Contemporary US Foreign Policy Readings

Samuelson, "Is America So Exceptional?"

"American exceptionalism," as a phrase, emerged because US capitalism was thought to be so advanced as to be impervious to communism; is the phrase self-congratulatory, or a reality? Americans favor freedom over security; Americans do not think that determinants of success are outside our control; prior to US, democracies were thought to be unstable and impracticable; government by the governed; individual effort matters; Putin views that the US has used moral authority to throw its weight around the world; more complicated-- involvement sometimes out of self-interesest/isolation out of moral reservations; isolationism may be rising, and exceptionalism declining; US welfare state now resembles the European ones

Lieber, 17-45

"Burden sharing with Europe: problems of capability and will;" Americans hardly play a role anymore in Europe; member countries of EU find themselves weakened and in disarray; deepening refugee crisis; Europe's lagging economic performance and population aging; Germany the largest population and economy, but reluctant to support euro bonds or use force; populist movements in response to globalization; military weakness in NATO spending; opposition to use force if NATO ally attacked; Japan faces similar problems; Obama pivoted to Asia; AIIB (led by China) a competitor to US; what could rejuvenate Europe?: strong economic recovery; negotiate TTIP and TPP; renewed threats could also rejuvenate partnership; erosion of European and Japanese relative power place more weight on US to sustain world order

Lieber, 112-137

"Can America still lead- and should it?" Yes, it can still lead; US foreign policy matters greatly for US and other countries alike- international organizations; US has remained resilient through crises such as world wars and recessions; after wars/extended conflicts, usually are desires for retrenchment from global affairs, and usually are desires for active role following actions/presence of an enemy power; idea of US decline has appeared before, but US is poised to remain most influential power; limited evidence that international burdens are excessive cost to US; US increasingly self-reliant on oil; partisan polarization at a high level, but share some key foreign policy ideas, and all recognize desirability of US as world's leading power, over other authoritarian regimes

Rubin, "Iraq has moved on. Will our foreign policy debate?"

"If it bleeds, it leads" is a common adage about television news. Perhaps it's not surprising, then, that Iraq has fallen so far from the headlines. Civilian casualties from terrorism are down an order of magnitude from just two years ago. Iraq is getting back to normal. The point of this is that Iraq is not perfect — far from it. The coming year will be a real test for the new government. Legitimacy is transitory, bestowed on a provisional basis. If the government fails to deliver, violence could reoccur. But, in comparison to Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt, Iraq is a breath of fresh air. It is a place where politics is for real, and not simply a sideshow to keep diplomats busy. It is a country where leaders rise up, and then step aside peacefully. It is that rare Arab country where retired ministers outnumber those still serving, and where 70 percent of parliament is new after each election. Iraq will never be Switzerland, but it will be normal. It is long past time the U.S. political debate moved on to address the reality and potential of Iraq today rather than continuing to treat it merely as a political football in the American context or a diplomatic and military game board on which to confront Iran. The point is that Iraq today is a country of multiple constituencies, and each matters. While Iraqis still embrace religious parties because of the importance of religious identity, such parties no longer have a blank check.

Lieber, 46-70

"Middle East policy: regional conflicts and threats to national interest;" US-Israeli alliance/US involvement in ME; unexpected consequences of involvement in Iraq; Arab Awakening failed except in Tunisia and Morocco; policy dilemmas/core national interests: security of oil supplies, preventing territorial control by hostile powers, support of regional friends and allies, maintenance of regional stability, counterterrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, democracy and human rights; Obama: themes of retrenchment and disengagement; effects of this have been problematic; results so far support arguments of those advocating sustained engagement; results of retrenchment: instability and disorder, civil wars, control by hostile powers, terrorism: US should support maintaining involvement

Hook and Spanier, 335-354

"The Revival of Power Politics;" rise of power politics coincided with 2011 Arab Spring; Putin increasingly nationalist- called fall of USSR the century's greatest tragedy- resented NATO's eastward expansion; 2013 annexation of Ukraine and Crimea (lots of Russian speakers who longed for "Mother Russia;" important trading port); Obama chose not to intervene and get US involved in another war with no end goal; China, under Xi Jinping, increasingly powerful militarily and economically; China aggressive in South China Sea/East Asia- allies look for US support- "pivot to Asia;" hub and spoke strategy; China's challenges to becoming strategic competitor to US: internal demands, lack of alliances, consumer goods based workforce; renewed violence between Israel/Arabs; US did little to prevent Israeli attacks on Gaza- Gaza a humanitarian crisis; Trump argued against Israeli settlements in Palestine

Hook and Spanier, 213-240

"The Shifting European Landscape;" following end of Cold War, US wanted to maintain central role in Europe; NATO: to keep Russia out, Germany down, and US present; 1992 Maastricht Treaty- common economic system, adoption of euro, goal of common foreign policy; these provided challenges of autonomy and practicality; important to jumpstart democracy in Eastern and Central Europe- high cost to rebuild, demoralized by Cold War, and unattractive to foreign investment; ethnic cleansing in Balkans, disagreement over US/Europe intervention/approaches; lack of support for intervention- air raids ineffectual/use of human shields; Serbs cleaned Croats and Muslims; following Dayton Accords, Milosevic simply turned to Kosovo; question: to let Russia suffer or provide it aid- did the latter; rise of Islamic powers in 1990s Middle East power vacuum; Russia asserted control over Chechnya, but could not overcome them; facing unpopularity, Yeltsin resigned and handed power off to Putin, in 1999

Hook and Spanier, 303-334

"Aftershocks of Arab Spring:" Obama called for renewal: join international community, live up to democratic principles at home, and revive diplomacy; effects of financial collapse throughout world showed US influence- Russia spoke out against US recklessness; bin Laden killed, but struggle continued; mass demands for democracy and regime change: Tunisia and Egypt (Mubarak)- Obama let Egypt run its course; in Libya, Obama led from behind NATO- Qaddafi; failed outcomes in both countries; Syrian civil war: Assad mistreated Sunnis, was supported by Russia; when used chemical weapons, Obama did nothing about "red line," but Putin intervened instead; Iraq and Afghanistan collapsed following US withdrawal, to ISIS and Taliban, respectively; Afghan civilian deaths rose

Lipset, "Still the Exceptional Nation?" 31-45

"American exceptionalism" as the idea the US was impervious to socialistic tendencies; Tocqueville: US lacked feudal past and was egalitarian; US, as lone superpower, now looks like the model for the world to follow; socialists began to sounds like New Democrats-- capitalism, while addressing inequality; will developed nations converge, to make America not "exceptional?" Taxes rising, and unions declining; Marxist prediction of growth of industrial proletariat did not occur; US at forefront of post-materialism; US Left's centrist "Third Way;" movements away from Marxism; US transition from "backwardness" to head of politically progressive movement; US still exceptional in other regards: Christian, mobility, low taxes; but also highest prison population, wealth inequality; low state welfare spending; Europeans and Americans continue to value things differently: taking care of poor, social mobility, etc.; American belief in ambition

Iraq Chronology- Congressional Resolutions to Authorize Use of Force in Iraq

1/12/91 Senate: 52-47 DEMS: 10-45 GOP: 42-2 House 250-183 DEMS: 86-179 GOP: 164-3 INDP: 01 (Bernie Sanders, VT) 10/11/02 Senate: 77-23 DEMS: 29-21 GOP: 48-1 (Lincoln Chafee, Rhode Island) INDP: 0-1 (Jas. Jeffords, VT) 10/10/02 House: 297-133 DEMS: 82-126 GOP 215-6 INDP: 0-1 (Bernie Sanders, VT)

Reagan, "Speech at Westminster"

1982 address to members of British Parliament; European trip to secure economic cooperation and arms reduction; Poland, at the center of European civilization, struggling for democratization at the moment; totalitarian regimes have failed to establish their legitimacy: "regimes planted by bayonets do not take root;" strength of Solidarity movements signals strong opposition to USSR; importance of START reduction, and negotiations of intermediate-range nuclear forces (Zero-Option Initiative); mutual abhorrence of dictatorship and totalitarianism; economic-political crisis Marx predicted came true-- but is occurring in USSR; decline in economic production, increase in military spending-- strain on USSR; people run away from communism, not towards it; democratic revolution is gaining new strength; it is necessary to assist the campaign for democracy; desire to include USSR on talks of competition and democratization; must strengthen NATO

Nye, Jr., "Will the Liberal Order Survive?"

19th century, US opposed interventionism outside of Western Hemisphere; flirtation with imperialism led to Wilson's ambitious involvement and then retrenchment- focus on domestic issues around the world led states to turn a blind eye to dictatorial powers; post-WW2, sought cooperation- liberal international order, Bretton Woods, investment- Marshall Plan- and troops; US bonded itself with other superpowers and isolated USSR, and by 1970s, economic globalization had stabilized; although US preferred democracies, supported dictators and was self-interested; US power could not prevent failures in Vietnam, Germany, etc.; defending and deepening ties with foreign superpowers is successful, central aim of foreign policy, even though it brings partisan differences; now, Trump argues that costs of supporting the order outweigh the benefits- should deal with countries on a transactional basis instead; other challenges to foundations of the order: power to non-state actors, and power transitions due to rise of India and China; When the strongest powers fail to appreciate this dynamic, global public goods- i.e. climate protection- are underproduced and everybody suffers; fear that China does not appreciate global order and will surpass US power- in reality, does appreciate it- involvement with UN- and will not pass US- it lags economically, militarily, and is not as capable in attracting people; non-state actors (corporations, terrorists, social movements) pose challenges, as does information age/complexity of issues; US cannot achieve all its goals alone; most significant challenge may be populism- against globalization and trade agreements; consequences of 1930s retrenchment will not occur again- protectionist sentiment not nearly as strong as election rhetoric suggests; US needs to be careful in selecting which countries to engage with- occupation breeds resentment, which lowers probability of success; political fragmentation and congressional inefficiency has been problematic; networks and norms are crucial

Hook and Spanier: Chronology: Cold War's End

384-386

Halevi, "The Real Dispute Driving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict"

Abbas's "Zion denial" explains much about why the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians remains so intractable. If Israel is merely a colonialist project, rather than the fulfillment of an exiled people's longing to return home, then it is illegitimate. You don't make peace with colonialism—you destroy it. Seventy years after the founding of the Jewish state and the beginning of the Palestinian tragedy, peace remains as elusive as ever—in large part because of the pervasive denial, both within Palestinian society and throughout the Middle East, of Israel's legitimacy, and the hardline response that denial evokes among Israelis; Even if we were to uproot every last settlement and withdraw to the 1967 lines, some Israelis say, it won't bring us any closer to peace, because the real Palestinian grievance is Israel's existence; as the U.S. embassy is moved to Jerusalem and Palestinians observe the 70th anniversary of the nakba, or the "catastrophe" that saw the expulsion of some 700,000 Palestinians from their homes in 1947 and 1948 by Israelis, violence in the region will almost certainly intensify. The ongoing war over 1948 is being played out on Israel's border with Gaza, where tens of thousands of Palestinians have been gathering over the last month, in attempts to storm the fence that separates the two; Palestine denial remains pervasive within the Israeli right. But there are also those Israelis who have long since come to terms with the right of the Palestinian people to self-definition—a prerequisite for achieving the right to self-determination; once Israelis were open to peace, received worse terrorism in Second Intifada; Israelis and Palestinians are caught in what could be called a "cycle of denial." The Palestinian national movement denies Israel's legitimacy, and Israel in turn denies the Palestinians' national sovereignty. The cycle of denial has defined this shared existence since the creation of Israel 70 years ago; ending the occupation is an existential necessity for Israel itself. The second is that, given the denial of Israel's legitimacy within the Palestinian national movement, a Palestinian state will likely be irredentist and itself a potential existential threat to Israel; The international community can help by expressing its vigorous opposition not only to Israeli settlement building, but also to the Palestinian campaign that portrays the Jewish return home to any part of the land as a colonialist affront.

Mandelbaum, 158-165

Afghanistan had been decimated since 1979 Soviet occupation and struggle against it; by 1990s, it was a failed state, and the Taliban emerged, and governed in a radical manner; allowed bin Laden's al-Qaeda training sites to exist; following 9/11, Taliban refused to hand over al-Qaeda; NATO invoked Article 5 for first time ever; US forces, with the Northern Alliance, swiftly removed Taliban from power; Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders fled to Pakistan; UN instituted Karzai to lead Afghanistan; Karzai subsequently won elections and popular support; US troops remained to enforce stability; Bush had unintentionally ended up democratizing, as he had criticized Clinton for so doing; downsizing of forces occurred, before Taliban returned in 2005

Lieber, 6-16

After 9/11, America no longer lone hegemon- other powers include BRIC countries; Obama sought retrenchment; Obama Doctrine: retrenchment and disengagement, a deep wariness about the exercise of American power, conciliatory policies towards adversaries, a distancing from traditional allies, an emphasis on the international community and multilateral organizations over autonomous American initiatives, and a focus on domestic affairs; Obama still used force selectively: drone strikes; should wield together diplomacy and war; in recent years, retrenchment has coincided with heightened instability and disorder; importance of robust American role

Haass, "A World in Disarray," 103-119

After fall of USSR, rosy world-views were short lived; all governments united to oppose Iraq in Kuwait, but this level of consensus would not be achieved again; fall of USSR led to independence movements fraught with nationalism, desires for self-determination, and diverse ethnic groups within borders; Yugoslavia invaded states that declared their independence; Czechoslovakia was much more peaceful; instability and revolt in Iraq following Operation Desert Storm; Somalian warlords- Clinton administration went beyond humanitarian aid and attempted to establish government; Rwandan genocide- Hutus and Tutsis- world sat on its hands; from Rwanda emerged R2P; R2P led to concerns from countries that the policy could be turned against them; Syria in 2011, and subsequent rise of Al-Nusra and ISIS; R2P did not kick in because countries could not agree who was at fault and weren't sure how to fix problems

Nathan vs. Allison, "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: Why It Matters Who Blinked"

Allison viewed US actions as successful; believed it set a framework for how to deal with Iran and North Korea; concessions in Turkey were kept secret; Nathan believes that to appear stronger is dangerous; bluffing will lead to war if threats are not carried out; lying taught public faulty lessons about power of threats; diplomacy important; Allison viewed the threat of force as necessary to make Khrushchev remove his weapons; a mix of threat and compromise is necessary

Power, "Rwanda: 'Mostly in a Listening Mode,'" 329-389

Although the U.S. had received ample warning that mass violence was imminent, government officials did almost nothing to stop it; Before gaining independence from Belgium, the Tutsi had enjoyed a privileged position in Rwanda. After independence, three decades of Hutu rule saw Tutsi subjected to systematic discrimination and waves of ethnic cleansing; In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) gained ground on Hutu forces and in 1993, peace talks resulted in a power-sharing agreement called the Arusha accords; UN peacekeepers would enforce the cease-fire and assist in demilitarization; Even after the Hutu government began eliminating the Tutsi, the U.S. focused on reestablishing the cease-fire and in an attempt to restore the Arusha agreement. The U.S. and UN officials threatened to withdraw UN peacekeepers from Rwanda. This was an extremely ineffective threat, as the Hutu government wanted nothing more than a withdrawal; when Dallaire (UN) requested troops, US removed troops instead; focus was on evacuating foreigners at expense of assisting Tutsis; deliberate exclusion of the word "genocide;" Clinton never gathered his top policy advisors to discuss the massacres in Rwanda. At the UN, the United States called for the withdrawal of Dallaire's forces and refused to support any missions that would challenge the killings; "The Clinton administration did not actively consider U.S. military intervention, it blocked the deployment of UN peacekeepers, and it refrained from undertaking softer forms of intervention;" Dallaire's meager forces did have some effect; after most victims had been killed; US agreed to set up protected zones at Rwanda's edge; it were mostly RPF Tutsi rebels that ended the genocide. Hutu perpetrators, along with over a million refugees, fled into neighboring countries; military intervention would have been significantly less expensive than humanitarian support that was provided to Hutu refugees

Hook and Spanier, "American Foreign Policy," Preface

America an "empire by invitation" after WWII; foreign policy is shaped by national identity; after WWII, America alone at top of balance of power; countries chose to bandwagon with US, rather than balance it; in decades since, there has been an erosion of moral authority

Pew Research Center, "How the world views the U.S. and its president in 9 charts"

America's global image today is complicated. On balance, people around the world continue to give the United States favorable ratings and say it respects the individual liberties of its people. More countries also prefer the U.S. as the world's leading power over China. At the same time, many express frustration about America's role in the world and say they have little confidence in President Donald Trump to do the right thing in world affairs, according to a new Pew Research Center survey of 25 nations; confidence in Trump remains low in several EU countries; Western Europeans have strikingly negative views of Trump; Views of the U.S. are favorable on balance, but concerns are evident; People in other nations have long said the U.S. does not take the interests of their country into account when making international policy decisions; favorable views of US prevail in many countries; The U.S. receives some of its highest favorability ratings in Asia; America's lowest rating came from Russia (26% favorable); Western Europeans now say the U.S. does not respect the individual liberties of its people - a reversal from just a few years ago- The decline began after the National Security Agency's spying controversy during the Obama administration; More say China is playing a larger role in the world compared with 10 years ago than say the same about the U.S.; People are divided in their perceptions of how powerful a role the U.S. plays on the world stage compared with 10 years ago; Americans themselves are divided on their own influence in the world, with nearly equal shares saying their country plays a more, equal or less important role than 10 years ago; America is seen as the world's leading economic power; Most people prefer America over China as the world's leading power; In many countries, preference for U.S. leadership is linked to ideology, with those on the ideological right more likely than those on the left to prefer America as the world's dominant power.

Hook and Spanier, "American Foreign Policy," 1-11

American popularity has fallen to low levels (Trump reject of trade, Paris Agreement, etc.); challenges today: Russia, China, North Korea: will US be able to maintain its stronghold? America was detached in its early history, until WWII; post Cold War: 9/11, ISIS, Trump, rising Russia and China led to questions; idea of American hegemony/influence across rest of world; America as a "benevolent hegemony," but unipolarity is unstable: too costly for hegemon, or other powers will try to weaken hegemon

Cohen, "Trump's Lucky Year: Why the Chaos Can't Last"

As a candidate, Trump had evinced a partiality for foreign strongmen, derided U.S. allies as a gang of freeloaders, proposed banning Muslims from entering the United States, sneered at Mexicans, and denounced free-trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement; bent towards populist isolationism; Being in office has done little to moderate Trump's belligerent rhetoric, improve his commitment to facts, or alter his views on trade and international agreements; strong on defense (he increased the Pentagon's budget, although not as significantly as it had hoped), willing to use force (he launched cruise missiles at Syria as punishment for its use of chemical weapons), and committed to allies (enthusiastically in the case of Israel and Japan, grudgingly in the case of the Europeans). Although he has been more of an economic nationalist than some might like, the thinking goes that he remains within the bounds of GOP tradition; Trump was remarkably lucky in 2017. He did not experience any external shocks and paid no visible price for alienating the United States' friends; But congressional mandates and the sheer inertia of previous policies got in the way of "America first." consensus unquestionably diverges from Trump's worldview in its support for free trade, U.S. alliances (particularly NATO), and the U.S.-led global order; senior officials have guided Trump; What is not known is what will happen if and when the president decides on a course of action that his advisers deem deeply dangerous but nonetheless legal; North Korea continued developing nuclear weapons; China made clear that it would not act as the United States' sheriff in East Asia; apparent just how actively Russia had intervened in the 2016 U.S. presidential election- to no retaliation from Trump; a Europe increasingly preoccupied with its own populist and secessionist movements presents more opportunities for Russian subversion; China as one of the United States' major competitors, and the president continued complaining about China's trade surpluses and failure to rein in North Korea; China's steady acquisition of military power, its menacing posture toward Taiwan, and its use of economic aid and investment as a tool of geopolitics are accelerating; Trump administration scored a major success by completing the campaign to help Iraq eliminate the physical footprint of the Islamic State; The contest with jihadists will go on well after the Trump presidency, and the administration has not articulated a clear strategy for success; Israel now faces an emboldened Hezbollah and the possibility of a more permanent Iranian military presence in Syria; Trump more firmly aligned the United States with Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states and against Iran; Even though Trump promised to replace multilateral trade agreements with bilateral ones, he has failed to follow through; Taken together, these actions made the United States appear less committed to an open international trading order than China. And Trump's approach to trade will likely alienate old friends, such as Canada, and critical allies, such as South Korea; lack of involvement in Latin America; Trump acquired a global reputation for being unreliable, temperamental, and deceitful; costs of such a deterioration in U.S. standing are long term. They may not be visible yet, but they will come into the open in a moment of acute stress; After denouncing excessive involvement abroad, it increased, not decreased, the deployment of forces to active war zones; Not only are foreign policy challenges beginning to pile up; a year of the Trump administration has left the United States in a worse position to handle them; Conflict with Russia has also become more likely. The curious tension between the president's sympathetic rhetoric and his administration's more hostile actions has increased the risk that a contemptuous and irritated Russia will poke back in eastern Europe. The Kremlin's anxieties about legitimacy in the midst of economic stagnation exacerbate the situation. At the same time, the United States could find itself in fights with Iran and in a more adverse relationship with China; instability arising from lack of ability to focus on multiple conflicts; he has demoralized the institutions of the U.S. government on which he depends; there is no reason to believe that he has developed the knowledge or judgment to handle such a challenge when it does arise

Gerecht, "Iran," in Schmitt, "Rise of the Revisionists"

As for Iran, Gerecht posits that, while the Islamic Republic has seen itself as revolutionary since 1979, the broader Islamic agenda has largely "lost its mojo." It has effectively been replaced by a "militant Shi'ite fraternity" designed to give the regime new legitimacy at home and, potentially, a hegemonic position within the Middle East, by playing the Shi'ite card in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and among the oppressed Shi'a in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. But, Gerecht argues, "Iran is a volcano of [internal] contradictions," and Washington would do well to "accentuate those contradictions, especially the century-old Iranian quest for representative government;" Disorder in the Middle East and the perception of US retrenchment from the region have opened the door for Iran to expand its influence across the greater Near East. While the fervor associated with the 1979 Islamic Revolution has subsided and, with it, Tehran's claim to leadership in the Muslim world, the clerical regime is now using the great divide between Shi'a and Sunnis to advance and legitimize its regional ambitions both at home and abroad.

Hook and Spanier, 41-44

At end of Cold War, US power continued to grow; Russia struggled, and China continued to grow rapidly, yet focused on feeding its own people; states joined US bandwagon, rather than oppose it; popular desires to tone down global engagement during 1990s

Hook and Spanier, 77-82

BRICS as free riders- countries have not been cooperative or taken on stakeholder role; collective action problem- put their own interests first; climate change/human rights/nuclear proliferation/R2P; pursue predatory trade and have high levels of corruption; China: cyberwar and violations of intellectual property; Brazil: movement away from free trade; BRICS don't cooperate with international community, nor with each other; BRICS have their own regional problems, and as a whole, the group has declined

Chronology: Cold War's End

Blackboard

Key Events in Early Cold War

Blackboard

Hook and Spanier, 225-234

Breakdown of USSR led to nationalistic rivalries; Yugoslavia held together during Cold War by Tito; Serbs conducted ethnic cleansing by removing Muslims in order to expand their territory; neither Europeans nor Americans felt threatened by events in Bosnia, so did not intervene directly; wanted to seek diplomatic solutions; Clinton wanted a multilateral approach, because a unilateral one would make it "America's War," as Vietnam had been; Serbs continue to defy UN and overran Muslim enclaves, deterring air strikes by using human shields; UN, allowed only to use force in self-defense, watched a Muslims were sent to concentration camps and executed; in 1995, Croatia fought back Serbs, and Milosevic was forced to exert his power over Serbs; Serbs, Croats, and Muslims signed a ceasefire in Dayton, Ohio, in 1995; NATO forces remained; Serbia simply redirected its force to Kosovo, in 1999- when NATO avoided ground force, Serbs executed Muslims; Milosevic withdrew after attacks on electrical grid

Hook and Spanier, 158-171

Bush's management of Soviet Union collapse; fair negotiations in order to ensure peace: dismantling Stalin's empire (free elections, non-communist governments), detaching Brezhnev's outposts (Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cuba), and stabilizing the nuclear balance (START, US abide by 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty)

Lomborg, "How to Fix Global Warming Smartly"

CO2 emissions have risen drastically, while renewable energy usage has decreased; Rather than focusing on carbon taxes and subsidies, governments should instead invest in innovation, which will be much more effective in combating climate change

Hook and Spanier, 86-90

Castro came to power in Cuba, resented US imperialism, appealed to social justice and aligned Cuba with USSR; Bay of Pigs invasion failed; Khrushchev placed missiles in Cuba; Kennedy blockaded Cuba; Khrushchev removed missiles; Castro remained popular throughout the region, and remained in power; US led coups in Guatemala and Dominican Republic, which led to worsening perceptions of the US

Zakaria, "Senator Schumer's illogical case against the Iran deal"

Chuck Schumer opposed Iran Nuclear Deal: would provide Iran sanctions relief and allow them to redouble their efforts to cause chaos in the Middle East; Zakaria argues that agreement is not perfect, but will allow inspections, it mandates that Iran demilitarize its nuclear capabilities before receiving sanctions relief, and that, without the agreement, sanctions would unravel anyway; this agreement is the most comprehensive one to date- much more detailed than previous agreement with North Korea, in 1994; in addition, US has ability to pull back sanctions relief

Mandelbaum, 133-158

Clinton's presidency relatively uneventful- no major wars; Bush criticized failures of democratization, yet would experience these failures himself in the War on Terror; US intelligence had been aware of Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden before 9/11, but did not take terrorism overly seriously; "War on Terror," as a phrase, had its issues: terror is a tactic, did not name radical Islam for fear of insulting non-radical Muslims and Saudi Arabia, and did not specify a single enemy; drone strikes under Obama, surveillance, and torture of captured terrorists became controversial topics; America violated its own ideals of liberty; a decade passed without another serious foreign-based attack on US- terrorism may no longer be a threat warranting large-scale war efforts, but tactic may never be fully eradicated

Haass, "A World in Disarray," 37-54

Cold War was remarkable for being cold; military actions for acts of local containment (Korea, Vietnam), stability of bipolarity, diplomatic process and knowledge across governments, lack of direct conflict out of fear for nuclear weapons, MAD, respect for spheres of influence (US did not involve itself with supporting insurgency liberation movements within USSR) all reasons for this; Helsinki agreement of 1975- Westphalian, insoluble borders; end of Cold War: USSR economically flawed, could not support expansive overseas role; etc.; Gorbachev tried to change politics, and lost power as a result; failed coup exacerbated decline of USSR; containment frustrated USSR; USSR dissolved, broke up, and Germany entered NATO

PART 2: Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations"

Common identities are more likely to cooperate; conflicting identities will not; Rather than convergence around set of institutions, there will be increasing cultural and civilizational differences; The fundamental source of conflict in the future will not be ideological or economic, it will be cultural; Conflict will occur along civilizational fault lines; people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. Future wars would be fought not between countries, but between cultures, and that Islamic extremism would become the biggest threat to world peace; while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural lines; But after the end of the Cold War, world politics moved into a new phase, in which non-Western civilizations are no longer the exploited recipients of Western civilization but have become additional important actors joining the West to shape and move world history

Khler, "American Reds, Soviet Stooges"

Communist Party of the US was an instrument of Soviet foreign policy; dissolution of Comintern did not end USSR supervision; Earl Browder concluded that US-Soviet relations would persist after WWII, so engineered CPUSA to work within Democratic Party-- was removed from power; 1935, Comintern called for united front against fascism; USSR often changed position, and CPUSA had to abide by changes; CPUSA was supported by Soviet money; existence of hundreds of spies; loyalty to Soviets was paramount

Evans, "R2P: Looking Back, Looking Forward"

Concept of R2P born out of realpolitik policies, in which the US was friendly with genocidal Cambodia for political reasons; goal to prevent situations like Rwanda, etc.; It was designed not to create new legal rules but rather a compelling new sense of moral and political obligation to apply existing ones; R2P has gained widespread normative traction; more resolutions were passed after 2011 Libyan intervention; R2P had led to new norms/standards of behavior; further norm consolidation is necessary, as it mindset convergence of various emerging powers; US has led the way in UN context, but has refrained from using "R2P" terminology, out of fears that actions solely are to meet requirements- a mistake; UK and France use power too liberally, Germany too much restraint; Russia used R2P to justify Georgia, and has blocked resolutions in Syria; India historically non-interventionist; establishment of a number of focal points across governments; civilian institutional response systems should be improved (self-policing, etc.); idea of also developing an "individual right to protect;" R2P as a preventative framework; structural prevention must be developed; R2P as a reactive framework- through diplomacy, or force if necessary; gone are days when atrocities behind borders are not the concern of others

Lieber, "A Glimpse into the Abyss: The Cuban Missile Crisis," 164-183

Concerns that USSR perceived US resolve to deter to be declining; Kennedy gathered ExCo, shot down ideas of airstrikes or invasion (too dangerous-- would be hard to take out all the missiles, and USSR might retaliate in Berlin); missiles withdrawn after blockade, US pledged not to invade Cuba, and US later removed missiles in Turkey; removal of missiles not only a political embarrassment for USSR, but also a lost opportunity-- stationing missiles in Cuba would have had strategic benefits; US had to respond to protect credibility; missiles represented challenge to geopolitical status quo; some see crisis as an American victory; critics allege that Kennedy failed to punish USSR/did not drive a hard enough bargain; some critique unnecessary strain between nuclear war and domestic politics

Betts, "Misadventure Revisited"

Critics doubted in South Vietnam was an appropriate testing ground for the East-West struggle; in post-Vietnam cases, assertiveness became popular again; misunderstandings: JFK may not have ended up disengaging, and LBJ was not set on escalating efforts; LBJ was less aggressive than his advisors; like JFK, LBJ took a "limited strategy;"feared disruption of his "Great Society;" Nixon also took a middle ground, appealing to "Silent Majority" that wanted to disengage but not lose; balanced re-escalations with peace talks; Nixon allowed North Vietnam troops to remain South Vietnam after ceasefire; leaders wanted to stave off defeat, with no expectation of victory; LBJ knew that gradually building up strength would not win the war, but saw no alternative to hoping that Hanoi would grow weary; American consensus behind intervention obscured by later disillusionment and realization that war too costly and South Vietnamese communism not a threat; decision to engage in Vietnam influenced by past successes in Korea, etc.; desire for return to Eisenhower style containment; neither containment nor disengagement is risk-free

Byman, "What Happens When ISIS Goes Underground?"

Defeating the Islamic State could be the marquee foreign-policy accomplishment of the Trump administration. Doing so, however, will require more than just forcing the caliphate underground; The Islamic State is on the ropes, yet the group may make a comeback. The U.S.-led coalition has driven it from much of its territory in Iraq and Syria, while most of its so-called "provinces" elsewhere in the Muslim world also have lost territory or stagnated. In July, U.S.-backed local forces took Mosul, the Islamic State's largest stronghold in Iraq, and then in October took the Syrian city of Raqqa, the Islamic State's capital. The caliphate may soon exist only as an idea; the United States is not well prepared for the group's defeat. After losing control of key territory, the Islamic State may repeat the actions of its predecessor when the U.S.-led surge brought Al Qaeda in Iraq to the edge of defeat: go underground, disrupt politics and foster sectarianism; wage an insurgency; and then come roaring back. The United States cannot depend on its partners to counter this cycle, as local allies in Iraq and Syria are unprepared to govern and conduct effective counterinsurgency operations; Trump's rhetoric, "Muslim Ban," decline in foreign aid, and embrace of Saudi position in ME could reduce cooperation; Trump should train allies and bolster resilience; following 2014-2015 peak, forces have driven ISIS out of cities; ISIS could come back to power the way Al-Qaeda did; out of government discontent and Assad's atrocities against Sunnis; ISIS ideas have spread beyond the region; Europe under more of a threat; increasing "lone wolf" attacks; US must redouble its efforts; US must recognize link between civil wars and terrorism; US must broaden scope of counterterrorism and involve Congress in it; ISIS air strikes only have dubious legal legitimacy

Hook and Spanier, 260-272 (Ch 10)

Definition of terrorism; problem of communication between intelligence agencies who didn't connect the dots before attacks of 9/11; difficulties in achieving successful diplomacy to achieve allies on war on terror; homeland security beefed up; Bush Doctrine (grand strategy): primacy (attacks against unipolar US power as self-defeating) and preemption (a challenge to international norms) against those who planned to attack US

Feaver, "Could ISIS Have Been Averted?"

Different decisions by Bush and Obama could have prevented Islamic State threat, which reached its peak in 2014; four key, fateful decisions: Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003, along with the policy management problems that the invasion engendered immediately after, Obama's decision to disengage from Iraq and carry through with a near-total withdrawal from Iraq in 2010 and 2011, Obama's decision not to intervene more robustly in the Syrian civil war during the early (pre-2013) phase of that conflict, Obama's decision in late 2013 and 2014 not to confront the Islamic State when it was making its eastward conquest through Syria and Iraq; Bush critics, especially Obama, were wrong when they went on to argue that the invasion of Iraq made the rise of the Islamic State inevitable; success of Iraq gave Obama a false sense of confidence- situation was fragile, and required continued US presence; alternative policies may also have had their own counterarguments and downsides

Ross, "Coming Apart"

Do Brexit, unbridled immigration, Russian aggression, and mounting nationalist sentiment augur the imminent end of the European project? In this well-researched and tightly reported study, James Kirchick presages calamity for the continent if such trends aren't reversed. "We are on the cusp," he cautions, "of witnessing the end of Europe as we have known it for the past seven decades: a place of peace, stability, prosperity, cooperation, democracy, and social harmony." To arrest this descent—no mean feat—Kirchick calls for a restoration of Europe's "muscular liberal center;" long-held grievances, economic frustrations, and revanchist ambitions stoked by Vladimir Putin have largely reversed the political and social freedoms inaugurated by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin; central European countries feel gravitational pull towards Russia; rise of populist movements a result of restricted dialogue on immigration as "racist;" Europe must cohere around core principles

Kirchick, "Europeans want to break up with America. They'd do so at their peril"

Donald Trump ascended to the presidency challenging the basic precepts of America's relationship with Europe: NATO, he proclaimed, was not only "obsolete," but Washington should make its security commitment contingent upon alliance members paying "their fair share." The European Union was not an ally but a competitor that had been "formed, partially, to beat the United States on trade." Over the past year and a half, Trump has taken many steps to rankle Europeans: He pulled out of the Paris climate agreement, recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and threatened to impose tariffs on aluminum and steel. But it was the president's decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal that has led many to declare the transatlantic relationship dead; These eulogies for the transatlantic relationship are irresponsible and premature. Though Trump has certainly made America more unreliable, the United States and its European allies still share the same fundamental values and interests. Moreover, such sweeping declarations ignore the extent to which the European project owes its very existence to the beneficence, sacrifice and tutelage of the United States, and still relies upon Washington for its security; Declaring the bond between America and Europe kaput exaggerates both the severity and suddenness of the current predicament; transatlantic relations were not peachy even before Trump/disinterest in alliance is a two-way street

Hook and Spanier, 105-118

Early in Cold War, US held supremacy in nuclear warfare, and USSR held supremacy in conventional and regional warfare; once USSR stockpiled weapons, the two were on par; Nixon and Brezhnev sought limitation and reduction-- SALT I, as did Ford-- SALT II; Kissinger's key was balance of power-- also to exploit Sino-Soviet relations; "linkage" of US and USSR through diplomacy and trade; Ford wanted to focus on domestic affairs; Carter urged moral rejuvenation of US on world stage; focused on human rights in developing states, and cooperative foreign policy

Hook and Spanier, 185-204

End of Cold War brought about uncertainties of world politics; unipolar balance of power in that US was far more advanced than anyone else, but US unsure how to approach foreign affairs; great expectations; "the end of history," and spread of liberal democracies and peace across globe; US options: retreat from global leadership, campaign of liberal internationalism, effort to maintain economic and military supremacy, or selective engagement; Clinton's geoeconomics focus on domestic economy, not influencing world politics; economic integration: NAFTA, GATT, WTO; global integration, but also fragmentation: instability and power vacuums in former communist states-- "clash of civilizations" imminent; Gulf War- Saddam, who'd been supported by Reagan against Iran, took over Kuwait for its oil fields; UN coalition gave Saddam a deadline to leave; did not leave, so Operation Desert Storm over 43 days of air assaults; US did not want to remove Saddam from power and see Iraq disintegrate into a civil war; Clinton lost upper hand to Iraq as 1990s progressed; lacked domestic support

Mandelbaum, "Mission Failure," 1-13

End of Gulf War in Iraq symbolized end of Cold War (US was unopposed by USSR); post-Cold War, US opted to maintain its powerful international role, but content of its policy contrasted sharply with its historical policy; shift from containment to transformation; before and after 9/11, US tried to prevent threatening governments from taking control, in order to preserve stability; all such missions failed; because there were no major threats, Americans were reluctant to approve necessary investment abroad, AND because goals were not achievable ones; US did not have the ability to align ethic and state allegiances (nation-state mismatch); post-Cold War, MILITARY missions were successful, while POLITICAL missions were failures

Schlesinger, "Hopeful Cynic: All the Letters from Yalta"

FDR and Stalin met twice (Tehran, 1941, Yalta, 1945), after Hitler's 1941 invasion of USSR, Stalin and Roosevelt corresponded with over 300 letters before Yalta meeting of 1945; FDR was frail, not as physically sharp, but his mental faculties were still high; Stalin and Churchill also old; FDR recognized horrors of Red Army, but US was in debt to USSR for help in defeating Hitler; FDR had hoped for continued alliance with Stalin post-war; Stalin did defer to FDR and his New Deal politics somewhat; during interwar period, FDR urged international collaboration from US; post-war, wanted to commit US to international structure of peace; there was still the challenge of isolationist sentiment

Lieber, 59-61

Factors leading to Iraq War: 9/11, rapid ouster of Afghan Taliban, belief in US military ability, belief that Saddam sought nuclear weapons- desire to end threat preemptively, containment of Iraq eroding; 2002 NSS had focused on preemption, military primacy, and multilateralism; UN provided a "final opportunity" for Saddam to comply; Operation Iraqi Freedom undertaken by US with coalition of 40 countries; 2007-2008 military surge, allied with Sunnis, shut down al-Qaeda, US handed power to democratic regime of Maliki, in 2011; Maliki purged Iraqi army, and in the crisis, 1/3rd of country fell to ISIS; consequence of failures of Iraq: the rise of Iran as a bigger threat in the Middle East

Hook and Spanier, 208-210

Following death of US-friendly, but brutal Somali leader, Barre, Somalia descended into a civil war marked by rivalry between warlords and starvation; in 1992, troops were sent by US, then replaced by UN forces; 1993, UN changed mission from humanitarian to rebuilding political order; there is no such thing as apolitical humanitarian intervention; UN suspended mission in 1995; failure in Somalia spurred inaction in 1994 Rwandan genocide, which the US and UN both apologized for

Reich, "Useless Commemorations?"

Following each genocide since the Holocaust, politicians always proclaim "never again," and admonish governments for not acting, yet they continue to turn a blind eye and not involve their countries in others' affairs; when "again" occurs, politicians express willful ignorance; Holocaust commemorations seem meaningless if leaders continue to justify their failures, but eventually, by focusing on individual stories, they will learn to act justly

Hook and Spanier, 211-212

Following regional strifes and failures, popular support for global disengagement; shift to "Powell Doctrine," which focused on costs and benefits and having an exit strategy; failures had proved that military force could not address long-lasting, underlying challenges; disengagement from humanitarian efforts a sign of future US policies

Wilson's War Message to Congress (1917)

Four days later, Congress overwhelmingly voted to bring US into the Great War; Germans had been torpedoing ships approaching Great Britain: a "war against mankind/all nations;" necessary to vindicate human right; armed neutrality is ineffectual; implores Congress to allow US to bring Germany to terms and end the war; necessary to form a partnership of democratic nations; the world must be made safe for democracy; will leave relationship with German allies for another time; reiterated friendship with the German people; "the right is more precious than peace"

Samuelson, "Curbing Global Warming: Mission Impossible?"

Global warming is a reality- need to move beyond politics and blame; cuts to greenhouse emissions will slow concentration, but will still raise concentration levels; eliminating fossil fuels emissions would destroy the global economy; political solutions do nothing to reduce concentration levels; political rhetoric is stronger than action; hope that technological breakthrough will liberate economic growth from fossil fuels

Review of Graham Allison's "The Thucydides Trap: Will America and China go to war?"

Graham Allison, a Harvard scholar, thinks the world underestimates the risk of a catastrophic clash between China and the United States. When a rising power challenges an incumbent, carnage often ensues; war is "more likely than not;" China and America could blunder into war in several ways, argues Mr Allison. A stand-off over Taiwan could escalate. North Korea's dictator, Kim Jong Un, might die without an obvious heir, sparking chaos. American and Chinese special forces might rush into North Korea to secure the regime's nuclear weapons, and clash. A big cyber-attack against America's military networks might convince it that China was trying to blind its forces in the Pacific. American retaliation aimed at warning China off might have the opposite effect. Suppose that America crippled China's Great Firewall, as a warning shot, and China saw this as an attempt to overthrow its government? With Donald Trump in the White House, Mr Allison worries that even a trade war might turn into a shooting war; But Mr Allison's overall thesis is too gloomy. China is a cautious superpower. Its leaders stoke nationalist sentiment at home, but they have shown little appetite for military adventurism abroad. Yes, the Taiwan strait and the South China Sea are dangerous. But unlike the great powers of old, China has no desire to build a far-flung empire. And all the wars in Mr Allison's sample broke out before the invention of nuclear weapons. China and America have enough of these to destroy the world. That alone makes war extremely unlikely

Hook and Spanier, 92-103

History of Vietnam War; after "first Vietnam War" against France, Ho Chi Minh came to power, UN urged South Vietnam to have own elections-- elected Diem, but North Vietnam expected South to fall, because Ho was popular; US stepped in due to "domino theory," but did not understand Vietnam's history or politics; US unprepared to defeat guerrilla war, and war was massively unpopular at home; Nixon sought "peace with honor," and ramped up efforts right as war ended, then treaty was signed, and Ford brought forces home; following war, Congress passed law to withdraw forces from unsuccessful interventions; US has since faced situations where, again, it has not understood developing countries

Mandelbaum, "Mission Failure," 75-94

Humanitarianism, as an end in itself, represented a new form of global engagement; "mission creep" implied that some rescue missions evolved in scope; tension in international law between humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty; conflict increasingly within states, not between them; humanitarianism as a reaction to morally corrupt Vietnam War that influenced those in the Clinton administration; Bush reluctant to get involved, was a realist, whereas Clinton was an idealist; humanitarian intervention not overly popular among American public; Clinton caught between interventionist administration and the voting public; Bush authorized action in northern Iraq and in Somalia; Somalia became a failure during Clinton administration; humanitarianism cannot be separated from politics; US, with Carter helping to quell junta, reestablished the deposed leader of Haiti, Aristide; in the wake of Somalia, US did not act in Rwanda, and this failure spurred greater desires to act in Bosnia

Fukuyama, "The End of History"

Huntington saw history as evolving through conflict between opposing ideas; the final condition of humanity's socio-political order is a homogeneous state ruled by a single victorious ideology. This will mark the end of ideology (and therefore of history) since such a society will be a "post-political" society which won't be divided by ideological differences; Fukuyama sees the end of the Cold-War and the fall of the Berlin Wall as marking the end of ideological conflict with the unchallenged establishment of Western liberal democracy as the final ideological stage of human evolution. After the opposition between the liberal West and the communist world was resolved, Fukuyama sees no further direction in which history can go. Hence the end of history is not to be understood as no more events happening and no more people born of die, but rather as the final resolution of the tensions which drive history forwards; denies Marx's view of history; heavily criticized by Huntington/9/11 events; Fukuyama agrees there will be temporary setbacks

Paarlberg, "The Burden of Being Essential"

In 1980s ozone fight, US was a leader, but in 1990s, US shrunk back from leadership on climate change; US did not accept Kyoto Protocol, for a number of domestic pressures: industry opposition, labor force opposition, and economic fears; a problem: lack of international cooperation, because developing nations do not want to sacrifice industrialization to assist developed countries with their fight against climate change; controversy in Congress over CBD ratification; Conference of Parties (COP) and GM organisms; We have seen from this review that without wise U.S. leadership, the making of sound international environmental policy becomes far more difficult. In this sense, the United States is indeed an "essential" country in global environmental affairs. But we have also seen how difficult it is for the United States Government to provide wise leadership. In the exceptional case of stratospheric ozone protection, after a period of hesitation prior to 1986 the United States did take a lead and help produce a sound international agreement in Montreal. But this was an exceptional case - a case most likely to produce a U.S. leadership success - because U.S. industry and union opposition was nil, the economic costs were low, the scientific consensus was high, and the barriers to international cooperation were not insurmountable. In the far more difficult area of climate change policy where industry and labor opposition are both high, where economic costs are high, where scientific consensus is low, and where international cooperation is difficult to arrange, the efforts of the U.S. to lead have thus far been embarrassingly ineffective; We thus conclude that in environmental policy, the United States should take little comfort from knowing that it is an "essential" country. Holding this status is anything but a guarantee of policy success. The United States can find it hard to bring domestic groups into line on global environmental policy issues, and being the essential nation abroad does not always help to solve this political problem at home. Nor does being essential mean the same thing as being unavoidable. We learn from the biodiversity case that other countries do not always have to come to the United States to secure prior approval for their own designs. If U.S. disengagement gives them the opportunity to go ahead on their own they may well do so, perhaps compromising important U.S. interests in the process.

Hook and Spanier, 355-359

Increase in nuclear proliferation across globe; in 1998, Pakistan and India joined nuclear club that included US, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Israel; Iran planned to develop nuclear capabilities by 2015, but JCPA (Iran Nuclear Deal) offered sanctions relief in exchange for suspension of nuclear program; nuclear Iran a problem in unstable Middle East; three consecutive North Korean leaders- Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un- defied US wishes in developing nuclear program; Carter, in 1990s, offered oil and sanctions relief to North Korea in exchange for promises, which have repeatedly been broken; China frustrated with North Korea's (an ally) nuclear brinkmanship; may provoke South Korea and Japan

Hook and Spanier, 94-97

Increased attempts for relationship with Russia under Obama, but no tangible achievements were made, besides "New Start" reduction agreement; when Putin returned in 2011, nationalistic and antagonistic Russia emerged; 2014 annexation of Crimea: Obama did not give defense support to Ukraine; when US withdrew European forces, Russia ramped up defense budget- Russia has become more aggressive due to lack of US/NATO resistance; China has ramped up military spending- South China Sea, cyberattacks, and predatory trade policies; skepticism among Asian allies over US willingness to protect them after 2013 Syria red line fiasco and Iran nuclear deal tensions

Mandelbaum, 185-218

Iraq established after World War I, and was not expected to succeed; Bush saw removal of Saddam as unfinished business, but before 9/11, this was not a high priority; following 9/11, immediately began looking into invading Iraq; Iraq War unique in that there was no clear cause for aggression; possible link between Saddam and terrorism, so Bush wanted to punish Saddam (war on terror was global, going beyond just Afghanistan); possible presence of WMDs (Saddam obstructed UN inspections); preventative war, because did not want to let guard down against next surprise attack; rationale leaned more towards WMDs, because preventative war went against international law; 9/11 was seen as emerging from general political climate of ME- this necessitated removal of Saddam; US was very pessimistic about what would happen if they did not intervene, but was also very optimistic about outcome of involvement; did not even have a real plan for post-Saddam Iraq; Bremer was tasked with 2003 transformation of Iraq from Baathist state to free-market democracy; CPA did not understand Iraqi culture; 2005 election of Maliki; Rumsfeld provided fewer forces than were necessary; Iraq rejected western style politics; US failed to improve Iraq's infrastructure, which was necessary

Haass, 280-283

Israeli-Palestininian conflict; both states would be better off peacefully coexisting, but neither side is willing to make concessions; there is reason to beef up Palestinian forces to combat Hamas in Gaza Strip; should limit Israeli settlements in developed areas, and should maintain diplomatic ties so that accords can be made when cooperative parties come to fruition in the future

Brinkley, "The Hypocrisy of the UN's Human Rights Council"

It's time to disband the United Nation Human Rights Council; Just look at the latest appointees to the council, whose job is to promote universal respect and protection for human rights around the world. This month, Russia, China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia were elected to three-year terms. On the council, they join more than 40 other states, including Pakistan, Congo, Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, and Venezuela—some of the world's worst human-rights malefactors; this is a recipe for disaster; do they join to avoid criticism?

Mr X (George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"

Kennan advocated policy of containment of the Soviet Union and strong anti-communism; USSR perceives itself at perpetual war with capitalism, views left-wing, non-communist groups as greater enemies than capitalist ones, would use controllable Marxists as allies, did not see peaceful coexistence with capitalist world; Soviets weak and vulnerable compared to Western world; conflict within US power to solve, and without recourse to general military conflict; restrain and confine Soviet influence

Hook and Spanier, 244-251

Many states resented US hegemony, and saw US as arrogant and moralistic, and as opponents of UN goals; globalization faced backlash- WTO meetings in Seattle, 1995; US pulled away from multilateral institutions, a move that was widely criticized by the international community

Feaver, "A Decade Later and the Iraq Debate is Still Contaminated with Myths"

Myths of factors leading to Iraq War, and their realities: The Bush administration went to war against Iraq because it thought (or claimed to think) Iraq had been behind the 9/11 attacks- after 9/11, did explore link between Saddam and al-Qaeda, no "smoking gun," but may have been indirect connections; The Bush administration went to war against Iraq because it wanted to forcibly democratize Iraq- democratization was not the prime motivation — confronting the WMD threat was. Democratization was the consequence of that prime motivation; The "real" motivation behind the Iraq war was the desire to steal Iraqi oil, or boost Halliburton profits, or divert domestic attention from the Enron scandal, or pay off the Israel lobby, or exact revenge on Hussein for his assassination attempt on President George H. W. Bush- these conspiracy theories lack evidence; What Frank Harvey calls the "neoconism" myth — that the Iraq war was forced upon the country by a cabal of neoconservatives, who by virtue of their political skill and ruthless disregard for truth were able to "manipulate the preferences, perceptions and priorities of so many other intelligent people..." who otherwise would never have supported the Iraq war- truth is not so simple, as Gore may have taken same actions, and had been Hawkish in Clinton administration; Bush "lied" in making the case for war- Bush did not lie, but was mistaken, and was in fact committed to diplomatic solutions; individuals both pro and anti-war were wrong about different things (2007 surge, etc.)

Hook and Spanier, 124-131

Nixon a realist, and Carter a conservative; American confidence in itself shattered after Vietnam and Watergate; Nicaragua's Sandinista revolution, which sprang from anti-Somoza coalition supported by US, following ouster of Anastasio Somoza Garcia's dictatorship; America stopped providing aid to "Junta of National Reconstruction;" Iran Hostage Crisis a sign of growing anti-US hostility; began with ouster of US-supported brutal dictator, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and Khomeini's battle cries symbolizing emergence of theocratic rule in Iran; Soviet takeover in Afghanistan as attempt to bridge USSR to oil fields; Carter funded mujahidin, ultimately entangling US in Afghanistan and future War on Terror; Nixon's detente and Carter's world-order politics came to ends in 1980s, as superpower relations disintegrated

Mead, "The Minefield in the Middle East"

Obama mistakenly believed Middle East to be liberalizing: Erdogan and Arab Spring provided false hope; liberalism has been viewed as the solution, but policymakers have explained away its failures in the Middle East (not enough liberalism, etc.); the reality is that US is unable to bring changes directly through policy choices; it is true, however, that many problems cannot be solved only through diplomacy; Middle East countries willing to coexist with radical forces hostile to west, so long as they are protected-- problematic; Middle East as a Thucydidean space; US remains committed for global energy reasons

Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories"

Post-9/11 assessment of 3 views of international relations: realism (how deal with non-state actors?), liberalism (under Bush, a retraction from international governmental organizations), idealism/constructivism (can mean many things to many people); none of 3 theories can explain change

Mandelbaum, 367-381

Post-Cold War era from 1993-2014 as fifth distinct period of foreign policy; previously 3 made US stronger, but this period saw failures of humanitarian intervention, multilateralism, and Iraq/Afghanistan wars- nation-building does occur, but cannot be made to occur; US should instead have addressed social conditions that would allow institutions to be built, rather than attempt to build them themselves; in Russia and Iran, democracy has fallen despite lack of US influence; opportunity cost of ME wars: address nuclear concerns with N. Korea; expansion of NATO to Balkans served no benefits to US except to agitate Russian nationalism

Haass, "A World in Disarray," 188-191

Post-WW2 Europe marked a break with much of history; creation of EU in Western Europe created an economic powerhouse that is among most stable regions of world; after Cold War, questions over what degree of integration was desirable- United States of Europe (power increasingly ceded to Brussels): Maastricht Treaty (1992) created EU, and commitment to common foreign policy and single market- fears of loss of national identity and sovereignty/at whim of bureaucracy; United Europe of States (balance weighted towards national capitals): this is more the reality- states don't contribute much to common defense and have own foreign policies; mismatch between common monetary policy and national-level fiscal policy decisions; challenges of aging population and refugee crisis; rise of populist parties and dissatisfaction with European project (Brexit); once most stable, now fraught with geopolitical challenges

Hook and Spanier, 45-72

Post-WWII US involvement with Western Europe; Marshall Plan; Containment; alliances: NATO, EEC, etc.; combating communist influence at Asian perimeter; Korean War-- 38th parallel; Eisenhower and "massive retaliation;" nuclear weapons had "most bang for the buck;" triad of nuclear weapons; CIA operations in developing countries with aim of containment

Hook and Spanier, 73-82

Post-WWII, divides were not just East-West, but also North-South; after decolonization, developing world fell into chaos; US and communist powers tried to influence them; US, in trying to establish anti-communist governments, supported despots that restricted the freedoms of their people

Forum 14 on "Obama's World: Judging His Foreign Policy Record"

ROSE: favorable view (favorably emphasizes Obama's "grasp of the big picture," his perspective as an "ideological liberal with a conservative temperament," and his determination to reverse the mistakes of the George W. Bush administration; Obama was "better at strategy than implementation" in his focus on preserving the core of the liberal world order by "downsizing the U.S. global role" and reducing the commitment of U.S. resources); FEAVER: The critics identify some praiseworthy items in the Obama record whilst even the most ardent boosters concede that the record was not quite perfect; To Rose, Obama is a successful foreign policy president, on his own terms and especially compared to the Bush record which Rose roundly denounces; some of the geopolitical situation Obama inherited: a global recession, an Afghan war on a sharply negative trajectory, friction in the U.S.-Russian relationship was offset by Bush's Iraq surge, economic preparation for crisis, and G-20 cooperation; Obama enjoyed some success in the foreign policy areas where he continued the policy lines he inherited in 2009 (even if he pretended otherwise in scorched-earth rhetoric against his predecessor). Where Obama did not enjoy success was where he diverged in both rhetoric and reality from the Bush policy lines.[16]; the failed 'reset' with Russia; the failed effort to hold Israel-Palestine negotiations hostage to a 'freeze' in new housing on the West Bank; the President has made progress on the global climate change agenda; Obama must take responsibility for the fact that he will be leaving to his successor a far more disordered world than the one he inherited; his foreign policy legacy may well prove to be reviving public awareness that American power can yield disastrous results through inaction as much as through action; consequences of retrenchment in Syria; identifying where Obama has struggled does not settle the comparative assessment of whether he has done better than Bush; Bush's problems arose from how he started wars, while Obama's arose from how he has tried to end them; JENTLESON: critics should get past the focus on U.S. policy and discuss the broader systemic, regional and related contexts in which the U.S. seeks to achieve its objectives; LEBOVIC: The Obama administration repaid its predecessor by establishing that U.S. global challenges are not attributable solely to the Bush administration's irresponsible U.S. leadership; doing less and acting with deliberation and restraint will not necessarily produce better resolutions and can still result in costly and erratic policy investments with damaging long-term consequences. The evidence lies everywhere. The war in Syria is now a full-blown humanitarian disaster, Russia has overtly challenged the territorial status quo in Europe; the issue is how to engage when necessary to achieve U.S. goals while avoiding the liabilities of over-commitment, which most certainly include the unnecessary entanglement of the United States in long and costly conflicts; United States has allowed U.S. adversaries - Russia, Iran (via Hezbollah), and Shiite militia groups, respectively — to seize ground; Obama has maintained - even furthered - many of the Bush administration's counterterrorism policies- US troops have returned to Iraq; Obama administration has pursued inconsistent policies, on multiple fronts, in efforts to solve deeply rooted regional problems. The essential issue, however, is not whether these policies are consistent with one another; Obama, the prudent realist, better fit the administration's apparent strategy than do the policies of Obama, the transformationalist; NAU: he "has avoided any deep military commitments in Syria, extricated U.S. forces from Iraq, secured a nuclear deal with Iran, and endorsed the Arab uprisings;" U.S. China relations "are far more tense today than they were in 2009."[52] But "this is not necessarily the Obama's team fault." "when does the statute of limitations on blaming George W. Bush . . . finally expire;" Obama acted "to save the core of the liberal order" by being "willing to sacrifice the periphery;" There is no hint of Cold War struggles in Rose's view of the world - even his language of allies "nestling" under the US nuclear umbrella is becalming; definition of the periphery spells Retreat, not defense of the liberal core; Bush, not Obama, initiated the bailouts that saved the financial system.[63] Obama's stimulus, regulatory (Dodd-Frank), and health programs only added obstacles to an anemic recovery and massive long-term debt to the nation's future; priorities should be to defend and succor freedom in countries on the borders of existing free countries

Continetti, "The Men Who Didn't Disarm Syria—But Said They Did"

Rather than take military action, Obama had entered into an agreement with the Russians to remove and destroy Assad's chemical stockpiles. The Obama administration knew at the time that the deal would leave Assad plenty of armaments, but officials were happy nevertheless to make statements that left the public with a different and mistaken impression. we are dealing with the fallout in lives and lost credibility from a bad Iran Nuclear Deal deceptively marketed to the public, no member of the Obama-media echo chamber wants to be reminded of his colossal misjudgment and credulity; media wrongly praised success of these deals; Syrians no longer had the weapons they agreed to hand over. They just had all the weapons they kept instead; Even though Obama and his supporters parenthetically acknowledged that the deal with Syria depended in large part on the good faith of the Baathist regime—always a bad idea—they were nonetheless determined to play up the transfer of chemical weapons as a significant achievement. To do otherwise would have undermined the logic of the president's foreign policy, which privileged negotiated settlements and concessions over hard power; political leaders and the media claimed that all chemical weapons had been removed, but in reality, only the "declared" ones had been removed; eliminating declared programs does not matter if an undeclared program exists—as Assad demonically revealed in 2017 when he used chemical weapons to attack a town in northern Syria. "We always knew," Blinken said, "we had not gotten everything, that the Syrians had not been fully forthcoming in their declaration."

Hook and Spanier, 133-158

Reagan had strong anti-communist sentiment and an ability to mobilize public opinion; after US fell behind on world stage in 1970s, it built up its forces, and increased the strains on USSR; return to containment policy; expansion of US military forces and opposition to arms control; Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI), or "Star Wars," was a layered defense to protect US against nuclear weapons; this worried USSR; "rollback" in developing countries: Nicaragua's "contras" funded for fight against Sandinistas; history was on the side of capitalism, not Marxism; involvement in Grenada; US had supported anti-communist, but brutal, dictators; US assisted with ouster of Duvalier in Haiti; Iran-Contra Scandal: Oliver North oversaw sale of weapons to Iranian terrorists to fund support of Contras, in violation of congressional ban against funding Contras; Poland and the rise of Solidarity: USSR did not directly intervene; friendliness between Gorbachev and Reagan; glasnost and perestroika; economy, unrest in Baltic region, and uncertainty of Eastern European states led Gorbachev to end Cold War

Lagon, "R2P4: The Unsung Fourth Element of Humanitarian Intervention"

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) adopted as humanitarian doctrine by UN in 2005; Pillar 1 is the responsibility of sovereign governments to help protect their citizenry from humanitarian calamities—naturally or especially human-caused; Pillar 2 involves the state seeking peaceful help from the international community to provide protection to their innocent citizens when it cannot do so on its own. In particular, the international community has the responsibility to offer that non-military humanitarian aid; Pillar 3 is triggered when a government manifestly refuses to protect its people or is complicit in atrocities. Then the international community, with the authorization of the UN Security Council (according to the 2005 UN Summit), may use military force to intervene and stop the atrocities, even over the objection of the state in question; use of force by outside actors should not be a reflexive early choice when other options are truly viable; buyer's remorse over past failures may impede UNSC approval in some cases; So actually, rather than too much focus on Pillar 3 in place of Pillar 2, what is truly being neglected is an as yet unmentioned "Pillar 4." If R2P is such a solemn norm, to save the livelihoods of targets of atrocities, then Pillar 4 would represent unilateral or, better, collective action when the Security Council's approval is not forthcoming

Haass, 215-224

Resurgence of great power politics- US, Russia, and China, in order to avoid confrontation, must deter each other in "gray areas" at local/regional levels; neither Russia or China are on bid for global domination; should regulate external affairs, not focus on internal affairs of others; diplomatic interdependence; expand bilateral ties; put NATO expansion on hold

Satloff, "Here's How to Fix But Not Nix the Iran Deal"

Satloff encouraged senators to vote no on Iran Deal, only because it could have been fixed and made better; there is an opportunity now, under Trump, to revise and fix it; fear that funds from sanctions relief will be diverted to terrorist groups and to continue nuclear development program; program continues to develop, deal or no deal, with ballistic-missile program; US should cooperate with Europe to enact multilateral punishments for Iran if they continue with program; currently, there are no punishments besides scrapping the deal altogether; another flaw: expiration of ban on Iran's nuclear program in 15 years; US must repair the "sunset clause;" Trump administration should take this opportunity for a "second chance" at deal, but may be difficult to convince allies to cooperate, with North Korean threat looming as a distraction

UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheets

Since 1948, 68 peacekeeping operations; 15 current peacekeeping operations; mix of volunteers and international/local civilians; over 100 countries contribute volunteers, and majority come from diverse areas; surge in operations from 1991-1995, and from 2004-present (peaked in 2010); UNSC established no-fly zone over Libya,with civilian protection and asset freeze, in 2011, during Arab Spring against Gaddafi regime- except for those pursuing humanitarian aid (BRIC countries abstained from vote- thought there were better options)

Kirchick, "The Roots of Russian Aggression"

Some have concluded that the West is to blame for low point in US-Russian relations: activity in Balkans, trade with powers of Eastern Bloc; So stubbornly is this historical narrative of Western arrogance- that US was triumphant power after USSR's fall- and Russian innocence asserted that it has become impervious to all manner of Russian mischief, no matter how morally egregious or physically destructive. In 2014, after Russian president Vladimir Putin annexed the Crimean peninsula in the first armed seizure of territory on the European continent since World War II, former Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev denounced NATO "triumphalism" as the culprit; US "failed to include Russia" in security programs, and believes that it has "won," so tries to spread American values; in reality, US vision DID win- with fall of Brezhnev Doctrine, and encouragement of national sovereignty, the USSR's vision fell; in the Balkans, the United States and its allies intervened militarily to avert ethnic cleansing carried out by Moscow's traditional ally, the Serbs; claim that NATO's "encircling" of Russia had somehow forced Putin into invading his neighbors; false notion that US had promised not to expand NATO further; US attempted to ensure Russia of good intentions; real cause of deterioration: Putin-led revanchism and revisionism; "Eurasianism;" part of problem: Russia never atoned for its past crimes the way Germany did; Vladimir Putin's refusal to acknowledge that small countries have the same rights as larger ones has pitted a rules-abiding West against a rules-flouting Russia; The post-Cold War "ideas and assumptions" of America and its allies were not "triumphalist" diktats meant to humiliate or "encircle" Russia by "rubbing its nose" in defeat, but fundamental principles of sovereignty and national self-determination established to avert war on a continent repeatedly plagued by it. Far from being too "triumphalist" in its dealings with Russia, if anything, the West was not triumphalist enough

Hook and Spanier, 165-184

Taliban returned to Afghanistan in 2005; failed of Karzai government to appeal to Pashtun Afghans; state building effort had failed; Bush did not attempt to rebuild country; shifted focus to Iraq; Afghanistan long poor and backward- traditional society where kinship ties matter more than allegiance to law; Karzai able to appoint local leaders, violating Afghan desire of decentralization and regional autonomy; Karzai lacked power outside Kabul; corruption widespread; country a point of contention in US-Pakistani relations (allies, but Pakistan wouldn't go against Taliban, who aligned with Pakistan over India); Karzai too friendly to India for Pakistan; US fears that Pakistani nukes could fall into terrorist hands; Obama had opposed Iraq War, and wanted to get out of Afghanistan/did not want to nation-build there; compromise: sent in more troops, but with 2011 end date to return home; counterinsurgency program (COIN) had worked in Iraq, replicated in Afghanistan; nation-building not necessary for US to achieve its goals; like Johnson, Obama focused on domestic stimulus program, and like Nixon, wanted to end casualties in Afghanistan; Obama's rejection of counterinsurgency ended era of spreading American values through nation-building, which was not worth pursuing

Sorley, "The Real Afghan Lessons of Vietnam"

The "clear and hold" strategy of General Creighton Abrams was working in South Vietnam, then Congress pulled the plug on funding; North Vietnam, in violation of 1973 Paris Peace Accords, conquered South Vietnam, due to Communist backing and lack of US support in South Vietnam; US commitments had included financial support and air support in the case of aggression for North Vietnam-- did not live up to promises; people tend to use criticisms of the early stages of the war for the entire war, even for the part after the Tet Offensive; differences between Westmoreland and Abrams approaches were significant; Westmoreland cared less for pacification, more about "body count;" transformation of objectives from "search and destroy" to "clear and hold;" Thieu viewed as pacification officer; he neutralized enemy infrastructure; by the time of the Easter Offensive, US had withdraw, and South Vietnam withstood the attack itself; when US left in 1973, South Vietnam had a viable government that could resist North Vietnam's aggression, so far as had US support; South Vietnam failed due to lack of that support; important to consider this lesson in face of current situation in Afghanistan

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002

The National Security Strategy issued on September 17, 2002 was released in the midst of controversy over the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war which is contained therein. It also contains the notion of military pre-eminence that was reflected in a Department of Defense paper of 1992, "Defense Policy Guidance", prepared by two principal authors (Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis Libby) working under then US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. The NSS 2002 also repeats and re-emphasizes past initiatives aimed at providing substantial foreign aid to countries that are moving towards Western-style democracy, with the "ambitious and specific target" of "doubl[ing] the size of the world's poorest economies within a decade." The Bush doctrine emerges in the context of moving from the old Cold War doctrine of deterrence to a pro-active attempt to adjust policy to the realities of the current situation where the threat is just as likely to come from a terrorist group such as al-Qaeda as from a nation state such as Iraq or Iran. The document also treats AIDS as a threat to national security, promising substantial efforts to combat its spread and devastating effects.

Hook and Spanier, 218-244

The end of Baathist rule/Saddam's regime, 3 new wars developed: Sunnis attacked US, Shias occasionally had conflict, Sunni insurgents attacked Shias, who retaliated; Shia organized themselves on sectarian lines; Shias were beneficiaries of US occupation; Iran and Syria both gained from Saddam's Iraq downfall; war in Iraq became increasingly unpopular with increases in casualties; costs of war were focused only on voluntary military members and their families- taxes did not rise, nor did military spending decrease; Bush gained in 2002 midterms, won in 2004 (war had not crippled presidency), and lost in 2006 midterms; in 2007, mission was failing- instead of retrenchment, Bush called for a "surge;" surge lowered violence and left in place elected government; when Obama took office, timeline for exit was in place; contested 2010 election- US backed Maliki; Maliki saw Sunnis as threat, and broke promise to those who aligned with US during Anbar Awakening; following 2010 Arab Spring, groups of Sunnis in Syria rose up against Assad's regime and were repressed brutally- one group, ISIS, spread to Iraq and executed Yazidis; Obama would not support Maliki after sectarian politics; US air strikes in response to this; US tried to preserve Kurdistan, the one success story of Iraq War; US had not left in place a system or regime

Schweller, "Three Cheers for Trump's Foreign Policy: What the Establishment Misses"

The media though US was going to decline when Trump was elected; So far, the world has not come to an end, far from it. A year into Trump's first term, the Islamic State, or isis—a fascist organization, by the way—had been virtually defeated in Syria and eliminated from all its havens in Iraq, thanks to the Trump administration's decision to equip the largely Kurdish militia fighting isis in Syria and give U.S.; ground commanders greater latitude to direct operations. All the while, Trump has continued the Obama doctrine of avoiding large-scale conventional wars in the Middle East and has succeeded where his predecessor failed in enforcing a real redline against Bashar al-Assad's use of nerve gas in Syria by launching targeted air strikes in response. In North Korea, Trump's strategy of "maximum pressure" has cut the country's international payments by half, forcing Kim Jong Un to realize that his only choice is to negotiate; On the domestic front, the unemployment rate fell to 3.8 percent in May, a level not seen since the heady days of the dot-com boom; stock market and consumer confidence have hit all-time highs, the number of mortgage applications for new homes has reached a seven-year high, and gas prices have fallen to a 12-year low; illegal immigration was reduced by 38 percent; Trump does reject many of the core tenets of the liberal international order, the sprawling and multifaceted system that the United States and its allies built and have supported for seven decades. Questioning the very fabric of international cooperation, he has assaulted the world trading system, reduced funding for the un, denounced nato, threatened to end multilateral trade agreements, called for Russia's readmission to the G-7, and scoffed at attempts to address global challenges such as climate change; United States will now look after its own interests, narrowly defined, not the interests of the so-called global community, even at the expense of long-standing allies. This worldview is fundamentally realist in nature. He believes that political factors should determine economic relations, that globalization does not foster harmony among states, and that economic interdependence increases national vulnerability. This realist worldview is not only legitimate but also resonates with American voters, who rightly recognize that the United States is no longer inhabiting the unipolar world it did since the end of the Cold War; instead, it is living in a more multipolar one, with greater competition. Trump is merely shedding shibboleths and seeing inter- national politics for what it is and has always been: a highly competitive realm populated by self-interested states concerned with their own security and economic welfare; A key part of Trump's agenda is to rebalance the United States' trade accounts with the rest of the world. The goal is to correct systematic and excessive trade imbalances with wealthy East Asia and Europe, while protecting industries vital to U.S. national security. Trump's threats of tariffs and other protectionist measures are better seen as bargaining chips designed to open other countries' markets. They also represent attempts to elevate trade diplomacy to greater strategic prominence, using sanctions and other forms of economic statecraft; Chinese state enterprises have been buying up their U.S. competitors in high-tech sectors, while U.S. firms are prohibited from making equivalent purchases in China, but now, the White House is wisely look- ing to subject China to similar invest- meant hurdles; harsh G7 criticism over US's tariffs on steel; the United States should work with its international partners on a bilateral basis whenever possible, rather than through multilateral arrangements and commitments (Iran deal, Paris agreement, TPP); end the North American Free Trade Agree- ment and instead strike separate bilateral agreements with Canada and Mexico, which he contends are easier to enforce than multi- lateral arrangements; Multilateralism, in Trump's view, "reduces our ability to control our own affairs." The United States' leaders and foreign policy elites have been championing multilateralism, international institutions, and the rule of law as values in themselves, regardless of how they affected U.S. national interests; The final piece of Trump's foreign policy is his insistence that U.S. al- lies pay their fair share of the costs of their defense; U.S. presidents have complained about allies' free- riding, but when push came to shove, they failed to do much about the problem; there is no justification whatsoever for the United States to continue subsidizing European countries' security; Trump has met with the leader of the Kremlin in search of cooperation on a range of security issues (in this case, particularly on Iran and Syria) and, at a most basic and existen-tial level, to avoid war between the two nuclear superpowers; post-USSR, US has no interest in NATO; Trump made a mistake an increasing troops in Afghanistan out of fear of leaving vacuum; the declining relevance of the west as a security community after the end of the cold war, together with its diminishing economic weight, especially in relation to China; Many Americans rightly feel that globalization, by bringing cheap consumer goods into the country and outsourcing jobs to lower- paid workers overseas, has ruined U.S. manufacturing, increasing un- employment and depressing wages. No wonder Trump's complaints about unfair trade deals resonated with so many voters, especially those in the industrial Midwest; the Great Recession, which, coupled with the rise of China and a resurgent Russia, cast doubt on the United States' relative power. The result is that the unipolar era, if not already over, is beginning to wind down. Declining powers under conditions of low vulnerability tend to reduce their peripheral commitments and look inward- under unipolarity, US sought to shape international order to its vision- international structure has changed

Trump's 2017 UN Speech

The stock market is at an all-time high -- a record. Unemployment is at its lowest level in 16 years, and because of our regulatory and other reforms, we have more people working in the United States today than ever before. Companies are moving back, creating job growth the likes of which our country has not seen in a very long time. And it has just been announced that we will be spending almost $700 billion on our military and defense; Authority and authoritarian powers seek to collapse the values, the systems, and alliances that prevented conflict and tilted the world toward freedom since World War II; Our success depends on a coalition of strong and independent nations that embrace their sovereignty to promote security, prosperity, and peace for themselves and for the world; We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government. But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation. This is the beautiful vision of this institution, and this is foundation for cooperation and success; In America, we do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to watch; I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries first; we can no longer be taken advantage of, or enter into a one-sided deal where the United States gets nothing in return. As long as I hold this office, I will defend America's interests above all else; The scourge of our planet today is a small group of rogue regimes that violate every principle on which the United Nations is based. They respect neither their own citizens nor the sovereign rights of their countries; No one has shown more contempt for other nations and for the wellbeing of their own people than the depraved regime in North Korea; It is an outrage that some nations would not only trade with such a regime, but would arm, supply, and financially support a country that imperils the world with nuclear conflict; Rather than use its resources to improve Iranian lives, its oil profits go to fund Hezbollah and other terrorists that kill innocent Muslims and attack their peaceful Arab and Israeli neighbors. This wealth, which rightly belongs to Iran's people, also goes to shore up Bashar al-Assad's dictatorship, fuel Yemen's civil war, and undermine peace throughout the entire Middle East; We must deny the terrorists safe haven, transit, funding, and any form of support for their vile and sinister ideology; our security interests will dictate the length and scope of military operations, not arbitrary benchmarks and timetables set up by politicians; we support recent agreements of the G20 nations that will seek to host refugees as close to their home countries as possible. This is the safe, responsible, and humanitarian approach; United States continues to lead the world in humanitarian assistance, including famine prevention and relief in South Sudan, Somalia, and northern Nigeria and Yemen; United Nations must reform if it is to be an effective partner in confronting threats to sovereignty, security, and prosperity. Too often the focus of this organization has not been on results, but on bureaucracy and process; In some cases, states that seek to subvert this institution's noble aims have hijacked the very systems that are supposed to advance them. For example, it is a massive source of embarrassment to the United Nations that some governments with egregious human rights records sit on the U.N. Human Rights Council; The United States is one out of 193 countries in the United Nations, and yet we pay 22 percent of the entire budget and more; The American people hope that one day soon the United Nations can be a much more accountable and effective advocate for human dignity and freedom around the world. In the meantime, we believe that no nation should have to bear a disproportionate share of the burden, militarily or financially. Nations of the world must take a greater role in promoting secure and prosperous societies in their own regions; The socialist dictatorship of Nicolas Maduro has inflicted terrible pain and suffering on the good people of Venezuela; That goal is to help them regain their freedom, recover their country, and restore their democracy; From the Soviet Union to Cuba to Venezuela, wherever true socialism or communism has been adopted, it has delivered anguish and devastation and failure; In America, we seek stronger ties of business and trade with all nations of good will, but this trade must be fair and it must be reciprocal; millions of jobs vanished and thousands of factories disappeared. Others gamed the system and broke the rules. And our great middle class, once the bedrock of American prosperity, was forgotten and left behind; calls for a renewal of patriotism

Brodie, "Strategy in the Missile Age"

The threat of war has often failed to deter; deterrence different with nuclear weapons-- problem of credibility; deterrence vs. win-the-war strategy; maximum possible deterrence depends on the ability to win; the degree of incentive matters in deterrence (i.e. Soviets would eliminate US threat); the problem of guaranteeing strong retaliation-- automaticity; mutual homicide; question over how much to spend on protection, as opposed to expanding forces; first-strike capabilities; a retaliatory force must be capable of a surprise attack; retaliatory force smaller than original force; difficult to try to target remaining weapons; strategy should always take into account deterrence failing; what happens if allies are hit-- need to put own people in danger of retaliation? We overspend and defenses that will fail to protect cities; best way to reduce danger of attack is to reduce incentives on both ends, communicate intentions; speed of retaliation as important as certainty; cost must be higher than benefit of striking first

Banbury, "I Love the U.N., but it is Failing"

The world faces a range of terrifying crises, from the threat of climate change to terrorist breeding grounds in places like Syria, Iraq and Somalia. The United Nations is uniquely placed to meet these challenges, and it is doing invaluable work, like protecting civilians and delivering humanitarian aid in South Sudan and elsewhere. But in terms of its overall mission, thanks to colossal mismanagement, the United Nations is failing; a bureaucracy so maddeningly complex, requiring so much effort but in the end incapable of delivering the intended result. The system is a black hole into which disappear countless tax dollars and human aspirations; UN needs to attract and deploy personnel, but recruitment takes a long time; personnel decisions are considered more dangerous than the responsibility to lead a mission on which the fate of a country depends; very difficult to fire a UN member, so there is a lack of accountability and competence; too many decisions are driven by political expediency instead of by the values of the United Nations or the facts on the ground; Peacekeeping forces often lumber along for years without clear goals or exit plans, crowding out governments, diverting attention from deeper socioeconomic problems and costing billions of dollars; the United Nations bureaucracy is getting in the way of its peacekeeping efforts; for the world's sake we must make the United Nations succeed- need overhaul of our personnel system, all administrative expenses should be capped at a fixed percentage of operations costs, independent controller must direct budget allocations, and performance audits to be carried out

Hook and Spanier, 251-260

Throughout 1980s and 1990s, US was more concerned with USSR than with terroristic threats; terrorists were non-state actors, and were not viewed as challengers to US power; terrorists resented US/UN redrawing of maps following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, their exploitation of the oil-rich regions, and their ways of life; following 9/11 attacks, direction US foreign policy changed; no longer would ideologies shift as in the post-Cold War period, but now, terrorism was the clear target

Mead, 92-110

Thucydides trap (look up); relationships between internal dynamics and external policies; democracies promote populism and decreases rationality at time goes on; regime type matters, but democracies or liberalization won't necessarily ensure peaceful relations; humans not rational actors; politics is unpredictable; Obama mistook Arab Spring as beginning of democratization: "liberal meliorism;" cannot apply boilerplate liberal ideology; "Asian Game of Thrones:" hopes that drawing China into global economy would lead to democracy and liberalization have been disappointed; failure of liberalization and triumph of nationalism throughout much of East Asia; biggest question: future of China's economy; need to look beyond bilateral relationship; US and EU both have achieved democracy and prosperity, but EU won't invest in defense and US is tired of burden of maintaining global state of affairs- democracies act on emotion rather than reason- the Thucydides trap is at home

Garfinkle, "Here's to You, Harry"

Truman was unpopular, but popularity rose over time as his basic principles set foundations for Cold War victory; recognized Israel, allowed airlift, desecrated army; stuck by judgment even when would cost his re-election

Kupchan, "The Clash of Exceptionalisms: A New Fight Over an Old Idea"

Trump's "America first" ideology a reincarnation of another era's philosophy, one that ended during WWII; during this era, America shielded itself from foreign entanglements; this new strategy is bound to fail-- the world is too interconnected now; there is a need for US foreign policy to take a new, defined direction-- the world is tilting towards illiberalism; US was without allies until WWII; post WWII, a strategy of global engagement took prominence; Trump has an isolationist vision and rejects multilateralism; easier said than done/US still important; US should strike a balance between isolationism and overreach, should remain arbiter of great-power peace; US must demonstrate unity

Joscelyn, "The Afghanistan War is Over. We Lost"

US now wants out of Afghanistan; Trump rarely discusses Middle East wars; wars end in loss or victory, but US just wants out; when Obama ended Iraq War, in 2011, he claimed to have brought war to sensible end; instead, ISIS filled the vacuum that had been left by US forces; in Afghanistan, the Taliban is strong, still connected to al-Qaeda, is run from Pakistan, and is waiting for US to leave before taking control over Afghanistan once again; US whitewashes Taliban's actions in order to justify withdrawal; Taliban knows victory is at hand

Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine, R.I.P."

Under pressure to respond to Assad's use of chemical weapons, Trump reached for the same playbook that his predecessor resisted opening- Obama failed to convince Washington to put away the playbook permanently; Obama's foreign policy doctrine, like many foreign policy doctrines, was contradictory at times, and it sometimes lacked coherence; Obama possessed a number of well-developed foreign policy predispositions: U.S. has traditionally paid too much attention to the Middle East, and that, in any case, even concentrated American attention could not make the region a better place—and actually, in some instances, made it worse. Another of Obama's salient foreign policy views held that the U.S., particularly in the Middle East, had traditionally been too quick to pursue military solutions to problems that neither represented core U.S. national security interests, nor were susceptible to amelioration by missile strike; Obama publicly drew a red line concerning Assad's behavior, but later decided to forgo military strikes; "The perception was that my credibility was at stake, that America's credibility was at stake," Obama explained. "And so for me to press the pause button at that moment, I knew, would cost me politically. And the fact that I was able to pull back from the immediate pressures and think through in my own mind what was in America's interest; Where America is directly threatened, the playbook works. But the playbook can also be a trap that can lead to bad decisions; Vladimir Putin, offered him a way out—in exchange for forgoing strikes on Assad regime targets, the Russians would convince the Syrians to give up their chemical weapons stockpiles; 2013 Obama-Putin deal to disarm Assad of his chemical weapons was a failure. It was not a complete failure, in that stockpiles were indeed removed, but Assad kept enough of these weapons to allow him to continue murdering civilians with sarin gas; An all-out war against the Syrian regime would have been, in many ways, Obama's Iraq. And Obama wasn't interested in having his own Iraq. Obama was known for an overly cerebral commitment to the notion of strategic patience. Trump seems more committed to a policy of glandular, non-strategic impatience

Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment"

Unipolarity emerged; internationalism under attack from isolationists; war more likely due to small states with WMDs; bipolarity will be achieved in coming decades; Japan, Europe, etc. are second-tier, strong economic powers, without strong response to Gulf Crisis; for Iraq, US response a challenge to Iraq's regional hegemony; pseudo-mutilateralism-- a dominant power acts alone, but with blessings of others; imbalance between geopolitical reach and resources; imperial overstretch means that unipolarity is unsustainable; America's economic decline will be due to domestic issues: declining productivity, increased welfare, etc.; foreign entanglements are a burden, but also a necessity; isolationism-- realism; act on own narrow interests; desires to be a normal country in a normal time; should not strive to be a power balancer abroad; international stability only occurs when great powers make it so; new challenge: proliferation of WMDs; current weapon states (i.e. Iraq) hold resentment towards the West; western consensus should be to: deny (weapons to states), disarm, and defend; the alternative to unipolarity is chaos-- US should lead battle against chaos

Hook and Spanier, 273-302 (Ch 11)

War on Terror different because "terror" was not a clearly defined enemy; Afghanistan in 2001, to destroy al-Qaeda's sanctuary, and Iraq in 2003, to remove Saddam's WMDs; Afghanistan had poor infrastructure from years of war; both became missions of democracy building; Reagan had aided mujaheddin, and GHWB had neglected situation after USSR's withdrawal; Clinton lacked domestic support to act forcefully; Taliban easily toppled within a month, but bin Laden escaped Operation Anaconda; problem: needed to maintain NATO forces to establish democracy; Taliban and al-Qaeda waited in the wings to seize power again; preemptive war idea tailor made for Iraq; fear that sanctions were not enough, and that Saddam would share WMDs with terrorists; Saddam had ordered destruction of WMDs, but interfered with inspections and acted mysteriously, so as to protect Iraq from Iranian hostility; Operation Iraqi Freedom was a success; quickly removed Baath party from power and secured oil fields; however, subsequent attempt to build democracy and establish government was a failure; small US force made it easy for insurgents to congregate; Iraqi military was disbanded and photos circulated of US soldiers mocking Iraqis; Iraq divided politically; other coalitions removed their forces following terrorist attacks; Bush pressed on, did not want to "lose" Iraq; similarities between Iraq and Vietnam: regional conflict in face of global dispute (ignored specific cultural factors), decision makers suffered from "group think," US forces were better prepared for conventional war than asymmetric war, escalation of forces was too slow, and both were initiated under false pretenses; differences: homogeneity, familiarity with states, existence of unifying figures

Bieber, "Retreat and Its Consequences," Introduction

What are the implications of a reduced US international presence? US engagement in world affairs may be necessary for world order, and for its own security; policy makers, however, often advise retrenchment

Haass, "A World in Disarray," 195-205

What counts most in politics is implementation, which is challenging; success of UNSC resolution against Saddam because of broad agreement among powers; "forum shopping" for multilateral legitimacy when veto powers are used; no country will refuse to act within self-interest due to lack of international authorization; UNSC does not deserve power of bestowing legitimacy because it lacks legitimacy itself- not an accurate representation of world powers; proposals for change are blocked by current members; institutional change is lagging; expansion from G-7 to G-20- harder to achieve goals with broader membership; legitimacy and effectiveness are often at crossroads; problem of coordinating long-term best interest with short-term problems; growing number of powers makes consensus harder; there are no longer "superpowers;" "multipolarity" does not accurately depict current situation, because there are plenty of "medium" powers (including organizations as varied as EU, UN, OPEC, Gates Foundation); power on paper doesn't translate to power in practice (nation-building doesn't work, even with strong military)

Beckley, "Stop Obsessing About China: Why Beijing Will Not Imperil U.S. Hegemony"

Widely held view: that the country is at imminent risk of being overtaken by China. Unless Washington does much more to counter the rise of its biggest rival, many argue, it may soon lose its status as the world's leading power; China now boasts the world's largest economy and military, and it is using its growing might to set its own rules in East Asia, hollow out the U.S. economy, and undermine democracy around the globe. In response, many Democrats and Republicans agree, the United States must ramp up its military presence in Asia, slap tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods, and challenge China's influence worldwide. But this emerging consensus is wrong and the policy response misguided. China is not about to overtake the United States economically or militarily—quite to the contrary. By the most important measures of national wealth and power, China is struggling to keep up and will probably fall further behind in the coming decades. The United States is and will remain the world's sole superpower for the foreseeable future, provided that it avoids overextending itself abroad or underinvesting at home; Instead of hyping China's rise and gearing up for a new Cold War, Washington should take more modest steps to reinforce the existing balance of power in East Asia and reinvigorate the U.S. economy. To keep the peace, U.S. leaders should seek to engage rather than alienate Beijing, safe in the knowledge that long-term geopolitical trends will favor the United States; GDP (China's very high) is a poor measure of a country's power; throughout history, largest powers have often failed; GDP and military spending exaggerate the power of populous countries, because they count the benefits of having a large workforce and a big military but not the costs of having many people to feed, police, protect, and serve; a nation's power stems not from its gross resources but from its net resources—the resources left over after subtracting the costs of making them- production costs, welfare costs, price of security; United States' net stocks of resources are several times the size of China's, and its lead is growing each year, possibly by trillions of dollars; China exaggerates output and is more inefficient; United States maintains a huge economic and military lead over China. To catch up, China will need to grow its power resources faster. This, however, is a long shot, not only given its massive debts, dwindling resources, and rampant corruption but also because of its eroding work force; Thucydides' Trap, in which a rising power challenges the ruling hegemon, and the two slide into a major war. This misguided notion, widespread in both countries, is already driving a spiral of hostility- China has claimed much of East Asia as theirs, and US has shored up military forces to be able to retaliate in case of war; The most sensible path, therefore, is to maintain deep economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties with China while taking sensible steps to keep it in check; focus on defenses of East Asian allies, rather than beefing up US's own military; should punish China through WTO, rather than retaliatory tariffs; The main threat to U.S. primacy is not China's rise but geopolitical hyperventilating that emboldens Beijing while encouraging reckless U.S. foreign adventures and domestic underinvestment

PART III Diehl, "China's Communist leadership has a model of totalitarianism for the 21st century"

Xi Jinping was confirmed as most powerful leader in Beijing since Mao Zedong — and he proclaimed the regime's intention not just to become the world's leading power, but to establish a new model of totalitarianism; Its aim is to make China "a leading global power" by 2050, with a "world class military" built to fight and win wars. These aims will be achieved by reinforcing Xi's dictatorial powers, and those of the party, over every area of life, using cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence. It's a Stalinism for the 21st century; Twenty-five years ago, the liberal democratic system of the West was supposed to represent the "end of history," the definitive paradigm for human governance. Now, Xi imagines, it will be the regime he is in the process of creating. "It offers a new option for other countries and nations; consequences of these realized ambitions: concentration of power (no successor to Xi has been named), state control of all behavior (Every citizen will be given a "social credit" rating based on data collected through the Internet, the financial system and public surveillance, which will be stored along with facial images), and a global imperial system (Xi's "belt and road " initiative, which will invest hundreds of billions of dollars in infrastructure projects across Eurasia, is meant to create a Beijing-dominated geopolitical block that overshadows the transatlantic alliance; If Xi has his way, even countries that remain democratic won't practice free speech where China is concerned); Xi's goals could easily fail, but must be taken seriously by opponents

Key Events in Early Cold War, 1945-1953

Yalta: Declaration on Liberated Europe (1945); Truman Doctrine: $400 million for Greece and Turkey (1945); Containment: Kennan argued containment could prevent Soviet expansion (1947); Marshall Plan proposed (1947); Division of Germany (1948); Signing of NATO (1949); USSR tests first atomic bomb (1949); N. Korea invades S. Korea (1950); Stalin dies (1953)

"Flexible Response"

http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-flexible-response.htm

"Massive Retaliation"

http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-massive%20retaliation.htm

Busby, "Why Climate Change Matters More Than Anything Else"

https://www.realclearworld.com/2018/06/28/why_climate_change_matters_more_than_anything_else_192876.html ; https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P4-2058267379/warming-world