Crim Con

Warrants: General Principles with Regard to the Particularity Requirement

(1) A greater degree of ambiguity will be tolerated when the police have done the best that could be expected under the circumstances, by acquiring all the descriptive facts which reasonable investigation of this type of crime could be expected to uncover and by ensuring that all of those facts were included in the warrant. (2) A more general type of description will be sufficient when the nature of the objects to be seized are such that they could not be expected to have more specific characteristics. (3) A less precise description is required of property which is, because of its particular character, contraband. (ex. cocaine is hard to describe) (4) Failure to provide all of the available descriptive facts is not a basis for questioning the adequacy of the description when the omitted facts could not have been expected to be of assistance to the executing officer. (5) An error in the statement of certain descriptive facts is not a basis for questioning the adequacy of the description if the executing officer was nonetheless able to determine, from the other facts provided, that the object seized was that intended by the description. (6) Greater care in description is ordinarily called for when the type of property sought is generally in lawful use in substantial quantities. (7) A more particular description than otherwise might be necessary is required when other objects of the same general classification are likely to be found at the particular place to be searched. (8) The greatest care in description is required when the consequences of a seizure of innocent articles by mistake is most substantial, as when the objects to be seized are books or films or the papers of a newsgathering organization. (9) The mere fact that some items were admittedly improperly seized in execution of the warrant "does not mean that the warrant was not sufficiently particular." (10) The Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement does not "require particularity with respect to the criminal activity suspected." (11) Some leeway will be tolerated where it appears additional time could have resulted in a more particularized description, where there was "some urgency to conduct a search ... before the defendant had the opportunity to remove or destroy the evidence." (12) A description which alone might be insufficient may become particular enough given the context within which it is used. (13) A search warrant that does contain a sufficient description of the items to be seized, even in the probable cause sense, can be "undone" by later events occurring either prior to or subsequent to the commencement of the warrant's execution.

Carrol v. US: Rationale for Automobile Exception

(1) Mobility- vehicle can be moved out of the locality of the jurisdiction, so that warrant won't be effective any more (2) Lesser expectation of privacy in cars- highly regulated, traverses public streets

California v. Acevedo - F: DEA agent seized a package containing marijuana addressed to Daza in Santa Ana, California. Officer Coleman took the package to FedEx and Daza came to claim it. D entered Daza's apartment and left with a brown paper bag. He placed the bag in the trunk of his car and started to drive away. Officers stopped D, opened the trunk and the bag and found marijuana.

(1) Officers allowed him to get in his vehicle instead of stopping him on the sidewalk (2) Can't search the backpack until it gets into the car--> weird but that's the rule

Congressional response to Smith v. Maryland: Pen Register Act

(i) Applies to all dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information for any wire or electronic communication including incoming phone numbers, outgoing phone numbers, and the To and From line on e-mails (ii) To obtain an order from the Court *The Govt's application must identify the attorney for the Govt; *Identify the law enforcement officer conducting the investigation; AND *Include in its application a certification that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation (iii) Not meant to be a process involving an inquiry by the court into the adequacy of the govt's basis but instead one that is designed to create accountability for the govt agents who can be charged with a crime if there is a false representation made to the court (iv) Content information including numbers dialed during the connected phone call and the subject line of the e-mail receive greater protection (ex. If you put in a credit card number to pay a bill)

Stored Communications Act

(i) Applies to content information stored by third parties (not in transit communications) (ii) Three categories (1) Electronic Communications Services Data; (2) Remote Computing Services Data; AND (3) Customer Records (iii) While a message is in temporary storage before being opened, treated as electronic communications services data (iv) Once the message is opened, if stored by the Internet Service Provider, will be categorized as remote computer services data (circuit split as to exactly when this transformation occurs) (v) Violations under the statute do not result in exclusion but instead criminal and civil liability

General Search and Seizure Principles and Rules Asserted in Katz

- "The Fourth Amendment protects people not places." - "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." - As a general rule, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions

3P Disclosure Doctrine

- A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. (no clear test for what falls under Smith/ Miller vs Carpenter) (1) The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. (Smith v. Maryland) (a) This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the Bank Secrecy Act that records of depositors' transactions be maintained by banks. Even if the banks could be said to have been acting solely as Government agents in transcribing the necessary information and complying without protest with the requirements of the subpoenas, there would be no intrusion upon the depositors' Fourth Amendment rights. (US v. Miller) (2) LIMITATION: An individual maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through cell-site location information (CSLI) (Carpenter v. US)

Detaining Persons Who are Present When a Warrant is Being Executed

- An officer's authority pursuant to Summers to detain incident to a search is categorical (neither probable cause nor even reasonable suspicion is required) (Muehler v. Mena) - Inherent in Summers' authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. (Muehler v. Mena) - The categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant must be limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. Once an individual has left the immediate vicinity of a premises to be searched, detentions must be justified by some other rationale (Bailey v. US)

Retroactivity: The Rule

- As a general rule, criminal constitutional law decisions do NOT apply retroactively. - The decisions do apply to (application in these circumstances is not considered to be retroactive): i. The particular case decided by the Supreme Court in which it announces the new constitutional rule, ii. Future cases, iii. Cases pending before a trial court, and iv. Cases pending before an appellate court but only those on direct appeal (the first round of appeals before a state appellate court up to petition for cert).

People on the Scene When a Warrant is being Executed: Rules

- As a general rule, the police cannot search persons who are present when a warrant is being executed just by virtue of the person being there (Ybarra v. Illinois) - The police, however, may detain persons who are present when a warrant is being executed (Michigan v. Summers)

Kentucky v. King - F: Suspect ran into an apartment, but uniformed officers went to wrong apartment based on the smell of marijuana. Knocked and announced themselves, heard people and things moving. Believed that evidence was about to be destroyed. Forcibly entered the apartment and found marijuana and cocaine in plain site

- Conduct of the police prior to their entry was lawful and they did not violate the 4th Amend or threaten to do so - R/R i. The exigent circ rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable. ii. Officers acting reasonable because (1) Standing in apartment hallway- license to stand in hallway and knock (2) An officer can knock at the door and say "police," but the officer can't threaten to breach the 4th amend (can't say "we're going to break down the door") -On remand, KY SC found these weren't actually exigent circ--> hearing people moving inside the apartment is NOT enough i. Sounds the officer described were consistent with normal household sounds, such as getting up to answer the door--> this is NOT enough for an objectively reasonable basis to believe that evidence is being destroyed ii. Have to articulate the specific sounds heard that led the officer to reach the conclusion that evidence was being destroyed

Open Fields Doctrine

- Exploration by government officials of open fields does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment (Oliver v. US) -What is an open field? * Marijuana field over a mile from the home (Oliver)

Probable Cause for Search Warrants- Gates Standard

- For issuance of a search warrant, the determination of probable cause hinges upon whether, under the TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched b. In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of acts

Hot Pursuit Exception

- For this exception to the warrant requirement to be applicable, law enforcement officers must have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the suspect is on the premises, there must have been some form of a chase ("immediate and continuous pursuit") of the suspect, and while a short time lapse before entry will not render the warrantless entry unconstitutional, a significant delay will. * Also, suspect must know that they are being chased - There is NO time frame for how quickly police have to get there based on SCOTUS, but lower courts have said if it's more than ½ hour, not hot pursuit. If it's less than ½ an hour, then it's pretty favorable toward law enforcement

Maryland v. Garrison (mistake of fact) - F: Officers obtained warrant to search the 3rd floor apartment of McWebb. The 3rd floor actually had two apartments McWebb's and Garrison's. The officers searched Garrison's, not realizing they were searching another apartment, and found heroin and drug paraphernalia

- H: 4th amend didn't prohibit seizure of contraband. Officer's conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and ID the place intended to be searched i. As long as the mistake of fact is objectively reasonable, you're good to go ii. But we must judge the constitutionality of their conduct in light of the information available to them at the time they acted. - R/R i. Validity depends on whether the officer' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable (1) Verification of info from informant, exterior exam, inquiry of utility company; the objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction between McWebb's apartment and the third floor premises (2) Officers stopped as soon as they realized they were in a separate unit

Rodriguez v. US - F: Rodriguez pulled over for driving on shoulder of highway. After officer issued a warning to Rodriguez, had him wait for another officer to come. Officer used drug dog to sniff car and found meth. About 7-8 minutes from time Struble issued written warning

- H: A police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Con's shield against unreasonable seizures. This violated the 4th Amend-> unconstitutional seizure (not an uncon search) (1) A seizure justified only by a police observed traffic violation becomes unlawful if is PROLONGED BEYOND THE TIME REASONABLY REQUIRED to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation (2) Alito Dissent: the way around this is you just walk the drug sniffing dog around the car, then issue the ticket (complete the traffic stop last)-> there is some outer bound there in terms of "when the traffic stop reasonably should have ended" but we don't know exactly what that is

US v. Dunn - F: D convicted of various charges r/t phenylacetone and amphetamine. DEA agents installed tracking devises on Carpenter's pickup (with a warrant) and the pickup went to Dunn's property. DEA agents entered the property without a warrant and observed what they thought was a lab in one of the barns. Then got warrant to search the property -I: Was this a search?

- H: Barn was not part of the curtilage, so this was not a search - R/R (1) Proximity- 50 yards from fence surrounding house and 60 yards from house itself (2) Enclosure- barn did not lie within the area surrounding the house that was enclosed by a fence (barn stands out as a distinct portion of the ranch, separate from the residence) (3) Use- objective data indicated barn not being used for intimate activities of the home *Looking at how the barn is actually being used, not how barns are generally used on farms/ ranches (4) Protection- did little to protect the area from observation (was a fence but just one for corralling cattle, barbed-wire fence) *Had a screen, a gate, and no trespassing signs

Bailey v. US - F: Police obtained search warrant for a residence believed to belong to Bailey. Before beginning the search of the residence, police observed Bailey leave the residence. They followed him and detained him about a mile from the residence, then brought him back to the residence

- H: Confining officer's authority to detain under Summers to the immediate vicinity of a premises to be searched is a proper limit because it accords with the rationale of the rule - R/R (1) Detaining away from immediate vicinity does not comport with law enforcement interests given in Summers (a) Officer safety- if not on the premises, can't hurt an officer (b) Facilitating completion of the search- can't impede investigation if not on premises (c) Preventing flight- the point of preventing flight has more to do with officers not being distracted from the search to closely watch the person-> not an issue if the person isn't on the premises; also this could be used to detain an occupant regardless of her location or time of the search

US v. Robinson - F: Robinson stopped and arrested for driving without a license. Officer then searched the entire car and found heroin.

- H: Court upholds the validity of the search. Police may search a person incident to arrest regardless of the crime that led to the arrest (a) Regardless of what the person is arrested for, there is still a risk of danger to the officer

Horton v. California (Plain View) - F: Wallaker was robbed by two masked men with a machine gun and a stun gun. Police obtained warrant to search D's house for the proceeds of the robbery. During the search the weapons were in plain view so the police seized them. At trial, officer testified that he was interested in finding other evidence connecting the D to the robbery, so the seized evidence was not discovered "inadvertently"

- H: Inadvertence is a characteristic of most legit "plain view" seizures, but it is not a necessary condition - R/R (1) Plain view alone is never enough to justify a warrantless seizure (2) Officers had legal right to be in the house because had a warrant (3) Incriminating nature of guns was immediately apparent (4) Once a warrant has been obtained, the 4th amend has been satisfied also as to things in plain site because there is no additional intrusion on privacy so long as the search does not exceed the scope permitted by the warrant

LA County, CA v. Retelle (mistake of fact) - F: Deputies obtained search warrant for house they believed suspects of a fraud and identity-theft crime ring resided. The home actually belonged to Retelle, and the police in conducting their search had Retelle and Sadler get out of bed and stand naked for 1-2 minutes before they were allowed to dress.

- H: No 4th Amend violation. Warrant was valid and officers acted in a reasonable manner to protect their safety - R/R i. Believed suspects were armed: could hide a weapon in a bed-sheet ii. Didn't know suspects weren't in the house just because there were Caucasian people in the bed

Florida v. Harris - F: Officer Wheatley pulled Harris over for an expired license plate. During the stop, Wheatley used his narcotics dog Aldo, who alerted at Harris's driver's side door. Wheatley searched the car and did not find drugs, but there were ingredients to make meth. Wheatley arrested Harris, then when Harris was out on bail Wheatly stopped him again. Aldo alerted but this time there was nothing in the car. * FL Supreme Court determined that the State must present various records documenting the dog's reliability (emphasized need for records of the dog's field performance) to have probable cause

- H: No rigid rule like FL Supreme Court's is necessary for probable cause. Basically this should look more like Gates (totality of the circ), and not a rigid test -The court should allow the parties to make their best case, and then the court should evaluate the proffered evidence to decide what all the circ demo-> Aldo's sniff gave Wheatley probable cause (a) D can challenge the rigor of a training or certification program, etc (b) Evidence of dog's satisfactory performance in certification or training programs is sufficient evidence to trust the alert

Oliver v. US - F: KY state police found a field of marijuana over a mile from D's home (no warrant) - I: Was this a search?

- H: No search occurred because marijuana was in an open field - R/R (a) Expectation of privacy in open field is not one deemed reasonable by society (i) Fields don't provide setting for intimate activities intended to be sheltered by the Amend (ii) More easily accessible: people can easily wander around your open field (b) Not Jones: Jones dealt with a con protected "effect," whereas open fields are not protected by the 4th Amend

Illinois v. Caballes - F: D was stopped by a state trooper for speeding. Another state trooper came with a narcotics detection dog which found marijuana in the trunk of D's car - I: Whether the 4th Amend requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legit traffic stop?

- H: No. A dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop that reveals no info other than the location of an illegal substance and is not prolonged does not violate the 4th Amend - R/R (1) Any interest in possessing contraband can't be deemed legit, and thus govt conduct that reveals possession compromises no legit public interest--> expectation that certain facts will not come to the attention of authorities in not the same as an interest in privacy that society considers reasonable (2) No physical intrusion into the car with a dog sniff and only alerts to drugs

Muehler v. Mena - F: Police obtained search warrant for home where Mena resided to search for weapons and evidence of gang membership. During execution of the warrant, police detained Mena and 3 others for 2-3 hours and left them in handcuffs the entire time. Officers also asked Mena about her immigration status. - I: Was this an unreasonable search?

- H: Not a 4th Amend violation - R/R (1) Officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (here they had a proper warrant, believed there was a suspected murderer in the house, possibly weapons in the house) (a) Govt interests outweigh the "marginal intrusion" esp in dangerous situation (b) It's safer for officers and the person to have the officers detain them-> if you don't detain them, you add a lot of uncertainty to an already tense situation (2) Questioning- mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure, so police did not need reasonable suspicion to ask their questions

Smith v. Maryland - F: Police requested that telephone company install a pen register (records phone number dialed but not convo) at its central offices to record the numbers dialed from D's phone. D called McDonough and she later IDed him as the man who robbed her

- H: Not a search - R/R: When Smith used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. (i) Not Katz because couldn't acquire contents of communication (ii) Did D exhibit an actual expectation of privacy? No *People in general don't expect privacy in the numbers they dial (iii) Does society think expectation of privacy was reasonable? No. *Anytime you dial a phone number you know that the phone company can see that/ record that, so you're already giving that information out

State v. Jennette (TN) - F: Marijuana seen from helicopter. Then police entered without a warrant on the ground

- H: Not a search: [W]e are of the opinion that no warrant was necessary to justify the entry of the officers in this case and the seizure of the contraband immediately following lawful observation thereof by a proper aerial overflight. - R/R: Officers had actually seen marijuana growing in the fields by their own observation of it, at a time and from a place where they had a lawful right to be

Wyoming v. Houghton - F: Police stop a car with a broken taillight. Driver has a syringe in his pocket and admits that he uses it for drugs. Now officer has probable cause to search the car. There is a purse in the backseat that belongs to a passenger, not the driver. Officer searched the purse and found meth

- H: Ownership doesn't matter. If the container/ package is in the car, then it's fair game

Minnesota v. Dickerson (Plain View) - F: Officers spotted D leaving a known crack house and believed he was acting evasive, so they stopped him and ordered him to submit to a patdown. Did not find any weapons but did find a small amount of crack cocaine

- H: Plain view doctrine also applies to plain touch, but here the officers impermissibly expanded the search - R/R (1) As long as officers are where they have a lawful right to be, then they can use their senses so long as they don't expand the scope of the search (2) Here, the officer knew the small lump of crack cocaine was not a weapon, so the purpose of the Terry stop was done. So, the officer could not continue to manipulate the lump of crack cocaine-> doesn't meet prong 2 (it was not immediately apparent that this was a lump of crack cocaine) - It's advantageous to list small things on a warrant application because that's going to allow you to search more places (you can hide a ring a lot more places than a gun)

Knowles v. Iowa - F: Officer pulled Knowles over for speeding and issued him a citation. Then performed a search of the entire car and found marijuana. Officer had neither Knowles consent nor probable cause to conduct the search. (1) Iowa has a law that says if you go 25 miles over the speed limit you can either issue a citation or arrest the person

- H: Search was invalid. It's not enough that the officer could arrest someone. The officer must actually arrest the person. - R/R (1) Safety risk in a routine traffic stop is minimal: less risk to officer safety with a citation than with an arrest. Would be acceptable to have the driver step out of the vehicle (a) If you have reasonable suspicion that they're armed then can have them submit to a pat down

Chimel v. California - F: Police arrested suspect in his home for burglary of a coin shop. They did not have a warrant to search his home, but they conducted a 45 minute search of the entire home. Found coins

- H: Search went too far. Can't search beyond the person and the area within his immediate vicinity (the grab area) without a warrant *The search can be for weapons, as well as, the protection of evidence ii. R/R (1) Officer safety (2) Prevent concealment/ destruction of evidence (3) Here, officers searched the entire house which was well beyond Chimel's person or the "immediate vicinity" (a) In subsequent cases, the immediate vicinity has become quite expansive

Whren v. US - F: Officer Soto pulled car over that had a temporary license plate driven by young passengers, stopped at a stop sign for more than 20 seconds, and sped off from the stop sign at an unreasonable speed. Ds arrested and convicted of multiple drug charges. Challenged legality of the stop on the grounds that it had not been justified by probable cause

- H: Soto had probable cause--> probable cause to believe that the law has been broken justifies search and seizure * A traffic violation is adequate for probable cause - A D could bring an Equal Protection claim for purposeful discrimination * For heightened scrutiny to apply, the burden is on the challenger to show that a law (enforcement of the law) is purposefully discriminatory on the basis of a protected classification (a classification to which heightened scrutiny applies) * However, even if a D were to prevail in an equal protection challenge, no indication that they would actually obtain suppression of the evidence, instead damages might be the remedy

Richards v. Wisconsin - F: Police obtained warrant to search D's motel room for drugs. Asked for a no-knock warrant but magistrate crossed out the no-knock portion. Officer dressed as maintenance man knocked on D's door. D opened door, recognized that they were police, and slammed it shut. Officers rammed the door in and IDed themselves as police as they were doing this. Wisconsin Supreme Court decided there was a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation

- H: The 4th amend does NOT permit a blanket exception to the knock and announce requirement for felony drugs. However, the officers not knocking and announcing in this case was reasonable * Duty of the court to determine whether the facts and circ of that particular entry justify dispensing with the knock and announce requirement--> case by case determination (looking at the facts before the knock, or lack thereof) * Police must have evidence that knock and announce would be dangerous or futile or inhibit the effective investigation of the crime (reasonable suspicion) - R/R (1) Reasonable in this case because saw police and slammed door in their face--> worry is he's retreating to destroy evidence or grab a weapon

Collins v. VA - F: Police officers believed Collins was driving a stollen motorcycle. Went to Collin's girlfriend's house. The motorcycle was parked in the driveway underneath a tarp. Officer removed the tarp and arrested Collins for receiving stollen property.

- H: The automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein - R/R (1) Plain view doesn't cut it-> An officer must have a lawful right of access to a vehicle in order to search it pursuant to the automobile exception. (had to go into the side yard, not just the front door, and move the tarp)

Andresen v. Maryland (Warrant Particularity) - F: Investigation found that Andresen had defrauded Standard-Young Associates, the purchaser of Lot 13T and defrauded an insurance company. Investigators applied for warrants to search Andresen's law office and the office of Mount Vernon Dev. Corp. for specified docs pertaining to the sale and conveyance of Lot 13T. The warrants were issued. The warrants had a detailed list of the items to be seized, but at the end of each warrant it said, "together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown." So D claiming this is a general warrant

- H: The descriptive terms of the search warrants were NOT so broad as to make them impermissible general warrants (the warrant was particular) i. Warrants only authorized search and seizure of evidence relevant to the crime of false pretenses of Lot 13T

Illinois v. Gates - F: Bloomingdale police received an anonymous letter claiming the Gateses were drug dealers and would be picking up drugs in Florida soon. Police had Officer Mader conduct some surveillance, and his surveillance corroborated the info in the letter. Gave a signed affidavit of Mader's surveillance and the letter to a judge, who issued a search warrant for the Gatses' home and cars. Found marijuana, weapons, and contraband.

- H: The judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause to search the Gates's car and home existed - R/R i. Don't have to verify the actual crime when doing the surveillance, it's enough that the surveillance confirmed the very specific details of the letter * It's odd to fly from Chicago to FL then get up the next morning to do a 22 hour drive back to Chicago-> quite suspicious ii. Veracity (reliability) and basis of knowledge of the informant are relevant considerations in the totality of the circumstances analysis-> a deficiency in one can be compensated for by a strong showing in the other iii. The magistrate could rely on the anonymous letter which had been corroborated in major part by Mader-> being right about some things, means probably right about other things iv. Probable cause is more than reasonable suspicion or conclusory statements * It's not going to be enough to just say "I have a reliable informant," there has to be specific facts for the magistrate to determine whether the officer had probable cause

Maryland v. Pringle - F: Pringle was a passenger in a car that got pulled over for speeding. During the stop the officer found $763 in cash and cocaine in the car. Officer arrested all 3 men, but Pringle confessed to being the owner of the cocaine at the police station. - I: Did the officer have probable cause to arrest?

- H: The officer had probable cause a. Basically the court is saying there's enough here to arrest all of them-> probable cause does not require a certain percentage; rather it's would a person of reasonable prudence act on this i. Money in front of Pringle ii. Any of the guys could have accessed the cocaine - Takeaway: The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages a. Probable cause requires more than reasonable suspicion, but is not so high as a preponderance of the evidence

Arizona v. Hicks (Plain View) - F: Police went into an apartment without a warrant in response to shots fired. Officer thought stereo equipment was stolen, even though he had no probable cause to support this. Officer picked it up and found the serial number and called it in. Found out it was indeed stolen

- H: This does not fall under the plain view doctrine - R/R (1) The scope of the exigency was the shots fired, turning over a stereo has nothing to do with responding to that exigency (officer had a legal right to be there but did not have a lawful right to access the object itself) (2) However, if the serial number had been visible, then it would have been in plain site and the officers would have had a lawful right to be there

Grady v. NC - F: Grady argues that the NC monitoring program, which requires recidivist sex offenders to wear a tracking devise at all times, violates his 4th Amend right to be free form unreasonable searches and seizure

- H: This is a search. 4th Amend also covers civil stuff - Jones Analysis (1) This is a physical intrusion on a person because you're requiring them to wear something which is outside social norms (2) Intrusion is upon the person (3) Doing it to obtain info about where the person is

Groh v. Ramirez (warrant particularity) - F: Groh received a tip that Ramirez had a store of weapons on his property. Groh obtained a search warrant for the property, but in the portion of the form that called for the "person or property" to be seized Groh typed in a description of Ramirez's house

- H: This search was unreasonable because Groh did not have a warrant particularly describing the things he intended to seize - R/R i. The warrant is an independent requirement and the failure to comply makes the search illegal (it can't be saved by the fact that the search was "otherwise reasonable") ii. The warrant was so obviously deficient that it must be considered an unreasonable search

State v. McCormick (Community Caretake exception) - F: Officer stopped to perform welfare check b/c car pulled into parking lot blocking 75% of entrance and protruding into the road. The man in the car is slumped over the steering wheel, there's an open beer bottle. Officer opened the car door and ended up arresting the guy

- H: This was a good search - R/R i. Community care taking doctrine- part of officer's job is to assist in welfare issues and have a duty to protect the community. (1) To establish that the community caretaking exception applies, the State much show that: (a) Specific and articulable facts- car protruding into road (b) Scope of intrusion reasonably restrained (want to make sure that law enforcement doesn't use this as pretext to violate the 4th amend)- parked behind car with lights on, woke the guy up, turned off engine

Florida v. Jardines: - F: Police received tip that D was growing marijuana. Without obtaining a warrant, used a drug dog to sniff around the front-porch and onto the front porch. Then got a warrant and discovered marijuana in the home

- H: This was a search - R/R i. This was an unlicensed physical intrusion because there is no customary invitation to have a police dog explore the area around your house to search for drugs (1) If JUST the officer came to the door, not a search because it's normal for people to walk up to your door ii. Applying Jones (1) This was an unlicensed physical intrusion-> not customary to have a drug sniffing dog brought onto your property (2) Curtilage is enumerated in the 4th amend (3) If you're bringing a drug dog, it's to obtain info about the possible presence of drugs - Kagan Concurring: This can be decided on privacy grounds (this is both a Jones search and a Katz search) -> a drug dog is a specialized device for discovering objects not in plain view so this is Kyllo

Jones v. US - F: Govt placed GPS tracker on Jones's car without a valid warrant. Jones was convicted of drug trafficking conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison. - I: Whether the attachment of a GPS tracking device to an individual's vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

- H: This was a search based on trespass. Under the concurrences this was also a search under Katz. - R/R 1. Majority (or maybe plurality) i. The car was an "effect" as used in the 4th amend, and occupation of such private property for obtaining info would have been considered a search within the meaning of the 4th Amend at the time it was adopted ii. Katz did not erode the principle ''that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 2. Sotomayor Concurring: Thinks that Majority focuses too much on physical trespass-> many cars now have GPS's that are factory intstalled-> it would still be a search within the 4th amend to access that data 3. Alito Concurring: the lengthy monitoring (28 days) that occurred in this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment based on Katz (reasonable for people to think that they would not be constantly surveilled for 28 days) i. We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.

US v. Karo - F: DEA agents received a tip that Karo and associates were purchasing ether to extract cocaine from clothing that had been imported. DEA agents used their own barrel with a beeper in it with the informant's consent, to put the ether in. Agents tracked the beeper to a bunch of different locations until it arrived at a house in Taos. Used the beeper to confirm that the barrel was IN THE HOUSE for two days prior to applying for a warrant

- H: This was a search because "pinged" the beeper inside the house (1) The fact that the beeper (can) was inside the house could not be visually verified from outside the curtilage - Not Jones because beeper installed before

State v. Lakin (TN) - F: Marijuana warrantless search onto property

- H: This was a search. Decisions in this state are more restrictive on police than fed decisions, but there is no compelling reason to overturn them. - R/R (1) occupied, fenced areas used daily in connection with and as a necessary part of farming operations are protected by the state Con-> if we're using it as a regular part of farming operations, then there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (a) path that led to the area (b) water source with a hose (c) fencing

Thermal Imaging of Homes: Kyllo v. US - F: Police discovered indoor marijuana growing operation using a thermal scanner.

- H: This was a search: needed a warrant to obtain this info. Obtaining by sense enhancing technology any information regarding the INTERIOR OF THE HOME that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion 'into a constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search - at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use a. Not in general public use= people would not reasonably expect that they need to take precautions to protect their privacy against things that aren't in general public use b. Basically Scalia is asking "what would you have had to do to get this info in 1791?"-> if the answer is you would have had to go into the house, then it's a search - R/R a. Anything in the home, ALL details are intimate details-> nothing gets as much protection as the home b. The fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment

Protecting the Safety of Officers and Others Exception: State v. Meeks - F: Warrantless search of a meth lab in a motel. i. Occupants of hotel room next door called police to say there was a weird smell that was giving them headaches ii. Officers arrived at scene and smelled the distinct smell of meth iii. Opened door and a cloud of meth fumes came out iv. Got hazmat suits and went into the room and got the guys out v. Then got a warrant to search the room

- H: This was an exception based on the fact that the officers believed there was a serious and immediate risk of injury to themselves and others - R/R i. Officers made a mistake by not clearing out the rest of the hotel occupants, but court says that really doesn't have an impact on whether they needed a warrant ii. Facts are that meth production is very hazardous: toxic fumes and risk of fire/ explosion iii. When they initially went in without the warrant, they limited their scope to that of the exigency-> they got the people out of the room and turned off the hot plate-> if they started searching drawers, that would have exceeded the scope of the exigency.

United States v. Knotts - F: Police placed beeper in five gallon drum of chloroform which was then traced to D's cabin. Police followed the D's associate in a car. Had to keep their distance so used the beeper for some of this. Once the associate's car got to Knott's property, they stopped using the beeper. The drum was discovered outside the home

- H: This was not a search because: when the defendant travelled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property. - R/R (1) Lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle-> travels public thoroughfares where occupants and contents are in plain view (2) While Knotts, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, this did not extend to visual observation of the car leaving the public thoroughfare to stop on the property (3) The final ping from the drum came from the property but in an "OPEN FIELD" NOT inside the house (4) Not Jones because: beeper placed in container before it came into Knott's possession, and Knotts did not challenge that installation

California v. Ciraolo - F: Police observed marijuana in D's backyard by flying over the property at 1,000 feet without a warrant. Later used this info to obtain a warrant and seize marijuana from the property i. D had two fences: a 6 foot and a 10 foot

- H: This was not a search. There was no reasonable expectation of privacy - R/R i. "[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection" ii. "[T]he mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities [does not] preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible" (1) Ct. noted the officers were operating within publicly navigable airspace - the Ct. added that any member of the general public could have glanced down and seen what these officers observed (2) Part of the curtilage, but being part of the curtilage does not itself bar police observation iii. Done in a physically non-intrusive manner

US v. White - F: D convicted of various charges related to narcotics. Govt agents overheard convos between D and Jackson, a govt informant, using a radio transmitter and testified to those convos at trial-> basically we're looking at investigations using electronic recording of conversations where one party consented to the convo being recorded

- H: This was not a search. This is different than Katz because in Katz neither party knew that the convo was being recorded * Re-affirm the false friend cases

Carpenter v. US - F: Used cellphone records that disclosed Carpenter's location to show that he was in the area at the exact same time as robberies that Carpenter was on trial for. Govt asked for 152 days worth of records, and received 127. So basically the govt can see everywhere that person's cellphone has been for 127 days

- H: Unreasonable Search - R/R (i) Smith/ Miller does not control here * Societal expectation is that law enforcement couldn't surveil you for that long of a time-> phone does this all the time, on it's own, and the records are kept for five years (Roberts saying this is even more intrusive than a car GPS) * FN 3 is saying once you hit 7 days, you're hitting that time period where it becomes a search under Katz because it violates a reasonable expectation of privacy (if you want these cell records going back 7 days or more will need probable cause and get a warrant), but there is an argument available to prosecutors in a GPS case that the line should be further than 7 days

Wilson v. Arkansas - F: Police entered the house through the open main door, then opened an unlocked screened door and announced that they were police with a search warrant. D challenged validity of the search on the grounds that officers failed to "knock and announce" before entering the home - I: whether the common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the 4th Amend reasonableness inquiry

- H: Yes it does (so knock-and-announce is part of what makes a search reasonable; exception applies for exigent circumstances). Reverse and remand-> a search or seizure of a dwelling might be Con defective if police enter without prior announcement; law enforcement interests may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.

Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden - F: Armed robbery of a Cab Company and man was spotted leaving the crime scene, 2 cab drivers follow him, and then he entered a home. Police arrived at the home within 5 minutes, and were permitted entrance into the home. Searched for the man, weapons, and money that was stollen - I: Was this a valid search without a warrant?

- H: Yes. - R/R i. Police got to house within 5 minutes- hot pursuit- Hayden chased by cab drivers and then police immediately there * He could try to escape, destroy evidence, danger to law enforcement (barricade himself, pull out weaponry)

Bond v. US - F: D was on a bus and a Border Patrol Agent squeezed all the soft luggage in the overhead storage space as he passed. Found a brick of methamphetamine in D's bag. - I: Was this physical manipulation a search?

- H: Yes. Basically saying the "squeeze" went too far - R/R i. Physically invasive (tactile) inspection is more intrusive than visual inspection ii. Katz (1) Exhibited expectation of privacy-> yes (a) Opaque bag placed directly above his seat (2) Reasonable-> yes (a) Expect to be handled by other passengers but not that they will feel the bag in an exploratory manner

Heien v. NC (mistake of law) - F: Officer stopped vehicle because one of its brake lights was not working. Officer believed driver and passenger were acting suspicious so he asked to search the car and found cocaine. Later determined that the law only requires one functioning brake light - I: whether a mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under the 4th Amend?

- H: Yes. If the officer's mistake of law was reasonable, then it can give rise to reasonable suspicion - R/R i. This mistake was reasonable because there is some debate over what the statutory language requires and the court had never interpreted it prior to this case

Montgomery v. LA -I: Whether the holding in Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively? (a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could not be sentenced to life in prison without parole absent consideration of the juvenile's special circumstances in light of the principles and purposes of juvenile sentencing)

- H: Yes. Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive - R/R a. Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all but " 'the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,' " it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for "a class of defendants because of their status

Place - F: D flying out of the airport and police took his bags and subjected them to a canine "sniff" test

- H: this was not a search - R/R- no physical intrusion of the bag (don't have to open the bag for dogs to sniff) (1) Sniff test only reveals whether there are narcotics in the bag. Nothing else.

California v. Carney - F: Minor came out of motor home parked in a parking lot and confirmed that he had received marijuana in return for allowing the D sexual contacts. Without a warrant, agents entered the motor home and observed marijuana and other drug paraphernalia

- H: vehicle exception applies to the motor home - R/R (1) It can still be driven away-> mobility still applies (2) Less privacy- highly regulated, traverse public streets (3) Hard to determine if someone is living out of their car, so we don't want to have to play that game, we're just going to say if it's a car then it's a car and the exception applies

Brigham City, Utah v. Stewart - F: Officers received call about loud party. When arrived at scene heard shouting coming from the back of the house. Entered the backyard and saw a fight happening in the kitchen through a screen-door and kitchen window. Entered the house and yelled that officers were there twice. - I: Can police enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury?

- H: yes - R/R i. Officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assist to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury ii. Doesn't matter what the officer's subjective intent was, so long as the circ, viewed objectively, justify the action iii. Manner of Entry was reasonable- yelled "police" twice-> when you enter based on an exigent circumstance, the actions inside need to match that reason for entry (officers broke up the fight) (1) No one would have heard knock

Katz and Business and Commercial Premises: Scope of Access

- If a police officer has entered as would any member of the public, it is not a search for the officer to conduct herself therein as might be expected of any other person who would enter, but she may not exceed the scope of access that would be reasonably afforded to a customer a. Can examine merchandise in the fashion that a prospective customer could be expected to do (ex: picking up items, but can't remove the shrink wrap from a magazine) b. Can only come at times when premises are open to the public c. Can only go in area of premises open to the public (ex) can't go in a storage closet - Not all business/ commercial premises are open to the public at large (ex) factory, office, club or other business that is operated for a select clientele

Searches Incident to Arrest

- Officers may conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee as part of a valid search incident to arrest -- the level of dangerousness of the crime or likelihood of discovering evidence of crime is irrelevant in determining whether the warrantless search was constitutional [Robinson] -- but law enforcement officers have to actually make a custodial arrest of the person to conduct a search incident to arrest not just be authorized to arrest the person [Knowles] b. Officers may conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee's grab area - the area from within which the arrestee might have obtained either a weapon or evidence - as part of a valid search incident to arrest [Chimel]

Retroactivity Exceptions: Substantive vs Procedural

- Only applies to substantive rules (not procedural ones)- Substantive rules- set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State's power to impose. (1) Forbids criminal punishment of certain primary conduct or prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of Ds because of their status or offense (2) This isn't a general substantive change, we're saying you either can't punish this conduct anymore, or you can't punish this conduct in this way any more - Does not apply to procedural rules- designed to enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating "the manner of determining the defendant's culpability"

Florida v. Riley - F: D was charged with possession of marijuana after police officer used a helicopter flown at 400 feet to observe a partially enclosed greenhouse (There were just some roof tiles missing ) in his backyard. There were no FAA guidelines dictating the height that helicopters could fly

- Plurality A. H: This was not a search because the officers were in navigable airspace B. R/R (1) Navigable Airspace: The helicopter was flying at a height that was not prohibited by law, any member of the public could have flown in a helicopter above Riley's greenhouse and seen his marijuana plants (a) Limitations to navigable airspace rationale (i) Nothing in the record to indicate that helicopters flying at 400 feet is rare (ii) Nothing in the record to indicate that the helicopter's flight overhead interfered with the normal use of the greenhouse or other parts of the curtilage, (iii) No intimate details were revealed, and (iv) Physically non-intrusive- there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury arose - O'Connor A. H: Not a search because there was a lack of evidence from Riley that it's rare for the public to fly helicopters at this altitude B. R/R (1) Rule: Put the burden on the defendant to show that observation from such a vantage point is sufficiently rare that police surveillance violates reasonable expectations of privacy (a) Question we should ask is: Whether the helicopter was at an altitude that members of the public travel with sufficient regularity such that Riley's expectation of privacy was defeated (i) That someone could legally and conceivably be there is not sufficient in and of itself (ii) Nor is it conclusive that police helicopters often fly at this altitude rather the question should be whether the vantage point is one used by and exposed to public view not police view

Florida v. Jardines: takeaways

- Reworking the first element of the Jones test to bring it into the modern age - Takeaways: adding "unlicensed" to physical intrusion i. A physical intrusion can be licensed either through permission or implicitly via being implied from background social norms ("the habits of the country") ii. Even where social norms would allow for some degree of physical intrusion, government cannot exceed the scope of the authorization (ex: walking to a person's front door is licensed by social custom, bringing your drug detecting dog with you is not)

Prevention of Destruction of Evidence Exception

- Rule: An objectively reasonable belief that the destruction of evidence is imminent provides officers with a basis for conducting an otherwise impermissible warrantless search to preserve the evidence * Officers' subjective intentions in conducting a warrantless entry are irrelevant and the danger of destruction of evidence having arisen in response to law enforcement's actions, even where such a reaction was reasonably foreseeable, will not invalidate a warrantless entry - Exception: if the exigency arises in response to an actual or threatened 4th Amendment violation [difference between police announcing that they are at the door (permissible) and police saying that they are breaking the door down and coming in (impermissible)] * Conduct of the police prior to the exigency must be reasonable

Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine (Michigan v. Long)

- Rule: The United States Supreme Court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that state court rests on a state law ground [can be a substantive or procedural state law ground] that is (1) independent of federal law AND (2) adequate to support the judgment a. Independent - if the resolution of the issue is not tied to the federal issues in the case (question of independence normally arises where the state court addresses both federal and state law requirements in its analysis) b. Adequate - if the judgment would have been upheld even if the federal ground was reversed, then it is adequate

Unforeseen Circ or Mistakes While Executing a Warrant: Rule

- The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively reasonable. We do not examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved. (Heien) * If the officers know or should have known of the mistake, then search will be unreasonable - As soon as the mistake is realized, must discontinue the search

Curtilage Test: determining whether an area falls within the home's curtilage

- The central question is "whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's umbrella" - Factors (the factors are not to be applied mechanically) (1) The proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home; (2) Whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home (3) The nature of the uses to which the area is put; AND (4) The steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.

Is the probable cause standard subjective or objective?

- The question of whether under the totality of circumstances there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched is answered based on OBJECTIVE rather than subjective considerations a. An officer's subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable cause determinations

Open Fields and Aerial Searches in TN

- Under Article I, Section 7 of the TN Constitution, officers are conducting a search, which as a general rule requires a warrant, if they enter upon land that although it is outside the curtilage of the home is nevertheless used in the daily operation of the premises, which can include fenced areas used in farming, barns, areas near barns and gardens (In TN, the barn in Dunn would be protected) i. Exception: no warrant is necessary to enter upon open farmland where officers have lawfully observed contraband growing thereon either from an aerial overflight or from lawful ground observation (Jennette) - No warrant is necessary for officers to explore wild or waste lands or lands that are unoccupied

Curtilage

- Unlike open fields, the curtilage of a home is protected under the 4th Amendment; curtilage is the area immediately surrounding the home and is considered part of the home

Anticipatory Search Warrant (US v. Grubbs)

- What it is: An anticipatory search warrant requires that a triggering event occur before the search can take place - The rule: For an anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied: a. Probable cause to believe that the condition (triggering event) is going to occur; AND b. If the triggering event does occur, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place (this part is just your baseline probable cause for warrants)

Emergency Aid Exception

- Where an officer has an objectively reasonable belief that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury ("in need of immediate assistance"), warrantless entry is permissible to render emergency assistance to the injured or to protect an occupant from injury - The officer's subjective intentions in entering without a warrant are irrelevant. The officer could have entered trying to discover evidence, not caring about the safety of the individuals inside or even believing that someone was actually seriously injured or in danger of such injury, instead simply hoping to see evidence in plain view, and the entry would still be constitutional

Katz v. US - F: Convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone based on evidence of D's end of the call overheard by FBI agents who attached an electronic recording device to the outside of the public phone booth

-H: This was a search within the meaning of the 4th Amend -R/R i. 4th amend is about protecting his privacy * Doesn't matter that he was visible in the phone booth-> what is protected is what he said (He didn't own the phone booth but he had a reasonable expectation of privacy)

Katz Test

-Test 1 for searches: reasonable expectation of privacy test - A search occurs if there is a govt intrusion upon a person who has: (1) A subjective expectation of privacy AND (2) That expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable ("reasonable" is the touchstone of 4th amend search analysis)

Jones Test clarified by Jardines

-Test 2 for searches: trespassory/ physical intrusion search test - a search occurs if there is: (1) a "trespass"/ unlicensed physical intrusion occurs, (2) the trespass /unlicensed physical intrusion is upon an area enumerated in the Fourth Amendment ("persons, houses, papers, or effects"), AND (3) it occurs with the intent "to find something or to obtain information

Aerial Searches Rules

1. 1,000+ ft: "[T]he mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities [does not] preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point WHERE HE HAS A RIGHT TO BE and which renders the activities clearly visible" --> if flying within FAA regs then good to go * and which is done in a physically non-intrusive manner 2. sub 1,000 ft or no FAA floor: apply both of the following a. Navigable Airspace- if flying in navigable airspace then g2g subject to a few limitations: (a) flying at that height not rare (b) does not interfere with normal use (c) no intimate details revealed (d) physically non-intrusive b. O'Connor's test: Put the burden on the defendant to show that observation from such a vantage point is sufficiently rare that police surveillance violates reasonable expectations of privacy

Beepers/ Tracking: Rules

1. A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. 2. The government engages in a search where the Government surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house * A search occurs even if visual observation initially revealed that the article to which the beeper is attached entered the home if SUBSEQUENT USE OF THE BEEPER VERIFIES THAT THE ARTICLE REMAINS ON THE PREMISES 3. A State also conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person's body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual's movements.

Exceptions to the warrant requirement

1. Hot Pursuit 2. Emergency Aid 3. Prevention of Destruction of Evidence 4. Protecting the Safety of Officers and Others 5. Community Caretaker Function 6. Plain View 7. The Automobile Exception 8. Searches Incident to Arrest 9. Searches Incident to Arrest Involving Automobiles 10. Inventory Searches 11. Protective Sweeps 12. Consent 12. Administrative Searches 13. Border Crossings 14. Checkpoints 15. Govt Employees 16. Schools 17. Drug Testing 18. Jails and Prisons 19. Searches of Persons on Probation or Parole 20. DNA Testing and Arrestees

Search Tests

1. Katz- Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 2. Jones Test- Trespassory/ Physical Intrusion Search Test

Knock and Announce Rules

1. Knocking and announcing is part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 4th Amendment. In some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might constitute an unreasonable search/seizure under the Fourth Amendment (Wilson v. Arkansas) 2. Although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be unconstitutional if police officers enter without prior announcement (knock and announce), circumstances may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Examples (not exhaustive; this is a reasonableness inquiry): i. Under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence ii. Where a prisoner escapes from an officer and retreats to his dwelling, iii. Where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given. (Wilson v. Arkansas) 3. "In order to justify a 'no-knock' entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion (less than probable cause required) that announcing their presence would be dangerous/ futile or allow the destruction of evidence (Richards v. Wisconsin)

The Automobile Exception: Rules

1. Law enforcement may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile or other moveable vehicle (boat, plane, etc.) if officers have probable cause to search the vehicle. (Carrol; Carney) 2. Containers in Vehicles (Acevedo)- Law enforcement can engage in warrantless searches of containers in vehicles if the officers have probable cause to search either the container or the vehicle * If the container is not in the vehicle, then officers cannot engage in a warrantless search of the container even if they have probable cause to search the container but can seize the container while they attempt to obtain a warrant if there are exigent circumstances 3. Where the government has probable cause to search a vehicle, they can search not only containers therein belonging to the driver/owner but also passengers in the vehicle even if there is no reasonable suspicion or probable cause as to the passengers in particular (Houghton) 4. When the police lawfully stop a vehicle, they may order the driver [Pennsylvania v. Mimms] and passengers out of the vehicle [Maryland v. Wilson] -- this is automatic; not even reasonable suspicion is required 5. Additionally, the police may conduct a pat down search for weapons on persons pulled over in traffic stops if the police have reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous [Arizona v. Johnson] 6. The automobile exception does not permit the government to enter a home or the curtilage to search a vehicle therein without a warrant (Collins v. Virginia)

Why do we care about Probable Cause?

1. Law enforcement needs probable cause to get a search warrant (if one is needed), 2. Law enforcement needs probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, 3. Law enforcement needs probable cause to arrest in the absence of a warrant, AND 4. There are important exceptions to the warrant requirement for which probable cause is required for the police to search and/or seize

Use of Dogs to Sniff for Contraband (This incorporates Search, Seizure and Probable Cause): The Rules

1. Law enforcement utilization of well-trained drug detection dogs in public areas to sniff a person's effects does not constitute a search (Place) 2. Law enforcement utilization of well-trained drug detection dogs walking around the exterior of the vehicle sniffing the interior thereof during a traffic stop does not constitute a search (Caballes) 3. Officers' authority to SEIZE with a traffic stop ends, however, when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are - or reasonably should have been - completed and continuing detention for purposes of allowing a drug sniffing dog to inspect the vehicle is unconstitutional (Rodriguez) * tasks tied to the traffic infraction include checking a driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, inspecting the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance are permitted during a traffic stop (Rodriguez) 4. There is PROBABLE CAUSE to search a vehicle after a drug-dog alerts if all the facts surrounding a dog's alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime (Harris)

Protecting the Safety of Officers and Others Exception: Alcohol

1. Missouri v. McNeely - NO per se rule: In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so. * We do not doubt that some circumstances will make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood test. 2. Birchfield v. ND -Takeaway: A breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving (officers automatically get to admin a breath test) 3. Mitchell v. Wisconsin - When police have probable cause to believe a person has committed a drunk driving offense but the driver's unconsciousness requires him to be taken to the hosp (so police can't admin breathalyzer) police may almost always order a warrantless blood test without offending the 4th amend. * However, an exception may arise where the person's blood would not have been drawn if police had not been seeking BAC information, and that police could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties.

Katz and Business and Commercial Premises

As a general rule, law enforcement officers may stand in the shoes of a member of the general public, entering businesses or commercial premises and observing in areas and in a manner CONSISTENT WITH THE INVITATION GIVEN TO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, even though law enforcement's purposes are investigatory, without the officers' actions constituting a search under the 4th Amendment

Chambers v. Maroney: Automobile Exception

Car had been taken to the police yard and officers searched it without a warrant (had probable cause). Court determined the automobile exception still applied, so this was a valid search

Determining immediate vicinity in close cases

Consider: (a) the lawful limits of the premises, (b) whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, (c) the ease of reentry from the occupant's location, and (d) other relevant factors

Protecting the Safety of Officers and Others Exception

For the exception to the warrant requirement for safeguarding against risks to the safety of the officers or others to be applicable, the officers must have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there is an immediate need to act to protect themselves and/or others from serious harm

Payton v. NY - F: Appeals challenge the constitutionality of NY statutes that authorize police to enter a private residence without a warrant and with force to make a routine felony arrest i. Probable cause that Payton murdered gas station manager ii. Forcibly entered his residence without a warrant iii. Obtained .30-caliber shell casing

H: 4th amend prohibits warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Absent exigent circumstances, the threshold can't be crossed without a warrant

US v. Miller - F: D convicted of various charges related to owning an illegal distillery. Bank Secrecy Act requires the bank to keep certain records that the bank might not have kept otherwise. This is info that the bank would not normally publicly disclose-> only turning them over because of subpoena - I: Whether the compulsion to file reports with govt of certain types of transactions and keep records in the Bank Secrecy Act as exercised in this case creates a 4th Amend interest in the depositor where none existed before?

H: No. There is no "expectation of privacy" in these bank docs (this is the 3P disclosure doctrine on steroids)

Searches of Trash: California v. Greenwood - F: Agent searched D's trash deposited for pickup outside his home and found items indicative of narcotics use.

H: Not a search. Having deposited his garbage, in an area particularly suited for public inspection and for the express purpose of having strangers take it, Greenwood had no reasonable expectation of privacy

General Rule Regarding Arrest Warrants

Irrespective of the seriousness of the offense, in the absence of exigent circumstances law enforcement cannot enter a home to effectuate an arrest without a warrant

False Friend Cases post-Katz (Hoffa v. United, Lewis v. United State, and Lopez v. United States)

Reaffirmed by White - No Fourth Amendment safeguard for an individual's "misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it" (basically, if you say incriminating things to an undercover officer that's on you) * Lack of 4th Amendment protection extends to circumstances in which the false friend is an undercover agent, that undercover agent is using electronic equipment to record the conversation, or the false friend is carrying recording equipment or a device that transmits the communications to be recorded elsewhere *one party to the convo has consented to it being recorded

TN Const. Art. 1, Sect. 7

That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offences are not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not be granted.

Community Caretaker Function Exception

The government must show that: i. The officer possessed specific and articulable facts which, viewed objectively and in the totality of the circumstances, reasonably warranted a conclusion that a community caretaking action was needed, such as the possibility of a person in need of assistance or the existence of a potential threat to public safety; and ii. The officer's behavior and the scope of the intrusion were reasonably restrained and tailored to the community caretaking need. - In Tennessee, officer's subjective intentions are irrelevant to community caretaker analysis (however - "courts must meticulously consider the facts and carefully apply the exception in a manner that mitigates the risk of abuse")

Fourth Amend Text

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Retroactivity: Exceptions

The ruling will be applied retroactively if: a. the Supreme Court ruling has found that the behavior cannot be subject to criminal sanction (ex: Lawrence v. Texas - prohibiting states from imposing criminal sanctions for consensual same sex sexual activity) b. Where certain categories of punishment have been prohibited (exs: because of the status of the offender or the nature of the offense) c. Watershed Rulings (more theoretical than actual) i. The constitutional change is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction, AND ii. The constitutional change alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding

For a warrant to be valid:

a. There must be PROBABLE CAUSE to issue the warrant, b. The warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, c. The warrant must be supported by an oath or affirmation, d. The warrant must PARTICULARLY describe the place to be searched, AND e. The warrant must PARTICULARLY describe the person or things to be seized.

Plain View Exception

i. The officer was where he or she was legally entitled to be when seeing the item in plain view, ii. The item's incriminating nature must be "immediately apparent," AND iii. The officer has a lawful right to access the object itself * if you're on a sidewalk and see through an open window that someone is growing a marijuana plant in their house, then meet factors 1 and 2, but do NOT have a legal right to access the home-> need a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement * responding to shots fired and turning over a stereo - Law enforcement needs probable cause to actually seize the item -The "plain view" exception also applies to other sensory perceptions such as plain touch and plain smell (Minnesota v. Dickerson)