First Amendment Midterm

Freedom from Religious Foundation

Believed in the seperation of church and state

Lemon Test (Lemon v. Kurtzman)

Three tests are described for deciding whether the government is improperly involved with religion. 1) Has a secular legislative purpose. 2) Its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion. 3) It does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. **Originally thought of in Abington v. Schempp (1963) when readings from the Bible and the Lord's Prayers were being discussed

Chaplain

clergyman attached to a chapel In 1789, the first Senate convened and their first order of business was to appointment a committee to recommend a candidate or chaplain

freedom of association

the right to join with others, share ideas, and work toward a common purpose -To leave groups without punishment -Developed through case law and its connection to Free Speech and implicating the Free Exercise promise Helps protect minority groups who don't want to participate

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006)

***determined that RFRA can be applied on a federal level. RFRA is useful when a petitioner can prove that the FEDERAL government is violating free exercise clause Facts of the Case: O Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a religious organization, brought suit in federal court to prevent the government from interfering with UDV's use of hoasca, a substance used during religious ceremonies that contains a drug prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. UDV argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibits substantial imposition on religious practices in the absence of a compelling government interest, established their right to use hoasca. The district court sided with UDV and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the government had not sufficiently proved the alleged health risks posed by hoasca and could not show a substantial risk that the drug would be abuse recreationally. In response to the Attorney General's argument that prohibiting the drug was required by an international treaty, the court ruled that the government had failed to "narrowly tailor" its prohibition of the drug. Question: Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 require the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession and use of an otherwise illegal drug by a religious organization when Congress has found that the drug has a high potential for abuse, is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and violates an international treaty when imported or distributed? Holding: Ruled in favor of UDV. es. In a unanimous 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that the government had failed to prove a compelling interest in regulating the UDV's use of drugs for religious purposes. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the government's argument that the Controlled Substances Act could accommodate no exceptions. On the contrary, Justice Roberts wrote, the Court is required by the RFRA to examine individual religious freedom claims and grant exceptions to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown. The Court also rejected the argument that an exception for UDV was precluded by international treaty. The government failed to submit "evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV," instead citing "the general importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in the international war on drugs." The Court held that such general government interests were not sufficient to satisfy the compelling interest standard. -The court "grants exception to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown

Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)

**After the case, the Court turns away from the belief, conduct language they made during the Reynolds case Held that the First Amendment does not require States to excuse public school students from saluting the American flag and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance on religious grounds. Facts of the Case: In 1935, Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from Pennsylvania public schools for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses and believed that saluting the flag was forbidden by the Bible. They argued the expulsions violated their First Amendment rights. Question: Did the mandatory flag salute infringe upon liberties protected by the 1 and 14th Amendments? Holding: In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the mandatory flag salute. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter he relied primarily on the "secular regulation" rule, which weighs the secular purpose of a nonreligious government regulation against the religious practice it makes illegal or otherwise burdens the exercise of religion. The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values," and that national unity was "the basis of national security." Frankfurter wrote that the school district's interest in creating national unity was enough to allow them to require students to salute the flag. The Court declined to make itself "the school board for the country." Justice Harlan Stone dissented, writing that the "very essence of the liberty" guaranteed by the Constitution "is the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say." Stone's position soon became the majority; the decision was reversed in 1943 in

Everson v. Board of Education (1947)...New Jersey

**First case that incorporates the Establishment, meaning this is the case where we see the establishment clause also apply to the states. Similar to Cantwell v. Connecticut did for Free Exercise Facts of the Case: A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds. Question: Did the New Jersey statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Holding: No. Justice Black reasoned that the law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was rather enacted to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school. An act of public safety that had nothing to do with public safety *Referenced Jefferson's wall of seperation in his private letter to the Danbury Baptists

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014)

**What do we do with free exercise when the Free Exercise of one person infringes another's free exercise right? Facts of the Case: The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. Hobby Lobby didn't want to provide 4 of the 20 available types of contraception. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. On September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, $500 million, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question: Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 allow a for-profit company to deny its employees health coverage of contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company's owners? Holding: Yes. Even though the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company's owners. The Court held that Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are composed of individuals who use them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception requirement forces religious corporations to fund what they consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. In fact, a less restrictive method exists in the form of the Department of Health and Human Services' exemption for non-profit religious organizations, which the Court held can and should be applied to for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby. Additionally, the Court held that this ruling only applies to the contraceptive mandate in question rather than to all possible objections to the Affordable Care Act on religious grounds, as the principal dissent fears. In his concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the government had not met its burden to show that there was a meaningful difference between non-profit religious institutions and for-profit religious corporations under the RFRA. Because the contraception requirement accommodates the former while imposing a more restrictive requirement on the later without showing proper cause, the requirement violates the RFRA. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority's decision was precluded by the Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith in which the Court held that there is no violation of the freedom of religion when an infringement on that right is merely an incidental consequence of an otherwise valid statute.

Elaine Photography v. Wilock (2013)

**state level Facts of the case: refused to photograph a same sex marriage but offered self-portraits etc Holding: Elaine Photograph's conduct violated New Mexico's Human Rights Act -Refusing to photograph was not supported free exercise -Accomodation of different belief is the price of civil life in a plural society -No compelled speech -The Supreme Court denied cert in 2013

Sherbert Test

-A response to the Court's vague use of "rational basis", introducing "strict scrutiny" instead. Under rational basis, the Court considered whether the law in question was rationally related to a government interest. The burden on the government was increased 1. The government is to carefully consider whether or not free exercise has been burdened 2. To impose a burden, the government had to prove a compelling state interest 3. Narrowly tailored—In order to pursue the compelling state interest, the state had so so in the least restrictive manner and prove there was no alternative way to achieve their ends in a less burdensome way to the person's religion

Enlightenment Views (aligned with the Evangelicals

-Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin -Wanted freedom from interference of Church and State -They were primarily motivated by preventing religion from interferring with the state -Skeptics of religion and organized religion if it infiltrated the political sphere

Puritan Views

-New Englanders -The Church and the State should exist in two separate spheres -Different purposes and leaders -Took measures that the two worlds remained separate...church officials could not hold public office and vice versa -The job of the church and the church leaders was to preach the word, administer sacraments, care for the poor, train the young -The job of the state and political authorities were called to enforce law, punish those who commit crimes, expected to cultivate a sense of virtue, protect peace and order -Each was supposed to use its sphere to maintain a sense of community towards the Divine. -Saw this two-spheres are ultimately linked together for one purpose -Each was supposed to use its sphere to maintain a sense of community towards the Divine. Together, they could be a model -The government and church helped out each other so it was not an absolute separation

Powers granted to state government under the articles of confederation

-Organize and control a milita -Taxation -State Court systems -Anything that isn't explicitly mentioned in regards to national, is given to the state government -Judicial proceedings

Civic Republican Views (aligned with Puritans)

-Positive view religion -Worked to enstill religious ethic or ethos within society -Thy felt society benefitted from religion -non-sectarian religion that is about promoting good practices and values -Believed in the bible and secular text for cultivating these values -Tried not to favor one religion over the other but still some favoritism

Evangelical View

-Wanted more seperation for Puritans -Believed in a strict seperation of church and state on any institutional level

Federal Judiciary Act of 1789

-passed by George Washington -created/designed the state and federal court system

Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)

..Facts of the Case: An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile. Question Did Alabama law violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause? Argument Wallace v. Jaffree - Oral Argument Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Jaffree, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Establishment of Religion Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.

How does a case get to the Supreme Court?

1. party from lower court petitions for write of certiorari 2. rule of 4: 4 justices must agree to hear the case U.S. District Courts --- U.S. Court of Appeals --- U.S. Supreme COurt

Articles of Confederation

1st Constitution of the U.S. 1781-1788 (weaknesses-no executive, no judicial, no power to tax, no power to regulate trade) 2nd contiental congress adopts the Articles of Confederation on Nov. 15 1777

Supreme Court Justices

9 justices, lifetime appointment, nominated by the president,approved by the Senate Gorsuch Kavanaugh Barett Thompson Alito Roberts Bryer Sotomayor Kagan

People v. Phillips 1813

A Catholic priest was seeking an exemption from presenting testimony in Court because of something that had been told to the priest in a confessional, something that was supposed to be private Sharing that information would be a violation of the priest's religious beliefs Involved a Free Exercise claim The Court ultimately rules in favor of the priest because they don't want to subject him to harm even though the defendant will now go free Violation of the "light of conscience" **The stolen items in question were returned so there wasn't actually a public safety issue

writ of certiorari

A formal writ used to bring a case before the Supreme Court. Cases are granted cert if: 1. A lower court is breaking with precedent that has been established 2. A case raises new constitutional questions 3. Two courts of appeals are handling the issue differently 4. Inconsistencies between 2 states on a federal issue

Federalists

A term used to describe supporters of the Constitution during ratification debates in state legislatures. Alexander Hamilton James Madison John Jay

Originalism

A view that the Constitution should be interpreted according to the original intentions or original meaning of the Framers. Many conservatives support this view. The mechanism to evolve is an amendment The nature of interperting a document requires that its meaning and surrounding meaning of the text remains the same or close to it Consider the context then and apply to know Limits the concept of judicial review which was established by Marbury v. Madison (constrains the power of unelected judges to prevent unelected people to overturn the decisions of those elected; preserving the integrity of democracy because justices are not appointed by the people)

Responsible for writing the declaration of Independence

Benjamin Franklin Thomas Jefferson John Adams Robert Livingston Rodger Sherman

First Amendment

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Powers granted to the national government under the articles of confederation

Declare war Sign treaties Coning money Established Congress Settles disputes between states Maintain an army

RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act)

Established by Congress in 1993 in response to Smith 1990 Seeks to reestablish the Sherbert test (the state must prove a compelling interest; heightening scrutiny) When it was first passed, RFRA applied to all levels of government Only focused on the Free Exercise Clause **The Court did not like RFFRA -Believed that congress had gone too far by establishing the precedent of RFRA, violating their legal bounds because it is the court's job to interpert the Constitution

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Established judicial review

Board of Education of Central School v. Allen (1968)...New York

Facts of the Case: A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and parochial schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education, requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the board and found the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding that the boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have standing, but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type of school they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment. Question: Do the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment forbid New York from requiring that public school boards loan textbooks to parochial school students without cost? Holding: NO. No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court applied the test constructed in Abington School District v. Schempp and found that, because the stated legislative purpose and necessary effects of the statute did not advance any one religion or religion in general, the law did not violate the First Amendment. Because the books were given to the students, rather than the parochial schools themselves, the Court reasoned, "the financial benefit is to parents and children, not schools." Connections to Everson

Zubik v. Burwell (2016)

Facts of the Case: In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires group health plans and health insurance issuers offering health plans to provide preventative care and screenings for women pursuant to the guidelines established by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These guidelines include "approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity." The regulations include an exemption from contraceptive coverage for the group health plan of a religious employer. The exemption does not mean that such services are not covered, but that they are not covered through a cost-sharing mechanism. The petitioners are religious organizations that argue that the contraceptive coverage mandate of the ACA violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which Congress enacted in 1993, because the mandate requires these organizations to "facilitate" the provision of insurance coverage for contraceptive services that they oppose on religious grounds. In several separate cases, the relevant district courts issued injunctions against the government, and the relevant Courts of Appeals reversed. The appellate courts held that the religious organizations were unable to show that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of their religious freedom. They didn't even want to sign a form for an employee to find contraception elsewhere because they felt they were complicity Holding: After determining through a supplemental briefing that insurance companies could provide contraceptive coverage to employees of organizations that object to such coverage on religious grounds without the organizations needing to provide notification, the Court vacated the case for further consideration by the lower courts in light of this agreement from the parties. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that it reached no decision on the merits of the case, and nothing in the opinion should be construed as affecting the ability of the government to ensure that employees covered by the insurance plans at issue receive full contraceptive coverage. Given the importance of the issues involved in this case, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts to afford the parties the opportunity to determine how to proceed in a manner that grants employees full contraceptive coverage while also respecting the organizations' religious exercise.

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018)

Facts of the Case: In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, CO, and requested that its owner, Jack C. Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages. Craig and Mullins filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-301 to -804, C.R.S. 2014. After the Division issued a notice of determination finding probable cause, Craig and Mullins filed a formal complaint with the Office of Administrative Courts alleging that Masterpiece discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation in violation of CADA. The Administrative Law Judge issued a written order finding in favor of Craig and Mullins, which was affirmed by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Commission's ruling. Question: Does the application of Colorado's public accommodations law to compel a cake maker to design and make a cake that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about same-sex marriage violate the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment? Holding: The Court reversed in a 7-2 decision, holding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's conduct in evaluating a cake shop owner's reasons for declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause. The Court explained that while gay persons and same-sex couples are afforded civil rights protections under the laws and the Constitution, religious and philosophical objections to same-sex marriage are protected views and can also be protected forms of expression. The Colorado law at issue in this case, which prohibited discrimination against gay people in purchasing products and services, had to be applied in a neutral manner with regard to religion. The majority acknowledged that from Phillips' perspective, creating cakes was a form of artistic expression and a component of his sincere religious beliefs. The Court also explained that in 2012, the year that Phillips refused his services to Craig and Mullins, the law in Colorado and across the country with regard to same sex marriage was much more unsettled than it became after United States v. Windsor, 570 US 744 (2013) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015). At the time, the State Civil Rights Division had also concluded in at least three other cases that bakers had acted lawfully in declining to make cakes that included messages they disagreed with, specifically messages demeaning gay persons. Thus it was not unreasonable for Phillips to believe that he was acting lawfully at the time, and his claims before the Commission were entitled to neutral treatment. However, the Court stated that Phillips did not receive this neutral treatment, with members of the Commission showing clear and impermissible hostility toward his religious beliefs. The Court explained that commissioners' comments disparaging Phillips' beliefs and characterizing them as rhetorical were inappropriate, though these comments were not mentioned or disavowed in subsequent legal proceedings. The Court concluded that these comments cast doubt on the fairness of the Commission's consideration of Phillips' claims. The Court also pointed out that disparities between Phillips' case and those of other bakers with objections to making cakes with anti-gay messages, and who were victorious before the Commission, further reflected hostility toward the religious basis for Phillips' position. The Court concluded that the Commission's actions violated the State's duty under the First Amendment not to use hostility toward religion or a religious viewpoint as a basis for laws or regulations. Under the facts of this case, the Court determined that Phillips' religious justification for his refusal to serve Craig and Mullins was not afforded the neutral treatment mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.

Zorach v. Clauson (1952)

Facts of the Case: In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in McCollum v. Board of Education, New York City began a program in which students in public schools could be dismissed from classroom activities for certain periods to participate in religious instruction elsewhere. In McCollum, the Court disallowed an Illinois program in which representatives of religious groups came to public schools and taught classes during the school day. New York's "released time" program was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals. Question: Did the New York program violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion: In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "released time" program neither constituted the establishment of religion nor interfered with the free exercise of religion. The Court noted that public facilities were not being used for the purpose of religious instruction and that "no student was forced to go to the religious classroom." Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas argued that there was "no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence."

County of Allegheny v. ACLU (1989)

Facts of the Case: Involved two separate displays around the holiday system in the city of Pittsburgh. One was a nativity scene in the grand staircase of a county courthouse. Had an angel with a banner, "Glory to God in the Highest" and it had a sign that it had been donated by a catholic group The second religious display was an 18-ft tall Menorah owned by a Jewish group next to the city council building which was next to a giant Christmas tree with a sign that said "A Salute to Liberty" So the ACLU and other members of the community sued against both of these holiday displays Holding: The Court has a fragmented decision where they say that the creche (nativity) was a violation of Establishment, but the Menorah was not. Justice Blackman argued that the nativity scene communicated a religious scene in itself that is only further emphasized in the banner next to it, Glory to God and the donation of the Catholic group also provided further endorsement of the beliefs. In contrast, the menorah did not send a message of endorsement or disapproval. The menorah has become more of a winter symbol than something religious specific in the way that a nativity scene communicates

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004)

Facts of the Case: Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words "under God" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to the words "under God" violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. The district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Newdow did have standing "to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter." The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words "under God" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause. Holding: In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court found that Newdow did not have standing to bring suit because he did not have sufficient custody over his daughter. "When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law," Justice Stevens wrote. Because it found that Newdow did not have standing, the Court failed to reach the constitutional question. Chief Justice Renquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas all wrote seperate concurrences, saying that requiring teachers to lead the Pledge is constitutional.

Espinoza v Montana Department of Revenue (2020)

Facts of the Case: Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule ("Rule 1") prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits "direct or indirect" public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs. Espinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court Question: Does a state law that allows for funding for education generally while prohibiting funding for religious schools violate the Religion Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution? Holding: The application of the Montana Constitution's "no-aid" provision to a state program providing tuition assistance to parents who send their children to private schools discriminated against religious schools and the families whose children attend or hope to attend them in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion on behalf of the 5-4 majority. The Court first noted that the Free Exercise Clause "protects religious observers against unequal treatment" and against "laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status." In this case, Montana's no-aid provision excluded religious schools from public benefits solely because of religious status. As such, the law must be subject to strict scrutiny review; that is, the government must show that its action advances "'interests of the highest order" and that the action is "narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests." Montana's interest in this case—which the Court described as creating greater separation of church and state than the federal Constitution requires—does not satisfy strict scrutiny given its infringement of free exercise. Because the Free Exercise Clause barred the application of Montana's no-aid provision, the Montana Supreme Court lacked the authority to invalidate the program on the basis of that provision. Yes. This deals with religious people, so this is discriminatory because anyone else could use the scholarship money towards education that is not religious

Epperson v. Arkansas (1968)

Facts of the Case: The Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-supported schools from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human evolution. Epperson, a public school teacher, sued, claiming the law violated her First Amendment right to free speech as well as the Establishment Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated her free speech rights; the State Supreme Court reversed. Question: Does a law forbidding the teaching of evolution violate either the free speech rights of teachers or the Establishment clause of the First Amendment? Holding: Yes. Yes. Seven members of the Court held that the statute violated the Establishment clause. Writing for the Court, Justice Abe Fortas stated that the law had been based solely on the beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, who felt that evolutionary theories directly contradicted the biblical account of Creation. This use of state power to prohibit the teaching of material objectionable to a particular sect amounted to an unconstitutional Establishment of religion.

Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010)

Facts of the Case: The Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law (CLS) filed suit against the university in a California federal district for violating its First Amendment rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize the CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all registered student organizations to allow "any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs." In contrast, CLS requires its members to attest in writing that "I believe in: The Bible as the inspired word of God; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son; The vicarious death of Jesus Christ for our sins; His bodily resurrection and His personal return; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration; [and] Jesus Christ, God's son, is Lord of my life." The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on recognizing student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Therefore, the school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights. Holding: Sides with Hastings. No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the college's all-comers policy is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student organization forum; and, therefore, did not transgress First Amendment limitations. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the same considerations that have led the Court to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums, counseled the same result in this case. The Court further reasoned that, considering this constitutional inquiry occurs in the education context, Hasting's all-comers policy is reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote separately, concurring. He agreed with the Court's holding and answered an argument raised by CLS that Hasting's Nondiscrimination Policy would be "plainly unconstitutional" if addressed in this case. He disagreed with CLS noting that while the First Amendment may protect CLS' discriminatory practices off campus, it does not require a public university to validate or support such practices. Not viewpoint specific Conduct, not belief stood in the way of RSO status

Little Sister of the Poor v. Pennsylvania (2020)

Facts of the Case: The Women's Health Amendment to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that women's health insurance include coverage for preventive health care, including contraception. The rule provided that a nonprofit religious employer who objects to providing contraceptive services may file an accommodation form requesting an exemption to the requirement, thereby avoiding paying for or otherwise participating in the provision of contraception to its employees. Holding: Research

Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017)

Facts of the Case: Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. (Trinity) operates a licensed preschool and daycare called The Learning Center that was initially opened as a non-profit corporation but merged with Trinity in 1985. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy and incorporates daily religious instruction into its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants that provide funds for qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. Trinity applied for such a grant but was denied because Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution states, "no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion." Trinity sued and argued that the denial of its application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First Amendment's protections of freedom of religion and speech. The district court granted Missouri DNR Director Pauley's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Trinity moved for reconsideration and to amend its complaint to include allegations that such grants had previously been given to religious organizations. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and the denial of the motions to reconsider and amend the complaint. Question: Does the exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Holding: The exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violates the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protected the freedom to practice religion and subjects laws that burden religious practice to strict scrutiny. First Amendment precedent had established that laws that deny an otherwise generally available benefit because of religious status are unconstitutional, though laws that are neutral and generally applicable may be upheld even if they hamper religion. The distinction was whether the law in question discriminates against some or all religious beliefs. In this case, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources' policy of denying religious organizations from its Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause because it discriminated against otherwise eligible organizations based solely on their religious character. **These two cases raised questions about how much benefit should be afforded to comply with free exercise but not too much so as to violate the Establishment Clause

School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp (1963)

Facts of the Case: Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself. The Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state. Question: Did the Pennsylvania law requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Holding: Yes. Public schools cannot sponsor Bible readings and recitations of the Lord's Prayer under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. In an opinion authored by Justice Clark, the majority concluded that, in both cases, the laws required religious exercises and such exercises directly violated the First Amendment. The Court affirmed the Pennsylvania decision, and reversed and remanded the Maryland decision because the mandatory reading from the bible before school each day was found to be unconstitutional. Justice Stewart dissented, expressing the view that on the records it could not be said that the Establishment Clause had necessarily been violated. He would remand both cases for further hearings.

Edwards v. Aguillard (1987)

Facts of the Case: A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well. Question: Did the Louisiana law, which mandated the teaching of "creation science" along with the theory of evolution, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? Holding: Yes. The Court held that the law violated the Constitution. Using the three-pronged test that the Court had developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to evaluate potential violations of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued that Louisiana's law failed on all three prongs of the test. First, it was not enacted to further a clear secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a "supernatural being created humankind," a doctrine central to the dogmas of certain religious denominations. Third, the law significantly entangled the interests of church and state by seeking "the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose."

Lee v. Weisman (1992)

Facts of the Case: In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. Question: Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Holding: Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.

Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000)

Facts of the Case: Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech. Question: Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Holding: Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."

McCreary County v. ACLU (2005)

Facts of the Case: The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." They also included portions of The Declaration of Ind that mentioned God. They then add other documents with significant legal influence to include with the 10 amendments. The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause. Question: Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation? Holding: Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."

Van Orden v. Perry (2005)

Facts of the Case: Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion. Question: Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" Holding: No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause." It was also featured with a number of other monuments and it was outdoors so not explicitly in a building. Couldn't agree with the legal reasoning. We have a ruling but leaves open the door for rulings as far as precedent **The Lemon Test was not used here because it involved a passive monument. It's better to take into account the nature of the monument and our nation's history—we've seen the 10 commandments in other government places and contexts throughout history **Also surrounded by other historical monuments—no texas specific meaning as its supposed to provide **A panel of people from a various religious background

Trinity Lutheran Church of Colombia Inc. v Comer (2017)

Facts of the Case: Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. (Trinity) operates a licensed preschool and daycare called The Learning Center that was initially opened as a non-profit corporation but merged with Trinity in 1985. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy and incorporates daily religious instruction into its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants that provide funds for qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. Trinity applied for such a grant but was denied because Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution states, "no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion." Trinity sued and argued that the denial of its application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First Amendment's protections of freedom of religion and speech. The district court granted Missouri DNR Director Pauley's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Trinity moved for reconsideration and to amend its complaint to include allegations that such grants had previously been given to religious organizations. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and the denial of the motions to reconsider and amend the complaint. Question: Does the exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Holding: Yes. The exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violates the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protected the freedom to practice religion and subjects laws that burden religious practice to strict scrutiny. First Amendment precedent had established that laws that deny an otherwise generally available benefit because of religious status are unconstitutional, though laws that are neutral and generally applicable may be upheld even if they hamper religion. The distinction was whether the law in question discriminates against some or all religious beliefs. In this case, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources' policy of denying religious organizations from its Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause because it discriminated against otherwise eligible organizations based solely on their religious character. The law did not need to prevent the religious organization from practicing its religion; it was sufficient that the law denied a religious organization the same opportunity to compete for a benefit that is otherwise available to all secular organizations. Because the state's interest in using this policy was simply to draw a wide berth around religious establishment concerns, it was not a sufficiently compelling interest. In his opinion concurring in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment clearly prohibited laws that facially discriminate against religion.

McCollum v. Board of Education (1948)

Facts of the Case: -Illinois The case tested the principle of "released time", where public schools set aside class time for religious instruction. The Champaign County Board of Education authorized a program in which outside religious teachers hired by private third parties provided weekly religious instruction in public schools. The classes were not mandatory. McCollum, an atheist, complained that her son was ostracized for not attending the classes. McCollum eventually sued the school board in 1945, arguing that the religious instruction in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Question: Did the use of the public school system for religious classes violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holding: In an opinion written by Justice Black, the majority held that program violated the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council violated the constitutionally-required separation of church and state. Because pupils were required to attend school and were released in part from this legal duty if they attended the religious classes, the Court found that the Champaign system was "beyond question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups and to spread the faith." In his lone dissent, Justice Stanley Forman Reed objected to the majority's broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause.

Braunfeld v. Brown (1961)

Facts of the Case: Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law. Question: Did the Pennsylvania blue law violate the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religious beliefs? Holding: In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute; however, the freedom to act (even in accordance with religious convictions) is not totally free from government restrictions. The Court found that the Sunday Closing Law had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. The blue law is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state can accomplish its secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all through other means. That an indirect burden, such as economic sacrifice, may be a result of the statute, does not make the blue law unconstitutional.

Lemon v Kurtzman (1971)

Facts of the Case: Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island's statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers' annual salaries. The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials' motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment. Question: Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Holding: Yes. Can't use government money towards advancing religious purpose Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority as to the Pennsylvania statute and 8-1 as to the Rhode Island statute. The Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster "excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court held that both the state statutes in question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure minimum secular education requirements were being met in the non-public schools. The Court did not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test, but it did find that the statutes constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island program, the amount of oversight of teachers and curricula required to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion into secular topics would require the government to become excessively involved in the nuances of religious education. The same danger holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides state funding directly to a church-related organization. Government financial involvement in such institutions inevitably leads to "an intimate and continuing relationship" between church and state. The Court also noted the potential political implications of public funding, as there is a risk of religious issues becoming politically divisive.

Marsh v. Chambers (1983)

Facts of the Case: Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature, challenged the legislature's chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Chambers on the use of public funds. The appeals court supported Chambers on the prayer practice. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Question: Does the chaplaincy practice of the Nebraska legislature violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Holding: In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court upheld the chaplaincy practice. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger abandoned the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which had been the touchstone for cases involving the Establishment Clause. In its place, Burger rested the Court's opinion on historical custom. Prayers by tax-supported legislative chaplains could be traced to the First Continental Congress and to the First Congress that framed the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, the chaplaincy practice had become "part of the fabric of our society." In such circumstances, an invocation for Divine guidance is not an establishment of religion. "It is," wrote Burger, "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."

American Legion v. American Humanist Association (2019)

Facts of the Case: In Bladensburg, Maryland, as part of a memorial park honoring veterans is a 40-foot tall cross, which is the subject of this litigation. Construction on the cross began in 1918, and it was widely described using Christian terms and celebrated in Christian services. In 1961, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the cross and the land, as well as the responsibility to maintain, repair, and otherwise care for the cross. The Commission has spent approximately $117,000 to maintain and repair the cross, and in 2008, it set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations. Several non-Christian residents of Prince George's County, Maryland, expressed offense at the cross, which allegedly amounts to governmental affiliation with Christianity. American Humanist Association is a nonprofit organization advocating for the separation of church and state. Together, AHA and the individual residents sued the Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Commission's display and maintenance of the cross violate the Establishment Clause. Applying the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the district court found that the Commission did not violate the Establishment Clause because (1) the cross has a secular purpose, (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not have a primary effect of endorsing religion. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. Using public funds to take care of and upkeep the cross is the problem Holding: The court saw no problem with the cross, believing that it was not an establishment problem The Court said that although the cross is a Christian symbol, it has taken on a secular meaning. This was a memorial originally for WWI veterans ***The Lemon test is not helpful here. When we encounter monuments and memorials like this (erected in 1925), we should presume them to be constitutional. We should assume that they're not doing anything evangelistic unless another set of facts prove otherwise Here Justices voice their distaste or Lemon

Sherbert v. Verner (South Carolina, 1963)

Facts of the Case: Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal to work on Saturday constituted a failure without good cause to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday. Holding: The Free Exercise promise required exemption of religious believes from this nondiscriminatory, secular law. The court rules in favor of Sherbert. The Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling state interest that justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right.

Reynolds V. US (Utah, 1879)

Facts of the Case: George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Question: Is religious duty or belief a defense to a criminal charge? Holding: The Court upheld Reynolds's conviction and Congress's power to prohibit polygamy. The Court held that while Congress could not outlaw a belief in the correctness of polygamy, it could outlaw the practice thereof. The majority reasoned that while marriage is a "sacred obligation," it is nevertheless "usually regulated by law" in "most civilized nations." Finally, the Court held that people cannot avoid a law due to their religion.

Wisconsin v. Yoder (Wisconsin, 1972)

Facts of the Case: Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs. They wanted to home-school their children according to their beliefs Holding: The Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade. In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion," and that an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law. **Became the basis for education alternatives **High water marker for free-exercise exemptions

Chuch of Lukumi Babalu Aye v City of Hialeah (1993)

Facts of the Case: Santeria, an Afro-Cuban religion with a number of followers in south Florida, sacrifice animals by cutting their carotid arteries in the neck then cooking and eating the animal thereafter for a series of different rituals and celebrations—birth, marriage, death rites, the initiation of new members and priests, and during their annual celebration. When the Church of Lukumi Aye announced plans to establish a church in Hialeah, Florid, the city council held an emergency meeting to pass ordinances that outlawed animal sacrifices for public or private rituals. The district court and the court of appeals upheld the ordinances. The Church of the Lukumi Aye alleges that their free exercise has been violated Question: Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause? Holding: Yes, the Court held that the ordinances passed by the City o Hialeah were neither neutral nor generally applicable, violating the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause A law that fails to satisfy the requirements of neutrality and general applicability imposes a burden that must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The ordinances did not pass the Smith test. The failure of the ordinances lies in the fact that they targeted the Santeria religion by passing discriminatory laws only applicable to their religious sacrifices, not other secular forms of animal torture and killing in the city—the Court listed practices such as hunting, extermination of mice and rats, euthanasia of stray animals, the infliction of pain for medical experiments, etc.—as permitted by law. The ordinances burdened more religious conduct than was needed to achieve their ends, and failed to survive under strict scrutiny

Employment Division v. Smith (1990)

Facts of the Case: Two counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related "misconduct." The state appellate court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that the denial violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The state supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees Question: Can a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes? Holding: The Court ruled that, yes, a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind -The court emphasizes that laws that are neutral and generally applicable do not in call cases pose these free exercise concerns ***Undid the work of Sherbert

Stone v. Graham (1980)

Facts of the Case; In Kentucky, a law required the posting of the 10 commandments in public schools. Some parents challenged the law. Stone representing the parents and Graham representing the superintendent of the County Schools. Kentucky lower courts uphold the district's thought that the display had secular, not religious purpose Holding: In a 5-to-4 per curiam decision, the Court ruled that the Kentucky law violated the first part of the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and thus violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The Court found that the requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted "had no secular legislative purpose" and was "plainly religious in nature." The Court noted that the Commandments did not confine themselves to arguably secular matters (such as murder, stealing, etc.), but rather concerned matters such as the worship of God and the observance of the Sabbath Day. The Supreme Court says, according to the Lemon test, requiring the 10 commandments to be displayed does not have a secular purpose. What is the secular purpose? **In 2018, Tennessee passed a law for all public schools to display the words "In God We Trust" somewhere in the school that is visible **No fixed standard for Establishment—iconsistent

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)

Facts of the case: The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court granted Boerne's request for certiorari. Question Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation? Holding: The court said that there is no violation of free exercise in this case, bu the supreme court rules that RFRA applied to the states was unconstitutional. Congress could not impose a federal burden on states. Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Court held that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, is precisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.

Engel v. Vitale (1962)

Facts of the case: The New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments. Question: Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment? Holding: The state cannot hold prayers in public schools, even if participation is not required and the prayer is not tied to a particular religion. Breached the wall of separation between church and state In an opinion authored by Hugo L. Black, the Court held that respondent's decision to use its school system to facilitate recitation of the official prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, the policy breached the constitutional wall of separation between church and state. The Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition of laws establishing religion meant that government had no business drafting formal prayers for any segment of its population to repeat in a government-sponsored religious program. The Court held that respondent's provision of the contested daily prayer was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. *some states started instating "moments of silence'

Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014)

Facts of the case: The town of Greece, New York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the denominations represented. In February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers. Question: Does the invocation of prayer at a legislative session violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment even in the absence of discrimination in the selection of prayer-givers and content? Holding: No. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the context and jurisprudence surrounding the First Amendment suggested that the Establishment Clause was never meant to prohibit legislative prayer, which created the proper deliberative mood and acknowledged religion's role in society. The content of this prayer does not need to be non-sectarian, because such a requirement would place the courts in the role of arbiters of religious speech, which would involve the government in religion to an extent that is impermissible under the Establishment Clause. The Court thus held that the prayers in question do not violate this tradition and are therefore acceptable under the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy further argued that legislative prayer is primarily for the members of the legislative body, and therefore such prayers do not coerce the public into religious observance. Though the respondents testified that they felt offended by these prayers, Justice Kennedy distinguished between offense and coercion and noted that the former does not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas did not join in this portion of the opinion. In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that there is a long tradition of constitutionally permissible legislative prayer and that such prayer need not be non-sectarian, especially when such a requirement would place the government in the position of policing prayer.

Reynolds v. United States (1879)

Facts of the case: George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Question: Is religious duty or belief a defense to a criminal charge? Holding: The Court upheld Reynolds's conviction and Congress's power to prohibit polygamy. The Court held that while Congress could not outlaw a belief in the correctness of polygamy, it could outlaw the practice thereof. The majority reasoned that while marriage is a "sacred obligation," it is nevertheless "usually regulated by law" in "most civilized nations." Finally, the Court held that people cannot avoid a law due to their religion. -Reynolds couldn't engage in an illegal act, polygamy, simply because his religion allowed it; he still has to circumscribe to the law or else that may result in others adding to or subtracting from the law as they see fit Here the court tries to draw a distinction between belief and conduct -Belief is protected by first amendment but religious conduct that violates criminal law is not protected The court believed that saying yes to mormons in this case would give religion too much power

Lynch v. Donnelly (1984)

Facts of the case: The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket. Question: Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Holding: No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."

Wall of Seperation Doctrine

Jefferson—A private letter to Danbury Baptist

Stansbury v Marks (1793)

Jonas Philips, a Jewish man, was fined 10 pound for refusing to act as a witness in the Stansbury case because the court date was on a Saturday, his Sabbath. He later waved the benefit of his testimony, and he was discharged of his fine

stare decisis

Let the decision stand; decisions are based on precedents from previous cases

At-least Standard What an establishment of religion means at minimum: **From Everson

No setting up of a church No aid in a particular way No coercion Tax-related issues

Neutrality

Non-preferentialism Suggests that the government cannot favor religion nor secularism

Anti-Federalists

Opponents of the American Constitution at the time when the states were contemplating its adoption. Advocated for a Bill of Rights to resolve the fact that they believe the Constitution went too far, granting too much concentrated power to the national government Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams

The Establishment Clause

Part of the First Amendment stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." 3 common perspectives: Strict Seperation, Neutrality, and Accommodation

RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act)

RFRA applied to land use and prisoners/inmates

Accomodationists

Recognize the importance of religion within society and should seek to accomodate within government -Can't coerce religious behavior or literally establish a church -Very literal interpertation

Holt v. Hobbs (2015)

Sherbert test revived. Facts of the Case: Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad) was an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and a practicing Salafi Muslim. He sought an injunction and temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections' grooming policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches and quarter-inch beards for diagnosed dermatological problems but otherwise no facial hair. Holt argued that growing a beard was a necessary part of the practice of his religion, that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to do so, and that the grooming policy was therefore a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Holt was willing to limit his beard to a length of one-half inch as a form of compromise with the policy. The district court granted temporary relief but then dismissed the complaint upon being presented with evidence of the other ways in which Holt was allowed to practice his religion and the extent to which the grooming policy was necessary to maintain prison security. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Arkansas Department of Correction The Arkansas Correction's Department said no to his initial request before filing a case for 1. Safety and 2. Identification Question: Does the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act by preventing Holt from growing a one-half-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs? Holding: Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Arkansas Department of Corrections policy on beards violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). The Court held that, while providing substantial protection of religious exercise, RLUIPA allows prison officials to test the sincerity of religious beliefs to prevent these from being used for illicit conduct. In this case, Holt met the standard for accommodation established in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. —that an accommodation must be based on a sincerely held religious belief—because he was neither slight nor idiosyncratic with the tenets of Islam. Further, the Court held that the district court erred in suggesting that Holt's other religious privileges demonstrated a reasonable accommodation of Holt's beliefs. The prison officials had the burden to prove that preventing inmates from growing beards furthered a compelling government interest and that this policy was the least restrictive means of interference, but the Court held that prison officials did not satisfy that burden in this case because other steps could be taken to ensure quick identification and an inability to hide contraband. In her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, while RLUIPA does not require prison officials to refute every less restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest, Arkansas officials responded inadequately to the Holt's objections. However, Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority opinion's dismissal of the explanations of the prison officials. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she objected to the majority opinion's use of the Hobby Lobby decision, because in this case the requested accommodation would not affect the religious beliefs of others.

West Virginia v. Barnette (1943)

The Free Speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits public schools from forcing students to salute the American flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance. District Court affirmed. Facts of the Case: In the wake of the Gobitis case, West Virginia passed a law that all public schools had to provide classes in history and civics to Foster national ideals and principles (also during WW2). The law demanded that kids salute the flag and if they didn't, they could face expulsion and the parents' kids could be prosecuted under the state's criminal law. Several kids from Jehovah's Witness families did not comply Question: Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment? Holding: Rule in favor of Barnette (JW). In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. In an opinion written by Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. He argued that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an improper and ineffective way of generating unity. Dissent **Believed that the Court was exceeding the scope of the judicial role and was taking o na legislative function in striking down a law

Lee Resolution (1776)

The Lee Resolution is the name given the proposal by Richard Henry Lee of Virginia that the colonies declare independence from England. Introduced in the Continental Congress on June 7, 1776, the Resolution began: Resolved, That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.... The Resolution also called for creating foreign alliances, developing a plan for confederation, and distributing it to the colonies. Lee and the other delegates knew that this proposal would be considered treason in the eyes of the English. To allow debate and input from the colonies, the Continental Congress decided to put off the vote on the Lee Resolution until July 2, 1776. On that date, Congress voted to declare independence. The words of the Lee Resolution became part of the closing lines of the Declaration of Independence. The Decleration of Ind. Call to form foreign alliances A plan for the confederation

Bill of Rights 1791

The first ten amendments to the Constitution -The First Congress of the US proposes 12 Amendments to the Constitution and the first that were not ratified, leading the third original as the first actual

Public University

The key is neutrality in dealing with issues of free speech and exercise Considered a government actor with first amendment implication Assess whether a university has instituted a policy that targets a group or viewpoint If a university allows organizations that express a viewpoint must be treated equally for religious and non-religious groups 1. Equal access to funding provided by the university 2. Freedom from the University's interference in intra-group governance 3. Due process 4. Equal access to facilities and communication

Strict Seperation

The strict principles articulated in the Lemon test for judging whether a law establishes a religion To the greatest extent possible the government should not operate in the secular and religious should operate in the private realm Concerned with private liberty -Evangelical influence—didn't want handouts from government that they're expected to repay with government interference

Symbolic interest test

Under this approach, the government violates the establishment clause if they symbolically represent one side

Constitution 1788

a body of fundamental principles or established precedents according to which a state or other organization is acknowledged to be governed. Key themes: 1. Popular sovereignty 2. Limited government 3. Seperation of Powers 4. Checks and Balances 5. Federalism 6. Republicanism

Ceremonial Deism

a legal term used in the United States for nominally religious statements and practices deemed to be merely ritual and non-religious through long customary usage (like under God in the pledge of allegiance)

Secular Regulation Rule

a person cannot be exempted on the basis of religious belief, if the law deals with a non-religious basis. weights the secular purpose of a nonreligious government regulation against the religious practice it makes illegal or otherwise burdens the free exercise of religion

Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)

incorporated the free exercise clause, recognized absolute freedom of belief Facts of the case: Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-to-door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message. Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law breach of the peace. Question: Did the Cantwell's convictions violate the First Amendment Holding: Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held the Cantwells' actions were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts reasoned that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not threaten "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech. -General regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not The Court said that the statute for disturbing public order couldn't infringe on their free exercise -The court held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views"

Endorsement Test

proposed by United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in the 1984 case of Lynch v. Donnelly asks whether a particular government action amounts to an endorsement of religion, thus violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Forbids governmental practices that a reasonable observer would view as endorsing religion; championed by Sandra Day O'Connor

Non-originalism

the meaning of the Constitution is viewed as evolving with changes in society and culture. Living or Practical constitutionalist The framers wrote the Constitution but they always intended it to be interpreted according to the values of the contemporary times, which explains some of the broad terms, allowing for the power of interperation to adopt the document to the time