History

Indian Wars 1790- 1840's: For Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne's expeditions in the Old Northwest, compare their troop discipline, use of Security, and overall success.

"Mad Anthony" Wayne's campaign and successful defeat of the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers (vs. his contemporaries failures) were due in large to his strict training and rigid discipline he instilled his his soldiers. (p. 119)

Spanish- American War: To win the Philippine War, did the US balance aggressive destructive patrols with aid programs which improved Filipino infrastructure?

Aggressive patrols to find, fix, fight and finish the guerilla enemy put heavy pressure on the rebels. Destroying villages whose inhabitants were known to support rebel guerillas was not unheard of. However, the US did conciliatory actions as well, which included infrastructure improvements, such as building roads and schools, and improving sanitation. says US officials increasingly allowed Filipino participation in government, and even formed a political party for Filipino to articulate their aims peacefully.

WWII European Theater: For the D-Day landings, did the Allies need air/naval superiority? Did airborne drop zones support all beaches? Did all beaches have hilly, easy-to-defend terrain?

Air and naval superiority was required. Airborne units would facilitate a breakout from Utah Beach by opening Avenues of Approach inland and also disrupting any German reaction. All beaches landed on flat terrain except for Omaha.

WW II Pacific: Did Guadalcanal teach US forces the importance of such things as air power? What did Buna teach MacArthur about where to attack in the Pacific?

Airpower was critical to success in the Pacific Theater. The battle at Guadalcanal was an example, where both sides fought over control of the islands airfield that would allow air domination of the region. The Allies took Buna, but at great cost and frustration. MacArthur's lesson: "No More Bunas!" pick more weakly defended but useful objectives, preferably with airfields (i.e. island hopping while avoiding Japanese strongholds).

Iraq 2003-2009, AFG 2005-2009: Regarding later developments in Afghanistan, did the US have aggressive NATO allies? Did it eliminate the Pakistani sanctuary? Was there an increasingly strong Afghan government to end a Taliban revival and secure most of Afghanistan?

Allied NATO nations sent smaller forces which operated under serious restrictions. This limited their combat effectiveness, and they could not make up for US shortfalls. The Afghan government was weak and beset by corruption and unable to control most of the country, while Pakistan's troubled border regions still made a good rebel sanctuary. All these elements led to a resurgent Taliban in 2008.

WWII Buildup: Did US leaders want to invade France sooner or later? What principle of War did their preference seem to achieve? Why did the British want to invade later? Resources? Germans?

Anglo-American debated over the timing of the invasion of France. The US wanted to land in France ASAP to achieve Mass. Britain wanted more supplies and peripheral operations to wear down Germany before hitting France.*

US and WWI: Did WW1's logistics and command demands produce a managerial revolution in the US Army? Did post-WW1 officer education support or undermine those advances?

As the US organized for a big overseas war, the Army went through a "Managerial Revolution" (page 20), which involved new homefront agencies and a General Staff shake-up to facilitate supply. The Plattsburg Movement, which helped inspire what has become the modern-day OCS represented a first in that the Army tried to provide some kind of formal training for new officers who had not gone to West Point or had finished the newly established ROTC. Post war Army education was strong & it sustained wartime lessons; e.g., Command & General Staff School; and branch schools.

War of 1812: Did pre-war supply and militia policies prepare the US well for this war? For example, was supply delivery for campaigns good? How well did the militia perform at Bladensburg?

At Bladensburg, untrained militia received mixed signals from commanders and ended up running from the field in disorder; US militia failure at Bladensburg led to Washington being burned- in part due to Poor training (per bad policies) and Poor leadership. Overall, all campaigns in 1812 failed due to poor preparation, bad leadership, unsatisfactory supply, and poor militia policies. (p. 138).

Civil War to 1863: Did Lee use Maneuver well at Chancellorsville? Did his envelopment occur early or late in the day? Crush Hooker's army or seize key terrain?

At Chancellorsville, Lee's masterful use of several Principles of War- Offensive and Maneuver- forced the Union commander to abandon his own offensive. Jackson's masterful envelopment of Hooker's right flank took all day to set up. It did not start until late afternoon; and though it shocked the Yankees, the actual attack was rushed and bred confusion which contributed to Jackson's fratricide. In all, Lee wrecked Hooker's pretty plan and put the Yankees on the defensive, Lee had not crushed Hooker's army. Nor had he seized any key terrain for that theater or for the war.

Civil War 1863-1865: For the winning side at Chickamauga (Rebels) and Missionary Ridge (Union), did envelopments of the enemy's line go according to plan? Or did penetrations become the winning maneuver?

At Chickamauga Bragg's initial envelopment move failed, but it inadvertently supported a later successful penetration. Similarly, for the Union side at Missionary Ridge, a failed envelopment led to a successful penetration attack - i.e.Grant's preferred double envelopment of Missionary Ridge foundered and instead, a planned diversionary attack against the Rebel center turned into a successful penetration attack. (p.284-85)

Mexican War: To take Monterrey, did Taylor initially Maneuver well? When he took the town, why were his actions controversial?

At the battle for Monterrey, Taylor's successful use of Maneuver fixed the Mexicans within the town. After forcing the city to surrender, Taylor was criticized by President Polk for allowing the Mexican army to leave without its arms under an armistice agreement rather than send them into captivity. (p.182-183)

Mexican War: Compare Taylor's Monterrey Campaign and Scott's Mexico City Campaign. They're both successful, but compare planning and logistics. Did both succeed only due to luck?

Both Commanders demonstrated good use of all Principles of War—especially Maneuver. However, both campaigns differed in execution. While Taylor's campaign was prone to logistical problem and reckless moves at times, Scott's Mexico City campaign was planned well and made use of excellent logistics (p. 191)

Civil War 1863-1865: In the Shenandoah Valley and in the March to the Sea, did Sheridan and Sherman destroy items that assisted the Rebel war effort?

Both Sherman and Sheridan waged a "Hard, total war" for both Sherman's March to the Sea and Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley operations. The intent was the destruction of any items that assisted the Rebel war effort. (p. 292-95)*

US Army's Non-Indian War activities 1865-1898: Did Emory Upton and John Logan both want Army reform? Regarding regular and militia forces, what kind of reform did each man want?

Both Upton and Logan wanted reform, but saw it in different ways. Emory Upton wanted a stronger, more professional regular Army with better organized and trained command (West Point-trained officers, a war college, a general staff), supplemented by federally trained/maintained reserve forces & limited militia. While as John Logan wanted a large, well-trained militia/volunteer force with less emphasis upon regulars and West Point officer.*

WW II Pacific: To support island landings, did US commanders use Mass? How about Surprise, Security and Maneuver?

Commanders used a combination of the principles of security, maneuver, mass and surprise as a part of the island hopping campaigns.

Nat'l Guard WWI- OEF/OIF: Was the Guard's role in Vietnam limited or extensive? Did this state of affairs help inspire the Total Force policy? How—greater or less role in US Army combat and combat-support functions?

Conscious decision not to activate Guard and Reserve for Vietnam = their minimal involvement in the war. Minimal Guard involvement in the Vietnam War means minimal: very, very few Guard Vietnam tours and certainly no repeat tours. After the Vietnam War, GEN Abrams and other top Army leaders did not want to repeat Vietnam, where the Guard and Reserves mostly sat on the sidelines. The Total Force change as of 1990 gave greater Guard and Reserve roles in combat and combat-support deployments.*

Operations between Vietnam and OIF/OEF: Did problems at Grenada help inspire the Goldwater-Nichols Act? Did that act in turn help guarantee in-theater Unity of Command in Operation Desert Storm?

Due to the operation's rushed nature, there were embarrassing coordination problems between the services. Lines of command were unclear. The services didn't understand each others' roles, procedures, capabilities, and limits. The Grenada operation and some other flubs inspired congressional reformers to pass the Goldwater-Nichols Act which guaranteed unity of command, later to prove successful in Operation Desert Storm.*

Desert Storm- OIF: Did the US launch air campaigns well before ground operations in both Desert Storm and the OIF invasion? Did the US achieve Surprise in both Desert Storm and the OIF invasion? How about Economy of Force and Mass?

During Desert Storm the air campaign would start before the ground campaign. Schwarzkopf would run the air campaign for weeks before committing ground forces. During OIF, Gen Franks would launch the air and ground campaigns simultaneously. Both of these operations demonstrated the effective use of the PoW elements of Surprise, Economy of Force, Offensive and Mass

Spanish- American War: In the Philippines, did the US Navy secure Manila Bay quickly? Did the US Army then work well with Filipino rebels to take Manila? Did Manila's conquest require a hard fight?

Early naval battle secured Manila Bay quickly, but Commodore Dewey had to wait 3 months for ground troops to arrive to project American power ashore. When the US Army did arrive in the Philippines, its relations with the rebels were not good because the rebels suspected the US wanted to become the Philippines' new colonial master.

After Korea up to Vietnam: Regarding terrain, type of enemy forces and required tactics, were the South Vietnam corps areas different or the same? How about for conditions within the corps areas? For the US, did Ia Drang, Binh Dinh, Dak To, and Operation Cedar Falls require the same tactical approach?

Enemy and terrain varied by corps area and within the corps areas. Commanders had to know which enemy they were fighting—NVA regulars or VC guerillas—and also account for the terrain, which might support one type of force better than the other. Different terrain and enemy situations required different tactics

THE ENGLISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE/ FRENCH & INDIAN WAR- (pre- Revolutionary War Era): Did the colonists invent England's first-ever militia units? Did they always include only volunteers and top-quality troops? Could there be discipline problems?

English militia tradition brought to America: quality varied, temporary duty by local civilian citizen, could be volunteers or draftees, perceived contractual relationship, discipline problems.

US Army's Non-Indian War activities 1865-1898: Did the president dominate post-Civil War Reconstruction policy, or did Congress? Did the US expand its Army's size to Persevere in providing full security and lasting reform in the South?

Following the end of the Civil War - Congress, not the President, set postwar policy for the Army's role in Reconstruction. While the Army was given jurisdiction for enforcing reconstruction, force-size became an issue. The Army was cut drastically after the Civil War, and could not cover all of the South. Ultimately, subtle southern resistance and waning US Perseverance led to incomplete reforms; the US Army's Reconstruction presence ended in 1877 (p.311)

Revolutionary War 1778-1783: What was the French fleet's most important contribution to Washington's successful siege at Yorktown?

French fleet blocked Royal Navy access into Chesapeake Bay. Since Cornwallis was already isolated at Yorktown from the land side, this action denied escape or resupply via the sea. (p.98-102)*

THE ENGLISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE/ FRENCH & INDIAN WAR- (pre- Revolutionary War Era): Did the Native-Americans use stealthy tactics? Did they have good security and fight willingly year-round?

GOOD: 'Guerilla' style, with raiding and use of stealth in wilderness terrain.* BAD: Not well organized; individual emphasis; poor security; poor winter operations.*

1945- Korea: Regarding firepower, what Principle of War did General Ridgway use to assist offensive success? Did he also raise morale? So why was MacArthur fired?

Gen. Ridgeway did Improved the 8th Army morale and restored offensive spirit and success. Exploited firepower Mass against Chinese mobility and firepower weaknesses. President Truman fired GEN MacArthur for publicly expressed unwillingness to support US Presidential policy.

Civil War to 1863: Did Grant use naval help and Maneuver well to take Vicksburg? Low- or high-cost campaign for Grant? Did his win give the Union full control of the Mississippi River?

Grant achieved a masterpiece of operational Maneuver and joint operations with the Navy when he took Vicksburg. With a Navy-assisted turning movement to the south and east of Vicksburg, Grant's excellent use of Maneuver pinned Rebel forces back into Vicksburg. Following a weeks long siege, the Rebels surrendered. This was a big strategic win for the Union, which now controlled the Mississippi River and also had cut the South in two.

Civil War: Later in the war, did Grant's strategic plans envision negotiations or total war? Respect for southern property? Did his strategy require short-term sequential offensives, or coordinated, continuous campaigns?

Grant favored Coordinated, Continuous Campaigns that kept the Confederates on the their heels -initiated a hard total war to break their will to fight on the homefront by destroying property and continued to enforce the Anaconda plan to strangle their supplies. (p.285-286).

Operations between Vietnam and OIF/OEF: New Technologies and/or New Weapons. Did night-vision devices help night fighting in Panama? Was anything said about technology's role in logistical planning for Desert Shield—or was there even a plan? For Operation Desert Storm, did new weapons help firepower Mass? Did they help Maneuver?

In Panama, new technologies, such as night-vision helped gain the advantage. However, high tech war requires greater logistical planning. Tech alone could help with, but not solve all logistical problems. Desert Shield is an example of no pre-existing plan that succeeded not by technology, but only due to the efforts of the man assigned to make it happen, MGEN Gus Pagonis. During Desert Storm, technology in the form of Bradley's, Abrahams tanks, Blackhawks helped Schwarzkopf effectively use Maneuver and Mass to great effect.

US and WWI: In the 1930s, did the US Army pay more attention to coast artillery, or to developing promising new tech-related functions like airborne and armor development?

In spite of the promise new technologies demonstrated in WWI, home defense was the Army's primary mission, thus giving the Coast Artillery Branch the largest budget priority over airborn and armor development (page 69). *

Post 1865 Indian Wars: Did the Army use campaigns into winter to win the South Plains and Sioux Wars? Did the US Army avoid using Indian allies in the Apache Wars? Were Apache Scouts always unreliable?

In the South Plains Wars and the Sioux War the Army gained a strategic advantage with relentless campaigns into winter, which denied the Indians critical resources. Further, nearly every Army campaign used Indian allies, whether the book mentions this fact or not. Perhaps the best example are the US Army's Apache Scouts, who proved to be very reliable. The Indian allies on a campaign could be just a few temporary scouts hired from a rival tribe, or they could even be an armed allied force.

Iraq 2003-2009, AFG 2005-2009: In 2004, could the Iraqi government exploit tactical victories that US forces won at places like Samarra? Did the 2005 elections have omens of the near civil war that erupted in 2006?

Iraqi security forces (gov't) could not secure US gains, (e.g., Samarra) which forced US units to move from crisis to crisis. The early-2005 elections seemed to go well, but were ominous regarding Iraq's future stability. The frustrated Sunnis didn't vote. Afterwards, factional violence increased leading to a near- civil war in 2006. (p. 503)*

War of 1812: Had militia performance improved in late-war battles like North Point and New Orleans? Or did the militia flee in disorder?

Jackson's leadership melded a diverse group of troops, including militia, to defend New Orleans successfully. Like North Point, the fight showed that militia could do well in War of 1812 battles.

WWII European Theater: For the Allies, did low resource priority hurt Italian operations? Did strained LOCs slow the late-1944 move to Germany? Were terrain/obstacles were a factor in slowing advance in both?

Logistical challenges plagued all the US forces- with too much demand from all the advancing armies and not enough ports and supplies. Terrain initially worked in favor of the allies in France (relatively flat providing excellent tank operational environment for Patton). Similar for the Italian peninsula. However, as both operational advances closed in on Germany, terrain became a major obstacle. Mountains in Northern Italy and rivers, heavily forested areas, etc, on Germanys western borders impeded progress.

Post 1865 Indian Wars: For the US Army, did the South Plains, Modoc, and Apache Wars each present a different environmental and tactical challenge?

Many of the wars featured initial bungling by US Army units. Red Cloud's War, the Modoc War, and the Nez Perce War noted that many of the Civil War veteran officers who remained in the Army lacked Indian-fighting experience. Moreover, each of these wars did present a different environmental and tactical challenge for the US Army. As exampled-the South plains required mounted cavalry; Modoc required infantry; Apache required highly mobile units.

Army Affairs 1900-1917: Did both the Army Corps of Engineers and Medical Corps play key roles in the Panama Canal's construction? In what ways?

Medical support was very important to US success in building the Panama Canal, which was itself a remarkable accomplishment of the US Army Corps of Engineers. Tropical disease, especially Yellow Fever, had been a big factor in beating a previous canal-building project by a French company.

THE ENGLISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE/ FRENCH & INDIAN WAR- (pre- Revolutionary War Era): In its North American colonial wars, did Britain rely exclusively upon colonial militia and Indian-style irregular tactics to beat the French?

Mixed Tactics: Enemy and terrain often determined use of guerilla-style ('American') tactics, or conventional linear ('European') tactics. Both militia and English regulars were used during conflict. See examples: Braddock's Defeat (pages 36-38- ex. militia) v. Battle of Quebec (page 39- ex. English regular troops)

Mexican War: For Taylor and his victories at Palo Alto and Buena Vista, discuss his use of artillery, terrain, and battlefield command.

Mobile artillery, sometimes called 'horse artillery' played a key role in the US victory at Palo Alto. Palo Alto's terrain was open, and seemed to favor the superior Mexican cavalry. However, it favored more the American horse artillery's ability to move quickly and shoot with clear fields of fire, which Taylor took advantage of. At Buena Vista, Taylor again utilized terrain in his defense denying the Mexicans the ability to sweep easily around the Americans' flanks. In all, Taylor maintained a strong cool confidence as a commander demonstrating battlefield Perseverance.

Revolutionary War 1775-1778: Were the bad Valley Forge conditions due to the US not having any supplies, or due to bad supply management?

NOT lack of supply; but poor logistical organization. (pg.61,79,85-87)

Iraq 2003-2009, AFG 2005-2009: For the Surge, did the US Army's COIN doctrine reflect a long-term embrace of Vietnam's lessons? Did this doctrine emphasize 'kinetic' combat over working with locals? During the Surge, did US forces work with Iraqi groups and/or the government who were more reliable allies?

New COIN doctrine re-embraced lessons abandoned after Vietnam i.e. increase emphasis upon political and social factors—along with 'kinetic' combat skills. In doing so, the US worked with more reliable Iraqi allies (such as Sunnis) as it cleared rebels, and then held areas, and built Legitimacy.

WWII European Theater: Did the Allies' Operation Market-Garden, the Germans' 1944 Ardennes attack, and the US forces at Remagen all overcome obstacles and exceed their aims?

No - both Market Garden and the Germans Ardennes attack were ultimately failures unable to overcome significant obstacles to their success. Of these three examples, only Remagen was successful where US forces used offensive and initiave to overcome obstacles and force a crossing of the Rhine River at the Remagen bridge.

After Korea up to Vietnam: Were the Pentomic, ROAD and AirMobile Divisions--and the wars for which each division was designed to fight--all applicable to the fighting in Vietnam?

No- not all these divisions and the wars they were intended to fight were applicable to Vietnam. As example, the Pentomic Division of the Mid/Late 1950s was a division with five small battle groups for the atomic battlefield. Not viable for its main mission and irrelevant for other scenarios thus abandoned in early 1960s. The ROAD Division was nuclear capable, but was bigger and more flexible to fight in various conventional war scenarios (think Europe) that would serve the intent of flexible response. the ROAD division could be adjusted to account for different scenarios and threats. The division adapted well to fight in Vietnam, but not all of its components were deemed applicable (pages 313-314, 318). The Airmobile Division: used improved helicopters to create a highly mobile division for all combat scenarios.*

Post 1865 Indian Wars: Were the San Carlos and Pine Ridge Reservations examples of how Indians remained pacified after the Army sent them to such places?

Not at all! Indians being placed on reservations often did not end the problem. Apaches hated the San Carlos Reservation's bad conditions, and some bands left to live the nomadic raiding life they had known. One of the fugitive raiders was the famous Geronimo. The Pine Ridge Reservation story is more tragic. Years after the Sioux War of the 1870s, many Sioux became miserable enough on the reservation to embrace the preaching of a holy man who promised a return to life before the whites arrived. The result was unrest which led to the controversial battle at Wounded Knee

Operations between Vietnam and OIF/OEF: In the 1990s, did US operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina encounter the same conditions, require the same approach, and achieve the same results?

Not the same conditions: Somalia was in chaos. Haiti had leadership problems, but at least had a government. Bosnia had been stabilized by a peace accord. Not the same aims and approach. In Somalia, the aims evolved, and in such a way as to produce more violence. In Haiti, the US oversaw the new leader's mostly peaceful establishment of control, and then departed. In Bosnia, US and other forces oversaw a peace already achieved. Not the same results. The US left Somalia still in chaos. It left a stable Haiti to a UN mission. Bosnia remained stable into the early 2000s.

War of 1812: In the Niagara Front battles, did aggressive combat leaders like Winfield Scott show that US Army regulars improved their ability to fight outside the US against British regulars?

On the Niagara front, leaders like Winfield Scott led well-trained and disciplined regulars into Canada (recall that the 1792 act forbade militia service outside the US), and that they fought British regulars to a standstill in conventional, linear-tactics battles. (p. 137 & 142)

Civil War to 1863: Did Lee use Offensive a lot to defend Richmond in the Seven Days battles? Did McClellan use Offensive even better at Antietam to destroy Lee's army and inspire full emancipation?

Overall Rebel General Robert E. Lee showed a lot more Offensive than his counterpart, Union General George McClellan, whose attempt to take the Rebel capital at Richmond failed. McClellan was always too slow and cautious to do any of that. (p.223-225) Lee would seize, retain and exploit the initiative if given the chance—and McClellan gave him the chance. Lee's attacks were costly and often did not achieve their tactical aims, but McClellan was so intimidated by them he retreated away from Richmond. At Antietam McClellan attacked Lee throughout the one-day battle, but failed Offensive. McClellan's uncoordinated attacks let Lee move forces along the line to deflect each Union assault. McClellan's refusal to attack Lee the next day or to pursue Lee as he retreated allowed him to escape and spared his army. The battle inspired Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation putting moral teeth in the US war aim--something that might gain European public support for the US over the Rebels.

Civil War: Did railroads and telegraphs affect operational-level events?

Overall yes! At the Operational level, railroads had a huge impact. They were the objectives and/or the facilitators for many campaigns. Telegraphs had equally big impact at the operational level, such as coordinating unit rail travel, not to mention armies. First Bull Run and the Chattanooga campaign are prime examples of how these technological advancements affected operational level influences.

Civil War: Did Army tactics account for rifled muskets at all? What hurt the tactics' effectiveness? Unit size? Experience/practice issues?

Overall, technology created problems that tactics struggled to solve. Army leaders tried to create infantry tactics that accounted for new weapons like rifled muskets. They included adding small groups of skirmishers in front of the usually regiment-sized main force whose role was to disrupt the enemy line. However, tactics still used cumbersome, large linear formations, often with inexperienced leaders that could overwhelm the newly appointed commanders' abilities. (p194-196)

WWII Buildup: General Marshall reduced the Army's combat divisions from 215 to what 90? Why? Balancing homefront and combat needs? In what way?

Per 'Victory Plan' estimates months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack (pages 82, 95), the US Army aimed to field 215 combat divisions. However, wartime realities such as homefront industry demands forced General Marshal to reduce the number of combat divisions to 90 in early 1944.

Civil War to 1863: Did Grant violate Security at Shiloh? Did he still win? High or low casualties? Did his advance into the South accelerate or decelerate? So then when Bragg went north into Kentucky, did he have the Legitimacy to secure Kentuckians support? Did that issue help end his campaign?

Poor Union Security at Shiloh enabled Rebel Surprise however, poor Rebel attack lost momentum on the first day; Grant attacked successfully the next day . Grant technically won the Battle of Shiloh, but his losses were high and his operational offensive to the south stalled. Bragg's Failed Kentucky Campaign, due in large part to lack of Legitimacy- or the inability to gain rebel support within the neutral border stare. Bragg compelled to retreat due to weaker than expected local support, poor supplies, and costly, stalemated battle at Perryville.*

1945- Korea: Did the Army reorganize after WW2? Did the reorganization sustain readiness so that Task Force Smith could stop the North Korean invasion? Where in Korea did the US/UN stop the North Koreans? By what maneuver/means did the US/UN take Inchon?

Post-WW2 drawdowns and continued tight budgets created an Army that, in spite of the beneficial organizational reforms described previously, was unready for the test it would face in Korea. The first US Army units to fight there, like Task Force Smith, would do so undertrained, undermanned and underequipped. Because of this, Task Force Smith and other 24th Infantry Division blocking forces were easily swept aside in the N. Korean initial invasion.(p. 227). At the Naktong River line the UN forces used to stabilize the western part of the Pusan Perimeter, which would finally stop the North Korean invasion. Utilizing an amphibious turning-movement, US forces landed at Inchon with spectacular success that reversed the war's fortunes.

American Military Affairs 1783-1812: Did President Jefferson build up the Army? Did he create a US Military Academy and include the Army in the Lewis and Clark Expedition?

President Jefferson Cut the Army and Navy, (review logistics, page 123), BUT he Established US Military Academy at West Point and ensured the Army's involvement in the Lewis & Clark military expedition!

WWII Buildup: When the war started for the US, which theater had top priority? Did that theater actually get the most support early in the war?

Prewar plans made Germany the top priority in a two-front war with Germany and Japan, but Japan's spectacular run of early victories disrupted that priority somewhat. Army divisions in Europe would not exceed those in the Pacific until late 1943.

Spanish- American War: Regarding US elections, what was the Filipino rebel strategy? Via what type of warfare? Did the strategy work? Why not?

Rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo chose a strategy of protracted guerilla war until the next US election in 1900. Stretching the war to the next American election via guerilla fighting would hopefully frustrate the Americans enough to vote for people who would grant Philippine independence. This strategy backfired when McKinley won re-election. McKinley favored the US retaining the Philippines and was determined to continue the fight to hold onto the island nation. *

WWII Buildup: Did the US advance across the Pacific by one axis or two? Island-hop or take every island? Regarding Formosa and the Philippines, where did the axes meet—and not meet?

Regarding China and desirable Pacific islands, in which did the US apply Economy of Force and Mass? The US advance across the Pacific represented an Economy of Force via a two axis approach led by Admiral Nimitz (central Pacific) and Gen. MacArthur (New Guinea) via a island hoping method that would not take every Japanese-held island, but would instead seize certain islands as bases for their advance toward Japan. Debate remained on where the two axis would meet- China or Philippines with the Philippines winning out. The US applied minimum essential combat power (not Mass) in China to enable Maneuver and application of decisive combat power at key islands at key times.

Army Affairs 1900-1917: Regarding Upton and Logan from Lesson 4, did Secretary of War Eli Root favor either one, or both men's ideas in his reforms? Did Root's reforms include the militia and regular-Army command?

Root would embrace both Upton and Logan's approaches to Army improvement; and he would start both militia reform and Army command reform.

Revolutionary War 1775-1778: What P of W violations hurt the British in their Saratoga Campaign? Did the British campaign fail? Any strategic consequences?

SIMPLICITY, UNITY OF COMMAND, SECURITY. Failed British operation with Big operational and strategic consequences. Snuffed a serious threat to New York and New England; Boosted Patriot morale; France saw a safe bet; and recognized and formed military alliance with the US. (p. 85)

Revolutionary War 1775-1778: At Trenton and Princeton, what Principles did Washington show he could use well? Did these US tactical victories have any strategic impact?

SURPRISE, MANEUVER, OFFENSIVE. Trenton and Princeton: Small Battles, Big Strategic Impact -Reinvigorated the American cause, Washington retained an army, Rallied American 'fence-sitters' and militia. (p. 72)

Civil War 1863-1865: Did Sherman use frequent turning movements to take Atlanta? Did his victory deny the South a rail center? Any greater political or strategic effect?

Sherman used Maneuver via frequent turning movements to force the Rebels to retreat from various defensive positions ultimately ending in Atlanta where Confederate Gen. Hoods defense of the city ultimately fell to another big turning movement which allowed Sherman to capture the city. Sherman's capture of Atlanta had considerable political and strategic effect. It was a tangible victory that helped change northerners' attitudes toward the war's progress. And the tangible result of that change was the re-election of the war-party president, Abraham Lincoln.

Nat'l Guard WWI- OEF/OIF: From Desert Storm onward, did post-Cold War commitments increase Guard involvement in overseas deployments? Did this include combat and its risks?

Since Desert Storm, the National Guard had consistently deployed as an important fraction of every major mission and routinely assumed some overseas missions, including combat and its risks, deployed alongside US Army regulars.

Vietnam war to 1980's: Did the post-Vietnam AirLand Battle doctrine emphasize the defensive or the offensive more? Did it emphasize Maneuver and the timing-related aspect of Mass more or less?

TRADOC, GEN Donn Starry, introduced AirLand Battle doctrine, which was more offensive oriented and also more flexible in handling the Soviet threat than Active Defense had been.

Revolutionary War 1778-1783: How did the Waxhaws' conduct help Patriot militia leaders like Marion? In what kind of warfare and against what kind of targets?

Tarleton's horse-borne force of mostly Tories slaughtered a retreating force of Patriot militia and regulars at the Waxhaws near the North-South Carolina border. British harsh tactics gave rise to guerilla militia leaders, such as Francis Marion, who gained local popular support attacking British forces, outposts and LOCs (p.91-93)

Operations between Vietnam and OIF/OEF: Was Task Force HAWK's deployment smooth? Did it achieve combat success in Kosovo? Did HAWK help inspire Army Transformation measures like Brigade Combat Teams?

Task Force Hawk was a US Army Apache attack-helicopter force which deployed to support the air campaign. It encountered a number of high-profile problems in its deployment, and it did not see combat. HAWK's problems helped push the Army toward what US Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki called Transformation. Perhaps the best example of his Transformation-related reforms is the Brigade Combat Team, a more deployable stand-alone unit for expeditionary operations like the one Task Force HAWK tried to support.

Indian Wars 1790- 1840's: Early in the War of 1812 on the Detroit Front, did Tecumseh enjoy combat success? Better support among Indians? What was his ultimate fate?

Tecumseh was noted as leading the Indian unity movement against colonial aggression in early 1800's.. He supported the British during the War of 1812 achieving early combat success gaining more Indian support. He was later killed at the Battle of Thames in 1813. (p. 132)*

Indian Wars 1790- 1840's: Did Tecumseh have any effect upon the Creek Indians? Describe the result among the Creeks. How did the Red Sticks fight the US in the Creek War—guerilla attacks or defensive battles? Did the US win decisive battlefield victories versus the Red Sticks?

Tecumseh's pan-Native American movement established a model for future resistance. A faction among the Creeks, who came to be known as the Red Sticks, responded to Tecumseh's call to arms, which led to the Creek War in the deep south. Red Sticks lost several conventional defensive battles- Horseshoe Bend was the most decisive. Red Stick defeat ended some of the Indian threat (war aim) and denied the British Indian allies when the British attacked the south coast. (p.144-146)

Desert Storm- OIF: In mountain operations with Afghan forces in 2004, did US forces achieve success? Could they exploit it? What role did US force size and sanctuaries in Pakistan play?

The 'MOUNTAIN' and other operations struggled to exploit success. Small US force size and Pakistani sanctuaries for the Taliban helped limit these the operational success.(509)*

THE ENGLISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE/ FRENCH & INDIAN WAR- (pre- Revolutionary War Era): Was the American Rifle an easy-to-use weapon that was suitable for European-style conventional tactics?

The American Rifle (pages 40-41, 104) Comparatively good range and accuracy; but an even slower firing rate and less user-friendly than the European smooth-bore muskets.

WWII European Theater: Fire Support. Did artillery help save US forces at Kasserine Pass? Did naval fire support help save an amphibious landing in Sicily and two other such landings on the Italian peninsula (i.e., Salerno and Anzio)?

The American use of effective fires in this war was significant, helping stave off German counter attacks at critical times. For example, US Army artillery units who, along with other forces, saved US forces and stopped Rommel after his Kasserine Pass breakthrough. Other amphibious landings on Sicily and the Italian peninsula, to include Salerno and Anzio, benefitted from US naval fire support, which snuffed a German attempts to push the Americans back into the sea. *

Civil War: Was the Anaconda Plan strategy increasingly effective in the Civil War? Was its blockade was effective early in the war? Why? Did the Union Navy implement it quickly?

The Anaconda Plan pushed a strategy featuring seizure of the Mississippi River and a coastal blockade to split and strangle the Confederacy. Initially it was ridiculed because critics believed it would take too long. However, the Union Navy implemented the Anaconda Plan blockade quickly in 1861 calling it "the most important contribution toward an ultimate Union victory" that year. As time wore on, the blockade became increasingly effective ultimately helping win the war. *

US and WWI: Did the WW1 Square Division emphasize quick maneuver or massed blows in depth? What did the WW2 Triangle Division emphasize? Was it larger or smaller than the Square Division?

The Army created the large Square divisions for Mass and staying power on a lethal, maneuver-limited, Western Front battlefields of WWI. The WWII Triangle division had to be smaller for deployment most anywhere. Higher headquarters could feed other units into the division per the varied situations it might encounter in the world. Triangle Divisions were small and adaptable for quick combat maneuver.

Post 1865 Indian Wars: In the Red Cloud, Nez Perce and Modoc wars, did the Army apply perseverance and good tactics consistently to send all of these Indians to reservations?

The Army demonstrated the PoW Perseverance in all cases except Red Cloud's War. Red Cloud's war is the one time in the western Indian wars that the US did not persevere to achieve its aims. (p.332)

Spanish- American War: Was the US Army well prepared for the Spanish-American War? How well did its South Cuba logistical operations, staff work, and disease control go?

The Army was not well prepared, given its post-Civil War cuts in force size and budget. In preparation for war, rapid Army expansion bred logistical support problems. During the conflict, delays, clumsy use of an observation balloon, and misplaced artillery could be traced to poor staff work. American Army disease control was a serious problem throughout this war. Heat and tropical disease which hurt the Army during and especially after the active fighting in Cuba.

Army Affairs 1900-1917: Were the Army deployments to Mexico and China both long term (i.e., years)? Were they both large or small-scale (i.e.; at least division-size)? Did new weapons like warplanes fare well in both?

The Boxer Rebellion was a nationalistic uprising by Chinese who resented foreign control. Over the years, China's government fell apart amidst revolution, civil war, and war-lord factionalism. To protect its interests, the US felt compelled to place an Army regiment in China, which remained for decades. The Mexican Revolution that stirred American concern, was a very bloody, ten-year civil war which frequently threatened to spill over into the US in the form of refugees, military-assistance seekers, and borderland battles. While the US established forward operating bases in Mexico to monitor the situation, the US terminated the expedition in 1917 when American involvement in WW1 seemed imminent. The Army made its first operational use of airplanes during the expedition, but they did not fare well.

Revolutionary War 1775-1778: Describe Patriot Principle of War (P of W) violations at Bunker Hill. What British P of W violations allowed the Patriots to get away with those errors?

The Brits violated SURPRISE (Brits) & MANEUVER (Brits), allowing the Patriots to get away with violating UNITY OF COMMAND (US)& SECURITY (US)* (p. 48-50)

American Military Affairs 1783-1812: Per the Constitution, is the president the commander-in-chief of the armed forces? How about of the militia?

The Constitution made the President commander-in-chief of all the services, to include the militia when called into federal service; BUT Congress has the power to raise and support armies (i.e., budgetary power p. 111-113)

WW II Pacific: Did the Japanese oppose the US amphibious landings at Luzon and Okinawa? Or did they instead use inland terrain to avoid surrender while inflicting high US losses?

The Japanese did not oppose US amphibious landings at Luzon or Okinawa, but instead used inland terrain to fight a protracted battle, avoid surrender and inflict high US casualties. *

Vietnam war to 1980's: Were the events like the My Lai atrocity and the Firebase MARY ANN defeat due only to poorly trained Soldiers on one-year tours? Or were officer leadership problems also a factor?

The My Lai massacre was another example of a leadership breakdown. Firebase Mary Ann's fall was not only due to poor Soldier security, but also to poor leadership. (p.354) To reduce combat-tour length for the overtasked regular and draftee force, the Army assigned its people to one-year individual tours in Vietnam. The policy hurt more than helped: (a) the revolving-door effect of individuals rotating in and out of units hurt their cohesion and effectiveness; and (b) the constant demand for replacements undermined training programs/standards. Both consequences contributed to a poorer quality of leadership which would yield bad consequences.

US Army's Non-Indian War activities 1865-1898: Was the National Guard Association formed to preserve local militia units as they were, or to improve them? Thus, did it resist or encourage congressional involvement in militia affairs?

The National Guard Association (NGA) was formed to advocate militia interests pushing for more federal congressional funding and guidance, not less The NGA knew the militias needed federal assistance to improve training and standards if the Guard was to remain the Army's premier reserve force.

Nat'l Guard WWI- OEF/OIF: Did National Guard units fight in France in WW1? Was the Guard was the largest part of the Army in the 1920s and 1930s? Did President Roosevelt activate the Guard prior to our entry into WW2? Was he able to keep it activated up to the Pearl Harbor attack and our entry into the war?

The National Guard participated in a foreign war, along with regulars and draftees. The Guard would send entire divisions to France, such as the 28th and the 42nd. Following WW I, the Defense Act of 1920 formalized the Regular, Guard, and Reserve force structure; with tight budget concerns, the Guard was the largest component through 1939 (59, 62-63). After a big European war scare in 1938, President Roosevelt started preparations. Roosevelt activated the Guard for a year, and page 75 says he persuaded Congress to extend the activation. This activation would thus remain in place until the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor and we entered the war.

American Military Affairs 1783-1812: How did Washington handle the Newburgh Conspiracy? Did he want a big, powerful regular army?

The Newburgh Conspiracy would have constituted an open mutiny and direct threat by army officers against civilian authority. The affair is an example of ethical and dynamic on-scene leadership, which Washington demonstrated by defusing the situation and promising to please the officers case to Congress. Washington did not want a big standing army, and certainly did not want the army coercing the civilian government--in this case, Congress.

Civil War 1863-1865: Did Grant's Overland Campaign achieve a decisive tactical win versus Lee? If not, then did it do anything to Lee operationally and strategically?

The Overland Campaign mostly worked, but many battles failed to meet Grant's primary aim to destroy Lee's army. However, the campaign crippled Lee operationally and strategically ultimately pinning Lee's army in Petersburg and thus set it up for ultimate destruction. (p.292)

US Army's Non-Indian War activities 1865-1898: Did a post-Reconstruction backlash against a federal US Army role in domestic law enforcement produce an air-tight law banning same? Or could there be loopholes? Was the 1894 Pullman rail strike an example a complete ban or a loophole?

The Posse Comitatus Act was an example of Post-Reconstruction backlash which forbade the use of federal Army involvement in domestic law enforcement situations and was in part due to a backlash against the use of federal Soldiers in Reconstruction law enforcement in the South. The act had many loopholes allowing the gov't ways to work around it. The Pullman Strike of 1894 is an example of this, whereupon Pres. Grover Cleveland took advantage of a federal court order as an excuse to send in federal troops to suppress a labor strike. (p.312) Other examples include the National Guard being Federalized to deal with domestic issues, such as civil rights issue of the 1960's or Hurricane Katrina relief in New Orleans.

Desert Storm- OIF: Did the US make aggressive use of Offensive in the OIF invasion? Would the Thunder Runs be a good example? Were Iraqi irregulars so intimidated that they did not strike US combat-arms units or even support units?

The Thunder Runs into Baghdad are a good example of the Offensive Principle, however, the intimidating display of US force did not stop Iraqi irregulars from attacking the main combat units in foolhardy, doomed attacks and on occasion they did well, such as the ambush of a support unit (p. 486).

Iraq 2003-2009, AFG 2005-2009: Did nearly all Iraqis greet US troops eagerly? Did Iraqi factions undermine stability? Were US forces ample enough, and were policies like Bremer's locally popular enough, to boost US Legitimacy?

The US got an Iraqi reception that was noticeably less warm than expected. One problem was that deep divisions within Iraqi society led many Iraqis to be suspicious of, or even reject, a post-Saddam Iraq and a US presence in same. The US was not prepared for the mess that arose in Iraq throughout 2003 and into 2004, and this would affect adversely the Legitimacy of its presence and its policies in that country. There weren't enough troops to handle the load, and the US couldn't establish Legitimacy by securing all of the place. The US also hurt its Legitimacy with bad policies implemented shortly after the invasion: L. Paul Bremer, the Coalition Provisional Authority director, disbanded the Iraqi Army and dismissed most Ba'ath Party members from their jobs.

Revolutionary War 1778-1783: Regarding the Principles of War, Kings Mountain hurt what for the British? Describe effective P of W use at Cowpens. Did Economy of Force and Mass also play a role?

The battle hurt British Legitimacy (p. 95). Cowpens demonstrated Patriot PoW prowess in use of MASS, SURPRISE, MANEUVER, SECURITY, & ECONOMY OF FORCE (p. 96-98)

War of 1812: Did the Battles of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain have any operational or strategic effect upon the war?

The battles of Lake Champlain and Lake Erie may have been small naval fights on lakes, but they had big operational and strategic impact. Both battles illustrated the importance of waterways in American wars of this era, and the importance of joint operations. The British lost control of the lake, and the LOC = end of invasion. Confirmed US sovereignty in the northeast theater.

After Korea up to Vietnam: What was Westmoreland's Dilemma?

The dilemma was that if Westmoreland dispersed forces for COIN, he could not mass them to handle stronger NVA units, and if he concentrated on conventional fighting, he could not disperse forces and focus upon COIN and the population. i.e. Conventional v. COIN focus.

US and WWI: Was the US Army prepared and trained well enough to do Hutier-style tactics in WW1? Did it have problems with combined-arms operations from the first battles up through the Meuse-Argonne fighting? Did trench-networks and terrain pose problems at the Meuse-Argonne?

The infantry combined-arms tactics that the Germans introduced have various names, but will be called Hutier Tactics. They represent the first substantial change to conventional infantry tactics up until this time. prior armies had persisted in using some form of linear tactics in relatively large units (battalion and above). They required experienced, well-trained Soldiers. It would be something the US Army would not be able to match in its rushed entry into the war. At the battle of St. Mihiel the US Army encountered the same combined-arms problems that the other Western Front armies had struggled with for years: bad communications; poor artillery-infantry coordination in offensive operations; overstrained logistics for such large forces (eleven divisions. During the Meuse-Argonne offensive none of the US Army divisions had yet embraced more sophisticated infantry operations like the Germans' Hutier Tactics. American Soldiers attacked with great enthusiasm, but lacked the skills to overcome the Germans' interlocking defenses easily or the obstacles of terrain..

Nat'l Guard WWI- OEF/OIF: Did the Guard deal with domestic disturbances and security threats from the 1950s through the 1970s? Did it handle all smoothly and under state, not federal, authority?

The late 1950s and especially the 1960s featured a lot of social unrest where the Army got involved in some way. 1957 Little Rock and 1962 University of Mississippi are examples where local authorities did not react firmly to local unrest about racial integration. To enforce federal integration policy as affirmed by the courts, the president in each case federalized the state's Guard units. The Guard didn't always handle unrest well: example- the Kent State shootings.

Revolutionary War 1778-1783: At Monmouth, did the Continental Army demonstrate its Valley Forge improvements? In what kind of tactics?

The post-Valley Forge Continental Army gets a chance to demonstrate conventional battlefield prowess as it pursues the British Army from Philadelphia to New York City. The battle ended as a draw; but it validated Valley Forge improvements in linear tactics.

Vietnam war to 1980's: Did post-Vietnam reforms included the following? More roles for women? An emphasis upon professionalism or laxity? Training venues like the National Training Center?

The post-Vietnam programs focused not only on attracting quality Soldiers to the all-volunteer Army (374-376), but also emphasized training, discipline, professionalism and pride instead of laxity. Moreover, womens roles were expanded in dramatic fashion. TRADOC was formed in 1973 to improve training programs and create the National Training Center at FT. Irwin for more realistic combat training.

American Military Affairs 1783-1812: Per the Constitution, does Congress exercise exclusive power over the militia? In the 1792 militia act, did Congress even exercise its Constitutional militia powers regarding the militia?

The states & the US Congress share control of the militia. The president is the militia commander-in-chief only when militia are called into federal service. Congress organizes, arms and disciplines militia, while States appoint militia officers and conduct training. The Militia Acts of 1792 were weak providing no real means of arming and disciplining militia, which is what the Constitution charged Congress to do, as well as placing serious limits on service: no more than 3 months/year and no service outside the US. (p.114-116)

After Korea up to Vietnam: As the Vietnam War began In the early 1960s, did South Vietnam's COIN measures like Strategic Hamlets have problems? Did South Vietnam's later COIN efforts exploit the success of big US Army sweeps?

The takeaway is that the Strategic Hamlet program was a good South Vietnamese COIN idea that had problems. South Vietnamese Army protection was too weak; the hamlets were too isolated; local militias were too poorly trained and under-armed; and compulsory relocations undermined peasant support for the program. The US Army commander in Vietnam, GEN William Westmoreland, believed in conventional-style sweeps against communist activity--especially North Vietnamese activity--along the border. These would hopefully allow the South Vietnamese Army time to pacify the countryside against Viet Cong guerillas (page 310). The South Vietnamese government and ARVN could not and would not do the COIN 'pacification' part of the strategy. Pages 329 and 333-334 complain about the local forces' inability to exploit American tactical successes

Mexican War: Describe Scott's conduct of administrative and diplomatic affairs after he took Mexico City. Did he receive Mexican support and avert a wider war?

Though the Mexican War didn't end immediately after Scott took Mexico City, he created administrative conditions and exploited diplomatic opportunities which led the Mexicans to accept money in return for ceding the land the US desired. Scott gained support from local Mexicans through his fair conduct of administration, which averted the threat of a wider war and assisted the Mexican government's decision to settle with the US. (p.192)*

1945- Korea: Regarding the war from 1951 to 1953, did the US encounter frustration with prisoner exchange and care? Did it undertake big ground offensives that gained much territory for South Korea?

Truce talks began in July 1951, with apparent agreement about line of demarcation in fall, but negotiations continued for another two years due to frustrating haggling over POWs. During this time, expecting peace and wishing to minimize casualties in a war which was increasingly unpopular at home, US commanders limited offensive operations considerably. Occasionally, a small tactical advance would be ordered to make a point, to restore some offensive spirit, or to secure a small tactical advantage; but mostly the US/UN remained on the defensive from 1951 to the 1953 cease fire. Pages 245, 247 and 249.

Desert Storm- OIF: Did American Special Forces play a big role in overthrowing the Taliban government in Afghanistan? Did they play a big role in the OIF invasion?

US Army Special Forces played a critical role in toppling the Taliban government in Afghanistan andplayed a big role supporting this OIF invasion.

Indian Wars 1790- 1840's: Describe factors for US Army success in the Second Seminole War. Did it campaign year-round or avoid summer campaigns? Did it improve transportation? Did it remove all Seminoles?

Ultimate success was due to relentless, year-round campaigns, which included the summer months. This year round campaign, combined with better transport for moving troops rapidly denied the Seminoles to ability to maintain sustenance. Negotiations ultimately led to the removal of nearly all—but a few—Seminoles out of the region.

Civil War to 1863: Did Lee use Maneuver as well at Gettysburg? Did his second-day envelopments occur early or late in the day? Gain key terrain? Crush the Union Army?

Unlike Chancellorsville, Lee's masterful use of maneuver was thwarted at Gettysburg starting with difficulties with a timely envelopment against the Union left flank. It didn't start until mid-afternoon. The delays allowed the Yankees to occupy high ground—that is, key terrain—along Cemetery Ridge before the Rebels reached it. The Rebel attack on Culp's Hill, the key terrain on the Union right flank, was even later--during the evening. The Yankees had the time and the interior lines to repel it as well. The Third Day (3 July) brings up the famed Pickett's Charge, a massed Rebel assault that tried to penetrate the Union center. The book does not explain fully why Lee tried this attack, but the evidence indicates Lee believed Meade had weakened his center to protect his flanks. The attack failed leaving Lee unable to achieve his big win or crush the Union Army.

1945- Korea: After the Inchon landing, the UN aimed to do what? Regarding the US/UN advance north, describe the supply situation, the position of the ground forces, and awareness of Chinese actions.

War-aim change: UN advanced into North Korea to reunify all of Korea. MacArthur's forces raced north but one critical error was to keep the major ground commands—8th Army and X Corps--separate organizationally, logistically, and geographically (i.e. split forces) which strained logistics. In all, rushed advance, split ground forces, strained logistics, and Chinese threats/limited action combined with . MacArthur's overconfidence and lack of awareness=Maximum Chinese surprise in late November.*

Vietnam war to 1980's: Did the Tet Offensive victory boost US morale? Was GEN Abrams then able to improve COIN? Given operations like the Laos incursion, was Vietnamization successful?

While US and South Vietnam crushed this offensive, the morale effect upon the American homefront was bad. Abrams had some COIN successes, but progress was often superficial, given South Vietnam's deep-rooted problems. The 1971 Laos Incursion used ARVN troops:bad result, and a bad sign for Vietnamization. (p.358-362)

WW II Pacific: Did the Battle of Bismarck Sea show how US airpower could isolate island objectives? Were air and submarine campaigns able to isolate Japan itself?

Yes to both questions. At the battle of Bismarck Sea, MacArthur demonstrated he could isolate objectives using air and naval power keeping the objective from resupply or troop reinforcement. This carried forward to Japan, where ultimately Japan itself was strangled by air and submarine interdiction campaigns.

Army Affairs 1900-1917: In the early-1900s congressional acts, did National Guard advocates gain greater federal support for the militia in return for more federal control and training of the militia—or did they resist greater federal control?

Yes- The National Guard helped secure greater federal support for the militia in return for more federal control and training of same.*