Final Exam

Libel

An injury to reputation caused by circulating written untruths about someone.

Slander

An injury to reputation caused by speaking untruths about someone.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Cohen vs. California

F: A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with "F*** THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail. I:Did California's statute, prohibiting the display of offensive messages such as "F*** the Draft," violate freedom of expression as protected by the First Amendment? R: Yes. In an opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas).

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Edwards vs. Aguillard

F: A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well. I: Did the Louisiana law, which mandated the teaching of "creation science" along with the theory of evolution, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? R: Yes. The Court held that the law violated the Constitution. Using the three-pronged test that the Court had developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to evaluate potential violations of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued that Louisiana's law failed on all three prongs of the test. First, it was not enacted to further a clear secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a "supernatural being created humankind," a doctrine central to the dogmas of certain religious denominations. Third, the law significantly entangled the interests of church and state by seeking "the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Globe Newspaper Co vs. Superior Court

F: A Massachusetts law required trial courts to exclude members of the press and public from certain cases involving sexual offenses and testimony of victims less than eighteen years old. In a trial involving a male who was accused of raping three minors, the court, acting in reference to the Massachusetts statute, conducted a closed trial. I: Did the Massachusetts law violate the First Amendment's freedom of press guarantee as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? R: The Court held that the Massachusetts law violated the First Amendment. Recalling the Court's holding in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980), Justice Brennan reviewed important historical and judicial reasons why access to criminal trials is "properly afforded" First Amendment protection. When the court denies access, argued Brennan, the only justification is to serve a compelling state interest. The Court found no such interest here. First, protecting the psychological well-being of a minor, arguably a compelling interest, conceded Brennan, "does not justify a mandatory closure rule" as circumstances can vary greatly in this type of case. Second, there was no convincing empirical or logical evidence to prove that victims would be more likely to come forward if the press and public were excluded from trials of this nature.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Nebraska Press Association vs. Stuart

F: A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused. I: Did the judge's order violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? R: Yes. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity." However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that"a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Everson vs. Board of Education

F: A New Jersey law allowed reimbursements of money to parents who sent their children to school on buses operated by the public transportation system. Children who attended Catholic schools also qualified for this transportation subsidy. I: Did the New Jersey statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? R: The New Jersey law reimbursing parents for transportation costs to parochial schools did not violate the Establishment Clause. No. A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. After detailing the history and importance of the Establishment Clause, Justice Black argued that services like bussing and police and fire protection for parochial schools are "separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function" that for the state to provide them would not violate the First Amendment. The law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was simply a law enacted as a "general program" to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: New York vs. Ferber

F: A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances I: Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? R: No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling "government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Thomas vs. Collins

F: A Texas law required union officials to obtain an organizer's card before soliciting possible members. A judge convicted a labor organizer of contempt for speaking at a union rally without a permit. I: Does the Texas law requiring labor organizers to secure permission to solicit members violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? R: Yes, the law was unconstitutional. It interfered with freedom of speech and freedom of assembly which possesses "a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Richmond Newspapers, Inc vs. Virginia

F: After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action. I: Did the closure of the trial to the press and public violate the First Amendment or the Sixth Amendment? R: In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Branzburg vs. Hayes

F: After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries. I: Is the requirement that news reporters appear and testify before state or federal grand juries an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and press as guaranteed by the First Amendment? R: No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Osborne vs. Ohio

F: After obtaining a warrant, Ohio police searched the home of Clyde Osborne and found explicit pictures of naked, sexually aroused male adolescents. Osborne was then prosecuted and found guilty of violating an Ohio law that made the possession of child pornography illegal. I: Did Ohio's ban on the possession of child pornography violate the First Amendment? R: The Court held that Ohio could constitutionally proscribe the possession of child pornography. The Court argued that the case at hand was distinct from Stanley v. Georgia, "because the interest underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley." Ohio did not rely on "a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's mind;" rather, Ohio merely attempted to protect the victims of child pornography. The Court argued that regulations on production and distribution of child pornography were insufficient and could not dry up the market for pornographic materials. The Court also found that an error in jury instructions in the lower courts mandated Osborne be given a new trial.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Wallace vs. Jaffree

F: An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile. I: Did Alabama law violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause? R: Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Herbert vs. Lando

F: Anthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the "actual malice" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the editorial decisions that were made during the production of the program. I: In an accusation of libel, do the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect members of the press from inquiries into their thoughts, opinions, and conclusions that go into the editorial process? R: The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the privilege not to answer editorial inquiries is not absolute. Justice White argued that shielding editorial decision-making from inquiry would "substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice," a burden which was already substantial in the Court's view. White was confident that investigations into this process for falsehood or libelous reporting would not lead to self-censorship of stories that are documented and true; "only reckless error will be discouraged," which would not threaten the constitutionally protected freedom of the press.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Brown vs. Entertainment Merchants Association

F: Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute "obscenity" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective. I: Does the First Amendment bar a state from restricting the sale of violent video games to minors? R: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection." Justice Samuel Alito concurred in judgment, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Alito noted that he disagreed "with the approach taken in the Court's opinion. In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make every effort to understand the new technology." Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer filed separate dissents. Adhering to his strict understanding of the Framers' intent with the Constitution, Thomas wrote: "The Court's decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment." Breyer argued that the California statute met current constitutional standards.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Brandenburg vs. Ohio

F: Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." I: Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? R: The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Hudgens vs. NLRB

F: Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the nine retail locations in Atlanta. One of those stores was located within the North DeKalb Shopping Center, owned by the Petitioner, Hudgens (Petitioner). After the picketers had been marching for about half an hour, the general manager of the shopping center threatened to have the strikers arrested if they did not leave. I: Can a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the public? R: A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town and, therefore, not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Whitney vs. California

F: Charlotte Anita Whitney, a member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was prosecuted under that state's Criminal Syndicalism Act. The Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime, including "terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership. . .or effecting any political change." I: Did the Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments? R: In a unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause, and that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. The Court argued "that a State. . .may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances. . .tending to. . .endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means" and was not open to question. The decision is most notable for the concurring opinion written by Justice Brandeis, in which he argued that only clear, present, and imminent threats of "serious evils" could justify suppression of speech.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Chicago vs. Morales

F: Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties. I: Does Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? R: Yes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an opinion for a marjority on several key points. The Court held that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: US vs. O'Brien

F: David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime. I: Was the law an unconstitutional infringement of O'Brien's freedom of speech? R: Earl Warren Warren Hugo L. Black Black William O. Douglas Douglas John M. Harlan II Harlan William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Potter Stewart Stewart Byron R. White White Abe Fortas Fortas Thurgood Marshall Marshall No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest. "[W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." https://youtu.be/hGBolRh1PC4

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: New York Times vs. Sullivan

F: Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment. I: Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? R: The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Schenck vs. US

F: During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. I: Are Schenck's actions (words, expression) protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment? R: Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character of every act depends on the circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be punished.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: FCC vs. Pacifica Foundation

F: During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included sh*t, piss, f*ck, c*nt, c**ks*cker, motherf****r, and t*ts. The station warned listeners that the monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son. I: Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances? R: No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Terminiello vs. Chicago

F: Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his central role in inciting a riot. I: Did the Chicago ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment? R: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Walz vs. Tax Commission of City of New York

F: Frederick Walz, the owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York, brought suit against the New York City Tax Commission, challenging property tax exemptions for churches. Walz alleged that the exemptions forced him, as a taxpayer, to indirectly contribute to those churches. I: Did the property tax exemptions violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? R: In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the exemptions did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that the purpose of the exemptions was to neither advance nor inhibit religion; no one particular church or religious group had been singled out to receive tax exempt status. Unlike direct subsidies, which would have unduly entangled the state with religion, tax exemptions created only "minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches." The Court noted that "benevolent neutrality" toward churches and religions was "deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Gertz vs. Robert Welch, Inc

F: Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling. I: Does the First Amendment allow a newspaper or broadcaster to assert defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure? R: 5-4 DECISION FOR GERTZ MAJORITY OPINION BY LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. For private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media but any standard of fault lower than recklessness limits private individuals to awards for actual injury. The Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that Gertz's rights had been violated and ordering a new trial. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. First, the recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard of fault less then recklessness limits private persons to actual injury. Justice Harry A. Blackmun write a concurring opinion signing on to the reasoning and outcome of the majority. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and William O. Douglas dissenting, arguing that the failure to apply the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to private persons involved in public matters would stifle "free and robust debate." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined the majority in reversing the Court of Appeals ruling but would have simply reinstated the jury verdict and damage award. They disagreed with the majority's refashioning of state liable laws involving private individuals and the news media.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Gitlow vs. New York

F: Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested for distributing copies of a "left-wing manifesto" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under a state criminal anarchy law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterences without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The New York courts had decided that anyone who advocated the doctrine of violent revolution violated the law. I: Is the New York law punishing advocacy to overthrow the government by force an unconstitutional violation of the free speech clause of the First Amendment? R: Threshold issue: Does the First Amendment apply to the states? Yes, by virtue of the liberty protected by due process that no state shall deny (14th Amendment). On the merits, a state may forbid both speech and publication if they have a tendency to result in action dangerous to public security, even though such utterances create no clear and present danger. The rationale of the majority has sometimes been called the "dangerous tendency" test. The legislature may decide that an entire class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited. Those legislative decisions will be upheld if not unreasonable, and the defendant will be punished even if her speech created no danger at all.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Adderley vs. Florida

F: Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of "trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent" for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so. I: Were the petitioners denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? R: The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jail house and not because he "objected to what was being sung . . . or disagreed with the objectives of the protest," there were no First Amendment violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: PruneYard Shopping Center vs. Robins

F: High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities. I: Did PruneYard's regulations violate the students' free speech rights? R: Yes. Since the California Constitution protected "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the shopping centers are privately owned," PruneYard could not prevent the students from soliciting on its property. The Court argued that it was within California's power to guarantee this expansive free speech right since it did not unreasonably intrude on the rights of private property owners.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Loper vs. NYCPD

F: Homeless people filed a class action against the New York City Police Department challenging a state statute that punished anyone who loiters , remains, or wanders about a public place for the purpose of begging" as an infringement of free speech. The law furnished a basis for charging violators with a misdemeanor and also provided grounds for police officers to repeatedly prod the homeless to move along. I: was the statute banning begging in violation of the First Amendment? R: Yes, it violated the first amendment. The court held that "a verbal request for money for sustenance or a gesture conveying that request carries no harms of the type enumerated by the city police, if done in a peaceful manner.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily

F: In 1971, officers of the Palo Alto, California, Police Department obtained a warrant to search the main office of The Stanford Daily, the student newspaper at the university. It was believed that The Stanford Daily had pictures of a violent clash between a group of protesters and the police; the pictures were needed to identify the assailants. The officers searched The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but no materials were removed from the office. This case was decided together with Bergna v. Stanford Daily, involving the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant. I: Did the search of The Daily's newsroom violate the First and Fourth Amendments? R: In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "third party" search of the newsroom did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that such searches, accompanied by warrants, were legitimate when it had been "satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises." The Court also found that the Framers of the Constitution "did not forbid warrants where the press was involved."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Texas vs. Johnson

F: In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court. I: Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment? R: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." https://youtu.be/PNOo5oDpvGo

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Tinker vs. Des Moines School District

F: In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest. Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion. I: Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the students' freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment? R: Yes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference. In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that children are not necessarily guaranteed the full extent of First Amendment rights. Justice Byron R. White wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that the majority's opinion relies on a distinction between communication through words and communication through action. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment does not provide the right to express any opinion at any time. Because the appearance of the armbands distracted students from their work, they detracted from the ability of the school officials to perform their duties, so the school district was well within its rights to discipline the students. In his separate dissent, Justice John M. Harlan argued that school officials should be afforded wide authority to maintain order unless their actions can be proven to stem from a motivation other than a legitimate school interest. https://youtu.be/ZdPPZR_XoCI

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Curtis Publishing Co. vs. Butts, Associated Press vs. Walker

F: In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "Bear" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case. I: In light of the Court's ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, were the allegations made against Butts and Walker libelous? R: In a unanimous decision, the court held that The conduct of the Associated Press did not constitute a severe departure from accepted publishing standards, so it may not be held liable for defamation of a public figure.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Lee vs. Weisman

F: In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. I: Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? R: Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: In re farber and the New York Times Co.

F: In these consolidated appeals The New York Times Company and Myron Farber, a reporter employed by the newspaper, challenge judgments entered against them in two related matters — one a proceeding in aid of a litigant (civil contempt), the other for criminal contempt of court. The proceedings were instituted in an ongoing murder trial now in its seventh month, as a result of the appellants' failure to comply with two subpoenas duces tecum, directing them to produce certain documents and materials [78 N.J. 264] compiled by one or both of these appellants in the course of Farber's investigative reporting of certain allegedly criminal activities. Farber's investigations and reporting are said to have contributed largely to the indictment and prosecution of Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich for murder. Appellants moved unsuccessfully before Judge William J. Arnold, the trial judge in State v. Jascalevich, to quash the two subpoenas; an order was entered directing that the subpoenaed material be produced for in camera inspection by the court. The appellants' applications for a stay of Judge Arnold's order were denied successively by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, by this Court, and by two separate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. Impelled by appellants' persistent refusal to produce the subpoenaed materials for in camera inspection, Judge Arnold issued an order returnable before Judge Theodore W. Trautwein, directing appellants to show cause why they should not be deemed in contempt of court. During the subsequent hearing, Judge Trautwein ordered counsel for Jascalevich to apply to Judge Arnold, pursuant to R. 1:10-5, for an additional order to show cause, this to be in aid of litigants' rights. The order was issued, served and the hearing on the matter consolidated with the hearing on the criminal contempt charge. Judge Trautwein determined that both appellants had wilfully contemned Judge Arnold's order directing that materials be produced for in camera inspection and found them guilty as charged. A fine of $100,000 was imposed on The New York Times and Farber was ordered to serve six months in the Bergen County jail and to pay a fine of $1,000. Additionally, in order to compel production of the materials subpoenaed on behalf of Jascalevich, a fine of $5,000 per day for every day that elapsed until compliance with Judge Arnold's order was imposed upon The Times; Farber was fined $1,000 and sentenced to confinement in the county jail until he complied with the order.I I: Does the In camera inspection violated both first amendment and New Jersey's shield law (grants confidentiality of a reporter's source material? R:the Supreme Court held that newspaper reporters or other media representatives have no privilege deriving from the First Amendment to refrain from divulging confidential information and the sources of such information when properly subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury. The three media representatives were directed to appear and testify. The holding was later underscored and applied directly to this case by Justice White in a brief opinion filed in this cause upon the occasion of his denial of a stay sought by these appellants. He said, There is no present authority in this Court either that newsmen are constitutionally privileged to withhold duly subpoenaed documents material to the prosecution or defense of a criminal case or that a defendant seeking the subpoena must show extraordinary circumstances before enforcement against newsmen will be had.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: New York Times vs. US

F: In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co. I: Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment? R: Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. https://youtu.be/pj1ZCwVjSyI

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Near vs. Minnesota

F: Jay Near published a scandal sheet in Minneapolis, in which he attacked local officials, charging that they were implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction to prevent Near from publishing his newspaper under a state law that allowed such action against periodicals. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined (stopped) from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. I: Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment? R: The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was unconstitutional as applied. History had shown that the protection against previous restraints was at the heart of the First Amendment. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. Thus the Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. https://youtu.be/BWEELUHibQc

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Beauharnais vs. Illinois

F: Joseph Beauharnais, president of White Circle League, Inc., was arrested on January 7, 1950 for distributing leaflets on Chicago street corners. The leaflets called in part upon the mayor and aldermen of Chicago "to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people...by the Negro." Beauharnais was charged with violating an Illinois law making it illegal to distribute any publication that "exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy." A jury found him guilty and he was fined $200. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. I: id Beuharnais' conviction under the Illinois statute violate his constitutional right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? R: No. In a 5 - 4 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court concluded that Beuharnais' speech amounted to libel and was therefore beyond constitutional protection. Citing the racial tensions of the day, the Court characterized Beuharnais' speech as provocative and rejected the argument that the Illinois statute could be easily abused, stating, "Every power may be abused, but the possibility of abuse is a poor reason for denying Illinois the power to adopt measures against criminal libels sanctioned by centuries of Anglo-American law."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Houchins vs. KQED, Inc

F: KQED Inc., owner of a number of licensed television and radio broadcasting stations, requested permission to inspect and take pictures of the Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. KQED sought to investigate a recent suicide that had occurred at the facility. Houchins, the Sheriff of Alameda County, denied access to the media. I: Did the First Amendment guarantee news media a right of access to jails over and above that of other persons? R: No. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the First Amendment granted no special right of access to the press to government-controlled sources of information. The Court reasoned that the importance of acceptable prison conditions and the media's role of providing information afforded "no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to enter these institutions. . .and take moving and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Stanley vs. Georgia

F: Law enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials. I: Did the Georgia statute infringe upon the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment? R: The Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited making private possession of obscene materials a crime. In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall noted that the rights to receive information and to personal privacy were fundamental to a free society. Marshall then found that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." The Court distinguished between the mere private possession of obscene materials and the production and distribution of such materials. The latter, the Court held, could be regulated by the states.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: City of Ladue vs. Gilleo

F: Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance. I: Does the Ladue ordinance violate Gilleo's right to free speech as protected by the First Amendment? R: Yes. Although acknowledging Ladue's police power to minimize visual clutter associated with signs, the Court ruled that the law "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important." The Court held a "special respect" for an individual's right to convey messages from her home.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Cox Broadcasting Corp vs. Cohn

F: Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims. I: Did the Georgia law violate the freedom of the press as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? R: The Court held that the Georgia statute violated the Constitution. Justice White recognized the primacy of issues of privacy and press freedom, but he also identified compelling reasons why the press should not be restricted in this case. First, the news media is an important resource for citizens which allows them to scrutinize government proceedings. The commissions and adjudication of crimes are issues relevant to the public interest. Second, in the development of the privacy right, the Court has held that the interests of privacy "fade" in cases where controversial "information already appears on the public record." Restricting the media as the Georgia law did was a dangerous encroachment on press freedom, argued White, as it "would invite timidity and self-censorship."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Time, Inc vs. Firestone

F: Mary Alice Firestone filed for divorce from her husband, an heir to the Firestone Tires fortune. He counterclaimed alleging "extreme cruelty and adultery". The court granted the divorce with an ambiguous decree that did not specify the grounds. Time Magazine printed an article reporting that Firestone's extreme cruelty and adultery caused the divorce. Firestone requested a retraction, but Time refused. Firestone sued Time, Inc. for libel in Florida state court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Firestone for $100,000. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. I: Did the Florida court's judgment violate Time's First Amendment protections? R: No. In a 6-2 vote, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion vacating the lower judgment and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the actual malice standard for media reports on public figures did not apply. Firestone was not a public figure as defined by prior precedent. The Court also held the Florida judgment invalid because the court awarded damages without determining fault. Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurrence, stating that the ultimate question is whether Time exercised reasonably prudent care in light of the ambiguous divorce decree. Justice Potter Steward joined in the concurrence

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Miller vs. California

F: Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings. I: Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee? R: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: ISKCON, Inc vs. Lee

F: New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals. Solicitation was permitted outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed. I: Does the regulation violate the First Amendment free speech clause? R: No. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Ward vs. Rock Against Racism

F: New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression. I: Does the New York ordinance substituting a city-employed technician and mixing board for a performer's mixer and equipment violate the First Amendment? R: No. The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest "could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Zelman vs. Simmons-Harris

F: Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. I: Does Ohio's school voucher program violate the Establishment Clause? R: No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the program does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that, because Ohio's program is part of Ohio's general undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients and the incidental advancement of a religious mission, or any perceived endorsement, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Feiner vs. New York

F: On March 8, 1949, Irving Feiner, a white student at Syracuse University, made an inflammatory speech on a street corner in Syracuse, New York. During the speech, which was intended to encourage listeners to attend a leftist rally, Feiner made several disparaging remarks about local politicians, organizations, and President Truman. A crowd gathered, and several listeners began "muttering" and "shoving." One listener threatened Feiner. Two officers on the scene, fearing violence, asked Feiner twice to end his speech. After he refused, the officers arrested Feiner for inciting a breach of the peace. A trial court found Feiner guilty and sentenced him to thirty days in prison. On appeal, Feiner argued his arrest violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. The Onondaga County Court and the New York Court of Appeals each denied his claim. I: Did Feiner's arrest for inciting a breach of the peace violate his right to free speech under the First Amendment? R: No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Chief Justice Fred Vinson, the Court applied the "clear and present danger" principle it originally articulated in Schenck v. United States (1919). According to the Court, Feiner's arrest was a valid exercise of "the interest of the community in maintaining peace and order on its streets." The Chief Justice dismissed the notion that the arrest amounted to the suppression of free communication. "It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Miami Herald Publishing Co. vs. Tornillo

F: Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The Miami Herald published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the Herald publish his responses to the editorials. When the Herald refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The Herald challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision. I: Did Florida Statute Section 104.38, the "right to reply" statute, violate the free press clause of the First Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? R: Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Florida and held that Florida's "right to reply" statute violated the freedom of press found in the First Amendment. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court recognized the risks posed to the "true marketplace of ideas" by media consolidation and barriers to entry in the newspaper industry. However, even in that context, "press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and...cannot be legislated." The statute was an "intrusion into the function of editors," and imposed "a penalty on the basis of the content." Chief Justice Burger relied on New York Times v. Sullivan in that the "right to reply" statute "limits the variety of public debate," and was therefore unconstitutional. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. authored a concurring statement. Justice Byron R. White authored a concurring opinion.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Rosenberger v. University of Virginia

F: Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines. I: Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines? R: Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furtheremore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Roth vs. US, Alberts vs. Caifornia

F: Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products. I: Did either the federal or California's obscenity restrictions, prohibiting the sale or transfer of obscene materials through the mail, impinge upon the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment? R: In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973).

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: R.A.V vs. City of St. Paul

F: Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. I: Is the ordinance overly broad and impermissibly content-based in violation of the First Amendment free speech clause? R: Yes. In a 9-to-0 vote, the justices held the ordinance invalid on its face because "it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." The First Amendment prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-semites are bastards but not that all Jews are bastards. Government has no authority "to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules." https://youtu.be/1ZO-BDjHxNQ

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Paris Adult Theatre I vs. Slaton

F: State officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were "hard core" pornography unprotected by the Constitution. I: Did the Georgia injunction against the films violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression? R: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene films did not acquire constitutional protection simply because they were exhibited for consenting adults only. Conduct involving consenting adults, the Court argued, was not always beyond the scope of governmental regulation. The Court found that there were "legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity," including the community's quality of life and public safety. The Court also noted that conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene materials was not necessary to justify the Georgia law. The Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court with instructions to reconsider its decision in light of the obscenity standard spelled out in Miller v. California. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the works in question were obscene and directed the trial judge to issue an order permanently enjoining the theatre from exhibiting the films.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Abington School District vs. Schempp

F: The Abington case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools. At the beginning of the school day, students who attended public schools in the state of Pennsylvania were required to read at least ten verses from the Bible. After completing these readings, school authorities required all Abington Township students to recite the Lord's Prayer. Students could be excluded from these exercises by a written note from their parents to the school. In a related case -- Murray v. Curlett -- a Baltimore statute required Bible-reading or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at open exercises in public schools. Murray and his mother, professed atheists -- challenged the prayer requirement. I: Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? R: The Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment since the readings and recitations were essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Furthermore, argued Justice Clark, the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the school's actions from violating the Establishment Clause.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Forsyth County, Georgia vs. Nationalist Movement

F: The Board of Commissioners for Forsyth County enacted an ordinance that permitted the county administrator to charge a fee of not more than $1,000 per day for a permit to hold a parade, assembly, or demonstration on public property in the county. The law allowed the administrator to adjust the fee to correspond with the estimated cost of maintaining public order during the activity. In January 1989, The Nationalist Movement (Movement) applied for a permit to hold a rally on the courthouse steps in Cumming, Georgia, to protest the federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr. The county charged $100 for the permit, but that amount that did not include a calculation for expected law enforcement expenses during the rally. The Movement did not pay the fee and did not hold the rally; instead the Movement sued the county in federal district court and challenged its authority to interfere with the Movement's free speech and assembly rights. The district court found that the county administrator did not unconstitutionally apply the ordinance to the Movement's permit application because the fee was based solely on content-neutral criteria such as the costs of processing the application. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the permit fee of up to $1,000 a day exceeded the constitutional requirement that governments charge only a nominal fee for using public forums. I: Does an ordinance that permits a government administrator to vary the fee for assembling or parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order violate the free speech guarantees under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? R: Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the ordinance violated the free speech guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it contained no reasonable or definite standards to guide the county administrator's calculation of permit fees. Additionally, the ordinance required the administrator to examine the speech's content to assess the likelihood of public hostility to the message and adjust the fee accordingly to account for security and law enforcement costs. In the Court's view, a nominal fee lower than $1000 could not save the ordinance from the constitutional infirmities it found. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent in which he disagreed with the argument that the Constitution limits a parade license fee to a nominal amount and argued that the Court should have remanded the case to determine the scope of the ordinance and how it was administered. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined the dissenting opinion.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Engel vs. Vitale

F: The Board of Regents for the State of New York authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. This was an attempt to defuse the politically potent issue by taking it out of the hands of local communities. The blandest of invocations read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our teachers, and our country." I: Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment? R: Yes. Neither the prayer's nondenominational character nor its voluntary character saves it from unconstitutionality. By providing the prayer, New York officially approved religion. This was the first in a series of cases in which the Court used the establishment clause to eliminate religious activities of all sorts, which had traditionally been a part of public ceremonies. Despite the passage of time, the decision is still unpopular with a majority of Americans.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Island Trees School District v. Pico

F: The Island Trees Union Free School District's Board of Education (the "Board"), acting contrary to the recommendations of a committee of parents and school staff, ordered that certain books be removed from its district's junior high and high school libraries. In support of its actions, the Board said such books were: "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy." Acting through his friend Francis Pico, and on behalf of several other students, Steven Pico brought suit in federal district court challenging the Board's decision to remove the books. The Board won; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. I: Did the Board of Education's decision to ban certain books from its junior high and high school libraries, based on their content, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections? R: Yes. Although school boards have a vested interest in promoting respect for social, moral, and political community values, their discretionary power is secondary to the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that as centers for voluntary inquiry and the dissemination of information and ideas, school libraries enjoy a special affinity with the rights of free speech and press. Therefore, the Board could not restrict the availability of books in its libraries simply because its members disagreed with their idea content.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Lemon vs. Kurtzman

F: The Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 109, which reimbursed nonpublic religious schools for certain secular educational services. On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court held that Act 109 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The case was remanded, and on remand the district court entered an order which permitted the State to reimburse nonpublic religious schools for services provided before Act 109 was declared unconstitutional. Lemon and others challenged the district court's opinion, asserting that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin payment of around $24 million set aside by the State to compensate nonpublic religious schools for educational services rendered during the 1970-1971 school year. I: Was it an abuse of a court's discretion to allow payment of allocated funds to nonpublic religious schools, after such allocations were found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court? R: No. Announcing the Judgment of the Court, Justice Warren E. Burger affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Court held that permitting payment of allocated funds for 1970-1971 school year would not substantially undermine constitutional interest at stake. The Court also recognized that the denial of payment would have serious financial consequences on private schools which relied on the statute and the funds allocated for the 1970-1971 school year. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment. Justice William O. Douglas, joined by Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Potter Steward, dissented. The dissent held that the First Amendment was violated whether the payment from public funds to religious schools involved the prior year, the current year, or the next year. Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in consideration of this case.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Hazelwood School District vs. Kuhlmeier

F: The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court. I: Did the principal's deletion of the articles violate the students' rights under the First Amendment? R: No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Erznoznik vs. City of Jacksonville

F: The University Drive-In Theater in Jacksonville, Florida had a screen that was visible from nearby public streets. The theater showed an R-rated film containing female nudity, which violated a Jacksonville city ordinance that prohibited the showing of films containing nudity if the film was visible from a public area. Richard Erznoznik, the theater's manager, was charged with a Class C offense under the ordinance. He challenged the ordinance in Duval County Circuit Court, which upheld the statute. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari. I: Did Jacksonville's ordinance violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? R: Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down the Jacksonville ordinance. While individuals did have a right to not be exposed to offensive films, the ordinance singled out "some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others," Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for the majority. Since the "offended viewer readily can avert his eyes" from the films shown, Jacksonville's distinction between films with nudity and films without nudity was unconstitutional. Under Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, "government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." The ordinance was "broader than permissible" in trying to protect children from exposure to nudity and "invalid" as an attempt to prevent traffic accidents. Justice William O. Douglas authored a concurring opinion.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: West Virginia vs. Barnette

F: The West Virginia Board of Education required that the flag salute be part of the program of activities in all public schools. All teachers and pupils were required to honor the Flag; refusal to salute was treated as "insubordination" and was punishable by expulsion and charges of delinquency. I: Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment? R: In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. The Court found that such a salute was a form of utterance and was a means of communicating ideas. "Compulsory unification of opinion," the Court held, was doomed to failure and was antithetical to First Amendment values. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson argued that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." https://youtu.be/hcHifcBzyoo

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Lynch vs. Donnelly

F: The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket. I: Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? R: No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Abrams vs. US

F: The defendants were convicted on the basis of two leaflets they printed and threw from windows of a building. One leaflet signed "revolutionists" denounced the sending of American troops to Russia. The second leaflet, written in Yiddish, denounced the war and US efforts to impede the Russian Revolution. The defendants were charged and convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and for urging curtailment of production of essential war material. They were sentenced to 20 years in prison. I: Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? R: No and no. The act's amendments are constitutional and the defendants' convictions are affirmed. In Clarke's majority opinion, the leaflets are an appeal to violent revolution, a call for a general strike, and an attempt to curtail production of munitions. The leaflets had a tendency to encourage war resistance and to curtail war production. Holmes and Brandeis dissented on narrow ground: the necessary intent had not been shown. These views were to become a classic libertarian pronouncement.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Tilton vs. Richardson

F: The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been given, schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose. I: Did the Act violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment? R: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would have the effect of advancing religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in question had not used their federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the facilities were "indistinguishable from a typical state university facility." The Court also held that the Act did not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that college students were less susceptible to religious indoctrination, that the aid was of "nonideological character," and that one-time grants did not require constant state surveillance.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Agostini vs. Felton

F: This suit was brought by a New York parochial school board, and some of its student's parents, as a challenge to a District Court ruling upholding the twelve-year-old decision set out in Aguilar v. Felton (473 US 402). The decision in Aguilar prohibited public school teachers from teaching in parochial schools as a violation of the Establishment Clause. On appeal from the Second Circuit's affirmance of a District Court's denial of the parent's challenge, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. I: Is the Establishment Clause violated when public school teachers instruct in parochial schools? R: No. The Court overruled its decision in Aguilar v. Felton. The Court held that there was no evidence to support its former presumption that the entrance of public school teachers into parochial schools will inevitably lead to the indoctrination of state-sponsored religion. The New York program under which public school teachers were sent into parochial schools did not provide parochial schools with any incentive, financial or other, to establish religion in order to attract public school teachers. The Court added that under its new view, only those policies which generate an excessive conflict between church and state will be deemed to violate the Establishment Clause. As such, one should no longer find that all entanglements between church and state have a distinctly positive or negative impact on religion.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Van Orden vs. Perry

F: Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion. I: Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" R: No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Allegheny County vs. ACLU

F: Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh. I: Did the public displays violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? R: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the creche inside the courthouse unmistakably endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. By prominently displaying the words "Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ," the county sent a clear message that it supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy. The Court also held, however, that not all religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally legitimate given its "particular physical setting."

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Madsen vs. Women's Health Center, Inc.

F: Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer-zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order. I: 1) Is the prohibition of all protesting within the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic an infringement of the First Amendment right to free speech? 2) Is the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the clinic a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 3) Do the limitations imposed on noise-making constitute a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 4) Do the restrictions placed on the use of images violate the First Amendment right to free speech? 5) Is it a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech to bar protesters from approaching potential patients when they are within a 300-foot radius of the clinic? 6) Is it a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech to prohibit all protesting in a 300-foot radius of clinic staff residences? R: No, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Shepherd vs. Maxwell

F:After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. I:What threshold must be crossed before a trial is said to be so prejudicial, due to context and publicity, as to interfere with a defendant's Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial? R:In an 8-to-1 decision the Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. Noting that although freedom of expression should be given great latitude, the Court held that it must not be so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting. The Cleveland television media's repeated broadcasts of Sheppard confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with, the blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media, and the physical arrangement of the courtroom itself - which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and present media - all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against Sheppard as to deny him a fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: US vs. Progressive, Inc.

F:En 1909, Robert LaFollette, the famous Progressive leader from Wisconsin, founded a monthly news magazine in Madison, Wisconsin called The Progressive. The Progressive movement enjoyed some success as a third-party movement in American politics into the 1920s, and the magazine enjoyed a wide circulation. After LaFollette's 1924 bid for the presidency, which won 16% of the popular vote, third parties such as the Progressives largely disappeared as a force in American politics until the 1992 campaign of H. Ross Perot. Today, the magazine has a small but loyal audience of approximately 50,000 subscribers. In 1978, the magazine commissioned freelance writer Howard Morland to write an article concerning government secrecy in the area of energy and nuclear weapons. Energy and nuclear issues were Morland's specialty, and after months of extensive background research Morland wrote "The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It." On February 27, 1979, Samuel H. Day, Jr., the magazine's managing editor, sent a copy of Morland's draft to the Department of Energy's offices in Germantown, Maryland. Day asked the DOE to verify the technical accuracy of Morland's draft before the magazine published it. John A. Griffin, DOE's director of classification, and Duane C. Sewell, assistant secretary of energy for defense programs, read the article with alarm. They determined that it contained sensitive material, material that constituted "restricted data" under the Atomic Energy Act. On March 1, 1979, Lynn R. Coleman, DOE's General Counsel, phoned Day and Erwin Knoll, another editor involved in the Morland article. Coleman asked that the magazine not publish the article, stating that in addition to DOE, the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency believed publication would damage U.S. efforts to control the worldwide spread of nuclear weapons. The next day, Sewell met with Day, Knoll, and Ronald Carbon, the magazine's publisher. I:the question before this Court involves a clash between allegedly vital security interests of the United States and the competing constitutional doctrine against prior restraint in publication. R: Judge Robert Warren granted the injunction arguing that not all the information had come from sources available to the public and even if it did, the Morland article posed a danger by exposing certain concepts that up to that point had not been dislcosed in relationship to each other. The letter described in detail how to construct a hydrogen bomb. All articles in parts do not pose a threat; however when taken together, they can reveal to the public how to create a bomb. Thus, posing a security threat.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Reynolds vs. US

F:George Reynolds, secretary to Mormon Church leader Brigham Young, challenged the federal anti-bigamy statute. Reynolds was convicted in a Utah territorial district court. His conviction was affirmed by the Utah territorial supreme court I:Does the federal anti-bigamy statute violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause because plural marriage is part of religious practice? R:No. Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, writing for a unanimous court, held that the statute can punish criminal activity without regard to religious belief. The First Amendment protected religious belief, but it did not protect religious practices that were judged to be criminal such as bigamy. Those who practice polygamy could no more be exempt from the law than those who may wish to practice human sacrifice as part of their religious belief.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: US vs. Stevens

F:Robert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for "knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain." His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest. I:Is 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? R:Yes. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that depictions of animal cruelty are not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court further reasoned that because a "substantial number" of § 48's applications are unconstitutional, the law is overbroad and, thus, invalid. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented. He disagreed with the majority opinion arguing that § 48 was not intended to suppress speech, but rather to "prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty." He was concerned that the majority holding will practically legalize the sale of such videos and spur the resumption of their production.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Skyywalker Records, Inc vs. Navarro

F:The recording As Nasty As They Wanna Be was released to the public by 2 Live Crew in 1989. To date, public sales have totalled approximately 1.7 million copies. The recording is available in various formats including phonograph records, cassette tapes, and compact discs. 2 Live Crew has also produced a recording entitled As Clean As They Wanna Be (Clean) which has sold approximately 250,000 copies. Although neither party introduced Clean into evidence, it apparently contains the same music as Nasty but without the explicit sexual lyrics. In mid-February 1990, the Broward County Sheriff's office began an investigation of the Nasty recording. The investigation began in response to complaints by South Florida residents. *583 Broward County Deputy Sheriff Mark Wichner was assigned to the case. On February 26, 1990, he traveled to Sound Warehouse, a Broward County retail music store, and purchased a cassette tape copy of the Nasty recording. The tape was purchased from an open display rack marked "Rap Music", easily accessible to all of Sound Warehouse's customers regardless of age. Deputy Wichner listened to the Nasty recording, had six of the eighteen songs transcribed, and prepared an affidavit detailing these facts requesting that the Broward County Circuit Court find probable cause that the Nasty recording was legally obscene. On February 28, 1990, Deputy Wichner submitted the affidavit, an attached transcript of the six songs, and the tape cassette of the Nasty recording to the duty judge of the Broward County Circuit Court, the Honorable Mel Grossman. The communications between Deputy Wichner and Judge Grossman were limited to the filing of the affidavit, transcript, and tape cassette. Several days later, Judge Grossman's chambers contacted the deputy and requested further information concerning the location in Sound Warehouse of the Nasty recording and its accessibility to the public. Deputy Wichner communicated that information to the judge. On March 9, Judge Grossman issued an order after reviewing the Nasty recording "in its entirety." The judge explicitly found probable cause to believe this recording was obscene under section 847.011 of the Florida Statutes and under applicable case law. The Broward County Sheriff's office received and copied the order, and distributed it county wide to retail establishments that might be selling the Nasty recording. It decided to "warn the stores as a matter of courtesy" rather than make an initial arrest because, according to Deputy Wichner's testimony, such conduct would have been overaggressive. The Sheriff's office has not opened any investigations of other musical recordings because of the absence of citizen complaints. Thereafter, Deputy Wichner re-visited the store where he had purchased the original recording plus another Sound Warehouse outlet and a store called Uncle Sam's Records. On these visits, the deputy wore a jacket marked "Broward County Sheriff" and displayed his badge in plain view. He spoke with a manager in each of the three stores, provided them with a copy of Judge Grossman's order, and told them, in a friendly conversational tone, that they should refrain from selling the Nasty recording. The managers were warned that further sales would result in arrest and that if convicted, the penalty for selling to a minor was a felony, and a misdemeanor if sold to an adult. Between fifteen and twenty different Broward County stores were personally visited by the Sheriff's office, and the evidence indicates that each of the visits was conducted in the same manner as were Deputy Wichner's three stops. The Sheriff's office warnings were very effective. Within days, all retail stores in Broward County ceased offering the Nasty recording for sale. Those stores not directly visited by deputy sheriffs pulled the recording from their shelves after hearing about the visits from television and radio reports. Some stores continued to sell the Clean recording. Nasty was no longer sold even by stores having a policy of specially marking the recording with a warning, and of not selling it to minors. 2 Live Crew also includes a small statement on the front of the paper insert to their recording, as follows: "WARNING: EXPLICIT LANGUAGE CONTAINED". The Broward County Sheriff's office took no further action because there was no information that any store was selling the Nasty recording. I: Is Nasty recording obscene under state law or protected by the first amendment freedom of speech? R: No not protected speech. Freedom of speech not absolute especially on the grounds of obscenity. The people of Florida have made obscenity a crime. Individuals are not free to disobey or disregard the law. The law is not a smorgasbord where people are free to pick and choose among which laws they will obey and which they will reject. Neither is it a channel selector available to every member of the public to use as they deem fit. As noted in the Pattern Instructions of the Eleventh Circuit, jurors in deciding the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens "must ... follow the law ... whether.... [they] agree with that law or not." Men and women in good faith may agree or disagree as to whether obscenity should be prohibited. They can argue that the obscenity statutes should or should not be repealed. In the meantime, however, the law must be obeyed and the Sheriff has a duty to enforce it. Indeed, Florida's Legislature has mandated that all sheriffs in the state are to "vigorously enforce" the obscenity laws.

Identify the constitutional issues/issues, holding, subject matter and what law comes out of it: Village of Skokie vs. National Socialist Party of America

F:The village of Skokie, Illinois had a population of approximately 70,000 persons, of whom approximately 40,500 were Jewish. Included within this population were thousands who survived detention in Nazi concentration camps. On March 20, 1977, Frank Collin, the leader of the National Socialist ("Nazi") Party of America, informed Skokie's police chief that the National Socialists intended to march on the village's sidewalk on May 1. As a result of media attention and a number of phone calls allegedly made by Nazi Party members to residents with "Jewish names", this planned demonstration became common knowledge among Skokie's Jewish community. Collin wrote a letter to Skokie officials stating that the purpose of the demonstration was to protest the Skokie Park District's ordinance requiring a bond of $350,000 to be posted prior to the issuance of a park permit. He also stated that the demonstration would consist of 30-50 demonstrators marching in single file in front of the Skokie Village Hall. The demonstrators intended to wear uniforms similar to those traditionally worn by Nazis, including swastika armbands. Collin also said that the demonstrators would not make derogatory public statements and would cooperate with reasonable police instructions. The district court of Cook County conducted a hearing on a motion by the Village of Skokie for a preliminary injunction. The court considered Collin's letter as an affidavit and took the testimony of a number of Skokie residents. One resident testified that a number of Jewish organizations planned a counterdemonstration for the same day with an expected attendance of 12,000 to 15,000 persons, and that the appearance of Nazi demonstrators could well lead to violence. The mayor of Skokie also testified that the demonstration could lead to uncontrollable violence. The court entered an order enjoining defendants from marching, walking, or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or off their person on May 1, 1977. The Nazi Party applied to the Illinois appellate court for a stay of the district court's injunction; the appellate court denied their application. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court also denied the petition for a stay. The Nazi Party then filed an application for a stay with Justice John Paul Stevens, who referred the matter to the Court. I:Did the Illinois Supreme Court improperly deny the National Socialist Party's request for a stay of the district court's injunction? R:Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Illinois must provide strict procedural safeguards, including appellate review, to deny a stay for an injunction depriving the Nazi Party of protected First Amendment rights. The Court treated the Illinois Supreme Court's denial of a stay as a final judgment for the purposes of Supreme Court jurisdiction because it involved a right separable from and collateral to the merits of the Nazi Party's case. Hence, the Court also treated the Nazi Party's application for a stay as a petition for certiorari. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Potter Stewart, dissented. He disagreed that the refusal of the Illinois Supreme Court to stay an injunction could be described as a final judgment or decree by the highest court of a state. He noted that no Illinois appellate court had heard or decided the merits of the Nazi Party's federal claim.

In the area f freedom of religion and freedom from religion, two general approaches or attitudes concerning how the Constitution should be interpreted with regards to this provisions has been presented. Identify by name and describe what the assumptions behind each approach are.

In the area of freedom of religion and freedom from religio, two attitudes concerning how the Constitution should be interpreted with regards to this provison has been presented. They are seperationist and nonpreferentialist. Seperationist give a broader scope to the establishmnet clause. They would preclude any legislation on the subject of religion(emphasize wall seperation between church and state). On the other hand, nonpreferentialist believe that congress would be barred from creating an official, publicly supported church, but nothing would prevent government from supporting religious activities as long as there is no discrimination among sects or religious groups. (advocates of original intent: framers did not intend any wall of separation b/w religion and government)

What, specifically, does John Stuart Mill have to say about the freedom of speech?

John Stuart Mills suggests that a struggle always takes place between the competing demands of authority and liberty. Such a concept for an unlimited domain of free speech cannot be defended. Mill tells us that any doctrine should be allowed the light of day no matter how immoral it may seem. Such liberty should exist so that we have absolute freedom of opinion.Mill also suggests that we need some rules of conduct to regulate the actions of members of a political community. Because of this matter, Mills created the no harm principle. This principle states no action should be taken against the speech of another unless it causes direct harm to another (invades someones else's rights).

What is the nature of the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the States?

Originally, the bill of rights was made to protect us from the Federal Government not the state governments so they did not have to comply with it nor give us the same protections guaranteed to us by the bill of rights that the federal government provided. Usually, most cases were decided on a case by case basis. Over time, the idea that the state governments should incorporate the bill of rights (or at least some of it) into the legal system at the state level began to arise. The question was how much of the bill of rights should we incorporate and which rights should we incorporate. Thus, there arose several theories on how to incorporate the bill of rights into the states. They are the following: case by case fairness, selective incorporation, selective incorporation plus, total incorporation, and total incorporation plus.

What is the difference between speech that causes a "clear and present danger" and speech that creates a "bad tendency"?

Speech that causes a "clear and present danger" is speech that produces or is intended to produce clear and imminent danger that will bring about forthwith substantive evils. It is a question of proximity and degree. However, speech that creates a "bad tendency" to harm the public walfare can be outlawed or regulated even if the harm was not imminent or clearly present.

what does it mean to talk about both freedom OF religion and freedom FROM religion? Explain differences between these terms and make specific appropriate references to constitution. Making specific appropriate reference to the Constitution, explain what the difference is.

The first Amenment includes two clauses relating to religion. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.." The first amendment seems to talk about two different concepts: freedom of religion and freedom from religion. The founding fathers wanted a country free from a national religion. This was to be a country free from one religion overpowering others as the establised and respected national religion. The second clause indicates a freedom of religion. The freedom to pick and choose one's own religious beliefs.

what is the nature of the conflict that may arise between the First and Sixth Amendments? In other words, what two specific rights find themselves in tension?

The nature of the conflict that may arise between the first and sixth amendments stems from freedom of the press and the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.

What are the political and ideological difference between the two ways of thinking? While the two approaches obviously don't deal with criminal justice, how could you compare the way they are presented to the two models of criminal justice described by Herbert Pecker in his article from the first part of the course. While the two approaches obviously don't deal with criminal justice, how could you compare the way they are presented to the two models of criminal justice described by Herbert Pecker in his article from the first part of the course.

The political or ideological differences between the two ways of thinking are that one favors a total separation between church and state and the other favors the original intent of the framers. Thus, for seperationist laws respecting a particular religion or religious activities could be deemed unconstitutional. For nonpreferentialist, claim that there is nothing that would prevent government from supporting religious activity so long as there is no preference. While the two approaches obviously do not deal with criminal justice, one could compare nonpreferentialist as due process models due to their tendency to be more liberal and seperationists could be compared to the crime control modeld due to their tendency to be retrictive b/w church and state.

Which position seems to be the prevailing theory? How do you know?

The prevailing theory is selective incorporation plus. I know this today virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated. Further, as an examination of the cases reproduced in chapter 8, the court's selective approach to absorbing provisions of the first 8 amendments plus the Griswold holding meant a trend toward selective incorporation plus.

amicus curiae

a friend of the court; a party who has interests to protect, but who has no right to appear in the instant suit and who, by leave of the court, is permitted to introduce argument or evidence bearing on the policy question before the court.

precedent

a previous court decision thought to be analogous in some important respect to a current case.

federalism

a system of government in which state governments and national government share power.

statute

a written law passed by a legislative body.

dissenting opinion

an opinion written by a judge who votes for the losing part in a lawsuit.

Selective Incorporation

distinguishes between important and unimportant rights and gives firm protection to right incorporated, but affords no protection for rights outside the bill of rights; lacks any historical justification, and criterion for incorporation is vague. In Selective incorporation theory "liberty" means all of the provisions of the first eight amendments thought "fundamental to a scheme of ordered liberty." Justice Cardozo took this position in Palko.

Total Incorporation Plus

has all of the advantages and disadvantages of total incorporation except that, while it is not static, it raises the problem of subjectivity in incorporation of rights beyond the Bill of Rights. In Total Incorporation Plus "liberty" means all of the provisions of the first eight amendments and any others thought fundamental. Justices Murphy and Rutledge took this position in Adamson. Justice Douglas took this position in Adamson and in Griswold. *The plus is Right to Privacy.

Case by Case Fairness

is flexible, dynamic, and sensitive to the cost of incorporation, but can be very subjective and unpredictable, and affords inadequate protection to civil liberties. In the theory of case by case fairness, "due process" means assessing on a case by case basis whether the procedures at issue are fair. The court took this position in Hurtado, Justice Reed took this position in Adamson, Justice Frankfurter took this position in Adamson and in Rochin, Justice Harlan Jr. took this position in Griswold, Duncan, and Williams.

Selective Incorporation Plus

is what is being used now. It distinguishes between important and unimportant rights and gives firm protection to rights incorporated but also adds privacy as a right.

prior restraint

judicial suppression of material that would be published or broadcast, on the grounds that it is libelous or harmful.

writ of certiorari

orders a lower court to deliver its record in a case so that the higher court may review it.

Total Incorporation

provides a clear guide as to which rights are incorporated and affords firm protection for civil liberties, but is very rigid, static, and costly. It may be historically questionable. In Total Incorporation, "liberty" means all of the provisions of the first eight amendments, no more, on less. Justice Harlan took this position in Hurtado, Maxwell, and Twining. Justice Black took this position in Adamson, Rochin, and Griswold.

Which one is more restrictive of speech and why?

speech that creates a "bad tendency" is the most restrictive because virtually anything that could disturb the public peace or attempt to subvert the government is not protected by the first amendment. In other words, just the mear revolutionary utterance can lead to distubances of public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction. The clear and present danger test only regulates the speech that which there is a clear and present danger not just a bad tendency of speech. It allows for more flexibility of what it restricts.

What has been proposed to minimize said problem? (conflict between first and sixth amendment)

the court has recognized that publicity may in fact help acheive a fair trial by encouraging individuals with relevant information to come forward. Media intrusion on the defendant's right to trial before an impartial jury depends on the volume and nature of the publicity have in fact jeopardized the fairness of the proceedings. prior restraint of publication is the suggested proposition to minimize the issue. An Additional solution would be change of venue---less exposed to the intense publicity that seemed imminent, postponement of trial to allow public attnetion to subside, use of searching questioning of prospective jurors (screen out those fixed on opinion of guilt or innonce), and the use of emphatic and clear instructions on the sworn duty of each juror to decide the issues only on evidence presented in open court.

appellant

the party who lost in the lower court and who seeks review of that court's judgement by a higher court.

judicial review

the power of a court to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of a coordinate branch of government

stare decisis

the practice of adhering to settled law, as contained in previous court decisions; reliance upon precedent.