Constitutional Law Case Rules

Substantive Due Process: Gay Marriage Defended / United States v. Windsor

(1) A reviewing court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal even if the appellant is not seeking redress from an adverse judgment, provided the party retains a sufficient stake in the case to satisfy Article III of the Constitution. (2) A federal statute excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage for purposes of federal benefits is unconstitutional. The provision in DOMA defining marriage as excluding same-sex couples is a deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause includes a right to equal protection. Congress enacted DOMA, which governs the definition of marriage in over a thousand federal statutes, in 1996 in response to efforts to legalize same-sex marriage. DOMA treats marriages of same-sex couples as "second-class" without any legitimate interest justifying discrimination. Though Congress may enact laws that impact marriage, regulation of marriage is within states' exclusive power over domestic relations, subject to constitutional limits. Marriage was historically understood as a union between opposite-sex couples, but many now see this limitation as unjust. Eleven states have legalized same-sex marriage. DOMA "departs from th[e]...tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage." The federal government denies equal treatment to a group New York deems equal in status to opposite-sex married couples. This violates equal protection and due process. Those guarantees require that Congress not discriminate merely to hurt a "politically unpopular group."

Interstate Commerce Powers Further Restricted: Fall of The Aggregate Rule and Lack of Protections From Private Discrimination / United States v. Morrison

(1) Congress does not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate violence against women because it is not an economic activity. (2) Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may only regulate the discriminatory conduct of state officials, not private actors. (1) The United States argues that Congress may regulate gender-based violence because it is an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. However, a key consideration in Lopez was the criminal, non-economic nature of the conduct at issue. Similarly, gender-based violence is a non-economic activity. No legislative history or other findings indicate that gender-based violence has an effect on interstate commerce. Any link between the two is attenuated. The United States argues violence against women affects the travelling, engaging of business, and employment in interstate commerce of women as a group. This argument is rejected as Congress cannot regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. (2) The Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. For example, it is a well-settled principle from the precedent decisions in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits discriminatory state action, not private action.

Agency Deference and Standing / Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency

(1) The Clean Air Act provides the Environmental Protection Agency with the statutory authority to regulate new motor vehicle emissions greenhouse gases as an "air pollutant." (2) For standing to be appropriate, an actual case or controversy must be present, which is characterized by a truly adversarial relationship. (A plaintiff can show the existence of a truly adversarial relationship by demonstrating that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent; that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant; and that it is likely that a favorable decision would redress that injury. In a class action suit, only one member of a class of petitioners must meet the required elements of standing to sufficiently demonstrate an adversarial relationship). (3) Although an agency's refusal to initiate rulemaking is subject to judicial review, such review is extremely limited and highly deferential. (A court may reverse an agency action found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law).

Commerce Clause Limits & State's Choice / NFIB v. Sebelius

(1) The individual mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is a valid use of Congress's power to tax; and (2) The Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is an unconstitutional use of Congress's spending powers. (1) Congress may not compel individuals to participate in commercial activity under this provision. The individual mandate does not regulate existing commercial activity. Instead, the mandate compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. The mere possibility that individuals will participate in commercial activity at some point in the future is not enough to justify regulation under the commerce power. Validating the individual mandate on this ground would open the door to all sorts of regulation not contemplated by the Framers. For example, obesity has contributed more to rising healthcare costs than the uninsured, but the federal government cannot compel people to buy vegetables. Next, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress power to take actions incidental to the valid exercise of some enumerated power. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause alone, however, cannot justify the individual mandate. Nevertheless, the mandate imposing a "penalty" is more akin to a tax. The penalty is paid to the IRS when individuals file their tax returns, the amount is dependent upon household income, and revenue is generated for the government. It is reasonable to construe the individual mandate as increasing taxes on those who have a certain income, but choose to go without health insurance. Thus, the individual mandate is within Congress's power to tax. (2) Next, the Medicaid expansion exceeds Congress's authority under the Spending Clause. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. While the federal government may condition receipt of money by the states on states' agreement with certain federal policies, the federal government cannot compel the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. States must have a genuine choice whether to accept the offer. The states are given no such choice here; they must either accept a basic change in the nature of Medicaid or risk losing all Medicaid funding.

Substantive Due Process: Gun Rights / Mcdonald v. Chicago

A Bill of Rights guarantee applies to the states if it is fundamental to the nation's scheme of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. The Second Amendment applies to the states, thereby invalidating Chicago's law prohibiting residents from possessing handguns. Under the process of selective incorporation, a particular Bill of Rights guarantee will apply to the states if it is fundamental to the nation's scheme of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570 (2008), this Court found that individual self defense is a basic right, which forms the central component of the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms, and which is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition.

Removal Power of The President over Principal Officers is Unrestrained / Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

A President may not be restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer, because such multi-level protection from removal prevents the President from fulfilling his Article II duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Political Question / Baker v. Carr

A challenge to malapportionment of state legislatures brought under the Equal Protection Clause is not a political question and is thus justiciable. For an issue to be a non-justiciable political question, one of six tests (listed in descending order of importance and certainty) must be satisfied: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of that issue to another political branch; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue; (3) an impossibility of deciding the issue without making an initial policy determination of a kind not suitable for judicial discretion; (4) a lack of respect for the other branches of government in undertaking independent resolution of the case; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potential for embarrassment for differing pronouncements of the issue by different branches of government.

Mootness / Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.

A controversy will be deemed moot on the grounds of voluntary cessation by the defendant if the defendant proves there is no reasonable chance it could resume the offending behavior. (high burden of proof)

Equal Protections Clause: Neutral Yet Discriminatory / Yick Wo v. Hopkins

A facially neutral law that is applied in a discriminatory manner on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Dormant Commerce Clause: State Market Participant Exception In Action / United Haulers v. Oneida-Herkimer solid waste management authority

A flow-control ordinance that favors the government, but treats in-state and out-of-state private businesses the same, does not constitute an excessive burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), held that laws passed to channel all waste to a private processing plant were invalid. The present case is distinguishable from Carbone because the waste is channeled to a public benefit corporation, not a private plant. This difference is significant because the government is benefiting from any burden placed on interstate commerce. Laws favoring local government cannot be based on economic protectionism in the same way as laws favoring local businesses. Local governments have the right to make decisions and enact laws to better provide for the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens, whereas private businesses are generally solely concerned with economic profits. Additionally, because waste disposal is both typically and traditionally a government function, interference with these local government actions based on the Commerce Clause should be avoided. Under the standard articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), a nondiscriminatory statute should be upheld "unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." The benefit of increasing the local government's ability to provide for the waste disposal needs of its citizens outweighs the burdens placed on out-of-state waste disposal plants.

Equal Protections Clause: Gender Discrimination Requires Intermediate Scrutiny / Craig v. Boren

A governmental regulation involving gender discrimination is constitutional if it is substantially related to the achievement of an important government purpose. The appropriate standard of review for governmental gender-based classifications is intermediate scrutiny. The classification must be substantially related to the achievement of an important government purpose.

Appointment Power of the Judiciary and Limit On Presidential Removal / Morrison v. Olson

A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer (an independent counsel) and prohibiting removal without cause does not violate separation of powers principles. The Constitution divides federal officers into "principal" and "inferior" officers. The Appointments Clause requires principal officers be appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, but allows inferior officers to be appointed by the President, department heads, or the judiciary. In this case, the independent counsel is an inferior officer. First, the independent counsel is subject to removal by a higher executive officer, the Attorney General. Second, the independent counsel's powers are limited to investigation and prosecution, which do not impact executive policy. In addition, the independent counsel has limited jurisdiction and tenure. Thus, Congress may authorize the interbranch appointment of independent counsels by the judiciary, as permitted by the Excepting Clause of the Constitution. limiting presidential authority to remove officials without cause has been upheld in the past. Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The good cause requirement is not a burden on the president's ability to execute his constitutional authority. This is because the president's need to fully control such "inferior officers" is not central to the functioning of the executive branch.

President's Privilege of Confidential Communication Has Limits / United States v. Nixon

A presidential claim of privilege asserting only a generalized interest in confidentiality is not sufficient to overcome the judicial interest in producing all relevant evidence in a criminal case. Although there is a presumptive presidential privilege for his confidential communications, when the communications do not concern military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, that presumption may be rebutted due to the constitutional need to produce all relevant evidence in a criminal case.

Equal Protection Clause: Racist Court Procedures Are Also Invalid / Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.

A private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race because the exercise or peremptory challenges invokes state action. The Lugar v. Edmonson Oil, 457 U.S. 922 (1982), two-step analysis shows that Leesville acted pursuant to state authority. Firstly, the act of exercising peremptory challenges has its source in state authority. A peremptory challenge means nothing outside of a court of law, which in this case is provided for by the state. Additionally, peremptory challenges are only exercised based on statutory authority provided by the government. Secondly, Leesville can be deemed to be a government actor in this situation. According to precedent, state action has been found when private parties make "extensive use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials." In the present case, a private party cannot exercise peremptory challenges without the overt, significant assistance of the court. The judge in the case, who is clearly a state actor, enforced Leesville's discriminatory peremptory challenges and effected the final and practical denial of the excluded jurors' opportunity to serve on the jury.

Implied Rights: Avoiding Indirect Bans On Abortion / Planned parenthood v. Casey

A state abortion regulation places an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion and is invalid if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. the trimester framework established in Roe is overruled. This structure creates overly rigid rules for defining states' and women's interests in the abortion debate. It is improper to completely prohibit a state from regulating abortion before the end of the first trimester. Before the first trimester ends, a state can constitutionally issue reasonable regulations for abortion to help ensure that women are properly informed about their decision to abort. Instead of adhering to the trimester framework for judging the constitutionality of such regulations, a new undue burden test is hereby created for determining whether a regulation impermissibly interferes with a woman's right to an abortion. An undue burden exists if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. Applying this new standard to the Pennsylvania statute, the spousal notification requirement constitutes an undue burden, according too much power to a husband over his wife, and is therefore invalid. However, the informed consent, parental notification, and 24-hour waiting period restrictions do not constitute an undue burden and are upheld.

Equal Protections Clause: Sterilization Is Not Ok / Skinner v. Oklahoma

A state law requiring forced sterilization of criminals convicted of crimes of moral turpitude unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental rights of marriage and procreation and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state legislation deals with some of the most basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation, both rights impacted by forced sterilization, are fundamental to the very survival of the human race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, can have far-reaching and potentially devastating effects not only on Skinner as an individual, but on the future of the human race if exercised imprudently. The Oklahoma law infringes upon these fundamental rights, so it is best examined with strict scrutiny. The sterilization statute only applies to criminals convicted three times of crimes of moral turpitude. It does not apply to criminals convicted three times of other crimes, such as embezzlement. Oklahoma offers no compelling justification for treating certain classes of criminals differently. Its forced sterilization statute is arbitrary and amounts to invidious discrimination against Skinner. Criminals convicted of crimes of moral turpitude in the state are singled out as a suspect class for no legitimate state purpose.

Equal Protection Clause: Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York

A state law that is substantially underinclusive does not necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause because a state may rationally decide to address a public problem in phases the legislature could have rationally decided that it is most pressing to regulate just one type of advertising at that present time. The regulation passes rational basis review and thus does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Equal Protections Clause: Gay Housing Protections From Discrimination Denial Not Valid / Romer v. Evans

A state law that neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class of persons will be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. Amendment 2 functions to ensure that no similar laws protecting gays and lesbians are ever enacted. Thus, the Amendment does treat homosexual persons differently from the population as a whole because it withdraws from them, but no other persons, specific legal protection from discrimination, and forbids the reinstatement of laws and policies which would protect their interests. The effects of the Amendment are far-reaching and prevent the enactment of policies in both the public and private sectors that would protect gays and lesbians from discriminatory treatment in accessing basic services, which is a basic freedom taken for granted by most other persons.

Dormant Commerce Clause: State Market Participant Exception Limits / South central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke

A state may impose burdens on commercial transactions within the market in which it is a participant, but may not go further and impose conditions that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market. Alaska's conditions on the sale of its timber are improper because the state is indirectly regulating conditions relating to the timber processing market as a result of its ownership of the raw timber market. Alaska is a market participant in the timber market and thus can impose whatever conditions it wishes on commercial transactions relating to the sale of timber, but it is acting as more than merely a seller of timber in attempting to regulate timber processing. If Alaska had merely provided a subsidy to timber sellers that processed their products in the state, it would have been acting within its constitutional rights as a market participant. However, because the Alaska regulations leave buyers no choice of where to process their timber, Alaska's actions exceed the narrow scope of the market participant exception to the dormant commerce clause.

Dormant Commerce Clause: States Can't Burden Interstate Commerce / City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey

A state may not discriminate against other states' articles of commerce on the basis of origin. Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, if Congress has not acted to regulate an area of interstate commerce, states are presumably free to regulate that area. Any state regulation is subject only to Commerce Clause restrictions and may not burden interstate commerce. In this case, New Jersey passed its law for legitimate environmental and economic purposes. However, New Jersey acted improperly when it sought to remedy its environmental and economic problems by targeting solely out-of-state waste producers with its regulations. New Jersey's refusal to let waste into its landfills simply because the waste originated from outside New Jersey violates the Commerce Clause.

Dormant Commerce Clause: It Applies To Cities As Well / United Building and construction trades council v. city of camden

A state may not discriminate against out-of-state interests if those interests are sufficiently fundamental to the promotion of interstate harmony so as to fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, unless the state has a substantial reason for treating out-of-state citizens differently, and the discriminatory means it imposes are closely related to accomplishing that reason. Firstly, there is no real difference between state and municipal actions in relation to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. This is because any action by the municipality is ultimately approved by the state treasurer, and because cities are merely political subdivisions of states. The Privileges and Immunities Clause applies to discrimination by city actors because of these similarities. Secondly, non-New Jersey residents venturing into Camden would not enjoy the same privileges as a New Jersey resident living in Camden, which gives rise to a Privileges and Immunities violation. Additionally, it is not problematic that New Jersey residents not living in Camden would be negatively impacted by the ordinance without having a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as they could seek a remedy by voting against the ordinance at the polls. However, because out-of-state residents do not have this opportunity, it is proper to review their discrimination under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Equal Protections Clause: Interacial Marriage Valid & Strict Scrutiny Applied / Loving v. Virginia

A state may not restrict marriages between persons solely on the basis of race under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Virginia seeks to uphold its interracial marriage ban on the grounds that it furthers a legitimate state purpose of preserving racial integrity and preserving racial pride. Virginia also argues that the regulation of marriage has traditionally been left to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Finally, Virginia argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause suggested that it is only obligated to apply its laws equally among different groups of people. Thus, it argues that it is complying with its obligation by preventing interracial marriage for all people, not just Caucasians. The argument that the mere equal application of a law is enough to overcome the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on invidious racial discrimination is rejected. Virginia's statute is motivated solely to restrict marriage based on race, and by precedent, such laws have been found to be a threat to equality. At the very least such race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and cannot be upheld unless they are shown to accomplish a permissible state objective independent of the racial discrimination. In the present case, there is no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination that justifies Virginia's classification.

Substantive Due Process: Minimum Wage For Women / West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish

A state may regulate the minimum wage paid to female employees when that regulation is for the purpose of promoting employees' health, safety and general welfare. The liberty interest asserted by West Coast is that of freedom to contract, but this freedom is not expressly found in the Constitution. Rather, the Constitution, through its Fourteenth Amendment, clearly outlines the liberty interest of freedom from actions which attack an individual's health, safety, or general welfare. Thus, all asserted liberty interests are ultimately restrained by the health, safety, and general welfare interests that comprise due process. States pass minimum wage laws designed to promote the health and safety of female employees, and this regulation thus embodies principles of due process. To hold that states cannot regulate in this way would be to deny due process constraints on a state's freedom to contract, and to deny protections for the health and safety of women. Additionally, changing economic times mean that workers who are not paid a living wage would have to rely on taxpayers for the care of their various needs.

Substantive Due Process: Life Support Removal Safeguards / Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

A state may require that a guardian seeking to remove life-prolonging treatment prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person in the persistent vegetative state would have wanted the treatment withdrawn under such circumstances. a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse unwanted medical treatment. However, an incompetent individual is unable to make such a choice. A choice must be made for her by a guardian. Thus, a court must balance the liberty interests of the incompetent individual against the state's interest in preserving life. a state may rightfully decline to make quality of life judgments about the particular individual. The state may simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life that must be weighed against the protected interests of the individual. There may be instances when a guardian does not hold the best interests of the incompetent patient in mind when seeking to terminate her life. Thus, a state's requirement that the guardian meet a heightened evidentiary standard to prove the wishes of the incompetent individual is valid.

Equal Protections Clause: Rational Basis Review Means Over-inclusiveness Is Fine / New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer

A state regulation that is over-inclusive because it regulates a general class of persons based on the conduct of particular members within that class does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution if it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The Transit Authority has a legitimate interest in not employing narcotics users. Given the risks of recidivism or lingering effects of narcotics use among persons enrolled in methadone maintenance programs, it is reasonable for the Transit Authority to enact a policy of total exclusion from its payroll persons who are currently enrolled in methadone programs. Beazer argues that the Transit Authority's rule was unconstitutional because it was overbroad and potentially excluded from employment methadone users that are not recidivists and would successfully complete their programs. However, the general rule employed by the Transit Authority serves general objectives of safety and efficiency. The rule does not enact additional discriminatory provisions against a more defined suspect class of persons, rather, the rule discriminates against a general class of persons. Under these circumstances, it is of no constitutional significance that the degree of rationality for the Transit Authority's regulation is not as great for some methadone users as for others. The regulation of employment for an entire class is rationally related to legitimate safety and efficiency interests,

Equal Protections Clause: Gender Discrimination Not Found Against Men In Statutory Rape Laws / Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County

A state statutory rape law that discriminates against males does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it deters males from engaging in sexual behavior that might lead to illegitimate pregnancies. purpose in enacting the statutory rape law is to prevent illegitimate teen pregnancy. This finding by the legislature is entitled to great deference. The State of California has a significant interest in preventing illegitimate pregnancies among teen females because of the significant physical, emotional, and financial risks associated with the condition.

Equal Protection Clause: Disparate Impact By Itself Does Not Trigger Strict Scrutiny / Washington v. Davis

A state-sponsored racial classification violates the equal protection provisions in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause only if it is shown to have both a disproportionate impact on a particular race and is motivated by invidious racial discrimination. the Court has never adopted a rule which invalidates official conduct that merely has a disproportionate impact on a particular racial group without evidence of a discriminatory purpose. A discriminatory purpose can be inferred from the totality of the facts, including the fact that a law burdens one race more heavily than another. However, the mere instance of a disproportionate impact does not, without more, trigger strict scrutiny by the courts. The Verbal Test on it's face was neutral and was not applied unequally.

Equal Protections Clause: Gender Discrimination; Intermediate Scrutiny Qualified / United States v. Virginia

All governmental gender classifications must be substantially related to an important government purpose that can be demonstrated by the government if it offers an exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification. Inherent differences exist between men and women, but these differences can be used only for purposes such as remedying the history of sex discrimination against women, or promoting equal employment opportunities, not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity. Virginia has not shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding all women from VMI's leadership training. Virginia argues that the existence of a single-sex school furthers the important state purpose of maintaining a diversity of public education institutions. This argument is rejected. VMI has never existed for the purpose of promoting diversity, evidenced by its policy of excluding women. Virginia also argues that its adversative method of training students provides educational benefits that cannot be made available, unmodified, to women. There is no reason that Virginia's stated goal of training competent future leaders cannot be extended to include women. Without further proof, Virginia falls short of establishing the "exceedingly persuasive justification" required for a sustainable gender-based classification. In addition, the VWIL is different and substandard when compared to VMI on many levels. The creation of this school does not provide a meaningful educational alternative for women seeking to attend VMI.

Equal Protections Clause: Racial Discrimination By Prisons & Strict Scrutiny Applied / Johnson v. California

All racial classifications made by the government, including those involving prison policies, are subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. The reason for always applying strict scrutiny is that racial classifications run a particularly high risk of being motivated by invidious discrimination. In the present case, California argues that its policy should be exempt from strict scrutiny because it is "neutral"—it applies to all racial groups equally. This argument is rejected on the basis of precedent cases involving racial matters. California's argument that strict scrutiny is not needed because the policy is essential for reducing violence from racial gangs is similarly rejected. By continually segregating prisoners, prison officials are actually contributing to problems of racial hostility by elevating race to a position as the most divisive factor between different groups. Requiring prison administrators to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibitions on racial segregation does not overly burden the institution, but actually bolsters the legitimacy of the state's criminal justice system. Granting California an exception from the general rule requiring strict scrutiny for racial classifications would undermine unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from the criminal justice system.

Apellate Review of SC limited by Congress / Ex Parte McCardle

Although the United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is derived from Article III of the Constitution, it is conferred subject to whatever exceptions and regulations Congress chooses to make. (However, Congress may not strip the U.S. Supreme Court of jurisdiction over those cases that fall under the Court's original jurisdiction defined in the U.S. Constitution. Congress can limit only the appellate jurisdiction of the Court).

Implied RIghts: RIght to Contraceptives & Other Implied Rights / Griswold v. Conneticut

An implied "right of privacy" exists within the Bill of Rights that prohibits a state from preventing married couples from using contraception. For example, the First Amendment protects the right to association. The Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers in a person's house without their consent. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination. The Ninth Amendment provides that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The protected activities in each of these Amendments are "penumbras" that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, but instead represent various "zones of privacy" into which the government cannot intrude. (harlan wanted to just say is was a due process right)

Foreign Dispute Resolution Power of The President Backed By Congressional Approval / United States v. Curtiss Wright

An otherwise unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive may nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive goal is to provide relief in a foreign conflict. Any exercise of power by the President must be exercised within the constitutional parameters granted to him, but the scope of the President's powers in international affairs is broad. In order to effectively maintain international relations, congressional legislation concerning foreign affairs must accord the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction that would not be admissible if domestic affairs alone were involved.

Substantive Due Process: Punitive Damages Being Too Excessive / State Farm v. Campbell

Awards of punitive damages by state courts that exceed a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages are usually "grossly excessive" and violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compensatory damages are awarded for actual, concrete losses suffered by plaintiffs, while punitive damages serve to punish acts of misconduct and deter their repetition. While states have significant discretion over awards of punitive damages, all awards are still subject to procedural and substantive due process limitations based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The test outlined in BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), relies on three factors to determine whether punitive damages awards are "grossly excessive": (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. The degree of reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct depends on whether the harm caused is physical or economic, whether the tortious conduct evinces an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others, whether the target of the conduct has financial vulnerability, whether the conduct involves repeated actions or is an isolated incident, and whether the harm is the result of intentional malice, trickery or deceit, or mere accident. A plaintiff should be considered made whole after an award of compensatory damages, and thus the court should only award punitive damages if the defendant's conduct is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.

Equal Protections Clause: Gender Based Protections vs State Immunity; Ok If Remedy is congruent and Proportional to injury / Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs

Congress implemented a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity when it established a private cause of action under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce the Amendment's constitutional guarantees through legislation. Congress may implement legislation that prohibits directly unconstitutional conduct and it may also implement broader remedial legislation that regulates facially constitutional conduct for the purpose of preventing unconstitutional conduct. In order for remedial legislation to represent a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 authority, the legislation must demonstrate a congruent and proportional relationship between its regulatory mechanisms and the harm it seeks to remedy. The FMLA addresses gender-based discrimination in the workplace and seeks to remedy that discrimination using gender-based classifications. Gender-based classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny review. A gender-based classification must serve an important government objective and any discriminatory means employed must be substantially related to the attainment of the government's objective.

Implied Rights: Abortion Ban of A Specific Kind / Gonzalez v. Carhart

Congress may ban a specific type of partial-birth abortion provided its restrictions on the practice are narrow and clear and the ban does not constitute an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion. Congress's purposes for passing the PBABA is founded on a profound respect for human life and a desire to ensure women make an informed decision in aborting a fetus. These purposes were upheld as permissible state objectives in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

Interstate Commerce, Racial Discrimination, & Due Process / Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States

Congress may enact regulations that prevent racially discriminatory policies in hotel accommodations because of the negative effects of those policies on interstate commerce. The unavailability to African Americans of adequate accommodations interferes significantly with interstate travel. Moreover, evidence shows that racial discrimination has a disruptive effect on commercial intercourse. Passage of the CRA is a constitutional use of Congress's plenary power to regulate interstate commerce. Heart of Atlanta's argument that the Civil Rights Act violated its due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is rejected. The purpose of provisions such as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is largely to protect marginalized groups from discrimination.

Sovereign Immunity of States: Only One Way To Bypass / Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida

Congress may not abrogate states' sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh Amendment unless through an exercise of power derived from §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to determine whether Congress has abrogated states' sovereign immunity, two questions must be asked: (1) whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate such immunity and (2) whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Here, although Congress clearly stated in the IGRA its intention to abrogate states' sovereign immunity from suit. However, Congress did not act pursuant to a valid exercise of power. In previous cases, the Court has found authority to abrogate under only two provisions of the Constitution. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), it was held that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity through regulations made under its powers in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, under the Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S 1 (1989), Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity through regulations passed under the Interstate Commerce Clause. However, the Union Gas Co. decision had little constitutional support at the time it was made, presented significant difficulties with its application in lower courts, and is not based on established precedent. Hence, Union Gas Co. is hereby overruled. Congress may not abrogate states' sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh Amendment unless through an exercise of power derived from § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Tax Power Limits / Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.

Congress may not attempt to regulate through a tax a matter that is reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904), the Court upheld a tax on yellow margarine versus white margarine that was motivated by a desire to promote the sale of white margarine. Finally, in United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), the Court upheld a tax on the manufacture, importation, and sale or gift of opium that was motivated by the goal of discouraging drug use. While each of these taxes was motivated by a regulatory goal apart from raising revenue, the difference between them and the Child Labor Tax Law was that each was applied to a subject area squarely within the ability of Congress to regulate. In contrast, the Child Labor Tax Law represents an effort by Congress to regulate a subject area clearly reserved to the states by the Constitution. Thus, Congress overstepped its regulatory bounds and the Child Labor Tax Law is unconstitutional.

Sovereign Immunity of States: Can't Sue State Even With Fed Approval, But Can Sue Municipalities / Alden v. Maine

Congress may not authorize suits against state governments in state courts, even on federal claims, without the state governments' consent. Congress's Article I powers do not grant it power to subject non-consenting states to private suits for damages in state courts. The states' sovereign immunity from suit is not actually derived from the Eleventh Amendment but is a fundamental concept of sovereignty they enjoyed before ratification of the United States Constitution. The historical context surrounding the adoption of the Constitution and later, the Eleventh Amendment, establishes the inference that the Framers never intended to strip the states and their courts of their sovereign authority except as was expressly provided by the Constitution. The historical context surrounding the Constitution's ratification and judicial precedent shows that the intended design of the Constitution is not to strip states of sovereign immunity in their own courts. The Constitution would never have been ratified if this was the case, and that holding otherwise would violate principles of Federalism embedded in the very structure of the Constitution. Sovereign immunity of the states is not without limits, however. States are expected to act in good faith compliance with the Constitution. Additionally, state sovereign immunity from suits in state court without their consent does not extend to lesser entities such as municipalities and local bodies.

Regulating States Through Personnel Doesn't Work / Printz v. United States

Congress may not compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs. Firstly, no clear evidence exists that historical Congresses believed they had the power to compel state executives into federal service. Secondly, the Constitution creates a system of dual sovereignty whereby the states and the federal government are independent entities with different governmental functions. Thus, the Constitution's structure suggests that it is inappropriate for the federal government to violate states' status as separate entities by compelling their officials to perform federal roles. Additionally, the Constitution clearly states the execution of the laws is the responsibility of the President. The Brady Act transfers this responsibility to thousands of CLEOs, who are not subject to Presidential control or oversight. Hence, empowering each CLEO to make background check decisions would reduce the power of the executive branch and strain the constitutional separation of powers. Finally, the present case is governed by New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which held Congress may not require states to legislate according to federal standards because doing so constitutes a commandeering of traditional state policy making functions.

Regulating States, Failed Coercion / New York v. United States

Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. Congress may not pass regulations that have the effect of "commandeering" states' legislative processes. There are two ways Congress may urge a state to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests: (1) as part of its spending powers, Congress may attach conditions on states' receipt of federal funds, or (2) where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, Congress may offer states the choice of regulating that same activity according to federal regulations or having state law preempted by federal regulations. These options allow states to decline compliance with federal regulatory standards if state citizens decide a federal policy is contrary to local interests.

Interstate Commerce Power Restrictions & Gun Control / United States v. Lopez

Congress may not, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, pass a law that prohibits the possession of a gun near a school. While Congress has broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, this power does not extend so far as to authorize the regulation of the carrying of handguns, particularly when doing so has no clear effect on the economy overall. Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activities: the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate commerce; and activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce. Here, the GFSZA does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Therefore the analysis must focus on the third category: whether the activity at issue substantially affects interstate commerce. The mere carrying of handguns (not the buying or selling) in a school zone in no way affects commerce, either substantially or otherwise.

Equal Protections Clause: Equal Protections May Be Enforced By Congress Against States / Katzenbach v. Morgan & Morgan

Congress may pass legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even when the legislation conflicts with state law. The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment included §5 to grant Congress with broad power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, Congress may pass legislation under its powers in §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided that the legislation is (1) an enactment to enforce a provision of the Equal Protection Clause; (2) plainly adapted to that end; and (3) consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Interstate Commerce, The Aggregate Rationale / Wickard v. Filburn

Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. By growing his own wheat, Filburn decreases the amount of wheat purchased in the market and negatively impacts the price of wheat grown for interstate commerce. It does not matter that Filburn himself only exerts a small impact on the wheat market. When taken together with all the other farmers similarly situated, Filburn's activity has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. On account of the aggregate effect of homegrown wheat on the commercial wheat market, Congress may regulate Filburn's activities.

Interstate Commerce Powers: Substantial Effect Test and Resurgence of the Aggregate Rule / Gonzalez v. Raich

Congress may regulate the use and production of home-grown marijuana as this activity, taken in the aggregate, could rationally be seen as having a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. Raich's activity of growing marijuana for home use can be seen rationally as having a substantial effect on interstate commerce because there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market for marijuana.

Regulation By The Fed of State Employees: The Rationale For Why It's OK / Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority

Congress's application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the employment actions of a state municipal transit authority is a constitutional exercise of its Commerce Clause power. the Wage and Hour Administration of the United States Department of Labor ruled that SAMTA could be regulated by the FLSA because its actions were not a "traditional government function" reserved for the states under National League of Cities. The lower courts have had difficulty applying National League of Cities because of that holding's lack of clarity as to what state activities constitute "traditional government functions" and are thus protected from congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. National League of Cities is overruled on the grounds that its holding is unnecessary to protect state sovereignty as required by the Tenth Amendment. It is important, under true principles of state sovereignty, that states be free to engage in any activities its citizens deem appropriate, not just those approved on the grounds that they constitute "traditional government functions." Additionally, systems to protect state sovereignty are already built into the structure of the federal government itself. States play a significant role in electing representatives to the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. Elected representatives then continue to represent the interests of their states while in office. States are also vested with indirect control over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by virtue of their control of electoral qualifications. Moreover, the fact that states have been able to channel federal funding into their respective treasuries to finance public works programs indicates that the political process is adequately functioning to provide for their needs.

Equal Protections Clause: Affirmative Action Valid For College Students If Passes Strict Scrutiny / Grutter v. Bollinger

Consideration of race as a factor in admissions by a state law school does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because supporting student body diversity is a compelling state interest; however, the school must demonstrate it previously made a serious, good faith consideration of workable, race-neutral alternatives to achieve the sought-after racial diversity. The proper standard for reviewing this issue is strict scrutiny. The Law School cites significant benefits as reasons for its policy, including the promotion of cross-racial understanding, the breaking down of racial stereotypes, and the enabling of students to better understand persons of different races. Any one of these benefits constitutes a compelling state interest for strict scrutiny. Additionally, the Law School uses narrowly-tailored means to accomplish its purpose because it does not employ a "quota system" as outlawed in Bakke to achieve diversity. The Law School provides an individual, holistic review of each of its applicants and reasons that alternative methods of achieving the Law School's purpose risk sacrificing both academic excellence and other types of diversity in the school. However, the Law School should cease racial consideration in its admissions policies after instances of past discrimination have been sufficiently remedied.

Due Process Rights of Enemy Combatants / Hamdi v. Rumsfield

Due process guarantees that United States citizens held in the United States as enemy combatants must be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-maker. In order to determine the due process issues in this case, the private interest affected by the official action must be weighed against the government's asserted interest, including the function involved and the burdens the government would face in providing greater process. Hence, Hamdi's interest in being free from involuntary detention must be weighed against the government's interest in ensuring that those who have fought with the enemy in armed conflict do not return.

Equal Protections Clause: Education Is Not A Fundamental RIght And Needs Only Rational Basis Scrutiny / EqSan Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

Education is not recognized as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and thus a state regulation impacting the right to education should be analyzed under rational basis review to determine if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. The analysis turns on whether education itself is either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed as a right in the Constitution since it is not explicitly mentioned therein. There is no implicit basis for holding education is so protected. the Texas funding system should not be subjected to strict scrutiny, but rather should be analyzed in terms of whether it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Applying this standard to the Texas funding system, no reasonable less discriminatory alternatives exist for collecting revenue for public education in the state.

Interstate Commerce & Supreme Law Of The Land Issues / Gibbons v. Ogden

If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, the federal law governs pursuant to Congress's constitutional grant of power to regulate interstate commerce. Congress is granted the power to regulate interstate commerce in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The word "commerce" includes traffic, intercourse and navigation, as well as commodities associated with interstate commerce. With the exception of completely internal commerce, Congress may regulate all commercial activities occurring between states but within one state's borders. Since Congress has the power to regulate this activity and New York passed conflicting regulations of the same activity, federal supremacy principles dictate that the federal regulation trump the state regulation. Thus, the New York regulatory law is deemed unconstitutional.

Equal Protections Clause: Voting Recounts Require Uniform Rules That Are Not Arbitrary / Bush v. Gore

In the event of a contested presidential election, the Equal Protection Clause requires states conducting a manual recount of votes to issue uniform rules governing the recount to determine the intent of the voters and give equal weight to each vote. An individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for President of the United States, unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as a means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College. However, if a state holds such an election, the right to vote is fundamental and equal weight must be accorded to each vote. Ensuring equality of votes extends beyond just making the right to vote available. Equality can be compromised if the voting process accords more weight to certain votes over others. The Florida Supreme Court, in issuing its ruling for a manual recount, directed that such ballots be examined to determine the intent of the voter. This ruling is abstract and standardless and does not satisfy the minimum requirements for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right of voting. The formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these recurring circumstances is both practicable and necessary. Otherwise, different standards will be applied throughout the recount for determining whether a vote was cast, resulting in impermissible inequality of treatment of votes

Unilateral Legislation / Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha

Legislation providing Congress with a veto over an action of the executive branch does not meet the constitutional requirements of presentment and bicameralism. Article I of the Constitution requires that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law. The Framers carefully crafted this requirement into the Constitution. Additionally, the Framers also required bicameralism in the enactment of any law—a law could not be passed without gaining support from a majority of both houses. A unilateral veto of executive action is not included in these powers. The Constitution's silence in this area means that the House of Representatives cannot unilaterally act to defeat an executive decision.

International Law Does Not Necessarily Become Federal Law / Medellin v. Texas

Only self-executing international obligations automatically become binding federal law. An ICJ ruling constitutes international law, but not all international obligations have automatic domestic effect. A treaty is an international agreement that imposes obligations on its signatories. Only "self-executing" treaties immediately become federal law. Treaties are not self-executing if they require subsequent legislation to take effect. Nothing in the Protocol, United Nations (UN) Charter, or ICJ Statute gives automatic domestic effect to ICJ judgments. Choosing to comply with ICJ decisions represents sensitive foreign policy matters that should be left to the executive and legislative branches, rather than courts. Permitting the ad hoc creation of new federal law through ICJ decisions violates the intent of the Constitution's framers. Further, the president's power to enforce an international obligation must derive from the Constitution or an act of Congress. The president does not have the authority to unilaterally declare a treaty self-executing and binding on state courts.

Supreme Law Of The Land: Federal Pre-emption of State Laws / Geier v. American Honda Motor Company

Ordinary preemption principles such as federal conflict preemption may apply to defeat state common law tort actions based on strict products liability. Geier's action for strict products liability based on a state standard is federally preempted by the standard in FMVSS 208 because the state law actually conflicts with the federal law governing use of airbags in 1987 vehicles. Ordinary preemption principles such as federal conflict preemption may apply to defeat state common law tort actions based on strict products liability. "Ordinary preemption principles" may include express preemption, where a federal law specifically states that it preempts subsequent state laws, or conflict preemption, where the federal law preempts all state laws that "actually conflict" with the federal standard.

Equal Protections Clause: Affirmative Action For Public Schools Denied & Strict Scrutiny, What Qualifies As Compelling Interest ; Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1

Public schools may not assign students to schools solely on the basis of race for the purpose of achieving racial integration, although the use of narrowly-tailored, race-conscious objectives to achieve general diversity in schools is permissible. There are two government interests that qualify as compelling: the interest of remedying the effects of past discrimination; and the interest of promoting student body diversity in the context of higher education the programs are not used to remedy the effects of past racial discrimination because such discrimination has never before occurred in PICS districts. school districts provide no evidence that the amount of racial diversity necessary to achieve these intangible benefits coincides with the amount of racial diversity achieved by their racial assignment policies. Without clear evidence that the school districts implemented their policies for the purpose of working toward a specific diversity goal that would benefit their students, the race-based policies are unconstitutional.

Substantive Due Process: Education Choice / Pierce v. society of sisters

Requiring children to be educated only by public instruction violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. While states may require that children attend school and reasonably regulate such schools, states do not have the authority to require public education only. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty of parents and guardians to direct their children's education. Children are not owned by the state. Unless a state can show a reasonable relation between legislation and a legitimate state objective, the state may not curtail its citizens' constitutional rights. No reasonable relationship is shown in this case. There is no evidence that private education is harmful. Thus, the Act unreasonably interferes with a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Equal Protections Clause: Voting Protections That Expired / Shelby county v. holder

Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act imposes current burdens that are no longer responsive to the current conditions in the voting districts in question. Although the constraints this section places on specific states made sense in the 1960s and 1970s, they do not any longer and now represent an unconstitutional violation of the power to regulate elections that the Constitution reserves for the states. The Court also held that the formula for determining whether changes to a state's voting procedure should be federally reviewed is now outdated and does not reflect the changes that have occurred in the last 50 years in narrowing the voting turnout gap in the states in question.

Equal Protections Clause: Congress Cannot Establish A Standard Of Review For An EP Right / City of Boerne v. Flores

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress only with remedial powers, and when upholding a constitutional right, Congress may only enforce legislation that utilizes means proportional to achieving that legislative purpose. Congress has broad but not unlimited enforcement powers. Congress's powers under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment are strictly remedial and not plenary. As such, Congress has the power to enforce laws to prevent the violation of a constitutional right, but does not have the power to define the substance of that constitutional right. (Congress Tried To Impose A Standard Of Review)

Equal Protections Clause: Segregation At Schools Invalid / Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)

Separate educational facilities based on racial classifications are inherently unequal and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. it is not possible to rely on the original intent surrounding adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment because prior cases and the legislative history involved in its enactment are inconclusive as to the true extent of its meaning. Additionally, it is not helpful to look at the status of public education at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, as most Caucasian children were then educated by private schools, and most African American children were not educated at all. Very few public schools existed at the time, which adds to the difficulty in determining the historical intentions surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment's effect on public education. An examination of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself is utilized to determine the intent behind the Amendment's application to public education. The basic language of the Amendment suggests that it was passed to prohibit all forms of discriminatory legislation against African Americans. In the present case, all basic attributes of the Caucasian and African American schools are essentially the same. To determine whether the segregated schools violate the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted, it is necessary to examine the actual effect of this segregation on the institution of public education as a whole. Public education has, over the years, become one of the most valued and important public services performed by state and local governments. Children can hardly be expected to succeed in life if they are not educated. Thus, when an opportunity for education exists and the state has undertaken to provide it, that opportunity must then be made available to all students on equal terms. In the present case, the opportunity for education is not equally provided to minority students, as the existence of segregation has a profound and detrimental effect on their hearts and minds. Modern studies confirm that the children experiencing segregation feel inferior, become less motivated, and perform at a lower standard than children that do not experience segregation.

Equal Protections Clause: Loophole, Racism Can't Be Enforced By a Court / Shelley v. Kraemer

State court enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That Clause guarantees equal treatment of all people under the law, including in their exercise of various property rights. There is no question that restrictive covenants that discriminate solely on the basis of race would be invalid on equal protection grounds if created by a state or local law. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The issue here is whether state court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants entered into by private actors constitutes state action. The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to purely private discrimination. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Thus, people are free to enter into and voluntarily abide by racially restrictive covenants. Nevertheless, the Court has long held that the actions of state courts and judicial officers are state actions within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). Improper state action does not only occur when a court practices unfair procedures. A court is also a state actor when it enforces a substantive rule that violates individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Equal Protections Clause: Discrimination Exception?Korematsu v. United States

State laws restricting the rights of persons based on race are subject to strict scrutiny and will only be upheld if they further a "pressing public necessity." (Why wasn't this done to Germans or Italians?)

Equal Protections Clause: Education Cannot Be Denied To Illegals Without It Benefitting Substantial Goal / Plyler v. Doe

States may not deny free public education to children not legally admitted into the United States. states do have the authority to take action in regards to undocumented aliens if it complies with federal goals as well as furthers a legitimate state goal. There is no evidence of any federal policy that supports the denial of education to the children of undocumented aliens. `Children of immigrants did not choose to enter the country unlawfully, and depriving them of an education will contribute to a large disenfranchised underclass of undocumented aliens. Therefore, the law will only be held constitutional if it furthers a substantial goal of the state. There are three possible state goals, yet none of them are substantial enough to validate the state's discrimination. There is no evidence that denying public education to undocumented aliens will help stop undocumented immigrants from moving to Texas. There is also no evidence that denying these children an education will increase the quality of public education in the state because the children of aliens require a disproportionate amount of educational resources. Finally, the argument that children of undocumented aliens are less likely to remain in the state is without merit.

Appellate Review of SC / Martin v. Hunter's Lessee

Supreme Court has authority to exercise appellate review of state court decisions.

Superiority of Federal Laws to State Laws / McCulloch v. Maryland

The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, and to make such other laws as it deems necessary and proper to carry out this enumerated power. Additionally, federal laws are supreme and states may not make laws that interfere with the federal government's exercise of its constitutional powers. (1) Yes. Congress has the constitutional power to charter the Bank of the United States. This power is ultimately derived from the Constitution's grant to Congress of the general power to "tax and spend" for the general welfare. However, in addition to its enumerated powers, Congress is also given general powers under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, which states that Congress may create laws it deems necessary and proper to help carry out its enumerated powers. The Necessary and Proper Clause functions to expand, not limit, Congress's enumerated powers. Congress decided that chartering the Bank of the United States was a necessary and proper method of raising revenue to carry out its overall taxing and spending powers. (2) No. The Bank was created by federal statute. Maryland may not tax the Bank as a federal institution because federal laws are supreme to state laws. A federally-created institution may not be inhibited by a state law. The Bank of the United States functions to serve the entire nation. It is thus inappropriate for it to be controlled by one part of the nation (i.e. Maryland) through a tax.

Rational Basis Review / Armor v. Indianapolis

The Court used rational basis review because the classification between homeowners was not suspect and did not involve a fundamental right.

Substantive Due Process: Employment As a Property Right? Beware States What You Make Rights, No Takebacks / Cleveland board of education v. loudermill

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving individuals of property without due process. Once a law confers a substantive right, a person may not be deprived of that substantive right without constitutionally adequate procedures. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving individuals of property without due process. The Constitution does not create or define property interests. Property interests are created and defined by other sources, such as state law. Here, Ohio law creates a property interest in continued employment because it permits termination of classified civil service employees only for cause.

Equal Protections Clause: Jury Service Can't Be Racist / Strauder v. West Virginia

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from enacting laws that deny any of its citizens equal protection under the law. A state statute limiting jury service to white persons only is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to protect a race of people, recently freed from slavery, from adverse action by the states, and to prevent the states from denying them their civil rights. singling out an entire race of people and denying them the right to participate as jurors, thus branding them as inferior, furthering racial prejudice, and impeding their access to equal justice under the law. This court does not hold that states are prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment from designating other qualifications for jurors, such as limiting jury selection to males, citizens, landowners, or persons of a certain age or with a certain level of education. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to prohibit discrimination based on race or color.

Foreign Claims Settled Through Executive Orders / Dames & Moore v. Regan

The President has authority to settle claims through executive orders where the settlement of claims is necessary for the resolution of a major policy dispute between the United States and another country and where Congress acquiesces to the President's action. The United States, along with other countries, has historically exercised its right to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign governments for the purpose of keeping peace with those governments. While international treaties often accomplish these actions, the President historically used executive orders, without the consent of the Senate, to settle claims. Congress has implicitly approved this practice of claim settlement by executive agreement through its history of acquiescence and its enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (ICSA). This holding is narrow and does not mean that the President has plenary power to settle all claims. The President has authority to settle such claims where, as here, Congress acquiesces to the President's action.

Presidential Lawmaking Powers / Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

The President of the United States may not engage in lawmaking activity absent an express authorization from Congress or the text of the Constitution. The link between the power to make war decisions and the power to seize private property for the resolution of labor disputes is attenuated. (1) When the President acts under an express or implied grant of power, he can rely on both his own powers and Congress's. (2) When the President acts without an express grant or denial of Congress's powers, he acts under the aggregate of his own independent powers. (3) When the President acts in a way that is incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, he may rely only on the powers expressly granted to him by the Constitution.

Privileges & Immunities Clause: Travel Freedoms & Strict Scrutiny Standard / Saenz v. Roe

The Privileges and Immunities Clause protects the right to travel in three ways: allowing citizens to move freely between states; securing the right to equal treatment in all states when visiting; and securing the rights of new citizens to be treated the same as long-term citizens living within the state. In the present case, Roe and the other plaintiffs can assert authority for their right to equal treatment as long-term citizens based on their protection as state citizens and as citizens of the United States. The application of strict scrutiny to the California statute determines that the law is discriminatory without a compelling state purpose. The only possible purpose for such a statute is to deter people from moving into the state for the purpose of gaining more welfare benefits, but empirical findings suggest the amount of people doing this is quite small. Additionally, this purpose is not offered by the state as justification for its statute.

Judicial Review of SC / Marbury v. Madison

The Supreme Court has the authority to review laws and legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the United States Constitution.

Procedural Due Process Rights: DNA Evidence Is Not A RIght / DA V. Osborne

The Supreme Court held that even assuming that Mr. Osborne could pursue his claims using § 1983, he had no constitutional right to obtain post-conviction access to the state's DNA evidence used against him at trial.

Equal Protections Clause: Mainly For Racial Discrimination / Slaughter House Cases: Butchers' Benevolent Assn. of New Orleans v. Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughter-house Co.

The Thirteenth Amendment solely prohibits slavery as experienced by Africans in the United States before the Civil War, and the Fourteenth Amendment (which is largely geared towards the protections of emancipated slaves and African Americans) only protects rights guaranteed by the United States and not individual states. It is doubtful that any state action not specifically directed at emancipated slaves as a class or at the African or African-American race could ever fall within the restrictions of the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause does not apply to plaintiffs in the present case because the Louisiana statute does not involve emancipated slaves or race issues.

Immunity of The President N/A for Acts Before Taking Office / Clinton v. Jones

The United States Constitution does not grant the President of the United States immunity while in office from suit for actions allegedly occurring prior to his assuming the presidential office. The policy basis for providing immunity for public officials acting in their "official" capacities is to permit them to perform the full range of their official duties without being hindered by the threat of or actual litigation. However, the policy reasons behind providing immunity for "official" acts do not transfer to justifying immunity from suit for "unofficial" conduct. The president is not entitled to a stay of judicial proceedings based on his unofficial acts until he leaves office. A stay of proceedings against The President does not take into account Plaintiff's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Additionally, it could jeopardize the availability of evidence and witnesses.

Implied Rights: Abortion Legalized, Partially Overruled / Roe v. Wade

The constitutional right of privacy encompasses a woman's right to an abortion. However, abortions may be regulated by a state after the first trimester of pregnancy and may be completely prohibited after the point of "viability" of a fetus unless necessary to preserve the health of the mother. Historically, women have had a greater right to terminate their pregnancies than they currently enjoy. There are three reasons for the gradual increase in strictness in anti-abortion laws. Firstly, decreasing the availability of abortion is seen as a way to decrease illicit sexual activity. Secondly, concerns over the safety of abortion procedures prompted a decrease in its prevalence to protect the health of women. Finally, states increasingly note their own interest or duty in protecting prenatal life. The Court must analyze the right of women to obtain abortions against the backdrop of these countervailing state interests. The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to personal privacy, but such a right is implied from various aspects of the Bill of Rights. The "zone of privacy" implied in the Constitution is broad enough to encompass a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. However, this holding is qualified by noting that the right is not unlimited and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. Regulation limiting a "fundamental right" of privacy must be justified by a compelling state interest, and legislative enactments must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. Applying this test to the abortion issue, a woman's privacy interest outweighs any countervailing state interests during the first part of her pregnancy when abortion is deemed relatively safe and when the fetus is very early in its development. However, at some point in the pregnancy, the potential dangers to the mother of a later abortion and the increased development of the fetus as a potential person outweigh the right of the mother to privacy. Thus, state interests grow in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a certain point during pregnancy, became compelling enough to override her general right to privacy. With respect to the state's interest in protecting the health of the mother, the interest becomes compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester (first three months of pregnancy), when performance of an abortion becomes increasingly risky. A state's interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling at viability, or whenever the fetus is capable of a meaningful life outside the mother's womb. A state can prohibit abortion after viability, except when it is necessary to protect the life of the mother.

Gerrymandering & Political Question / Vieth v. Jubelirer

The issue of political gerrymandering represents a nonjusticiable political question incapable of adjudication by the courts. Examining eighteen years of jurisprudence on political gerrymandering reveals a lack of judicial standards for clearly resolving the issue, and therefore, the issue at bar represents a nonjusticiable political question.

Substantive Due Process: Homosexuality Not Illegal / Lawrence v. Texas

The liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of consenting adults to engage in intimate contact in the privacy of their own homes, which includes homosexual activities. The liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court upheld a Georgia statute prohibiting private, consensual sodomy between both homosexual and heterosexual couples. However, the Texas statute at issue prohibits such conduct only between homosexual couples. there is no longstanding history in America of laws directed at prohibiting homosexual conduct as a distinct matter. This is partly due to the difficulty of enforcing legal punishments of consenting adults engaging in private sexual behavior. Other nations have done away with statutes criminalizing homosexual sodomy. Finally, most states that have laws prohibiting homosexual conduct largely do not prosecute individuals for engaging in such conduct. This reflects increasing legal and social acceptance of homosexual behavior and the right to privacy in consensual conduct between adults.

Equal Protections Clause: Mentally Ill Only Need Rational Basis Review / City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

The mentally disabled are not a quasi-suspect class and thus any legislative regulations affecting their rights are subject to rational basis review and not intermediate scrutiny. Firstly, it is undeniable that mentally disabled persons require special care for functioning in the everyday world, so legislative judgments are likely to be rational and should not be scrutinized more closely. Secondly, on a national scale, federal lawmakers have shown great appreciation for the plight of the mentally disabled and enacted significant legislation prohibiting discrimination against them. Applying heightened scrutiny and requiring the legislature to show that these efforts are substantially related to an important governmental purpose might actually discourage the legislature from continuing to act to protect the mentally disabled. Thirdly, the existence of so many regulations make it clear that the mentally disabled are not politically powerless, but have already been able to attract the attention of lawmakers to provide for their rights. Fourthly, finding the mentally disabled a quasi-suspect class would pose problems in the future for classifying other groups as such that possibly share some but not all characteristics with mentally disabled persons as a group. For these reasons, rational basis review is appropriate for any legislative determinations affecting mentally disabled persons. The City does not require a special use permit for apartment buildings, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the elderly, private clubs, and fraternal orders. In contrast, the City requires a special use permit for a group home for mentally disabled persons. This difference in treatment is irrelevant because the Center's proposed home would not threaten legitimate interests of the City in a way that other permitted uses would not. The City's arguments that the home would create negative attitudes about the mentally disabled in the community, or that it would elicit harassment of residents from children in a nearby school, are rejected as this concern is speculative and thus irrelevant. The City's concern that the home is located on a floodplain is not sufficient for denying the permit for the home because other similar buildings are located there. Finally, the City's concerns about the size of the home and the amount of residents are also rejected because if the residents were not mentally disabled, the city would have no objections. Thus, there is no rational basis for the City to conclude the group home would impact its legitimate interests, and therefore the denial of the special use permit violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Tax & Spending Powers Used To Bribe States; State Dependancy = Coercion If Federal Funding Taken Away / South Dakota v. Dole

The receipt of federal funds may be conditional if the exercise of the spending power is for the general welfare, the conditions are unambiguous, the conditions are related to a federal interest in a particular national project or program, and the conditions do not violate any other constitutional provisions such as the Tenth Amendment. Congress has specific constitutional power to tax and spend for the general welfare of the United States. In exercising this spending power, Congress may condition the receipt of federal funds by states subject to the following four limitations: (1) the exercise of the spending power must be for the "general welfare; (2) " the conditions on the receipt of funds must be unambiguous; (3) conditions must be related to a federal interest in a particular national project or program; and (4) conditions must not violate any other constitutional provisions such as the Tenth Amendment. Tenth Amendment operates to limit Congress's imposition of conditions on states' receipt of federal funds, when the effect of those conditions are coercive, that is not the case in Section 158. Noncompliance only results in a loss of five percent of what states would otherwise receive. The potential loss is not so great as to force states to comply with federal standards.

Tenth Amendment Limits: States Can't Mess With Term Limits Of Fed Officials / US Term Limits v. Thornton

The requirements for membership in the United States Congress are established by the Qualifications Clause of the United States Constitution and may not be amended by individual states. Tenth Amendment cannot reserve to states powers that they did not originally possess before the adoption of the federal Constitution. Even if the states did possess some sort of original power in this area, the framers intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for members of Congress, and thus divested states of any power to add qualifications when they created the federal Constitution. The framers recognized that because no unified national government existed before the Constitution, the election of representatives to the national legislature was a new right arising from the Constitution itself. Thus, the Tenth Amendment provides no basis for reserving this new right of election to the states, as there was no original power before the Constitution to "reserve." The framers intended that representatives in Congress not be elected as individual delegates from sovereign states, but rather as vital members of the unified, national government. It is only fitting that the electoral qualifications for these individuals be derived from the unified, national Constitution.

Substantive Due Process: Families Have A RIght TO Live Together / Moore v. City of East Cleveland Ohio

The right of related family members to live together is fundamental and protected by the Due Process Clause, and necessarily encompasses a broader definition of "family" than just members of the nuclear family. the present case is distinguishable from Belle Terre because the Belle Terre ordinance expressly allowed all who were related by "blood, adoption, or marriage" to live together. It prevented only unrelated individuals from living together, while the CEC ordinance limits blood relatives from living together. When a city attempts such an intrusive regulation of family as that present in the CEC ordinance, its decision to do so is examined under strict scrutiny. Thus, it must be determined whether the housing ordinance is necessary for the achievement of an important government objective. CEC seeks to justify its ordinance as a means of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden on the CEC's public school system. While these are all legitimate public purposes, the housing ordinance serves them only marginally and is not necessary to their accomplishment. The right of family members to live together is fundamental and protected by the Constitution. The CEC's argument that this right extends only to nuclear family members is rejected. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has strong historical roots and is worthy of constitutional recognition.

Equal Protections Clause: Marriage Rights & Strict Scrutiny / Zablocki v. Redhail

The right to marry is a fundamental right, and any legislative attempts by a state to limit that right are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly-tailored to the accomplishment of an important governmental purpose. strict scrutiny is appropriate for evaluating the constitutionality of any state statutes limiting the right to marry. Numerous, less discriminatory means exist by which the Court may compel delinquent persons to fulfill child support obligations in This Case

Substantive Due Process: Fundamental Rights Test & Euthenasia Not Legal / Washington v. Glucksberg

The right to physician-assisted suicide is not a constitutionally-protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is a two-step analysis for determining whether a fundamental right exists under the Due Process Clause: (1) whether the right is objectively, deeply rooted in U.S. history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if the right is sacrificed; and (2) whether a careful description exists of the fundamental liberty interest. Applying these principles to the issue of physician-assisted suicide, the Nation's history and tradition has almost uniformly rejected the existence of the right, and most states continue to explicitly reject it in the present day.

Line Item Veto Power of The President / Clinton v. City of New York

There is no provision in the United States Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes. If Congress seeks to create a new procedure for creating laws, it must amend the Constitution.

Substantive Due Process: No Affirmative Duty of The State To Protect Due Process Rights Of Individuals From Individuals / Deshaney v. Winnebago county department of social services

Under substantive due process principles, there is no affirmative duty of the state to act to protect individuals from deprivations of their life, liberty, or property by other citizens, unless those citizens are prisoners held in custody against their will by the state. Due Process Clause generally confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, even when such aid might be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself could not deprive individuals. A state is required to provide medical care to inmates because a state detains inmates against their will.

Dormant Commerce Clause: Ignoring 21 and The States Power To Regulate Alcohol / Granhom v. Heald

Under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, states cannot enact legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. New York and Michigan's regulations prohibiting out-of-state wineries from making direct sales to their consumers explicitly discriminates against interstate commerce. § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment, which more broadly prohibits the importation of alcohol into a state against its laws. That amendment does not affect this Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.

Substantive Due Process: Parental Rights To Prevent Visitation / Troxel v. Granville

Under the Due Process Clause, a state court may not grant visitation rights to a person, even when doing so would be in a child's best interest, if those visitation rights are opposed by the child's parent because doing so interferes with the parent's fundamental liberty interest in rearing his or her child. The liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is one of the oldest interests recognized by the Court as absolutely protected by the Due Process Clause. The statute is overly broad in that it does not require any deference to a parent's decision that visitation by a third party will not be in his or her child's best interest. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the statute for no reason other than a disagreement over visitation existed between Granville and the Troxels. This decision is not based on any showing by the Troxels that Granville is an unfit parent, or that she seeks to cut off visitation completely between her children and their grandparents. On the contrary, Granville merely seeks to limit visitation with her deceased husband's parents after his death because she believes it is in the best interest of her own children.

Substantive Due Process & Equal Protection: Gay Marriage Legalized / Obergefell v. Hodges

Under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, states must issue marriage licenses and recognize lawful out-of-state marriages for same-sex couples. Same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Marriage is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. Though marriage has historically been viewed as between opposite-sex couples, the institution has changed over time, including through the changing legal status of women. Similarly, while same-sex relationships were once forbidden, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court held that same-sex couples had an equal right to intimate associations. Refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry denies them a myriad of legal rights, including those related to taxation, insurance benefits, intestate succession, spousal evidentiary privileges, child custody and support, etc. In this instance, the liberty interest protected by due process intersects with the right to equal protection, and same-sex marriage bans violate both.

Equal Protections Clause: Doesn't Apply To Private Actors / The Civil Rights Cases: United States v. Stanley

Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may only prohibit discrimination by state actors, not private individuals.

Necessary and Proper Clause's Enhancement of Congressional Powers / United States v. Comstock

Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the authority to enact a law that allows civil commitment of mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal inmates beyond the end of the prisoners' criminal sentences. First, the Necessary and Proper Clause confers expansive power on Congress to enact legislation that is convenient or useful. Though Congress's powers are limited and enumerated, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the ability to enact any law that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power. Second, Congress has authorized civil commitment of federal detainees and prisoners since the 1850s. This statute is only a small extension of the existing mental health framework for federal prisoners. Third, it was reasonable for Congress to provide for civil commitment of sexually dangerous inmates. Congress is the custodian of federal prisoners and may therefore constitutionally take steps to protect the public from those inmates. Fourth, the statute does not violate the Tenth Amendment by usurping powers reserved to the states. In fact, the statute specifically provides that inmates must be handed over if states assert their authority. Finally, the statute is sufficiently related to enumerated Article I powers and does not give Congress general police powers. In light of these considerations, the statute is a "necessary and proper" means of exercising Congress's enumerated powers.

Removal Power of Congress / Bowsher v. Synar

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, Congress may not retain removal power over officials charged with executing the laws except by impeachment. The Constitution does not permit Congress to retain an active role in supervising officers tasked with executing the laws of the United States. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution permits the President to appoint officers with the advice and consent of the Senate, but then explicitly states that Congress shall only be involved in removal of these officers through the impeachment process. If Congress had additional removal powers over executive officers, the legislative branch would essentially have control over the execution of laws. This would violate the separation of powers doctrine as Congress could exercise a "congressional veto" over the actions of executive officers by threatening to remove or removing officers who were found to be executing laws in a manner unsatisfactory to Congress.

Dormant Commerce Clause: Deference Only If ForSafety / Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways

Under the principle of the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state law that heavily burdens interstate commerce while only marginally furthering a state health and safety purpose is unconstitutional. The Iowa state law limiting truck size only marginally furthers a state safety purpose while overly burdening interstate commerce, and is thus unconstitutional. Under the principle of the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state law must further a health and safety purpose if it heavily burdens interstate commerce to be constitutional. While state judgments about health and safety issues are normally entitled to great deference by the courts, if a state's safety interest is found to be illusory, and its regulations are found to significantly impair the federal interest in efficient and safe interstate transportation, the state law violates Commerce Clause principles.

Privileges & Immunites: Only Fundamental Privileges Protected / McBurney v. Young

VFOIA does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because VFOIA does not actually violate any fundamental privileges or immunities. Though the Petitioners argued that VFOIA interferes with their fundamental ability to earn a living, own property, and access Virginia courts, the Court rejected these arguments. The Court was also unconvinced that the right to access public information is a fundamental privilege or immunity because neither the Constitution nor the common law guarantees the existence of acts like VFOIA. The Court further held that VFOIA does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because the law does not interfere with the natural functioning of the interstate market.

Equal Protections Clause: Remedies For EP Violations Must Be Congruent And Proproportional To The Injury Itself / Board of Trustees v. Garrett

Where legislation, adopted pursuant to Congress's section 5 enforcement power, reaches beyond the express substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, the means adopted to prevent or remedy the injury must be congruent and proportional to the injury itself. Congress exceeded its section 5 enforcement powers by permitting individuals to bring suits for money damages against state employers. In order to permit individuals to bring suits for money damages against the states for discrimination based on a disability, Congress must first show that the states have engaged in a pattern of discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the remedy imposed against the states is congruent and proportional to such discrimination. States are therefore not required to provide special accommodations for the disabled if there is a rational basis for doing so. Here, there is nothing in the legislative record that indicates that Congress, in enacting the ADA, identified a pattern of irrational state discrimination against people with disabilities in the area of employment. Although local governments are state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court does not consider their constitutional violations in this analysis, because only the states are afforded sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and Congress does not need to rely on section 5 in order to subject local governments to private claims for damages.

Agency Procedure & Due Process / matthews v. eldridge

Whether an administrative procedure meets the constitutional guarantees of the Due Process Clause requires a consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest at stake in the administrative action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. the administrative and societal costs of affording an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of disability benefits would be high. For example, affording such hearings would have a direct financial impact by increasing the number of hearings and providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending decision would be expensive. Given the consideration of these factors, the court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of Eldridge's disability benefits.

Equal Protections Clause: Affirmative Action For Businesses Faces Strict Scrutiny For Enforcement / Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.

Without evidence of past particular race-based discrimination, a city may not enact a plan to provide a race-based set-aside to exclusively promote minority business enterprises, as this does not constitute narrowly-tailored means geared towards accomplishing a compelling state purpose. A state or local subdivision of government has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction, as long as it identifies such discrimination with sufficient particularity so as not to run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to judge the constitutionality of the City's actions in attempting to remedy past discrimination. To pass strict scrutiny, the City must demonstrate that it used narrowly-tailored means to accomplish a compelling state interest. The City provides no evidence to identify with particularity instances of past discrimination, but rather justifies its actions based on a general assertion that discrimination in business contracts has historically targeted African Americans. However, the City does not assert that particular MBEs that might benefit from the MBUP were once targets of discrimination. Thus, the MBUP's stated objectives do not constitute a compelling state interest. Next, the City does not use narrowly-tailored means to accomplish its stated objectives. The MBUP is designed to promote business for many different minority groups. No evidence exists of particularized discrimination against African Americans or other minority groups. Additionally, the City does not consider other race-neutral alternatives by which it might accomplish the same purposes.

Eugenics / Buck v. Bell

a state statute permitting compulsory sterilization of the unfit, including the intellectually disabled, "for the protection and health of the state" did not violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Equal Protections Clause: Affrimative Action For College Students Denied Through Referendum Does Not Violate EP / Schuette

the attempt to define and protect interests based on race ran the risk of allowing the government to classify people based on race and therefore perpetuate the same racism such policies were meant to alleviate. While voters may certainly determine that some race-based preferences should be adopted, it is not the role of the courts to disempower the voters from making such a choice. If certain issues were decided to be too sensitive to be addressed by voters, it would be denying the voters their right to debate and act through the lawful democratic process.

Equal Protections Clause: Gender Discrimination; Failing the Test / Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland

the self-care provision, standing alone, did not validly abrogate Maryland's immunity from suits for damages. Justice Kennedy argued that Congress' evidence failed to show a pattern of state constitutional violations when it wrote the self-care provision; instead, Congress considered evidence that men and women are on medical leave in roughly equal numbers. In contrast, Congress often referred to its concerns about discrimination against women when constructing the family-care portion of the act. Hence, the self-care leave provision was not a congruent and proportional response to discriminatory conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not abrogate Maryland's sovereign immunity.