits the exercise of a fundamental right (e.g., the right to appeal) based on an individual's wealth. Under strict scrutiny, a discriminatory statute is unconstitutional unless it uses the least restrictive means (i.e., is necessary) to achieve a compelling government interest. Here, the state may have a compelling interest in adequately funding the state's judicial system, but this statute is unconstitutional since there are less restrictive ways to achieve that interest—e.g., raising taxes, reducing spending in other areas. Therefore, the federal court should overturn the state appellate court's ruling. Why is (A) wrong? The state may prohibit a prisoner from exercising certain fundamental rights—e.g., the Fourteenth Amendment permits states to prohibit convicted felons from voting. Regardless, the defendant's right to appeal was denied based on his inability to pay the filing fee—not his status as a prisoner.

A state law created legislative districts for both houses of the state's legislature based on the total population of the state. The variation in people assigned to a district between the largest and smallest districts for the state senate was 8%. A voter in the district with the largest population filed suit contending that the legislative districts violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Is the voter's challenge likely to succeed? (A) No, because a state senate district is not subject to the "one person, one vote" principle. (B) No, because the districts do not violate the equal protection clause. (C) Yes, because even minor deviations in the populations of state legislative districts are not permitted by the equal protection clause. (D) Yes, because the districts do not comport with the "one person, one vote" principle.

(B) No, because the districts do not violate the equal protection clause. The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause ensures that each citizen is given equal voting power (i.e., one person, one vote) by requiring state legislative districts (e.g., state senate districts) to have largely equal populations. This "one person, one vote" principle means that the populations in each voting district must be approximately equal. A deviation of 10% or less between the populations of legislative districts is considered minor and does not violate the equal protection clause absent evidence of discrimination. Here, the deviation between the populations of the largest and smallest state senate districts was 8%. Since this deviation was less than 10% and there is no evidence of discrimination, the districts comport with the "one person, one vote" principle. Therefore, the districts do not violate the equal protection clause, so the voter's challenge is unlikely to succeed. NOTE: The "one person, one vote" principle requires nearly precise mathematical equality between congressional districts. But minor deviations (i.e., deviations of 10% or less) in the populations of state legislative districts are permitted by the equal protection clause—provided there is no evidence of discriminatory intent (as seen here).

A state sales tax applied to the sale of most items, including newspapers and magazines. A state statute that exempts from this tax periodicals that are published or distributed by any religious organization and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teachings of that religion has recently taken effect. The statute requires the publisher of a qualifying periodical to demonstrate to a specified state tax official that it is a religious organization. The statute also specifies that the official may not question the reasonableness of the applicant's religious beliefs. The purpose of the statute is to reduce the financial burden on religious organizations. The publisher of a magazine that does not qualify for this special tax exemption has filed an action in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the exemption statute violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Should the court find that the tax exemption is constitutional? (A) No, because a religious organization cannot constitutionally qualify for a tax exemption. (B) No, because the exemption is confined solely to religious organizations. (C) Yes, because the exemption does not favor one religious sec

(B) No, because the exemption is confined solely to religious organizations. The First Amendment establishment clause, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, compels government neutrality toward religion. Challenges brought under this clause are generally reviewed under the historical test. But courts may forego this test and apply the more stringent strict scrutiny test when the law expressly impacts religion (e.g., religious organizations). Under strict scrutiny, the law is invalid unless the government proves that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. Here, the state statute expressly favors religion by exempting from the state sales tax the periodicals that religious organizations (but no others) publish or distribute. The state may have an interest in reducing the financial burden on religious organizations. But there is no indication that periodicals published or distributed by religious organizations must be exempt from the state sales tax to achieve that interest. The court should therefore find that the tax exemption is an unconstitutional establishment of religion. NOTE: Religious organizations can qualify for tax exemptions—provided they do not violate the First Amendment establishment clause. NOTE: Although the tax exemption does not favor one religious sect over another, the exemption still violates the establishment clause by favoring religious over nonreligious interests.

In response to growing concerns about the overcrowding of landfills with scrap metal nationwide, Congress passed a statute requiring all unwanted vehicles to be disposed of at federally licensed auto-recycling facilities. These facilities were able to recycle more components of vehicles than most other recycling facilities. However, due to the high operating costs of these facilities, the cost of disposing of the vehicles was much higher than the cost of disposing of them at general-purpose recycling facilities. A state wants to dispose of its fleet of decommissioned trucks at a state-operated recycling facility. However, this facility is not federally licensed. Is the state permitted to dispose of its decommissioned trucks at the state-operated facility? (A) No, because the federal statute was passed pursuant to Congress's power to legislate for the general welfare. (B) No, because the federal statute regulates interstate commerce. (C) Yes, because the market-participant exception applies. (D) Yes, because states are given broad discretion in areas governed by the state's police power.

(B) No, because the federal statute regulates interstate commerce. The commerce clause gives Congress broad authority to regulate interstate commerce, which includes: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially impact interstate commerce, singly (noneconomic) or in the aggregate (economic). Here, a federal statute requires the disposal of all unwanted vehicles at auto-recycling facilities licensed by the federal government. A state wants to dispose of a fleet of its decommissioned trucks at a state-operated recycling facility, but this activity, in the aggregate, likely has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. This means that the federal statute is a valid exercise of Congress's commerce powers. Therefore, the state must comply with the federal statute and cannot dispose of its decommissioned trucks at the state-operated facility.

A man was charged with violating a state criminal statute in state court. While prosecution was pending, the man filed a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court, alleging that the state statute as applied to him violates the U.S. Constitution. The man sought an injunction against the state's prosecution of him. Should the federal district court hear the man's claim? (A) No, because the man lacks standing since he has not been convicted and sentenced for a violation of the state statute. (B) No, because the man seeks an injunction against a pending state criminal proceeding. (C) Yes, because a federal court may enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. (D) Yes, because the man has alleged that the state statute violates the U.S. Constitution.

(B) No, because the man seeks an injunction against a pending state criminal proceeding. A federal court may invoke a variety of reasons to abstain from deciding a case properly before it. For example, the Younger abstention doctrine requires that a federal court abstain from issuing a declaratory judgment or injunction if doing so would interfere with a pending state criminal, or particular civil (e.g., termination of parental rights or contempt), proceeding that: (1) involves an important state interest, and (2) provides an adequate opportunity to litigate federal issues. Here, the man asked the federal court to enjoin the pending state criminal proceeding against him. However, the state has an important interest in enforcing its own criminal law, and the man has an adequate opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim in state court. The federal court must therefore abstain from hearing the man's claim.

Officials from the federal Environmental Protection Agency sought an injunction in federal court to preclude the owner of a hazardous facility from illegally discharging pollution from the facility into the river in the future. Shortly before trial, the owner, closing the facility temporarily for routine maintenance, voluntarily ceased to discharge pollutants into the river. The owner filed a motion to dismiss the action as moot. Should the court grant the owner's motion to dismiss? (A) No, because a live controversy need only exist when a suit is filed. (B) No, because the owner retained the ability to pollute the river. (C) Yes, because the injunction sought by the government would have a prospective effect. (D) Yes, because the owner had voluntarily ceased to pollute.

(B) No, because the owner retained the ability to pollute the river. In general, a case has become moot if further legal proceedings would have no effect (i.e., if there is no longer a controversy). A court will not dismiss as moot a case in which the defendant voluntarily ceases its illegal or wrongful action once litigation has commenced. The court must be assured that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated. Here, while the facility has voluntarily ceased its illegal pollution of the river, this has been effected by a temporary shutdown of the facility for routine maintenance. The owner has not taken any action that would make it reasonable to expect that the facility will not illegally pollute the river in the future.

A tenured professor who had been employed for 30 years at a state university was dismissed. A week before the dismissal took effect, the professor was informed that she was being dismissed due to allegations of plagiarism in several of her published works. The professor was not given the opportunity to respond to the allegations against her prior to her dismissal. Shortly after her dismissal, the professor contested her termination in a post-termination evidentiary hearing, at which her termination was upheld. The professor then filed an action in federal court, arguing that her termination was unconstitutional as she was denied due process of law. Was the professor's termination constitutional? (A) No, because the professor was not granted a full evidentiary hearing prior to termination. (B) No, because the professor was not provided with a pre-termination opportunity to respond to the allegations of plagiarism. (C) Yes, because the professor could be terminated without cause, so no due process was required. (D) Yes, because the professor received notice of her dismissal and a post-termination hearing.

(B) No, because the professor was not provided with a pre-termination opportunity to respond to the allegations of plagiarism. When a state attempts to deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the state provide the individual with procedural due process. To determine the process due, courts balance the government's interest against the individual's interest. Since a public employee who can only be terminated for cause has a property interest in such employment—and termination is a serious deprivation of that interest—due process requires that the employee receive: (1) notice of his/her alleged misconduct; (2) a pre-termination opportunity to respond to that allegation; and (3) a post-termination evidentiary hearing to determine if the termination was warranted. Here, the state-university professor had a property interest in her job because she was tenured and therefore could only be terminated for cause. The university provided the professor with notice and a post-termination evidentiary hearing. But since the professor was not given the opportunity to respond to the allegations of plagiarism against her prior to her dismissal, her termination violated due process and was unconstitutional

State A and State B are separated by State C. After researching the medical uses of a synthetic drug that was originally developed as a "club drug," State A and State B have legalized the synthetic drug as a medical treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). State C has not legalized any use of the drug and has a statute that criminalizes its possession. There is no federal law regulating this synthetic drug. The drug is much cheaper in State B because most of it is manufactured in that state. A PTSD patient residing in State A decided to save money by visiting State B to fill her prescription for the drug. As she was returning to State A, she was validly arrested in State C for an unrelated traffic offense. When the police found the synthetic drug in a proper inventory search of her car, State C seized the drug and brought a criminal possession charge against her. After the patient learned that the State C possession statute has an exemption for common carriers who contract to transport the drug from State B manufacturers to State A pharmacies, the patient challenged the State C charges and State C's seizure of her medication solely on the grounds that State C has violated the

(B) No, because the state has a rational basis for differentiating between private persons and common carriers. The rational basis standard is used in all cases in which one of the higher standards (intermediate or strict scrutiny) does not apply. Thus, rational basis review applies to laws drawing distinctions based on age, wealth, weight, or most other classifications, as well as to any distinctions drawn for business or economic reasons. Here, rational basis review will apply, and because there is a rational basis to regulate possession by private individuals but not common carriers, the law is likely constitutional.

A private contractor entered into an agreement with the U.S. Department of the Interior to remove a dam across a navigable river. The agreement called for the contractor to be paid for the expenses incurred in removing the dam plus an additional 5% of those expenses as his profit for completing the job. When the contractor purchased materials for this job, state sales taxes were imposed. The contractor paid them, but after finishing the removal of the dam, he filed suit for a refund, contending that the state sales taxes were an unconstitutional taxation of the federal government. The state can show that its sales taxes are uniformly imposed on the purchasers of such materials and that the sales taxes did not significantly increase the cost of the job. Is the contractor likely to be successful in his suit? (A) No, because the state sales taxes satisfied the uniformity requirement of the taxing and spending clause. (B) No, because the state sales taxes were imposed on the contractor's purchase of the materials, and not directly on the federal government. (C) Yes, because a state may not tax the federal government's affiliates. (D) Yes, because Congress has not specifically agreed to the

(B) No, because the state sales taxes were imposed on the contractor's purchase of the materials, and not directly on the federal government. States can tax federal government affiliates (e.g., employees or contractors) unless: (1) Congress granted the affiliate immunity, (2) the tax is discriminatory, or (3) the tax substantially interferes with the affiliate's federal purpose or duties (e.g., when a high tax burden makes it impossible for the affiliate to accomplish its federal functions). Here, the contractor is responsible for paying the state sales taxes when purchasing materials to remove the dam. Although the federal government is contractually obligated to pay for the contractor's expenses—including the state sales taxes—in removing the dam, they are not direct taxes on the federal government. And since (1) Congress has not granted the contractor immunity, (2) the taxes are nondiscriminatory, and (3) there is no indication they impose a prohibitively high tax burden, the contractor is unlikely to be successful in his lawsuit.

A woman and her ex-husband shared joint custody of their children in State A. Without court approval, the woman took the children and moved to State B. The woman was arrested, convicted of kidnapping in a State B court, and imprisoned for two years. After completing her prison sentence, the woman returned to State A, where she, her ex-husband, and their children currently reside. Last month, the legislature in State A enacted a statute that requires individuals convicted of kidnapping to register with local law enforcement and provide it with the individual's name, current address, and place of employment. The information provided by the individual is maintained in a database that is accessible to the public. The purpose of the database is to protect the public by providing basic information about individuals who have been convicted of kidnapping. The woman has filed suit in a court in State A, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Is she likely to succeed? (A) No, because the parental kidnapping judgment was valid under the full faith and credit clause. (B) No, because the statute's punitive effect does not clearly override its nonpunitive purpose. (C) Yes, because the sta

(B) No, because the statute's punitive effect does not clearly override its nonpunitive purpose. The ex post facto clauses generally prohibit state and federal governments from enacting criminal laws that have a retroactive punitive effect. However, a civil law will be deemed to be an ex post facto law when its retroactive effect is so punitive that it clearly overrides its nonpunitive purpose. Courts weigh several factors to determine whether the punitive effect of a retroactive civil law clearly overrides its nonpunitive purpose. These include whether the law: (1) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint (e.g., imprisonment) (not seen here), (2) has historically been regarded as punishment (e.g., public shaming), (3) promotes the traditional aims of punishment (e.g., retribution), and (4) is rationally related to its nonpunitive purpose. Here, the statute requires convicted kidnappers to register with law enforcement so that their personal information can be maintained in a public database. The statute's purpose is to protect the public from convicted kidnappers—not to punish or shame them for their past illegal conduct. And since the statute's registration requirement is rationally related to protecting the public, the statute's retroactive punitive effect does not clearly override its nonpunitive purpose. Therefore, the statute is constitutional

Congress, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, enacted a law requiring everyone in the United States to purchase Vitamin D tablets during the winter months. Congress determined that, based on scientific evidence, the consumption of Vitamin D during those months alleviates depression in the general population and prevents a substantial number of suicides. Faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of this law, how is the Supreme Court likely to rule? (A) Strike down the law, because the law does not regulate a channel or instrumentality of commerce. (B) Strike down the law, because Congress may not mandate that persons engage in commerce. (C) Uphold the law, because the activity in the aggregate has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. (D) Uphold the law, because Congress may regulate the private consumption of goods.

(B) Strike down the law, because Congress may not mandate that persons engage in commerce. While the Commerce Clause has been interpreted as granting broad powers to Congress, it does not give Congress the power to mandate that persons engage in commerce.

A federal statute was enacted that banned all individuals born on a specific sovereign island nation from entering the United States after it was established that only such individuals were carriers of a highly contagious and deadly virus. A U.S. citizen who had been born on the island nation has challenged the constitutionality of this statute in federal court after being denied reentry to the United States. Which of the following constitutional clauses provides the best ground for this challenge? (A) The comity clause of Article IV. (B) The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. (C) The naturalization clause of Article I, Section 8. (D) The privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(B) The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. A law that treats similarly situated persons differently may violate the constitutional principle of equal protection, which applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment due process clause. This is likely when the law intentionally discriminates against a suspect class (e.g., national origin). That is because the government must clear the highest hurdle—strict scrutiny—to justify such a law. And since this federal statute intentionally targets national origin, due process provides the best ground to challenge the statute. Why is it not (C)? The Article I, Section 8 naturalization clause grants Congress the authority to enact laws that regulate naturalization—i.e., the process through which any noncitizen may obtain U.S. citizenship. But Congress must comply with other constitutional provisions when exercising this authority, including the Fifth Amendment due process clause.

A state senator was on a committee reviewing the compliance of all state government buildings with federal wheelchair accessibility policies. The senator headed the committee, and as such, delivered multiple speeches during committee meetings about the importance of having not only all government buildings, but also private buildings, comply with the federal wheelchair guidelines regarding accessibility. One day as he was leaving his office, a reporter asked the senator about his views on wheelchair accessibility. The senator repeated verbatim a speech he gave during one of his committee meetings, including a comment that, unless protected by immunity or privilege, would expose him to liability for defamation of another senator. Can the senator be subject to civil liability for the statements he made to the reporter? (A) Yes, because the Speech or Debate Clause does not apply to state legislators. (B) Yes, because his statements were outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. (C) No, because the Speech or Debate Clause protects him from civil liability. (D) No, because the senator is immune from liability under the principles of federalism.

(B) Yes, because his statements were outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. The Speech or Debate Clause does not apply to state legislators, but under the principles of federalism, state legislators are immune from liability for actions within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Here, the senator's comments made during committee meetings were within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. However, the comments he made to the reporter, despite the fact that they were verbatim of what he said in a committee meeting, are not. Thus, he is not immune from civil liability arising from his comments.

Latino Americans make up approximately 40 percent of the population of a state. They wish to bring a lawsuit challenging a redistricting plan adopted by their state legislature that they contend will prevent them from exercising their voting strength. In addition to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which of the following constitutional provisions would best support this action? (A) Thirteenth Amendment (B) Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (C) Fifteenth Amendment (D) Twenty-Fourth Amendment

(C) Fifteenth Amendment The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits both the state and federal governments from denying any citizen the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The courts have interpreted the right to vote to include the right to have that vote meaningfully counted. Therefore, the Fifteenth Amendment will support this action. Why is it not (B)? Although the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does protect the right to vote, the challenge here is the denial of this right to a particular minority, rather than the denial of this right on another basis.

An employee of a large nondenominational church served five years as the minister for the church's youth program. During the past year, the minister regularly missed work because he suffered from chronic migraine headaches. As a result of his frequent absences from work, the church's governing body voted to terminate the minister's employment. The minister filed suit against the church for monetary damages, alleging that its decision to terminate him violated a federal law that prohibits discrimination against public and private employees based on disability. In response, the church has filed a motion for summary judgment. How should the court proceed? (A) Deny the motion, because the federal law is a law of general applicability. (B) Deny the motion, because the minister's due process rights were violated. (C) Grant the motion, because the free exercise clause requires dismissal of the suit. (D) Grant the motion, because the minister does not have standing to sue.

(C) Grant the motion, because the free exercise clause requires dismissal of the suit. The First Amendment free exercise clause prohibits government interference with a religious organization's right to shape its faith and mission. As a result, the Supreme Court has recognized the ministerial exception, which protects religious organizations from civil liability for employment discrimination when they hire or fire employees who serve in ministerial roles. This exception applies to anyemployee whose primary function is to advance the organization's religious mission (e.g., pastor, parochial school teacher). Here, the minister filed an employment discrimination claim against the church for violating federal law when it terminated him because his medical condition caused him to regularly miss work. However, since the minister's primary function was to advance the church's religious mission, the church was immune from civil liability for its decision to terminate him. Therefore, the court should grant the church's motion for summary judgment and dismiss the suit. NOTE: Religious organizations typically must comply with laws of general applicability—i.e., laws that apply equally to all regardless of their religion. However, the ministerial exception protects religious organizations from civil liability under generally applicable employment discrimination laws such laws. Therefore, the church's motion for summary judgment will be granted.

In response to an increase in the number of sexual harassment suits filed by government employees, a state passed a statute requiring all government employees to participate in sexual harassment classes. Pursuant to a provision in the statute, the classes would include watching videos depicting common interactions between employees that were considered acts of sexual harassment in the workplace. Accordingly, the state validly contracted with a production company to create the sexual harassment videos. However, before the production company began to create the videos, the state legislature decided that it would be less expensive to create a government employee handbook regarding sexual harassment that could be reviewed by government employees during the sexual harassment classes. As a result, the state amended the statute to exclude the required videos and canceled its contract with the production company. Was the state permitted to amend the statute and cancel the contract? (A) Yes, because the production company had not yet started production of the videos when the statute was amended. (B) Yes, because the state has the constitutional authority to amend the statute regarding the vide

(C) No, because the amendment impairs the state's contractual obligation to the production company. Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from passing any law "impairing the obligation of contracts." This prohibition applies only to state legislation that retroactively impairs contractual rights. Impairment by the state of a public contract (one to which the state or local government is a party) must be reasonable and necessary. Furthermore, the state must show that its important interest cannot be served by a less-restrictive alternative and that the impairment it seeks is necessary because of unforeseeable circumstances. Here, the amendment retroactively impaired the state's contract with the production company. Although arguably reasonable, there is nothing in the fact pattern to indicate that the government lacked sufficient funds for the creation of the videos. Moreover, there was no unforeseeable circumstance requiring the state to impair the contract with the production company. Therefore, the state was prohibited from amending the statute and canceling the contract.

A plaintiff, invoking her status as an American citizen, filed suit in an appropriate federal court seeking an order to remove the President from office. The lawsuit alleged that the President was not born in the United States and that he therefore was ineligible to serve as President because the Constitution requires that the President have been born in the United States. Which doctrine would the court likely rely upon to dismiss this suit? (A) Abstention. (B) Mootness. (C) Standing. (D) The political-question doctrine.

(C) Standing. A federal court will not hear a case unless the plaintiff has standing—i.e., the plaintiff (1) suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact (2) that was caused by the challenged action and (3) can likely be redressed by a favorable judicial ruling. A generalized grievance shared by many or all citizens will not suffice. Here, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court to remove the President from office because she alleged that he was not born in the United States. However, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she has suffered a particularized injury-in-fact or that it is redressable by the court since impeachment is reserved to Congress. Therefore, the court will likely dismiss the suit because the plaintiff lacks standing.

Botulinum toxin is a controlled substance that is commonly used in anti-wrinkle injections. Because of its toxic nature, Congress enacted a federal statute that established minimum safety and testing standards that must be met for the toxin to be eligible for commercial use. In particular, the federal statute mandated that no form of botulinum toxin may be distributed for commercial use unless it is first approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Since the federal statute was enacted, the FDA has only approved two types of botulinum toxin for commercial use: a dominant product and a competing product. Recently, several patients in State A have experienced temporary paralysis due to severe botulism poisoning after being injected with the competing product. In response, the legislature of State A enacted a state statute that establishes safety and testing standards for the commercial use of botulinum toxin in the state. Because the state statute's safety and testing standards are more rigorous than those established in the federal statute, only the dominant product is eligible for commercial use in State A. The company that manufactures the competing product has sue

(C) The State A official, because the state statute does not interfere with the achievement of the federal statute's purpose. The federal government and states can regulate the same subject matter. But the Article VI supremacy clause renders a state law void when a federal law expressly or impliedly preempts it. Here, the federal statute does not expressly preempt the state statute since neither the Constitution nor federal law explicitly forbids the state from regulating the commercial use of botulinum toxin. The federal statute also does not impliedly preempt the state statute. Implied preemption occurs through: (1) field preemption - when Congress intended to completely occupy a particular field by legislating so thoroughly that it left no room for supplementary state regulations; (2) direct conflict preemption - when it is impossible or nearly impossible to comply with both federal and state law; or (3) indirect conflict preemption - when the state law frustrates the purpose of the federal law. Here, there is no field preemption since the federal statute establishes minimum safety and testing standards, which leaves room for states to establish more rigorous standards. There is no direct conflict preemption because the company can comply with both statutes. And there is no indirect conflict preemption since the state statute furthers the federal statute's purpose of preventing injuries from the commercial use of the toxin. Therefore, the federal statute does not preempt the state statute and the state will likely prevail. NOTE: The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers that the Constitution does not expressly grant to the federal government—including the police power to enact and enforce laws that protect the public's health, safety, and welfare. But there is no presumption that state laws prevail over federal laws.

State X's Board of Education (Board) does not regulate high schools sports, but instead has designated a non-profit, voluntary athletic association of private and public high schools as the entity to provide standards, rules, and regulations for interscholastic competition among the state's public schools. The association includes over 90 percent of the public high schools in State X as members. Over 80 percent of the association's members are public high schools. The association requires its members to play all games and scrimmages against other association members unless permission of the association is secured in advance. The association also imposes penalties (e.g., fines, suspension of players or teams) for schools that do not adhere to its rules. The Board reviews and approves the association's rules and regulations. Members of the Board can and do serve as members of the association's governing body and on its committees for the various sports. Employees of the association are covered by the state's health and retirement systems for state employees.The association has promulgated a rule that prohibits member schools from recruiting athletes except at specific times and under speci

(C) The association's actions are pervasively entwined with those of the Board. State action may exist if there are sufficient mutual contacts between the conduct of a private party and the government to find that the private party is subject to constitutional restrictions. The symbiotic relationship here between the Board and the association (e.g., overlapping membership, Board oversight, and inclusion of association employees in the state's health and retirement programs) indicates the association's actions are pervasively entwined with the Board's authority and actions. Consequently, this constitutes a strong argument in favor of treating the association as a state actor. Why is (D) incorrect? While an entity that performs a traditional and exclusive governmental function is a state actor for the purposes of free speech rights, providing athletic programs is not a traditional and exclusive governmental function. Merely providing a product or service that the government could offer is not sufficient to make the provider a state actor.

Public schools within a state are managed by local school boards, which have the authority to impose taxes on real-property owners within a school district. The members of each local school board are elected. To promote voter responsibility in school-board elections, a state law provides that the eligible voters for school-board elections are the property owners in the county whose property-tax revenue supports public school districts. Of the following, which is the most likely constitutional basis on which this method of electing the local school board can be challenged? (A) The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (B) The elections clause of Article I, Section 4. (C) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (D) The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.

(C) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state law that treats similarly situated people differently (e.g., property owners v. nonproperty owners) violates the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause if it lacks sufficient justification. A discriminatory law that substantially impacts a fundamental right (e.g., right to vote) is justified only if it passes strict scrutiny. This requires the state to prove that the law is the least restrictive means (i.e., necessary) to achieve a compelling state interest. Here, the discriminatory property-ownership requirement substantially impacts a fundamental right by prohibiting persons who are not property owners from voting. Although states have a compelling interest in promoting voter responsibility, a property-ownership requirement is not the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. That is because public school districts can provide information about school-board elections to nonproperty owners so they vote responsibly. As a result, the equal protection clause is the most likely basis for challenging this law. Why is it not (A)? The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause is violated when a law arbitrarily impacts a right of allpersons—not just a class of persons (as seen here). Therefore, equal protection is a more likely basis for finding the property-ownership requirement unconstitutional. Why is it not (B)? The elections clause in Article I, Section 4 grants Congress the power to regulate congressional elections—not state or local elections. Therefore, this is not a basis to challenge the state law's constitutionality.

The Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives initiated impeachment proceedings against a federal district court judge. The President, a lifelong friend of the judge, considered the grounds for impeachment that were being discussed to be politically motivated and without substantial merit. Prior to any hearing on the matter by the House committee, the President pardoned the judge. What effect does this pardon have on the impeachment proceedings against the judge? (A) The proceedings must stop, because the President's power to pardon is plenary. (B) The proceedings must stop, because the President acted in good faith in granting the pardon. (C) The pardon has no effect on the proceedings, because a President's power to pardon does not extend to impeachment. (D) The pardon has no effect on the proceedings, because a President may not pardon a person until that person has been convicted.

(C) The pardon has no effect on the proceedings, because a President's power to pardon does not extend to impeachment. The President (i.e., executive branch) has the distinct power to enforce laws. This includes the plenary (i.e., absolute, unqualified) power to grant reprieves and pardons to persons who commit federal offenses—except in cases of impeachment. Since the President's power to pardon does not extend to impeachment, the pardon has no effect on this impeachment proceeding against the federal district court judge.

Condominiums located within a particular city block were known to be the center of illegal narcotics sales. Many individuals living within that city block had been arrested multiple times in connection with the illegal sales, and neighbors were outraged that the local police department did not attempt to do something more severe than individual, sporadic arrests. The city took action by filing an action in the appropriate federal district court seeking the forfeiture of real and personal property involved in the illegal narcotics sales. After an ex parte hearing at which only the city was present, the court properly issued a warrant of arrest authorizing the seizure of private property. The city seized all condominiums that were located within the city block and any car that was known to have transported illegal narcotics. A man whose condominium and car were seized in connection with the alleged crimes filed suit, alleging that he was not given prior notice of the city's intent to seize his condominium and vehicle. Were the seizures of the condominium and the vehicle proper in light of the principles of procedural due process? (A) The seizure of the condominium and the vehicle were bo

(C) The seizure of the vehicle was proper, but the seizure of the condominium was improper. In civil forfeiture actions, the government deprives an individual of his/her property interest by seizing property allegedly used in criminal activity. As a result, procedural due process generally requires that the government provide reasonable notice of the seizure and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a neutral decision-maker. However, personal property may be seized prior to providing notice and a hearing when: (1) the seizure serves a significant government interest; (2) that interest would be frustrated by advance notice of the seizure; and (3) the seizure is performed by the government. Here, the city seized the man's car without providing him notice and a hearing. The car was known to have transported illegal narcotics, so the seizure served the city's significant interest in preventing the car from being used for illegal activity in the future. That interest would have been frustrated by providing advance notice of the seizure since the car could have been moved or concealed before it was seized. Therefore, the city's seizure of the vehicle was proper. The city also seized the man's condominium without providing him notice and a hearing. To determine whether real property may be seized by the government prior to providing notice and a hearing, the court must balance three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the deprivation; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through current procedures and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that other safeguards would entail. Here, the man's property interest in his condominium likely outweighs the state's interest in preventing illegal drug sales. And the risk of erroneously depriving the man of his home is high since ex parte proceedings offer little or no protection to innocent homeowners. Therefore, the city's seizure of the man's condominium was likely improper.

A police officer made a controversial video that he marketed on the Internet. The video, which was made while the officer was off-duty, correctly identified the maker of the video as a police officer for the city in which the officer lived. The video depicted the officer engaged in indecent acts while wearing a police officer's uniform and brandishing a badge and toy gun, all of which he had purchased from a Halloween costume shop. When the chief of police learned of the video, she requested that the officer remove the video from the Internet because the video significantly undermined the police force's morale and harmony, with a marked effect on the department's efficiency. The officer, asserting that the video was intended as a parody of police misconduct, refused to remove the video from the Internet and was fired as a consequence. The officer brought an action against the police chief, seeking reinstatement to the police force. The officer contended that he had been dismissed for exercising his free-speech rights. If the court finds in favor of the police chief, what is the most likely reason? (A) Government employees do not enjoy free-speech rights. (B) The police officer's parody

(C) The video impeded the police force's efficiency. The First Amendment right to free speech, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not extend to public employees speaking pursuant to their official duties (i.e., within the scope of employment). But this right does extend to public employees who, as here, speak as private citizens about matters of public concern (e.g., police misconduct). However, the government can regulate the content of that speech if its interest in efficient government function outweighs the employee's free-speech right. Here, the video impeded the police force's efficiency by significantly undermining its harmony and morale. Therefore, the government's interest in ensuring that the police force operate efficiently outweighs the officer's right to free speech.

A municipality enacted an ordinance prohibiting any person from uttering any "accusation of moral turpitude in public." Violation of the ordinance results in a monetary fine. A woman who lived in the municipality stood on a street holding a sign that falsely accused another resident of adultery. The woman was fined by the municipality for her actions. The woman has challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance, arguing that it violates the First Amendment on its face as an overbroad restriction on speech. Which of the following would be the municipality's WEAKEST defense? (A) The municipality had the authority to enact the ordinance through its police power. (B) The woman cannot challenge the ordinance as applied to her. (C) The woman cannot challenge the ordinance on its face. (D) The woman cannot meet her burden of establishing that the ordinance is overbroad.

(C) The woman cannot challenge the ordinance on its face. The woman likely engaged in defamatory speech when she held a sign that falsely accused another resident of adultery. Defamatory speech is unprotected speech, so the woman cannot challenge the constitutionality of this ordinance as applied to her. But she can still challenge the ordinance on its face since it could be unconstitutionally applied to others not before the court. The ordinance will be deemed facially invalid if it is either: (1) overbroad - the law restricts a substantial amount of constitutionally protected expression or (2) unduly vague - the law fails to give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of prohibited expression. Here, the ordinance penalizes any person who utters an "accusation of moral turpitude in public." Although this encompasses unprotected speech, it also impacts a substantial amount of protected speech—e.g., speech concerning newsworthy events that involve crimes of moral turpitude such as theft. This means that woman can challenge the ordinance on its face because it could unconstitutionally be applied to others not before the court. Accordingly, this is the municipality's weakest defense.

A state has a statute that prevents U.S. resident noncitizens from being hired in any law enforcement position in the state. A resident noncitizen whose application for a job as a police officer was denied, and who was otherwise highly qualified for the position, has challenged the constitutionality of this statute. Which of the following best states the applicable standard of review? (A) The statute must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. (B) The statute must be necessary to advance an important governmental interest. (C) There must be a rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate governmental interest. (D) The statute must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

(C) There must be a rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate governmental interest. This question involves equal protection based on one's status as a lawful resident noncitizen. Classifications based on status as a lawful resident of the United States (as opposed to a citizen) are subject to a variety of different standards, depending on the level of government and the nature of the classification. Courts will generally apply the strict scrutiny test and strike down state laws that discriminate against noncitizens, such as laws prohibiting noncitizens from owning land, obtaining commercial fishing licenses, or being eligible for welfare benefits or civil service jobs. A growing exception exists, however, for state laws that restrict or prohibit a noncitizen's participation in government functions. Such laws need only have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, and are generally upheld as preventing noncitizens from having a direct effect on the functioning of the government. Because working as a law enforcement officer is a position involving participation in the governmental function of enforcing law, rational basis is likely the proper standard to apply. NOTE: (A) is incorrect because it more closely resembles the standard of review for a federal classification based on citizenship status.

A federal statute generally makes age discrimination in the hiring or firing of employees illegal and provides for a civil action for damages against the offending employer. The statute applies to public as well as private employers and contains a clear statement of Congressional intent to abrogate state immunity. In federal court, an employee sued her employer, a state agency, for violation of this statute and sought relief in the form of retroactive money damages. The state agency moved to dismiss the action as constitutionally prohibited. The state employee conceded that the age discrimination that she experienced was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Should the court dismiss the action on constitutional grounds? (A) No, because Congress was acting pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause. (B) No, because Congress was acting pursuant to its power under the Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (C) Yes, because the Eleventh Amendment prevents the recovery of retroactive money damages by citizens against a state agency. (D) Yes, because the strict scrutiny test must be met for there to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

(C) Yes, because the Eleventh Amendment prevents the recovery of retroactive money damages by citizens against a state agency. The Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as barring unconsented private suits against a state for retroactive money damages. Congress may abrogate state immunity from liability if it is clearly acting to enforce rights created by the remedial provisions of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments (i.e., the Civil War Amendments), and does so expressly. Here, Congress is not remedying conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as age is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class and thus a state's age-based discrimination merely needs a rational basis.

A state law imposes civil liability for the intentional publication of communications by individuals who know or have reason to know that the communications were unlawfully obtained. An animal rights blogger investigated a corporation for testing its salon products on animals. A subscriber of the blog unlawfully obtained a trove of the corporation's documents, which revealed that the corporation had concealed its testing on animals from the public. The subscriber sent the documents from his personal email to the blogger for use in her investigation and told the blogger that he had hacked into the corporation's internal server to access the documents remotely, without the corporation's knowledge or permission. After receiving the documents, the blogger posted a blog post on the internet that exposed the corporation's testing on animals. The blog post included links to the corporation's documents that had been obtained by the subscriber. As a result of the blog post, the corporation's sales dropped significantly. The corporation has filed suit against the blogger and seeks damages for publishing the corporation's documents in violation of the state law. Can the corporation recover damages

(C) Yes, because the blogger knows that the subscriber unlawfully obtained the corporation's documents. The First Amendment shields the media from criminal and civil liability for publishing lawfully obtained private facts (e.g., crime victim's identity) and other truthful information involving matters of public concern (i.e., newsworthy events). The First Amendment also shields the media from liability for publishing truthful information that was unlawfully obtained by a third party if: (1) the information involves a matter of public concern; and (2) the publisher neither obtained it unlawfully nor knows who did. Here, the corporation sued the blogger for publishing the corporation's documents, which were unlawfully obtained by a subscriber of the blog. The documents involve a matter of public concern since they relate to the corporation's testing of its salon products on animals. Although the blogger did not unlawfully obtain the documents herself, she did know who sent the documents to her, and that they were obtained unlawfully. Therefore, the corporation can recover damages from the blogger.

Congress enacted and the President signed into law a federal statute that delegated the primary responsibility for developing and administering a toxic waste disposal program to a federal agency based on intelligible standards set forth in the statute. The statute also authorized the creation of a toxic waste fund that imposed the cost of disposing toxic waste onto the creators of such waste through a statutorily fixed fee. The statute requires the secretary of the federal agency to annually evaluate the fees that are collected to ensure that they offset the costs of the waste disposal program. If not, the secretary is required to adjust the amount of the fee accordingly. The statute provides that the secretary's adjusted fee becomes effective 90 days after publication unless both houses of Congress adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving of the adjustment. This year, the secretary proposed a fee increase pursuant to statutory authority. Both houses of Congress disapproved of the increase by resolution. Is a challenge to the constitutionality of this provision likely to be successful? (A) No, because the President approved of the provision by signing the statute into law. (B) No, be

(C) Yes, because the provision provides for a legislative veto of an executive action. Once Congress delegates power to an executive agency, it cannot interfere with the agency's functions without satisfying the legislative-action process—i.e., bicameralism and presentment. Through this process, Congress can delegate some of its powers (e.g., rulemaking) to federal executive agencies. But once Congress does so, it cannot interfere with the agencies' functions unless it again complies with the legislative-action process. Any attempt to bypass this process amounts to an unconstitutional legislative veto. Here, Congress delegated power to the federal agency to develop and administer a toxic waste disposal program. But the statute includes a provision that prevents the agency's fee adjustment from going into effect if both houses of Congress adopt a concurrent resolutiondisapproving of the adjustment. The provision does not require that the resolution be presented to the President, so the provision amounts to an unconstitutional legislative veto of an executive action. Therefore, a challenge to the constitutionality of this provision is likely to be successful.

Congress enacted a federal statute that prohibits the erection of structures that completely enclose federally owned land. The statute authorizes the removal of any structure that completely encloses federally owned land. The federal government owns farmland in State A. The farmland is surrounded by land owned by a cattle farmer. In an effort to prevent his cattle from wandering, the farmer erected a fence on his property, which completely enclosed the farmland owned by the federal government. The federal government sued the farmer in federal court, seeking the removal of the farmer's fence. How is the court likely to rule? (A) For the farmer, because the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states their traditional power over the regulation of land found within the state. (B) For the farmer, because the federal government has limited powers under the Constitution and does not possess the general police powers of the state. (C) For the federal government, because the necessary and proper clause of Article I, Section 8 permits Congress to enact any law that is necessary and proper for the public welfare. (D) For the federal government, because the property clause of Article IV, Section 3 giv

(D) For the federal government, because the property clause of Article IV, Section 3 gives Congress the power to regulate private property when necessary to protect federal lands. The Article IV, section 3 property clause gives Congress complete power to dispose of and regulate federally owned land and territories. This clause includes the power to regulate private property that affects federal public lands when such regulation is necessary to protect those lands—e.g., by prohibiting the erection of structures that completely enclose federally owned land. Therefore, the court is likely to rule for the federal government.

A state statute provides that municipalities within the state may adopt an ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages within the municipality's borders. Pursuant to this statute, a municipality adopted an ordinance that banned the sale of alcoholic beverages with an alcohol content in excess of 10%. Which of the following is the best source of authority for enacting this ordinance? (A) The dormant commerce clause. (B) The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. (C) The import-export clause. (D) The Twenty-first Amendment.

(D) The Twenty-first Amendment. The Twenty-first Amendment grants states broad authority to regulate the use of alcohol within their borders. This authority permits a state to prohibit the importation, transportation, or sale of alcohol within the state and to delegate such authority to local governments (e.g., municipalities). As a result, the Twenty-first Amendment provides the best source of authority for enacting an ordinance that bans the sale of alcoholic beverages with an alcohol content in excess of 10%.

A state statute regulates the homeschooling of a child by the child's parent or guardian. The statute specifies the academic subjects that must be taught and the number of hours of educational instruction the child must receive during an academic year. In addition, the statute requires that the child's instructor possess at least a high school diploma or its equivalent. The parents of an elementary-school-age child who is homeschooled have challenged these requirements in federal court as violating their due process rights regarding their child's education. How should the court rule on the parents' challenge to these requirements? (A) The court must strike them down, because parents have a fundamental right to control their child's education. (B) The court must uphold them as a valid exercise of the state's police powers, because a state may compel a child to attend public school. (C) The court must uphold them, because education has been an area of traditional state concern. (D) The court must uphold them, because they impose reasonable educational standards on homeschooling.

(D) The court must uphold them, because they impose reasonable educational standards on homeschooling. The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause generally prohibits states from enacting laws that substantially impair parents' right to control their children's upbringing and education. However, this right is not absolute, so states may impose reasonable educational standards on schools without violating the due process clause, including: -Requiring children to attend school—e.g., by specifying the number of hours of educational instruction a child must receive during an academic year -Establishing minimum competency requirements for instructors—e.g., by requiring them to possess at least a high school diploma -Defining academic curriculum and content—e.g., by specifying the academic subjects that must be taught Therefore, the court must uphold the statute's requirements since they impose reasonable educational standards on homeschooling.

A long-standing federal law provides for the payment of a $250,000 death benefit to the immediate family of a firefighter who dies as a direct result of fighting a fire. The law provides that this payment must supplement any other benefit paid to the firefighter's family from any other source. The federal law does not address the relationship between it and any conflicting state law. A state legislature recently enacted a state law that requires the commission overseeing the state's workers'-compensation program to reduce a recipient's worker's compensation by any federal benefits that he or she receives. Acting pursuant to the recently enacted state law, the commission reduced the amount of worker's compensation that a firefighter's widow was entitled to by the amount of the federal death benefit that she had received. The widow has challenged the constitutionality of the state law. How should the court rule on the challenge? (A) Deny the challenge, because the commission's action did not affect the federal death benefit received by the firefighter's widow. (B) Deny the challenge, because the federal law does not state that it expressly preempts conflicting state laws. (C) Uphold the

(D) Uphold the challenge, because the state law violates the supremacy clause of Article VI. Here, the federal law provides that the federal death benefit paid to a firefighter's family be used to supplement—not reduce—any other benefits that the family receives. But the state law requires the commission that oversees the state's workers'-compensation program to reduce a recipient's worker's compensation by any federal benefits that he/she receives. These laws directly conflict as it is impossible to comply with both of them. Therefore, the court should uphold the widow's challenge because the state law violates the supremacy clause. A federal law will impliedly preempt a conflicting state law that makes it impossible or nearly impossible to comply with both laws (i.e., direct conflict) OR frustrates the accomplishment of the federal law's purpose (i.e., indirect conflict).

Congress recently enacted a federal statute creating a five-member commission whose purpose is to identify and prevent threats to national security. The statute grants the members of the commission broad discretion and administrative and enforcement powers to conduct investigations into possible security threats. Commission members are required to report the results of their investigations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, who was appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Upon receiving the investigation results, the Secretary advises the President on what, if any, action should be taken to address potential national security threats. The statute permits the President to appoint the members of the commission, which she did without seeking Senate approval. Was the appointment of the commission members by the President constitutionally permissible? (A) No, because Congress cannot delegate this appointment to the President. (B) No, because the President needs the consent of the Senate to make these appointments. (C) Yes, because Congress can appoint members with administrative and enforcement powers. (D) Yes, because Congress can delegate these appointment

(D) Yes, because Congress can delegate these appointments to the President without Senate approval. The Article II appointments clause grants the President the power to appoint principal federal officers with the Senate's advice and consent (i.e., approval). But Senate approval is not required for the President's appointment of inferior federal officers—i.e., federal officers who are supervised by principal federal officers. That is because Congress may delegate the appointment of inferior federal officers to the President alone (i.e., without Senate approval), the heads of executive-branch agencies, or the federal courts. Here, the federal statute created a five-member commission whose members are inferior federal officers because their work is supervised by the Secretary of Homeland Security, a principal federal officer. Since the appointments clause permits Congress to delegate the appointment of inferior federal officers to the President alone, the President's appointment of the commission members without Senate approval was constitutionally permissible

After a trademarked cartoon character was almost elected as mayor of a small town as a write-in candidate, the state in which the town is located enacted a statute that bans write-in candidates for local elective office. The statute also requires candidates for local elective office to obtain a specified number of voter signatures in order to appear on the official election ballot. The purpose of the statute is to ensure that only candidates who have strong support among the voters are placed on the ballot. A man who was a candidate for local elective office failed to obtain enough voter signatures to appear on the ballot. The man has brought an action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Is the statute constitutional? (A) No, because it restricts the fundamental rights of voters to vote for write-in candidates. (B) No, because it restricts the man's right to access the ballot. (C) Yes, because it is authorized by the elections clause. (D) Yes, because it is a reasonable restriction to further the state's legitimate interest.

(D) Yes, because it is a reasonable restriction to further the state's legitimate interest. States may regulate their own elections by requiring voters and candidates to abide by certain requirements. But these regulations must comply with the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, which together secure an individual's right to vote and freely associate—e.g., the right to access the ballot. If an electoral regulation is challenged under either constitutional provision, the standard for evaluating that regulation depends on the severity of the burden imposed. A court will apply either: (1) Rational Basis Review: Applies to reasonable, nondiscriminatory burdens and requires the challenger to prove that the regulation is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest (2) Strict Scrutiny: Applies to severe or discriminatory burdens and requires the state to prove that its regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest Here, the statute requires candidates for local elective office to obtain a specified number of voter signatures to appear on the official election ballot. Although this infringed upon the man's right to access the ballot as a political candidate, the petition-signature requirement is subject to rational basis review because it is an ordinary burden that applies to all candidates. And since the requirement is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in ensuring that candidates have strong support among voters, the requirement is constitutional.

A federal statute created a long-term program to fund a massive renovation and repair project for bridges in the interstate highway system. The statute provided that the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) "shall allocate and distribute the appropriated funds" in accordance with a specified statutory formula to state transportation agencies that agree to participate in the program. In the current fiscal year, Congress appropriated $80 million towards this program. However, because the President determined that the statutory allocation formula reflects the exaggerated influence of certain states on Congress rather than a prioritization of repair projects based solely on engineering concerns, the President directed the administrator of the FHA to first conduct a review of the bridges in the interstate highway system based solely on engineering safety criteria before allocating and distributing the funds on the basis of a formula keyed to those criteria. Since the study has not yet been completed, the President has directed the FHA administrator to delay the allocation and distribution of the appropriated funds until the next fiscal year. Assuming no other federal statutes are applicable,

(D) Yes, because the President may not unilaterally delay an explicitly mandated allocation and distribution of monies appropriated by Congress. If Congress explicitly mandates an allocation, distribution, or expenditure of funds, the President lacks the power to impound those funds (e.g., refuse to spend them or delay their spending). Because Congress has mandated that these funds must be allocated and distributed in accordance with the statutory formula, the President cannot unilaterally impose a different allocation or distribution formula. Why is (C) incorrect? The President is not always prohibited from exercising discretion when Congress allocates funds to the states, but only when Congress mandates the funds be allocated to the states and provides a formula for doing so.

A legal representative of a resident in a state-owned and state-operated mental health facility sued an official of the facility in federal court. The representative, who is a citizen of another state, seeks an injunction to compel the official to comply with a state law that requires the least-restrictive-environment approach to be used in mental health facilities. The state official has moved to dismiss the action as unconstitutional under the Eleventh Amendment. Should the court grant the official's motion? (A) No, because the action seeks injunctive relief instead of damages as a remedy. (B) No, because the action was brought against a state official rather than the state. (C) Yes, because the action does not involve a fundamental right. (D) Yes, because the action seeks to enforce state law rather than federal law.

(D) Yes, because the action seeks to enforce state law rather than federal law. The Eleventh Amendment bars private parties and foreign governments from suing a state in federal court without the state's consent. This immunity extends to suits against state officials for a violation of state law, regardless of the type of remedy that is sought. State official sued for injunctive for alleged constitutional violation is NOT immune.

U.S. armed forces seized a noncitizen engaged in combat against them in a foreign country. The noncitizen was taken to a territory outside the United States but over which the United States had sovereign control. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed a law denying federal courts jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by individuals who were designated as enemy combatants, but the law did not suspend the privilege of filing habeas corpus petitions. Subsequently, the noncitizen, who was designated an enemy combatant by the President, filed a habeas corpus petition in a federal court. May the court hear this petition? (A) No, because Congress denied the federal courts jurisdiction over this type of petition. (B) No, because Congress has plenary power over noncitizens. (C) Yes, because Congress lacks the power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. (D) Yes, because the law violates the suspension clause.

(D) Yes, because the law violates the suspension clause. Article III grants Congress the power to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts. But when exercising this power, Congress cannot violate: (1) the separation-of-powers doctrine (e.g., usurping judicial power to decide cases) or (2) other constitutional provisions (e.g., the Article I suspension clause). Under the Article I suspension clause, a person in federal custody can challenge his/her detention by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court unless Congress has explicitly suspended the writ. This clause applies to noncitizens classified and detained as enemy combatants in territories over which the United States has sovereign control (e.g., the noncitizen here). The noncitizen here filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The federal statute denies federal courts jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by individuals who were designated as enemy combatants. However, Congress did not explicitly suspend the writ of habeas corpus. This means that the statute violates the suspension clause by preventing the noncitizen from challenging his detention by having his habeas corpus petition heard in federal court. Therefore, the court may hear the noncitizen's petition.

A prisoner at a federal prison contracted a staph infection that was resistant to the antibiotics used to treat ordinary staph infections. The warden refused to provide the prison doctor with the funds necessary to purchase the appropriate antibiotics for the prisoner's infection. As a result, the prisoner died. The prisoner's wife filed a wrongful death suit against the warden. At trial, the prison doctor was called to testify that the prisoner was not given the appropriate antibiotics. Since the prison doctor primarily provided medical treatment to prisoners, she rarely testified in court. During her testimony, the prison doctor made general statements about the lack of appropriate medical care in prisons and the need for improvement for the health and safety of the prisoners. After the trial, the prison doctor was fired by the warden for the statements she made during the trial about the lack of appropriate medical care in prisons. The prison doctor subsequently sued the warden in his official capacity, alleging that the warden violated her First Amendment rights by firing her in retaliation for her testimony. Did the warden violate the prison doctor's First Amendment rights? (A) No

(D) Yes, because the prison doctor was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern. The First Amendment right to free speech, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not extend to public employeesspeaking pursuant to their official duties. A public employee speaks pursuant to his/her official duties when that speech is made within the scope of the public employee's ordinary job duties (e.g., drafting an internal memorandum). But when a public employee's speech is made outside the scope of his/her ordinary job duties, the public employee is speaking as a private citizen—even if that speech concerns those job duties. When a public employee is speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, the government can limit that speech only if its interest in efficient government function outweighs the employee's right to free speech. Here, the prison doctor was fired for her testimony about the lack of medical care in prisons. But the prison doctor spoke as a private citizen since testifying in court was outside the scope of her ordinary job duties. And since there is no indication that the prison doctor's comments impeded government efficiency, her right to express herself on this matter of public concern outweighs any legitimate state interest in discharging her. Therefore, the warden violated the prison doctor's right to free speech.

In order to save money, a state adopted a law restricting voting times and reducing the number of polling sites on Election Day. The law does not significantly impact the ability of voters to cast their ballots. The law applies to all state, local, and congressional elections occurring on Election Day. Does Congress have the authority to override the law? (A) No, because the limitations are unrelated to the suppression of ideas. (B) No, because the voters' ability to cast their ballots is not significantly impacted. (C) Yes, because the state cannot limit state or federal voting practices. (D) Yes, because the state law regulates congressional elections.

(D) Yes, because the state law regulates congressional elections. The Article I, section 4 elections clause grants state legislatures the power to enact laws that regulate the time, place, and manner of congressional elections (e.g., by establishing voting sites). But the clause also grants Congress the power to override those state laws by supplanting them with federal law. Here, the state law regulates congressional elections by restricting voting times and reducing the number of polling sites on Election Day. Therefore, Congress has the authority to override the state law. NOTE: Congress cannot override state laws that only regulate state or local elections (not seen here).

A state adopted a nonpartisan blanket primary election system, which permits voters to vote for any candidate and advances the top two vote-getters to the general election. The system requires candidates for state office to be identified on the official election ballot by their self-designated "party preference." The purpose of this requirement is to provide voters with relevant information about candidates on the ballot. Is this primary election system likely to withstand a constitutional challenge? (A) No, because a nonpartisan blanket primary election system is per se unconstitutional. (B) No, because states must permit candidates to designate their party affiliation on the ballot. (C) Yes, because states have plenary authority to regulate state elections. (D) Yes, because the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

(D) Yes, because the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The Article I elections clause of the Constitution grants states the power to regulate their own elections—e.g., by establishing a nonpartisan blanket primary election system. But these regulations must comply with the First Amendment freedom of association, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. If an electoral regulation is challenged under either constitutional provision, the standard for evaluating that regulation depends on the severity of the burden imposed. A court will apply either: (1) Rational Basis Review: Applies to reasonable, nondiscriminatory burdens and requires the challenger to prove that the regulation is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest (2) Strict Scrutiny: Applies to severe or discriminatory burdens and requires the state to prove that its regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest Here, the state's nonpartisan blanket primary system requires candidates seeking state office to be identified on the official election ballot by their "party preference." In Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, the U.S. Supreme Court held this party-preference requirement is subject to rational basis review because it is an ordinary burden on associational rights. The requirement here is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in providing voters with relevant information about candidates, so the requirement is likely constitutional.

Congress has proposed repealing a federal statute that exempts the payment of federal income tax on the interest earned by the holders of state bonds. State bonds are the primary method by which many states finance public works projects, such as highways and educational facilities. Repealing the exemption would increase the interest that a state must pay to bondholders, which would have a substantial adverse economic impact on the cost of these projects to the state. The holders of private bonds are not eligible to receive the tax exemption. Would the repeal of the tax exemption be constitutional? (A) No, because taxing this income would have a substantial adverse economic effect on the states. (B) No, because the Tenth Amendment prohibits federal taxation of a state. (C) Yes, because Congress has unlimited power to tax and spend for the general welfare. (D) Yes, because the tax would not be imposed directly on the states.

(D) Yes, because the tax would not be imposed directly on the states. Under the Tenth Amendment, the federal government cannot impose federal taxes directly on states that unduly interfere with their essential functions. But the Tenth Amendment does not prohibit the federal government from imposing federal taxes on states indirectly through their affiliates—i.e., persons doing business with state governments—so long as the taxes are nondiscriminatory. This is true even if the cost of the tax is ultimately passed on to the states. Here, the bondholders (state government affiliates) would be responsible for paying income tax on the bond interest if the federal statutory exemption were repealed. Although the exemption's repeal would have a substantial adverse effect on the states by forcing them to pay higher interest rates, the resulting tax would not be imposed directly on the states. And since the tax already applies to the holders of private bonds, the tax would be nondiscriminatory. Therefore, repeal of the federal statutory exemption would be constitutional.

A state governmental water and sewer authority was sued in federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction by a private contractor for an alleged breach of contract and the resulting damages. The authority, in answering the complaint, contended that it was immune from the suit under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The authority filed an appeal of the district court's order denying its motion. The contractor has challenged the authority's right to appeal the district court's order. Should the appellate court permit this appeal? (A) No, because of the final-judgment rule. (B) No, because the district court order denied the authority's motion. (C) Yes, because a constitutional issue is at stake. (D) Yes, under the collateral-order doctrine.

(D) Yes, under the collateral-order doctrine. A final judgment generally must be entered before an appellate court can acquire jurisdiction over a case. A final judgment is a decision that fully resolves a dispute on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but enforce the judgment. An order denying summary judgment (as seen here) is not final because it merely determines that there is some dispute of material fact—it does not fully resolve the underlying claim. As a result, these orders are typically not appealable. However, the collateral-order doctrine provides a narrow exception to the final-judgment rule. Under this doctrine, an interlocutory order will be characterized as final and immediately appealable if three elements are met: (1) the order conclusively resolves an important issue (the water and sewer authority's immunity); (2) that issue is separate from the merits of the underlying claim (whether the water and sewer authority breached the contract); and (3) the order cannot be effectively reviewed on appeal from a final judgment (the water and sewer authority's claim of immunity will be ineffective once the case has gone to trial). Therefore, the court's order denying the water and sewer authority's claim of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment constitutes a collateral order over which the appellate court has jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal.