HON 103 Midterm

Who would agree with this statement? Truthlikeness of a theory is irrelevant to its problem solving effectiveness

- laudan Lakatos would also agree

How do the defenders of Freud's psychoanalysis and Adler's individual psychology use the explanatory power of their theories to support such theories? What is Popper's assessment of this situation? Do you agree with him? Why? (Or why not?)

Freud's psycho-analysis Supporters use anecdotal evidence Karl Marx's theory of history Bourgeoisie—Marxist middle class that own wealth and means of production Workers will naturally revolt and become the dominant social class, controlling means of production. Popper's assessment of Freud and Adler Neither one presents theories that are falsifiable Essentially, they can just apply their logic to any situation and there's no way to disprove it

Feyerabend discusses the argument that science deserves a special position in society because it works. What does Feyerabend think of this argument? Do you agree with him? Why or why not?

Feyerabend agrees that science is always evolving and very diverse. It has helped explain and progress many things in society, but it is still vulnerable to uncertainties and limitations.

Men and drowning child analogy—any human behavior can be interpreted via Freudian or Alderian beliefs (Popper 35)—man who sacrifices life or man who pushes child into water

Freud First man suffered from repression (like Oedipus complex) Second man achieved sublimation—channeling bad feelings into good outlet Adler First man suffered from inferiority—must push child to make me feel better Second man also suffered from inferiority—must sacrifice myself

In Feyerabend's view, how should the aim of education be achieved? If a system of education along the lines suggested by Feyerabend were implemented, what impact would it have in science and society?

○ Aim of education should be achieved with different perspectives, not a dogmatic view. Pluralistic approach and education should include more exploration, not just memorizing facts. ○ Students would be able to understand theories and their origins better. They would understand the progress and true science behind the finding rather than memorizing.

What is the aim of Feyerabend's paper?

○ Challenges view that science is objective. ○ Suggests that there is no single scientific method to obtain objective knowledge. ○ Argues that science shouldn't be used to dictate the beliefs or values of society. ○ Suggests science has been used in the past to justify political systems and society should be careful of granting too much power to science.

What are the arguments used by Feyerabend against Kuhn? Are they any good? Are they fair? Why or why not?

○ Feyerabend argues that Kuhn's normal science as a puzzle solving activity within an existing paradigm is too limiting and excludes creativity. Argues that scientific progress is more gradual and incremental and not just one paradigm. ○ His arguments help us see the limitations and biases in Kuhn's ideas, but they somewhat disregard Kuhn's contributions.

Feyerabend also critically discusses Lakatos's proposal. From Feyerabend's brief remarks, can you tell what Lakatos was trying to achieve with the notions of research program and heuristics? What criticism does Feyerabend raise to Lakatos?

○ Lakatos argued that research programs would help explain scientific progress. ○ Feyerabend says heuristics oversimplifies the complicated process of scientific inquiry and that there is no single set of heuristics that can explain scientific inquiry.

In the section "Against Method", Feyerabend briefly examines a somewhat popular answer to the questions: "What is the scientific method? And how does it work?" What is this popular answer? How does Feyerabend react to this answer?

○ Reacts with criticism and skepticism. The view suggests that scientific knowledge is obtained through a systematic and objective process of gathering and analyzing empirical data. ○ Argues that it is oversimplifying and misleading of how science actually works. ○ Argues that scientific knowledge should be evaluated based on its usefulness and effectiveness.

In your view, what are the strong points and the weak points in Feyerabend's proposal? How would you compare Feyerabend's account with Popper's and Kuhn's?

○ Strong points: emphasis on creativity and critical thinking in scientific theory, education should be a pluralistic approach and encourage different perspectives. ○ Weak points: lack of a clear structure to balance perspectives that clash, possibility of greater uncertainty in scientific inquiry, limited guidance on how to examine validity and reliability of different perspectives. ○ Popper: argues for falsifiability and testing of hypotheses, Feyerabend wants a more open approach to scientific inquiry. ○ Kuhn: paradigm shifts and importance of scientific communications contributing to scientific knowledge. Feyerabend emphasizes the need for diversity and creativity in scientific inquiry.

Feyerabend compares the way in which scientific "facts" are taught now with the way religious "facts" were taught a century ago. What is the point of this comparison? Do you agree with Feyerabend? Why or why not?

○ To emphasize the dogmatic and authoritarian tendencies of scientific education. ○ Argues that scientific theories and models as absolute and unchanging truths, rather than as provisional and contingent on empirical evidence. ○ Challenges that science is a more rational way of acquiring knowledge than religion. But both forms have their biases, assumptions, and limitations. ○ The dogmatism of scientific education can limit innovation and potential for new discoveries.

According to Kuhn, does a scientist usually try to test the paradigm he/she is working with? Why? (Or why not?)

● Page 144 quote "In so far as he is engaged in normal science, the research worker is a solver of puzzles,not a tester of paradigms",(Kuhn, 1999) ● According to Kuhn a scientist is not testing or seeking to confirm their guided thesis. Because most anomalous are explained away and igrnored to prevent testing of their beloved paradigm

According to Kuhn, why are scientific revolutions necessary?

● Scientific revolutions are necessary because: ○ Anomalies that were previously an issue are now resolved. ○ Concepts that are changed so daradstivcaly the old theory is not longer relevant and in the question. ○ Another necessity is that in normal science theories are not questioned which allows them to exist longer. Whereas revolutionar sciences the core theories are questioned which allows for resolve.

What was the problem that Popper was grappling with since 1919? Explain the problem in your own words.

The problem was Humes Dilemma- Inductive logic cannot demonstrate that correlation implies causation. EX: If 100 baseballs hit, all balls should move when hit. Proposal for dilemma: Use only deductive logic. Test with falsification. The more survival from falsifiability the better, and the test must be falsifiable.

How does Laudan's account accommodate the eight desiderata discussed in the beginning of the paper? What is his conclusion?

"Judging this sketch of a problem-solving model of science against the desiderata discussed at the beginning the essay, it is clear that the model allows for the possibility that a theory may be acceptable even when it does not preserve cumulativity"

According to Laudan, under what conditions do we say that a theory solves a problem?

A theory solves an empirical problem when it entails, along with appropriate initial and boundary conditions, a statement of the problem A theory solves a conceptual problem when it fails to exhibit a conceptual difficutly of its predecessors

According to Kuhn, "the man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must often do so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving. He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind can only be made on faith" (p. 158). What argument does he invoke to support this claims.

According to Kuhn a scientific revolution and paradigm shift onl can occur when enough anomolias cause a crisis. When a crisis occurs they must renounce the current hard evidence in order to follow what may easily prove the will of the wisp. But its more than chaos that attracts other to these shifts but the new justified technical arguments are what causes the changes. ○ For example he discusses that people are drawn to Einstiens general theory because it attracts people on aesthatic grounds, an appeal to people from outside of mechanics

According to Popper, what is the problem of using verifiability as a criterion of demarcation of science from non-science?

Demarcation=fixing the boundary/limit of something You can always find a way to make the world fit your theories The rationality of science is in the rational choice of the theory, not the deductive reasoning itself Example Einstein's gravitational theory (Popper 36) Risky prediction (Popper 36) One can take pictures to measure predicted effect (Popper 36) Can be disproved via observation (Popper 36) Therefore satisfies criteria for falsifiability (Popper 37)

According to Kuhn, is scientific development cumulative or not? What arguments does he use to support his view?

According to Kuhn scientific development is both cumulative and non-cumulative. ○ Normal Science: Science that is practiced within a paradigm. When it is within a paradigm it is cumulative. ○ Revolutiornary Science: from one paradigm to another. ■ Not cumulative and anomalies can be solved. ● Support for his argument: ○ When gestalt shifts occur a new paradigm replaces an old one and ceases to exist. ○ According to Kuhn science development is not uniform and can be divided into two process, normal and revolutionary. Where normal science is the problem solving phase and revolutionary phase. Normal science is cumulative because they are finding different ways to solve a problem. Just like a accumluation of ways to win a match of chess. Where as Revolutionry science according to Kuhn is not cumulative. In scientific revolutions the revisions to a existing scientific belief or practices. This is called Kuhn-loss. ○ For example: Changing standards of scientific explanation can turn the old issue into a non-problem. For example, Newton's gravity was eventually accepted as fact, not needing a mechanical cause.

According to Popper, "some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers, for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by re-interpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status" (p. 37). What does Popper mean? Can you think of an example of such ad hoc maneuvers?

Ad hoc=when necessary Popper believes scientific theories must be falsifiable by nature Therefore, if you refuse to make/allow a theory to be unfalsifiable, it is not scientific, or is less scientific Ex: Astrology Astrologist greatly impressed and misled but supposed confirming eveidnce. By leaving things vague it made evidence seem correct. To avoid faslificaiton they removed the testability of their theory.

Lakatos outlines what he calls a "naïve falsification." How does he define this? In your opinion, is this a fair characterization of Popper's position? Why or why not?

Also known as dogmatic (naturalistic) falsification • Admits fallibility of all scientific theories without quantification, but it retains infallibility empirical basis; strictly empirical • Recognizes that all theories are equally conjectural; science cannot prove any theory, although science can disprove. • Empirical counterevidence is the one and only arbiter which may judge a theory • This is a fair characterization of Popper's position because it relies on empirical basis rather than inductive logic

Feyerabend then critically assesses Popper's view. What arguments does he use to criticize Popper? Is Feyerabend's criticism effective? Is it fair? Why or why not?

Argues that Popper's falsifiability is too restrictive and doesn't really show how science is practiced, that Popper's view ignores the social and political contexts that the scientific knowledge is produced, and that scientific knowledge is influenced by biases, religion, etc. ○ It's fair because it shows the biases and limitations of traditional scientific approaches. ○ It's unfair because he doesn't consider empirical evidence and rational argumentation.

According to Feyerabend, "there is nothing inherent in science or in any other ideology that makes it essentially liberating." What is the argument that he uses to support this claim?

Argues that science can be used to promote harmful practices. ○ Suggests that its potential for liberation depends on how it's used by society. ○ Argues that science is not a neutral or objective enterprise, but influenced by social, political, and cultural factors. ○ Biases can affect the research questions that are asked, the methods that are used, and the interpretation of results. ○ Suggests a pluralistic approach is a more effective way to promote freedom and social progress

How would you compare and contrast the accounts of scientific change developed by Popper, Kuhn and Laudan? What features do these accounts have in common? How do they differ?

Differ Laudan's account has achievable goals Laudan argued scientific progress measured through problem solving Popper argued for falsifying Kuhn argued for paradigms and normal science Laudan argued for research traditions Kuhn ignores conceptual problems Popper on the realism spectrum Kuhn on the relativism spectrum Laudan not on truthlkeness spectrum Laudan argues against the notion of a period of normal science Problem solving and falsification has the same technical problems as problem solving regarding how to scale falsifying theories and problem solved theories among themselves.

Protective belt defined

Auxillary assumptions and supporting theories can be modified if the changes are progressive such as: Lead to novel, testable predictions Lead to more precise predictions Incorporate unification Makes Calculations or predictions more easily. Expands the scope of the theory Lead to better economy As long as you can falsify it again that would be great. And must avoid ad hoc changes Making changes not falificable it is degenerating.

Lakatos Disagreements tih Kuhn

Bashes Kuhn and incommusnirabityl Exampe Geo and Helio would agree on how telescopes work, the presence f the moon, and its size are all complete agreements.

"If all theories are equally unprovable, what distinguishes scientific knowledge from ignorance, science from pseudoscience?" What motivates this statement? What potential answer does he argue against?

Before Popper's time, inductive logicians claimed that if the if the mathematic probability is high then it qualifies as scientific, if low probability it is non-scientific. • Many scientists saw Newton as the decipherer of God's laws. • Ampere discovered that many theories regarding electromagnetism had no experiments that were performed nor the equipment constructed to perform them. • Popper claimed that the mathematical probability of all theories, scientific or pseudoscientific, given any amount of evidence is zero. • Lakatos argues in favor of falsification: "A theory is 'scientific' if one is prepared to specify in advance a crucial experiment which can falsify it. If a theory refuses to present a potential falsifier, then it is pseudoscientific.

Lakatos sketches out that which is the "hallmark of science." Outline what he advocates as an answer to what this "hallmark" is.

Before Popper: Never say anything that is not at least highly probable. • After Popper: Skepticism should be shown even towards most cherished theories, a falsifier needs to be present for something be scientific. • Lakatos' answer to the hallmark of science is a methodology of research programmes which solves the problems of Popper and Kuhn. • Descriptive unit of scientific achievement is research programme. • Science is a series of conjectures and refutations, rather than trial and error • There is a hard core which is protected from refutation by the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses. • Research programme has a heuristic that works with mathematic techniquest o digest anomalies and turn them into positive evidence.

What is deductive logic?

If the premises are true and the logic is true the conclusion must be true: From general to specific Logical entailment. (Mathematical Sense) ABSOLUTE

Positive hueristic

Change auxiliary assumptions

Negative hueristic

Change hardocre as a last resort

. How does Lakatos define the following terms: Classical empiricism

Classical empiricism: accept only a small set of factual propositions, these are expressed as 'hard facts' ▪ Truth-value established through experience and constituted empirical basis of science. ▪ Need for inductive logic

In Laudan's view, what is cognitive progress?

Cognitive progress is to ask whether science through time brings us closer to achieving our cognitive aims or goals

In Laudan's view, what are conceptual problems?

Conceptual problems occur when a theory is inconsistent, has counter assumptions, has no backing, goes counter to research tradition, or disregards related research.

Conceptual problems defined and example

Conceptual problems: a problem exhibited by a particular theory that is characteristic of that theory, and has no existence independent of theory. Internal inconsitiencs Conflict with another supported theory. Aritostle and Ptolemy Epicycles

Quantum Revolutions 3 or more phenomena that were anomalous to the Newtonian research program/paradigm

Emission Spectrum: described by electron jumps. Emit light when orbs jump. Jumps are the essence of the word quantum and come out in discrete packets. Double Slit Experiment: particles are both waves and particle-wave duality. How can one electron know where to land? One particle comes through at a time. One at a time they come through what aspect tells electrons where to land. How does the electron know where to land as if it is given instructions? Photo Electric Effect: Shine a light on metal the brighter red beam no electrons jump out but the lightest purple causes electrons to jump. No one has any ideas. Explained Light has different waves and frequencies. The waves are individuals photons. Example there three colors: Red= nothing happens to metal. Ultra Violet = jump out and fly out with most speed. Blue = electrons are emitted and jump out of metal

According to Lakatos, what is actually tested when a falsifiable test/experiment is conducted? If a result falsifies, what recourse does a scientist have with respect to the research program? Describe how heuristics are to be applied.

Empirical basis of scientific theory is being tested. • If result is falsified, then the positive heuristic is applied; change auxiliary assumptions and supporting theories to support hard core • Avoid the negative heuristic at all costs!

According to Laudan, what are empirical problems? Explain Laudan's distinction between potential problems, solved problems and anomalous problems.

Empirical problems are those concerning potential problems, solved problems, anomalous problems Potential problems are phenomena which have no explanation anomalous problems are problems which rival theories solve but which are not solved by the theory in question Solved problems are problems are that class of putatively germane claims about the world which have been solved by some viable theory

According to Laudan, "the logic of acceptance and rejection is simply too restrictive to represent [the] range of cognitive attitudes [found in science]" (p. 150). Why does he make this claim?

Even if a theory is unacceptable, it may deserve investigation or warrant further elaboration

. How does Lakatos define the following terms: Falliabalism and probabilism:

Falliabalism and probabilism: ▪ Probabilism: scientific theories have different degrees of probability relative to the available empirical evidence ▪ Fallibilism: All theories have zero probability; all theories are not only equally unprovable but all equable improbable

Describe an example of two (actual or hypothetical) competing research programs and state the hard core of each, then describe what aspects of their protective belts could be shared between the programs.

Geocentrism and heliocentrism are competing research programmes o Geocentrism hard core: Earth is center of the universe, all other celestial bodies orbit the Earth, concept of equants o Heliocentrism hard core: Sun is the center of our solar system, celestial bodies orbit the Sun, planets travel in elliptical orbits with other bodies affecting the elliptical orbit o Protective belt (shared auxiliary hypotheses): Celestial bodies orbit around a central point, each model allows us to make predictions about Earth and the other planets' future movement, concept of epicycles is retained, all celestial bodies orbit in retrograde and circular motion

Hallmark of science simplified

Hallmark of Science Unsolved problems into solved problems

What is Hume concerned with?

Hume is concerned about the basis of the "Uniformity of Nature" assumption formulated the "problem of induction" Humes dilemma Hume showed that inductive logic cannot demonstrate the correlation implies causation.

Why does Hume claim that induction cannot be logically justified?

Hume's theory—humans rely on repetition and inductive reasoning to assume the uniformity of nature Induction cannot be logically justified because we don't know if nature is uniform If it isn't, we cannot say that our observations "prove" something definitively because Even if a baseball moves when it's hit 100 times, we can't say that it will definitely always move when hit That would be inductive Deduction is scientific though I guess

. How does the described methodology of research programs get around some of the problems maintained against naïve falsification? If Lakatos' research program account is correct, is scientific knowledge cumulative? Why or why not?

If there is a flaw in the research programme, instead of completely throwing it out, modify the auxiliary assumptions and supporting theories so it supports the hard core. o This is a less strict demarcation criterion o More empirical than dogmatic falsification o Allows generation of novel ideas • Scientific knowledge is cumulative and progressive; research programs can be continuously modified allowing us to reach rational scientific progress

What is inductive logic?

Inductive: generalize from specific to general. Even if you do it correctly not logical entailment. ALWAYS PROVISIONAL But most commonly used by science. Conclusion used in: All findings in science All findings of law All application of science, engineering, government,

Kuhns Major thesis

No meaningful progress towards science. Paradigm shifts prevent changes. All world views are embedded into one thing you cannot focus on one thing because of incommensurability. Newton Versus Einstien roll in mass. Convince mass is inertia newton Eisnting mass is energy. Gestalt shifts Uses historlica examples BUT Kuhn uses the strategiezes scientist would use to make up for the account of that one. Why isn't phiolsohpy in science the same? Can convince a popperian into a kuhnina which is a problem because it breaks his own rules???

. How does Lakatos define the following terms: Justificationalism

Justificationalism: scientific knowledge consists of proven propositions; identification of knowledge with proven knowledge ▪ Logical deductions help us to infer not to prove ▪ Justificationalists often disagreed about the nature of propositions whose truth can be proved by extralogical means

Laudan Bagged on Kuhn

Kuhn ignores the rules of conceptual problems Does not tell use relationship between paradigm and constituent theories Kuhn asserts that there is not corrective relationship between paradigm and data He ignores difference between aims/goals and acceptance of methods. A scientist positions toward a theory can be anything.

According to Kuhn, "the normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone before" (p. 103). What does Kuhn mean? Explain how Kuhn uses the example of Newton's work (pp. 103-106) to illustrate the above claim. In Kuhn's view, is there a cumulative development of methods and standards in science? Why? (Or why not?)

Kuhn is saying that a normal scientific tradiaiton will not be comapitble with a revolutionrayr science. They both also do not go hand in hand when explaining a new theory of concept. Additionally scientist within there own paradigms will find anyway to reject the contradictory paradigm until later on. For example let us consider Newtons work on Gravity. ○ During the eighteenth century many scientist used the mechanico-corpuscular to explain the "nature" as to why objects fell when dropped(gravity). Although Newtons three laws matched up with explanations from the corpusuclar many scientist still had the challenge of interpreting gravity if you used both corpuscular and followed Newtons Principia as a paradigm. In order to combat this confusion many scienitn rejected newtons principia and stuck with the corpuscular. But when scientist where not able to use the principia and could not produce results that conformed to the copuscular they decided to accept the view that gravity was innate. With gradual change in paradigm everyone accepted Newtons laws and his principia because of their accepatne of gravity being innate. ○ Kuhn believes that scientific knowledge isnot cumulative but revolutionary. In which it wasn't until the core theories were challenged that science changed.

According to Kuhn, what does the example of Herschel's discovery of Uranus establish (pp. 115-116)? In Kuhn's view, "the very ease and rapidity with which astronomers saw new things when looking at old objects with old instruments may make us wish to say that, after Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different world" (p. 117). What does Kuhn mean? In your view, what is the main point of each of the above two chapters of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions? Do you agree with them? Why? (Or why not?)

Kuhns use of Herschels discovery of Uranus is to give an example of how a paradigm induced changes in scientific knowledge. The idea is that with the change of an instrument the perspectives of the world around us also change. In this case Copernicus use of astronomy did the same to establish stepping stones and tools for future astronomers to use and changed their entire view of the world. ● The main point of these two chapter is that: ○ Paradigm induced changes are influential on sciefntifc knowledge. Without these paradigms we would not be able to properly investigate the "nature" of the world and solve its problems. ○ The other point is that science is not cumulative but is broken down into phases of normal and revoltionery scinece. Normal science is our comfor zone where we can investigate prbles within our circle (paradigm), where as revolutionary sciences challenges the theories we know and must be replaced. ○ We also must understand that a shift in a paradigm is a shift from an idivduals world view. ○ Also we know that revotuinary science are incommusurabilt for normal science which leads to changes in paradigm shifts

Models are tested and improved through falsifiability

Lakatos = research programs. Methodology of Scientific Research programs Testing our models and if our model fails we can change tings around. Lakatos is focused on testing models

In Laudan's view, how should we understand scientific progress? What are the merits of his proposal?

Laudan argues for the goal of solving problems because the achieving nature allows us to secure theories as high problem-solving effectiveness Merit: it captures much that has been implicit all along in discussions of the growth of science Merit: it assumes a goal which is not intrinsically transcendent and hence closed to epistemic access

What is the relationship between Laudan's research traditions and Kuhn's paradigms?

Laudan's research traditions suggest the co-existence of rival research traditions and argues that the neglect of conceptual issues are undesirable unlike Kuhn

What is the relationship between the degree of falsifiability of a theory and its informative content?

More falsifiability=more informative Easier to test Popper is a falsificationist—believes that theories cannot really be held up as "true", but there is a way to distinguish rational science from superstition without induction (Popper 228) Uninterested in establishing scientific theories as probable (Popper 229) Only interested in criticizing and testing theories to find mistakes (Popper 229) We may not know when we find truth, but we can be led by the principle of truth and progress towards it (Popper 226) Science aims for a high degree of falsifiability/testability (Popper 219) How much falsification do you need before something is officially falsified A theory is scientific if it can be falsified/refuted/tested (Popper 36)

What does Popper mean by "corroboration", and what is the role of this notion in his account of scientific progress?

My description of his goal of increasing the degree of corroboration The goal of science is to search for the truth, even if we may never find it (Popper 229) Truth which has the power to explain many things (Popper 229) Looking for answers to problems (Popper 230) Searching for truths that are relevant to science as those are the truths that are useful (Popper 230) Capital "T" truth=objective truth (Popper 231) Popper questions whether or not there are truly degrees of truth (Popper 232) And if there are not, is there such thing as better correspondence with the Truth (Popper 232) Popper's goal to increase corroboration (Popper 231) If a theory is more precise and stands up to precise tests than the other If a theory explains more than the other If a theory gives more detail than the other If a theory passes tests the other failed If a theory suggests new tests and passed them If a theory connects seemingly unrelated problems

According to Laudan, is truth an adequate aim of science? Why? (Or why not?)

No because there is no satisfactory sematic characterization of truthlikenessand no method of comparing truthlikeness among theories

According to Popper, "the belief that we can start [to do science] with pure observations alone, without anything in the nature of a theory, is absurd" (p. 46). How does Popper support this claim?

Observation is not science on its own if you're not moving towards something He talks about how he taught a class and told his students to observe "What do you want us to observe" Observation is selective—you need something to direct it towards Object, task, interest, pov, problem Description presupposes a descriptive language, similarity, classification, interests, pov, and problems Objects must be classified in how they relate to our needs/interests

How does Laudan characterize scientific progress in terms of problem solving? Is Laudan's account of scientific progress cumulative? Why? (Or why not?)

Our priniciple of progress tells us to prefer that theory which comes closest to solving the largest number of important empirical problems while generating the smallest number of significant anomalies and conceptual problems Laudan's account of scientific progress is not cumulative to allow for the possibility of progress even when there are explanatory losses as well as gains

In Kuhn's view, "when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them" (p. 111). What does he mean?

Paradigms are closely knitted with an individuals world view and hw they view the world. When an individual switches paradigms they are sacrificing their old view of the world for a new one and that old world is no longer existent. For example when ptolemist became copernican they had to view the world in a different persepcative and ignore the use of epicycles and the structure of the solar system from their previous paradigm. ● When they switch to a new paradigm they are now using new instruments and looking in new places unlike before. After a revolution these sicenitst are responding to a different world.

What is the relationship between the content of a statement and the probability of a statement? What is the consequence that Popper draws from this relationship? Do you agree with him? Why? (Or why not?)

People assume science should aim for high probability (Popper 219) Probability tested inductively (Popper 219) "truthlikeness" in theories should not be compared to mathematical probability (Popper 219) "I personally think it is most convenient to reserve the term 'probability' for whatever may satisfy the well-known rules of this calculus" Verisimilitude/truthlikeness is not probability in a mathematical sense/as it cannot be numerically certain Criterion of satisfactoriness is how testable a theory is Therefore, only a highly testable or improbable theory is worth testing Tests must be severe and highly rigorous Low probability=high probability of being falsified HE'S SAYING THAT THE BEST THEORIES ARE THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE ONES BECAUSE THEY ARE THE EASIEST TO FALSIFY THROUGH THAT FALSIFICATION WE CAN LEARN MORE AND ADVANCE SCIENCE

Who would likely agree with the following statement? Progress is a measure of how closely our scientific ideas approximate the real world.

Popper and Lakatos would agree. Popper sees moving forward by looking at how far we progressed Kuhn would disagree because progress does not exist.

Explain Popper's criterion of potential progressiveness of a theory (p. 217). Can you give examples of a theory that satisfies this criterion and another one that doesn't?

Popper's analogy—is science rational and always moving towards truth Criterion of progress—before testing a theory empirically, we might say whether it would improve upon other theories (Popper 217) Theory that tells us more would be better (if it stands up to testing) (Popper 217) Prefer a highly informative theory—theory that is more groundbreaking Desirable properties: can be more rigorously tested, is logically stronger, and tells us more Theory that satisfies this criterion: Einstein's gravitational theory Risky prediction (Popper 36) One can take pictures to measure predicted effect (Popper 36) Can be disproved via observation (Popper 36) Therefore satisfies criteria for falsifiability (Popper 37) Theory that does not satisfy this criterion: Karl Marx's theory of history Marxists see evidence for their historical interpretations everywhere, such as in the news—both in what is said and what is not said (Popper 35) Marxist predictions were falsified, but he just reinterpreted the theory and data so that they agreed, making it irrefutable (and thus unscientific) (Popper 37)

On p. 45, Popper raises the following question: "Having refuted the logical idea of induction [Hume] was faced with the following problem: how do we actually obtain our knowledge, as a matter of psychological fact, if induction is a procedure which is logically invalid and rationally unjustifiable?" What is Popper's answer to this question? Do you agree with him? Why? (Or why not?) In Popper's view, what is the relationship between the problem of demarcation and the problem of induction? How does Popper solve the latter?

Popper's answer is that we should only use deductive reasoning/falsification In order for science to progress, it should aim to become more deductive (Popper 221) Theories founded on principles of deduction will be logically stronger (Popper 221) The rationality of science is in the rational choice of the theory, not the deductive reasoning itself (Popper 221) Science should progress from problem to problem (Popper 222) Scientists aim to solve problems (Popper 222) Demarcation—you can always find a way to make the world fit your theories I don't really think this works cause how are you gonna make theories in the first place Also what if you "falsify" a theory but the experiment itself was flawed? Are you just gonna throw out the whole thing?

How does Laudan's proposal combine coherentist and correspondentist accounts of scientific knowledge?

Problem- solving model acknowledges both concerns are co present Empirical and conceptual problems represent respectively correspondentist and coherentist which we place on our theories Conceptual difficulties should be minimized Empirical problems are contained in the dual demands that a theory should solve a maximal number of empirical problems while generating a minimal number of anomalies

Laudan Main Point

Progress is measured in the amount of problems are solved. A pragmatic approach Claims that philosophers of science is a cumulative knowledge but there are episodes in science that reveal non rational factors. We think we are getting closer but what happens when the ontology is dismissed or no longer makes sense in frame work how is that progress?

Concept that challenged poppers falsification as a means of assessing sceintiifc progress is the Quine-Duhem Thesis.

Quine -Duhem Thesis No way to state a test of a theory that does not involve other theories and assumptions. Cannot dissect things into one area. Example Galileo showed people how to use telescope and how do we know it owkrd the same way when we point it at the ground will work the same when we point it to the sky. Kuhn and others sometimes go after a strawman, and popper came up with rules The least falsified theory can stay at the top.

realism vs relativism

Relativism and Realsims Popper = realism (hardcore) Lakatos = realism (hardcore) Kuhn = partially relativism. Feyerbend = relativism (hardcore) Laudan = No where

What is a "research program?" Describe the positive and negative heuristics of Lakatos and the role they play in defining a research program? What does he mean by "hard core" and "protective belt?"

Research programme is composed of a model which accounts for falsifiable scientific theories and its auxiliary assumptions • Positive heuristic states change auxiliary assumptions and supporting theories to support hard core; changes must be progressive; governed by protective belt • Negative heuristic states do not change hard core unless all fails • Hard core are the core commitments of a program • Protective belt are auxiliary assumptions and supporting theories • Protective belt and positive heuristic lead to: o Novel and testable hypotheses o More precise predictions o Unification o Makes calculations or predictions easily o Expands scope of theory o Lead to better "economy" in model

In Kuhn's view, "the competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs" (p. 148). What is the argument he uses to support this claim?

The argument he uses to support this claim is: ○ The proponent of competing paradigms are at cross purposes and neither side will grant non-empircal assumptions that the other needs to make their case. For example: ■ Proust and Berthollet argue about the composition of chemical compounds in hopes to convert the other by demonstrating their own ways, in hopes to influence the other, which may not occur. ■ What Kuhn is saying that shifting paradigms is not based on facts but primarily influsnince and marketing your views to attract the other to change their world view. When world views are contradicted the stronger the debate between different paradigms.

What is Kuhn's assessment of Popper's view on theory falsification in science (pp. 146-147)? ● Kuhn has a negative view of Popper theory of falsification.

The biggest problems that Kuhn has with the theory of falsification is that: ○ Falsification is no different than verification. ○ Additionally history shows that some theories held up after falsifiacation even after failing field testing. ○ Also poppers falsifications are challenged by the Quin-duhem problem that one theory cannot be tested by itself, and a test of one theory depends on other theories and hypothesis.

"Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programs:" What is the goal of Lakatos in writing this paper?

The goal is to introduce a new methodology of approaching science but at the same time applying the ideas of falsification to his ideology. • Additionally this paper explores concepts of Popper and Kuhn and how the research programme solves the problems of Popper and Kuhn's philosophies.

What arguments are used by Lakatos in his criticism of "naïve" or "dogmatic" falsification? Outline the most significant problems he raises.

The problem with naïve falsification is consists of a sharp demarcation criterion which rejects the theory completely. This in essence is not creating an objective view of science. • Rests on two false assumptions: o There is a natural, psychological borderline between theoretical or speculative propositions on one hand and factual or observation propositions on the other o If a proposition satisfies the psychological criterion of being factual or observation then it is true; it is proved from facts • These assumptions disprove an empirical basis which proven falsehood can be carried by deductive logic to the theory under test. • Dogmatic falsification would become useless for eliminating the most important class of what are scientific theories; disproving power of experiments would be extremely restricted

Lakatos claims "One can today easily demonstrate that there can be no valid derivation of a law of nature from any finite number of facts." What is meant by this provocative statement? Would Kuhn agree? Why or why not? Would Popper agree?

Theories cannot be proven by facts. Scientists should stop deducing theories that are proven by facts. • Newton only published theories that were proven by facts; he deduced his laws from phenomena provided by Kepler, though he was wrong because Newton claimed that planets move in ellipses only if the planets did not disturb each other in their motion • Kuhn would not agree with this because his claim was focused on facts inducing paradigms shifts. • Popper would agree because he agreed with Hume's dilemma that inductive reasoning cannot be justified. He rejects the idea that empirical evidence (facts) are relevant in confirming the truth of scientific laws or theories.

Lauda says there is a need for a new basis to understand rationality in science. The rationality and progressive of a theory is more closely linked to its problem solving effectivnees. True or false

True, new basis needed to understand as rationlity and progress of a theory is linked to its effectivnes.

In Laudan's view, what is a research tradition? What are the components of such a tradition? What functions do research traditions serve? How can we compare different research traditions?

Two components of research traditions A set of beliefs about what sorts of entities and processes make up the domain of inquiry A set of epistemic and methodological norms about how the domain is to be investigated, how theories are to be tested, how data are to be collected, and the like Functions: They indicate what assumptions can be regarded as uncontroversial background knowledge to all the scientist working in that tradition They help to identity those portions of a theory that are difficulty and should be modified or amended They establish rules for the collection of data and for the testing of theories They pose conceptual problems for any theory in the tradition which violates the ontological and epistemic claims of the parent tradition

What is the role of the notion of verisimilitude in Popper's approach to the growth of scientific knowledge?

Verisimilitude=the appearance of being true or real Falsification is easier than finding the truth We can sometimes only find the truth via disproving bold and outlandish ideas (Popper 231) We learn the most from our mistakes (Popper 231) Information is relevant based on how much it can explain (Popper 231) Popper questions whether or not there are truly degrees of truth (Popper 232) Popper asserts that there CAN be theories that more closely approximate the truth (Popper 232) Every statement has some degree of truth/verisimilitude (Popper 233) Popper's goal to increase corroboration (Popper 231)

According to Lakatos, is the concept of demarcation an important notion to define for society?

Yes, the concept of demarcation is important in distinguishing between scientific theories and pseudoscientific ones.

For Popper, when can we say that a theory is scientific? If a theory is not scientific, can we say that it is meaningless? Why? (Or why not?)

theory is scientific when it is falsifiable Einstein's gravitational theory is a good example You can make predictions involving risk If observation shows predicted effect does not occur, it refutes the theory Therefore, theory is falsifiable and scientific Theory: light must be attracted by heavy bodies just like material bodies Testable during an eclipse I don't think unscientific theories are without meaning Theories in fields such as psychology (not Freud and Adler) and social science are sometimes speculative, but they are not meaningless For example, you cannot "prove" racism/homophobia/etc. definitively and mathematically despite the overwhelming evidence to support them

What is the view of Lakatos on the relationship between one's commitment to a belief and what one should consider knowledge?

• Believed one's commitment to belief should be based on models • One should consider knowledge if and only if there is a well-supported theory and auxiliary assumptions that has already been subject to falsification

. Kuhn claims scientific paradigms are incommensurable. Would Lakatos agree? Lakatos' assumptions about methods, measurements, and the Quine-Duhem issue differ greatly from that of Kuhn. In what ways does his research program account differ from Kuhn's concept of paradigms?

• Lakatos would not agree that scientific paradigms are incommensurable • Two scientific paradigms can exist simultaneously, they would just be competing • Kuhn did not agree with this, science can only have paradigm shifts, only one paradigm can exist at a time

According to Kuhn, scientific revolutions and political revolutions are similar in two ways. Explain, in your own words, these similarities. Do you agree with Kuhn? Why? (Or why not?)

● The Simularities between Politcal and Scientific Revolutions are: ○ 1. Politcal Parties and Scientific Communities have institutions and subdivisions that only fit their specific world views. Other views or theories that exist outside of those divisions cease to exist and are ignored. ○ 2. In order for a revolution to occur one institution must sacrifice and relinquish to another that is contradictory to the previous. Explanation in own words: ○ Political and scienfitfic communites develop there own subdivisions that sustain their beliefs for their world views. Anything else outside of their view cease to exist and is irrelevant. Something is only revolutionary if it affects there paradigm. (Example Copernican versus Ptolemy) ○ In order for revolutions to occur in both areas one item must be relinquished to be replaced by another that contradicts the current institution. In order for a revolution to occur you must change the institution even if that institution attempts to prohibit it. ○ I disagree with Kuhn with his statement as: ■ 1. Just because groups have their own views does not mean they are excluding other ideas and practices. (Example Copernicans and Ptloemy) can agree there is a moon. ■ 2. Even though you are replacing a theory with another does not mean its ceases to exist and that it must contradict the institutions itself. In many cases these changes are developed because of other theories that do a better job at exaplng nature but that does not mean that it is incorrect. ○ I will agree that: ■ Kuhn is correct to an extent that politicla na dsciefitifc revolutions are similar in the sense that they require controversy for change. But he does not quite explain directly why they are similar.

In Kuhn's view, "When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular"(p. 94). Why is this the case? Does this circularity raise a problem? What is the consequence that Kuhn draws from this circularity?

● The reason the paradigms are circular is because each group creates its own paradigm and within their circle they include there debates to support their paradigm. The circles do not mix and you can either pick one circle or another. If you are not within that circle you cannot make a completing enough argument and you must use persuasion to encourage. ● Circularity does raise a problem because its main focus points is based on persuasion instead. For example think of the Duck, Rabbit image. If you see a duck you will argue there is a duck and visa versa. In this scenario two circles are made one debating the duck and the other debating rabbit. ● Kuhn did not like circulatory arguments because of the concepts of Incommensurability. Incommensurabilty is present in these circulatory arguments, which means that there is no common ground for their rational comparison and choice. For example in our duck versus rabbit image there is no common ground to say what is right or wrong because each person has a different perspective of it. When they debate whether it is a duck or rabbit there is no rational choice and they must use persuasion.