Homework 5: Kuhn (Normal/Revolutionary Science), Feyerabend

Without quoting the first sentence of the chapter, explain what Kuhn means by a "scientific revolution."

A scientific revolution is a shift in worldview in which an older conception of science is partially or wholly replaced by a new conception. This shift is prompted by an accumulation of anomalies to the older worldview, and occurs through a revolutionary period of science, which is different from otherwise "normal" science (p. 208).

According to Kuhn, what aspect of science speaks most loudly against the commonly held view that scientific development is cumulative?

According to Kuhn, the fact that the assimilation of all new theories and phenomena included in a new paradigm require the destruction of the all or some of the theories and phenomena described in the older paradigm. Basically, if science was cumulative, there would not be mass rejections of past knowledge in favor of new paradigms during scientific revolutions, but there are many historical examples of this occurring, proving that science is non-cumulative (p. 211).

According to Feyerabend, why is it that we sometimes have to resort to persuasion, instead of rational arguments, in science?

Feyerabend claims that in science, when an argument loses its predictive, or forward-looking, aspect and therefore becomes an obstacle to progress. When this happens, people lose confidence in the argument, and this is when Feyerabend argues that it must resort to persuasion instead of rationality. This is because the psychological conditions that once made this argument effective, regardless of its actual truth value, no longer work to influence people, and one can only rely on persuasion, or "propaganda", to support their argument (p. 232).

In the case of a scientific revolution, why is it that the recommendation to adopt a new paradigm "cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling?"

Kuhn argues that the decision to adopt a new scientific paradigm cannot be done logically or even with consideration of probability of what is best, simply because different paradigms proposed as replacements are so radically different, there is no neutral framework to evaluate them by to decide which should be chosen. Because of this, Kuhn argues that any proponent of a paradigm, like members of revolutionary political groups, can only use persuasion to convince other members of the scientific community that their view should be chosen; any attempt to provide a logical argument would be based in circular reasoning, as one utilizes their paradigm & its limitations to demonstrate the benefits of that same paradigm (p. 209).

What are the two distinctive features of puzzles that make them a good analogue for normal science?

Two distinctive features of puzzles that make them a good analogue for normal science are: 1) the outcome or result of the puzzle doesn't have to be good or interesting, and 2) they must have a guaranteed solution. Kuhn argues that puzzles are designed to test the skill of the person solving them, within certain limits, and that normal science is conducted is a similar way (p. 203).

What is the main lesson about scientific change that Feyerabend believes we should extract from the history of political revolutions?

Feyerabend argues that anarchism is "excellent medicine" for both epistemology, the understanding of knowledge, but also the philosophy of science. He claims that history, particularly history of revolutions, is extremely complex, fluid, and full of accidents and argues that a successful scientist of philosopher must be capable of maximizing opportunity. By citing Lenin and Einstein, Feyerabend further supports his claim that one must be unattached to any particular philosophy, but rather ready to adapt to whatever fits the situation (p. 228-229).

Feyerabend argues that, although we can continue to practice science with the illusion of "objectivity," it is not desirable to do so. Why not?

Feyerabend argues that it is not desirable to practice science with the illusion of objectivity for two main reasons, the first being that the world is a largely unknown entity. Because of this unknown, it would be advantageous to not restrict our study before we even begin; Feyerabend questions who has the authority to determine what epistemological principles that guide the discovery of nature. Secondly, he argues that the objective scientific education is in conflict with the cultivation of individuality and forces students to work more like standardized machines (p. 229-230).

According to Feyerabend, what is the main problem with science education today and how is this related to the "objectivity" of science?

Feyerabend argues that the main issue with modern science education is that it simplifies science by defining a domain of research, and then isolated from its historical context in order to provide its own logic. Training in this logic conditions the people that work in the domain, or discipline, of science which makes their actions more streamlined and uniform, removing personal bias and experience that places limitations on one's imagination within research (p. 229).

Why does Feyerabend believe that the way science is currently taught and practiced is inconsistent with a humanitarian attitude?

Feyerabend believes that the way science is taught and practiced in modernity is inconsistent with a humanitarian attitude because of the objectivity it praises, he claims that this education system slowly forces out the parts of students that are unique or individual. This forces them to fit into a specific, homogenous way of thinking that contributes to the greater objectivity of science, but is simultaneously at odds with the development of well-rounded, individual people who have differing strengths to offer (p. 230).

In what sense is it correct to say that Feyerabend is against method in science?

Feyerabend is against method in science in the sense that he believes the idea of a method with unchanging and firm principles for conducting science has faced many issues over history. He argues that there is not a single epistemological rule that has not been broken at some time or another, and argues that these violations of epistemology are actually necessary for progress. Feyerabend argues even further that any rule, no matter how "fundamental" to science, can always face a circumstance that would not only require its rejection, but the adoption of its opposite. Feyerabend, in short, is against method in science as it pertains to creating an objective, machine-like, (p. 230-231).

Is Kuhn's argument in 5.16 compelling? Why or why not?

I think that Kuhn's argument is very compelling, since he demonstrated that the concept of mass is different between the different physics paradigms, indicating that they are incompatible based on the fact that they utilize different definitions and applications of the same topics.

Why must revolutionary parties in a political conflict resort to mass persuasion?

In political revolutions, the aim to change institutions necessitates a shift from one political institution to another, and in between, society doesn't have a governing institution. During this time, the crisis can grow and cause society to get divided into opposing ideological groups, which causes political recourse to fail because there is no criteria that can be used to evaluate the proposals of either side. Since no unbiased decision can be made, the opposing sides must resort to mass persuasion in order to gain influence and hopefully place their party into power (p. 209).

How does Kuhn argue for the conclusion that Newtonian dynamics cannot be derived from Einsteinian dynamics.

Kuhn argues that Newtonian dynamics cannot be derived from Einsteinian dynamics in the way that logical positivists believed since the concepts that the equations reference are different between the paradigms. He focuses on the symbol "m", which represents the concept of mass in both equations, and argues that Newtonian and Einsteinian physics define mass differently, meaning that the "p=mv" derived from Einsteinian dynamics is not the same equation "p=mv" from Newtonian physics. This is because in Newtonian physics, mass is a simple additive quality - if two objects come together, one must simply add their individual masses to get the new total mass. However, in Einsteinian physics, the total mass must be subtracted by the energy released in the interaction between the two objects forming the new singular whole. Because of this, Newtonian dynamics cannot be derived from Einsteinian physics and Kuhn provides further support for his incommensurability of meaning thesis for paradigm shifts (p. 214-215).

What is the philosophical significance of scientific theorizing that attempts to explain anomalies?

Kuhn argues that if new theories are used to resolve anomalies in relation to an existing theory of nature, then the successful new theory must permit predictions that are different than the predecessor. This means that the old and new theories of anomalies are incompatible, and therefore necessitate a displacement of old ideas with the new (p. 212).

Briefly describe the argument Kuhn attributes to logical positivists about the relationship between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics.

Kuhn claims that logical positivists believe that Newtonian dynamics can be derived from Einsteinian dynamics, therefore meaning that the two paradigms are compatible with each other. Logical positivists (and others) argue that if you take the limit of the Einsteinian dynamics equation as it approaches one, it becomes equal to the Newtonian dynamics equation, p=mv (p. 213-214).

Describe two or three key features of what Kuhn calls the "genetic aspect of the parallel between political and scientific development."

Kuhn draws a parallel between political and scientific revolutions, and initially outlines the primary, or genetic, aspect of this parallel. He describes that political revolutions start with a growing sense in one part of the community that the existing institution has ceased to properly meet the issues created by the environment they produce. Scientific revolutions, begin on a very similar basis, with the growing sense in a part of the community that the existing paradigm has ceased to adequately explore aspects of nature that it initially prompted research in. Kuhn argues that this genetic aspect of the parallel is the shared sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is the beginning of any revolution (p. 208).

What are the three types of phenomena that, according to Kuhn, might lead to new scientific theorizing?

Kuhn outlines three types of phenomena that could lead to new scientific theorizing, the first being phenomena that are already well-explained by the existing paradigm and rarely provide grounds for new theory construction. When new theories explaining these types of phenomena are published, they are generally rejected. The second type of phenomena is that whose nature is indicataed by the existing paradigm, but details are only understood through further articulation of the theory; these phenomena are the subject of research in normal science in an attempt to further the existing paradigm, and refine it through new evidence, rather than creating totally new theories. The final type of phenomena are those that are recognized anomalies within a paradigm that cannot be assimilated, Kuhn argues that this class gives rise to new scientific theories, but are not often focused on by the scientific community (p. 211).

What is one of the main parallelisms between puzzle-solving and normal science?

One of the main parallelisms between puzzle-solving and normal science is that not only must a problem have a solution, but there are rules that limit the range of acceptable solutions and the methods by which they are obtained. For example, in a puzzle, you work towards the final picture, but also must work within the confines of the puzzle: all plain sides turned down, pieces must fit correctly together, and there must be no holes in the picture. In normal science, a scientist doesn't randomly obtain data and make any conclusion, they must utilize existing theories to formulate a specific question to experiment (p. 204).

What is the aim of normal science?

The aim of normal science is to avoid making major "novelties", or discoveries, as well as conducting research under a limited scope in order to add scope and accuracy to the existing paradigm. Kuhn suggests that the activities of normal science are like puzzle-solving, since they seek to reach existing conclusions in new ways that include solving instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical problems within the confines of certain rules (p. 202-203).

Why, according to Kuhn, is the cumulative development of science likely to be "improbable in principle"?

The cumulative development of science is likely to be "improbable in principle", according to Kuhn, because normal science is cumulative, and only seeks to solve problems using pre-existing ideas and instruments that already exist. Unanticipated discovery can only happen to the extent that the scientists' anticipations about nature or his instruments are wrong; this means that there must be a difference between the paradigms that consider a particular phenomenon to be an anomaly, and those that consider it to be a law. Because of this difference, past and future paradigms are further proven to be incompatible, thus necessitating the destruction of an older paradigm in order to move forward with a new one (p. 211).

What is the main motivation for scientists to be involved in a research program during a period of normal science?

The main motivation that scientists have to be involved in a research program during a period of normal science is to extend the paradigm, adding detail, scope, and accuracy (p. 203).

How do the four commitments in 5.5 make it possible for normal science to have well-defined research problems with anticipated solutions?

These four commitments of normal science make it possible to have well-defined research problems with anticipated solutions because provides rules or limitations that inform the scientist on what the world and science are like. After knowing this, the scientist can put all of their energy into solving the problems that their existing knowledge and rules allow them to, by narrowing the scope of possible problems allows for a seemingly faster progression of science (p. 206).

List and explain the four "commitments" that govern scientific practice during a period of normal science. Be sure to cite a specific example for each type of commitment. Note: Kuhn lists these four "commitments" beginning on p. 205.

i) Conceptual: explicit statements of scientific laws and about scientific concepts help set the limitations for acceptable solutions; Newton's laws provided these limits in physics during the 18th and 19th centuries & force was a largely researched topic (p. 205). ii)Instrumental: there are preferred types of instrumentations & ways in which instruments are legitimately used; changing attitudes about fire led to many discoveries in the field of chemistry in the 17th century (p. 205). iii)Metaphysical & methodological: Descartes' writings told scientists what types of entities exist in the world (metaphysical) and told them what fundamental explanations or laws must be like. His ideas of matter and motion set limits on scientific laws, claiming that they must describe matter in motion and interacting with other matter (p. 206). iv) Theoretical ("theoretical" is NOT A GOOD DESCRIPTION OF THIS COMMITMENT): scientists must be concerned with understanding the world and extending the scope and accuracy of the existing paradigm, one must scrutinize themselves/their colleagues/nature in empirical detail. If this scrutiny leads to finding disorder, they must challenge for new observational techniques or further theoretical explanation (p. 206).