ENVS Law & Policy cases/facts
Lucas v. South Carolina
ALSO a big one (takings) In late 19th, Court added 2 "categorical takings tests": taking = interfering w owner's core right to exclude others from land, & taking = deprivation of all the economically viable use of the property (Lucas v. South Carolina, the whole parcel of land must be considered, if some of it can be developed it is not takings) E.g. of Lucas being applied to Tahoe-Sierra (can't conceptually sever land into different temporal pieces LOL)
Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Edward J. Stockton. (1981)
Appealed from Trial court, which sustained the actions of Stockton, commissioner of commerce, approving plan for industrial park in Manchester Trail court ruled that MEC lacked standing Stockton approved the project before the completion of environmental impact statement CT General Statutes 22a-16 confers standing to any person to sue any person for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction SC held that the trial court did not correctly apply the test to determine whether the actions of the defendant would constitute "unreasonable pollution" Legislative history shows the unreasonable does not mean a compromise between state and private interests, but rather to prevent suits being brought as a form of harassment The plaintiff proved through several experts that the project would damage air quality The trial court did not recognize this, and aptly shift the burden to the defendant to refute, therefore their ruling cannot stand
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982)
Appellant purchased an apartment building in which the prior owner had allowed appellee cable company to install a cable on the building and to furnish cable television services to the tenants. ISSUE Did the installation by the cable company constitute a taking that warranted just compensation? Yes, minor but permanent physical occupation of the owner's property authorized by the state law constituted a "taking" of property for which just compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, since when the character of the governmental action is a permanent physical occupation of real property, there is a taking to the extent of the occupation without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner
TVA v. Hill (1978)
Court stopped development of a damn because it endangered snail fish -- ruling upheld explicit provisions of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
Established "Chevron two-step" rule
Lead Industries Association v. EPA
FACTS "EPA made the decision that "the maximum safe individual blood lead level should be no higher than the blood lead level used by the Centers for Disease Control in screening children for lead poisoning" Qs raised abt selection of EP elevation as the pivotal adverse health effect, and the threshold of EPA elevation St Joe said EPA is wrong for not considering econ & tech feasibility in setting lead standards LIA says limits on EPA's authority are necessary (they say should be based on clearly harmful, not clearly adverse effects) PROCEDURE (anything?) RULE/LAW Act's stated goal is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population(.)" Section 101(b)(1) ISSUE Did the EPA administrator exceed his authority under the Act in promulgating the lead standards? FINDING/HOLDING St Joe's argument is without merit Clean Air Act requires NAAQS to be set based on public health considerations alone, without balancing those considerations against the costs of meeting them (& this is made clear in Section 109)
Massachusetts v. EPA (2007)
FACTS 1990, IPCC says "emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of...greenhouse gases" which will warm Earth's surface 1992, Earth Summit where Bush agreed to reduce atmospheric conc of CO2 & GHGs PROCEDURE Petition (from Mass & other states) said GHGs accelerate climate change, CO2 is biggest contributor, and CC will have srs adverse effects or human health & env, + EPA already said itself that it had power to reg CO2 2003, EPA denied petition, saying CAA doesn't authorize EPA to reg CC, and even if it did, unwise to set GHG emission standards at this time Plus said congress was well aware of CC, but didn't establish limitations, only authorize further investigation EPA said that Congress designed original CAA to address local air pollutants rather than substances consistent in global atmosphere Basically, "EPA concluded that climate change was so important that unless Congress spoke with exacting specificity, it could not have meant the agency to address it" & GHGs not air pollutant, if CO2 were, need reduction of tailpipe emissions, which Congress & DOT have already done, + would only be piecemeal approach instead of comprehensive RULE/LAW CAA section 202(a)(1), EPA shall by regulation prescribe standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class of new motor vehicles or engines which cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare Act defines "air pollutant" as "any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive...substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air" ISSUE Does section 202 of CAA authorize EPA to reg GHG emissions from new motor vehicles if that would be them saying that they contribute to CC FINDING/HOLDING Statute is unambiguous, and EPA isn't relying on it during its reasoning Just bc DOT sets mileage standards, doesn't mean EPA can shirk env responsibilities, both can work towards health & welfare The court holds that Massachusetts has standing to challenge the EPA (because it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that it can be traced to defendant, and that favorable decision will relieve or avert that injury) Congress knew flexibility would be required so CAA didn't become obsolete Court of Appeals reversed, & case remanded COMMENTS Roberts & Scalia wrote dissents (on standing & merits → ASK abt what these mean)
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn.
FACTS Respondents argue that econ should be taken into account Also that secondary meaning of public health is correct one And that many more factors than air pollution affect public health, e.g. economic cost There ARE sections that require this to be taken into account, but not in CAA? Only there to assist states in carrying out their role as implementers of NAAQS PROCEDURE Court of Appeals said that 109 didn't provide "intelligible principle" to guide EPA's authority in setting NAAQS & therefore violated nondelegation doctrine (Supreme Court disagrees) RULE/LAW In 108, no mention of needing to take cost into consideration in initial calculation "Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA instructs the EPA to set "ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on [the] criteria [documents of section 108] and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health." ISSUE(s) Does §109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) delegate legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Whether the Administrator may consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under §109(b)(1) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §7501-7515, with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS If so, whether the EPA's interpretation of that part was permissible" FINDING/HOLDING Re "intelligible principle", the Court unanimously rejected the D.C. Circuit's holding that an agency could cure an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by developing an "intelligible principle" to confine its exercise of its discretion "the Court remanded this aspect of the case back to EPA "to develop a reasonable interpretation of the nonattainment implementation provisions" as applied to a revised ozone NAAQS."
Whalen v Union Bag Paper Company (NY 1913)
FACTS Union Bag Paper Co. (defendant) operates pulp mill on creek few miles upstream from Mr. Whalen's land. It discharges into creek waste ("sulphurous acid, lime, sulphur, and waste material consisting of pulp wood, sawdust, slivers, knots, gums, resins and fibre"). Whalen sued to stop the pollution. PROCEDURE Trial court granted an injunction & damages to take effect 1 later. Appeals court reversed on the amount of damages and the injunction, persuaded by the arg that defendant will suffer great loss if an injunction is granted, compared to the relatively small injury suffered by Mr. Whalen by that small part of the pollution affecting him. Plaintiff appealed to NY Court of Appeals about the issue of the injunction. RULE/LAW Companies don't get to be immune from injunctions just because they have expended money in their activities. They "assume the risk" that their activities may damage others, and injunctions should be on the table in such cases. ISSUE Is it appropriate to use a "balancing of the injuries" approach when determining whether to grant an injunction? FINDING/HOLDING Reversed decision of Appellate Division, reinstating decision of trial court granting an injunction. A "balancing of the injuries" approach when determining whether or not to grant an injunction is not a sound approach: "if followed to its logical conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant of his little property by giving it to those already rich."
Alaska DEC v. EPA
Facts Procedure Rule/Law Issue Finding/Holding Comments
Union Electric
Facts Procedure Rule/Law Issue Finding/Holding Comments
Penn Central Transportation v. NYC
One if the BIG ones (takings mainly) In late '70s (Penn Central), Court basically confessed to being "unable to develop any set formula" for defining regulatory takings → instead should be ad hoc & fact-specific while balancing 3 main considerations 1) The extent of interference with "distinct investment backed expectations" 2) The nature of the interference 3) The purposes of governmental regulation (later, 2 definitions were added in Lucas v. South Carolina)
Grimes v. Conservation Comm'n (1997) - Katz - CT SC
Plaintiff appealed after not enjoining permits for regulated activities in a wetlands Trial court dismissed appeal, appellate court reversed on the basis that the commission violated due process rights by providing inadequate notice before conducting their inspection SC courts goal is to determine if this is trueThe defendant argues that posting the meeting in the town hall and newspapers was sufficient, while the plaintiff contends that person notice was required because it was an integral evidentiary hearing which only one side attended The plaintiff has no legal ground to stand on here outside of general principles of fairness The plaintiff conceded this in oral argument The court sides with the defendant here No due process rights were impinged b/c plaintiff had no cognizable property interest Due process is applied to property interest only when without the alleged interference with due process the permits in question would certainly or very likely be granted Im not really sure how this applies The court does recognize a common-law interest in fairness This requires an opportunity know the facts and offer rebuttal Nothing in the record indicates that anything other than a routine inspection took place, making the fairness claim irrelevant All parties had an opportunity to be heard the hearing which took place afterwards Judgment of appellate court is reversed
American Electric
SC ruled unanimously that federal legislation, like the clean air act and the regulations it authorizes the EPA to enforce supersede common law claims like the public nuisance claim brought by several states against the four largest producers of emissions
Michigan v. EPA (2015)
SCOTUS overturned the EPA's limits on mercury, arsenic, and acidic gases emitted by coal-fired power plants, known as MATS, challenged by private sector because compliance was expensive, estimated costs near $9.6 billion, but to prevent premature deaths, Justice Scalia determined EPA's interpretation of Clean Air Act "unreasonable"
United States v. Lopez
Sets up three cases where regulatory commerce power can be used Channels of interstate commerce Persons or things in interstate commerce Activities with a substantial relation to interstate commerce
International Paper v. Ouellette (1987)
The CWA prevented Vermont from bringing common law liability against a New York source, as this undermines the intent of the CWA It does not, however, prevent Vermont from seeking remedy under New York common law, as Milwaukee II recognized states authority to impose high common law restrictions than those imposed by CWA
Kleppe v. Sierra Club
The Sierra Club argued that the Department of the Interior could not allow further development of federal coal reserves in a four-state area of the Northern Great Plains without preparing a comprehensive EIS on the entire region. The D.C. Circuit held that four factors should govern when a programmatic EIS must be commenced: (1) the likelihood and imminence of a program's coming to fruition (2) the extent of information available on the effects of a program (3) the extent to which irretrievable resource commitments are being made, and (4) the potential severity of environmental effects. ISSUE Did the federal agencies act arbitrarily in refusing to prepare one comprehensive environmental statement on the entire region? The Court held that Sierra could prevail only if there had been a report on a proposal for major federal action with respect to the Northern Great Plains region. Instead the court noted that there were several EIS for individual local projects, and an EIS for the national coal-leasing initiative, but because there was no regional project Therefore, the injunction against the Department of Interior's approval of the mining plans was improper because there was no threat of irreparable harm.
Sierra Club v. Morton (1972) - Opinion by Justice Stewart - Ninth Circuit Appeals to SC
The sierra club sued Morton, who planned to construct a massive ski resort in the Mineral King Valley, Sierra Nevada Mountains, California The Sierra Club sued as a "membership corporation with special interest in the conservation and sound maintenance of national parks" The court ruled that the Sierra Club lacked standing to sue, for while the proposed construction would constitute an "injury in fact", none amongst the petitioners or members of the club alleged use of the Mineral King valley in a manner that would be harmed by the construction of the resort The court held that while the Sierra Club doubtless had a special interest, this alone was insufficient, as any organization or individual could feasibly have a special interest in anything Confirming the need for a personal stake in the outcome of judicial review, the court contends, does not prevent the protection of public interests or the limitation of executive power, merely the co-opting of the judicial process by those "who seek to do no more than vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial process" Dissent by Justice Douglas Inanimate objects should be able to sue for their own preservation, or rather interest groups should be able to sue for them Following Sierra Club v. Morton, the logic around standing shifted, as the government and its agencies went from being treated essentially the same as a private party (meaning direct injury would constitute standing) to a more flexible understanding of standing which accounted for the possibility of congressional intent around broader standing
UARG v. EPA
UNANIMOUS 9-0 decision, the court decided that "air pollutants" do not always need to contain greenhouse gases. EPA retains its ability to interpret the term in a context-appropriate way depending on where the term was being used. EPA overstepped its authority in trying to regulate greenhouse gases under this section of the Clean Air Act, but the Court held that the EPA's decision was within the boundaries of the EPA's discretion.
