Criminal Procedure, Trial

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Homicide crimes - Mitigating circumstances

A death sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments if the sentencing judge refuses to review or admit mitigating evidence. Mitigating evidence must be presented if it meets a low threshold test for relevance.

Guilty pleas - Plea bargain - No right to bargain

A defendant cannot compel the prosecutor to bargain; the defendant does not have a constitutional right to plea bargain.

Due process - Right to testify

A defendant has a right to testify and to present evidence on his own behalf.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Homicide crimes - Aggravating circumstances

A defendant in a homicide case cannot be sentenced to death unless the trier of fact convicts the defendant of murder and finds at least one "aggravating circumstance" at either the guilt phase or penalty phase. Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 218-19 (2006). The aggravating circumstance must meet two requirements: i) It must not apply to every defendant convicted of murder; and ii) It must not be unconstitutionally vague. (For example, "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" conduct definition is unconstitutionally vague.) The trier of fact can consider both statutory and non-statutory aggravating circumstances, but the death penalty cannot be imposed without one statutorily defined aggravating factor being found.

Jury trial - Compliance - Impartial jury - views on race

A defendant is entitled to inquire on voir dire into ethnic or racial prejudice of possible jury members only when the issues to be tried involve allegations of racial or ethnic prejudice, or whenever race is "inextricably bound up in the case."

Jury trial - Waiver

A defendant may waive the right to a jury trial and opt for a trial by judge, known as a "bench trial," if the waiver is freely and intelligently made. However, the defendant does not have an absolute right to a bench trial. The court or prosecutor may compel the defendant to submit to a jury trial, unless the defendant would be denied a fair trial.

Guilty pleas - Plea bargain - Pressure to bargain

A defendant's plea made in response to the prosecution's threat to bring more serious charges does not violate the protection of the Due Process Clause against prosecutorial vindictiveness, at least when the prosecution has probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the crimes. Similarly, the bringing of felony charges against a defendant after the defendant asserted his right to a jury trial for misdemeanor offenses related to the same incident does not in itself constitute prosecutorial vindictiveness.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - cross examination of witnesses - Impeachment for bias

A denial of the opportunity to cross-examine a prosecution witness with regard to bias violates the Confrontation Clause. However, such denial is subject to harmless-error analysis. Moreover, trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the safety of the witness, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.

Guilty pleas

A guilty plea is an admission of facts contained in the charging document (e.g., indictment, information).

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - non death penalty - equal protection limitations on punishment

A jail sentence is impermissible if it is imposed only because the defendant was unable to pay a fine. If a defendant has made reasonable bona fide efforts to pay the fine, then revocation of probation without consideration of alternative punishments is fundamentally unfair under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Jury trial - Compliance - jury size and unanimity

A jury of less than six members is a denial of due process, and a unanimous verdict is constitutionally required if a jury is made up of only six members. For state-court juries of seven or more, the vote need not be unanimous, but there is no strict rule as to how many votes are required for conviction. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a unanimous vote by a 12-member jury in federal criminal trials, unless waived in writing and approved by the court. A verdict by 11 jurors is permitted if the 12th juror is excused for good cause after deliberations begin.

Due process - Burden of proof - Presumption of facts - Mandatory presumption

A mandatory presumption regarding an element of an offense violates the due-process requirement. This could include either a conclusive presumption that cannot be rebutted (which would relieve the prosecution of having to prove an element of their case), or a rebuttable mandatory presumption (which shifts the burden of proof regarding the element of the offense). To the extent that these presumptions require the trier of fact to accept a fact as proving an element of the crime and disallow the trier of fact from rejecting it, or shift the burden of an element to the defense, they are unconstitutional.

Due process - Burden of proof - Presumption of facts - permissive presumption

A permissive presumption (i.e., a presumption that the trier of fact is not compelled to accept and that does not shift the burden of proof) regarding an element of an offense does not violate the due-process requirement that the prosecution must prove each element of an offense unless the presumption is irrational. A presumption is not irrational if it is more likely than not to flow from the proven fact on which it depends.

Guilty pleas - Plea bargain

A plea bargain between the prosecutor and the defendant is treated as a contract. The bargain may involve the crimes with which the defendant has been charged, such as a promise by the prosecutor to drop specific charges in exchange for the defendant's promise to plead guilty to other charges, or the defendant's sentence, such as a promise by the prosecutor to recommend a particular sentence in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - non death penalty - Physical force

A prisoner need not show serious injury to recover for a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The inquiry is whether the physical force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, rather than applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.

Fair trial - Fair conduct by the prosecutor - no use of false testimony

A prosecutor may not knowingly use perjured or false testimony for the case in chief, for sentencing, or to impeach the credibility of a witness.

Fair trial - Fair conduct by the prosecutor - examples of misconduct

A prosecutor may not: i) Make material misstatements of law or fact; ii) Elicit information from the defendant outside the presence of his counsel; iii) Express opinions about the defendant's guilt or innocence; iv) Make unfair or improper remarks about the defendant, his counsel, or witnesses; v) Comment on the defendant's failure to testify at trial; or vi) Make improper remarks to the jury to inflame their passions to convict for an improper reason.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - non death penalty - sentencing proportionality

A sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. However, a lengthy sentence does not necessarily violate the Eighth Amendment.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - cross examination of witnesses - Confrontation clause and the hearsay rule - Testimonial statements

A statement is considered "testimonial" if the declarant would reasonably expect it to be used in a prosecution. Such statements include affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony, and statements given in response to police interrogation. The Supreme Court has also held that certificates of analysis, which state the results of state laboratory tests, are testimonial evidence that may not be admitted without accompanying live testimony by the analyst who conducted the tests. It is not sufficient to substitute the testimony of another analyst who is familiar with the testing protocol but did not perform or observe the tests or sign the report.

Sentencing - Enhancement over the statutory maximum

Any fact, other than a prior conviction, that can be used to increase a sentence beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and established beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is considered an element of a crime, as opposed to a sentencing enhancement, when it can increase the maximum sentence imposed. The failure to abide by the above procedure is a violation of the defendant's due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights to notice and a jury trial, both of which are incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not a Sixth Amendment violation for a judge to impose consecutive sentences based on facts that were not found by the jury, but rather by the judge. The rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, is thus limited to sentencing for single crimes, not to the arrangement for punishing multiple offenses. However, a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, may not find the facts necessary to impose the death penalty. Similarly, a state law allowing a jury to issue an "advisory sentence," but allowing the judge alone to ultimately weigh the facts to decide whether to impose the death penalty, is unconstitutional. Harmless-error analysis applies in deciding whether or not to overturn a sentence for a judge's failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury.

Fair trial - Fair conduct by the prosecutor - no suppression of favorable evidence

As discussed in IV.F., supra, due process requires the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to the accused when such evidence is material to guilt or punishment. Evidence is material if there is a "reasonable probability" that disclosure would have changed the outcome of the proceeding; a reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." The prosecution's failure to disclose evidence in its possession both favorable and material to the defense entitles the defendant to a new trial. Under Bagley, the prosecution's failure to turn over specifically requested evidence will seldom, if ever, be excused. Similarly, police violate due process when, in bad faith, they destroy evidence that would have been useful to the defendant at trial. The defendant does not, however, have the right to require police to preserve all evidence if it is not certain that the evidence would have been exculpatory.

Guilty pleas - Knowing and voluntary

Because a guilty plea constitutes both a confession and a waiver of various constitutional rights, the plea must be both intelligent and voluntary. The record must reflect that the judge has determined that the defendant knows and understands the following: i) The nature of the charges and their essential elements; ii) The consequences of the plea (e.g., the maximum and minimum possible sentences, possible immigration consequences); and iii) The rights that the defendant is waiving (e.g., right to a trial).

Fair trial - Impartial judge

Due process requires that a judge possess neither actual nor apparent bias. If actual or apparent bias exists, the judge must follow a recusal process in the federal or state jurisdiction. The impermissible bias or prejudice usually must stem from an extrajudicial source.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - face to face confrontation

Face-to-face confrontation is not an absolute right. A criminal defendant has the right to confront witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment, unless preventing such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. A defendant who voluntarily leaves the courtroom or a disruptive defendant whom the judge removes from the courtroom has not had his right to confrontation violated. This is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The state's interest in protecting child witnesses from more than de minimis trauma as a result of testifying in the defendant's presence is considered an important public purpose under this rule.

Guilty pleas - Effect of the plea on the defendant's rights

Generally, a defendant, by entering a guilty plea, waives his constitutional rights, such as the right to a trial, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront his accusers. However, a defendant may challenge a guilty plea on the due?process grounds that it was not a knowing and voluntary waiver of such rights. In addition, a guilty plea does not constitute a waiver of a double jeopardy challenge unless the waiver is agreed to in the plea agreement. A defendant may also attack a guilty plea that is due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Guilty pleas - Plea bargain - No duty to disclose impeachment information - Defense

If a defendant fails to abide by the plea agreement (e.g., fails to testify in another trial), then the prosecution can have the sentence vacated and reinstate the original charge

Jury trial - Compliance - inconsistent verdicts

If a jury renders a verdict that a defendant is guilty of certain offenses but not guilty of other related offenses, then the verdict is not reviewable on the grounds of inconsistency, even when the jury acquits the defendant of an offense that is a predicate offense to an offense for which the same jury finds the defendant guilty. This rule, which permits inconsistent verdicts, is also applicable when a defendant is convicted of an offense for which a co-defendant, who is tried at the same time, is acquitted, even though the facts would logically dictate the same verdict for each defendant. This rule extends to bench as well as jury trials.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - non death penalty - Defendant's perjured testimony

If a trial judge believes that the defendant perjured himself during the trial, then the judge may take this belief into consideration when determining the sentence.

Speedy trial - Remedy

If the defendant's right to a speedy trial is violated, the charges are dismissed with prejudice.

Jury trial - Maximum sentence to exceed 6 months - Contempt

In a civil contempt case, there is no jury trial requirement if the witness can avoid the punishment by complying with the court order. In a criminal contempt case that has no statutorily authorized punishment, the right to a jury trial is determined by the actual penalty imposed. Thus, a sentence of over six months would trigger the right to a jury trial. However, an alleged contemnor is not entitled to a jury trial simply because a strong possibility exists that upon conviction he will face a substantial term of imprisonment regardless of the punishment actually imposed. Moreover, if a sentence is imposed for contempt and it is more than six months, an appellate court may reduce the sentence to six months or less to protect the conviction against constitutional attack for lack of a jury. There is no right to a jury trial when the sentence imposed is probation, regardless of the length of the probation, at least when imprisonment following revocation of probation does not exceed six months.

Due process - Burden of proof - Presumption of facts - Directed verdict

In a criminal case, a judge may order a directed verdict only for acquittal; the power to convict is reserved to the jury.

Guilty pleas - Right to counsel

In entering a plea, a defendant has the right to counsel.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Homicide crimes - Felony murder

In felony-murder cases, the death penalty may not be imposed if the defendant, acting as an accomplice, did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill, unless the defendant significantly participated in the commission of the felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Jury trial - Compliance - Composition of the jury - state's rights to use neutral principles

In response to a claim of intentional racial discrimination in jury selection, the state has the right to apply neutral, nonracial principles to jury selection, even though it results in a smaller percentage of minorities on juries. The state must prove "absence of discriminatory intent."

Jury trial

In the federal system, the Sixth Amendment provides the right to jury trials. States are obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide jury trials in criminal cases involving only serious offenses. States have wide latitude, though, to determine the conduct and details of jury use.

Jury trial - Compliance - Sentencing - concurrent versus consecutive sentences

Judges can decide whether sentences for multiple crimes run concurrently or consecutively without violating this right.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Lethal injection

Lethal injection is not considered cruel and unusual punishment because there is only a mere possibility that the condemned may receive an improperly administered shot that would cause him unnecessary pain. c. Adequate medical care Although prison inmates have a right to adequate medical care, such care constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment only when there is a deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Mere negligence in assessing an inmate's medical condition or in providing treatment is not sufficient to trigger a constitutional violation.

Jury trial - Compliance - Composition of the jury - peremptory challenges

Peremptory challenges are requests by both parties during the voir dire jury-selection process to disqualify potential jurors without the need to show cause.

Jury trial - Compliance - Impartial jury - views on capital punishment

Prospective jurors who are opposed to the death penalty may be removed for cause if their opposition to the death penalty is so strong as to prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties at the sentencing phase of the trial. An improper exclusion of a juror from a jury that imposed a death sentence is subject to automatic reversal.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Non homicide crimes

Punishment that is disproportionately excessive in relation to the crime committed is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The death penalty is considered excessive in rape cases, whether the victim was an adult woman or a child.

Public trial - Public's rights

Regardless of the wishes of the defendant or prosecutor, a trial must be public unless there is either a substantial likelihood of prejudice to the defendant or a need to limit access to ensure an orderly proceeding.

Sentencing - Applicable rights

Sentencing is considered a critical stage triggering the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A defendant may have the right to confrontation and cross-examination at sentencing, particularly in death-penalty cases, or when a sentence is based upon a finding of new facts beyond those necessary to prove the offense charged.

Guilty pleas - Plea bargain - No duty to disclose impeachment information - Prosecution

Should the prosecution violate the provisions of the plea bargain, the judge decides whether specific performance of the plea is required or whether the defendant can withdraw his plea.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - non death penalty - repeat offenders

Some jurisdictions have statutes imposing mandatory indeterminate life sentences (e.g., 25 years to life) on defendants who commit three felonies, even if the felonies are non-violent property-related offenses. These recidivist statutes are not unconstitutional under either the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

Speedy trial - Commencement of the right

Statutes of limitations are the primary safeguards against pre-accusation delay. However, the Due Process Clause may be violated if the delay was used to obtain a tactical advantage for the prosecution or to harass the defendant. Delay resulting from an investigation conducted in good faith does not violate the Due Process Clause. Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the time period commences at the time of arrest or formal charge, whichever comes first. The defendant need not know about the charges against him for the right to attach.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - cross examination of witnesses - Confrontation clause and the hearsay rule

The Confrontation Clause limits the use of hearsay evidence in a criminal trial. Out-of-court statements by witnesses that are "testimonial" are barred under the Confrontation Clause, unless the witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable by the court. If, however, the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, then the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of the declarant's prior out-of-court testimonial statements. Out-of-court testimonial statements are not barred by the Confrontation Clause when they are used for a purpose other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. The Confrontation Clause has no application to "non-testimonial" out-of-court statements.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - cross examination of witnesses - Confrontation clause and the hearsay rule - Non Testimonial statements

The Confrontation Clause permits the admission of non-testimonial statements, even if they lack indicia of reliability. Statements made for the primary purpose of assisting the police in the investigation of an ongoing emergency are not testimonial. Examples of non-testimonial statements include statements made to a 911 operator during a domestic dispute, and statements made to police officers by the victim of a mortal gunshot wound as he lay in a gas-station parking lot.

Jury trial - Compliance - Composition of the jury - peremptory challenges - harmless error doctrine

The Constitution allows states to choose between harmless-error review and automatic reversal when a judge, acting in good faith, erroneously denies a defendant's peremptory challenge. Thus, if state law permits harmless-error review of the erroneous seating of the juror, there is no constitutional requirement for automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction.

Speedy trial

The Due Process Clause and federal statutes protect defendants from intentional and prejudicial pre-accusation delay. The Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, and other federal and state statutes protect defendants from undue post-accusation delay.

Due process - Burden of proof - Presumption of facts - Elements of the prosecution's case

The Due Process Clause requires that the prosecution prove all of the elements of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process does not require the court to use any particular words to advise the jury of the government's burden of proof. In some jurisdictions, the failure to instruct on reasonable doubt may result in reversible error, whereas in other jurisdictions, the lack of such an instruction is per se reversible error. Sentencing factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt unless the fact is being used to increase the penalty beyond the proscribed statutory maximum, in which case proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Age of the defendant

The Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibits the execution of a defendant who was younger than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of a crime. In addition, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on a defendant who was younger than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime if the crime was not a homicide. If the crime was a homicide, the juvenile cannot be subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Under such circumstances, the sentencing judge must be permitted to take the defendant's youth and other relevant circumstances into consideration when imposing punishment.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Intellectual disability of the defendant

The Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of persons with intellectual disabilities (formerly referred to as "mental retardation").

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Defendant insane

The Eighth Amendment prohibits states from inflicting the death penalty on a prisoner who is insane or can "demonstrate a severe mental disorder."

Cruel and unusual punishment - Applicability

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the federal government from imposing cruel and unusual punishment for federal crimes, or "such punishment as would amount to torture or barbarity, any cruel and degrading punishment not known to the common law, or any fine, penalty, confinement, or treatment so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."

Jury trial - Compliance - Composition of the jury - representation of the community

The Equal Protection Clause bars racial discrimination in the selection of juries, including grand juries. The requirement that a jury be selected from a representative cross-section of the community also extends to sexual discrimination. However, the actual jury selected need not represent a fair cross-section of the community.

Jury trial - Compliance - Composition of the jury - peremptory challenges - Discriminatory use

The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause prohibits both the criminal defendant and the prosecutor from exercising peremptory challenges solely based on race or gender.The defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to have standing to contest the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges. If the explanation for striking a juror is deemed pretextual, then it gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent that makes it difficult for the challenge to survive. The United States Supreme Court has set forth a three-prong test (the "Batson" test) to determine whether a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The test requires that: i) The moving party establishes a prima facie case of discrimination; ii) The party who exercised the challenge provides a race-neutral explanation for the strike; iii) The moving party carries her burden of proving that the other party's proffered reason was pretextual and that the strike was indeed motivated by purposeful discrimination. Once the party who exercised the challenge offers a race-neutral explanation and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue becomes moot. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with the opponent of the strike.

Public trial - defendant's rights

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a public trial. The defendant may waive the right and request a closed proceeding. However, because the request also implicates the First Amendment right of access of the press and the public, the court must consider several factors, and the likelihood of a closed proceeding is slight. The court may even allow the proceedings to be televised over the defendant's objection. The right to a public trial extends to preliminary hearings and suppression hearings. A suppression hearing may be closed if (i) there is an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced by an open trial, (ii) the closure is not in excess of the interest, (iii) other alternatives have been considered, and (iv) the court enters adequate findings to support closure.

Jury trial - Compliance - Impartial jury

The Sixth Amendment provides that an accused person is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury. Claims of juror bias and misconduct are subject to the harmless-error rule.

Guilty pleas - Knowing and voluntary - factual basis for plea

The U.S. Constitution does not forbid criminal sentencing of defendants who are willing to waive their trial and accept a plea while maintaining their innocence. Therefore, because an express admission of guilt is not a constitutional requisite for the imposition of a criminal penalty, a judge may accept pleas that result in a criminal sentence without violating the Constitution, even if the defendant maintains his factual innocence. However, Rule 11(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a judge to ascertain that there is factual basis for a defendant's plea in order to accept a guilty plea. Therefore, when the defendant asserts his innocence despite entering a guilty plea, the judge must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea in order to accept the plea.

Right to confrontation - Trial

The accused has the right to directly encounter adverse witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to be present at any stage of the trial that would enable the defendant to effectively cross-examine adverse witnesses as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Not only does this right allow the defendant to cross-examine the adverse witness, but it also allows the defendant to observe the demeanor of the adverse witness. A witness may invoke the right against self-incrimination; however, such an invocation after testimony has already been made may violate the defendant's right to confrontation, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, because the witness's invocation will prevent adequate cross-examination by the defendant. If the defendant was instrumental in preventing a witness from testifying, then he forfeits his right to confrontation.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - cross examination of witnesses - Confessions of a non testifying co defendant at a joint trial - Severance

The accused may assert a demand for a severance of the trial of his case from a co-defendant's case whenever the prosecution intends to introduce a confession that is hostile to one co-defendant, and the confession: i) Implicates the confessing defendant but is not admissible against the non-confessing defendant; and ii) Cannot be edited to exclude inculpation of the non-confessing defendant. The prosecutor may avoid severance if the court denies the use of the statement or the prosecutor chooses not to use it at trial.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - cross examination of witnesses - Confessions of a non testifying co defendant at a joint trial - Bruton rule

The admission of a confession by a non-testifying co-defendant at a joint trial against the defendant violates the Sixth Amendment, even when it merely corroborates the defendant's own confession. A limiting instruction will not cure the defect. If the co-defendant testifies, then the rule does not apply. The rule does not apply at a bench trial. It also does not apply to the statements of an accomplice who is not tried as a co-defendant or to a co-defendant who takes the stand and denies making such a statement. b) Harmless error Admission of a co-defendant's statement in violation of Bruton, however, is subject to harmless-error analysis.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment

The death penalty may be imposed only under a statutory scheme that provides: i) Clear and objective standards; ii) Specific and detailed guidance; and iii) An opportunity for rational review of the process.

Jury trial - Compliance - Composition of the jury - all defendants may challenge jury selection discrimination

The defendant has standing to challenge the jury-selection process, regardless of any showing of actual bias.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - cross examination of witnesses - Memory loss by the witness

The fact that a witness has a memory loss does not by itself violate the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar testimony concerning a prior out-of-court identification when the identifying witness is unable, because of memory loss, to explain the basis for the identification. A defendant may conduct an effective cross-examination if given the opportunity to address the very fact of the poor memory of the witness.

Speedy trial - Balancing test

The factors to be considered in determining whether the defendant has been deprived of a speedy trial post-accusation are the: i) Length of the delay; ii) Reason for the delay; iii) Defendant's assertion of a right to a speedy trial; and iv) Prejudice to the defendant. Courts weigh these factors and determine whether the state made a "diligent, good-faith effort" to bring the defendant to trial. A delay caused by the inaction of an attorney assigned by the state to represent the defendant may be attributable to the defendant, but a delay caused by the court's failure to promptly appoint replacement counsel when an assigned attorney withdraws or by a breakdown in the public-defender system is attributable to the state.

Jury trial - Compliance - Composition of the jury - peremptory challenges - not constitutionally required

The loss of a peremptory challenge does not violate the right to an impartial jury. A defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - non death penalty - physical conditions of incarceration

The physical conditions of incarceration amount to cruel and unusual punishment only if the prisoner can show that prison officials had actual knowledge of a substantial risk to the prisoners.

Jury trial - Compliance - Composition of the jury - prima facie case

The prima facie case for absence of a representative cross-section can be established by showing that: i) The group allegedly excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; ii) The group was not fairly represented in the venire from which the jury was chosen; and iii) The underrepresentation resulted from a systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. To rebut, the prosecution must show that the disproportionate exclusion manifestly and primarily advances a significant governmental interest.

Guilty pleas - Plea bargain - No duty to disclose impeachment information

The prosecution is not required to disclose impeachment information or information related to an affirmative defense to a defendant when the defendant enters into a plea bargain agreement prior to trial. The failure to disclose such information does not render the defendant's plea bargain involuntary.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - cross examination of witnesses - Witness availability

The right of confrontation is satisfied if the defense counsel had a right to cross-examine the witness at an earlier hearing, provided that the prosecution failed in a good-faith effort to produce the witness at the trial and the declarant is now unavailable. However, if the witness is unavailable because of the defendant's conduct, then testimonial hearsay is admissible.

Right to confrontation - Compliance - cross examination of witnesses

The right to confrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically. The principal purpose of confrontation is to secure for the defendant the opportunity of cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses.

Due process - Burden of proof - Presumption of facts - Affirmative defenses

The state is not forbidden by the Due Process Clause from placing the burden of proving an affirmative defense—such as insanity, self-defense, entrapment, or duress—on the defendant.

Jury trial - Maximum sentence to exceed 6 months

There is a constitutional right to a jury trial for serious offenses—those that carry an authorized sentence of more than six months of imprisonment, regardless of the actual penalty imposed. The right to a jury trial attaches for crimes punishable by six months of imprisonment or less only if additional statutory or regulatory penalties make the offense a "serious offense." There is no right to trial by jury for multiple petty offenses (those that carry a combined total maximum term exceeding six months); the prison terms imposed for such convictions are not aggregated.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Fairness of sentencing proceedings

To minimize the risk of arbitrary action, a capital sentencing process must satisfy, at a minimum, two general requirements: i) The process must channel or limit the sentencer's discretion in order to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder; and ii) The court must allow the jury to consider any relevant mitigating evidence that might lead the sentencer to decline to impose the death penalty. The sentencer is also allowed to take into consideration victim impact statements. If the state puts a capital defendant's future dangerousness at issue, the defendant has the right to inform the jury that the only possible sentence besides death is life imprisonment without parole.

Cruel and unusual punishment - Compliance - Capital punishment - Racial discrimination claims

Under McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Supreme Court held that despite serious statistical evidence of racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty (e.g., African-American defendants who kill white victims are more likely to receive the death penalty), it was not imposed as a result of unconstitutional discrimination.

Jury trial - Compliance - Sentencing -enhancements

When a sentence may be increased if additional facts are established, a jury must determine the existence of such facts. Enhancement of a defendant's sentence by a judge without such a determination violates the defendant's right to a jury trial. This limitation on a judge's ability to impose an enhanced sentence also applies when the defendant has entered a guilty plea. However, the harmless-error test applies to determine whether a sentence enhanced in violation of a defendant's right to a jury trial must be reversed.

Guilty pleas - Plea bargain - No duty to disclose impeachment information - Court

When entering into a plea bargain, the agreement is enforceable against the defendant and the prosecutor, but not against the judge. If the judge is not satisfied with the bargain, he can reject the plea. A defendant does not have a constitutional right to have his plea accepted by the court.

Guilty pleas - Knowing and voluntary - effect of violation

When the court fails to ensure that the plea was knowing and voluntary, the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea.

Due process - Burden of proof - Presumption of innocence

While a defendant is not automatically entitled to a jury instruction apprising the jury of the presumption of innocence doctrine, the presumption is a basic tenet of a fair trial, and it may be required when necessary for a fair trial