IR COMPS NOTE CARDS

Haas (1958) -- The Uniting of Europe THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Focus: The European Coal and Steel Community Neo-functionalist argument: - Views the integration process as group driven - Federal institutions are established because important political groups see tangible benefits from joint governance in specific areas - The integration process pushes forward when federal institutions affect the interests of groups that respond by organizing across national boundaries and pushing for more integration Detailed Argument: - Does not require majority support, nor need it rest on identical aims on the part of all participants - ECSC was initially accepted because it offered a multitude of different advantages to different groups - Acceptance of a federal scheme is facilitated if the participating state units are already fragmented ideologically and socially; if among the participating industrial, political, or labor groups there is a tradition, however vague, of mutual consultation and of rudimentary value sharing; and if there exists an external threat - Groups. parties, and governments have reassessed and reformulated their aims in such a way that the drive for a United Europe has become the battle cry of the Left (hope to achieve the welfare state through the EU) - He argues this should generalize to like states

Gowa (2011) -- The Democratic Peace after the Cold War DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Key Finding: - Dyadic dispute rates converge after the Cold War, casting doubt on the existence of a democratic peace; she considers 1992-2001 - Wars to convert states to democracies are unnecessary for world peace, since regime type really has nothing to do with it. What really matters is whether it's a unipolar or bipolar system. Main Argument: - The Cold War created a number of proxy wars with non-democracies fighting each other; thus the bipolar system created a dispute-rate pattern that was orthogonal to DPT yet contributed to its empirical success - The low level of disputes among dyads in the Cold War is due to the common threat faced by the western countries, such that they were more focused on fighting the USSR than fighting each other Data: - Soviet collapse reduced East-West major power disputes by 42 percent - Democratic dyads shifted from 8 percent of all dyads 1950-1991 to 17 percent after the Cold War (contrasts with pre-1914 data when there were no democracies) - So this period should be a good test for the democratic peace; it also increased heterogeneity so not all Ds were advanced capitalist countries

Acharya (2003) -- Will Asia's Future Be Its Past? THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Literature: - Friedberg (1993) argues that Asia is "ripe for rivalry" given its lack of stability-enhancing mechanisms of the kind that sustains peace in Europe, such as its high levels of regional economic integration and regional institutions to mitigate conflict - Kang (2003) argues that Asian states tend to bandwagon with China (and have done so historically) with the periods of Asian instability coinciding with periods of Chinese decline - a strong China stabilizes Asia Argument: - Asia's future will not be like its past - instead of sliding into anarchy or organizing itself into a pre-Westphalian hierarchy, Asia is increasingly able to manage its insecurity through shared regional norms, rising economic interdependence, and growing institutional linkages - India balances against China - Pursuing economic self-interest via trade ties to China is not the same as bandwagoning - In reality, ASEAN is pursuing "double-binding" which is a conscious effort by ASEAN to enmesh China and the US in regional interdependence and institutions so as to induce moderation on the part of China and increase the cost of Chinese use of force

Hiscox (2002) -- Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation SPECIAL INTEREST MODELS OF TRADE POLICYMAKING

Main Argument: - Class distinctions between voters are more economically and politically salient when interindustry mobility is high; when mobility is low, industry distinctions become more critical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions - Large changes in levels of labor and capital mobility over the last two centuries coincide with significant shifts in the character of American trade politics (evidence for HO) Method: - Factor mobility is a continuous variable (between HO/SS and RV) affected by a range of economic, technological, and political conditions - To compare the utility of class and industry-group models, he relates voting patterns among House and Senate over time to measures of the class and industry makeup of their constituencies - Smaller differentials in wages and profits across industries are indicators of higher levels of mobility (because if factors are mobile, return differentials are arbitraged away) - We can observe a decline in variation in wages over the nineteenth century (rise in labor mobility) and an increase in wage variation starting 1910-1930; we can explain the trend with technological advances associated with industrialization - free movement in the 1900s and industry-specific skill growth in recent decades following the dawn of the assembly line in 1910-1920 - Votes are pooled into 5 periods: 1824-60, 1875-1913, 1922-37, 1945-62, 1970-94 Predictions: - Per SS, we should expect: (-) for land and protectionism since US is endowed with land, (+) for labor, and (+) for capital pre-1914 but (-) for capital post-1914 - Per RV, we should expect importance of exporting industries (-) associated to votes for protection, importance of import-competing industries (+) associated to votes for protection Findings: - Value of farm production (-) with votes for protection except 1945-62 - Manufacturing employment (+) with protectionism, although results are unclear 1945-62 - Effects of capital profits on votes (+) through 1937, then they flip - RV industry-based results are in line with predictions - Voting decisions more closely reflect Senator's consideration of interests of broad factor classes when mobility is higher - Using pseudo-R squared and J tests, he corroborates these general results Implications: - Predicts incoherent trade strategies for US politicians given industry influence - Olsonian nightmare in which a growing share of the economy's resources are squandered on zero-sum distributive battles instead of being invested in productive activities Problems: - Could wage variability be driven more by relocations (i.e. incentivizing people to move West or to big cities) than mobility?

Johnston (1995) -- Cultural Realism THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Main Argument: Ancient Chinese were realists, but realist ideas arose from and were transmitted through culture Detailed Argument: - Johnston defines strategic culture focusing on what culture actually does to behavior - Johnston focuses on the Seven Military Classics - the most extensive compilation on Chinese statecraft, grand strategy, and military tactics with mixed elements from various Chinese traditional thoughts RD: - Empirically combines strategic culture with traditional structural variables (relative capabilities) and compares performance in predicting behavior with purely structural variables Problems: - Seems to assume that the strategic culture 700 years ago is the same today just based on the fact that leaders still read it - Tests for Mao but nothing before or after

Mercer (1995) -- Anarchy and Identity STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Mercer here argues that even if we assume that constructivists are correct in arguing that anarchy has no inherent "logic," social psychological research on group behavior indicates that states will still distrust other states (the "out-group") and focus on improving the welfare and power of their own citizens (the "in-group"). Thus, Mercer provides a social psychological foundation for neorealism, in addition to the basic structural foundation (i.e., anarchy + uncertainty) discussed by Waltz and Mearsheimer. Bridges constructivism and neorealism.

Iversen and Cusack (2000) -- The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization? GLOBALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Main Argument: - Most of the risks being generated in modern industrialized societies are the product of technologically induced structural transformations inside national labor markets - Increasing productivity, changing consumption patterns, and saturated demand for products from the traditional sectors of the economy are the main forces of change - These structural sources of risk fuel demand for state compensation and risk sharing Theory: - Two previously largest sectors - agriculture and industry - have contracted all over - Change might lead people to take lower-paying jobs, jobs without benefits, or leave the job force altogether - Governments have responded in one of three ways: (1) promote employment in private services via deregulation of product and labor markets and the allowance of greater wage dispersion; (2) maintain extensive regulation of private services and compressed wage structure while expanding employment in public services i.e. more consumption; (3) regulation remains in place and the public sector is not expanded i.e. more transfers - Whether openness is related to risk depends on extent to which international market volatility is greater than domestic market volatility - Two conditions: (1) price volatility in international markets is greater than in domestic markets; (2) trade concentrates more than diversifies risk - Rodrik's analysis includes non-democratic or less developed countries to whom the argument presented here does not apply - Main sources of risk are found in interaction of sector-specific skills and domestic economic processes; labor-market dislocations associated with major shifts in the sectoral-occupational structure have been a driving force behind expansion of welfare state since early 1960s - The importance of changes in occupational structure depends on transferability of skills and social benefits - Firms provide social benefits that are specific to employment in order to reinforce acquisition of firm-specific skills; it follows that workers can protect themselves only via mediation of the state - Forms include state-guaranteed health insurance, old age pensions, early retirement, disability insurance, etc. - When skills/benefits do not travel, but many are expected to have to travel, there should be high demand for state-sponsored compensation and risk sharing; firms like this because without assurance, no investment in skills - Most skills obtained in manufacturing and agriculture do not travel to services - Political and institutional factors (labor unions, left government) still matter Findings: - It does not appear that openness to trade or openness to international financial system increases the volatility of the domestic real economy - Growth in transfers and government consumption can be explained as a function of the severity of internally driven employment losses in traditional sector, not globalization - Only finding that holds is left-labor power creates expansion of government - None of globalization variables - openness and capital mobility - are significant on government transfers - Political factors do affect government consumption, but not transfer payments - Two pathways: governments increase transfers and governments increase public employment - The latter effect is amplified by centralized bargaining and dominance of left parties - Countries with least historical dependence on traditional sectors have experienced the fewest jobs lost over time; speaks to domestic rather than international determinants - They close by saying that globalization is associated with deindustrialization / offshoring Discussion: - Again, it does not necessarily seem that this refutes Rodrik directly; just that his argument might apply to a different sub-sample - Most of the world is not deindustrializing, so Rodrik can explain more countries - Deindustrialization is actually endogenous to capital mobility and globalization!

Fearon (1994) -- Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes AUDIENCE COSTS AND CREDIBILITY

Question: During a crisis, how do leaders come to revise their beliefs about an opponent so that attack is preferred to holding out for concessions? Takeaway: at a price, audience costs make escalation in a crisis an informative although noisy signal of a state's true intentions; democracies generate greater audience costs and are therefore less likely to back down in a crisis; more likely to get better results in crisis bargaining International crises: occurs when one state resists a threat or demand made by another, with both taking actions that suggest that the dispute might be decided militarily; occur because (1) states have private information about their willingness to use force; (2) they have incentives to misrepresent their information to get a better deal Argument: - Relative audience costs matter: the side with a stronger domestic audience (democracy) is always less likely to back down than the side less able to generate audience costs (non-democracy) - Democracies should be able to more credibly and clearly signal their intentions - Audience costs are an important factor enabling states to learn about an opponent's willingness to use force in a dispute - Posits a widespread norm that it is a bad idea to make threats and back away from them - Domestic audience costs are dangerous, giving political opponents an opportunity to deplore the international loss of credibility, face, or honor There are two sorts of costs leaders face for backing down: (1) domestic and international price for conceding the issues at stake, which is the same regardless of when concessions are made or after how much escalation; (2) whatever additional costs are generated in the course of the crises itself (only the added costs can serve as costly signals) Types of mechanisms making escalating and backing down worse: - Physical costs: includes the financial and organizational costs of mobilizing and deploying troops and simple impatience (time preferences) - Accidental or preemptive war: concerns risks of war generated in some direct way by crisis escalation - International and domestic audience costs: the only one focusing on the public nature of conflict; the greater the escalation, the greater the cost - Audience costs can be domestic (government officials, general public) or international (adversaries, allies, IOs) Model: - International crises are modeled as a "war of attrition" with two key features: (1) state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate; (2) a leader who backs down suffers audience costs that increase as the public confrontation proceeds - Neither the balance of forces nor the balance of interests has any direct effect on the probability that one side rather than the other will back down once both have escalated - A crisis always has a unique horizon - a level of escalation after which neither side will back down because both are certainly locked in, making war inevitable - States typically update their beliefs about an adversary's resolve in a Bayesian fashion in response to costly signals - Crisis ends when one state quits or attacks; there is no crisis without imperfect information Findings: - A state's ex ante expected payoff in a dispute is increasing in the degree to which escalatory moves create audience costs for the state's leadership - As time moves forward, states with lesser resolve are more likely to have backed down already because they would prefer a quiet concession without audience costs to avoid being bound to war: war of nerves - The more a crisis escalates, the less likely a state is to back down - The state less able to generate audience costs is always more likely to back down in disputes that become public contests; regardless of resolve and value of war Problems: - Debs and Goemans (2010) and Weeks (2008) - elites are an audience and they can really hurt autocrats

Monteiro (2014) -- Theory of Unipolar Politics EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Question: How durable is a unipolar world? Is it peaceful? What is the best grand strategy that a unipolar power like the US can implement? Setup: - No state in modern history has enjoyed the power preponderance of the US since the collapse of the SU - it is a unipolar world - Made possible by its enormous defense budget (especially its defense R&D budget, which equals 80% of China's total defense expenditures) Three Key Points: 1. In a nuclear world, unipolarity can be durable, but its durability depends on the strategy of the unipole. Rising powers in a unipolar world can convert growing latent power into military power beyond the point at which their survival is guaranteed (a nuclear deterrent), or they can become satisfied with the military status quo once they develop a nuclear arsenal a. Systemic factor: The possibility of maintaining one state's preponderance in military power depends on the expected costs of a war between the unipole and a rising challenger. The higher these costs (which are determined by the technology of warfare), the narrower the range of situations that will prompt the rise of a military challenge. In a nuclear world, the expected costs of great-power war are incredibly high, making unipolarity durable b. Strategic factor: Durability also depends on the strategy of the unipole vis-à-vis the economic growth of major powers. If the unipole accommodates this growth over the long term, it gives them fewer incentives to militarize. If this long-term economic viability is threatened, other states have greater incentives to invest in additional military capabilities beyond those that assure their immediate security and survival, thereby creating a military challenge to the unipole. 2. A unipolar world is not peaceful. It generates conditions propitious for significant conflict. a. The absence of a global balance of power makes room for significant conflict beyond the most powerful states in the system. Unipolarity generates abundant opportunities for war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers that don't have the capabilities or allies needed to deter it. It also creates room for conflict among minor powers, which are less likely to be disciplined by great-power allies (as would be the case in a balanced system) b. Unipolarity consequently will be prone to produce asymmetric and peripheral conflicts 3. The optimal strategy for a unipole varies by situation. Monteiro argues that US interests would be best served by a grand strategy of "defensive accommodation," which combines a military strategy aimed at maintaining the international status quo (defensive dominance) with an economic strategy that makes room for the interests of rising major powers a. Defensive accommodation will lead to frequent US involvement in peripheral military conflicts. Needs to actively maintain the status quo. b. Defensive dominance is not sufficient for guaranteeing the durability of US power preponderance. It is a military strategy; says nothing about economic policy. The US must also implement an economic strategy of growth accommodation for major economic powers - Monteiro says his argument is in line with Waltz (1979) and defensive realism; states care first and foremost about survival, so they will invest in military power sufficient to deter threats. They also care about economic power, because their long-term survival depends on the maintenance of their ability to invest in military power when necessary - There is an interaction between the nuclear revolution and the absence of a systemic balance of power: 1. States with nuclear weapons have little incentive to acquire additional conventional military capabilities to deter or fight other nuclear states; nuclear states will balance against a stronger conventional power only if their long-term viability is threatened 2. The nuclear revolution transforms realist insights about the balance of power, making possible relations among nuclear states largely consistent with liberal theories of IR. Nuclear states can cooperate, given their certainty that their survival isn't at risk 3. But nuclear weapons also have a destabilizing effect on international politics. When a balance of power is absent, recalcitrant states threatened by a dominant military power have an incentive to acquire nuclear weapons to deter these threats. Can lead to preventive wars In sum, if the unipole accommodates economic growth for rising economic powers, they have no incentive to continue balancing past the nuclear threshold

Nexon (2009) -- The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Questions: - Given concerns regarding generalization of one time period to another, how do we construct plausible generalizations that shed light on international processes? - How do we make sense of the texture of international relations when it involves actors that do not fit neatly into a world order of states? Relationalism: - Patterns of transactions; the stuff of social reality lies in relations - Networks of networks co-constituted by network structures of actors who populate the system and also of social ties across and between them - Argues in favor of agent-structure co-constitution Three key concepts: - Social ties: routine transactions to which participants attach shared understandings, memories, forecasts, rights, and obligations - Categories: generalized roles embedded in routine transactions such as "Catholic" and "dynast" that provide potentially salient forms of collective identification/mobilization - Networks: patterns of ties produce networks with varying properties, such as density and distribution of social interactions, the location and direction of super- and subordinate relationships, and so forth - We can generalize when we identify similar embedded relationship structures Critiques of Paradigms: - Realists argue that rising Hapsburg power threatened other actors and they suffered from traditional hegemonic overextension - Realists ignore non-state actors (were important), the implications of norms and identities for patterns of collective action, and state forms that deviate in significant ways from the hierarchic, centralized, sovereign, and national logics of organization associated with the states-under-anarchy approach - Anarchy is not an overarching structure, but a particular network structure in which actors lack authoritative ties with one another or to a common third party - Constructivists focus on how new ideas and identities from the Protestant Reformation thrust Europe into crisis, resolved by developing new norms and practices of international politics - Constructivism is not generalizable Networks have attributes: - Density: ratio of actual ties to possible ties - Sparseness: a network is sparse when no actor is connected to another; sparse networks have gaps The structural location of an actor depends on how she is positioned within networks: - Centrality: the degree to which an actor is connected to other actors (brokers were most central in the dynastic system) - Content: meanings and symbols; networks of enmity vs. friendship Key variations are in catness (the degree of homogeneity of salient identities) and netness (the density of salient social ties) - High H and low D: 9/11 rally around the flag syndrome; an exogenous shock brings you together and you separate once it fades - Low H and high D: repeated PD case where interactions form social ties to facilitate cooperation via learning - Low H and low D: states-under-anarchy at the international level - High H and high D: easy cooperation, as is common within states - Few hurdles to collective action within states but huge barriers for collective action between states Theory of State Formation: - Dynasts in the late medieval period commonly cobbled together empires via contracts/marriages with a hub-and-spokes approach facilitated by intermediaries at the local level - The divide-and-rule system tends to limit the capabilities of local actors to overcome the capabilities of central authorities; lack of coordination between segments leads to differentiation and serves as an impediment to collective mobilization - Indirect rule reduces governance costs but it leads to inefficiencies and principal-agent problems; local actors have identities and interests - Rulers more effectively extract resources and negotiate with their subjects if they find ways to legitimate their rule across diverse audiences; they did this via multivocal signaling - The Reformation, via the emergence of cross-region and cross-polity networks centered around religious beliefs and identities, blew up the hub and spokes system by undermining multivocal signaling and increasing ties b/w segments - Multivocal signaling undermined b/c the two sides were total opposites - can't play both - Religion tended to internationalize conflicts and lead to foreign assistance - Brought about nation-states with national identities (as opposed to heterogeneous states with primarily local identities) Problems: - Is the theory falsifiable? It is not parsimonious

Moravcsik (1997) -- Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Argument Summary: - Assumes the primacy of societal actors, cementing liberalism as a bottom-up theory whereby the preferences of rational and risk-averse individuals are ontologically prior to state politics - Assumes representation and state preferences are organized such that state institutions constitute the "transmission belt" through which societal demands become state policy - Assumes that each state pursues the realization of its preferences constrained by every other state's simultaneous pursuit of its specific preferences Liberal IR Theory: - For liberals, the focus is on how state preferences are configured, not on the configuration of capabilities (realists) or configuration of information and institutions (institutionalists) - Liberal theory is analytically prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold - Bottom-up view of politics with the demands of individuals and social groups as prior to politics - Focuses on the consequences for state behavior of shifts in fundamental preferences, not shifts in the strategic circumstances under which states pursue them - States are self-interested, and what they want governs what they will do Three major variants of liberal theory: - Ideational liberalism: stresses the impact on state behavior of conflict and compatibility among collective social values and identities concerning the scope and nature of public goods provision (constructivist) - Commercial liberalism: stresses the impact on state behavior of gains and losses to individuals and groups in society from transnational economic interchange (functionalist) - Republican liberalism: stresses the impact on state behavior of varying forms of domestic representation and the resulting incentives for social groups to engage in rent seeking (DPT) Advantages: - General and Parsimonious: liberalism provides a general theory of IR linking apparently unrelated areas of inquiry - Rigorous and Coherent: institutionalist theories of regimes - commonly treated as liberal due to ideological and historical connotations - are in fact based on assumptions closer to realism than to liberalism - Demonstrates Empirical Accuracy vis-à-vis other theories: Reveals significant methodological biases in empirical evaluations of realist theories of "relative gains-seeking" and constructivist analyses of ideas and IR due to the omission of liberal alternatives - Demonstrates Multi-causal Consistency: Liberal theory is analytically prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold Assumptions: - The Primacy of Societal Actors: bottom-up view of politics in which the demands of individuals and societal groups are analytically prior to politics; actors are rational and risk-averse - Representation and State Preferences: states represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests officials define state preferences; the state is not an actor, but a representative institution; states are "functionally differentiated," pursuing different combinations of security, welfare, and sovereignty as preferred by powerful domestic groups enfranchised by representative institutions and practices - Interdependence and the International System: the configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior; each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states Three Patterns of Interdependence: - Naturally compatible or harmonious preferences: externalities of unilateral policies are optimal for others and there are strong incentives for coexistence with low conflict - Zero-sum or deadlocked preferences: an attempt by dominant social groups in one state to realize their preferences through state action necessarily imposes costs (negative externalities) on groups in other countries; the result is a bargaining game with few mutual gains and high conflict - Mixed preferences: exchange of concessions can improve mutual welfare —> incentive to negotiate policy coordination Problems: - Argument is degenerative and ad hoc3 - "if it anticipates novel facts but does so in a patched-up development rather than by a coherent, pre-planned positive heuristic"; Moravcsik says "anomalies within one variant of liberal theory may be resolved by considering other variants" - Russett and Oneal have a more integrative frame

Snyder (1991) -- Myths of Empire EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Goal: To explain why over-expansion has been so common among the great powers Argument: - Cognitive theory of overexpansion: emphasis on belief systems and heuristics - Central myth: idea that one's security can be safeguarded only through expansion - Originated as justification for policies of domestic political coalitions formed among groups having parochial interests in imperial expansion, military preparations, or economic autarky - Groups logroll their various interests via "security through expansion" arguments; myths then become politically and intellectually entrenched - Three general premises: (1) gains and losses are cumulative; (2) offense has the advantage; and (3) offensive threats make others more cooperative; this suggests that the balance of power does not operate and threats are effective 1. Gains and losses are cumulative: conquest increases power by adding resources, both human and material, that can be used in further competition with great powers 2. Offensive advantage: surprise attack, cheap defense, preventive war 3. Offensive threats: paper tiger approach, which should attract allies to bandwagon and intimidate opponents; balance of power operates in reverse; paper tiger myth extreme in Germany and Japan - Wilhelm thought British naval supremacy would strangle German trade but that Germany's attempts to close the gap would not be contested Two problems with (over)expansion: 1. Self-encirclement: provocation of overwhelming coalition of opposing states 2. Imperial overextension: costs begin to outstrip benefits (see Gilpin) - Consistent with "defensive" but not "aggressive" realism - good states form defensive alliances to contain the expansion of aggressive states - This is a domestic politics story consistent with the collective action explanation for protectionism; benefits of imperial expansion are highly concentrated while the costs are diffuse; by justifying parochial interests in terms of national security, imperialist and military interest groups seek to pass costs of aggression onto society; interests in expansion and militarism are typically more concentrated - The key contribution is coalition logrolling, which subsumes and strengthens earlier theories - Narrow imperialist interests hijack national policy in two ways: 1. Joining in logrolled coalitions by trading favors and passing costs onto society 2. Capturing the state in order to harness its propaganda resources - So narrow interests pool their power in a coalition and then the state's leadership becomes a manager of a heterogeneous coalition that prevents policy adjustments - Timing of industrialization matters (as in Gerschenkron): in Wilhelmine Germany and imperial Japan, the social consequences of late industrialization gave rise to logrolling among narrow interest groups, producing overcommitted expansionist policies - GB and US were early industrializers, strengthening diffuse interests - Democracies and systems dominated by unitary oligarchy have been less prone to overexpansion and strategic mythmaking than have systems dominated by logrolling among cartels or individual dictators Theory: - Parochial interest groups include militaries, colonial bureaucrats, and economic groups - They are better positioned to sell imperial myths due to: 1. Organizational and Motivational Advantages a. Compactness: flexible, nimble, easy decision-making, similar interests b. Motivations: they seek organizational strength, wealth, longevity, prestige, and autonomy through expansion c. Information monopolies: expertise in the area as to what works and what doesn't d. Close ties to the state 2. Cartelized political systems are ideal for parochial groups to spread the myths of empire a. Power and resources concentrated in groups concerned with narrow interests b. Parochial interests protected through logrolling (exchange favors) 3. Multiple expansion a. Each group pursues own interests within different expansionist projects 4. Offensive détente a. Parochial and anti-parochial groups negotiate and compromise (divide the pie) 5. Parochial groups vs. the state: how the two parties are reconciled? a. Self-delusion: the myths are internalized through propaganda b. Short political time horizon: the declining ruling group resorts to over-expansion as a way to shore up its power and public support Case: Germany- landowners want aggressive Russian FP (tariffs on grain) and industrialists want shipbuilding to compete with GB so adopt both!

Snyder and Diesing (1977) -- Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Crisis Behavior Theory: - Crises lie at the nexus of peace and war, representing a "moment of truth" and a major form of interstate interaction - bargaining, which includes coercion, persuasion, and mutual accommodation. - Crisis: a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war. - Uncertainty is a key feature of crises and pressure derives from the risk of war / fear of escalation. - Psychological (resolve) rather than physical strength determines outcomes. - Crises are caused by an attempt by one state to coerce another by an explicit or implicit threat of force. - The first act of severe coercion is a challenge, stimulated or motivated by an external or internal precipitant, and which must be resisted or deterred by the challenged in order for a crisis to occur. - The collision of challenge and resistance produces a confrontation, which results in war or resolution. - War comes specifically when recognition of power realities comes too late to abort (Fearon 94) or when interests are incompatible such that no bargaining range exists (Fearon 95) Crisis Feature Elements: - Bargaining: crises tend to involve coercion, (re)distribution, conflicting rather than common interests, asymmetries in available strategies, emotional content, and high stakes - Decision making: essentially psychology; interactions between governments result from the choices made by each, which themselves involve internal bargaining. Information and signaling link bargaining activities at these two levels. Utility maximization, bounded rationality, and bureaucratic politics are the key aspects of decision theory considered here. - Systems theory: the overarching international (# of major actors and distribution of power among them) and domestic (national styles, government institutions, party philosophies, bureaucratic roles, decision maker personalities, and public opinion) structures affect alignment possibilities, preferences for certain bargaining strategies, and the context in which all process occurs. Value structures: - The net weight each party places on possible outcomes, including war. - These subsume both a state's interests - which may be strategic (military power), reputational (images of resolve, flexibility, trustworthiness, etc.), or intrinsic (non-instrumental aspects such as self-respect and prestige which are valuable for their own sake) - and its military power, which translates as utility for war (its estimated probability of victory and attached utility). - Bargaining is a process of communicating values Signaling Effectiveness: - Jervis gives general characteristics of information processing but does not give the relative importance or frequency of each characteristic - Fails to answer the question: What are the chances of correct information getting through the system? Bureaucracy gets in the way... - Coded 350 interpretations from crisis data - both messages (signals) and indices - Chances of a message getting through untarnished to someone in the receiving government are about four in ten (higher in alliances) - Many mistaken interpretations do not get corrected, but a great deal of them do - perhaps because correctly interpreted messages contain important, counteracting information; the actual sequence of messages is important; or have some attached rational quality - Misperception stems more from expectations (predicted behavior) and desires (wishful thinking) than belief systems (prior theories and images of both international politics and oneself / potential adversaries) Images: - Immediate images fluctuate without changing the underlying / background ones - Background image change is a long-term process that crises may accelerate via shifting system structure or alignment - i.e. change in regime or balance of power, not via individual attitudes. Images typically go from soft to hard and not the other way around.

Abbott and Snidal (2000) -- Hard and Soft Law in International Governance LAW, NORMS, AND RIGHTS

This article looks at: 1. The reasons for the widespread legalization of international governance. 2. The different degrees of legalization, specifically "hard" and "soft" law Reasons for Widespread Legalization: Legalization is a tool that allows states to increase the credibility of its commitments; it constrains auto-interpretation and increases the costs of reneging; it increases the capacity for enforcement and imposes consequences for violations (also often becomes part of domestic law); mobilizes interests and advocacy groups; increases normative costs of violation (reputation, legitimacy) Law is both a "contact" and a "covenant" in that it involves calculation of interests as well as establishment of norms (rationalist v. constructivist approaches) 1. Actors use law to achieve interests and values (which are often related) 2. Actors used norm-based and interest-based strategies to create legal arrangements 3. Laws change behavior by changing material incentives and understanding/identity Different Degrees of Legalization: The degree of legalization is characterized according to its level of Obligation, Precision, and Delegation. Hard and soft law represents a spectrum, not a binary choice. There are tradeoffs to hard and soft law Hard law: Legally binding obligations that are precise and delegate authority for interpreting and implementing law. Hard law reduces transaction costs (managerial process) and enhances credibility, but it can infringe on the sovereignty of states. Hard law is harder to achieve (Problems of incomplete contracting: precision can be wasteful and too rigid, so delegation handles the problem of incomplete contracting) Soft law: Involves weaker obligation, precision and delegation. Soft law has been criticized for being too weak or meaningless, but actors often CHOOSE soft law as a superior institution. Soft law is often easier to achieve, can deal with uncertainty, and facilitates cooperation especially when the issues challenge state sovereignty. Soft law is dynamic; it initiates a process of learning and change over time. It lowers contracting costs, mitigates problems of distributional issues. Soft law helps compromise between strong and weak sates (regularize relations). Soft law is easier to achieve, allows states to achieve compromise over time, but it easier to shirk commitments. Not all soft law is a step to hard law; hard law is not always ideal. Hypotheses about when states will choose hard law: 1. As an assurance device when the benefits of cooperation are high but the potential for opportunism is high (trade, environment, labor) 2. To increase the credibility of commitments when noncompliance is hard to detect (arms control) 3. When forming "clubs" of committed states, ex ante sorting device (EU, NATO) 4. Within the states, when executives want to commit other domestic agencies or political groups 5. Legal commitments should be more credible when made by states with certain characteristics (strong domestic legal institutions/traditions) Certain variables increase the costs of international agreements: 1. Sovereignty costs: are highest when agreements infringe on relations between the state and its citizens/territory. Delegation is the greatest source of unanticipated sovereignty costs. (Negative sovereignty costs: agreements enhance sovereignty). States limit sovereignty costs through nonbinding/imprecise agreements or low delegation. Sovereignty costs are high for national security issues, low for technical issues of pol. economy but high for investment policy/money laundering/security-related export controls, and vary depending on trade issues. 2. Uncertainty: soft law deals with uncertainty by reducing the precision of agreement, how binding they are, or having moderate delegation. Such soft legalization allows for learning

Spruyt (1994) -- The Sovereign State and Its Competitors THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Question: Why did the modern state system emerge in Europe? Main argument: - The state was a unity of crown and town; various reasons stemming from new economic activity in towns allowed a coalescing of interests between the crown and the new town - Tax System: More money in the towns; crown wanted to tax in exchange for concessions including communal rights breaking down feudalism - Administration: Anti-feudal system of oversight by the Kingdom including bailiffs independent of feudal nobles; external locus of control - Standardization: codified system of law that helped to facilitate education and common benefits between monarchy and town - Emergence of town is endogenous to economic recovery from late Middle Ages Ch 5 Argument: - Pushes back on Tilly's explanation of states forming as a response to changes in warfare - The modern state system arose due to a social coalition based on similar interests and perspectives between the monarchy and burghers (members of the commercial bourgeoisie - Ideas need to be empowered to become political practice - There was an epistemic shift or redefinition of what counted as power and legitimate rule - State formation resulted from the acquiescence of privileged classes - The emergence of towns allowed new social bargains to be struck that enabled the king to centralize authority; towns featured a buildup in a grievances with feudal lords; kings offered towns better deals than nobles - Kings also chartered new towns and offered them liberties to attract more labor - towns appreciated the regular, predictable nature of royal taxes versus irregular collection by nobles - The king offered burghers communal liberties in exchange for support, freeing people from feudal servitude - The king deployed bailiffs to assert his will - The development of literacy and spread of knowledge, contra Church dominance, was encouraged by the king and towns Ch 8 Argument: - Sovereign states were more effective/efficient in curtailing free-riding and defection and therefore better at mobilizing resources of societies - The problem with the warfare argument is that city-leagues were as good as states as mobilizing resources for war and city-states raised more revenue than states - neither more land nor money - Also, states developed before militaries, and it is not obvious ex ante that kings are who you should go to for protection - Survival of the fittest: standardization of weights and measures, coinage, tariff-free trading, binding regulation of trade, and an internal juridicial hierarchy - Mutual empowerment: sovereign states preferred interacting with other sovereign states (credible negotiation, others tended to defect under treaty) - Deliberate mimicry and exit: German lords looked at the success (in terms of reducing internal transaction costs, providing collective goods, generating revenue, and mobilizing resources) and decided that "sovereign, territorial statehood was the most preferable form of organization." RD: Focus on France, Germany, Italy

Krasner (1976) -- State Power and the Structure of International Trade EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Argument: - A hegemonic distribution of potential economic power is likely to result in an open trading structure (particularly when the hegemon is in its ascendency) Theory: - State-power theory: begins with the assumption that the structure of international trade is determined by the interests and power of states acting to maximize national goals - Four basic state interests: aggregate national income, social stability, political power, and economic growth - related to the degree of openness for movement of goods 1. Aggregate national income: trade gives small states relatively more welfare benefits than it gives large ones 2. Social instability: increased by trade via factor mobility and impact is stronger in small states than in large ones and in relatively less developed than in developed ones; mitigated by larger size and greater economic development b/c skilled labor moves more easily 3. Political power: a state that is relatively large and more developed will find its political power enhanced by an open system because its opportunity costs of closure are less 4. Economic growth: openness furthers the economic growth of small states and of large ones so long as they maintain their technological edge - In a hegemonic system, the benefits of trade are unevenly distributed; the hegemon gets increased income, better growth when its relative size and technological lead are increasing, increased political power, and social instability mitigated by relatively low levels of involvement in the international economy - Small states opt for openness because the advantages in aggregate income and growth are so great and political power is restricted regardless - Medium-size states can be compelled by the hegemon because it has superior symbolic, economic, and military capabilities - Hegemonic state can offer access to a large domestic market and relatively cheap exports to other countries as positive inducements, and it can withhold aid/grants or engage in competition with third-country markets as negative inducements - Size and economic robustness of hegemon enables it to provide confidence needed for a stable international monetary system, and its currency offers needed liquidity Periodization: - 1820-1900: modest closure - increased tariffs and declining trade proportions - 1900-1913: greater openness - tariff levels unchanged but increased trade proportions for all major trading states except US and less regionalism in 3 of 4 cases - 1918-1939: closure - tariff levels are increased in the 1920s and again in the 1930s; trade proportions decline and trade becomes more regionally encapsulated - 1945-1970: greater openness - tariffs lowered, trade proportions increased especially after 1960, and regional concentration decreases after 1960 (limited to non-Communist areas of the world) Great Powers: - Great Britain: until WWI, GB had higher per capita income and a greater share of world trade and investment than any other state; peak in 1880s - United States: post WWI, US became relatively larger and more developed, reaching new and dramatic heights 1945-1960 Results: - Does not explain 1900-1913, 1919-1939, or 1960-present Amendment: - Once policies have been adopted, they are pursued until a new crisis demonstrates that they are no longer feasible; states become locked in by the impact of prior choices on their domestic political structures

Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) - The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy ENVIRONMENT

Argument: - Vulnerable countries push for international regulations for two reasons: (1) unilateral abatement activities may be insufficient to improve the statement of its environment; (2) wants to avoid putting its polluting industries at a comparative disadvantage in international markets - Less supportive countries will be those whose environment is not degraded very much by domestic or foreign emissions - The greater the abatement costs of emission reductions, the more reluctant a country should be to support international regulations - Abatement cost is a function of the state of abatement or prevention technology & behavior modification (which can lead to price changes) Framework: - High vulnerability / low abatement cost = pusher - High V / high AB = intermediary - Low V / low AB = bystander - Low V / high AB = dragger Predictions: - A country's preference for international controls on ozone depletion is determined by the vulnerability of its population to increased UV radiation and the economic cost of reducing CFCs. - Hypothesized draggers include France, Germany, Italy, Japan, FSU, UK - Hypothesized pushers include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland - Hypothesized intermediate is the US Method: - Two cases of negotiations on atmospheric pollution control: efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer (1987 Montreal Protocol, phaseout of CFCs) and regulation of transboundary acidification (acid rain) in Europe (1985 Helsinki Protocol) Findings: Canada, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, and the US were particularly active in pushing for CFC reductions. France, Italy, Japan, and the UK were resistant. Improvements to technology (development of CFC substitutes) may have persuaded West Germany and the US to accept deep cuts to CFC production; industrial interests were initially opposed, but came around by 1986. Additionally, there was a growing perception of vulnerability to ozone depletion. The Helsinki Protocol required that signatories either reduce their sulfur emissions or their transboundary fluxes by 30% by 1993 over 1980. Norway and Sweden were the most active pushers (as predicted). The UK was hypothesized to be a pusher, but opposed strict sulfur regulations (high costs, distrust in scientific findings). Hypothesized draggers (Bulgaria and Greece) didn't play active roles in negotiations. Intermediate countries (East Germany, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia) were not very active. In summary, only the group of pushers conclusively acted as predicted (in part because of technological advancements); draggers, intermediates, and bystanders (excluding Finland) were more passive. In both cases, Nordic countries were early pushers for regulation. Advances in scientific research helped establish cause-and-effect relationships and attracted the support of early draggers

Autesserre (2010) -- The Trouble with the Congo INTERVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING

Note: an example of BF 1999 in practice Question: Why do third-party interventions often fail to secure a sustainable peace? Argument: - International peacebuilders have their own world, with its own rituals, customs, beliefs, roles, starts, villains, rules, taboos, meeting places - i.e. their own culture - The need for bottom-up conflict resolution processes in addition to top-down peacebuilding is where international intervention went awry - International peacebuilders often neglect to address the local causes of violence (UN) - In Congo, it wasn't for lack of motivation or effort; they had good intentions and sufficient power, education, and resources - But a dominant international peacebuilding culture shaped the intervention in the Congo in a way that precluded action on local violence i.e. culture shaped what international actors considered at all, what they thought was possible, and what they thought was the natural course of action Theory: - Organizations interpreted continued fighting as a consequence of national and regional tensions; they viewed local conflicts as the result of insufficient state authority and of the Congolese people's inherent propensity to violence - Culture constructed intervention at the national and regional levels as the only natural and legitimate task for UN staffers and diplomats - Culture is socially constructed over long periods of time, and collective understandings can either precede action or emerge from practice; the latter came with the labeling of the Congo as a post-conflict environment where the former is illustrated by the idea that Congo was inherently violent and therefore continued violence in the east was not linked to the conflict Levels of Analysis: - Level of organization: The UN bureaucracy and embassy staffs understood their role as exclusively concerned with national and regional peace settlements, ignoring the local - Level of world polity: There were two global cultural features; a veneration of elections and an understanding of violence as intrinsic to Congo - Level of the field (i.e. peacebuilding): post-conflict label and the perception of local conflict resolution as unimportant Path Dependence: - There was also a resistance to change to the dominant culture; people tend to interpret new information as a confirmation of existing, dominant beliefs, and bureaucracies are resistant to change because they rely on routines and stability to function and because change usually threatens entrenched organizational interests (PD) - Efforts were most effective following shocking and horrific events that forced the UN to reinterpret the environment and address the problem immediately Congo: - Two themes in interviews: primacy of land and other micro-level issues in causing violence and producing anguish, and the unspeakable horrors perpetuated on the Congolese populations - Congo wars of the 1990s and their aftermath caused highest death toll of any conflict since WWII, and they involved up to 14 foreign armies before the sides reached a comprehensive settlement in 2003 - Book focuses on the transitional period to peace and democracy, the period of heaviest international intervention, June 2003 - Dec 2006 - Conflict ceased; villages were rebuilt; international assistance to militias fell - But by 2009, the situation in eastern Congo had once again deteriorated; local antagonisms have spiraled into broader tensions often b/w indigenous Kivus and Rwandan Congolese - Congolese of Rwandan descent allied with new Rwandan Tutsi government, which intervened in Congo for security reasons - Indigenous groups organized into "Mai Mai" militias, allying with defeated Rwandan Hutus and the Congolese government - Peacekeepers never established peace at the subnational level, and bottom-up rivalries in the east sustained conflict at the local, national, and regional levels; fragmented, local militias tried to advance their own agendas at the level of the village or district, competing for land, mining sites, and political power RD: - 330 interviews and a year and a half of field research/ethnography - case study of the international intervention during the DRC's unsuccessful transition from war to peace and democracy 2003-2006 - Also analyzed numerous documents - policy papers, agency memos, confidential reports, and news articles

Yarhi-Milo (2013) -- In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING

Summary: the thesis predicts differences between a state's political leaders and its intelligence community in their selection of which signals to focus on and how to interpret those signals. In particular, decision-makers often base their interpretations on their own theories, expectations, and needs, sometimes ignoring costly signals and paying more attention to information that, though less costly, is more vivid (i.e., personalized and emotionally involving). The thesis also posits that organizational affiliations and roles matter: intelligence organizations predictably rely on different indicators than civilian decision-makers do to determine an adversary's intentions. In intelligence organizations, the collection and analysis of data on the adversary's military inventory typically receive priority. Over time, intelligence organizations develop substantial knowledge of these material indicators that they then use to make predictions about an adversary's intentions. Argument: - How signals are filtered and interpreted leads to better understanding of the types of signals that tend to prompt changes in relations with adversaries - Two Rationalist Approaches: 1. Behavior Thesis: observers refer to certain actions - such as the adversary's decision to withdraw from military intervention - to draw conclusions regarding intentions (costly signaling) 2. Capabilities Thesis: states should consider an adversary's military capabilities in assessing its intentions - Selective Attention Thesis: posits that individual perceptual biases and organizational interest and practices influence which types of indicators observers regard as credible signals of the adversary's intentions - Implies differences between political leaders and intelligence community in selection and interpretation of signals - Three categories of intentions: expansionist, opportunistic, or status quo - Subjective Credibility Hypothesis: decisionmakers will not necessarily detect or interpret costly actions as informative signals - Interpretation and selection dependent on: expectations about links between the state's behavior and underlying characteristics; own theories about which signals are indicative or type; vividness (imaginability) of information - Contrasts Bayesian updating because vivid information may be costless, or disconfirming information may be ignored - Organizational Expertise Hypothesis: the bureaucratic-organizational context in which intelligence analysts operate has specific effects that do not apply to political decisionmakers - Prism of expertise emphasizing careful empirical analysis of military capabilities for intelligence Competing Explanations: - The Capabilities Thesis: observers should infer an adversary's intentions based on indexes of military power (Mearsheimer) - The Behavior Thesis: non-capability action is useful because it requires the adversary to either sink costs or commit itself credibly by tying hands - Three types of actions: (1) State's decision to withdraw from binding international institutions; (2) foreign interventions in weaker states, or the withdrawal of these interventions; (3) arms control agreements signing or reneging as signal Case Studies: - Look for covariance between changes in the IVs and changes in the DV of perceptions of intentions - Process tracing to examine whether decision-makers or collective intelligence reports explicitly cited the adversary's capabilities or its behavior - Test the predictions of the selective attention framework by comparing decision-makers' assessments with those of the intelligence communities, as well as looking for variation among decision-makers

Rosato (2010) -- Europe United THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

- The EU came about as a result of the rise of the Soviet Union - The EU feared US withdrawal from Europe and sought to preserve its own economic and security positions through integration - Security integration failed because it lost steam when the Soviet Union collapsed; it has not been revived - Path dependence and economic gains keep the EU as we know it going Could talk about Brexit and Euroskepticism more broadly and how it accords with his theory -- he predicts the deterioration of the EU as soon as the economic benefits dry up (i.e. hard times)

Mearsheimer (2001) -- Tragedy of Great Power Politics STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Offensive realism! - The actors are great powers, states that "have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world" Basic Assumptions: - Anarchy, survival, uncertainty (about intentions), offensive power, and states as rational actors Hard Core: - Obstacles to Cooperation: relative gains and cheating - To gain relative power: states may go to war, bait and bleed, bloodlet or blackmail (threaten force) - - To check aggressors: balancing and buck-passing - The international system is anarchic; states behave according to fear, self-help, and power maximization; perpetual SD - Relative power matters in a realist world and states try to maximize relative gains rather than absolute gains - Likelihood of conflict depends on the distribution of power (polarity) - Multipolarity (1792-1939): Unstable and conflict-ridden; chain-ganging and buck-passing more likely; miscalculations more likely - Bipolarity (1945-1989): More stable; buck-passing and miscalculation unlikely; overreaction and balancing likely - Unipolarity (1990-present): Stability inconclusive - Offshore Balancing is the best strategy for a regional hegemon; the key areas to consider are Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf - Unbalanced multipolarity (potential hegemon exists) is most dangerous - The idea that states maximize power, as opposed to seek survival as the main goal, is the portion of the core that directly contradicts Waltz - Waltz argues imitation leads to sameness and defensive balancing; Mearsheimer argues states also imitate aggressive behavior and use innovation to deviate and surprise Hypotheses: - Great powers strive for hegemony only in their region of the world because of the difficulty of projecting global power over large bodies of water - Great powers aim to be wealthier than their rivals because military power has an economic foundation - Great powers aspire to have the mightiest land forces in their region of the world because armies and supporting air and naval forces are the core of military power - Great powers finally seek to achieve nuclear superiority (global hegemony) - very hard - States care not just about imitation, but also innovation in order to gain power at the expense of rival states - War is the main strategy for gaining additional increments of power whereas balancing and buck-passing are the strategies for preserving the balance of power - Hegemons are the only status-quo powers China: - China will not rise peacefully -- economic supremacy; will expel US from Pacific region; will interfere in politics of the Americas and potentially cause problems in strategic areas like Africa and Persian Gulf; US should pursue Asian NATO - Asian states will balance despite interdependence Problems: - Per Walt, balancing deters rather than rewards power maximizing behavior, which is contradictory - What does it mean to maximize power?

Ikenberry (2011) -- Liberal Leviathan FUTURE OF IR

Setup: - Western democracies have built a liberal international order: multilateral institutions and rules, open markets, IOs, cooperative security, progressive change, sovereignty, etc.; a liberal hegemonic order post-WWII - US provided services to states through the provision of security and commitment to stability and open markets, but this order is under fire, starting with Bush-era anti-globalization and anti-liberalism (and moving through to Trump) - Some say it is just a product of unipolarity, others say it is passing American dominance, others say it is anti-liberalism stemming from a Chinese illiberalism - Financial crisis, stemming from America, tarnished the image of capitalism and Western financial institutions, hurting American hegemony (which is built on trust and public goods provision) Argument: - The crisis of the old order transcends controversies by recent American FP or even the ongoing economic crisis; it is a crisis within the old hegemonic liberal order, not a crisis in the deep principles of the order itself (crisis of governance) - Underlying foundations of the old order have changed with shifts in power, contested sovereignty, threats related to non-state actors, and the scope of participating states - We need a new bargain (different authority figures) and not a new system - Four central claims: 1. A distinctive international order was constructed after WWII - it was a hierarchical system built on both American power dominance and liberal principles of governance 2. There are deep sources for the modern authority crisis rooted in the transformation of the Westphalian organization of the state system 3. To understand the nature of this crisis and the future of liberal international order, we need to understand the types of international order and the sources of rule and authority, power, and legitimacy within them 4. To the extent the US sees its unipolar position as waning, it has incentives to renegotiate postwar hegemonic bargains (retrench a la Gilpin?) - The liberal ascendancy is not over, but it is evolving and there are multiple pathways of change (reallocation of power and leadership) - Liberal Leviathan: American global authority is built on Hobbesian grounds; other countries handed the reins of power to Washington just as Hobbes' individuals in the state of nature voluntarily construct and hand over power to the Leviathan; the reestablishment of the US as liberal leviathan involves the voluntary granting of that status by other states (Hurd 1999) - International order can be established in three ways: 1. Balance: order maintained through equilibrium of power among major states 2. Command: powerful state organizes and enforces order hierarchically 3. Consent: organized around agreed-upon rules and institutions that allocate rights and limits on the exercise of power (EU, for instance) - The liberal international order moved through two great historical eras dominated by GB and the US respectively - Have been struggles over alternative forms of governance: authoritarian capitalism, democratic capitalism, and communism Key Observations: - The liberal international order is distinctive in that is is open and loosely rule-based - It is best ordered by consent rather than balance or coercion - The order is imperial in the sense that the American postwar political formation is organized around hierarchical relations of domination and subordination - There are also consent-based logics embedded in the world order - Imperial state imposes the rules of hierarchical order but is not itself bound by those rules (US has skirted rules as in Stone, Voeten) - Liberal hegemony is a hierarchical order built around political bargains, diffuse reciprocity, provision of public goods, and mutually agreeable institutions and working relationships - Despite America's imperial temptation, it will not abandon rule-based order: the US will want to wield power legitimately in a world of institutions and rules, especially given the rise of China and India challenging liberal hegemony

Jervis (2002) -- Signaling and Perception PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING

"Politics, especially international politics, falls at the intersection of psychology and game theory" Five characteristics of political psychology: - Belief that to understand human behavior, we have to understand how people think, interpret their environments, and reach decisions; rational choice is insufficient to catch the objectives toward which people strive or the means by which they try to reach them (black box) - Looking at decision making reveals both common patterns and idiosyncrasies - Behavior is related to the self-image and identities that are so important to people; includes heuristics, in-out groups, nationalism, etc. - People have emotions as well as beliefs; cognition is often "hot" - Rejection of a priori reasoning and the deep commitment to empirical research Signaling and Perception - The utility of political psychology can be illustrated by examining how actors communicate with each other, especially in international politics - Actors not only perceive each other, they signal in order to project true/false images - It is important to join how actors work to influence others' perceptions of them and how they perceive others though they have been kept separate in the literature The Problem Actors Face - Logic of images: the only behaviors that are informative are those that distinguish among actors who will react differently, or actor "types" - We should look only at behavior that discriminates between types Perceptions Control - A theory of signaling requires a careful investigation of how signals are perceived - Knowing how theorists read a signal does not tell us how the perceiver does - Most communications convey two messages: what the actor is saying and the fact that he needs to say it - Although behavior may reveal something important about the actor, often it is not clear exactly what is being revealed, what is intended to be revealed, and what others will think is being revealed - The impact of behavior depends on the perceiver's beliefs abut the links between the other's present and future actions; these links and the logic behind them are not always clear Typologies of Informative Behavior - Signals: like a language in that their meanings are established by agreement, implicit if not explicit; words and diplomatic language have meaning because both the signaler and the perceiver agree as to the message that the former is trying to convey; signals can be true or false - Indices: behaviors (either verbal or nonverbal) that the perceiver believes are inextricably linked to a characteristic that helps predict what the actor will do in the future; indices are seen as reliable and not available for deception (lifting a weight rather than simply saying that you are strong) - For a behavior to be an index, the perceiver must believe the actor cannot manipulate it to project a false image, either because manipulation is impossible or costly or because the actor is unaware that the perceiver is tracking it Costly Signals and Cheap Talk - Schelling (1960): a behavior that costs nothing can be equally well taken by an actor of any type and so provides no information - Only an actor that is willing and able to behave in a certain way can have the ability and incentives to send costly signals - Behavior often is highly diagnostic if it is cheap for an actor of one type but not for an actor of another kind (costly for expansionist state to give up offensive weapons but not for a peaceful state to do the same thing) - Two kinds of costly signals: 1. Cases in which the cost is incurred as the behavior is undertaken - example is taking an action in the face of significant domestic opposition 2. Threats and promises that will be costly to break; cost comes not with the issuing of the signal, but only later if it is broken Problem: the central role of perceivers' beliefs means that the cost borne can be very tightly related to the characteristic being judged, or not - Defense spending can be (1) index of the power of the gun lobby or (2) index of the capabilities and intent of a state - Knowing that a behavior is costly tells us little about what inferences will be drawn Changing Types - Types can change: France and Britain became less aggressive after WWI; paying a significant price sets of a variety of political, social, and psychological processes that can alter the actor's goals, views of the world, self-image, etc. Indices: - Only an actor of a certain type would behave this way and the behavior is a good predictor of what the actor will do in the future - Inference: only an actor of type X would undertake action Y, therefore actor is type X - Often, the set of connections that seem clear to perceivers rest on a set of unarticulated generalizations about politics and classes of actors Signals and Reputation - Indices are not intentional forms of communication, while Signals are intentional and require that the senders and perceivers interpret it in the same way (i.e. diplomatic language) - Belief is key because deceivers and honest actors can send the same Signal - Signals are implicit or explicit statements of future action, and costs are incurred later; this is the audience cost logic - Reputation writ large is different from Signaling reputation; the latter is the actor's reputation for living up to its word i.e. usually doing what it says Perceptual Biases - People are moved by both motivated (affect-driven) and unmotivated (purely cognitive) bias; the former derive from the need to maintain psychological well-being and self-image; latter from the need for short-cuts in an complex informational environment - Information is interpreted within the framework established by pre-existing beliefs Three crucial implications: 1. Images of other states are influenced by the implicit theories held by statesmen that specify the existence and meaning of indices (i.e. democracies are peaceful, economic growth demands a larger international role) 2. Images of individual states will only change in response to discrepant information that is high in quantity or low in ambiguity 3. Observers who believe different theories or hold different images of the state will draw different inferences from its behavior; anticipating how a Signal will be received entails an understanding of the theories and cognitive predispositions of the perceivers - As such, Bayesian models are naïve; how I perceive your signal is strongly influenced by what I already think of you (if I think the bag has mostly red chips, I am predisposed) - People shield themselves from painful choices (motivated biases) such that motivated biases often reinforce cognitive inertia; goal is to avoid conflicting values

Larson and Shevchenko (2010) -- Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING

Question: Key issue is how to persuade other states to accept and go along with US global governance, especially Russia and China. How to obtain their cooperation if they can't be integrated into the west? Argument: - Their cooperation is necessary; the US can't succeed on such issues as controlling terrorism, curbing proliferation of WMDs, rebuilding failed states, or maintaining economic stability without help from other states - Obtaining cooperation from these states will be especially hard because they're both outside of the Western liberal international order and have differing values and interests (Johnston would disagree!) - The authors argue that China and Russia will be more likely to participate if the US can find ways to recognize their distinctive status and identities, something that is overlooked by neorealism and liberalism Method: - Uses social identity theory (SIT) to analyze changes in Russian and Chinese foreign policy - SIT posits that people derive part of their identity from membership in various social groups (nation, ethnicity, religion, etc.) - Because membership reflects back on the self, people want to have a positive identity compared to other groups. States perceive status relative to other states (cf. Realists, who think that status is objective and a function of military power) Case Studies: - The study indicates that China and Russia initially sought great power status through partial acceptance of Western capitalist norms but were denied integration into elite Western clubs - Both states turned to more competitive policies but did not enhance their relative standing - Rather than adjust to the U.S.-led liberal democratic system, China and Russia sought to develop new, more positive images by contributing to global governance while maintaining distinctive identities (social creativity) - China has been remarkably successful in changing other states' perceptions of its identity, whereas Russia's cooperation was largely taken for granted. Russia's foreign policy is currently in a transitional phase with some elements of social competition Findings: - Case studies suggest that the desire for greater status may motivate rising powers to take on more responsibility for maintaining world order - For this outcome to occur, the dominant power, the United States, must offer recognition of the rising state's more positive identity and status - Overall U.S. predominance allows the United States to recognize other countries' achievements and contributions in the area of global governance without detracting from its own status - Use of status incentives should receive greater consideration as a tool of global governance Relation to other stuff: - Definitely should pair with Johnston (2008)

North and Weingast (1989) -- Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH

Question: What is the effect of institutions (how rules are enforced and might be changed) on economic outcomes? Argument: - For economic growth to occur, the sovereign must establish the relevant set of rights and also credibly commit to them - They attempt to explain evolution of political institutions emerging out of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 - Parliament with central role alongside Crown and independent judiciary (this was following a period of arbitrary expropriation and civil war) - Political institutions governing society can be considered endogenously (equilibrium?) - The more likely it is that the government will change rules to its benefit, the less incentive there is to invest and the lower the expected return on investment (i.e. expropriation) - There are two ways the leader can credibly commit: (1) showing a pattern of responsible behavior, which is rare in practice; (2) being constrained to obey a set of rules that do not permit leeway for violations - In sum, economic growth and the development of free markets requires some commitment British Case: - Problem they sought to solve: control of the exercise of arbitrary and confiscatory authority by the Crown - The Stuarts used "forced loans" to acquire capital and rarely repaid; also used "monopoly grants" to expropriate, which acted as an effective tax - There was then a conflict of interest between the Crown on the one hand and investors/wealth-holders and taxpayers on the other hand - The Crown would dissolve Parliament when it refused grants and judges served at its pleasure; the result was an anti-Crown coalition seeking preservation of personal liberties, rights, and wealth - The opposition took power post-civil war and reduced land use restrictions and restrictions on capital mobility to increase the fluidity and effectiveness of markets - Eventual restrictions prevented Crown from dissolving Parliament unilaterally, gave Parliament a central role in financial matters, and an independent judiciary with Crown subordinated to common law - Dethroning of Charles II and James I made the threat credible, creating a check - Two arrangements made agreement self-enforcing: (1) Crown was restricted by credible threat of Parliament to dethrone; (2) Parliament agreed to fund the Crown and put it on sound financial footing in exchange for increased government power - The result was increased government borrowing and a drop in interest rates - risk decreased significantly despite a flood of government debt Findings: - The institutional changes altered the incentives of governmental actors in a manner desired by winners of the Glorious Revolution; an explicit attempt to make credible the government's ability to honor its commitments - The Crown then had to obtain Parliamentary assent to change agreements - The result was a marked increase in property rights, which reflected in market activity - The government became financially solvent and gained access to unprecedented funds - Government borrowing increased by an order of magnitude, suggesting a substantial increase in perceived commitmentsti

Katzenstein (2009) -- Civilizations in World Politics FUTURE OF IR

Setup: - Plural: they coexist with each other within one civilization of modernity, or what we call today a global world - Pluralist: internal pluralism results from multiple traditions and vigorous debates / disagreements - There has often been a distinction between civilized and uncivilized people drawn along lines of racism, religion, ethnicity, etc. - Civilizations undercut both the realist confidence in the superiority of military power and the liberal presumption that universalistic secular liberal norms are inherently superior to all - It is wrong to talk about "East" and "West" in the singular Argument: - Realism may not be a theory of contestation within a civilization - Civilizations are often centered around religion, language, and literature; they are loosely coupled, internationally differentiated, elite-centered social systems that are integrated into a global context - Civilizations are not fixed in space or time; they are internally highly differentiated and culturally loosely integrated; they can become political reifications especially when encountering other civilizations On Huntington: - Huntington insisted on the existence of plural civilizations and anticipated that other civilizations (Sinic, Hindu, or Islamic) might succeed the West - He replaced the political and economic clash between authoritative communism in the East and capitalist democracy in the West with the civilizational clash between a cultural West and an Islamic and Sinic East - Katzenstein refutes Huntington and says conflict occurs more within than between civilizations - Two main criticisms: 1. Statistical and qualitative analyses show major clashes occur within rather than between civilizations, and that they are not the axis along which war is fought 2. Huntington succumbed to the illusion of singularity, the view of collective identities as singular, unchanged, and unchanging traits On Primordiality: - Primordiality is a crystallization in social consciousness that is simplifying; it can focus on civilization, gender, race, territory, language, etc. - The specific identity invoked is either civility (us and them boundary with focus on conduct) or sacredness (us and them boundary with focus on God) Theories of Civilizations: 1. Eisenstadt: religion and multiple modernities 2. Collins: cultural competition and zones of prestige 3. Elias: civilizing process Multiple actors, traditions, and practices: - Actors: various types of political actors including states, polities, and empires - Civilization is a process - State: centers of political authority with distinct identities and institutions, and are endowed with the capacity of collectively mobilizing resources in the achievement of political objectives - Empire: hubs export state institutions to other parts of the world where they provide an overlay to indigenous political forms of organization and loyalty which nest within the institutional import - Polity: broader center of authority that is not exclusively territorially based

McDermott (2001) -- The Psychological Ideas of Amos Tversky and Their Relevance for Political Science PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING

- Three Foci: Judgment under uncertainty, decision-making under risk, reason-based choice - Two Noteworthy Points: 1. Importance of reason-based choice whereby individuals actively seek to generate, understand, and justify their decisions in light of often emotionally laden rationales which make compelling sense to constituents 2. Suggests that people do not act even 'as if' they were the value-maximizers they are purported to be by more rationally based theories such as expected utility - Individuals function as problem-solvers who creatively construct their choices and resolve complex problems which require trade-offs between values and goals - Preferences are created, rather than elicited, within the process and context of choice Judgments under Uncertainty - Judgments take place prior to decisions, are assessments about external events, and happen under conditions of uncertainty; decisions are internal evaluations with some kind of value trade-off happening under conditions of risk - People make decisions based on judgments: 1. Choice: an either-or decision is made between two options in order to show that one is preferable 2. Matching: decision-maker is asked how much of one attribute would be needed to make it equal in value to another attribute Three types of efficient judgmental heuristics: representativeness; availability; and anchoring 1. Representativeness: occurs when a person judges that the probability of one object or event belongs to a particular category based on the similarity between them - People using this do not make full use of prior odds, or base rates, needed for Bayesian decision-making and updating - People instead tend to make judgments based on similarity between the person and pre-existing stereotypes 2. Availability: demonstrates how frequency is judged according to the strength of associations in memory or imagination; events that are easy to imagine are judged to be more likely simply because they are more cognitively accessible 3. Anchoring and Adjustment: predictions are based on initial values which are insufficiently adjusted to new information Decision-making under Risk - Presence of risk complicates decisions because something of value might be lost or something of value might not be gained if the wrong choice is made - Defining loss or gain depends on the reference point which can change over time Overview of Prospect Theory - Psychological theory of decision-making under risk (editing and evaluation phase) - Prospect theory states that individuals prefer goods they have rather than ones they don't; are averse to losses from the reference point; and are risk-averse regarding gains but risk-acceptant regarding losses - Expected utility emphasizes absolute rather than relative gains; losses hurt more than gains please - Weighting function: low-probability events are given too much subjective weight; certain or impossible events given too much weight Deferred Decisions - The tendency to delay decisions and to continue to seek new alternatives is much greater when conflict over values is high than when it is low - More or better information tends to induce decisional paralysis

Doyle and Sambanis (2006) -- Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations INTERVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING CIVIL WAR

Goal: To explain how the international community can assist the reconstruction of peace in civil war-torn lands Main Argument: - Sustainable peace is the measure of successful peacebuilding, and is influenced by three factors: 1. The degree of hostility of factions (measured in terms of human cost i.e. deaths and displacements, type of war, and # of factions) 2. The extent of local capacities remaining after the war (GDPPC) 3. The amount of international assistance (economic assistance or UN troops) Theory: - Interdependent logic of the peace-building triangle: the deeper the hostility, the more the destruction of local capacities, the more one needs international assistance - The UN, as a multilateral organization, cannot manage force as rationally as is necessary to win war, but can mediate, mobilize, and mange legitimate international assistance - The UNSC needs nine votes to proceed, making it impartial (lol) UN Background: - From 1990-1992, the UNSC adopted an intrusive interpretation of UN Charter Chapter VII concerning international peace and security, expanding the scope of intervention; in the Hurd context, the UN gained legitimacy as an intervener - While the UN has been effective at legitimizing enforcement coalitions for interstate, armed collective security (Korea, Gulf War I), it has been ineffective as a peace enforcer, or war-maker, in intrastate, civil conflicts post-Cold War - Weak implementation undermines even the best of agreements - Multilateral peacebuilding is impartial and therefore not chosen by states that seek unilateral advantages - Boutros-Boutros Ghali identified five interconnected roles for the UN: 1. Preventive diplomacy: prevents conflict from breaking out, involving confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning, and preventive deployment 2. Peace enforcement: ensure compliance with a case-fire mandated by UNSC 3. Peacemaking: bring hostile parties to agreement through powerful means 4. Peacekeeping: deploying UN troops as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between parties while diplomats negotiate a comprehensive peace 5. Post-conflict reconstruction: foster economic and social cooperation to build confidence among previously warring parties - Three generations of peacekeeping: 1. First generation: designed to respond to interstate crises by stationing unarmed or lightly armed UN forces between hostile parties as a buffer while peace negotiations proceeded 2. Second generation: increased flexibility to enhance consent and build / implement multidimensional peace agreements (everything short of war making) 3. Third generation: includes war-making in order to deliver supplies, rebuild failed states, or enforce cease fires RD: - Case studies and statistical analysis of all civil wars since 1945 - Peace measured not only by COW casualties (<1000) but also based on wider political participation; they bring in Polity data to code a minimal degree of political assent Findings: - International capacities: UN missions with a mandate and resources to build peace increase the chance for peace after civil war - Peace operations must be designed to fit the case (i.e. kind and degree of support) - Peace operations supplemented by extensive programs to rebuild economies are particularly successful in the long run - Peacebuilding does not however require that the US or any other great power take the lead except in the most violent cases - Lastly, peacebuilding trumps military victory i.e. comprehensive peace agreements implemented through a peace operation are more successful than total military victory at creating peace - Policy takeaway: the UN is bad at war & imposing settlement by force, but good at peace & mediating and implementing a comprehensively negotiated peace

Fearon (1995) -- Rationalist Explanations for War STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Main Argument: - Leaders who consider the risks and costs of war may end up fighting nonetheless Lit Review: - Rationalist explanations for war are neorealist because the explanatory variable is systemic (the nature of the international system) - Current rational explanations of war are insufficient because they fail to resolve the central puzzle that war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all prefer to war - Five rationalist arguments: (1) anarchy; (2) expected benefits greater than expected costs; (3) rational preventive war; (4) rational miscalculation due to lack of information; and (5) rational miscalculation or disagreement about relative power - The first three fail to address why no alternative settlement is reached - The last two fail to address why rational leaders do not use diplomacy or other forms of communication to avoid costly miscalculation Three Reasons for War: - Private information about relative capabilities and incentives to misrepresent such information (Blainey 1973 is the precursor for states coming to different conclusions about relative capabilities) - Commitment problems: situations in which mutually preferable bargains are unattainable because one or more states would have an incentive to renege on the terms (i.e. time inconsistency; preemptive war under offensive advantage; preventive war with rising states; most dangerous per Weisiger 2013) - Issue indivisibilities (can be resolved by side payments and issue linkage) Detailed Argument: - There should always exist a bargaining range so long as the issue is divisible given that war is ex post inefficient - Disagreements about relative power: conflicting estimates of the likelihood of military victory can eliminate any ex ante bargaining range - War due to miscalculation of an opponent's willingness to fight: leader's private information about their resolve to fight over specific interests - The above two causes raise the question of why the private information is not shared - must be an incentive to misrepresent as well! - Incentives to misrepresent in bargaining: states may exaggerate their willingness or capability to fight in order to strategically position themselves to obtain a favorable resolution; they can understate to retain first strike - The above is the reason why any effective signal must be costly (i.e. need ability or resolve to do it) but war can be a signal of resolve here - Anarchy only matters where one or both sides in a dispute have incentives to renege on peaceful bargains - First-strike (offensive) advantages narrow the de facto bargaining range and defensive advantage increases it Problems: - Fearon ignores risk-acceptant states outside of Nazi Germany - Jervis would argue that private information is not needed - states can look at the same information and draw different conclusions (perceptions) - If war is a costly signal of resolve/power, how can agreements always be preferable? (The Vietnam/Korean Wars as a signal that the US would fight a nuclear war to defend an ally like Berlin) - Fearon assumes that leaders are perfectly secure which rules out domestic politics (he black-boxes states)

Johnston (2008) -- Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000 FUTURE OF IR

Note: This is about security IOs and is therefore perhaps the best refutation of Mearhsheimer (1995) and Greico (1988) Question: - Why would Chinese foreign policy decision makers, for the most part socialized in a relatively hard realpolitik strategic ideology, operating in an era of overwhelming and potentially threatening US power after the end of the cold ear, and not offered obvious positive or negative material incentives, agree to cooperate in security institutions that did little to enhance China's relative power, and indeed had potential to damage its relative power interests? - A la Wendt (1994), the book is about convergence in the behavior of the participants in a social interaction via socialization (and not exogenous constraints) Main Argument: - Social interaction in IR can affect actor interests in such a way as to change the fundamental characteristics of the normative structures that constitute world politics - There is an important link between normative structures at the international level and the constraining effect of these norms on the behavior by the actor at the unit level (state or non-state) - Three micro-processes of interests: 1. Mimicking 2. Persuasion 3. Social influence - They work in the cases of China's participation in institutions like the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the ASEAN Regional Forum and associated regional multilateral security dialogues, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the anti-personnel landmine regimes - Mimicking: borrowing the language, habits, and ways of acting as a safe, first reaction to a novel environment - Persuasion: internalization of new causal understandings of the environment - Social Influence: function of an actor's sensitivity to status markers bestowed by a social group and requiring some common understanding of back-patting/signals Theory: - Constructivists are bad at telling us how socialization occurs - He argues that realists discuss socialization via balancing, but really that is just selection; the puzzle for realists is that some countries are socialized to anti-realpolitik practices and yet survive well under anarchy - The notion that IOs can be social environments comes from Keohane (1984) - Institutions are not exogenous, rule-based, sanction-based constraints on non-changing agents - Chinese realpolitik derives from the Ming dynasty as manifested in strategy toward Mongol "threats" in a highly conflictual environment, zero-sum game, offensive advantage framework - Chinese leaders could be socialized differently if exposed to other cultures; indeed, realpolitik was fostered by socialization - IOs involve norms entrepreneurs, strong conformity pressures, and strained and intense exchanges of specialized information Findings: - There is considerable, if subtle, evidence of the socialization of Chinese diplomats, strategists, and analysts in certain counter-realpolitik norms and practices as a result of participation in security IOs

Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz (2007) - Comment on Rose INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Argument: - Rose has overlooked a large proportion of countries to which the agreement applied and mistakenly classified them as non-participants, when in fact they had obligations under the agreement - The GATT gave rights and obligations not only to formal members, but also to three categories of nonmember participants: colonies, de facto members, and provisional members - There are 10 provisional members and 56 de factor members - Rose classifies colonies only as GATT members when trading with the colonizer Method: - 54% of the 21,037 dyad-years that Rose codes as "none-in" involved at least one GATT participant, and more than a third (36%) of the cases in the "one-in" category involve two participants - OLS and FE produce similar results Findings: - GATT increased trade for both members and nonmember participants when compared to nonmembers - Misallocating nonmember participants leads to a downward bias in results - Still no evidence of a diversion effect (the GATT improves trade generally) - Trade is improved for developing as well as industrial countries - Results also hold for each GATT trade round before the WTO

Fortna (2004) -- Does Peacekeeping Keep the Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War INTERVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING CIVIL WAR

Main Argument: - Peacekeeping does contribute to stability of peace after civil war - Given that peacekeepers tend to be sent where they are most needed (i.e. where it is difficult to keep) scholars tend to underestimate the effectiveness of peacekeepers - Selection problem: one cannot consider the success of peacekeeping in isolation; cases in which belligerents are left to their own devices are also relevant - Existing studies had treated any breakdown of peace as the same regardless of the length of time between initiation of peace and breakdown - All data is censored i.e. we don't know if peace will continue into the future, but duration models deal with these problems! - The likelihood of war resuming is affected by: war ending in stalemate/draw; peace via formal agreement vs. informal truce; ethnic divisions; cost of war; number of factions; economic success; natural resource dependence; democracy RD: - Attempts to control both for selection problems (i.e. where international personnel tend to be deployed) and the ease or difficulty of maintaining peace - She looks at both UN peacekeeping and peacekeeping by other organizations or ad hoc groups of states and explores the effects of different types of peacekeeping: observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement - Observer missions are small and unarmed; traditional missions are larger and involve light armaments; multidimensional supplement traditional with large civilian components to monitor elections, train police, etc.; enforcement missions do not require consent of belligerents and are large and armed - Considers civil wars post-WWII with a special focus post-Cold War because the international community did not keep peace within states before 1988; only 55 cases post-Cold War - Data is adapted from Doyle and Sambanis (2000) s.t. civil war is a conflict with 1000 battle deaths that challenged sovereignty, occurred within state, had state as one participant; and in which rebels were able to inflict casualties on the state - DV: duration of peace - IV: peacekeeping (coded both as binary and categorical as described above and both as time varying and time invariant) Findings: - Consent-based peacekeepers go where there are no clear victories, informal truces, and where the government army is smaller (i.e. to harder places) - Post-CW, all four types of peacekeeping reduce the likelihood of war breaking out - Peace is also easier after wars with decisive victory and formal treaties as well as after long wars and in countries with higher levels of development; it is harder to maintain peace after very deadly wars

Carnegie and Gaikwad (2017) -- Public Opinion on Geopolitics and Trade: Theory and Evidence INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, GEOPOLITICS, AND TRADE POLICY

Puzzle: - The article sets up a contrast between liberal peace theory (Doyle 1986) and security externalities (Gowa and Mansfield 1993) - The empirical record provides mixed evidence on the relationship between geopolitics and trade; the US and USSR hardly traded at all during the Cold War, yet the burgeoning of trade between France and Germany hinged on the assumption that this would produce peace between longtime rivals Argument: - Geopolitical factors inform popular support for trade with allies and adversaries; citizens should favor trade as an economic linkage that fosters peace while being wary of negative security externalities from trade with adversaries - Indeed, these security externalities dominate citizens' attitudes in survey experiments conducted in the US and India - citizens prefer trading with allies over adversaries and these preferences are difficult to alter - If considerations of economic statecraft dominate contemplations of peace, then a core assumption of interdependence theory may need revisiting. Findings: - Security externality concerns dominate peace - Even when told about the peace-inducing characteristics of trade, respondents still prefer trade with allies to trade with adversaries - Attack on interdependence theory

Fortna (2003) -- Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace IOs PEACEKEEPING

Question: Why does peace sometimes last and sometimes fall apart? What, if anything, can be done to enhance the durability of peace in the aftermath of war? Argument: - Mechanisms within agreements can make durable peace more likely by changing the incentives to break a cease-fire, by reducing uncertainty about actions and intentions, and by preventing accidental violations from triggering another round of fighting - Measures such as withdrawal of forces, creation of DMZs, formal cease-fire agreements, peacekeeping, third-party guarantees, and dispute resolution procedures should help foster peace that lasts Altering Incentives - War will resume if the incentives to attack outweigh the cost of breaking the cease-fire - Enemies can tie their own hands by withdrawing troops from the front line, creating DMZs, and arms control - Signing a formal agreement invokes international law, altering incentives - Actors can turn to a third party to enforce peace; raises costs of noncompliance Reducing Uncertainty about Actions and Intentions - Agreements specify the terms of the cease-fire; the more specific, the better - Verification mechanisms alleviate concerns about detecting aggressive moves by the opponent in time to respond; neutral monitors are best - Physical constraints, audience costs, and third-party guarantees or peacekeeping efforts change belligerents' incentives and serve as signaling devices Controlling Accidents - Withdrawal of forces, buffer zones, arms control, and negotiating forums are important Results: - Agreements are not merely scraps of paper; the implementation of specific mechanisms within cease-fire agreements can help make peace last - Strongest agreements yield the most durable peace: moderate agreements reduce risk of war by 57 percent; strong agreements reduce hazard of failure by more than 80 percent - Arms control, third-party mediation, and attempts to control irregular forces have not helped maintain peace, and may be associated with a fragile peace - Confidence building measures, formalizing an agreement, and withdrawal of forces may help, but the evidence to support their role is unclear - The most effective tools are DMZs, explicit third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, joint commissions for dispute resolution, and making the cease-fire specific

Kirschner (2000) -- Rationalist Explanations for War? STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Two broad problems: - (1) Framing assumptions: there will be many cases where war will occur even if the problem of private information is resolved - (2) Significance of private information depends on a central premise that is almost certainly wrong On (1): - Fearon is skeptical of issue indivisibilities, but they do exist (Jerusalem) - Risk-acceptance is dismissed, but sometimes (1) risk-averse leaders are being forced to take unwanted risks; (2) there are times when leaders, faced with a choice, will prefer the riskier option - States can often derive indirect utility from war as in domestic benefits, glory, prestige; fighting wars to affect relations with other states On (2): - Two rational leaders, and two rational experts, can look at the same information and come to different conclusions about expected outcomes, even absent any private information (NFL bets)

Mercer (2010) -- Emotional Beliefs PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING

Argument: - Because rationality depends on emotion, and because cognition and emotion are nearly indistinguishable in the brain, one can view emotion as constituting and strengthening beliefs such as trust, nationalism, justice, or credibility - Observing that emotion and cognition co-produce beliefs has policy implications: how one fights terrorism changes if one views credibility as an emotional belief - Focus on credibility: a belief that another's threat or promise is credible depends on one's selection (and interpretation) of evidence and one's assessment of risk, both of which rely on emotion - Emotion constitutes a belief when the belief's meaning changes without the emotion; trust, nationalism, and justice are emotional beliefs Theory: - People who are free of emotion are irrational - The experience of emotion is not true or false; emotion is not irrational and neither are emotional beliefs - Emotion is a part of reasoning and not a distraction upsetting a coldly rational process - Emotion is an assimilation mechanism, is important to strategy, and carries utility; the more ambiguity about the cause of the behavior, the more latitude for one's preferred interpretation; emotions influence one's assessment of reality Risk: risk assessments depend on feelings of being ahead or behind Selection: it feels good to disconfirm evidence that contradicts priors and to confirm prior beliefs

Bardhan (2005) -- History, Institutions and Underdevelopment DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH

Argument: - Institutions: rules of structured social interaction - Cross-national work is not the best for understanding the mechanisms of development b/c institutions are often implemented heterogeneously within-country - We should go beyond the narrow focus of the current literature on institutions that protect property rights; other institutions like those related to democratic political rights may also be significant in explaining cross-country variations in human-development indicators - It is too Euro-centric to attribute development to bad colonial institutions - Cross-country regression work is more preoccupied with finding a clever instrument than crafting a sufficient causal mechanism and explanation - NW (1989) point to the importance of institutions that facilitate economic growth by reducing opportunism in transactions; multilateral reputation mechanism supported by credible commitment, enforcement, and cooperation - In developing countries, institutions of exchange often did not evolve into more complex rules or institutions as in Europe Institutional Impediments in Developing World: - Financial market institutions (caste- or clan-based) are not sufficient for supporting the much larger risks of longer-gestation, large sunk-cost industrial investments - Private financiers who can internalize the externalities of complementary projects and raise capital from the market for the whole complex of activities are often absent - In the crucial leap from a mercantile to an industrialist economy, the ability of the state to act as a catalyst and a coordinator in the financial market can be important - East Asian financial crisis showed moral hazard in close relationship between state-supported financial system and private banks; calls for bailout

Hafner-Burton (2008) -- Sticks and Stones: The Efficacy of Human Rights 'Naming and Shaming' LAW, NORMS, AND RIGHTS

Argument: - Naming and shaming is not just cheap talk, but neither is it a remedy for all abuses - Governments put in the global spotlight for violations often adopt better protections for political rights afterward, but they rarely stop or appear to lessen acts of terror - Worse, terror sometimes increases after publicity; there are several reasons 1. In the face of international pressures to reform, some leaders want improvements but have more capacity to pass and implement legislation protecting political rights than to stop terror 2. Some abusive leaders adjust their methods of abuse in economical ways in reply to the spotlight, aiming to boost their legitimacy at home or abroad in the least costly way to themselves; some dampen down only those abuses that help them to dodge blame for other violations they intend to continue; others ramp up abuses that allow them to counteract reforms they make to take the edge off international pressure i.e. they make small upgrades to political rights, improving practices or legislation, such as holding an election, to signal conformity with global norms and laws but persist with, or even increase, acts of terror that may help offset the other improvements

Waltz (1979) -- Theory of International Politics THEORIES OF IR

Defensive realism! Assumptions: (irrational) states are the primary unit and they seek survival; states are differentiated by their relative capabilities; and the international system is anarchic. Basic Predictions: self-help; recurrent balances of power; and emulation. States do not intend to maximize power, which leads to balancing as opposed to bandwagoning. Cooperation is difficult because of relative gains and a fear of dependency. Bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity because of five conditions: interdependence (chain-ganging); miscalculation (under external balancing) vs. overreaction (under internal balancing); perception of threats/responsibilities; flexibility of alignment; and buckpassing (instead of balancing). Theorizing: any theory below the structural level is reductionism; systemic theories explain how the organization of the international system acts as a constraining and disposing force; theories contain at least one theoretical assumption; assumptions can be more or less useful but never true or false; theories are evaluated in terms of what they claim to explain and need not account for particularities; a law (T/F) is if-then and a theory (how much can you explain) is a statement that explains the laws

Frieden (1989) -- The Economics of Intervention: Overseas Investments and Relations With Underdeveloped Areas, 1890-1950 EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Goal: To explain the different political ramifications of the varying economic interests domestic actors have in the colonial endeavor Argument: - He hypothesis that sellers of uncompetitive goods and investors in primary products for export will be supportive of direct colonial intervention while competitive exporters, investors in production in local markets, and lenders to foreign governments will be unsupportive - He examines the development of US foreign economic policy in the Caribbean from its early roots as a mirror of classic European colonialism to its later phase as a form of 'Good Neighborliness' that is without a direct colonial thrust - This shift is driven, he claims, by socioeconomic change and the related change in economic interests Americans had in the region: 1. Prior to WWI, American economic interest in plantation agriculture and mineral extraction lead to a policy of direct colonialism 2. After WWI, a shift to government lending and industrial production for local consumption removed this impetus Theory: - Frieden claims that intervention can be used for a number of reasons, including the enforcement of property rights (though this benefits domestic economic actors in the 'colonized' state as well as the colonizer), and to extract concessions specific to certain economic interests (for example, using coercion to increase demand for commercial services such as insurance and shipping and to establish and protect exclusive markets to allow goods producers higher prices for their product and lower prices for their imports) - Further, the benefits of intervention accrued by the state depend on the nature of metropolitan economic interests in the area in question: while foreign investors in primary production are more subject to local attachment and so they tend to be more interventionist, foreign investors in local production hold less tangible assets and are thus less susceptible to conquest and concomitantly are less supportive of intervention - For creditors or investors in local markets, an enormous military effort would be required to extract their assets from the local economy and as a result they too are less supportive of intervention by the colonial power - Frieden also assesses the costs of intervention as the relate to different economic interests, claiming that economic development in the colonized state both raises the cost of intervention to a foreign power and reduces the benefits that intervention might yield. Further, intervention itself is expected to develop the colonized country and eventually make direct intervention more costly and less fruitful to the colonizer Case: - US foreign economic policy in the 19th and 20th centuries Findings: - In the two main areas of US interest, the Caribbean and East Asia, initially security for shipping and US investment in primary product extraction before WWI lead to a policy of direct involvement sometimes backed up by force in order to open certain markets - From 1890 until the 1920s, Frieden thus characterizes the US's foreign economic policy as being concerned with securing markets for US goods, protecting US raw materials and agricultural investments, and using force when necessary - Where possible, as in the Caribbean, the US established economic and political dominance and where other colonial nations had already established control, such as in the Middle East and Dutch East Indies, the US attempted to force open doors for as long as possible to allow US entrance - After WWI, however, socioeconomic development in the colonial areas most import to the US made US military intervention and political control less beneficial and more costly - Local capitalism often spurred by the initial foreign contact made local elites more reliable and more capable of resistance and on the other hand local economic development extended the range of foreign economic interest into activities where home-country intervention was not as useful - Gun-boat diplomacy lost its utility and so in Latin America and the Middle East American policy become more willing to compromise with local leaders and insisted that European powers did the same and decolonized

Gowa and Mansfield (1993) -- Power Politics and International Trade Gowa (1995) -- Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, GEOPOLITICS, AND TRADE POLICY

Main Argument: - Free trade is more likely within, rather than across, political-military alliances - Alliances are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems - The advantages of bipolarity are less credible threat of exit and clearer responsibilities for alliance stability - Security externalities are the most critical aspect of FTAs under anarchy; trade produces security externalities that arise because the source of gains from trade is the increased efficiency with which domestic resources can be employed - In sum, trade enhances potential military power of any country by freeing economic resources for military use via efficiency gains - Trade with an adversary creates a security diseconomy; trade with an ally produces a positive externality Gowa (1995): - During the Cold War, international trade closely paralleled the division of the world into two rival political-military blocs. NATO and GATT were two sides of one coin; the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were two sides of another. Problems: - They argue that alliance patterns explain tariffs and tariffs explain trade volume, so tariffs are endogenized allowing them to look only at the relationship between alliances and trade (they do so because tariff data is missing) - problems in the context of Rose (2004) i.e. low tariffs DNE trade - Focus on US, Great Britain, France, Italy, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and Japan 1905-1985 because of data missingness, but gains from trade accrue mainly to partial members and developing countries per TGR (2007) - Small N (42 observations)

Bagwell and Staiger (1999) -- An Economic Theory of GATT INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Questions: - How can we explain the principles that form the foundation of the GATT? - Will preferential agreements interfere with the efficiency properties of the multilateral trading scheme? Takeaway: They establish that GATT's principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be viewed as simple rules that assist governments in their effort to implement efficient trade agreements Argument: - Preferential agreements (free trade areas and customs unions) undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes - They are inherently discriminatory and therefore revive the local-price externality, which means reciprocity does not generate efficient outcomes - Customs union can work when the bloc is treated as one country with the same preference - this is a narrow circumstance The two pillars of the GATT are reciprocity and nondiscrimination - Reciprocity leaves world prices unchanged and therefore corrects TT - Politically optimal tariffs are efficient if and only if they conform to nondiscrimination (i.e. nondiscrimination and reciprocity are complementary) - Nondiscrimination also eliminates the local price externality by which a country prefers imports from the country on which the highest tariffs have been placed

Schultz (2001) -- Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Question: What are the effects of democratic politics on the use of coercive diplomacy in international crises? Literature: - Neorealism fails to address the costs and inefficiencies of war (Fearon 1995) - Democratic peace theory fails to address the fact that a mutual desire for harmony/cooperation doesn't guarantee success Argument: - Schultz builds on Fearon 1995; seizes on "asymmetric information" as a source of uncertainty (willingness and ability to wage war not perfectly observable, private information about strength and resolve) - Not quite Fearon 1994 - he doesn't follow Fearon in assuming that threats by democratic governments generate systematically higher audience costs than threats by non-democracies - What matters is just that the rival state understands when the government has political incentives to carry through on threats made - This is because democracies allow public debate and transparency, reducing private information - Domestic politics affect the credibility of signals - both parties can signal the adversary; the opposition party has an incentive to speak out if they think a move is ill-advised Findings: - Democracies are less likely to initiate crises by issuing threats, but when they do so they tend to be more successful (the threats are resisted less). Accordingly, the probability that a democracy initiates a crisis which then leads to war is less than for non-democracies. - The probability of war is lower when informative signals can be sent by both parties than when signals are only sent by the government. This is due to two reinforcing effects: (1) restraining and (2) confirmatory effects of domestic competition. Restraining effect: Democracies have fewer chances to exploit their private information by engaging in deception or bluffing. When conditions are such that the resort to force would be undesirable, opposition groups have an incentive to publicly oppose the use of force and thus reveal the government's constraints, reducing the credibility of a potential threat. This means democratic governments must be more selective about the threats they issue. Non-democracies are better able to bluff. The observable implication is that democracies should be less likely to initiate crises by threatening to settle disputes by force. Regression analysis supports this claim: if a states switches to a democracy, the probability of crisis initiation fall by a third to a half. In all of the four British cases, the government took into account the expected reaction of domestic opposition parties and believed that their public opposition to the use of force would complicate the issuance of a credible threat. Rival governments also appeared to observe the political situation in Britain and interpreted signals from the opposition party as evidence that a threat to use force would be difficult to carry out. Confirmatory effect: When a democracy does issue a threat, it will tend to be more credible. This is because democracies have a harder time bluffing. When the costs of war are expected to be low relative to the stakes of the war, the opposition party has electoral incentives to publicly support the government's threats. This permits the opposition party to "match" the government, blunting the electoral salience of what is supposed to be a foreign policy success. This also signals to foreign governments that the government has a political incentive to carry out its threat. This is supported by the aforementioned "logic of multiple signalers." The opposition has little incentive to collude in a bluff. The observable implication is that target states should be less likely to resist when the challenger is a democracy. Evidence from 56 cases suggests that democratic defenders were more successful in deterring attacks on valued protégés than non-democracies, especially when their deterrent threat was supported by all major opposition parties.

Peters (2014/2017)

- At all times, there are anti-immigration attitudes in a country, so you need a strong pro-immigration lobby - Argues that immigration is liberalized when there are low-skill firms lobbying for low skill workers, which is a function of the cost/benefit for those firms - Where capital/firm is immobile and where trade is not liberalized, low-skill firms lobby heavily - Technological advancements drive mobility of capital and increased trade, which drives those firms out of business and eliminates the lobby - Application to the US case; Trump was against both trade and immigration, which was a function of ethnonationalist appeals criticizing out groups

Greico (1988) -- Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism IOs

- Defines realism in terms of states' concerns about relative gains - States are "defensive positionalists" in search of security, a desire that makes them sensitive to relative rather than absolute gains - States cooperate less (or, more precisely, they cooperate under different circumstances) than the mere presence of mutual benefits might lead us to expect, because they must "pay close attention to how cooperation might affect relative capabilities in the future" - Grieco is aware that states do not always forgo "absolute" economic benefits for "relative" geopolitical gains, so that any theory must state the antecedent conditions under which relative-gains seeking occurs - Given that not all states in all situations are equally sensitive to gaps in payoffs, he argues, we should employ a factor (termed k) that measures sensitivity to gaps between payoffs (relative gains), alongside absolute gains - We can thus restate Grieco's causal claim as follows: When k is high, states are more motivated to seek relative gains (or limit losses) - k is always high in security affairs, an assumption endorsed by Mearsheimer Problems: - The central problem for Grieco is quite simply that relative-gains concerns, conflict, inefficient bargaining, and suboptimal cooperation are predicted by all major rationalist (and some non-rationalist) theories of IR

Jensen (2003)

- Democracies care more easily attract FDI because of veto points and audience costs generated by committing to FDI and subsequently backing down (or expropriating) - Democracy is one form of tying hands or credible commitment - Veto points may be weak (Stasavage 2002) and audience costs may not matter (Snyder and Borghard 2011)

Fearon (1996) -- Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science Fearon (1991) -- Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science STRUCTURE/AGENCY

- Explores the feasibility of increasing the size of small-N case studies through the careful use of counterfactuals (think Hui) - Concludes that (proper) use of counterfactuals is difficult and extremely limited. Suggests that can only be used in highly local situations, "in which the hypothetical antecedent and consequent are close together in time and separated by a small number of causal steps" - Rationality as the default standard in counterfactuals

Waltz (1959) -- Man, the State, and War STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

- Problem with first image (Morgenthau 1948): a constant of human nature is expected to explain a wide diversity of social fact, such as both war AND peace; humans may be good but the international system can still make them bad. - Problem with second image: making peace through regime change can also lead to more war. - Anarchy is the permissive cause of war - relative gains; security dilemma; stag hunt; balance of power is imposed on the system by statesmen - The immediate causes of war can be contained in the 1st and 2nd images (war is not monocausal)

Jervis (1997) -- System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

- Rebuke of the third image - the nature of interactions changes over the course of the interaction (impossible to do iterated PD) - We cannot understand systems by examining the interconnected elements alone. - The status of a system depends not only on the state of particular variables, but on how that state was reached. If one finds that changing a variable does not change the outcome, the implication is not necessarily that the variable is unimportant; it may be that change requires 2+ variable to be altered. - No preferences from outcomes; no intentions from outcomes; signaling is really hard Key points: - Many crucial effects are delayed and indirect - Relations between 2 actors are often determined by each actors relations with others (i.e. policies toward one affects others) - Interactions are central and cannot be understood by additive operations (linearity cannot comprehend most actions; actions depend on anticipated reaction of others; feedback loops; rebuke of boxes-in-boxes perhaps) - Many outcomes are unintended (i.e. do not follow from intentions; cannot infer preferences from outcomes) - Regulation is difficult (b/c unintended consequences) - Methods used by actors and social scientists are not appropriate to systems (difficult to test methods when you can't hold something constant)

Rathbun (2010) -- Is Anybody Not an (International Relations) Liberal? DEMOCRATIC PEACE

- There is no liberal hard core - the independent variables that are considered liberal are not connected in any logical way other than through the relationship to a given dependent variable - Moravcsik instead juxtaposes disparate logics, including both a rational choice, utilitarian logic and a Wendtian, constructivist logic. No unitary theory could reasonably merge the two distinct logics - Moravcsik arbitrarily excludes the portions of both the utilitarian (boxes in boxes) and constructivist logics that fall outside of the domestic realm in order to keep the theory at the domestic level of analysis - Moravcsik's argument is similar to what Lake and Powell (1999) define as a strategic choice approach, with preferences and bargaining at lower units of analysis pooling to create bargaining opportunities at higher levels of analysis; the crucial difference is Moravcsik's restriction of the "boxes in boxes" approach to the domestic level

Jervis (1989) -- Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence Jervis (1988) -- Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation STRUCTURE/AGENCY

- This is a knock on rational choice - The choice between the deductive approach and one building upon case studies involves a trade-off between "rigor and richness." The former misses many nuances of individual cases, while the latter will fall short of generalization - We often assume that actors can be seen as seeking to maximize their subjective expected utilities (SEU) - SEU requires consideration of input about the situation the actor thinks he is facing, what options he perceives, how he ranks his goals, and how he thinks others will react (subjectivity, cognitive) Contra-rational choice: - The minimum requirement of SEU is that behavior and thus inferred preferences be consistent - This is not the case (misperception, misunderstanding, cognitive biases) - The nature of the game can change as it is played (payoffs shift) so an iterated PD is bad -- this is constructivist! - Assuming people act as though they were maximizing utility will not answer many hard questions

Mercer (2013) -- Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING

- Two properties of emotion—as an assimilation mechanism and its use as evidence—are key to addressing four strategic problems - Emotion addresses four strategic problems 1. It helps to resolve enduring puzzles over the role reputations for resolve play in international politics, such as why decision makers wrongly believe they obtain reputations (i.e. why they worry about it) 2. "Cost" can be important to what makes a signal credible and emotion is important to understanding cost (i.e. costly signaling) 3. Emotion helps to explain both why decision makers poorly predict their future preferences and when one can anticipate radical changes in those preferences 4. Emotion sharpens understanding of strategic problems without being self-invalidating; common knowledge of emotion's effects does not always change those effects Korean War: - Emotion explains why the US switched from not vowing to defend Korea to doing so - Stalin thought that the US would stick to its guns when he told the N. Koreans he would back them, but the US thought he thought they were irresolute - So they decided they had to back the S. Koreans, otherwise the US reputation would be destroyed - "Emotion is key to understanding both the sudden switch in US preferences (from abandoning to defending South Korea), as well as American decision makers' certainty that US reputation was in jeopardy."

Reiter (2009) -- How Wars End STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Absolute War: - Means removing the defeated state's ability to organize resistance; eliminates the threat of reneging on a war-ending settlement - Forms of total defeat include: (1) Total annihilation of the population; (2) state destruction and annexation; (3) foreign imposed regime change - Pacifism is hardwired via military restrictions Argument: - Commitment dynamics are often about shaping a belligerent's expectations regarding future benefits; specifically commitment problems can serve to make some war-termination settlements more valuable than others - When compliance fears dominate, belligerents may pursue an absolute war outcome to overcome the commitment proposition - When commitment problems are severe, discouraging information coming from the battlefield may not cause a belligerent to abandon its pursuit of absolute victory - In sum, the larger the commitment and compliance problems, the more we see states pursuing absolute war outcomes Reneging on settlement happens when: - There is a shift in the aggregate balance of power (including preventive war) - A state may feel there is a new and temporary advantage to attacking first - A new leader may come to power with a higher or lower resolve for fighting Wars end (limited outcomes) because: - A side has extremely diminished hopes for victory - The costs of fighting are expected to escalate - A third-party has agreed to deploy peacekeeping - A belligerent has captured an increment of the goods (like winning side obtains something of value and gains from fighting then decline) - When both sides agree on military balance and distribution of goods reflects it, war-ending agreements are self-enforcing Problem: - It seems that Clausewitz, by arguing that war is never final unless the enemy is wholly disarmed, may leave Reiter with a regressive and repetitive theory

Wendt (1987) -- The Agent-Structure Problem in IR Theory STRUCTURE/AGENCY

Agent-Structure Problem: - Situates agents and structures in relation to each other - Humans and their organizations are purposeful actors - Society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors (rules of the game) Context: - Individualism: realists reduce the nature of the international system to the properties of states; system can't explain how states are generated if the system is explained in terms of states - Structuralism: world-system theorists reduce state agents to effects of the reproduction requirements of the capitalist world system; they can't explain why the system emerged as it is Structurationalism: - Agents and structures receive equal ontological status; agents and structures as mutually constitutive elements - Different from structuralism: social structures do not exist independently of the activities they govern - Different from realism: states are not even conceivable as states apart from their position in a global structure of individuated and penetrated political authorities

Rosendorff and Milner (2001) -- The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Argument: - Almost all international trade agreements include some form of "safeguard" clause, which allows countries to escape the obligations agreed to in the negotiations - For instance, GATT/WTO specifies the conditions under which a government can grant relief to an industry from import competition, and industries then have the option of choosing which mechanism to file their complaints under - The key factor that renders escape clauses desirable is the presence of uncertainty; in each period the political pressure for protection at home (and/or more open market abroad) is subject to a shock - In the presence of exogenous shocks, international institutions may be much better served by allowing states to make temporary use of escape clauses (i.e. defection) and pay a cost for doing so - With escape clauses cooperation is deeper and more likely and international trade institutions are more durable - The optimal trade institution has escape clauses with moderate costs (prevent constant defection) - Need for escape clauses varies by regime type and issue area -- democracies push for them more often and the macroeconomy is more uncertain

Bombardini and Trebbi (2012) - Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy? SPECIAL INTEREST MODELS OF TRADE POLICYMAKING

Argument: - In an oligopolistic market, firms can benefit from an increase in their product-specific protection measure, if they can raise prices and profits - They find it less profitable to do so in a competitive market where attempts to raise prices are more likely to reduce profits - In competitive markets firms are therefore more likely to lobby together, thereby simultaneously raising tariffs on all products in the sector - Contrasts the view that in more competitive environments free-riding pressures should dominate, inducing political disintegration Findings: - Almost every US industry engages in some form of lobbying, but there is great heterogeneity in the extent to which firms lobby individually vs. collectively - Shows that sectors characterized by a higher degree of competition tend to lobby more together (through a sector-wide association), while sectors with higher concentration and more differentiated products lobby more individually Relation to other stuff: - Relates closely to Kim - same data

Weeks (2008) -- Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve AUDIENCE COSTS AND CREDIBILITY

Argument: - Autocracies shouldn't have a less significant audience cost than democracies when (1) domestic political groups can coordinate to punish the leader, (2) when the audience views backing down negatively, and (3) when outsiders can observe domestic sanctions for backing down. - Democracies do not have a significant signaling advantage over autocracies. - Regime stability is the crucial component of audience costs - not, as Schultz argues, open party competition and free mass media. As long as observers can see the leader make a threat, and then sees if they back down, freedom of the media is not required. Theory: - Most autocratic leaders require the support of key constituencies in their country much like the democratic leaders require the support of voting publics in theirs. - When you disaggregate autocracies, you find that most autocracies are just as successful in signaling their intentions as democracies - Only certain kinds of autocracies that can impede elite coordination, like "personalist" regimes (no domestic audience that can effectively sanction the leader), suffer fewer audience costs. - In autocratic countries where the intelligence apparatus is not controlled by the leader, it is easy for elites to congregate together and plan to oust the leader; moreover, the welfare of elites and leaders are often tightly linked Method: Uses the MID data set like everyone else, using the variable RECIP like everyone else to measure escalation, but the IV for autocracies is broken down by regime type Findings: - Democracies do not have a significant signaling advantage over autocracies; autocrats can incur audience costs as well, so the perceived signaling advantage for democrats is nullified. - Single- party regimes can generate threats in ways that are as credible as those issued by democracies.

Garrett (1998) -- Partisan Politics in the Global Economy GLOBALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Argument: - Globalization has not eroded national autonomy or leftist alternatives to the free market; it has actually strengthened the relationship between the left and organized labor on the one hand and economic policies that reduce market-generated inequalities of risk and wealth on the other hand - Macroeconomic outcomes in the era of global markets have been as good in strong-left-labor regimes (social democratic corporatism) as in other industrialized states - Electoral politics have not been dwarfed by market dynamics as social forces and globalized markets have not rendered immutable the efficiency-equality tradeoff - Rodrik (1997) says that increased exit options for mobile capital and increased voice among the immobile put everyone in danger (collision course between classes) but Garrett argues that social democratic corporatism avoids this problem; some government spending (education for example) is friendly to the market and drives growth - Corporatism creates government policies that cushion market dislocations in exchange for the regulation of the national labor market by leaders of encompassing labor movements - predictable wage growth patterns/restraints - Controlled wages, low levels of social strife, and high education are desirable for businesses and keep them from exercising their exit options - This only happens when labor movements are encompassing such that leaders care about the entire labor force (and now narrow sectors) Key Findings: - Globalization has generated new constituencies for the left among the economically insecure, offsetting the shrinking manufacturing class and fortifying enduring cross-national differences in the balance of power between left and right - Globalization has increased the political incentives for left parties to pursue redistribution of wealth and risk to those harmed by short-term market dislocations; thus, the relationship between left-labor power and big government remains strong - Globalization has increased the importance of economic, political, and social stability to the investment decisions of mobile asset holders; stability in wage-setting is desirable

Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) -- Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies IMMIGRATION

Argument: - Government policies that redistribute income alter the distributional politics over trade and immigration policy and often favor trade as opposed to immigration as a strategy for international economic integration - Public finance considerations can have a major impact on who support liberalization and what kind of liberalization is favored - Immigrants may pay taxes, receive public services, and vote over tax and spending choices, where imports obviously do not; fosters different political coalitions - Trade and immigration should both lower the pre-tax earnings of low-skilled workers - But trade and immigration impact post-tax earnings in different ways, with immigration affecting public finance and trade primarily leaving it unchanged; immigrants make greater use of welfare than natives, increasing native tax burden and reducing natives' post-tax income Method: - There is variation in social safety nets across states (California vs. Texas) which alters the anticipated tax effect of immigration - They match NES data from 1992 and 2000 to 1990 and 2000 data from the US Censuses of Population and Housing and state fiscal policies Findings: - High exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration among US natives, especially the more skilled - The magnitude of this post-tax fiscal cleavage is comparable to the pre-tax labor-market effects of skill itself - There is no public-finance variation in opinion over trade policy, consistent with US trade policy having negligible fiscal-policy impacts - Public finance thus appears to shape opinions toward globalization strategies

Byman and Pollack (2001) -- Now Let Us Praise Great Men FIRST IMAGE

Argument: - History can't be explained without reference to great men like Hitler, Stalin, FDR, Lenin, Gandhi, Churchill, etc. - The world today also can't be explained without reference to the personal goals and beliefs of world leaders - It is troubling that IR doesn't really pay attention to the role of personalities in world politics - Also believe that individuals can shape the second and third image Cases: - They give examples of when individuals have mattered in history: (1) Germany under Hitler; (2) the contrasting impact of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II on European politics; (3) France under Napoleon Bonaparte; (4) a comparison of Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Syria under Haaz al-Asad; and (5) the behavior of Iran in its war with Iraq under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Theory: 1. Individuals set the ultimate and secondary intentions of a state 2. Individuals can be an important component of a state's diplomatic influence and military power. The competence or ineptitude of leaders matters 3. Leaders shape their state's strategies and how the state uses its resources in the pursuit of goals 4. Individual leaders affect the behavior of opposing states that must react to leaders' idiosyncratic intentions and capabilities How do individuals matter? Hypotheses on personality traits: 1. States led by risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to cause wars. A high risk tolerance leads to aggressive behavior 2. States led by delusional leaders start wars and prolong them unnecessarily 3. States led by leaders with grandiose visions are more likely to destabilize the system 4. States led by predictable leaders will have stronger and more enduring alliances When do individuals matter? 1. The more power is concentrated in the hands of an individual leader, the greater the influence of that leader's personality and preferences 2. Individuals are more important when systemic, domestic, and bureaucratic forces conflict or are ambiguous 3. Individuals are more important when circumstances are fluid and in times of great change

Berger et al. (2013) -- Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, GEOPOLITICS, AND TRADE POLICY

Argument: - Increased political influence arising from CIA interventions during the Cold War was used to create a larger foreign market for American products - Imports from the US increased dramatically in industries which the US had a comparative disadvantage, not a comparative advantage - US covert services engaged in interventions that installed and/or supported political leaders in other countries; US government then had greater influence over the leaders installed by the CIA - Likely occurred as a result of US firms lobbying the US government, and the imports arose through direct government purchases Method: - Cold War period only because of Freedom of Information Act - Covert ops are desirable b/c unaffected by US public opinion (less endogeneity) Findings: - The increase in US imports is not accompanied by increases in imports from other states or increased exports to the US, making the link strong - There is no evidence that changing tariffs or FDI policies played a role - Total imports were not significant, meaning states shifted away from imports form other states and toward imports from the US - States with large government shares of GDP are found to be significant as well Problems: - Could be evidence of Krasner compelling effect - CIA interventions are considered independent, but intervention in one country could reduce the likelihood of intervention in another country

Buthe and Milner (2008) -- The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements? FDI

Argument: - International trade agreements - GATT/WTO and PTAs - provide mechanisms for making commitments to foreign investors about the treatment of their assets, thus reassuring investors and increasing investments - Policies implying limited government intervention in the economy should encourage FDI - A government can make a more credible commitment regarding present and future economic policies by entering into international agreements that commit its country to the liberal economic policies that are seen as desirable by investors - Governments can use them to make commitments credible for two reasons: (1) the international institutionalization of commitments provides information, which facilitates identifying and punishing those who renege on their commitments; (2) IOs lead to the establishment of mechanisms that make it easier to bring costly pressure on governments if they do not carry through on those promises - IOs can lead to increased monitoring as well as gathering and dissemination of information about noncompliance with institutionalized commitments, which facilitates punishment; reputation costs too RD: - H1: If a country is a member of GATT/WTO, it will experience higher inward FDI - H2: The greater the number of PTAs to which a country is a party, the greater will be the inward FDI that it experiences (why quantity over quality?) - Analysis of FDI flows over time for a panel of 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2000 (non-OECD countries with a population of one million) Findings: - Developing countries that belong to the WTO and participate in more PTAs experience greater FDI inflows than otherwise - Because PTAs and the WTO are partial substitutes, adding PTAs to the regression slightly reduces the significance of the WTO variable - Instrument for PTAs w/ regional PTAs Challenge: PTAs are quite diverse; US and EU PTAs lend themselves to this mechanism, but not all PTAs are like this as in the case of China

Owen (1994) -- How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Argument: - Liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another, and that the same ideas prod these states into war with illiberal states - Liberal ideology and institutions work in tandem to bring about democratic peace - Theory is superior because: (1) it grounds liberal ideology in self-interest; (2) it opens the 'black box' of the state to show how democratic institutions translate liberal preferences into policy even when statesmen are illiberal; (3) it considers perceptions (i.e. need to see states as democratic) - Liberal ideology prohibits war against liberal democracies but sometimes calls for war against illiberal states; democratic institutions allow these drives to affect FP and IR; non-democracies may be dangerous because they seek other ends than their citizens' true interests (like plunder); in self-interest b/c enhances self preservation - Illiberal leaders of democracies can make threats and yet be domestically constrained from attacking one another (Trump) - Democracies have enlightened institutions that translate the people's interests into politics - It is when war is threatened that public opinion matters; at this point, illiberal elites and leaders are constrained to change the existing perception of liberal states; opinion leaders then matter - Capabilities do matter - power is a consideration when Ds consider war with non-Ds - He does not think perpetual peace is coming Perception: - War of 1812 was fought when no Americans considered England to be democratic; this is why perceptions matter Problems: - Democratic institutions do not actually constrain illiberal leaders (Rosato 2003) - Mapping of preferences to policy is imperfect

Eisenstadt (2000) -- Multiple Modernities FUTURE OF IR

Argument: - Multiple modernities: rejection of idea of a single modernity originating in Europe that is destined to take over the modern and modernizing world - Actual developments have refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of the Western program of modernity - See the world as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs - Social actors connected to social / political / intellectual activists carry forward these re-constructions, each pursuing different programs - Unique expressions of modernity are realized through engagement with broader societies - In sum, Modernity ≠ Western - Emphasis on individual autonomy -> belief that society could be formed by conscious human activity - Critical characteristic of modernity: capacity for continual self-correction Characterized by: - Restructuring of center-periphery relations - Politicization of demands of various sectors of society - Continuing struggle over the definition of the realm of the political - Collective identities as not a given, but a foci of contestation and struggle Key Observations: - Features of Western modernity spread through military and economic might and imperialism - Adoption of European universalism allowed other people to preserve some aspects of their traditional identities - Subsequent development shaped by particularistic historical traditions and forms of incorporation - Growing autonomy of economic flows, cross-border flows of people (and social problems) led to the erosion of the control of the nation-state over its own affairs New conceptions of collective identity: 1. Movements with a more local scope, narrow focus (women's movement, ecological movement) 2. Fundamentalist religious movements 3. Particularistic ethnic movements - All three are examples of once subdued identities assuming a central place in a society - We are seeing a weakening of the ideological hegemony of once-powerful nation-states - Also efforts by groups to appropriate and interpret modernity in one's own terms In sum: - Processes of globalization entail neither an "end of history" (i.e. an end of ideological confrontational clashes between different cultural programs of modernity) nor a "clash of civilization" (i.e. secular West vs. societies denying modernity) - Globalization -> continual reinterpretation of the cultural program of modernity

Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo (2013) -- Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact IMMIGRATION

Argument: - One needs to make a distinction between prevalence and conditional impact - Prevalence: incidence of a mechanism across the population - Conditional impact: influence that a certain mechanism has on bringing about an outcome of interest when that mechanism is operating - The conditional impact of labor market threat is sizable - when labor market threat is present, there is a significant association between LMC and immigration views; this type of threat is not prevalent among the general population - Cultural concerns are high in both prevalence and conditional impact - Education is correlated with skill, but low- and high-education workers differ along many other dimensions driving opinion of migrants; less educated people are more nativist - Individuals who dislike immigrants for cultural reasons are likely to describe immigration as harmful on any dimension Methods: - Distinguish between the prevalence and conditional impact of determinants of immigration attitudes via a most likely case approach - Leverage a targeted sampling strategy of 1,134 respondents in 75 US high-technology countries, they conduct a study of Americans' attitudes toward H-1B visas - Most with these are Indian immigrants, who are skilled but ethnically distinct, allowing them to measure a specific skill set (high technology) that is threatened by a particular type of immigrant - Cultural and economic explanations produce contrasting predictions - Implicit Association Test (IAT) - gauges veiled or unconscious antipathetic sentiments toward various social groups - DV: Should we restrict or allow more H1-B visa recipients? - IV: Two ways: (1) Do you work in high technology? (2) industry of employment codes both combined with (3) do you think your job is in jeopardy? - Culture: (1) How threatened do you think the American way of life is by foreign influence? (2) Evaluate Indians on series of traits - Placebo DV: Should we increase/decrease the number of Indian immigrants? Should be driven more by cultural biases than H1-B - Placebo IV: White collar occupational category (similarly high skill but no threat) Findings: - Conditional impact of the relationship in the high-technology sector between economic threat and immigration attitudes is sizable; high technology workers exhibit the lowest support for H-1B visas, consistent with LMC hypothesis - this is true even for those below the median level of the cultural bias measure (so culture is not driving the effect) - Cultural concerns are strong predictors of both H-1B visa opinion and Indian immigration opinion, though economic threat is only associated with H-1B opinion; other tests understate the cultural effect by not measuring implicit attitudes - In regressions, high-tech workers exhibit 11% less support for H1-B visas (about half the effect of moving from high school education to advanced degree); non-tech white collar workers do not show the same opinion against H-1B - Labor market competition is not a prevalent source of threat and therefore is generally not detected in aggregate analyses Criticisms: - The high technology sector is not ripe for LMC because there is a surplus of jobs and the US faces a skills deficit in this sector; problematic since job security is biggest driver of LMC mechanism

Kang (2003) -- Getting Asia Wrong THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Argument: - Realism and other Western theoretical frames are not appropriate for describing China's rise - Most IR theory is inductively derived from the European experience and is no longer sufficient - Specifically, (1) pessimistic predictions about arms races and power politics have largely failed to materialize, and (2) contrary to realism's expectations, and although US power confounds the issue, Asian states appear to be bandwagoning with rather than balancing against China Evidence: - Chinese weakness has historically led to chaos in Asia - Regional relations in East Asia have historically been hierarchic and more peaceful / stable than those in the West - The evidence (WTO accession, ASEAN participation, resolution of outstanding territorial disputes) is against China holding revisionist or imperial aims - Japan is not so much waiting to balance China as seeking to remain a status quo secondary power - Not obvious that South Korea or Vietnam should want to balance China given complex historical legacies of being forced to adjust to China's behavior while maintaining autonomy - Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore all furnish the US with naval facilities yet have deep cultural and economic ties with China This suggests that China is different and not an appropriate counterfactual for EME (along the lines of Fearon 1996)

Bagwell and Staiger (2010) -- The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Argument: - The fundamental purpose of a trade agreement is to provide an escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoner's Dilemma - Most countries have the power to affect the terms of trade in some products, while some countries have the power to affect the terms of trade in most products The WTO: - Has adopted a bilateral approach to multilateral bargaining according to which reciprocal negotiations (over tariffs) occur on a voluntary basis through time between pairs of countries or among small numbers of countries, with the results of these bilateral negotiations then multilateralized to the full GATT/WTO membership by a non-discrimination requirement that tariffs abide by the most-favored nation (MFN) principle Avoiding Beggar-thy-Neighbor: - SOEs can adopt politically optimal tariffs - they are efficient - Big governments can gain from negotiating a trade agreement if each would otherwise attempt to shift costs onto the other and as a consequence adopt inefficient unilateral policies - The terms-of-trade externality is the mechanism through which such cost shifting would occur How is it fixed? - Reciprocity describes a fixed-terms-of-trade rule to which mutual tariff changes must conform; and in an environment where terms-of-trade manipulation is the problem to be fixed, a fixed terms-of-trade rule is bound to be attractive - MFN then multilateralizes the solution

Lake (2013) -- Theory Is Dead, Long Live Theory STRUCTURE/AGENCY

Argument: - While IR history is often told in terms of great debates, these clashes actually managed to resolve very little - The counter-narrative, recounted via mid-level or eclectic theories of world politics, suggests that a new cleavage has opened up between positivists and post-positivists - The field would be better off focusing on these mid-level theories, which can be more productive and help scholars answer more questions of interest. But if the positivist / post-positivist divide becomes the next GD, each should focus on progress within rather than between these paradigms. Key Concepts: - Positivists: those committed to social science and intentionalism Mid-level theories: - Draw on a positive and intentionalist approach to politics to account for the diversity of opinion within states and political differences over foreign policy (for instance: Jervis 1976, Allison 1971; but also see work in security studies by Posen, Snyder, Walt) - These theories and methods never clearly fit a paradigm and integrated case studies with large-N analysis, emphasizing historical contingency while looking to broader patterns of world politics - Tend to have explicit microfoundations / causal mechanisms, which has imposed discipline and demanded specification - They are measured by both their empirical power and their ability to generate new testable hypotheses - The OEP and DPT literatures are good examples

McKeown (1983) -- Hegemonic Stability Theory and Nineteenth Century Tariff Levels in Europe EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Argument: - McKeown says the consensus in support of hegemonic stability theory is premature - Important conceptual and empirical difficulties haven't been addressed and alternative explanations not comprehensively considered Conceptual difficulties: - When is a state hegemonic? Why was Britain successful as a near hegemon in the 1860s but not as a near hegemon in 1880s? - Theorists are silent on the motives and capabilities of the non-hegemonic states most likely to challenge the hegemon; these states might be just as supportive of an open regime - In what sense is hegemonic stability theory about "power"? Gilpin emphasizes Britain's naval might, but doesn't discuss how this translated into desirable policy outcomes for Britain. Krasner does provide some examples of military power being used to coerce tariff policy changes in Latin America and Africa, but hegemonic stability theory needs to do more than say that a powerful European power could successfully coerce less developed countries. Theorists need to explain how the hegemon manages to win the adherence of important rivals to the open system - Treating regimes as collective goods creates another difficulty. The international trading system was historically quite concentrated, and as Olson notes, in small-number (oligopolistic) systems members "can provide themselves with collective goods without relying on any positive inducements apart from the good itself." This implies that the presence of a hegemon isn't a necessary condition for the emergence of open economic regimes in oligopolistic systems (see Gowa and Kim) - The final difficulty is shared with other power theories: a lack of attention to theoretical predictions or empirical examinations of the process whereby the hegemon does or does not achieve open regimes Empirical difficulties: - If hegemonic stability is correct, what would we expect from British interactions with European states? 1. An active British policy on lowering tariffs 2. British efforts to capitalize on its bargaining advantages to secure tariff reductions (linking tariffs to other issues, reductions as a quid pro quo for British diplomatic/military/economic support) 3. These attempts should have been successful Findings: - After 1823, Britain for a time sought to achieve an open trading system through reciprocal treaties with MFN clauses. But this wasn't successful, as Britain had a hard time getting France to remove protections - Generally, intermittent British pressure between 1815 and 1850, scattered successes, but no clear evidence of British influence on European tariff policies Alternative explanations for cyclical fluctuations in tariff levels: 1. Customs revenues tend to decline in depressions, suggesting that governments will then increase customs duties 2. If governments want lower tariffs but are constrained by domestic protectionist interests, they will risk tariff reductions only when they are enjoying a large "surplus" of popularity

Kydd (2000) -- Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Argument: - Mistrust and fear play a crucial role in many explanations of international conflict; this makes reassurance an important issue - "Costly signaling" theory of reassurance allows for separation of trustworthy from untrustworthy types and has two main implications - First, reassuring signals must have some risk attached - Second, to send so costly a signal that the untrustworthy type finds it too risky to mimic, the trustworthy type must be willing to take greater risks for peace than the untrustworthy type - Blow to structuralist and security dilemma accounts blaming mistrust for the Cold War Model: - Separating equilibrium wherein signals are costly, but not too costly, and cooperation is possible even at low levels of trust when players are given a chance to deploy such signals - There is a "nice" and "mean" type, and the critical value for trust for the nice type must be lower than that for the mean type - Works in tandem with Fearon (1995) insofar as war is ex post inefficient and states prefer bargain Case study: - Kydd argues that decisive events which ended the Cold War can be interpreted as costly signals, especially the 1987 INF treaty, the 1988 withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe - Soviet leadership became less risk averse in its pursuit of cooperation at the possible expense of exploitation, which made the separating equilibrium possible - The main trend of US opinion displays increasing trust in response to costly signals with time

Verdier (1994) -- Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Background: - The trade policy process is endogenous to electoral politics; it is not time-invariant or determined by historically prior institutions (not path dependent). It is flexible - The driving force behind its politicization is electoral politics—politicians compete for reelection by taking advantage of this flexibility, agitating for rule changes if they fail to get their way - Trade preferences are treated as political strategies. Producers have mixed preferences—they seek competition on what they consume but a rent on what they produce. Even import-competing producers want lower tariffs on their inputs (see TRUMP and washing machines) Argument: - Voters indirectly control trade policymaking, and they do so by setting the rules according to which law makers make policy - A "Theory of Electoral Delegation": electorate -> policy process -> policy outcome - Voters do more than just choose agents ("free-agent theory") but less than actually choose policies ("mandate theory") - Voters set rules of representation, information transfers, and publicity. The policy process is defined as the rules of access to policymaking post-election - Policymakers determine access to the policymaking process. They make decisions to maximize their chances of reelection. Issue salience and divisiveness matter -- need both for trade to be a big issue Findings: - The higher the quorum (i.e. amount of spending on trade in elections; inclusiveness of trade debate), and the more adversarial (majoritarian) the decision rule, the easier it is for individuals (including concentrated interests) to pursue policies in the general interest, rather than policies tailored to their particular interests - In contrast, the lower the quorum, and the more consensual the decision rule, the easier it is for concentrated interests to extract rents

Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) -- Socialization and Hegemonic Power EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Argument: - Most observers would argue that hegemons exercise their power through material incentives (threats, promises, inducements, and sanctions) - But there is a subtler component of hegemonic power which works at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs i.e. socializing the leaders of secondary nations - These elites buy into and internalize the hegemon's norms and thus pursue policies consistent with the hegemon's notion of international order - "Rule based on might is enhanced by rule based on right" - Socialization comes about in three ways: 1. After wars and political crises, domestic and international turmoil creates conducive conditions for socialization; the emerging hegemon articulates norms regarding its preferred order, while domestic elites are seeking a new set of principles to replace discredited ones and facilitate political gains / coalitional realignment 2. Elite receptivity to the hegemon's norms is essential; they must spread to the elite level through coalitional realignment 3. Socialization occurs in the wake of but is distinct from coercion in that its outcomes are not explicable in material terms Theory: - Socialization helps explain why the ordering principles and norms of a given system are not isomorphic with changes in the relative distribution of military and economic capability, as these value orientations may be altered before substantial hegemonic decline or perpetuate the system beyond its time - This ability to generate shared beliefs in the acceptability or legitimacy of a particular order is an important if elusive dimension of hegemonic power (Keohane and Gilpin both acknowledge this in their own ways) - The three socialization mechanisms are: 1. Normative persuasion (least invasive) 2. External inducement (medium invasive) 3. Internal reconstruction (maximum invasive) - The degree to which socialization takes place is a function of the intrinsic qualities of the norms in question; the extent of pushback that hegemonic elites receive from secondary ones; and the level of discord that the ideas incubate in secondary states Method / Cases / Findings: - US diplomacy at the end of WWI saw the spread of Wilsonian norms without the extension of American military and economic power into Europe (however incomplete) - US diplomacy at the end of WWII articulated an elaborate set of norms and principles for the postwar international order via the UN Charter and Bretton Woods agreements, but was much more tied to military and economic dominance - British India and Egypt experienced socialization through colonization to varying degrees, which explains the longevity of influence in the former case and the short-lived impact in the latter

Mansfield (1994) -- Power, Trade, and War INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, GEOPOLITICS, AND TRADE POLICY THEORIES OF IR

Argument: - Structural theories correctly identify the distribution of power as a key determinant of war and peace, but are generally hampered by their failure to integrate process-level variables - Analyses of power distributions necessarily hinge on how power ought to be measured and which features to emphasize - The author derives analytical leverage from the distinction between polarity (the number of powerful states) and concentration (number and relative inequality) - There is (1) an inverse U-shaped relationship between the concentration of capabilities and major power war; and (2) a U-shaped relationship between this concentration and the level of international trade - The level of international trade is inversely related to the onset of war and this probably reflects the fact that expected war costs are higher when commerce is more important - Perhaps most controversially, both the distribution of power and the level of international trade influence the incidence of war by altering its expected costs and benefits - so neorealism and liberalism are compatible approaches Method: - Concentration is a superior metric that reflects both the number of great powers and the relative inequality among them (as measured by the proportion of aggregate major power capabilities divided by the number of major powers minus one) - It is a continuous measure which incorporates all major powers (poles or not) and can range from low (Concert of Europe) to intermediate (right after WWII) to high (immediately following breakdown of CoE) - Concentration is therefore not necessarily correlated with polarity, but it is closer to economists' concept of market structure and neorealist descriptions in Snyder & Diesing (1977) and Gilpin (1981) War Predictions: - Low concentrations of power raise the cost of initiating war since each potential aggressor faces many potential balancing coalitions - Intermediate concentrations reduce the number of potential blocking coalitions and thus the expected costs of war - High concentrations deter both small states through high costs and large states because they can achieve their objectives through measures short of war and won't want to fight with relatively evenly matched major powers Trade Predictions: - At low levels, no state can sufficiently influence its terms of trade so tariffs will be low and trade will be high - At intermediate levels, the disparity of capabilities among major powers enables the use of optimal protection - At high levels, states with substantial market power forgo an optimal tariff to maintain both monopoly power and the system's political favor

Baldwin and Magee (2000) -- Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills

Argument: - Trade policy is for sale - HO would predict that labor unions will oppose free trade while business groups support it RD: - Examines voting by US representatives on NAFTA, the Uruguay Trade Round, and MFN status for China Findings: - Campaign contributions influenced legislators' votes on the NAFTA and Uruguay Round bills - Labor group contributions were associated with votes against freer trade while business contributions were associated with votes in favor of freer trade - Economic conditions in each district and broad policy views of the legislators also affected representatives' voting decisions

Hafner-Burton et al (2016) -- Predictability vs. Flexibility: Secrecy in International Investment Arbitration FDI

Background: - Article focuses on the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) - world's largest mechanism for investor-state arbitration - Peculiar feature: filing of disputes is public record, but results need not be - In 40% of the cases 1972-2012, there is not record of an outcome - Created in 1966 within World Bank for firms and individuals to resolve disputes related to private investments; 3 judges and no appeals process Main Argument: - Secrecy allows them to drive hard bargains and allows governments to hide poor treatment of investors that could undermine the broader commitment to investor rights - Two broader implications: (1) secrecy may both facilitate hard bargains and prevent posturing over sensitive disputes while blunting government ability to signal their commitment to investor-friendly policies in the most contentious cases; (2) secrecy helps explain why the public is least informed about cases where investors and host governments do not want to be help publicly accountable - They argue that secrecy in the context of investment arbitration works like a flexibility-enhancing device similar to international trade escape clauses Predictions: - They expect secrecy to be invoked more often for long-lived investments where the goal is to shape negotiations over deals that keep a costly investment intact - Respondents with a history of past public losses will be inclined to keep future arbitration secret - No evidence that ICSID's reform effort have led to a lower probability of secrecy (and in fact secrecy has become more common with time)

Walt (1987) -- The Origins of Alliances STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Balance of Threat: - States tend to ally with or against the foreign policy that poses the greatest threat - The main consideration should not be power, but threat - The greater the threat, the greater the probability a vulnerable state will seek an alliance - Alliance: formal or informal arrangements for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states - Focuses on the motives behind the formation of alliances in the Middle East 1955-79 Characteristics affecting threat level: - Aggregate power: population, industrial and military power, and technological prowess - Geographic proximity: ability to project power declines with distance - Offensive power: states with greater offensive power are more likely to provoke an alliance; huge offensive power may lead to bandwagoning - Aggressive intentions: states perceived as aggressive are more likely to incite balancing Hypotheses: - In general, we should expect balancing to be more common than bandwagoning (makes states more secure), and bandwagoning should only occur under certain circumstances (defensive appeasement and desire to share spoils of war) - Balancing increases security by reducing fear of defection and level of aggressiveness - Bandwagoning results in a competitive world where aggressiveness is rewarded with alliances and defections are rampant (contradicts Mearsheimer's claim that aggressiveness is the best strategy) - Balancing is preferable under uncertainty - do not want to increase the aggressor's resources - Foreign aid and transnational penetration play a relatively minor role in alliance formation Factors affecting balancing vs. bandwagoning: - Weak states are more likely to bandwagon - States bandwagon when allies are unavailable (and balance more effectively when they think their allies are not unconditionally loyal) - States balance more in peacetime and early in war; once outcome seems certain -> bandwagon - Balancing leads to checkerboard alliances where bandwagoning leads to spheres of influence - States balance partially to achieve more influence than they could under bandwagoning Ideological Solidarity: - Alliances resulting from states sharing political, cultural, or other traits - Ideology is secondary to security concerns and therefore should be more prevalent under bipolarity where defense/deterrence dominate Foreign Aid: - The more aid, the tighter the alliance; it evokes a sense of gratitude, it communicates favorable intentions, and it increases dependency - Aid is a way for states with differing capabilities to respond to a common foe - Monopoly supply and asymmetric dependence and motivation enhance the effect of aid Problems: - Intentions (and therefore threats) are not necessarily a measurable variable and this may make it a degenerative addition to the theory - Might be able to use perceptions of intentions - Combining power and intentions without weighting makes the theory indeterminate (can't tell whether allying is balancing or not)

Schelling (1966) -- Arms and Influence STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Both Schelling pieces are about credible commitment (i.e. making enemy think you will act a certain way) Deterrence: - Deterrence requires the ability to project military power and also the ability to project intentions, and there is sometimes a high price to pay to make threats convincing. - Two interesting paradoxes of deterrence: 1) in threatening to hurt somebody if he misbehaves, it need not make a critical difference how much it will hurt you - the point is making your enemy believe your threat is real; 2) in deterring an adversary, it does not always help to be perceived as fully rational. Brinksmanship: competition in risk-taking - An example is the Cuban Missile Crisis - The essence of a crisis is that neither side is fully in control of events; there exists a serious danger of miscalculation and escalation. This is why deterrent threats are often credible - "leave up to chance" per Schelling 1960 "Face is the only thing worth fighting for" - resolve matters more than capabilities. First time it was said. Relates to Snyder and Diesing (1977). Threats: - It is important to distinguish between a threat that compels - one that often requires punishment to be administered until the other acts - from a threat that deters, which is administered if he acts - The threat of nuclear war is not the only credible deterrent however; limited war can deter continued aggression or be used as a means of intimidation, by representing an action that effectively enhances the risk of a greater (more costly) war

Sartori (2002) -- The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Corollary to Fearon (1994/1995) Diplomacy works in the absence of domestic audiences. For irresolute states, the possibility of gaining a reputation for bluffing deters them from bluffing. Leaders speak honestly in order to maintain their ability to use diplomacy in future disputes. They are more likely to concede less important issues and to have more important issues (from their perspective) decided in their favor. States use diplomacy to attain a mutually beneficial "trade" of issues over time. Diplomacy is most likely to succeed (be it honest or a bluff) when a state is most likely to be honest, which is when it has an honest reputation to lose (either by having used diplomacy consistently in the recent past, or by having bluffed without having been called on it). During the Korean War, China failed to deter the US from crossing the 38th parallel despite stating that it would enter the war if the US did so. The US dismissed the threats as bluffs. Why did US leaders disbelieve the threats? Sartori suggests China had developed a reputation for bluffing through a series of bluffs over Taiwan (didn't follow through on threats to invade or fight over Taiwan). US leaders believed that China was more likely to fight over Taiwan than over Korea.

Desch (2002) -- Democracy and Victory DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Critique of Reiter and Stam (1998, 2002) Question: Are democracies more or less likely to win wars? Argument: - Argues in line with the traditional view espoused by Thucydides, Tocqueville, Kennan, and Lippmann i.e. democracies are not more effective at war - There is no reason to believe, nor does the evidence suggest, that leaders of democracies are more careful in selecting their wars or better at fighting them - Other arguments beside regime type perform better - an advantage in military power, nature of conflict, nationalism, consolidation, and military organization matter Literature: - Selection effects: democracies are better at picking the wars they get into - Military effectiveness: democracies fight more effectively - they have bigger economies, form stronger alliances, make better decisions, have higher levels of public support, or can count on greater effort from their soldiers - He argues there is no reason to believe either RD: - Problems with the traditional data used: (1) misaggregation issues; (2) there are cases where democracies are coded as winning even though they are members of mixed alliances where the non-democracies account for the majority of the winning alliance as in Russia WWII; (3) the democracy is sometimes grossly more powerful than the adversary as in US-Japan WWII; (4) asymmetric interests; and (5) coding problems - An example of coding issues is treating WWII as a single war - there are really three wars - Battle of France, European War, and Pacific War - Uses the case of Israel since 1948 to illustrate problems with the democratic advantage logic: the standard view is that Israel has won wars despite the odds because they select and execute wars more effectively than nondemocratic foes Findings: - Democracies share no particular advantage or disadvantage in selecting and waging wars, and therefore, regime type hardly matter for explaining victory - Of the 21 cases of war that were fair fights, democracies won 12 with non-democracies winning 9 times (not conclusive)

Downes (2009) -- How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Critique of Reiter and Stam (1998, 2002) - Main Argument: - Democracies are not more likely to win wars than non-democracies, and the existing data analyses are flawed RD: - Suggest two alterations to the RS analysis: (1) three categories of states - initiators, targets, and joiners instead of just initiators and targets; (2) add wars that end in draws - importance because costly stalemates can threaten the tenure of democratic leaders - Case study of the Johnson administration's decision to begin bombing North Vietnam in 1965 and then to send large numbers of US ground troops into action in South Vietnam later that year - Anomaly for selection effects because they emerged with a costly draw and engaged despite knowing that prospects for a quick win were slim - US should be coded as initiator or joiner (not target) of Vietnamese war - Democratic politics was an important factor leading Johnson to fight - avoiding war could have doomed the Great Society reform agenda - The recent Iraq case suggests that democratic leaders may conceal costs of wars of choice from the public in order to build support Findings: - Democracies of all types - initiators, targets, and joiners - are not significantly more likely to win war

Snyder and Borghard (2011) -- The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound AUDIENCE COSTS AND CREDIBILITY

Domestic audience costs mechanisms rarely play a crucial role for four reasons: - Leaders see unambiguously committing threats as imprudent; ambiguity and flexibility are beneficial in a security context - Domestic audiences care more about substantive consequences than consistency between words and deeds; dovish publics never punish leaders for failing to carry out a threat - Domestic audiences' concern about their countries' reputations for resolve and national honor is largely independent of whether a leader has issued an explicit threat - Authoritarian targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do Four problematic assumptions: - Leaders seek lock-in, not flexibility: because conflict occurs under uncertainty, flexibility is valuable; actors can also find ways to publicly justify escapes from commitments - Publics care a great deal about consistency between acts and deeds: publics only condemn defection from threats when they agree with the threats on substantive grounds - Domestic audience costs are substantial, independent of reputational considerations: domestic audiences care about national honor, not consistency - Targets of threats understand domestic audience costs mechanisms Three ways a deviation can occur: - Nondemocratic target stands firm in response to the democratic challenger's threat (i.e. Sino-Indian war) - Democratic threatener backs down when the nondemocratic target stands firm and is punished by the domestic audience (Iran hostage crisis) - Democratic threatener backs down when the nondemocratic target stands firm and is not punished by the domestic audience (Suez crisis) The Cuban missile crisis is usually held up as an example of audience costs, but Kennedy's threats were vague. He made them not to tie his own hands, but because he was already under pressure from a hawkish public and opposition. He was mostly concerned about how he would appear to domestic critics and the USSR, not to the US public. Khrushchev also seemed to be totally tone-deaf to the audience costs mechanism, so even an example that audience costs theorists hold up as great for them actually doesn't support their theory.

Rosato (2003) -- The Flawed Logic of DPT DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Flaws in the normative logic: - Under the normative logic, democracies should only fight wars for self-defense and the inculcation of liberal values (i.e. preventing human rights violations) - But democracies often fight for other reasons; between 1815 and 1975 there were 33 democratic wars fought for imperial or colonial reasons against previously independent peoples - Moreover, democracies do not seem to trust and respect each other all that much; they bargain hard, issue threats, and use force when needed - The US used covert force to destabilize other democracies during the Cold War (Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua) - Some DPT people have said that perception of regime type matters most, but: any consensus on perception is elusive, states often perceive incorrectly, and any perception is subject to reinterpretation Flaws in the institutional logic: - Accountability: democratic leaders may be more likely to be removed following a costly military loss, but autocratic leaders are more likely to be killed or exiled (Debs and Goemans 2010) - Public constraint: democracies are just as likely to go to war as nondemocracies, and pro-war lobbies and sentiment are strong in democracies - Most democratic citizens are never personally affected by war - Nationalism, the military-industrial complex, myths of empire... - Democratic leaders are as likely to lead as follow public opinion (Lenz 2012) - Group constraint: antiwar groups rarely capture the war-making process and group constraint might be higher in autocracies where funds are valuable for buying off elites and the military is needed for internal repression - Slow mobilization/surprise attack: US presidents have often circumvented or ignored checks and balances to speed up war; the US has taken military action abroad over 200 times but only five have been authorized by Congress - Additionally, both autocrats and democrats have problems keeping attacks secret in the face of surveillance by foreign powers - Information: democracies struggle to reveal their resolve because (1) democracies processes reveal so much information that it is difficult to interpret and (2) domestic political competition does not ensure states will reveal their private information Findings: - While the democratic peace is a strong post-1945 empirical relationship, the causal logics need work, and it may be better explained by post-1945 US hegemony/imperialism (i.e. most double democratic dyads are in the Americas and Western Europe and US preponderance underpins the peace)

Lake and Powell (1999) -- Strategic Choice and International Relations STRUCTURE/AGENCY

Focus is on the choices that actors make in strategic settings i.e. when furthering one's ends depends on the actions others will take; the set of decisions made constitute the interaction Principal Components of SCA: - Strategic problems and interactions as the unit of analysis - Actors and environments are differentiated; actors are defined by the preferences and beliefs they hold; environments are made up of the set of actions and the information available to the actors - Agnostic toward level of analysis; strategic interactions at one level aggregate into interactions at another level (4) Boxes-in-Boxes: - Unit of analysis debate is not fruitful - strategic interactions at one level aggregate into interactions at another level (boxes-in-boxes) - What is exogenous (IV) in one box is endogenous (DV) in another; actors are generally aggregates of more basic actors and the appropriate level of aggregation depends on the question - Institutions determine which box's preferences matter most at any point in time - Partial equilibrium perspective: equilibria at different levels of analysis are additive; the domestic level allows rational choice theorizing to get output; at the international level you do the same with actors and interactions in a situation; since they are additive, you add them together to get an answer Microfoundations: - The interaction between actors, their preferences, their environment, and the outcomes of the interactions - In short, the link between assumptions and outcomes, which realism lacks Preferences (Frieden): - Preferences (over outcomes) are exogenous and constant in the short-term and hard to observe. The environment is thus the focal point of change - We must keep preferences separate from the strategic setting in order to distinguish between their respective causal roles; can't induce preferences from behavior, so we must use theoretical deduction - Experiments can either vary the actors and keep environments constant or vary environments and keep actors constant

Jervis (1976) -- Perception and Misperception in International Politics PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING FIRST IMAGE

Focus: - Jervis investigates how international political decision-makers perceive themselves, other actors, and the environment; how perceptions and misperceptions can influence their decisions; and how such decisions can influence outcomes in international politics - Focusing on cognitive psychological mechanisms, Jervis does not present a theory per se. Instead, he offers rich observations concerning the role of these mechanisms in perception and decision-making, and suggests that understanding them can lead to better explanations of international politics FOREWARD: Political psychology has the greatest overlap with constructivism, but it is not wholly absent from realism and liberalism. People are hard-wired to distinguish between in- and out-groups. These perceptual distortions can fit into realism. Leader psychologies are largely formed domestically and reflect different regime types, fitting in with liberalism. People suffer from cognitive closure. We need strong ordering ideas to grasp a complicated world. We suffer from confirmation bias. Theories and expectations drive perceptions. Cognitive closure can lead to often ill-advised perseverance. Framing is crucial. Information is interpreted through prior mental frameworks. Frames are most effective with naïve subjects. People suffer from a lack of awareness. The failure to understand the influence of our priors leads us to become more confident in them because we see information as less ambiguous than it really is and think that new information provides independent confirmations of our beliefs. We tell ourselves elaborate stories about why we have formed our judgements and can often report the relative weight we have given to a number of factors, and even to their interactions. People suffer from implicit prejudices, which we are unaware of and would typically not admit to. BOOK: Four levels of analysis applicable to theories of international politics: 1. Individual decision-making 2. The government bureaucracy 3. The nation-state (and domestic politics) 4.The international environment Argument: - Jervis emphasizes the importance of the individual level of analysis and contrasts it with approaches invoking other levels - The perceptions of decision makers have an independent causal impact on state behavior - A theory that assumes a level of analysis other than the individual level attempts to generalize about the impact of certain aspects of the setting (the independent variables) on actors' behavior (the dependent variable). However, such generalization may be difficult, since the importance of a certain level may vary with the particular issue, and the value of variables at one level may be coupled to variables in others - Moreover, such an approach ignores decision-makers' beliefs and intentions, since the situational context is assumed to determine action entirely. - Accounting for the individual decision-maker as an intervening variable accounts for context while also opening the "black box" of the decision-making process. - The three main factors involved in perception are (1) beliefs, (2) images, and (3) intentions - Perception involves a process of inference in which actors develop understandings (beliefs) about other actors (images) and what the others will do in given circumstances (intentions) - An observer has several difficulties in attempting to divine others' intentions. For an observer to predict an actor's intentions, he first must distinguish between internal and external influences on the actor's behavior—that is, the degrees to which his behavior is driven by situational constraints and by internal decision processes; and second, must try to understand the actor's internal decision process - States may be willing to pay higher costs and take greater risks depending on how they value the status quo or value changing the status quo. Applied to individual decision-makers, various factors can alter an actor's intended actions, including unexpected events, incorrect assessments of cause and effect, revised goals or values, and contexts for events that differ from those expected. - Jervis claims that models commonly invoked to explain the Cold War competition—the Deterrence Model and Spiral Model— fail to adequately explain state behavior - The Deterrence Model draws a parallel with the game of "Chicken." This model argues that if an aggressor believes a status quo power is weak, the aggressor will be tempted to challenge the other state to test its resolve. To avoid the dangers inherent in such a challenge, status quo states therefore must display an ability and willingness to wage war. The fear that concessions might be interpreted as weakness prevents both sides from resolving the struggle - The Spiral Model draws parallels with the "Security Dilemma" and the "Prisoners' Dilemma" game. States tend to be moved by mistrust and fear, and thus tend to act on worst-case assumptions. Hence, if a security-minded state acquires marginal improvements in its defenses, other states tend to perceive that their security has become threatened. These states then will act to improve their own security, resulting in a "spiral." Such spirals can lead to arms races and other forms of inter-state competition, which in turn can lead to war or other inadvertent consequences. - Whereas the Deterrence Model centers on revisionist states, the Spiral Model assumes states are security-seeking and centers on mutual fear and misperception. According to these models, the central theme of international relations is either "evil" or "tragedy." - Since the Deterrence and Spiral Models contradict each other, evidence that supports one disconfirms the other. Jervis presents empirical evidence that disconfirms each to establish grounds for his psychological explanations. As evidence against the Deterrence Model, Jervis cites cases where mutual threats failed to deter and led to increased competition (Anglo-German relations before World War I). Disconfirming the Spiral Model, Jervis notes cases in which an aggressive power interpreted concessions or conciliation as evidence of weakness, leading to exploitation and expansion rather than mutual concessions ("the Munich Pact") - Jervis posits psychological dynamics as an alternative to the prevailing conceptions. He argues that psychological determinants can reinforce misunderstandings and limit decision-makers' rationality. To introduce this framework, Jervis refers to contemporary spiral theories and the process of developing images about self and other. If a state takes steps to defend itself, it tends to assume that its intentions are obvious and that other states will perceive its actions in the same way. However, other states tend not to see the intentions behind such acts as "obvious," and thus react. The reaction of these states will be perceived by the first state as aggressive. Since all states act according to similar logic, this dynamic of perception and reaction can explain how dangerous competitions are reinforced. This "fog of foreign policy-making" is more than a theoretical concern since decision-makers face it all the time. Jervis proposes that the perception of intentions is the missing link that can lead to a fuller explanation of these dynamics. The rest of the book addresses these issues: how states perceive others and their intentions, and when and why these perceptions might be incorrect CHAPTER 6 - Decision makers over-learn from traumatic events, like wars, and fail to appreciate how the circumstances have changed such that the lesson of the event is no longer applicable - Event -> Lesson -> Future Behavior - In some cases, biases prevent the learning of what is the obvious lesson. People all learn differently from one event because they all have pre-existing beliefs that shape their interpretation of events - Decision makers also usually think of events as good lessons if they were a success, without realizing that the event could have just as easily been a failure if things were slightly different - Helps explain why there was a perceived defensive advantage in WWII

Goldberg and Maggi (1999) -- Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation SPECIAL INTEREST MODELS OF TRADE POLICYMAKING

GH Predictions: - Cross-sectional differences in protection should be entirely explained by three variables: import elasticity, import-penetration ratio, and whether or not the industry is politically organized - Two empirical predictions: (1) trade protection should be higher in industries represented by a lobby, and in industries with a lower import elasticity (low elasticity - demand for the imported good is not changed much in response to price); (2) Within the subset of organized industries, protection should be higher in industries with lower import penetration, whereas in the group of non-organized sectors, protection should increase with import penetration Method: - Data on nontariff barriers in 1983 - Coverage ratios for nontariff barriers are used instead of tariffs because tariffs are set collectively at WTO and the model assumes non-cooperative setting of barriers Findings: - Protection pattern differs between politically organized and non-organized sectors: within the group of non-organized sectors, protection tends to increase with import penetration; for organized sectors, there is weak evidence that protection is inversely related to import penetration - None of the added socioeconomic variables improves the explanatory power of the GH model (except unemployment rate and employment size slightly) - The weight of welfare is around 0.98 as opposed to 0.02 for contributions - the GH model has non-negligible explanatory power Problems: - GH present a quid-pro-quo model where I give you an amount of money in exchange for a specific policy - this is illegal in most economies

Frieden (1991) -- Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance CAPITAL FLOWS TRADE

Goal/Scope: - Proposes a framework for analyzing the politics of international capital mobility - Focuses on the distributional implications of cross-border capital movements and on the distributional implications of various economic policies in light of the high degree of international capital mobility On capital mobility: - While financial capital is extremely mobile across borders, other types of investment (especially in equities and sector-specific capital) are far less mobile - contra-SS/HO - Foreseeable levels of international capital mobility restrict but do not eliminate the possibility for national economic policies - Sectoral policies remain feasible, as do goals involving the exchange rate On policy preferences of socioeconomic groups toward financial integration: - Over the long run, international financial integration tends to favor capital over labor, especially in developed countries, but in the shorter run, the issue is more complex: in the developed world, financial integration favors capitalists with mobile or diversified assets and disfavors those with assets tied to specific locations and activities such as manufacturing or farming On policy preferences of economic interest groups in regard to other issues macroeconomic policy and the exchange rate: - International capital mobility tends to remake political coalitions by way of its impact on the effects of national policies - The political division between producers of tradeable goods and producers of nontradeable goods and services is likely to become more transparent, as are distinctions between internationally diversified and undiversified investors Mundell-Fleming: country can have at most two of the following: fixed exchange rate, monetary policy autonomy, and capital mobility Implications: - Capitalists love capital mobility because they have more investment options, but the increasing options for capital reduces those of labor - The wider menu of investments open to asset-holders increases influence on governments, labor, and others - Frieden prefers specific-factors model - Specific-factors: increase in the supply of finance to countries poor in capital and a reduction in the supply of finance to countries rich in capital - Specific factors in capital-poor countries do well, since they can now borrow at lower interest rates - Specific factors in capital-rich countries do badly, since they must now pay higher interest rates - In sum, increased capital mobility is good for financial asset-holders in the developed world and bad for those in the developing world; it is good for MNCs; it is bad for specific factors in the developed world and good for those in the developing world - The interests of owners and managers of financial assets and the multinational corporations are opposed to those of specific factors, so that financial and multinational interests in the developed countries diverge from interests of specific nationally based industrial sectors - In the developed world, Frieden anticipates support for increased financial integration from owners and managers of financial assets and from MNCs; he expects opposition to increased financial integration from specific industries, especially those tied to a specific domestic market

Gowa and Kim (2005) - An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-94 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Goal: - Examine the effect of GATT on member states in isolation and in aggregate - Determine whether the GATT replaced the system of interwar trade blocs not only de jure but also de facto Argument: - Under the GATT protocol, tariff bargaining adhered to the principal-supplier rule i.e. trade barriers were reduced on the basis of concessions on particular goods exchange between their principal suppliers (nations that were the main source of these goods to each other's markets) - As such, the GATT privileged trade expansion among the major trading nations (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the US) - Japan and Italy were excluded from this bloc because they specialized in those goods that privileged group members managed to exempt from GATT rules (textiles, leathers) - The US designed the principal-supplier rule to protect domestic industry while expanding MFN treatment (Congress wanted this) and to insulate post-war Europe; Britain would not concede the Commonwealth for this piecemeal approach, so it was grandfathered into the GATT along with other similar agreements Theory: - International regimes are supposed to resolve market-failure problems by supplying information assigning liability for actions, and reducing transaction costs - This does not imply that the gains are distributed uniformly across states - The GATT never acquired the organizational capacity to monitor whether states comply with the agreements they sign, and it therefore may not have had much of an effect; the trade regime operated largely as a bargaining forum Findings: - The GATT had a large, positive, and significant impact on trade between only five of its member states: Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the US - The postwar system coexisted with rather than supplanted several interwar blocs: The Commonwealth, Reichsmark, gold, and exchange-control blocs continued to exert positive and significant effects on post-1945 trade - These outcomes are attributable to the protocol that governed tariff negotiations under the auspices of the GATT

Boix (2011) -- Democracy, Development, and the International System AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND TRANSITIONS

Goal: To clarify the relationship between development and democratization by expanding time period under study with panel data running from early 19th century to end of 20th century Key Findings: - Shows a positive and significant effect of income on the likelihood of democratic transitions and democratic consolidations - Estimates hold controlling for country and time effects and an instrument for income; the size of the income effect is weak during the post-WWII period - Income has a decreasing marginal effect on democratization - The structure of the international system affects the resources and strategies of pro-authoritarian and pro-democratic factions in client states; the proportion of liberal democracies peaks under international orders governed by democratic hegemons, such as the post-CW period; it bottoms out when authoritarian great powers such as the Holy Alliance control the world system Theory: - At higher levels of development, high-income people should be more willing to redistribute (declining disutility of redistribution) - In the long run, development is correlated with lower inequality (and therefore smaller redistributive demands) - Development is correlated with a shift in the nature of wealth from fixed assets to mobile capital, and mobile capital induces declining taxes b/c credible exit threat for business - The income effect should be stronger as income grows but then weak or even nonexistent above a given income threshold - International system matters and can be constrained or unconstrained, where the latter is a single hegemon or a concert of great powers operating under a single security regime o Authoritarian unconstrained systems, as in the holy alliance, repress liberalism o Democratic unconstrained systems favor spread of democracy unconditionally because the costs of a democratic collapse are low (post-CW) o In a constrained or multipower world, the democratic hegemony prefers authoritarianism in poor countries and democracy in rich countries Method: - OLS regression models using all sovereign countries 1820-2000; results contradict Acemoglu et al. (2008) because they only use 25 countries and pool results 1875-2000 in 20-year periods; Boix tries 5-year, 10-year, and 20-year pools and results are consistent - Four instruments for income: (1) trade-shares; (2) genetic distance; (3) and (4) exploit absence of correlation between income and political regime before first wave i.e. ratio of each country's income to world median income in 1850 multiplied by world median income each year for (3) and a time trend instead of world median income in (4) - Temporal variation: Holy Alliance suppressed liberalism; first wave happens pre-CW; CW opens door to backsliding; post-CW second wave

Stone (2004) -- The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa IOs POWER POLITICS

IMF: agent of advanced industrial countries who provide the majority of its resources; these countries have a strong interest in guaranteeing financial stability and encouraging policies of conservative fiscal management, privatization, and trade liberalization in the developing world Key Findings: - Analysis of monthly data on 53 African countries from 1990 to 2000 shows the IMF's loans-for-reform contract lacks credibility because donor countries intervene to prevent rigorous enforcement; the US and the former colonial powers France and Britain interfere with the enforcement of IMF programs in Africa - IMF conditions are enforced less rigorously when the borrowing countries receive money from the US, belong to postcolonial international institutions linking them to FR or BR, or vote similarly to FR in the UN - Key measure of punishment is punishment interval which is the duration where a country is unable to draw on IMF funds after defecting; strategically important states are punished more often but for shorter durations - Financial conditionality is superseded by political conditionality and borrowers know access to funds really depends on connections to donor countries - Classic time consistency problem: while conditionality mitigates moral hazard and is generally beneficial to donors, there is temptation to intervene where suspension would be politically costly in key regions; compromise usually results - Stone's solution: IMFs institutional independence should be strengthened, and opportunities for interference by the leading donor should be curtailed

Simmons (1994) -- Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years FINANCE, MONEY, AND DEBT

Key Findings: - Ability to credibly commit to deflationary policies (i..e sticking to gold standard) is affected by more than economic factors (i..e domestic politics) - For limiting capital flows, significant negative result from cabinet turnover and labor unrest (more outflows), significant positive result for central bank independence. No result for democracy or left-wing participation in government. Political-economic model has far more explanatory power than just an economic model - For current account balance, significant negative results for left-wing participation and cabinet turnover and labor unrest, positive result for central bank independence. No significant results for democracy. Not much more explanatory power than an economic model - Simmons finds that democracies are less likely to stay on the gold standard (autocracies better able to control prices, quash labor demands). Greater central bank independence leads to more gold, as well. Curiously, more left-wing representation means a greater likelihood of staying with gold; Simmons finds that the left is willing to tolerate gold in good times, but will break from it when the political costs rise in bad times. In summary, the key factors are left-wing representation in government, cabinet instability, and central bank independence.

Reiter and Stam (1998) -- Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Key Findings: - Democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars - Democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong; strategy, terrain, and capability are relevant control variables Two general arguments to explain democracies' winning ways: - War-fighting explanation: They are perceived as intrinsically more effective at waging war than non-democracies because it is easier for them to rally their society behind a war effort - Selection-effects explanation: Democracies win more because they are more careful about deciding to initiate war Relevant Hypotheses: - War initiators are more likely to win than targets (because states with a greater objective chance of winning select themselves into the population of war by launching wars) - Democratic targets are more likely than other kinds of targets to win wars - Democratic initiators are more likely than other kinds of initiators to win wars (and among initiators, democracies are the most likely to win, followed by dictatorships, followed by mixed regimes which engender logrolling a la Snyder 1991) Other Notes: - Their findings are contrary to the normative arguments that democracies are more peaceful (pushing back on Doyle, Owen) - They suggest that democracies have greater war-fighting power because their armies fight with better leadership and more initiative, which are linked to the emphasis on individual prerogative in democracies - Selection effects come from the fact that democracies have better information with which to make policy, and the fact that democratic leaders are likely to be ousted if they lose a war. - Don't believe that democracies try harder than autocracies in war, don't believe that democracies have more resources in war than autocracies (pushing back on BDM) - In non-public conflict, Ds behave like non-Ds

Mansfield and Snyder (1995) -- Democratization and the Danger of War DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Key Findings: - Democratizing and autocratizing regimes are more likely to go to war than regimes that do not change - On average, democratizing states are 2/3 more likely to go to war than states without regime change - The more dramatic the change to democracy, the more likely the war. States that make the biggest leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy, are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization, compared to states that stay autocratic - The process of autocratization is also dangerous (although democratization is more dangerous) Theory: - Democratization has a "roulette wheel" aspect. It sometimes leads directly to peace, but it can also lead to a stage of belligerent nationalism, which can lead to wars. - The effect of democracy is pacifistic in the long run (once states navigate that dangerous transitional stage) so the world is likely to move toward peace as democratization progresses. - But you can't just promote democracy to get peace. You have to focus on smoothing the transition from autocracy to democracy, if you want to minimize the risk of war. - Mature democracies are less belligerent because they have stable coalitions, and stronger institutional and normative blocks on war. However, democratizing regimes are different. Democratization creates a syndrome of: (1) Weak central government; (2) Unstable domestic coalitions; (3) High-energy mass politics - Many democratizing states have vestige military elites interested in war; weak coalitions are formed via logrolling - the key idea is that leaders stroke nationalist sentiment to further their own ends - Autocratization also causes war - instability leads to the rise of militarist parties, which gain a place in a coalition and use war to cement their power (Ex: Hitler's Germany, Japan in the 1930s, and France under Napoleon I & III) How to avoid destabilizing transitioning democracies: - Golden parachutes: help out threatened elites and guarantee their income and employment. At the same time, make sure to keep them weak. - Marketplace of ideas: support free press to encourage a strong marketplace of ideas that will prevent militarism and jingoism from gaining political currency. - International incentives: don't yank out economic supports from a democratizing country (Weimar Germany, post-Tito Yugoslavia)

Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) -- The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes Toward Immigrants IMMIGRATION

Key Findings: - Despite rampant partisanship, immigrants are viewed similarly by Americans who are Democratic or Republican, rich or poor, high school or college graduates... - Mass-level consensus indicates that debates in the US are more over how many immigrants to admit or what to do with those already here than who to admit - American politicians should pursue skill-based immigration, English-language acquisition, increased border security, and penalties for illegal migration RD: - Extant research manipulates only a few immigrant attitudes at a time, like country of origin, skin tone, skill level, and language skills - need more to comprehensively test competing hypotheses - Conjoint experiment drawing on a two-wave, population-based survey that simultaneously tests the influence of nine immigrant attributes in generating support for admission to the US Detailed Findings: - Hypotheses emphasizing immigrants' adherence to national norms and their expected economic contributions receive strong support - bachelor's degrees, language skills, job experience, work in high-status jobs, and country of origin matter - Americans view educated immigrants in high-status jobs favorably, whereas they view those who lack plans to work, entered without authorization, are Iraqi, or do not speak English unfavorably - Americans' preferences vary little with their own education, partisanship, labor market position, ethnocentrism, or other attributes - The results are consistent with norms-based and sociotropic explanations of immigration attitudes and at odds with labor-market threat and cultural explanations Problems: - The AP literature shows that partisanship rules voting decisions even though issue preferences are generally more moderate and even consistent across party lines; immigration preferences matter little if they do not affect vote choice

Doyle (1986) -- Liberalism and World Politics THEORIES OF IR

Liberalism: - Resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics (individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity) -Liberal states are different and leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs; they are peaceful with other liberal states, but they make war on illiberal states for liberal reasons - States are progressing toward a liberal peace on a global scale Three Variants of the Argument: - Schumpeter: combined influence of capitalism and democracy lead to peace by fighting war machine interests -- critique is that it does not account for non-economic gains from democracy (like ideational gains) - Machiavelli: republics are best for expansion/imperialism - Kant (Doyle's preferred) Kant's Two Legacies of Modern Liberalism: - Pacific union (i.e. separate peace) caused in part by fact that people pay costs of war in democracy - International imprudence (i.e. liberal states do fight wars of aggression with illiberal states) Kant's Definitive Articles of Peace: - Civil constitution of state is republican (con law) - Pacific union (international law) - Universal hospitality and economic interdependence (cosmopolitan law)

Krasner (1976) -- State Power and the Structure of International Trade INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, GEOPOLITICS, AND TRADE POLICY

Main Argument: - A hegemonic distribution of potential economic power is likely to result in an open trading structure (particularly when the hegemon is in its ascendency) - Amendment: Once policies have been adopted, they are pursued until a new crisis demonstrates that they are no longer feasible; states become locked in by the impact of prior choices on their domestic political structures Theory: - Four basic state interests: aggregate national income, social stability, political power, and economic growth - Aggregate national income: trade gives small states relatively more welfare benefits than it gives large ones - Social instability: increased by trade via factor mobility and impact is stronger in small states than in large ones and in relatively less developed than in developed ones - Political power: a state that is relatively large and more developed will find its political power enhanced by an open system because its opportunity costs of closure are less - Economic growth: openness furthers the economic growth of small states and of large ones so long as they maintain their technological edge Causal Logic: - In a hegemonic system, the benefits of trade are unevenly distributed - the hegemon gets increased income, better growth when its relative size and technological lead are increasing, increased political power, and social instability mitigated by relatively low levels of involvement in the international economy - Small states opt for openness because the advantages in aggregate income and growth are so great and political power is restricted regardless - Medium-size states can be compelled by the hegemon because it has superior symbolic, economic, and military capabilities - Hegemonic state can offer access to a large domestic market and relatively cheap exports to other countries as positive inducements, and it can withhold aid/grants or engage in competition with third-country markets as negative inducements - Size and economic robustness of hegemon enables it to provide confidence needed for a stable international monetary system, and its currency offers needed liquidity Findings: - To test the argument, Krasner examines four periods: 1820 to 1879, 1879 to 1900, 1900 to 1913, 1918 to 1939, and 1945 to c.1970 - His argument explains the periods 1820 to 1879 (Britain is rising hegemon - opening), 1880 to 1900 (Britain is relatively declining hegemon - modest closure), and 1945 to 1960 (ascendancy of U.S. - opening) - It does not fully explain those from 1900 to 1913 (Britain in relatively decline but opening system), 1919 to 1939 (ascending U.S. but little effort to open structure), or 1960 to the present (U.S. in relative decline - structure not closing)

Weeks (2012) -- Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict AUDIENCE COSTS AND CREDIBILITY

Question: How do domestic institutions affect autocratic leaders' decisions to initiate military conflicts? Argument: - Institutions in some kinds of dictatorships allow regime insiders to hold leaders accountable for their foreign policy decisions. - However, the preferences and perceptions of these autocratic domestic audiences vary, with domestic audiences in civilian regimes being more skeptical of using military force than the military officers who form the core constituency in military juntas. - In personalist regimes in which there is no effective domestic audience, no predictable mechanism exists for restraining or removing overly belligerent leaders, and leaders tend to be selected for personal characteristics that make them more likely to use military force. Findings: - Substantial variation in conflict initiation occurs among authoritarian regimes. - Moreover, civilian regimes with powerful elite audiences are no more belligerent overall than democracies. - The result is a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of autocracies, with important implications for scholars as well as policy makers.

Jandhyala, Henisz, and Mansfield (2011) -- Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy FDI

Main Argument: - BITs were first adopted in the 1960s, proliferated in the late 1980s and 1990s, and fell out of fashion after 2001 - They argue that BIT signing followed a traditional logic of diffusion for an innovation: o In the first period, BITs provided a solution to the time inconsistency problem facing host governments and foreign investors o In the second period, these treaties became the global standard governing foreign investment o As the density of BITs increased, more countries signed them in order to gain legitimacy and acceptance without a full understanding of their costs and competencies o More recently, as the potential legal liabilities involved in BIT signing have become more broadly understood, the pattern of adoption has reverted to a more competitive and rational logic Predictions: - In the first stage, we should expect BITs to be signed between capital-exporting developed countries and capital-importing countries that are particularly prone to commitment problems (i.e. those with few checks and balances, where the absence of the rule of law, veto players, secure property rights, and coherent administrative institutions raise the specter of rent seeking and government predation) - In the second stage, this relationship should be weaker - peer countries signed BITs because they became part of the expected policy mechanisms for countries pursuing market-oriented reforms (prior adoption of peers and legitimacy were motives); two factors were particularly important: the endorsement of BITs by the US and emphasis placed on them by the World Bank and UNCTAD - The third wave reflected increased awareness of the costs of these agreements Hypotheses: - H1: The influence of the host country political system and the bilateral potential for FDI flows on the likelihood of BIT signing between the home and host countries will be lower in the second stage as compared to the first or third stages - H2: The influence of sociocultural peers' BIT programs on the likelihood of BIT signing between the home and host countries will be higher in economic significance in the second as compared to the first or third stages Findings: - A three-stage model of diffusion contra-Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) who posit a two-stage model of norm diffusion - The rational-political calculus to sign BITs is strongest in the first stage, weakest in the second stage, and relatively strong again in the third stage as compared to cues of peer adoption - In the second wave, peer-country cues of adoption and perhaps the norm of property protection for multinational investors in host countries played a larger role

Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006) -- Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000 FDI

Main Argument: - Competition between competitor states for FDI led to an increase in the number of BITs signed - Theory challenges the supply-driven power-politics theories of FDI that are common in the literature (i.e. US and Germany impose BITs) - Host countries are price-takers - they have no bargaining leverage and must compete - BITs are credible commitments to treat foreign investors fairly - They also raise the ex post costs of non-compliance above those incurred in the absence of the treaty by (1) clarifying the commitment; (2) explicitly involving the home country's government; (3) enhancing enforcement Background: - BITs were designed to remedy the lack of international law governing property rights of foreign investors - there was massive fear of expropriation and nationalization - Mandatory dispute resolution before an international arbitration body, a private right of action for investors, monetary compensation in the event of a violation, national treatment, and MFN - BITs are viewed by host governments and by investors as devices that raise the expected return on investments - Collective action problem: collectively host countries could refuse to sign BITs, but instead they defect individually to get a let up in investment Observable Implications: - BITs should diffuse among host country competitors; countries that are viewed as substitutable venues for investment - BITs should spread most readily to countries where the competition for capital is most intense (i.e. light manufacturers rather than primary production or extractive industries) - BITs should spread as the pool of available capital grows - BITs should diffuse somewhat more readily among host governments that lack credibility Methods: - DV is # years a dyad goes without signing a BIT - 1958-2000 at country dyad-year level with potential home and host identified based on level of development measured in GDPPC - Developed dyads excluded (but they show these occur increasingly often) - Three measures of competition: (1) degree to which the host governments compete in the same foreign market; (2) degree to which nations export the same basket of goods; (3) degree to which countries have similar educational and infrastructural resources Puzzle: why are BITs forming between developing countries?

Bailey (2001) - Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983-94 SPECIAL INTEREST MODELS OF TRADE POLICYMAKING

Main Argument: - Consensus holds that diffuse interests exert little or no influence on American trade politics, but there are empirical reasons to believe that diffuse interests can/do influence congressional trade policies - Members of Congress respond to these interests in order to preempt their mobilization by political rivals, interest groups, the president, and the media - Rival politicians, interest groups, the media, and the president have incentives to activate diffuse interests if representatives pay too little attention to them (Olson's "latent groups") RD: - Statistical analyses of ten years of House and Senate trade voting in the eighties and nineties Findings: - Skilled labor (an interest that receives diffuse benefits from trade but lacks direct organization) has been a statistically significant, consistent, and substantial influence on congressional trade voting - Representatives and senators from districts and states with skilled workforces have been consistently and substantially more supportive of free trade than those who represent unskilled labor Other stuff: - See Rho and Tomz (2017) on how people need cues to determine the distributive consequences of trade policy

Frieden (1994) -- International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation FDI

Main Argument: - Cross-border investment involves an explicit or implicit contract b/w host country and investor - Colonialism is a particular form that the resolution of these quasi-contractual issues can take: the use of force by a home government to annex the host region and eliminate the inter-jurisdictional nature of the dispute - Two dimensions of variation in overseas investments expected to be associated with different levels of interstate conflict and the propensity for investments to have been involved in colonialism: (1) ease with which rents accruing to investments can be appropriated by the host country, or protected by the home country, by coercive means; (2) difference between the net expected benefits of cooperation among home countries as compared with unilateral action by a single home country Initial Hypotheses: - H1: the more easily rents are seized, the more likely to use of force by home countries - H2: the lower the net expected benefits of cooperation, the more likely are home countries to engage in unilateral action, including colonialism Theory: - Certain types of investments lent themselves to protection by unilateral force by home governments, especially investments with site-specific and easily appropriated rents, such as raw materials extraction and agriculture - Colonial control resolved inherent property rights problems that arose in its absence - Colonialism has variation along two dimensions: (1) degree of force used; (2) degree of coordination w/ other powers - Investment is a contractual problem whereby investors have no recourse for breach - Cooperation among home countries can lead protection to resemble a public good, leading to collective action problems - The incentives for investors to cooperate in monitoring and enforcing contractual compliance by host governments increase the more such efforts are characterized by diminishing costs (increasing returns); agriculture and extractive industries are not generally associated with increasing returns - The greater the ability to control free riding, the more cooperation will occur Additional Hypotheses: - Primary prediction is that overseas investments in primary production for export will be more likely to be associated with the use of force - Host governments have little incentive to expropriate FDI-driven investments from MNEs in which assets have little value when separated from integrated company - Utilities may be seized by host countries but are unlikely to cause a use of force by home countries (they are between MNEs and primary products) - In the case of foreign lending, the use of force by home countries against debtors in default should be rare, but there should be a lot of cooperation among creditors Methods: - Evidence from the British empire - see if colonialism is correlated with certain investments Findings: - Overrepresentation of extractive and agricultural investments in the dependent colonial areas - Strong association between independence and foreign borrowing and foreign investment in manufacturing

Van Rythoven (2016) -- The Perils of Realist Advocacy and the Promise of Securitization Theory: Revisiting the Tragedy of the Iraq War Debate THEORIES OF IR

There is a bug in realism that prevents it from overcoming the influence of politically savvy actors like neoconservatives in the policy realm. Social identity and collective emotion have been turned against realists by their neoconservative foes. Realists are then perceived as attacking a collective identity. Threat perception is not a matter of economically efficient decision making, but rather a phenomenon bound up in psychology, myths, norms, and language. VR carves out a critical role for emotion, especially fear, in analyzing realist failures. In particular, the relationship between fear, memory, and coping ability mattered in 2003 - the historical success of Cold War containment had atrophied in a post-9/11 environment where the cultural resources lay in specific recent memories. Restraint and the politics of emotion may be in tension.

Pandya (2014) -- Democratization and FDI Liberalization, 1970-2000 FDI

Main Argument: - Democratization elevates the political influence of labor, the primary beneficiary of unrestricted FDI inflows; investments raise labor demand - FDI's distributive effects and the recipient country's level of democracy help to explain politicians' choice to restrict foreign ownership - Restrictions make it so that MNCs must form joint ventures with local companies; deter FDI because MNCs lose exclusive control over their proprietary techniques and associated revenue - FDI generates profits by allowing firms to enter new product markets or by reducing production costs - Central cleavage is between labor (beneficiaries of FDI) and capita (losers from FDI) RD: - Original dataset on foreign ownership regulations that span over 90 countries between 1970 and 2000 - Years since independence as instrument Findings: - Democracies restrict 6% fewer of their manufacturing and service industries as compared to non-democracies - Robust to economic crises, dictates of external creditors, influence of peer countries, & IMF - Democracies do not merely replace formal restrictions with less transparent ones Problems: - Basically, any of the Milner and Kubota criticisms would also apply here - FDI would have to be in manufacturing in a labor abundant country, and only then do we see Pandya's theory borne out; if in capital or vertical integration, labor benefits much less

Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) -- Democratization and International Organizations IOs DOMESTIC POLITICS

Main Argument: - Democratization is an especially potent impetus to IO membership; this is because leaders have difficulty credibly committing to sustain liberal reforms and the consolidation of democracy - Entering an IO can help leaders in transitional states credibly commit to carry out democratic reforms, especially if the IO is composed primarily of democracies - Political liberalization and IO membership go hand-in-hand - Without IOs, leaders have an incentive to consolidate power, cancel elections, etc. in such a way that the lack of a perceived commitment to liberalization hampers reform (time inconsistency / cheap talk); there is great uncertainty whether democratic transition will be effective - Costs associated with membership lend credibility to the regime's commitment to the IO by conveying to domestic and international audiences that its accession is not cheap talk - IOs allow democratic leaders to retain power by publishing credible information about democratic leader performance Method: - DV: delta IO which is the change in the number of IOs to which each state is a party - IV: whether state i experienced a democratic transition (Polity IV data in year t - 5 and t) Results: - Strong evidence that democratic transitions prompt states to enter IOs - States in the throes of democratization tend to join IOs composed of democratic members; and the likelihood that a democratizing state will subsequently backslide in an autocratic direction is reduced if it enters a relatively democratic IO - Democracies are somewhat less likely to join all IOs and marginally more likely to join IOs with a highly democratic membership than democratizing countries. However, democracy and democratization have independent influences on the propensity of states to join IOs - There is evidence that joining IOs composed of relatively democratic members can help democratizers reduce the prospect of a reversion to authoritarianism

Milner and Kubota (2005) -- Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Main Argument: - Democratization reduces the ability of governments to use trade barriers as a strategy for building political support - Regime change toward democracy is associated with trade liberalization - Democratization helped to shift leader attention to the broader population and the diffuse benefits spread by free trade (at the expense of concentrated losers); not that interest groups didn't matter, just that they mattered less - The optimal level of protection is declining in the size of the winning coalition - On developing countries: Per HO and SS, because they possess relatively less capital than labor and because they trade with developed countries, their import-competing sectors tend to be capital-intensive, and therefore protectionism benefits those well-endowed with capital as the scarce factor; trade benefits those endowed with the abundant factor - labor; the capitalists tend to be members of the selectorate Method: - TSCS covering 179 developing countries 1970-1999 - Example cases include Bolivia, Philippines, South Korea, Bangladesh, Zambia Findings: - Regime is always significant and in the expected direction - IMF reforms drive a wedge between capital and labor, causing inequality and encouraging protectionism (makes the government unstable and leads to autocracy) Problems: - GATT matters but in the wrong direction i.e. higher tariffs which seems weird - They fail to measure whether democratization erodes the power of interest groups - Couldn't reciprocal trade acts bake in autocracy?

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) -- Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? IOs

Main Argument: - Depth of Cooperation: extent to which it requires states to depart form what they would have done in the past; scope of the benefits; measure of accomplishment - Management school's policy inferences are dangerously contaminated by selection problems - High compliance levels and marginal enforcement result from treaties requiring states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement (i.e. enforcement levels are linked to the "depth of cooperation") - Treaties produce a selection bias: they are endogenous and selected from an infinitely large pool of possible treaties; they are selected because they are only small deviations and lower - Ideas and managerial tactics like transparency certainly play some role, but enforcement is also a key component of deeper treaties Cases: - Best cases of steadily increasing depth are in trade and European integration; more depth means more enforcement/punishment is needed - Maastricht came with new power for ECJ - Transition to WTO saw expansion in DSB

Gartzke (2007) -- The Capitalist Peace DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Main Argument: - Economic development, free markets, capital market integration, compatibility of FP preferences and similar interstate interests all anticipate a lessening of militarized disputes or wars; this 'capitalist peace' also accounts for the effect commonly attributed to regime type in standard tests of the democratic peace - Trade is the least important element of global capitalism in terms of mitigating warfare - Capitalism resolves the SD and insecurity by creating 'powerful pacifists', countries possessing military strength ensuring they are largely free from foreign influence or domination but equally that they lack incentives to act aggressively abroad - Argues that cost of war is totally endogenous because it evolves/is inflicted during war Peace results from three attributes of a mature capitalist economy: - Territorial expansion is tempered by the rising importance of intellectual and financial capital, factors that are enticed not conquered; land is not valuable anymore - Overlap in foreign policy goals of developed capitalist nations in the post-WWII period limits scope and scale of conflict - Rise of global capital markets creates a new mechanism for competition and communication for states that might otherwise be forced to fight Hypotheses: - Development leads contiguous dyads to be less likely to experience conflict - Development leads noncontiguous dyads to be more likely to experience conflict (easier to project power) - Similar state policy interests lead dyads to be less likely to experience conflict (UN affinity score) - Financial or monetary integration leads dyads to be less likely to experience conflict (economically integrated states can make costly and credible threats with tariffs) Key Findings: - Liberal economic processes do in fact lead to peace, even accounting for the role of liberal politics; democracy cohabitates with peace, but it does not lead nations to be less conflict prone, even toward other democracies - Economic openness significantly reduces conflict - Development is not significant but GDPPC increases conflict while it decreases conflict with contiguous neighbors - States with similar interests or integrated markets or mutual development and an absence of policy differences are less likely to fight - Need only add one of the variables to wash dem Problems: - Counter argument that globalization emboldens state autonomy by making a state less dependent on any given trade partner - The 'costs are endogenous' problem is weak because states are obviously capable of inferring costs from capabilities and using analogy - WWII pitted advanced capitalist states against one another

Glaser (1995) - Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Main Argument: - Glaser aims to show that even if we adopt structural realist assumptions, cooperation is much more likely than realists commonly assume and can be substantially assisted by international regimes - Glaser's argument is overtly functional - International institutions provide information to states that helps them to realize common interests and joint gains - Terms this "contingent realism" that may occur under peacetime, specifically in the form of arms agreements - Cooperation is a form of self-help Theory: - Integrates exogenous variation in transaction costs as a variable - "Institutions ... that provide information and reduce transaction costs ... do not pose a problem for structural realism. Nothing about the roles performed by this type of institution conflicts with structural realism's basic assumptions." - Tacit coordination or perhaps formal international institutions can be employed to generate joint gains where the transaction costs of decentralized signaling, coordination, and monitoring are high - Want an arms agreement when O/D are distinguishable and when O has advantage (because per Jervis 1978 that is when arms races are most dangerous); otherwise unilateral buildup - But Jervis says cooperation is hard under O advantage b/c exploitation costs are really high, so this is interesting Problems: - Glaser's alternatives (altruism and a world state) are straw men. Both altruism and a world state have been utterly absent from scholarly debates for nearly half a century - Institutionalization/cooperation under realism is done by Keohane (1984) - ad hoc 1/3

Davis and Meunier (2011) -- Business as Usual? Economic Responses to Political Tensions INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, GEOPOLITICS, AND TRADE POLICY

Main Argument: - In an era of globalization, actors lack incentives to link political and economic relations - Sunk costs in existing trade and investment make governments, firms, and consumers unlikely to change behavior in response to political disputes Both realist and liberal theories generate expectations for feedback - Realism: political factors that influence the likelihood of future conflict should affect economic relations (Carnegie and Gaikwad 2017) - Liberalism: emphasis on the commercial peace whereby economic interdependence creates vested interests opposed to conflict either via economic interest or deepening transnational ties Findings: - They show that negative events affecting political relations have not hurt US or Japanese trade or investment flows - They look to specific incidents of tensions in US-French and Sino-Japanese relations, showing that aggregate economic flows and high salience sectors like wine and autos are unaffected by the deterioration of political relations Relation to other stuff: - Perhaps pushes back on Gowa and Mansfield (1993) in a contemporary context

Alesina and Rodrik (1994) -- Distributive Politics and Economic Growth DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH

Main Argument: - Inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth-retarding policies - Policies that maximize growth are optimal only for a government that cares solely about pure "capitalists" - The greater the inequality of wealth and income, the higher the rate of taxation, and the lower growth - Main prediction: income and wealth inequality and growth are inversely related b/c distributive struggles harmful to growth are more likely to take place when resources are distributed unevenly Model: - Simple model of endogenous growth with distributive conflict among agents endowed with varying capital/labor shares - There is an accumulated factor called capital (broadly defined) and a non-accumulated factor called labor (unskilled) - Growth is driven by expansion of capital stock, which is determined by individual saving decisions - Long run growth is endogenous and linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together - Government services financed by a tax on capital - The lower an individual's share of capital income, the higher is his ideal tax, and the lower his ideal growth rate - Derived from MVT, the more equitable the distribution in the economy, the better endowed is the median voter with capital, the lower the equilibrium level of capital taxation, and the higher is the economy's growth rate Empirical Findings: - Inequality in land and income ownership (measured around 1960) is negatively and significantly correlated with subsequent economic growth

Fearon (1998) -- Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation IOs

Main Argument: - International cooperation has two linked phases: in the first, states bargain over the deal to be implemented in the second "enforcement phase" which is modeled as a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma - "Though a long shadow of the future may make enforcing an international agreement easier, it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal" - So the shadow of the future is both necessary for sustainable cooperative deals and it encourages delays in bargaining - "Getting to international cooperation involves first a bargaining problem and, second, issues of monitoring and enforcement" Model: - Bargaining phase is modeled as a war of attrition: both states pick a time horizon they are willing to wait; delays are costly because of opportunity cost and the possibility of a partner pursuing a new partner (i.e. outside options) - The state with lower costs for noncooperation is more powerful on this issue, because it has less to lose Takeaways: - An agreement will be enforceable: (1) the longer the shadow of the future; (2) the better the technology for monitoring and response to violations; (3) the lower the short-run benefits of defection; (4) the greater the costs of noncooperation - States take tougher bargaining positions with longer shadows of the future (i.e. The Soviet and US arms race) - Cooperation theory identifies regimes as institutional solutions to problems of monitoring and enforcement; regimes also deserve attention as "forums for bargaining" (this is a shot at Axelrod and Keohane presumably)

Kim (2017) -- Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization SPECIAL INTEREST MODELS OF TRADE POLICYMAKING

Main Argument: - Much of the variation in US applied tariff rates arises within industry - High levels of product differentiation eliminate the collective action problem faced by exporting firms while import-competing firms need not fear product substitution - This is because only a small number of firms actually trade the specific products on which the governments set tariffs (lobbying is endogenous response to firm's own cost-benefit calculation rather than an industry problem) - Product differentiation means that domestic firms face less competition than they would if their products were substitutable with cheaper versions from foreign producers - All of this makes it easier to trade within-industry on differentiated goods Theory/Model: - Similar products within an industry are often subject to very different tariff rates - Firms individually lobby on trade policies targeting very specific products - Introduces firm-level differences in productivity to the GH model to show that it is economically and politically optimal to reduce tariffs on differentiated (i.e. less substitutable) goods - SS would predict the US should trade with low and medium-skill countries, but they really trade with high and medium-skill countries (trade occurs between countries with similar factors, violating the assumptions of HO) - With respect to RV, the US now imports as much as it exports products in its top 20 exporting industries (meaning cleavages are not at the industry-level) - In sum, states are not specializing according to factor endowment or industry - this suggests that firms in the same industry have divergent trade preferences Hypotheses: - H1: Productive firms are more likely to lobby for trade liberalization when they compete in an industry with differentiated products than when they compete in an industry with substitutable products - H2: Differentiated products will have lower tariffs than substitutable products, on average Method: - Firm-level lobbying dataset based on reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 - identifies firm-level political activity that is directly related to trade policy making 1999-2014 Findings: - Productive exporting firms are more likely to lobby to reduce tariffs, especially when their products are sufficiently differentiated; when products are substitutable, less productive firms might have an interest in lobbying because they will have to exit the market if consumers switch to cheaper foreign goods - Using text analysis of bills, lobbied bills are more likely to be related to trade policies on certain products or on highly specific aspects of products - Highly differentiated products have lower tariff rates; changing the level of differentiation from low to high is associated with a 0.4 percentage point decrease in the applied MFN tariff rate Problems: - Disclosure requirements not strictly enforced

Putnam (1988) -- Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games IOs BARGAINING

Main Argument: - Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers so long as their countries remain interdependent yet sovereign - Rational decisions at one board may not be rational at the other board; two-table metaphor implies key stakeholders at both the international and domestic table matter - Two Stages: (1) Level I: Bargaining between negotiators (single leaders) leading to a tentative agreement; (2) Level II: Separate discussions among each constituency about whether or not to ratify the agreement - Expectations about rejection at Level II may abort negotiations at Level I - Document may not be amended at Level II without a return to Level I; final ratification must be voted up or down Win Sets: - Win-Set: for a given Level II constituency, a set of all possible Level I agreements that would win by gaining the necessary majority among constituents - Larger win-sets make Level I agreements more likely; smaller win sets make involuntary defection more likely - Relative size of win-sets affects distribution of joint gains; small domestic win-set is bargaining tool; large win-set get states pushed around - The lower the cost of no agreement, the smaller the win-set - Ratification procedures affect win-sets - Good will and issue linkage matter too

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) -- An Institutional Explanation for the Democratic Peace DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Main Argument: - Problems with normative arguments: (1) ad hoc; (2) democracies act against their norms to adopt imperial stances - Problems with institutional arguments: (1) institutions should constrain all war; (2) rally-around-the-flag effect is puzzling - Democratic leaders, when faced with war, are more likely to shift extra resources into the war effort than autocrats are. This follows because the survival of political leaders with larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy - The extra effort provides a military advantage over autocrats - This makes democracies unattractive targets for war; their institutional constraints cause them to mobilize resources for the war effort - Democrats are more selective in their choice of targets because defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement for democrats than for autocrats. Democrats only initiate wars they expect to win Seven empirical regularities related to democratic peace that we need to explain: - Democracies are not immune from fighting wars with non-democracies - Democracies tend to win a disproportionate share of wars they fight - When disputes emerge, democratic dyads choose peaceful processes of dispute settlement more often than other pairings - Democracies are more likely to initiate wars against autocracies than are autocracies against democracies - In wars they initiate, democracies pay fewer costs in terms of human life and fight shorter wars than nondemocratic states - Transitional democracies appear more likely to fight than stable regimes - Larger democracies seem more constrained to avoid war than do smaller democracies Model Findings: - Democracies must care more about policy failure, so they devote more resources - Implications: democracies are more likely to win wars, they pick and choose conflicts carefully; they spend resources to win wars and advance public policy goals; since two democracies both try hard war is unlikely between them and negotiating is likely; autocrats try less hard so they are more likely to lose and devote resources to elites Problems: - Goemans on democratic accountability - Effort in war is likely dependent on scope

Guisinger (2009) -- Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Main Argument: - Scholars assume that voting is an unproblematic mechanism for aggregating preferences in democracies, but this may be untrue when the salience of trade policy is low or heterogeneous throughout the electorate - Salience: extent to which a voter's utility for a candidate is affected by a candidate's position on an issue - Accountability requires knowledge of a deviation from preferences and sanctioning RD: - Pre- and post-election survey of 36,501 potential voters in the US 2006 midterm elections - Offers an estimation of trade policy salience based on the degree to which voters held Senate incumbents accountable for their 2005 vote on CAFTA, relative to roll call voters on other issues of the day - Only one of the respondents offered trade as the MIP Findings: - Trade policy salience is relatively low in terms of stated importance, voters' knowledge of their representatives' policy positions, and its effect on voters' propensity to vote for the incumbent - This calls into question voter-driven models of trade policy Problems: - CAFTA is not and never was a high salience trade issue - it is not a most likely case for identifying knowledge or voting effects

Facchini and Mayda (2009) - Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants? Evidence across Countries IMMIGRATION

Main Argument: - Skill and income are different measurements - Tax adjustment model: following immigration, the value of per capita benefits is unaffected, while welfare costs (tax rates) adjust to balance the government budget (so high-income individuals are more negatively affected) - Benefit adjustment model: following immigration, benefits per capita are reduced while tax rates stay the same (low-income individuals are hurt) RD: - Empirical analysis of the 1995 National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Program - Robustness check with the 2002-2003 European Social Survey Findings: - Find evidence consistent with the tax adjustment model and LMC - in countries where immigration is unskilled, income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences, while skill is positively correlated with them; these relationships are reversed in economies with skilled migration - Underscores the need to frame skill and income as different metrics rather than substitutes for one another

Chayes and Chayes (1993) -- On Compliance IOs

Main Argument: - The "managerial school" holds that defections are often involuntary, resulting from treaty ambiguity, capacity limitations of states, and uncontrollable social or economic changes - When nations enter agreements, they alter their behavior, relationships, and expectations of one another over time in accordance with its terms - The general level of compliance with an agreement cannot be empirically verified - Compliance problems often do not reflect a deliberate decision to defect on the basis of a calculation of interests - The treaty regime as a whole need not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compliance acceptable in light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to safeguard - The acceptable compliance level is subject to broad variance across regimes, times, and occasions; economic and environmental treaties can tolerate a good deal of noncompliance; violations are allowed so long as they are the result of extenuating circumstances and do not endanger the life of the regime - Enforcement involves both assistance and persuasion; defection is a problem to be solved and importance of enforcement is downplayed Violations generally come because: - Ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language - Limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their undertakings (both comply and enforce) - The temporal dimension of the social and economic changes contemplated by regulatory treaties (good treaties allow for time lag as in IMF and are dynamic in nature)

Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) -- Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection SPECIAL INTEREST MODELS OF TRADE POLICYMAKING

Main Argument: - The GH (1994) model is empirically testable, and they use real-world data to evaluate the model's predictions on both the protection side and lobbying side - Their results call for a serious consideration of the GH model in the PE literature - they find broad support for predictions from GH on both the protection and lobbying side Two predictions on the lobbying side: - Lobbying contributions must compensate the government for the deadweight costs from protection - Greater lobbying competition should lead to higher lobbying spending, with the payout increasing in the political power of opposing lobbies One prediction on the protection side: - In politically organized industries, protection varies with z/e where z is the inverse import penetration ratio and e is the absolute price elasticity of imports - Import penetration ratio: ratio between the value of imports as a percentage of total domestic demand - Price elasticity of imports: sensitivity of demand changes to changes in import prices RD: - Cross-sectional US non-tariff barrier data combined with lobbying and industry characteristics data covering four-digit SIC industries in 1983 Findings: - Evidence is consistent with the lobbying and protection side predictions - The government places almost equal weight on total net welfare and total lobbying spending (contra-Goldberg and Maggi 1999)

Debs and Goemans (2010) -- Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Main Argument: - The less the outcome of international interaction affects a leader's tenure and the less punitive are the consequences of losing office, the more a leader is willing to make concessions to strike a peaceful bargain (i.e. leaders make concessions the less they fear punishment) - This is the "ousted democratic leaders write memoirs and nondemocratic leaders are beheaded" argument - Challenges the conventional argument that democracies are more resolved because they face threat of losing office Key Prediction: - Democratic leaders' tenure is less sensitive to war outcomes and their fates less punitive post-office, thus democratic leaders are more likely to strike peaceful bargains than to fight. This is a monadic argument explaining the democratic peace Literature: - They focus on the Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) model in which rulers with larger winning coalitions enjoy a smaller incumbency advantage in the provision of private goods and must survive through the provision of public goods - BDM et al. assume war outcomes are public goods, so leaders are reluctant to enter into conflict unless they are certain to win, and you get the democratic peace - The authors disagree with BDM - there is no reason war outcomes should affect democratic leaders more than nondemocratic leaders RD: - Model predicts that peace prevails when the cost of replacing the leader - and therefore his or her survival probability - depends relatively little on war outcome and when the net gain of staying in office is relatively small - They examine the sample of non-democracies post-WWII for evidence Findings: - There is a fundamental difference in the replacement process: it is violent in dictatorships and nonviolent in democracies - The theory successfully predicts war involvement among nondemocratic regimes - civilian dictators are less likely to start wars than military dictators or monarchs - They show that although different types of dictators do not systematically differ in their sensitivity to the war outcome, they do differ systematically in their post-exit fate - civilian dictators do better than military dictators or monarchs - Also serves as an intuitive explanation for the democratic peace - compared to nondemocratic leaders, the tenure of democratic leaders depends relatively little on the war outcome, and democratic leaders fare relatively well after losing office - Thus, democratic leaders should be more willing and able to avoid war

Axelrod and Keohane (1985) -- Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions IOs

Main Argument: - The same analytical framework can apply to political-economic relationships as military-security relationships - The fundamental problem with games like the Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, and Stag Hunt is that "the myopic pursuit of self-interest can be disastrous." Both sides can benefit from cooperation when achieved - Expectations are important when considering the length of the shadow of the future. Institutions can embody and affect expectations; the rules and principles of international regimes make governments concerned about precedents, increasing the odds they will attempt to punish defectors. They create expectations - We can increase the chances for cooperation by establishing hierarchies and/or regimes to institutionalize reciprocity and lessen uncertainty for actors - The structural conditions that affect strategic choices leading to cooperation or discord are: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of actors - Cooperation is easier in PE than security Mutuality of Interest: - Payoff structures are grounded upon actors' perceptions of their own interests Shadow of the Future: - "The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less incentive to defect today - since the other side is likely to retaliate tomorrow" - Factors that make the shadow of the future conducive to cooperation: (1) long time horizons; (2) regularity of stakes; (3) reliability of information about the others' actions - Stakes are lower in IPE; longer time horizons (i.e. offensive advantage in 1914 vs. credit markets) Number of Players: - To get reciprocity, players must be able to identify defectors and need effective monitoring of counterparts in games that reward unreciprocated defection - "Sanctioning Problem": When there are more actors, these conditions are difficult to satisfy; each state may free-ride on the willingness of others to enforce rules - IOs resolve this problem by: (1) setting standards and assigning responsibility for sanctioning; (2) Provide information about actors' compliance and facilitate the development and maintenance of reputations

Ruggie (1998) -- What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge THEORIES OF IR

Neorealism and liberalism do not talk about where forces come from, only the motion that results. It is borrowed from micro-econ. Constructivism is about human consciousness and ideas. It asks how constituent actors came to acquire current identities and interests. It concerns itself with issues that R/L treats by assumption, discounts, ignores, or cannot apprehend. Ideas can be causal. They are not just held by individuals, but are held collectively (intersubjective understanding). For example, sovereignty exists only by collective intentionality. Constitutive rules "define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organized social activity - that is to say, they specify what counts as that activity." Neorealism is static - proponents argue that 1) the system has always been the same (anarchic), or 2) the current system is pretty stable. Constructivists focus on the historical evolution of structure at both the macro- and micro-levels. Kind of like Lake and Powell. Actors interpret and construct reality; they don't just find the world around them, they actually make it. Preferences aren't fixed.

Bechtel and Tosun (2009) -- Changing Economic Openness for Policy Convergence: When Can Trade Agreements Induce Convergence of Environmental Regulation? IOs ENVIRONMENT

Main Argument: - There is a difference between declaratory or de jure policy convergence and actual or de facto policy convergence since policies are not always enforced - Potential gains from trade, policy enforcement, and reputation costs, as well as domestic demands for environmental protection, affect occurrence of environmental policy convergence through conditional trade agreements Theory: - Higher demand for environmental protection culminates in higher levels of regulation; environment is put on the agenda when negotiating trade agreements - High-regulating countries use "conditional" FTAs to induce stricter regulation from low-regulating trade partners (coercive diplomacy); prevents a comparative disadvantage in polluting industries and prevents companies from leaving to pursue lax regulation - Non-enforcement of rules is rampant is low-regulating countries yet variance is higher in high-regulating countries - Low-regulating countries vary in terms of their ability and willingness to effectively enforce environmental regimes b/c: 1. Enforcement costs: dependent on a country's (administrative) ability to effectively enforce stricter environmental policy and the extent to which the government serves interests which prefer lax environmental regimes 2. Probability of detecting non-enforcement: reflects the likelihood of finding out that the environmental policies stipulated in the agreement are not enforced by the low-regulating country 3. Reputation costs: arise from being dishonest to the potential trading partner about the domestic enforcement of the stricter regulatory standards

Hurd (1999) -- Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics IOs INTERVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING

Main Argument: - Two perspectives in literature: (1) international system is like a Hobbesian state of nature where only material power matters; (2) international rules only have force when they are in the self-interest of each state - Argues that both are premature because of their shallow reading of international society and misinterpretation of the ways in which authority works in domestic society - There are three mechanisms for compliance: coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy - Coercion is neo-realist; self-interest is neo-liberal - Legitimacy is often overlooked, and it should not be left out without justification; it is also often mentioned without a satisfying definition - Legitimacy is defined as the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed; it is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor's perception of the institution Three Solutions to Problem of Social Control: 1. Coercion: asymmetrical physical power among agents, where the asymmetry is applied to changing the behavior of the weaker agent; operative mechanism is fear (of punishment) or simple compellance; expensive 2. Self-interest: compliance may promote one's self-interest (Kant); governing agent tries to structure incentives so that community members find compliance to be rationally attractive 3. Legitimacy: internal reason for an actor to follow a rule; compliance is driven by an internal sense of moral obligation (regarded as right)

Rodrik (1998) -- Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? GLOBALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Main Argument: - Government spending plays a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to a significant amount of external risk Puzzle: - It is widely presumed that the effectiveness of government intervention is lower in economies that are highly integrated with the world economy - Yet, Austria, Netherlands, Norway are SOEs with massive government spending - Societies seem to demand an expanded government role as the price for accepting larger doses of external risk Ancillary hypotheses: - Increases in external risk must lead to greater volatility in domestic income and consumption - A larger share in GDP of government purchases of goods / services must reduce income volatility - Risk-mitigating role of government spending should be displayed most prominently in social security and welfare spending, particularly in advanced countries that possess the requisite administrative capacity to manage systems - Causality should run from exposure to external risk to government spending Methods: - Risk measured as terms of trade risk and product concentration of exports - Interaction terms are used (with openness) Findings: - A positive correlation exists between an economy's exposure to international trade and the size of its government - The finding is robust in the sense that it holds up to: inclusion of control variables, measures of government spending from all available data sets, and low- and high-income countries - Interaction terms are strongly significant and the coefficient on openness per se becomes insignificant or negative - The relationship between openness and government size is strongest when terms-of-trade risk is highest - In advanced countries with administrative capacity, we should see spending on SS and welfare correlated with risk, but in developing countries, just on consumption - There may be a complementarity between markets and governments: markets empower rather than undermine government intervention Problems: - Does not account for politics at all (regime type b/c democracies produce both; the role of the left and labor should be important) - If the WTO truly resolves the terms-of-trade PD as suggested by Bagwell and Staiger then why do we need government spending as contingency? - Why can't it be that these countries are just wealthier, tax more effectively, and therefore want to offer better public goods? Countries driving the basic results are the Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands...

Gerschenkron (1962) -- Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective STRUCTURE/AGENCY

Main Argument: - The economic and political requirements of countries which industrialize early (when they have few competitors and simple, low-capital requirements for technology) are different from the requirements of late industrialization (competition already exists and industry has become highly complex, massive, and expensive) - The more advanced the global economy, the higher the entry costs. Paying these costs requires greater collective mobilization, which in turn requires greater central coordination. Societies which, prior to industrialization, developed strong central institutions will find these institutions useful if they attempt to catch up with "early" industrializers. - Political outcomes within countries are strongly affected by the character of the world economy at the time in which they attempt industrialization

Christensen (2015) -- The China Challenge FUTURE OF IR

Note: Counterpoint to Johnston (2008) Main Argument: - We should be worried about a "waking" China but a "sleeping" China b/c a passive China is more likely to care about the stability of the Korean peninsula than NK's nuclear weapons; energy supply and profits for its SOEs rather than Iran's nuclear progress; near-term job creation via exports and currency suppression rather than IP and global warming - The US and its allies and partners ought to manage regional security relations in East Asia and encourage China to contribute to global governance alongside the other GPs Theory: - There are China optimists and China pessimists: optimists suggest that US military and economic supremacy, not to mention the status of the dollar, will last; pessimists see the rise of China as a great destabilizing force likely to cause great power war - Optimists fail to realize the extent of China's military buildup where pessimists underestimate the strength of America's alliance/security network in Asia (especially post-TPP collapse) - China need not be economically dominant to be important: see how equity markets respond to changes in the Chinese economy

Stasavage (2002) -- Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: NW Revisited DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH

Main Contribution: - Proposes a revision to existing arguments that institutions of limited government (characterized by multiple veto points) improve the ability of governments to credibly commit - Argues that establishing multiple veto points can improve credibility, but whether this takes place depends upon the structure of partisan interests in a society, on the existence of cross-issue coalitions, and on the extent to which management of government debt is delegated Argument: - Veto points are neither necessary nor sufficient - Argues that veto points can improve credibility but whether this is true depends on the structure of partisan interests in society, the existence of cross-issue coalitions, and the extent to which management of government debt is delegated - Creditors either need to be represented or be a part of a cross-issue government coalition RD: - Comparison of 17th century UK and 18th century France Findings: - France had good institutions but creditors were not well represented - In England, holders of debt belonged to a cohesive cross-issue coalition in parliament that would otherwise have been dominated by landowners (Whigs) - Whigs were more creditor friendly than the Tories, who were into land - Estates of Holland rates did not drop until long after veto points came into being (i.e. long after Star Chamber is abolished) b/c creditors were not immediately represented - France had an absolutist monarchy for a much longer time; not the same kind of Glorious Revolution or checks and balances (lacked religious coalitions to support creditors as well)

Gourevitch (1978) -- The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics STRUCTURE/AGENCY

Main focus: reversing Waltz's second image and looking at how international politics affects domestic structure Main argument: - International forces (military pressure and international economic forces) constrain domestic behavior, but they usually do not fully determine the outcome. - States are left with at least a few options of how to respond, and these responses can only be explained by examining internal politics (not just structure, but also how institutions affect struggles between social forces or coalitions). - Sees the world as this interdependent ball of causality between agents and structures and domestic and international factors - The world today is not a structural break from the past Main goal: - To show that theories of international politics in which domestic structure is an IV are problematic b/c the supposed DV of foreign policy (or more generally the international arena) has an effect on the domestic political environment Two main facets of the international system affect states domestically: - War (distribution of power) - Trade (distribution of economic activity and wealth) - His main DVs here are regime type and domestic support coalition pattern Coalitional analysis: - Waltzian Third Image explanations are insufficient; what matters is how specific interests use various weapons to achieve their goals - (1) position in world economy; (2) within the country, which policies benefit what people; (3) who defines policy alternatives; (4) whose backing is needed to legitimate policy

Carnegie (2015) -- Powerplays: How International Institutions Reshape Coercive Diplomacy INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Mechanism: - Holdup Problems -> Coercion -> Underinvestment and Low Trade -> WTO Accession -> Increased Investment and Trade Argument: - Coercive diplomacy involves states utilizing a set of tools, one of which is GSP extension - Asymmetric states experience holdup problems wherein states underinvest in GSP Hypotheses: - Joint WTO membership increases trade more for pairs of states with dissimilar capabilities than for pairs with similar capabilities. - Joint WTO membership increases trade more for nonallied pairs of states than for allied pairs. - Joint WTO membership increases trade more for pairs of states with dissimilar regime types than for pairs with similar regime types. - Joint WTO membership increases investment most in contract-intensive goods. - WTO membership increases relationship-specific investments. - WTO members decrease the use of trade policy for coercion and increase the use of other policy tools to extract foreign policy concessions from other members - The United States experiences a diminished ability to exercise coercive diplomacy over WTO members, relative to non-WTO members Findings different from article: - WTO members that respect rights receive 243 percent more foreign aid (different tool) - The US has become less effective at coercing states to improve on human rights - Russia: US sanctioned USSR by limiting exports of technology and grains; effective because there was no alternative for technology; Gorbachev made changes to increase trade and investment with US; WTO accession led to Magnitsky Act (asset restrictions) which was ineffective and led Russia to withdraw assets from US - China: During the Cold War and following Tiananmen, US used trade as a lever; Chinese human rights issues have grown since WTO accession - Vietnam: Regression on human rights similar to China after WTO accession despite the use of GSP and foreign aid as levers - Cambodia: Textile quota was used as a lever to improve human rights; US started using aid and visa restrictions as coercive levers; similar pattern to China - Romania: US used MFN as lever to force democracy and better treatment of civilians; tool shifted to EU/NATO membership and now nothing which has led to a worse human rights record - China-Japan and India-SA-Pakistan as cases Relation to other stuff: - Put in conversation with Stone; the US is buttressed here more so than in the IMF

Rose (2004) -- Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Rose (2007) -- Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Reply INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Method: - Gravity model of bilateral merchandise trade and panel data covering 178 countries 1948-1999 - Explains (natural log of) trade with (logs of) the distance between the countries and their joint income - Covariates: culture (whether a pair of countries share a common language), geography (landlocked), and history (whether one colonized the other); control for as many natural causes of trade as possible - Data is "Direction of Trade" database from IMF - DV is aggregate trade to GDP Expectations: - Effect of both being WTO members should be positive - If trade is diverted then one being a WTO member should be negative - GSP membership should be positive Findings: - Countries acceding or belonging to the WTO do not have significantly different trade patterns than nonmembers (coefficients are small and negative) - The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) extended from the North to developing countries approximately doubles trade (136%) - Industrial GATT members trade 60% more than nonmembers - If we remove the standard gravity measures, the effect is significant, but not otherwise Two Proposed Explanations: - GATT/WTO has not forced most countries to lower trade barriers, especially developing countries that have received special and differential treatment - Members of the WTO seem to extend MFN status unilaterally to countries outside the system Problems: - "From the outset, most international trade has been conducted by GATT/WTO members"; the WTO has massive selection issues whereby countries have already embraced trade or made trade-oriented reforms before joining Reply to GRT:

Alkon and Wang (2017) -- Pollution Lowers Support for China's Regime: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Beijing ENVIRONMENT

Method: - Using eight-week long survey conducted day-to-day in Beijing in 2015, they leverage daily variation in air quality driven by intentional government reductions in pollution levels to estimate the causal effect of pollution on support for Chinese regime - Leverage daily, plausibly exogenous, within-city variation in pollution - N is 1,809 sampled over 57 days (32 per day) - DVs are (1) satisfaction with state/local government; (2) demand for oversight; (3) belief that global warming is Western conspiracy to constrain China's rise - They then match survey data to measures of air pollution from US AQI - Government intervention is quasi-exogenous because it is not done in response to citizen demands, but in preparation for a holiday parade Key Findings: - Find that government efforts to reduce pollution do successfully improve citizens' evaluations of the regime - Find that pollution makes citizens more skeptical that climate change is a Western conspiracy Theory: - Builds on literature showing that retrospective evaluation depends on recent experience - Exogenous variation in pollution levels increases salience of link between air quality and evaluations of government - Two posited mechanisms: (1) regime publicly claims credit for industrial policies and growth; (2) daily pollution lowers life satisfaction b/c makes them think more about the issue - Contrasts with blind retrospection where any troubles, even those not clearly linked to government, are blamed on the government Implications: - Given that Chinese opinion is ideologically charged and sticky, it is surprising to find any daily variation is support at all - Air pollution has negative PO consequences for governing regimes in high-growth states - Micro-foundational support for theories of information and institutions in authoritarian regimes that rest on efficacy of autocrats' policy responses to grievances

Bechtel and Scheve (2013) -- Mass Support for Global Climate Agreements Depends on Institutional Design ENVIRONMENT

Method: - Using opinion data in France, Germany, UK, and US, they explore how three dimensions of global climate cooperation - costs and distribution, participation, and enforcement - affect individuals' willingness to support climate cooperation efforts - Embedded experimental conjoint analysis in large-scale Internet surveys - Have respondents rank or rate two or more hypothetical choices that have multiple attributes with the objective of estimating the influence of each attribute on respondents' choices or ratings Key Findings: - Design features have a significant effect on public support - Support is higher for global climate agreements that involve lower costs, distribute costs according to prominent fairness principles, encompass more countries, and include a small sanction if a country fails to meet its emission reduction targets - The sensitivity of public support to design features reflects underlying norms of reciprocity and individuals' beliefs about the potential effectiveness of specific agreements Results: - The effect of cost is not mitigated by education level - Perceptions of fairness matter; support high when cost distributed by emissions - Support increases with number of participants - Support can be improved even among those who generally oppose international climate cooperation; appears to be driven in part by effectiveness concerns - The high/low environmentalism divide is distinct from left/right divide - Reciprocity / resonation with social norms matter Problems: - The conjoint might not capture the alternative of no agreement - people may be more likely to support one agreement as opposed to another, but is that informative? - Does this matter for policy outcomes? Lobbies? - Why not sample less likely cases?

Grossman and Helpman (1994) -- Protection for Sale SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Model: - Politicians maximize their own welfare as composed of the weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate welfare - Each lobby presents the incumbent with a contribution schedule, mapping the policy vector (trade taxes and subsidies) to a contribution level - Underlying model of a small open economy (i.e. can't affect the world price) - Quid pro quo model: political contributions are intended to directly affect policies chosen by the politician (contributions are made prior to the policy decisions) Findings: - Equilibrium tariffs for a given sector are higher when (1) it is organized; (2) when its output is high relative to competing imports i.e. enough supply that the tariff doesn't hugely inflate prices; and (3) when the price responsiveness of the corresponding trade flows is low (same logic as 2) The great advantage of this model is that it allows the endogenous derivation from first principles of the campaign contribution schedules of competing lobbies in a general framework. One criticism is that only a small part of real-life lobbying activity takes the form of financial contributions.

Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) -- International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict CIVIL WAR

Note: Refutes Fearon and Laitin (1993) Setup: - Irregular war: small, lightly armed bands operating in rural areas - Conventional war: rebels able to militarily confront states using heavy weaponry such as field artillery and armor - SNC: low tech, symmetric militaries engaged in conflict Argument: - The international system shapes civil war - the technologies of rebellion - The end of the Cold War resulted in a decline of irregular war, which was closely tied to the particular structure of the Cold War - Insurgency (Fearon and Laitin) is neither the only technology available to rebels nor is it as time invariant as assumed - Robust insurgency connected to CW through three channels: 1. Material support: states armed and trained insurgents in the developing world 2. Revolutionary beliefs: CW was an ideological conflict propagated across borders 3. Military doctrine: guerilla fervor after the Cuban war as war of the people - End of CW is associated with: 1. Decline of rebel capacity (no US/SU support or training) 2. Decline of state capacity (no US propping up governments) 3. Emergence of new post-communist states, within which factions could fight each other conventionally Method: -Look at irregular warfare as well as conventional and symmetric non-conventional (SNC) warfare Findings: - Irregular wars decline from 66 percent of civil wars in the CW period to 26 percent after 1991; they also last longer than conventional wars (b/c terrorism), are more likely to be won by incumbents, and are more likely to be associated with more battle deaths

Hui (2005) -- War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Note: Use Fearon (1991, 1996) to rebut method Background/Question: - China from 656-221 BC was a multi-state system (composed of sovereign territorial states) that closely resembled Europe in the early modern period (AD 1495-1815) - The Zhongguo system experienced disintegration of feudal hierarchy, prevalence of war, conditions of international anarchy, emergence of sovereign territorial states, configuration of the balance of power, development of the centralized bureaucracy, birth of state-society bargains, expansions of international trade, etc. - Interstate relations: ancient China developed the art of war and markers of territorial sovereignty light years before Western practices - State-society relations: bureaucratized administration, monopolized coercion, and nationalized taxation; legal rights and welfare policies; central budgeting - But the balance of power did not prevail - why? Theory: - Dynamic theory of the balance of power designed to examine the coercive mechanisms that facilitate domination and the countervailing mechanisms that check attempts at domination Three building blocks essential to a theory of change: - Strategic interaction of strategies and mechanisms - Heterogeneous motivations of human behavior (both rationalist cost/benefit and normative concern for the common good, for instance) - Integration of agency (what actors choose to do and what they can do) and structure (what actors are compelled to do and what they cannot do) Argument: - Whereas war made the state through self-strengthening reforms in ancient China, war in fact deformed the state through self-weakening expedients in early modern Europe (contra Gilpin) - Eventually, European states pursued the Pax Britannica model of administrative reforms that mirrored those of ancient China designed to facilitate state domination alongside parliamentary oversight designed to enhance constitutional checks and balances - Ironically, this system struck a balance between the logics of domination and balancing, which achieved the "Confucian ideal of the Mean" - States can choose internal balancing or self-strengthening reforms that either assist or prevent domination (for instance, an army via conscription in China allowed Qin domination where those in Europe used primarily mercenaries, weakening the state; higher taxation; more bureaucracy) Method: - Paired comparison of uncommon cases: Europe as a counterfactual China and vice versa

Bremmber and Roubini (2011) -- A G-Zero World FUTURE OF IR

Note: counter to Ikenberry (2011) Argument: - The US lacks the resources to continue as the primary provider of global public goods - There are no answers to global problems with Brazil, China, and India - G-Zero world: one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage (or the will) to drive a truly international agenda - The result is conflict over macroeconomic coordination, financial regulatory reform, trade policy, and climate change Key Observations: - The move from the G-7 to the G-8 did not challenge the virtues of representative government or the dangers of extensive state management of economic growth - G-20 production of a joint agreement on monetary and fiscal expansion, increased funding for the IMF, and new rules for financial institutions came from the common threat of the Great Recession - China rebounded quickly due to capital reserves and investment in infrastructure, fueling the West's fears and frustration - As the wealthy and developing states' needs and interests began to diverge, G-20 and IOs lost urgency needed to produce coordinated and coherent policy response i.e. the economic realm is converging to security, non-proliferation realm - WTO cannot manage the surge of protectionist pressures that has emerged (Doha)

Diamond et al. (2016) -- Authoritarianism Goes Global FUTURE OF IR

Note: counterpoint to Ikenberry Setup: - Three trends have characterized the quarter century since the collapse of communism: 1. A democratic surge starting in the 1970s 2. An authoritarian backlash around the Color Revolutions 3. Authoritarian surge comprising China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela - Authoritarian governments have become bolder and more adept at stopping dissent before it starts, as well as increasingly accomplished at projecting their influence abroad - The most influential antidemocratic regimes are not just content to contain democracy, but actually want to roll it back around the world Argument: - Though democracy is under attack, no plausible alternative with cross-cultural or cross-regional appeal has yet emerged; even China's model has struggled with repression, protest, and general uncertainty - Nevertheless, the "Big Five" have mobilized to contain democracy's spread while developing "soft power" tools to do so, including challenges to democratic norms; strategies for repressing free media and civil society; and disrupting the integrity of election monitoring China: - Since assuming power in 2012, Xi Jinping has been increasingly assertive in pursuing China's economic and strategic interests - Beijing's international engagement works against democracy in at least six ways: 1. As a model of illiberalism that combines economic growth with authoritarian rule 2. Via an international propaganda regime 3. Through developing and teaching censorship / repression techniques 4. Rolling back or stifling democracy in territories where it enjoys special influence, such as Hong Kong 5. Providing diplomatic support, economic access, and investment opportunities to fellow autocrats who are strategic or economic partners 6. Working with other illiberal powers to change the norms governing international organizations Russia: - Vladimir Putin has developed his own doctrine to legitimize authoritarianism at home and abroad, thus sustaining his personalized hold on power - Diversionary belligerency on Russia's periphery is meant to district the Russian public from its acute social / economic problems and allow Putin to pose as the restorer of national greatness - Russia actively seeks to contain and divide the West while building a pro-Kremlin lobbying network and bolstering fellow illiberal states by sharing information warfare / propaganda techniques with other members of CSTO and the SCO Iran: - Iran remains a brutal authoritarian regime, yet has retained a young and vibrant democracy movement throughout the revolutionary period - It is unclear whether visible cracks in the regime are actual faults or merely valves for releasing tension; the impact of the 2015 nuclear deal also remains to be seen - As with China and Russia, Iran has sought to build ties with like-minded regimes and exports an extensive international media presence Venezuela: - Venezuela has slid into "autocratic legalism" at home while pursuing in international strategy meant to arm the regime against criticism from abroad - Countries which benefit from Venezuela's oil largesse have generally been unwilling to harp on its human rights record or illiberalism - Chavez and then Maduro have used constitutional procedures to pass laws that are autocratic in nature; this record has not abated despite the drop in oil prices Saudi Arabia: - Saudi Arabia, facing domestic pressures and fearing an Arab Spring-style uprising, has mounted a defensive effort on behalf of its own regime and that of smaller surrounding countries - Riyadh seeks to suppress democratic forces that could bring Shia or Sunni radicals to power; it mainly does this by paying for regional allies to buy arms and stabilize their economies - While the Saudis do not necessarily project antidemocratic rhetoric, they have certainly damaged the spread of democracy and political pluralism in the Middle East Key Insights: - Together, these countries are challenging long-held assumptions about the historical trajectory of norms while experiencing dismaying success at reshaping international bodies that promote democracy and human rights into forums more favorable for regimes that don't care about either - They advance respect for "civilizational diversity" and "traditional values" in line with Katzenstein - Fears derived from the color revolutions produced a "counterrevolutionary playbook" that targets NGOs and democracy monitors - Autocrats have also sought to rewrite electoral narratives by pumping out disinformation and discrediting otherwise independent monitors - The legacy of Leninism in disrupting civil society remains alive and well, as does the export of propaganda couched as news or cultural exchange (RT, Confucius institutes, etc.)

Gilpin (1981) -- War and Change in World Politics EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Note: cyclical theory of "change within the system" CHAPTER 3 - Assumption: A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits - U-shaped cost curve to expansion: decreasing costs due to economies of scale; later increasing - Three Types of social formations: 1. Localized: of the communal, feudal type; inability of the society to generate a sufficiently large economic surplus to expand 2. Imperial System: economic surplus generated by agriculture and siphoned off through direct or indirect means to benefit the warrior, religious, or bureaucratic elite 3. Modern Industrial Nation-State: economic surplus generated by industrial production The Cycle of Empires: - Imperial system contrasts with modern European balance of power; empires held few values and interests in common; principal ordering mechanisms were territorial control and spheres of influence - Determinant of the cycle was the underlying agriculture-based social formation, which was a function of the territorial extent of the empire until diminishing returns begin - Growth in power and wealth was synonymous with growth in territory (and slaves) - Changes in trade routes and their control caused conflict often - Taxation was a major source of state revenue, and thus key to distributions of both economic surplus and power - Rise and decline of dominant states were governed by: (1) tendency for the cost of the best military techniques to increase with time and (2) the fact that the financial burdens of scale were large relative to the cost of the best armaments - Financial burden from empire prevented rise of surplus sufficient to beat barbarians; barbarians devoted all their resources to war-making The Triumph of the Nation-State - NS succeeded because it was the most efficient form of political organization for the set of environmental conditions that developed in early modern Europe (functionalism) - Pre-modern political forms were plagued by tradeoff between scale and loyalty - Revival of trade meant increase in taxable revenue provided that new forms of property rights for trading could be created and protected - New types of military weaponry and organization greatly increased the economies of scale and expanded the effective range of military power; costly to finance and caused a fiscal crisis for the feudal mode of organization - Transformation of economic and military environment triggered Darwinian struggle (in line with Tilly 1990) - Key attributes: strong central authority (monopoly over the legitimate use of force); complex class structure and division of labor; nationalism - Nation state liberated people to work and create wealth; it was not simply elites taking advantage of the working class; taxation made this possible by extending rights The Breakthrough to Economic Growth - Enduring technological breakthrough associated with the Industrial Revolution - Closer relationship between wealth and power; no fiscal tradeoff between the costs of military advances and financing the state; united economic and military power - Internal efficiency and ordering of society: incentive for individuals to undertake productive technological investment due to property rights and social changes The Creation of a World Market Economy - Market Economy: involves a marketplace wherein goods and services are exchanged to maximize the returns to individual buyers and sellers; openness and competition are the two key features - Hegemony and efficiency are the preconditions to champion a market economy (Krasner) - Three causes: monetarization of economic relations; innovation of private property; structure of the European state system - International economic efficiency is now the most importance source of wealth - Colonialism was more for exclusive commercial rights than property - World market economy developed the world, but did so unevenly in relative terms The Succession of Hegemonies - GB and the US have imposed their will on lesser states and had states accept their leadership to the benefit of their economies - Hegemonic-supplied public goods returned revenue to the hegemon and benefitted the economies of the other states; maintained a peaceful world order Limitations of Change and Expansion - Natural barriers (geography, topography, climate, precipitation, fertility of the soil) and the strength gradient (net benefits and economic surplus decline) - Balance of power (function of the density of the international system) - Notion that economic, technical, and other factors determine an optimum size for political entities in a particular historical era (should internalize all costs and benefits) - Suboptimization and fragmentization (i.e. redistribution and economic production) - Internal transformations in society (values and interests) CHAPTER 4 Assumption: Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo - Domination involves costs in manpower and material resources; military forces, financing of allies, foreign aid, and the costs associated with maintaining the economy - Divergence between costs and resources causes a fiscal crisis and disequilibrium - National income in three categories: protection, consumption, productive investment - over time, consumption wins out - Investment declines relatively with the age of the state such that efficiency and productivity decline and so does the overall state of the economy Internal Factors that Affect Political Decline: - Law of industrial growth: tendency for the growth impulse of any innovation to come to an end (S-shaped growth curve) - Theories: 1. Stagnation theories: economies stagnate with time; law of the increasing costs of war whereby technology diffuses and it is increasingly costly to maintain a military advantage; erosion of material spirit i.e. less incentive to join the military 2. Private and public consumption increase faster than GNP; saps productive investment (in both military and welfare) 3. Changes in the structure of the economy: largest sector moves from agriculture to manufacturing to services; lower rate of productivity and investment in mature economies 4. Corrupting influence of affluence: manifested in conflict over the distribution of national income in the three areas; as economic growth slows, conflict over resources intensifies Increasing costs of political dominance - Hegemon tends to overpay for public goods; others do not pay their fair share What can you do when you are overextended? - Retrench to the new equilibrium point (cut costs and reinvest in productive capacity such that your investment base gets back to innovating) - Appease the aggressors if they are appeasable - Organize a set of rules that appeals to other actors in the system FROM LAURA: - Rising states will seek to challenge the status quo because as their power increases the costs of doing so decrease, while for declining hegemons maintaining the status quo becomes more costly - If the declining hegemon fails to restore equilibrium in the system through different policies, the disequilibrium will be resolved through war - The declining hegemon attempts to restore equilibrium via two mechanisms: 1. New resources to meet the challenges of the rising power by increasing domestic taxes and/or tributes from other states, or manipulating terms of trade with other countries, but all of these things are difficult to sustain in the long term. Declining hegemon can also try to be more efficient with the resources it already has. Need to innovate with military, economic, and political institutions. This is very hard to do, and declining societies usually experience a cycle of decay and immobility. Very few states are able to innovate and stay productive for long periods of time (Chinese Empire is the exception). 2. Reduce costs by eliminating the reason for the rising costs (preemptive war against challenging power); expand to a more secure and less costly perimeter; reduce international commitments (retrenchment, make alliances to alleviate burdens, appease the rising power). Retrenchment can signal that a state is losing power and cause its allies to seek out the rising power. Britain in the years before WWI is a rare example of a state that was able to retrench successfully - Problems with alliances: great power may overpay (US and NATO); utility of alliances is limited by Riker's theory of coalitions: an increase in the number of allies decreases the benefits to each (and probability of defection increases); and chain-ganging can occur - Throughout history the primary means of resolving disequilibria in the system—between a rising power trying to transform the system and a declining one trying to maintain it—has been hegemonic war

Autesserre (2014) -- Peaceland INTERVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING SIGNALING

Note: example of BF 1999 in practice Question: Why do peace interventions regularly fail to reach their full potential? Why do certain ways of working persist when they are clearly ineffective? Main Argument: - There exists a subtle hierarchy and ritualized patterns of interaction among interveners and also between them and local populations; it persists in each conflict environment from Kosovo to Afghanistan to DRC - There is a pattern: peacebuilders conceptualize the project with no local input; they secure external financial resources; they task international agencies with implementation; and they involve local actors only in the final stages - Local ownership is essential for success, but local stakeholders rarely feel included in the design of international programs; interveners blindly apply templates that worked in other places (IMF) - They tend to ignore the importance of good relationships with locals - International peacebuilders inhabit a separate world with its own time, space, and economics - and its own system of meaning - a "Peaceland" - Mundane elements like social habits, security procedures, and habitual approaches to collecting information on violence impact effectiveness of intervention efforts; they enable methods that are viewed as inefficient to persist anyway Theory: - Peacekeepers generally lament a lack of financial, logistical, and human resources, but in reality, many of the practices, habits, and narratives that shape international efforts on the ground are counterproductive - An example: in the DRC, the UN deployed Congolese police units to volatile villages to encourage law and order and give the UN a foothold; the untrained police had to compete for control of the area with local militias and rebel groups, and they ended up adding to instability; they had no ethnic or family links with the surrounding groups; and the UN would not pay them (insisting the government do so); lacking resources, the police preyed on the people they were enlisted to protect - Peacebuilding efficacy relies primarily on the actions, interests, and strategies of national and local actors and of potential outside spoilers - need all parties to recognize the peace RD: - An ethnography of the inhabitants of Peaceland designed to paint a portrait of their customs, cultures, structures, beliefs, and behaviors - Focus is on standard practices (routine activities that are socially meaningful and have an un-thought character), shared habits (automatic responses to the world), and dominant narratives (stories that people create to make sense of their lives and environments) - 15 months of field observations; 195 in-depth interviews, 124 discrete participant-observation events lasting over 330 hours in total, and hundreds of documents Findings: - This is the same story we hear about tons of IOs from the IMF to the UN - bureaucracies have a certain way of doing things (often based on one initial success somewhere else); they ignore conditions on the ground and the input of local actors; they impose their will; then they are confused at the failure - Majority of peacekeepers arrive with no understanding of their locale of deployment; they use inefficient data collection techniques; they rely on biased samples of informants - In the Congo, narratives cover illegal natural resource exploitation as the cause, sexual violence as the worst consequence, and state building as the best solution - There is a wide split between interveners and locals reinforcing a power disparity, and daily routines perpetuate feelings of superiority - These dynamics create four outcomes, one positive and three negatives: o Positive: enables interveners to function in difficult environments o Negative: biased information and analysis, frequent misunderstandings, and the focus on top-down causes and solutions

Moravcsik (1998) -- The Choice for Europe THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Objective: Contest the sweeping, soft and often sloppy assertions about European integration as either a special form of supranationalism or driven by geopolitical ideology Argument: The process and the outcomes are much more normal in that the representatives of the leading states have for fifty years behaved logically in using the EU to promote their economic interests. European integration is best understood as a series of rational choices by rational leaders. Three-Stage Model: - National Preference formation which is driven by geopolitical or economic factors - A bargaining phase which can be explained as a process of "supranational entrepreneurship" or in terms of interstate bargaining power - The choice of institutions which can be explained by theories of federalist ideology, technocratic centralization or national credibility commitment RD/Findings: - The three stages produce a multi-causal explanation for each round of integration - Moravcsik's method involves the formulation of falsifiable hypotheses from the theories outlined above, the use of disaggregated case studies, and a reliance on primary sources - Assumption is that the nation-state is unitary and rational, i.e. it acts as if it had a "single voice", but not unitary internally - The nation-state is assumed to have stable preferences, which do change over time, but can be taken as stable within each round of negotiation

Clausewitz (1832) -- On War STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Outbreak of war: - Motives for war: hostile feelings and hostile intentions - States act according to the laws of probability rather than the extremes after the initial blow - War is an instrument of policy - War is a paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity rooted in the people, the commander of the army, and the government respectively Peace: - Disarming a country means: (1) the fighting forces must be destroyed; they can no longer fight; (2) the country must be occupied; (3) the enemy's will must be broken; it must want peace - Peace can occur due to improbability of victory or extreme costs Friction: - The concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper; it makes the theoretically easy so difficult (Fearon's rationalism is just war on paper) - The role of passion: without passion there would be no need for combat and war by algebra would be just fine - Could explain Fearon's puzzle of why states fight costly wars Defensive advantage relies on: - The utilization of terrain (Jervis 1978) - The possession of an organized theater or operations - The support of the population - The advantage of being on the waiting side - Closeness to resources and supplies Absolute War: - One approximates absolute war when he can/must - In absolute war, the final resolution (not small advantages or victories) is all that matters - One uses no greater force than needed to achieve political objectives (Reiter 2009) Other Notes: - Entire focus is on physical use of force - War tends toward the extremes, but max force is not used from the start for practical reasons - War is bound up in chance

Betts (1994) -- The Delusion of Impartial Intervention INTERVENTION & PEACEKEEPING

Problem: The principle that intervention should be limited and impartial because weighing in on one side of the struggle undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of intervention Argument: - Impartiality is a destructive misconception when carried over to the messier realm of "peace enforcement" where the belligerents have yet to decide that they have nothing more to gain by fighting - Hypothesis: intervention is not effective when the intervenor is both limited and impartial; you have to do one or the other to be effective Theory: - War occurs because groups cannot agree on who gets to call the tune in peace - Two ways to stop war: having one side impose its will after defeating the other on the battlefield or having both sides accept a compromise - Compromise is harder after a war starts: emotions intensify, sunk costs grow, demands for recompense escalate - Stalemate leads to compromise only when it lasts so long both sides lose hope - Impartial mediation is useful, but it helps peacekeeping most where peacekeeping needs help least: where wars have played themselves out and factions need the good offices of mediators to lay down their arms - Economic sanctions as a "trickle-up" strategy hurting the innocent long before the guilty - Refusing the mandate for intervention is better than impartial intervention in wars What to Do? - Recognize that to make peace is to decide who rules - Avoid half-measures - Do not confuse peace with justice: peace means intervening on behalf of the mightier side; justice means intervening on behalf of justice or shared values; this tension is importance - Do not confuse balance with peace or justice - Make humanitarian intervention militarily rational

Posen (1993) -- The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict CIVIL WAR

Purpose: - To apply the security dilemma to the special conditions that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own security - Article assesses the factors that could produce an intense security dilemma when imperial order breaks down, producing an early resort to violence Argument: - Realism: emerging anarchy after an empire dissolves makes security the first concern - Security Dilemma: what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure - Offensive and defensive military forces are more or less identical (i.e. indistinguishable); states will choose the offensive to survive; preventive war - The process of imperial collapse produces conditions that makes offensive and defensive military capabilities indistinguishable and make the offense superior to the defense - Uneven progress in the formation of state structures produces windows of opportunity and vulnerability - Strong national identity is the key ingredient of the combat power of armies b/c weapons are rudimentary; "groupness" of ethnic and religious groups emerging from collapsed empire means inherent offensive capabilities - History is the main method groups will use to assess capabilities - Unless proven otherwise - difficult given history of suppression and reliance on emotional oral history - each group will assess the other as dangerous because of their sense of identity and the cohesion it produces - It is a story of cohesion and not mere military assets (which are rudimentary) - Two main determinants of offensive superiority are typically technology and geography 1. Technology: inheriting a nuclear arsenal reduces the importance of group-ness 2. Geography: ring of encirclement and isolated ethnic islands - The UN frequently protects and legitimates the gains of the winning side or gives a respite to recover after a bloody stalemate Windows of Vulnerability and Opportunity: - Remnants of state infrastructure are unevenly distributed - Immediate military advantages to those further along in the process of state formation - Conscription creates gains of cumulativity and incentives for preventive war - Expected behavior of allies are also relevant and change the power calculus - If IOs and GPs are preoccupied with other conflicts, there may be an incentive to strike

Barrett (1997) -- he Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements IOs ENVIRONMENT

Purpose: Inquiry into the implications of sustaining international cooperation in the supply of a global public good when countries also engage in trade Argument: - The threat of not providing a public good where others will not provide the good must be credible in order for cooperation in the supply of the good to be sustained - This is the nature of a self-enforcing international environmental agreement (IEA) - But since punishments hurt signatories to an IEA and non-signatories, punishments are unlikely to be credible and free-riding is unlikely to be deterred - When countries interact in other spheres, the strategy space for punishing non-cooperation can be expanded (linked to international trade) i.e. agreements can ban trade with non-signatories in a given product line and trade sanctions therefore ban free-riding in this way Case: Montreal Protocol Results: - The credible threat of imposing trade sanctions may be sufficient to deter free-riding completely; sanctions must be accompanied by a minimum participation clause if they are to be incentive compatible - There are two equilibria, one in which every country is a non-signatory and one in which every country is a signatory; the latter is preferred by all - Solving the coordination problem requires a clause that the agreement is not binding unless k countries accede to it What happens without the minimum participation requirement? - Without it, countries have an incentive not to sign-up because they would carry costs without providing many benefits - It is safe to join the treaty here because it will only have an impact when almost everyone is a member and that is when you want to be a member because then the benefits are internalized

Fischer (1992) -- Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Purpose: Settle the debate between proponents of Critical Theory (CT) and Neorealists about the Middle Ages Literature: - According to CT, the Middle Ages "constitute the most important case to support their argument that world politics undergoes fundamental change" - Modern politics, according to CT, is shaped by the concept of sovereignty, which CT sees as the origin of conflict and violence, in contrast to medieval times, which were characterized by "communal discourse" Findings: - Fischer looks at four areas of feudal discourse: unity, functional cooperation, heteronomous and communal relations, and just war resolution. - Finds that while feudal actors seem to have been operating in distinct ways, most of the difference is nominal; below the surface they "behaved like modern states" - Thus, Fischer finds that there is no basis for the CT claims for historical change in international politics, which lends support to the Neorealist position that "conflict and power politics are a structural condition of the international realm—present even among individuals in a stateless condition" Detailed Findings: - With regard to unity, he finds that despite a long tradition of empire (Rome) and persistent rhetoric regarding a Christian union under God, medieval politics was characterized by extreme fragmentation—"a fluid condition of power politics among atomistic individuals" - The situation was similar where functional cooperation is concerned: despite strict doctrines regarding the functions of individuals and orders, norms prescribing one's place were constantly violated, and each actor had to provide for his own security - This state of affairs extends to heteronomous and communal relations, with actors pretending to observe their obligations and communal values, but in reality engaging in conquest and subjugation - Fischer then turns to immanent justice for the resolution of conflicts, which he finds equally hypocritical, since it amounts to nothing more than "self-help" Problems: - This would be a blow to Tilly, Spruyt, Nexon, Ruggie - the emergence of the state system is trivial and politics does not change over time

Blattman and Miguel (2010) -- Civil War CIVIL WAR

Purpose: literature review Argument: - Existing theory omits behavioral economics and has made little progress in key areas like why armed groups form and cohere or how more than two groups compete - There is little consensus on policies to avert civil war or promote recovery - Micro-level analysis, case studies, and a growth theoretic approach are necessary - Interesting directions for future research are: internal organization of armed groups, rebel governance of civilians, strategic use of violence, counterinsurgency strategy, and the roots of individual participation in violent collective action - Further cross-country regressions will only be useful if they distinguish between competing explanations using more credible econometric methods for establishing causality - The most promising avenue for new empirical research is on the subnational scale, analyzing conflict causes, conduct, and consequences at the level of armed groups, communities, and individuals - In sum: conflict is rooted in endemic competition for resources across groups, with bargained solution sometimes breaking down because of commitment or information problems

Krasner (1999) -- Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy

Purpose: to explain and understand what sovereign statehood has meant in actual practice with regard to international legal and Westphalian sovereignty Definitions: - International legal sovereignty refers to the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence (authority) - Westphalian sovereignty refers to political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory (authority) - Domestic sovereignty refers to the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity (authority and control) - Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state (control) Argument: - The basic contention of this study is that the international system is an environment in which the logics of consequences dominate the logics of appropriateness. Logic: - Actors often find themselves in a situation in which they have multiple and contradictory roles and rules, and the results of different courses of action are obvious so a logic of consequences will prevail -Both international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty can be defined by clear rules or logics of appropriateness: recognize juridically independent territorial entities; exclude external authority structures from the territory of the state. Yet both of these logics have been violated, more frequently for Westphalian sovereignty than international legal sovereignty, because logics of consequences can be so compelling in the international environment. - "Organized hypocrisy" - their defining rules have endured and been widely recognized and endorsed but, at the same time, sometimes compromised— in the case of Westphalian sovereignty, frequently compromised Findings: - The most important empirical conclusion of the present study is that the principles associated with both Westphalian and international legal sovereignty have always been violated Useful as a contrast to Tilly, Spruyt, Nexon, etc. because they assume sovereignty is a given and perfectly respected!

Stone (2008) -- The Scope of IMF Conditionality IOs POWER POLITICS

Puzzle: Some argue IOs are sufficiently autonomous to create a democratic deficit; others argue IOs are merely instruments for powerful states. Which is true? Argument: - Informal governance allows powerful states to intervene when strategic objectives override its interests in the organization's long-term goals - States allow this to occur so long as it is infrequent enough to avoid undermining the legitimacy of the IO as a whole - The implication for the IMF is that one should expect conditionality - the packages of policy reforms that countries promise to undertake to receive financial support from the Fund - to reflect long-term economic policy priorities during normal times in ordinary countries, but to reflect US interference during crises in politically important countries - US intervention should reduce conditionality - US influence should appear only when IMF support is particularly important to one borrower and when US strategic interests are threatened - Conditional delegation: US assumes control of the organization when core interests affected - Short-term interests conflict though long-term interests of the members are the same Method: - DV is the number of categories of conditions subject to test Results: - There is evidence of US influence, which operates to constrain conditionality, but only in important countries that are vulnerable enough to be willing to draw on their influence with the US; US foreign aid recipients receive less conditionality - In ordinary countries under ordinary conditions, broad authority is delegated to the IMF, which adjusts conditionality to accommodate local circumstances and domestic political opposition - The strength of the US intervention depends on the institutional capacity of the borrower; US intervention depends on the balance of influence between the aid recipient and the donor Problem: - Summing categories says nothing about depth - Relation to Pollack: this is about principal controlling agent not vice versa

Gaikwad and Nellis (2017) -- The Majority-Minority Divide in Attitudes toward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai IMMIGRATION

Puzzle: - Internal migrants can be more/less threatening: guaranteed voting rights; local citizens are unable to regulate the volume and composition of internal migration; and fellow citizens possess shared national identity and heritage Argument: - Minority communities facing persistent discrimination view in-migration by co-ethnics as a means of enlarging their demographic and electoral base, thereby achieving "safety in numbers" - Natives' willingness to oppose migrants possessing skill or occupational attributes deemed threatening from an economic standpoint is contingent on migrants' ethnocultural profile, specifically whether or not a migrant's ethnicity is aligned with that of the native individual or group being investigated - Theory is that natives will judge non-co-ethnic migrants endowed with undesirable skill sets more harshly than they would otherwise identical co-ethnic migrants Method: - Face-to-face survey experiment on representative sample of Mumbai's population to elucidate the causes of anti-migrant hostility - 28 enumerators interview 1,585 adults in Mumbai - Randomly manipulate skill and religion (H/M) Findings: - Point to centrality of material self-interest in the formation of native attitudes; dominant group members fail to heed migrants' ethnic attributes, yet for minority group respondents, considerations of ethnicity and economic threat crosscut - Strong overall preference for high-skilled migrants, driven by low-income respondents - Higher skilled natives are 13% more likely to back anti-migrant reservation policies when presented with high-skill vs. low-skill migrant workers - Education does not appear to increase tolerance of migrants - No evidence for sociotropic hypothesis that all natives prefer high-skilled migrants - Muslims prefer Muslims by 6.9%, while Hindus have no bias - Muslims discriminate based on migrant skill profile only when the migrant is Hindu; Muslims are under-represented electorally, they know it - In presence of discrimination and given potential to improve representation, minority groups view in-migration as an effective way to improve things

Jervis (1989) -- The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING

Puzzle: - Bizarre that so many statesmen and policymakers talk about nuclear weapons in terms of their psychological impacts or effects, instead of talking about nuclear weapons like the weapons they are by referencing military defeat or military victory Argument: - Have to use political psychology, not just existing frameworks like realism, in order to fully understand the role of nuclear weapons - Arms, like nuclear weapons, can be symbols, and can be more important as symbols than as actually military assets - Likewise, there are states that can exercise symbolic influence over world life if they're strong enough; they can be "reality makers" and shape other states' definitions of reality - One consequence of mutual second-strike capability is the unprecedented weakening of the links between the physical capabilities and much of the behaviors of states; this attenuation allows an unusual opening for the play of psychology, symbols, and beliefs - There has been a shift from brute force to coercion, and coercion depends on the ability to inflict and bear pain as well as on psychological assessments of likelihoods; thus, many questions about nuclear politics cannot be answered apart from the actors' ideas and beliefs about nuclear weapons (i.e. if actors believe limited war is impossible, it will therefore be impossible) - When problems are perceptual, they can be dealt with by changing one's definition of the situation, as opposed to the physical reality Five implications: 1. Many strategic policies create their own difficulties, but 2. there are opportunities for avoiding such pitfalls 3. A good deal of strategic planning operates autonomously on the basis of self-defined problems 4. Many of the possibilities for and arguments against arms control must be seen in psychological, not military terms 5. Beliefs about whether war is inevitable are especially important in determining whether peace will be maintained

Rodrik (1997) -- Has Globalization Gone too Far? GLOBALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Puzzle: - Globalization has pitted losers (low-skill workers, countries with norms deemed incompatible with the market, and former domestic beneficiaries of the welfare state) against the winners (the educated and the footloose holders of capital). - Governments seem to be stuck in between the market and the losers. - Can they do anything to alleviate the stresses of globalization? Answer: - The solutions are not easy. - One of them is a knee-jerk backlash against trade. - A more reasoned approach is to entrust governments with devising policies that maintain a balance between globalization and domestic cohesion, by redirecting social insurance, carrying out much needed domestic reforms, and discouraging militancy against widespread domestic practices as incompatible with free trade when practiced by foreign countries. Paradox: Free trade means that governments have to provide increased amounts of social insurance to groups of "losers" in order to maintain social consensus on the need for globalization. Yet, as globalization proceeds, the ability of governments to provide social insurance declines, which can easily result in a move towards protectionism. In order to generate revenue that could then be spent on social insurance, governments need to raise taxes. However, higher taxes will chase away highly mobile capital. Thus, governments have tended to tax capital less and labor more. While some countries with high exposure to external risk (a high degree of openness of trade and high volatility in the terms of trade) government spending is high, in OECD countries exposure to external risk is lower due to the low volatility of the prices of their traded goods. This effectively has led to the end of the postwar "compromise of embedded liberalism" (Ruggie) in advanced industrial societies, according to which labor would get periodic increases in wages and benefits in exchange for domestic peace and compliance with government policies.

Gunitsky (2014) -- From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND TRANSITIONS

Puzzle: Democratic evolution has been marked by "waves" - rapid democratization all at once Argument: - Volatility in the international system, manifested through abrupt hegemonic transitions, has been a major catalyst for domestic institutional reforms - Specifically, periods of sudden rise and decline of great powers, or "hegemonic shocks," create powerful incentives and opportunities for sweeping waves of domestic transformations. The fortunes of democracy, communism, and fascism in the twentieth century have been shaped by the outcomes of these geopolitical cataclysms. - Identify and tests three sets of causal mechanisms—coercion, influence, and emulation—that link hegemonic shocks to domestic transformations. - Namely, the outcomes of shocks (1) produce windows of opportunity for regime imposition by temporarily lowering the costs of external occupations; (2) enable rising great powers to quickly expand networks of trade and patronage, and in doing so to exogenously shift the institutional preferences and capabilities of many domestic actors and coalitions; and (3) inspire imitation by credibly revealing hidden information about relative regime effectiveness to foreign audiences Problem: - Theory of change in the international system, but does it explain why exactly states would take any of these actions during these times of transition instead of others?

Voeten (2005) -- The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force IOs SECURITY

Puzzle: Since the Persian Gulf War (1990) states have behaved "as if" it is costly to be unsuccessful in acquiring the legitimacy the UNSC confers on uses of force, but this is puzzling for theories that seek the origins of modern institutional legitimacy Summary: takeaway is that the SC may raise the costs of unilateral action but not prevent it, and the costs from disobeying (as in Iraq) are not large Setup: - We should expect less delegation to the SC than the IMF or World Bank because its activities are not routine and do not require great expert knowledge - Legitimacy: beliefs of actors that the convention or social norm that the SC authorizes and forbids discretionary uses of force by states should be upheld Argument: - When governments and citizens look for an authority to legitimize the use of force, they generally do not seek an independent judgment on the appropriateness of an intervention but political reassurance about the consequences of proposed military adventures - Council decisions legitimize or delegitimize uses of force in the sense that they form widely accepted political judgments on whether uses of force transgress a limit that should be defended - Domestic publics can be assured that the use of force is not an overextension; foreign publics are assured that the use of force is not an abuse of power; these judgments become focal points in the collaboration and coordination dilemmas states face in enforcing limits to US power while preserving mutually beneficial cooperation - The SC solves a coordination dilemma: the absence of UN approval triggers a coordinated response that imposes cost on violators - Has the characteristics of an elite pact: a self-enforcing agreement among a select set of actors that seeks to neutralize threats to stability by institutionalizing non-majoritarian mechanism for conflict resolution - In a unipolar world, credible limits to the use of force can benefit both the superpower and the rest of the world - The SC helps states that fear exploitation to solve the coordination dilemma and prevent the superpower from engaging in transgressions - The institutional design of the SC made it the most viable forum for cooperation: (1) elite pacts commonly grant influential actors the power to veto decisions; (2) compromises in elite cartels are generally secretive rather than transparent; (3) elite cartels embrace principles of subsidiarity i.e. delegation to other forums like NATO or regional powers like the US Method: - The successful cooperation between states in the first Persian Gulf War turned the SC into the natural first stop for coalition building; the number of Chapter VII resolutions went from two during the period 1977-1990 to 145 during the period 1990-1998; PGW was successful in the sense that it was the first conflict after the end of the CW and it was resolved cooperatively without US overextension - Two main cases where the UNSC has been ignored: the Kosovo intervention and the 2003 Iraq intervention - the lack of support was lamented by the US, NATO, and in domestic political debates - Kosovo did not elicit a collective response because (1) the US went through NATO and (2) previous UN resolutions hinted at the legitimate use of force - Iraq was more problematic and should reduce states' faith in the ability of the UNSC to either prevent US overextension or facilitate a collective sanction

Battig and Bernauer (2009) -- National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy? ENVIRONMENT

Question: Do democracies contribute more to the provision of global public goods? Main Argument: - Democracies are more cooperative with respect to climate change mitigation efforts - The democracy effect hinges on whether the median voter and/or influential interest groups prefer more public goods provision, and the demand and supply for climate mitigation measures are likely to be stronger in democracies (see selectorate theory) - The democracy effect on environmental policy outcomes (deeds) is likely to be weaker than on policy output (words) Theory: - Caveat 1: empirical evidence in favor of demand-side explanations is weak; interest group pluralism may cut against environmental protection; the median voter in a democracy is not necessarily more pro-environment - Caveat 2: national versus global public goods; policy output versus policy outcome; democracy may be better at national public goods, but not global; policy outputs are under the control of policymakers, but policy outcomes are affected by factors that are out of their control Hypotheses: - H1: More democratic countries exhibit stronger political commitment to climate change mitigation - H2: More democratic countries contribute more to climate change mitigation in terms of emission reduction. However, this positive democracy effect is weaker than the democracy effect on policy output Findings: - The effect of democracy on levels of political commitment to climate change mitigation (policy output) is positive, but the effect on policy outcomes, as measured by emission levels and trends, is ambiguous -Ambiguous democracy effect on total emissions is driven by negative democracy effect on emissions from transportation - This suggests that the democracy effect has not overcome the free-rider problem, discounting of future benefits, and other countervailing factors - The implication is that scholars should study policy output (commitments) and policy outcomes (emission reductions) side-by-side (the "word-deed gap")

Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast (1997) -- The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICY

Puzzle: Though the conventional view holds that those who lose from increased trade have a greater incentive to organize than those who benefit from the policy, democracies have and continue to support free-trade policies Main Argument: - Political institutions, by structuring conflict over trade policy, provide an explanation for the divergence between analyses that predict economic closure and the empirical reality of relatively free trade - RTAA mandated reciprocal, not unilateral, tariff reductions; under RTAA, in exchange for increased access to foreign markets, the president was authorized to reduce US duties by up to 50 percent - Democratic leadership wanted lower tariffs that would pass an increasingly skeptical Congress and would be able to outlive Democratic control of Congress; the institutions they designed met this goal because of reciprocal "bundled" agreements which necessitated the delegation of treaty-making to the executive - Innovation of coupling reciprocal tariffs had two advantages: (1) served to broaden the range of tariff cuts acceptable to a majority in Congress; (2) provided durability for the reform efforts by increasing the cost of overturning - The President must be free-trading because he serves a broader public Results: - Presidential authority likely allowed tariffs to decrease at a faster rate - US trade with treaty nations increased more rapidly than with non-treaty nations - Increased exports helped allow ideal points to shift in a more liberal direction - increased export growth made export industries more economically important in individual districts, leading to preference shifts (endogenous process) - The relative weight Congress placed on the two dimensions likely changed: the importance placed on foreign access increased relative to the importance of protecting domestic industry - Parties have since converged on trade policy, with cleavages forming more at the individual district level based on RV factors

Alt and Gilligan (1994) -- The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICY

Puzzle: Trade affects the distribution of wealth within the domestic economy, raising questions of who gets relatively more or less, and what they can do about it politically Argument: - The balance between the opposed coalitions favoring freer trade and those favoring protectionism creates the "demand" by society for liberalization or protection - Scholars who ignore institutions and collective action costs will confuse interests with outcomes, while those who neglect economic variables will not understand the underlying stakes of the actors involved - Institutions affect collective action in a way that differs from, and interacts with, factor mobility. Thus, neither the Ricardo-Viner nor the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is sufficient to predict coalition behavior without further assumptions; but then neither is knowledge of the institutions nor of collective action problems sufficient for explaining the effects of the international economy Theory: - If collective action costs are low and factors are mobile, institutions that frustrate majoritarian politics should not survive HO/SS: - HO: states that a country will export the good which intensively uses whichever factor of production is relatively abundant in that country - SS: an increase in the price of a labor-intensive good increases the the real income of labor more than proportionally - Combined with SS: In a relatively capital-abundant country labor will favor protection because it cannot be intensively used in exports, while capital will favor relatively free trade (Rogowski) - Protection increases the returns to the owners of the factors that are used more intensively in the protected (import-competing) industry and less intensively in the unprotected (export) industry; and it reduces the returns to those factors that are used less intensively in the protected industry and more intensively in the unprotected industry - Because factors are assumed mobile between sectors, owners of the same factor have the same change to its returns regardless of whether it is actually employed in the protected industry RV: - Factors of production are "specific" to a particular industry and when that industry declines they cannot move to the rising industry (contra-SS); knitting machines can't be used to make microchips - Economic development increases differentiation and specialization which increases the frequency of specific factors Trade Policy Coalitions: - The factor that is politically advantaged is that which is specific to the good which uses labor intensively if labor does not disproportionately consume that as well - The distribution of benefits, therefore is the demand side of collective action, where collective action problems form the supply side of coalition-formation Three parts of collective action problems: - Those which relate systematically to factor mobilization or specificity: CA is easier the more any non-participant can be excluded from the benefits (i.e. factor mobility makes CA harder) - Those which relate directly to the nature of domestic political institutions (referendum would benefit the abundant factor while systems insulated from majoritarian pressures benefit the scarce factor) - All the rest: residual category including ease of communication, geographical concentration and pre-existing collective organizations; reduce costs of CA Results: - The effects of institutions and CA costs are interactive - In political systems where factor owners have possibilities of (maj or not) as well as exit, there is no reason to expect them to choose the latter in line with SS; as such, factors may not be any more mobile in the long run than the short run, so we should see RV political behavior in the long run (this would be contra-RTB) - The indifference point between exit and voice in quasi-fixed factor industries will vary with the variation in political institutions Problems: - Nothing was mobile (land, capital, labor) until the 1970s - Alt and Gilligan cover economic self-interest, which is not the only factor on the demand side (values also matter in demand for collective action)

Rogowski (1987) -- Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Puzzle: Why countries have the political cleavages they do and why those cleavages change Main Argument: - Combining Stolper-Samuelson and a model of politics leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risk or costs of countries' external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between the owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors - Stolper-Samuelson leads to either urban-rural conflict or class conflict depending on two factors: land/labor ratio and advanced/backward econ - Assumes (1) no country can be rich in both land and labor; (2) an advanced economy is one in which capital is abundant - International shocks can restrict (expand) trade which creates winners and losers (i.e. the winners and losers reverse or intensify) - There is a link between economic and political power Predictions: - You get class conflict under high LL ratio and advanced econ (New Deal); low LL and backward econ (Eastern Europe fascism) - You get urban/rural conflict under high LL and backward econ (South America); low LL and advanced econ (Western Europe fascism) - If land and capital diverge, you get urban/rural cleavages; otherwise class cleavages Relation to other stuff: - Re: Gerschenkron argument that late-coming industrializing states would require strong states to accumulate vast sums of capital to compete, Rogowski contends that what matters is whether the late-comer's industrialization precedes or follows an increase in trade flows. If trade flows are increase after capital accumulation, then capital stands to benefit and industrialization may proceed - Considering a litany arguments about the lack of socialism in America, Rogowski argues that the cause is in fact an enduring scarcity of labor that has limited its political clout - Rogowski also claims that the new rise of protection in the US has to do again with labor scarcity and its failed resistance against foreign imports of goods such as cars Problems: - No mention of collective action problems; why does land always ask for protection? - See Alt and Gilligan

Rosendorff (2005) -- Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Question: - Absent any enforcement power, what function does international dispute settlement serve? Argument: - The revised DSP increases the stability of cooperation, not because it has become more rigid, but because it has become more flexible - It now permits "compensation" for violations and emphasizes that the compensation is limited to an amount proportional to the loss experienced - There is a tradeoff between rigidity and stability; the DSP with the proportionality principle reduces rigidity and increases stability - The DSP serves a crucial information-providing role: establishes the facts, adjudicates on a violation, estimates the damages, and reports a successful completion of the process. This informational role determines its effectiveness in the world trading system - In relation to Milner and Rosendorff (2001): violations incurred for domestic political reasons may be tolerated by other signatories if the violation is temporary, and some sort of compensation scheme is available for the affected country(ies) - Self-enforcement makes the DSP effective without explicit enforcement powers; proportionality prevents exit DSP process: - Contracting party files a complaint with the WTO over a perceived violations - Formal, bilateral consultations - If unsuccessful, complainant may request that a panel of independent experts investigate and make a recommendation - If the panel finds that the action is GATT-inconsistent, the offending party is obliged to terminate the measure - This is "legally binding," and can be appealed to the Standing Appellate Body (selection of 3 of 7 permanent members on four-year terms) - If the panel's recommendations aren't implemented, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) permits "compensation" or retaliation. Defendants are usually found in violation, and they usually comply with the DSP findings

Margalit (2011) -- Costly Jobs: Trade-related layoffs, government compensation and voting in the U.S. GLOBALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Question: - Does globalization's impact on the labor market affect how people vote? - Are voters sensitive to job losses per se, or is there a unique electoral response when job losses are caused specifically by foreign competition? Main Argument: - For trade openness to affect voting, need two conditions: (1) voters need to be able to make a connection between trade openness and its impact on their well-being; (2) the impact needs to be sufficiently meaningful to influence voting preferences - The literature has only consistently provided evidence for the first condition - Offshoring is uniquely encompassing, media-covered, and consequential, responsibility is clear, and it can stir nationalism and ethnocentrism - The conclusion is that adverse labor market effects of economic openness, particularly those resulting from offshoring, may generate a strong electoral response Problem with Literature: - The existing evidence is either indirect or based on survey data with limitations - surveys rely on self-assessments of job insecurity (vulnerable to ex-post rationalization) and are largely cross-sectional (no temporal or spatial variation means no causal effect) Method: - New dataset based on plant-level data from US DOL that measures the impact of foreign competition on the US workforce over an 8-year period - Includes every application made 1996-2004 to DOL's Trade Adjustment Assistance division to request compensation to workers for whose employment was harmed by trade-related competition - focus on shift between 2000 and 2004 elections - Uses TAA's actual certification decisions to link compensation schemes to vote choice - Generates measures for each US county of proportion of workforce whose employment was hurt by trade-related competition - DV: first difference in president's vote share across two elections - Disaggregates cause of TAA dislocations: offshoring, import competition, and indirect foreign competition Findings: - The areas suffering highest layoffs were Northeast, Rust Belt, South, and Midwest - Industries that are most affected are electronics and clothing/garments - Analyzing change in president's vote share, finds that voters were substantially more sensitive to the loss of local jobs when it resulted from foreign competition, particularly from offshoring, than to job losses caused by other factors - Notably, the anti-incumbent effect of trade-related job losses was smaller in areas where the government certified more of the harmed workers to receive special job training / assistance (squares with Adsera and Boix) - Voters may also punish the incumbent when denied compensation for job losses; there is a stronger effect for counties based on denials vs. acceptances - No partisan bias; holds for Bush and Clinton In sum, evidence for mechanism that voter sensitivity to job losses caused by offshoring is greater because these are more clearly associated with overseas competition and a recognized villain in the form of an explicitly named country Problem: - Might be a selection effect on TAA; areas with biggest China-driven job losses have no increases in TAA claims per Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) - They argue TAA is underfunded and underpublicized

Carnegie (2014) -- States Held Hostage: Political Hold-up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Question: - Does the WTO increase trade? For whom? Argument: - The benefits of international institutions accrue disproportionately to pairs of states that find cooperation most difficult (politically asymmetric states differing in terms of capabilities, regime types, and alliances) by reducing hold-up problems - Central reason states fail to cooperate in IR: they fear being "held up" by other states for political concessions - Hold-up problems occur when one state fails to undertake an otherwise productive investment due to the increased ability it would give another state to extract political concessions - Focusing on the WTO, political hold-up problems are pervasive in IR due to links between economic and political policies; institutions can solve hold-up problems by helping to enforce agreements Mechanism: - The political hold-up problem is a specific time inconsistency problem; these problems are most severe for politically asymmetric states - The WTO mitigates these problems, allowing states to trade for economic rather than political reasons - States anticipate their partners' opportunistic behavior and underinvest in the production of goods for trade with these partners - The WTO provides transparency and a loss of reputation for violators through its DSB; the loss of reputation before a large audience of members is a deterrent; the WTO decouples trade and politics - Formal model which shows that the WTO most benefits politically dissimilar country pairs by improving contract enforcement Hypotheses: - Membership in the WTO increases trade more for pairs of countries with dissimilar capabilities, relative to pairs with similar capabilities - Membership in the WTO increases trade more for non-allied pairs of countries, relative to allied pairs - Membership in the WTO increases trade more for pairs of countries with dissimilar regime types, relative to pairs with similar regime types Findings: - WTO membership increases trade in goods that require contracts - WTO membership increases fixed capital investment - Example of Hawaiian investments in sugar

Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) -- History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments and Paths of Development in the New World DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH

Question: - How and why did the areas favored by the forecasters of the colonial era, and the destinations of the vast majority of migrants to the Americas through 1800, fall behind economically? - Puzzle: there is a wide divergence in income despite similar European heritages / institutions Main Argument: - Initial factor endowments are important; while all the New World countries began with an abundance of land and natural resources relative to labor, and thus high living standards on average, other aspects of their factor endowments varied in ways that meant that the vast majority were characterized virtually from the onset by great inequality in wealth, human capital, and political power - Spanish colonies and sugar colonies had factor endowments abundant in labor and minerals/rich soil, combined with low human capital, which led to inequality - US and Canada had relatively less native labor than Spanish colonies and no comparative advantage in production of plantation-based slave-labor goods; most laborers were European migrants with relatively high human capital and similar skills; with abundant land and low capital requirements, most males were landowners; relatively homogeneous population and relatively less inequality - The differences across societies in the distribution of political power may have contributed to persistence in the relative degrees of inequality through the effects on institutional development (See AJR) Method: - Three factors relevant to inequality: (1) Soils, (2) climates, and (3) size or density of the native population - We might consider these to be relatively exogenous at the start of colonization, but the assumption becomes more tenuous with time - Initial inequality was sticky because governments tended to reproduce the initial conditions - Looking at when the franchise was extended in the New World, the US and Canada extended it far earlier than countries in Latin America - Inequality in land policies maps onto inequality in other areas Findings: - The most apparent explanation is that the extent of inequality or population homogeneity was highly relevant to understanding how quickly societies extended the franchise and pursued other democratizing reforms in the conduct of elections Discussion: - This piece suggests that factor endowments are causally prior to the formation of sticky institutions; different argument than North and Weingast (1989) - Does the southern US fit? The southern US was not really a democracy until after the civil war, and the area is still economically depressed and has voter suppression

Tingley and Tomz (2014) -- Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change ENVIRONMENT

Question: - How can countries cooperate in the absence of a central authority? - Axelrod (1984) and Keohane (1984) emphasize importance of reciprocity, so do citizens actually support strategies of reciprocity? Method: - Investigate whether citizens in the US and 25 other countries support reciprocity to deal with climate change - mTurk Key Findings: - Find little public enthusiasm for intrinsic reciprocity, in which countries restrain consumption of fossil fuels if and only if other countries do the same - Find significant support for extrinsic reciprocity, in which countries enforce cooperation by linking issues - Citizens support economic sanctions against polluters and are willing to shame them in international forums, especially when the polluters are violating a treaty - Cooperation should then emerge from efforts to link climate policy with other issues and to embed states' commitments in international law (Davis 2004) Two forms of reciprocity: - Intrinsic: adjust one's effort to reflect efforts of others, as in tit-for-tat (Lipson 1981) - Extrinsic: linking cooperation in one domain to cooperation on others (Lohmann 1997), as in carrots like aid or trade or threatening punishment to coerce Intrinsic cooperation has some issues: - It requires long time horizons and fear of a domino effect to hold - Leaders may worry about collateral damage of defecting (hurt allies and self) Three potential responses to climate policies of foreign countries: - Emulation: control if others do so and defect if others do so - Counterbalance: redouble efforts in order to offset defectors or conclude that action of other countries permits free-riding - No reaction which is an unconditional and non-contingent strategy Extrinsic Reciprocity - Extrinsic cooperation minimizes collateral damage by forcing compliance - Linkage strategies only succeed insofar as the linkages are credible (need public opinion) - They theorize that the public will prefer cheap measures such as diplomatic pressures - They also theorize that IOs shape support for conditional strategies because people should be more responsive to breaches of treaties Findings: - In every country, majority of citizens support unconditional climate action - Unconditional inaction was more supported in Russia and US (13%) which is probably a partisan and/or media bias problem - Test for emulation and counteraction: 8% and 3% supported these strategies - Support for unconditional action was not mediated by expected costliness; citizens tend to prefer broad agreements with no correlation to cost (contra- Bechtel and Scheve 2013) Detailed US evidence: - Unconditional preferences dominate in the US - Americans responded positively to foreign conservation; Americans did not respond negatively to foreign pollution; so, Americans engage in reciprocal conservation but not reciprocal shirking - 22% propose diplomatic talks, 8% recommend economic/technical aid, and 37% advocate trade sanctions - In sum, most Americans do not support intrinsic strategies, but they are willing to use extrinsic ones Discussion: - Does this argument make sense anymore? To the extent that trade and aid are performed primarily by IOs, and these IOs regulate coercion, the carrots and sticks approach may not be possible in practice (Carnegie 2015)

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) -- International Norm Dynamics and Political Change LAW, NORMS, AND RIGHTS

Question: - How do we know a norm when we see one? How do we know norms make a difference in politics? Where do norms come from? How do they change? Definition: a norm is a standard of appropriate behavior for an actor with a given identity. Norm-breaking behavior is recognized because it generates disapproval or stigma and norm conforming behavior either because it produces praise, or in the case of a highly internalized norm, is so taken for granted that it produces no reaction whatsoever Shifts in norms explain how our ideals change - norm shifts are to ideational theorists what balance of power shifts are to realists Norms can be influential in different conditions: when they legitimate domestic constituencies or the desires of states, when they are held by prominent states in the system and therefore seen as desirable and become "prominent," when the norm itself has compelling internal characteristics, when they fit well into frameworks of existing norms, when they pop up at the right point in "world time," etc. Three Arguments: 1. The ideational turn of recent years is actually a return to some traditional concerns of the discipline; the difference is the application of good empirical research 2. Norms evolve in a patterned "life cycle" and different behavioral logics dominate different segments of the life cycle; explores norm origins, mechanism by which they exert influence, and the conditions under which norms will be influential in world politics 3. The current tendency to oppose norms against rationality or rational choice is not helpful in explaining many of the most politically salient processes we see in empirical research, processes they call "strategic social construction" in which actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities, or social context The Norm "Life Cycle" 1. Norm Emergence: general mechanism is persuasion by norm entrepreneurs; ends with a tipping point that leads to Stage 2 2. Norm Cascade: facilitated by a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance self-esteem 3. Internalization: norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate; example is slavery being bad

Rudolph (2003) -- Security and the Political Economy of International Migration IMMIGRATION

Question: - In the pre-9/11 world, why would neoliberal strategies be applied to trade and capital but not labor? - In a post-9/11 world where a handful of individuals can create profound devastation, why would states risk migration? Argument: - Rudolph argues that threat perception (following Walt 1987) drives state behavior vis-à-vis migration policy - Pre-9/11, acute external threats would be expected to result in grand strategies favoring military and material dimensions. Economic production is necessary for military production, meaning that external threats should correspond to migration openness. Wartime nationalism produces a rally-round-the-flag effect that increases social cohesion by mitigating internal differences. - 9/11 hypothesis: newly established links between migration and military threat will swing grand strategy sharply towards closure

Leeds (1999) -- Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation IOs DOMESTIC POLITICS

Question: - The influence of domestic political institutions on the ability of leaders to establish bilateral cooperation in the international system Hypothesis: - Leaders operating in different domestic institutional environments have differing abilities to commit credibly to future courses of action, to accept the costs of policy failures, and to adjust to changes in the international environment - Jointly democratic and jointly autocratic dyads will cooperate more readily than dyads composed of one democracy and one autocracy - International policy coordination is better understood as an outcome of strategic interaction among state leaders responding to both domestic and international constraints and imperatives; integrated levels of analysis - Two dimensions affecting the abilities of states to credibly commit/cooperate: accountability (audience costs and domestic coalitions) and flexibility (democracies have less) Model: - States that feature higher degrees of accountability to domestic groups (democracies) face high costs for breaking promises - States characterized by more flexible policy-making apparatuses (autocracies) suffer reasonably low costs from a partner's unilateral defection because they can more quickly and easily adjust to changes - Domestic politics asserts a greater proportional influence on the costs to breaking commitments than on the costs suffered from unilateral defection Results: - Agreements are fulfilled whenever the costs of breaking a commitment are greater than both the benefits to unilateral defection and the costs suffered from a partner's unilateral defection for both players - Agreements formed by two democracies are most likely to be fulfilled - Autocratic states are more likely to take chances in forming agreements that may not be fulfilled Testable Hypotheses: 1. Jointly democratic dyads will engage in comparatively high levels of cooperation 2. Jointly autocratic dyads will engage in higher levels of cooperation than dyads composed of one democracy and one autocracy 3. Dyads composed of one democracy and one autocracy will find the impediments to cooperation strongest; they will engage in lower levels of cooperation than states with similar internal structures Problems: - Accountability per Debs and Goemans - Democratic leaders are flexible per Rosato - Audience costs may be fake news

Downes and Sechser (2012) -- The Illusion of Democratic Credibility AUDIENCE COSTS AND CREDIBILITY DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Question: Do democracies make more effective coercive threats? Goal: To revisit the quantitative evidence for the "democratic credibility hypothesis" Reflection on Literature: - The data contain few successful democratic threats, or indeed threats of any kind - Moreover, these data sets' outcome variables do not properly measure the effectiveness of threats, and therefore yield misleading results Data Problems: - The MID and ICB data sets contain a lot of incidents that shouldn't be classified as potential threats/military encounters (i.e. the actions of rogue soldiers, maritime incidents, etc.) - The OUTCOME variable in the MID database doesn't distinguish between success obtained through physical coercion and success obtained through coercive diplomacy - When the authors closely examine the cases in Schultz's (2001) analysis that provide the greatest statistical support for the democratic credibility hypothesis, they do not appear to substantiate the inference that "threats from democratic governments are less likely to be resisted than threats made by nondemocratic governments" Key Findings: - Reassesses the democratic credibility hypothesis using the Militarized Compellent Threats data set, a new data set designed specifically to test hypotheses about the effectiveness of coercive threats - The analysis indicates that threats from democracies are no more successful than threats from other states

Goldstein and Gulotty (2014) -- American and Trade Liberalization: The Limits of Institutional Reform DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Question: - Was the delegation of power to the US president in 1934 a necessary requisite for tariff reductions in ensuing years? Prior Work: - The conventional wisdom holds that delegation to the president sheltered Congress from constituent pressure thereby facilitating the opening of the US economy; this was caused either by the mobilization of the exporter lobby or by undermining social actors' ability to get access to the decision makers Main Argument: - After 1934, delegation led to a change in trade policy not because Congress gave up constitutional prerogative in this domain but because presidents were able to target the potential economic dislocation that derives from import competition to avoid the creation of a congressional majority willing to halt the trade agreements program - The 1934 trade act granted the President latitude to choose both among the set of principally supplied products and between possible treaty partners taking into account what products would be subject to competition and in whose districts the products were produced most intensively - Highly sensitive products were strategically excluded from negotiation; countries importing such products were not sought as trade partners - This created certainty for members of Congress whose products were not principally supplied by the negotiating partner and uncertainty for the others, undermining the former congressional Protectionist logrolling RD: - Study of US tariff schedule between 1928 and 1964 focusing on highly protected products (as those products most previously able to gain protection and those most subject to liberalization) - They examine which products were subject to liberalization and at what time Findings: - Those industries that were most protected before (and most likely had big political clout) and in the Smoot-Hawley tariff retained their high tariffs afterward - Most concessions came from industries with already low tariffs, suggesting that the 1934 trade act did not fundamentally affect the Congress-lobby relationship - The trade act did change the politics of tariff setting because of a new ability of presidents to structure congressional choice (agenda control) - Congress remained as active in trade policy as before with frequent renewals - Presidents preferred concessions that limited domestic interest group mobilization because they wanted to gain renewal of delegation authority, so they used agenda control to strategically select which products were subject to treaties and when - Policy change was incremental, hard cases of liberalization (like SH) were deferred until pro-liberalization culture was more widespread, and president did not ignore pro-protection interests in Congress

Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit (2014) -- Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide Over the Eurozone Bailouts FINANCE, MONEY, AND DEBT

Question: - Why do voters agree to bear the costs of bailing out other countries? Theory: - Three strands of arguments in the literature: economic self-interest; social dispositions like altruism and cosmopolitanism; and the influence of partisanship - Self-interest: high-income individuals might oppose transfers if they are funded by taxation; those dependent on social transfers might feel vulnerable; younger people might oppose it if financed by borrowing; those with stocks should support bailouts; those whose jobs depend on the EU or trade should support bailouts - Social dispositions: bailouts as a public good shaped by altruism and cosmopolitanism - Partisanship: divide could be left-right or moderate-extreme RD: - Observational and experimental survey data from Germany, the country shouldering the largest share of the EU's financial rescue fund - Two 2012 surveys - one online (5000 German voters) and one phone via random-digit dialing (1000 voters) Findings: - They find that individuals' own economic standing has limited explanatory power in accounting for their position on the bailouts; any financial concern is driven by a sociotropic concern for Germany as a whole - In contrast, social dispositions such as altruism and cosmopolitanism robustly correlate with support for bailouts - There is also a partisan component - supporters of centrist parties are supportive where supporters of extremist parties are not - So public opinion does not reflect distributive lines separating domestic winners and losers - it should be understood as a foreign policy issue that pits economic nationalist sentiments versus greater cosmopolitan affinity

Rodrik (1995) -- Political Economy of Trade Policy TRADE

Question: - Why is international trade not free? - Why are trade policies universally biased against trade? Goal: Systematic review of work on trade; conclusion is that the trade literature has moved away from a focus on these important questions Argument: - The RV and HO models cannot account for intra-industry trade, which accounts for a large share of global trade - This intra-industry trade will make everyone better off: increases the number of varieties available for consumption without reducing income. As long as intra-industry trade dominates factor-endowments-based trade, no individual will prefer autarky to free trade - There are a number of approaches to modeling trade: lobbying; political support; median voter; campaign contributions; political contributions - The common conclusion of the above models is that trade is not free because politically influential groups can be made better off by protectionist interventions. But this is problematic or at least incomplete, because trade policy is a highly inefficient tool for redistributing income - Only models of trade policy when policymakers lack access to other income-transfer instruments - Two possible answers: (1) tariffs are preferred because they are less costly to relevant political actors; tariffs may emerge in models w/ incomplete information b/c informational reasons - The Grossman-Helpman model suggests that the net effect of lobbying should be to encourage trade promotion, not protectionism - Most promising is a two-part explanation: (1) since trade is a convenient tax handle, most governments inherit trade taxes originally put in place for revenue motives; (2) persistence and status-quo bias makes this protection hard to take away

Goldstein (2011) -- Winning the War on War STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Question: - Can the world reduce the amount of war violence taking place? Well, it has! - Between 1980 and 2011 the number of people killed directly by war violence has decreased by 75 percent Argument: - The "war on war" is being won by international peacekeepers, diplomats, peace movements, humanitarian and aid agencies, and other IOs in war-torn and post-war countries despite a remarkable lack of funds and resources - The reduction of war is led by the participation of states in an international community consisting of organizations that allow governments to reach mutually beneficial outcomes that are not possible separately - international actors hold the central place in the process of building peace worldwide (Keohane 1984) - The UN lies at the heart of the "war on war" despite its shortcomings - WB President Robert McNamara once said the UN was broken and war was getting worse - this is a common belief among government officials, and it promotes dysfunctional policies like high military spending and aggressive military actions - This drives war machines and fear of war, which leads to pessimism and aggressiveness - The decline in war is not inevitable, irreversible, or part of an immutable trend - the gains humanity has made are fragile, reversible, and require maintenance Alternative Explanations: - Nuclear weapons: nuclear weapons did not prevent Vietnam or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - Evolution of humanity: humanity shows no propensity for peace - Democratic peace: nondemocracies like China follow the trend - End of the Cold War: the end of the Cold War does not explain the decline in violence throughout the 1970s and 1980s - The UN system and peacekeeping in particular kicked in mainly after 1945 and accelerated after 1989 exactly mapping onto the trend in war violence reduction Problems: - Fazal says medicine -> fewer battlefield deaths

Van Evera (1985) -- Why Cooperation Failed in 1914 STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Question: - He applies the PD to WWI - More specifically, was WW1's outbreak caused at least partly by perverse payoff structures, small shadows of the future, weak national "recognition" abilities, and relatively large numbers of players? He argues that an iterated PD would not have produced cooperation (even under tit-for-tat) WW1 broke out due to six misperceptions prevalent in Europe prior to the war (popular especially in Germany): - (1) Europeans were mesmerized by the "cult of the offensive." - (2) Europeans commonly overestimated the hostilities of neighbors, which justified aggressive policies that ultimately provoked actual hostility. - (3) European leaders falsely imagined a bandwagoning world in which strength and bellicosity would cow opponents and fracture opposing alliances. The situation was actually one of countervailing coalitions (balancing) and conflict spirals. - (4) Europeans exaggerated the economic and social rewards of territorial expansion. - (5) Many Europeans incorrectly saw war as beneficial and productive of domestic tranquility (actually produced great suffering, fall of governments, revolution). - (6) Each major power taught its people a mythical nationalist history that emphasized the righteousness of its own conduct and falsely case itself as the innocent victim in past conflicts (Jack?). These were fostered through perverse payoffs, small shadows of the future, and a large number of players (chain-ganging) Consistent with Jervis, Waltz, Mearsheimer, Snyder (little bit of ad hoc 3) Waltz would say the hope for bandwagoning was irrational, but states learned pre-WWII and overcorrected with an assumed D advantage

Dai (2005) -- Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism LAW, NORMS, AND RIGHTS

Question: - Why do countries comply with international agreements? - Despite collective action problems, many IOs do not directly monitor states compliance with treaties, but states still comply Main Argument: - International agreements have domestic distributional consequences and therefore there exist domestic sources of enforcement - A government's compliance decision reflects the electoral leverage and the information status of domestic constituencies - When those victimized by noncompliance have leverage over the government, compliance can be rational even if the country pays for it more than benefits from it - Those most informed about the policy process can screen out the noise affecting their welfare and accurately sanction the government Theory: - Governments are to varying extents in agency relationships with constituents - A government is accountable to a variety of constituencies with competing claims Method: - Formal model that specifies how competing constituencies influence a government's compliance decision - Empirical illustration from the European acid rain regime (Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution or LRTAP Convention) - DV: national compliance with the 1985 Sulphur Protocol (i.e. percentage reduction of emissions with target of at least 30 percent and 1980 as the base year) - IVs: national measure of the electoral leverage and informational status of competing domestic constituencies made up of four factors

Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000) -- Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Question: Are groups of democracies better able to liberalize trade than groups of autocracies or groups comprised of both democracies and autocracies? Main Argument: - Because democratic leaders need legislative approval for trade policies, unlike autocrats, pairs of democracies are likelier to agree upon reciprocal liberalization than mixed pairs of democracies and autocracies - MMR make no prediction about trade barriers of autocratic pairs without knowledge of the two autocrats' policy preferences Method: - Formal model, plus an empirical analysis covering 1960-1990 - MMR argue that legislative "ratification" of commercial policy occurs in both parliamentary and presidential systems—in the former, it is often ex ante; in the latter, it is often ex post. In autocracies, legislative approval isn't needed Model: - The threat of a legislative veto in both countries moves the executives to a freer trade equilibrium than in the case of a mixed pair - Paradoxically, protectionist legislatures force democracies to lower barriers more than otherwise (protectionist legislature increases odds of a trade war?) - The trade-war Nash is worse in democratic than mixed pairs Findings: - Democracies and autocracies engaged in 15-20% less commerce than a democratic dyad - No significant difference between the openness of commerce within autocratic pairs and within democratic pairs (variable denoting autocratic pair vs. democratic pair is insignificant) Problems: - The anti-FT legislature conclusion makes no sense

Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash (2009) -- Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986-2002 GLOBALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Question: Can international trade help improve the status of workers in developing nations? Are the labor rights of a given country influenced by the labor rights of its trading partners? Main Argument: - Amends Mosley and Uno (2008) who say that trade openness is negatively correlated with labor rights; FDI is positively correlated (raises wages) - A "California effect" (a la Vogel 1995) serves to transmit superior labor standards from importing to exporting countries, in a manner similar to the transmission of environmental standards - The labor standards of a given country are influenced not by its overall level of trade openness, but by the labor standards of its trading partners; the mechanism is through global production networks (or supply chains) - Importing firms use corporate policies and/or membership in voluntary labor codes to ensure that their overseas subsidiaries and subcontractors respect labor rights; multinationals' attention to labor rights should then spillover to local firms - Given that most exports from developing countries are consumed by developed countries, the effect should be quite strong (this is not really true per Kim 2017) Findings: - Strong legal protections of collective labor rights in a country's export destinations are associated with more stringent labor laws in the exporting country - The findings are weaker, however, in the context of labor rights practices, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between formal legislation and actual implementation of labor rights (much like Battig and Bernauer 2009)

Barnett and Finnemore (1999) -- The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING IO DESIGN AND CHANGE

Question: Do IOs really do what their creators intend them to do? Argument: - IOs often stray from the efficiency goals imputed by IO theory as they exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by founding states; it's alive - Rational-legal authority that IOs embody gives them power independent of the states that created them and channels that move power in particular directions; Weberian bureaucracy - IOs often produce undesirable and even self-defeating outcomes repeatedly, without punishment much less dismantlement - Constructivist approach: explanation of IO behavior is constitutive - IOs become autonomous sites of authority because of power flowing from two sources: (1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody i.e. norms and rules; (2) control over technical expertise and information - Three Types of IO Power: (1) classification: IOs classify and organize information and knowledge and define terms; (2) the fixing of meaning: naming or labeling the social context establishes the parameters, the very boundaries, of acceptable action; (3) diffusion of norms: they transmit and spread norms of what constitutes acceptable behavior Five Mechanisms by which Bureaucratic Culture Breeds Pathologies in IOs - Irrationality of rationalization; this occurs when the rules and procedures that enable bureaucracies to do their jobs become ends in themselves (i.e. IMF conditionality; UN elections) - Universalism: bureaucrats flatten diversity because they are supposed to generate universal rules and categories that are, by design, inattentive to contextual and particularistic concerns (IMF) - Normalization of deviance: exceptions to the rules over time become routinized and normal parts of procedures - Organizational insulation: organizations vary in the degree to which they receive and process feedback from their environment about performance - Cultural contestation: distinct internal cultures may grow up inside different parts of the organization (high-profile and expansive IOs like the UN that have vague missions, broad and politicized constituencies, and lots of divisions that are developed over time in response to new environmental demands) Advantages: - Provides a theoretical basis for treating IOs as autonomous/purposive actors in world politics and thus presents a challenge to the statist ontology prevailing in IR theories (liberal-institutionalists see IOs as mechanisms through which states act) - They challenge the assumption that IOs must be Pareto-improving and comparatively advantaged in a given issue area - Sociological Approach: provides reasons that organizations that are not efficient or effective servants of member interest may still exist - Opens up the possibility that IOs are powerful actors who can have independent effects on the world Problems: - They refer to deviations as pathologies, but is evolution in norms, goals, etc. actually a bad thing when it just lets the IO conform to environmental changes? Need to compare w/ state preferences - The mission seems like a poor place to measure the organizational goals (new, informal missions)

Dancgyier and Donnelly (2013) -- Sectoral Economies, Economic Contexts, and Attitudes toward Immigration IMMIGRATION

Question: Do economic considerations shape attitudes toward immigration? Argument: - Native workers consider the economic effects of immigration on their industry when formulating preferences over immigration policy - Changes in broader economic conditions alter perceived impacts of immigration on one's sector and therefore influence views about immigration i.e. national employment growth and growth at the sector level matter - Native opposition to immigration should rise during downturns when shrinking demand makes it less likely that industries will expand production in response to an increase in migrant labor supply - Natives care not only about self-interest, but about the collective economic impact of immigration on workers in their sector RD: - Survey data from European countries (ESS) 2002-2009 that employs new measures of industry-level exposure to immigration Findings: - Flows of migrant labor into one's industry dampen support for immigration, but only once economic conditions deteriorate - Economic context matters: making use of exogenous shock to national economies represented by the 2008 financial crisis, they show that sector-level inflows of immigrant workers have little effect on preferences when economies are expanding, but that they dampen support for immigration when economic conditions deteriorate and confidence in the economy declines - This is true even controlling for natives' views about the impact of immigration on the national economy and culture - Industry effects do not vary across skill groups and withstand controls for cultural predispositions, so it is industry-level rather than individual-level sympathy driving the effect (sociotropic) Similar to Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo

Tobin and Busch (2010) -- A BIT is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements FDI

Question: Do investment treaties with rich governments help poor ones conclude North-South trade agreements? Key Findings: - A BIT between a developed country and a developing one increases the odds that they will sign a PTA - This pair of states is less likely to negotiate a PTA, however, if the developing country has many investment treaties or trade agreements with other wealthy states - In other words, there is a curvilinear relationships between BITs and North-South PTAs. Too many BITs reduces the odds of signing another PTA - "a BIT is better than a lot" - BITs protect wealthy states against uncompensated expropriation, and PTAs cheapen their MNCs' inputs. PTAs are more politically costly, meaning that wealthy governments only have an incentive to pursue them when there are sizable electoral returns, which is likeliest when they provide rents to domestic MNCs. These rents can be congested by foreign MNCs when a poor government has many BITs or PTAs with other wealthy countries—greater competition undermines preferential market access

Pollack (1997) -- Delegation, Agency, and Agenda-Setting in the EC IOs DELEGATION

Question: Do supranational institutions matter (do they deserve the status of an independent causal variable) in the politics of the European Community (EC)? Functionalism: effect explains cause; the rationally anticipated effects of given institutions, subject to uncertainty, explain actor preferences for certain types of institutions, and the institutions ultimately adopted should reflect those preferences Intergovernmentalism: integration happens between states when states see more benefits than costs in integration; greater the benefit, the greater the integration (i.e. institutions are hollow shells with no actual effect) Argument: - Rationalist companion to Barnett and Finnemore - The agency or autonomy of a given supranational institution depends crucially on the efficacy and credibility of control mechanisms established by member state principals, and these vary from institution to institution; theory of delegation - Institutionalism: Autonomy of institutions can be seen as a function of the efficacy and credibility of the control mechanisms established by member states to monitor & sanction agency activity - Four functions: (1) monitor member state compliance with or transgressions of their international treaty obligations; (2) solve problems of incomplete contracting; (3) adopt complex regulations that require an independent regulator; (4) formal agenda-setting - Agency losses: conflict between interests of the principals who delegate and the agents such that opportunistic agents pursue their own interest subject only to the constrains imposed by their relationship with the principal - Oversight can be fire alarm or police patrol Four Determinants of Autonomy: - Distribution of preferences among member state principals and supranational agents; may exploit differing preferences to avoid sanctions - Institutional decision rules for applying sanctions - Role of incomplete information or uncertainty; most autonomous when an institution has more information about itself than do others and when members states has difficulty monitoring - Institutions possess clear transnational constituencies of subnational institutions, interest groups, or individuals within member states, which can act to bypass the member governments or place pressure on them

Malesky, Georguiev, and Jensen (2015) -- Monopoply Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam, a Survey Experiment FDI

Question: Does FDI lead to less corruption as is frequently posited in the literature? Main Argument: - Foreign firms use bribes to enter protected industries in search of rents; variation in bribe propensity across sectors should then correlate with expected profitability - Liability of foreignness hypothesis: FIEs should be more likely to bribe than domestic firms - Sectors where foreign investment is restricted by licensing or regulatory barriers afford artificial monopoly rents to any firm that is able to enter - It is not FDI itself, but the erosion of monopoly rents through the removal of restrictions on FDI in a country that lowers the value of bribing by allowing more firms to enter - Businesses are motivated to bribe, and gatekeeper bureaucrats are motivated to demand bribes and keep access constrained - Rent dissipation hypothesis only prevails in low-margin sectors where demanding rents would endanger FDI RD: - List experiment embedded in three waves of a nationally representative surveys of 20,000 domestic private enterprises and 3,888 FIEs in Vietnam 2010-2012 - Vietnam: signed several bilateral treaties and acceded to the WTO, but liberalizing reforms were not implemented uniformly across sectors Findings: - Foreign firms in restricted sector have a 41.3% chance of bribery, 26.9% points higher than domestic competitors in restricted sector and 21.1% points higher than foreign firms in non-restricted sectors - Removing investment restrictions lowers FIE bribe propensity by 24% points - In restricted sectors, which require special licensing procedures, FIEs actually contribute to further corruption, proving credence to the "liability of foreignness" perspective - "Rent dissipation hypothesis" is correct that FDI can reduce corruption by competing down monopoly rents in unrestricted sectors Problems: - The aggregated evidence seems to suggest that unrestricted sectors outweigh restricted sectors - we see more rent dissipation than liability of foreignness on average - How do firms balance access to high margins in restricted sectors with the negative externalities of corruption? Where are BITs?

Autor et al. (2016) -- Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Question: Has rising import competition contributed to the polarization of U.S. politics? Takeaway: Trade shocks polarize, but the direction is dependent on the initial population mix Main Argument: - Economic shocks incite a competition for government resources that divides along racial lines - white regions shift right where majority-minority districts shift left - It happens on both sides, though conservative Republicans benefit disproportionately, which led to a net rightward shift in voter political beliefs and voting behavior RD: - They exploit the exogenous component of rising trade with China - They classify legislator ideologies by congressional voting records - Regional trade exposure measured as change in industry import penetration from China, weighting each industry by initial share of CZ employment - Pew Research Center survey data for political beliefs on major US political issues Findings: - Using data from the 2002 and 2010 congressional elections and the 2000, 2008, and 2016 presidential elections, they detect an ideological realignment that is centered in trade-exposed local labor markets and that commences prior to the 2016 election - Congressional districts exposed to larger increases in import penetration disproportionately removed moderate representatives from office in the 2000s - Import penetration boosts induced a rightward shift in political stances - perhaps linked to nativism and competition for government resources - Trade-exposed districts with an initial majority white population or initially in Republican hands became substantially more likely to elect a conservative Republican, while those with an initial majority-minority population or initially in Democratic hands also become more likely to elect a liberal Democrat - In presidential elections, counties with greater trade exposure shifted towards the Republican candidate

Fearon (1997) -- Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING

Question: How can a leader make a threat to use force credible when the leader would, in fact, be willing to use the military? Argument: - Two types of costly signals: 1. Leaders can tie hands by creating audience costs that they will suffer ex post if they do not follow through on their threat or commitment (statement of intent) 2. Sink costs by taking actions such as mobilizing troops that are financially costly ex ante (does not affect the relative value of fighting vs. acquiescing) Theory: - For audience costs, two problems with the assumption that leaders can always generate large ones: (1) conditional on regime type; (2) may be more possible inn crisis bargaining Predictions: - In cases where leaders could generate sufficiently large audience costs to make commitment certain, we should rarely observe bluffing (less than certain commitment) - Leaders should prefer tying hands to sinking costs when the former is possible, despite the fact that doing so tends to "lock in" the leader and creates greater risks of war - We should expect tying hands to be more characteristic of signaling in crises than in grand strategy, where audience costs may be harder to generate - We should expect that sunk-cost signals will play a more prominent role in the efforts of authoritarian leaders to signal in crises than they will for leaders in democracies Results: - Leaders never bluff with either type of signal; they do not incur or create costs and then fail to respond if challenged (no bluffing in equilibria) - The possibility of sending convincing costly signals makes it impossible to partially convince an adversary by sending less costly signals - Leaders do better on average by tying hands, despite the fact that the ability to do so creates a greater ex ante risk of war than does the use of sunk-cost signals; leaders generally battle to generate audience costs rather than engaging in spending contests Problems: - The CW was a spending contest - Leaders do sometimes mobilize troops and then fail to use them when the challenger fails to back off - why are partial threats and signals not invariably subject to the logic observed in the model?

Fang (2008) -- The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics IOs SECURITY

Question: How can international institutions shape the behavior of democratic leaders by influencing domestic politics? Argument: - President Bush attempted to acquire a UNSC resolution authorizing force in Iraq despite the risk it would be rejected because biased leaders with private agendas can be forced to behave like unbiased leaders because of electoral concerns - The endorsement of international institutions matter to domestic audiences and state leaders can be compelled to seek support as a result of domestic concerns; US population wanted UNSC approval despite individual disapproval of Russia and China - International institutions are a source of information for various audiences; signaling effect of the institutions in the presence of asymmetric information between leaders and voters Model: - Two types of leaders: biased and unbiased - Only unbiased leaders should seek information from institutions in good faith, offering voters a signal of unbiased leadership - Voters have an interest in electing unbiased leaders who care about choosing and implementing the appropriate policies Predictions: - If an unbiased leader consults the institution, she will indeed take the institution's advice - If an unbiased leader has an incentive to consult the institution having received one message, the leader is equally motivated to do so after receiving the other message - There is no fully separating equilibrium in which one type of leader always consults the institution and the other type only does unilateral actions b/c the biased type mimics the unbiased type in taking an issue to the institution, but it may not follow the advice later on - Large private benefits cause biased leaders to pool only partially (Bush and the Second Gulf War) - If the voter's belief about a leader's type does not decrease when the voter observes an unexpected consultation of the institution by the leader, then an institutional equilibrium is the only equilibrium to the game - Without an institution, the unbiased leader must always choose one policy to signal her type & the biased leader must always choose the other policy Results: - If the private benefit is large, partial pooling occurs such that the biased type mimics the unbiased type in consulting the institutions but reveals her type subsequently by taking her preferred action if the institutions advises otherwise - Combined with democratic elections, an international institution could put constraints on the behavior of leaders with private agendas Problems: - Assumption is that the IO chooses the best policy, but the veto players in UN have private interests and do not consistently work toward the best possible policy outcome for the target state - This model does not interact well with a polarized party political landscape - How does this model square with Voeten (2001)? Would seem that the unbiased wants to look biased to get an authorization?

Weiss (2013) -- Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China AUDIENCE COSTS AND CREDIBILITY

Question: How do authoritarian states credibly signal their intentions in international crises? Argument: - Nationalist, anti-foreign protests are one mechanism by which authoritarian leaders can visibly demonstrate their domestic vulnerability - Because protests in authoritarian states are risky and costly to repress, the decision to allow or stifle popular mobilization is informative. The threat of instability demonstrates resolve, and the cost of concession increases the credibility of a tough stance. - The danger of instability and escalation increases foreign incentives to make concessions and preserve the status quo. - Giving a "green light" to anti-foreign protests sends a costly signal of resolve and generates a credible commitment to stand firm. - On the other hand, giving a "red light" to nationalist protests signals that the government places high enough value on international cooperation to offset the cost of appearing unpatriotic before domestic audiences. If authoritarian leaders prevent protest in a manner visible to foreign governments— arresting activists the night before a rumored demonstration or dispersing protesters as they gather—the act of repression sends a costly signal of reassurance. Mechanisms: - First, nationalist protest is akin to a "threat that leaves something to chance," to borrow Schelling's phrase. In authoritarian states, nationalist protests can spin out of control, causing domestic turmoil and disrupting diplomatic relations. - Second, because it is easier for the government to nip protests in the bud than suppress protests once they have spread, the escalation of street protests also locks in and enhances the credibility of an unyielding diplomatic stance. Findings: - A case study of two US-China crises shows how China's management of anti-American protests affected US beliefs about Chinese resolve. - The Chinese CCP knows that they're only safe from revolt so long as they get results, like Putin in Russia knows that he's only safe as long as he keeps delivering on his promises. Problems: - It seems like a relatively larger cost than the audience costs in a domestic regime (entire regime may be toppled) - Risk is not shared symmetrically, which is required for the Schelling "leaves something to chance" - Paradox: they need to create risk to leverage it, but they may be so good at containing the risk, total foresight, that there is no risk or leverage created; need to create just the right amount, which requires near total control

Ballard-Rosa, Carnegie, and Gaikwad (2018) -- Economic Crises and Trade Policy Competition SPECIAL INTEREST MODELS OF TRADE POLICYMAKING

Question: How do crises affect trade policy? Main Argument: - Economic adversity generates endogenous incentives not only for protection, but also for liberalization - Protection initially increases when affected firms lobby for assistance, but then decreases as industries run low on resources to expend on lobbying and as firms in other industries mobilize to counter-lobby - Key insight: policy adjustments to resuscitate afflicted industries typically generate 'knock-on' effects on the profitability and political maneuverings of other firms in the economy (incorporated into model in the form of downstream or complementary industries) Model's Predictions: - Tariff rates display an inverted-U shaped relationship in the intensity of shocks because above a certain point, no tariff can promote profitability - Tariff rates similarly display an inverted-U shaped relationship in the duration of crises because as a crisis persists, firms run low on resources RD: - Historical cases: introduction and repeal of the Corn Laws, policy reconfigurations in Great Depression, and tariff adjustments in the 1980s debt crises in Latin America - Brazilian data: industry-level price shocks and tariffs in Brazil 1986-95 - Cross-national data: 7,058 industries and 16 countries 1996-2010 Findings: - They find evidence of an inverse-U shaped relationship between crisis intensity and tariff levels in Brazil - They find an inverse-U shaped relationship between crisis duration and tariff levels in the cross-national sample

Glaser (1997) -- The Security Dilemma Revisited STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Question: How do rational states get caught in the security dilemma? Main Argument: - A rational state will react to another state's build-up with counter-measures if it believes that the other state is willing to expand for reasons other than security (i.e. greed) - In some circumstances, security-seeking states will prefer cooperation to competition, which means that anarchy does not necessarily imply competition Theory: - Using Jervis (1978), Glaser argues that the security dilemma does not depend on misperception, but can arise between perfectly rational states - Posits that two new variables - the presence of greedy states, and each state's perception of other states' motives - impact the severity of the security dilemma - States need not blunder into an arms race based on O/D indistinguishability; they can rightly perceive an adversary as power-maximizing - A state's actions communicate its nature to other states, such that states are not required to have unit-level knowledge of their adversaries in order to interpret their actions - Basically, some states are like Mearsheimer's GPs Problems: - Violates neo-realism by positing that states have a "type" and are not like units - It could be that states just don't know how much security they need to survive

Benhabib (1996) -- On the PE of Immigration IMMIGRATION

Question: How immigration policies that impose capital and skill requirements would be determined under majority voting when native agents differ in their wealth holdings and vote to maximize their income Theory: - With a native population that is heterogeneous in terms of wealth distribution, it is intuitively clear that free immigration will not benefit everyone - Game model: one-shot immigration with heterogeneous native and immigrant populations Findings: - Shows that the native population will be polarized between those who would like an immigration policy to maximize the domestic capital-labor ratio and those who would like an immigration policy that would minimize it

Kinne and Marinov (2013) -- Electoral Authoritarianism and Credible Signaling in International Crises PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING BARGAINING

Question: How, if at all, do nondemocratic elections affect credible signaling in international crises? Argument: - They focus on two fundamental properties of electoral institutions: (1) the degree of pro-incumbent bias and (2) the vulnerability of the incumbent to a de facto loss of power following an opposition victory - They distinguish between two distinct subtypes of electoral authoritarianism: (1) competitive authoritarianism, where elections may be flawed and competition unfair, but leaders nonetheless submit to contested elections and thus give oppositions a chance to win executive power (Levitsky and Way 2002); and (2) hegemonic authoritarianism, where the opposition can and does win representation, but the incumbent's grip on power never wavers (Sartori 1976) - They adopt the method employed by Weeks (2008) and Schultz (1999, 2001), which is premised on the assumption that insofar as some states are better able to signal resolve, they should encounter less resistance to their threats and demands; this implication is measurable within the context of militarized disputes Method: - Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data to assess levels of resistance in conflicts - They test their hypothesis using a directed-dyad data set similar to that used by Weeks (2008) for the 1960-2001 period - One state is coded as the challenger/initiator of the dispute, while the other is coded as the target Findings: - The analysis shows that, in general, hegemonic authoritarian regimes meet resistance to their challenges at virtually the same rate as closed autocracies, suggesting an inability to credibly signal resolve - Competitive authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, meet resistance nearly as infrequently as democracies, which indicates a strong capacity for credible signaling - Overall, these findings suggest that credible signaling is not merely a luxury afforded to procedural democracies, but is instead made possible by a more encompassing class of electoral institutions; even flawed elections are an important source of credible signaling in international crises Problems: - What about joiners? Downes (2009)

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) -- Educated Preferences: Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe IMMIGRATION

Question: Is opposition to immigration in Europe, found mainly among the low education, driven to a large degree by fears of labor-market competition? Earlier Work: - Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2006) suggest that LMC matters - But new work shows that if non-traded goods become cheaper under immigration, real wages do not change Argument: - Immigration is an issue that raises fundamental questions about values and identities among individuals - these debates are shaped less by economic factors then cultural conflict and the division between more- and less-education natives is primarily cultural - Short-term economic assistance programs then will not promote acceptance - Immigration support among college educated is part of a broader cosmopolitan identity and appreciation for cultural diversity (Betts 1988) RD: - 2003 European Social Survey - Skill proxy is the country of origin Findings: - They find that people with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question - Really, they find it is regardless of where people come from (which maps on to skill attributes in theory but maybe not in the minds of respondents) - These relationships are almost identical for individuals in the labor force and not; therefore, the connection between education/skill levels of individuals and views about immigration have little to do with LMC fears - Finding is consistent with economic research showing that the income and employment effects of immigration in European economies is small - A large component of the link between education and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs; educated respondents are less racist and desire cultural diversity; they are also more likely to believe that immigration benefits the economy as a whole Problems: - It should not matter if immigration actually has distributional effects; perception is what matters for public opinion formation - Can we really assume that people are aware of the skill profiles of immigrants from different regions (i.e. rich vs. poor)? If not, then they find nothing with respect to skills

Mayda (2006) -- Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants IMMIGRATION

Question: Is the LMC mechanism real? Earlier Work: - The paper most similar to Mayda's work is Scheve and Slaughter (2001), who use a direct measure of immigration preferences and a theoretical frame, but they don't do cross-national comparisons Method: - Mayda does cross-national comparisons with 1995 ISSP module, 1995-97 WVS wave - Education as skill proxy Argument: - HO explains preferences towards immigration - In relatively high skilled (wealthy) countries, skilled individuals are likely to favor immigration (immigrants will tend to be lower skilled) - In relatively low skilled (poor) countries, higher skilled individuals are likely to oppose immigration - Individual skill is positively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes in rich countries, and negatively correlated in poor countries Findings: - Cross-national correlations between skills and attitudes are consistent with the labor market predictions of the factor-endowments models - Backed up by individual-level data on occupation. Individuals in occupations experiencing a greater influx of immigrants are less likely to be pro-immigration - Undermines the view that only noneconomic considerations shape immigration attitudes, but they are still influential (security and cultural considerations, individual feelings towards political refugees and illegal immigrants; concerns about criminal behavior by immigrants, cultural effects of foreigners, racist feelings)

Ruggie (1993) -- Territoriality and Beyond THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Question: Is the modern system of states (1500 onwards) yielding to a postmodern form of configuring political space? Summary: The modern system of states is in the process of being remade. Ruggie uses the example of the formation of the European Community (EC) - there is nothing in international vocabulary to deal with this, which could be the first truly post-modern international political form. The global economy is also being remade, with microeconomic links forming around the world. These developments have transformational potential, but political science as a discipline isn't very good at studying these changes and asking whether the modern system of states may be yielding in some instances to post-modern forms of configuring political space. The main purpose of this article is to develop a vocabulary for political scientists to use when talking about the possibility of post-modern system change. Details: - Modern rule is territorial - the consolidation of all parceled and personalized authority into one public realm - Modern system of rule has differentiated its subject collectivity into territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion - Modern system is socially constructed - Territoriality is becoming unbundled, as new types of functional regimes, common markets, etc, with new dimensions of collective existence not defined by modern territorial rule emerge - Fundamental transformations are rarely absolute, i.e. in a given time period, you will have different territorial configurations coexisting, with some in ascendancy and some in decline; the modern state has proved more robust than most others, but new systems may gradually emerge - Unbundling of territoriality could be where the articulation of a new international political space could be occurring, e.g. EU as a "multiperspectival polity", or global ecological concerns creating a social episteme visualizing collective existence on the planet

Adsera and Boix (2002) -- Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness GLOBALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Question: Is there a theoretical relationship between trade openness and size of government? Argument: - Once choice of tariffs and taxes is modeled as simultaneous political game, any mechanical correlation between trade openness and domestic compensation breaks down - compensation is but one of many possible strategies to build FT coalition Alternative political-economic equilibria: - To insulate domestic actors from international shocks in relative prices, national policymakers may choose to close the domestic economy; in nations that avoid trade, public sector smaller - Expansion of public sector is not a derivation of openness, but a political pre-condition needed to secure liberalization under democracy - Low tariff coalition may require high taxes and minimized public expenditure to build a coalition. This strategy can only be implemented after excluding all trade losers; can happen only under authoritarian regime; FT does not imply bigger public sector under authoritarianism An authoritarian regime is imposed when: - Final burden of imposing it does not exceed difference between gains under openness and gains under closed economy - Resources of openness are larger than resources protectionist sector has to establish it - Tyranny is cheaper than just compensating the losers from FT Method: - DV: Size of Government (current receipts as percentage of GDP) - Key IV: political institutions*trade Findings: - Interaction terms is consistently positive and significant, while trade alone fails to remain positive and/or significant in several models - Domestic compensation is driven mainly by political decisions, not structural factors like area and distance - Trade openness pushes public revenue upward, but the combination of political regime and openness speeds up formation of larger governments - Case studies from UK and Scandinavia show that governments pursued free trade under restrictive suffrage, but implemented compensation regimes post-suffrage - Two implications: (1) more openness does not automatically constrain spending capacity of states i.e. public expenditure can be geared toward public goods and raise growth rates; (2) how sustainable a large public sector is over time depends on competitive advantage of exporting industries who pay for it Discussion: - This is a refinement of Rodrik. It still happens, but only in democracies and technically as a pre-condition for securing a FT coalition - Are current receipts sufficient to capture size of regime? No deficit-financed expansion - Elites have more options, like suppressing votes

Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) -- The Rational Design of International Institutions IOs RATIONAL DESIGN

Question: Major institutions are organized in radically different ways; why do these differences exist? Do they really matter, both for members and for international politics more generally? Do they affect what the institutions themselves can do? Main Argument: - Functionalism - States use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions purposively and rationally in line with those goals - Because institutions rarely adapt immediately to states' growing (or ebbing) power, and because institutions matter, states pay careful attention to institutional design - Basic strategy is to treat institutions as rational, negotiated responses (equilibria) to the problems international actors face Five Key Dimensions within which Institutions Vary (Dependent Variables): - Membership Rules: Who belongs to the institution? Is it inclusive or exclusive? - Scope of Issues Covered: What issues are covered? How is issue linkage handled? - Centralization of Tasks: Are some important institutional tasks performed by a single focal entity or not? - Rules for Controlling the Institution: How will collective decisions be made? (i.e. voting) - Flexibility of Arrangements: How will institutional rules and procedures accommodate new circumstances? Two types: Adaptive (deal with specific cases) and transformative (require new negotiations for survival) Independent Variables: - Distribution Problems: most severe in zero-sum games; Battle of the Sexes is a good case - Enforcement Problems: refers to the strength of individual actors' incentives to cheat on a given agreement or set of rules; heart of PD - Number of Actors and the Asymmetries among Them: refers to the actors that are potentially relevant to joint welfare because their actions affect others or others' actions affect them - Uncertainty about Behavior, the State of the World, and Others' Preferences: uncertainty refers to the extent to which actors are not fully informed about others' behavior, the state of the world, and/or others' preferences Conjectures about Membership - Restrictive membership increases with the severity of the enforcement problem - Restrictive membership increases with uncertainty about preferences - Inclusive membership increases with the severity of the distribution problem (zero-sum properties are attenuated as membership increases; issue linkage and side payments also become possible) Conjectures about Scope - Issue scope increases with greater heterogeneity among larger numbers of actors - Issue scope increases with the severity of the distribution problem (need issue linkage) - Issue scope increases with the severity of the enforcement problem Conjectures about Centralization - Centralization increases with uncertainty about behavior - Centralization increases with uncertainty about the state of the world - Centralization increases with number - Centralization increases with the severity of the enforcement problem Conjectures about Control - Individual control decreases as number increases - Asymmetry of control increases with asymmetry among coordinators - Individual control (to block desirable outcomes) increases with uncertainty about the state of the world Conjectures about Flexibility - Flexibility increases with uncertainty about the state of the world - Flexibility increases with the severity of the distribution problem - Flexibility decreases with number

Abbott and Snidal (1998) -- Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations IOs

Question: The article answers the question of why states use formal organizations by investigating the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform those functions Two Functional Characteristics Leading to IO Preference: (1) Centralization: concrete and stable organizational structure and an administrative apparatus managing collective activities; (2) Independence: authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often neutrality, in defined spheres Argument: - IO independence is highly constrained because members, especially the powerful can limit the autonomy of IOs, and often do; there is an incentive to grant independence to reap the benefits - IOs as community representatives allow states to create and implement community values and enforce international commitments - Rational states will use or create IOs when the value of these functions outweighs the costs, notably the resulting limits on unilateral action - States consciously use IOs both to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and to create information, ideas, norms, and expectations; to carry out and encourage specific activities; to legitimate or delegitimate particular ideas and practices; and to enhance capacities and power - These functions constitute IOs as agents which influence the interests, intersubjective understandings, and environment of states Centralization: - Support for state interactions: provides a stable negotiating forum; enhances iteration and reputational effects - Managing substantive operations: IOs also manage a variety of operational activities to provide efficiency benefits - Pooling: IOs are often vehicles for pooling activities, assets, or risks (World Bank) - Joint production: states sometimes for multinational teams to engage in production activities (NATO) - Norm elaboration and coordination: IOs resolve international law gaps by creating procedures for the elaboration of norms Independence: - Support for direct state interaction: IOs are initiating as well as supportive organizations; they call together meetings, influence agendas, and transmit new ideas for international governance - Managing substantive operations: Independent IOs are more capable than self-interested states to push negotiations forward - Laundering: can take activities that are unacceptable in the original state-to-state form and make them acceptable; i.e. states prefer IMF aid to US loans - Neutrality: adds impartiality to independence enabling IOs to mediate among states IOs also act as community representatives and enforcers

Voeten (2001) -- Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action IOs SECURITY

Question: Under what conditions can a dominant state use its outside power to satisfy its private interests through multilateral actions? Argument: - The ability of powerful states to act outside, either unilaterally or with an ally, helps the superpower to reach agreements that would be vetoed in the absence of the outside option - Because the US and its allies can pursue a costly outside option, it opens a bargaining range that would not be possible in absence of outside options - Asymmetric outside options profoundly affect the logic of UNSC action and multilateral action more generally - The model integrates realist concerns about the consequences of power asymmetries with institutionalist concerns about incomplete information and Pareto-inferior outcomes - The US wants UNSC action b/c lower cost, added legitimacy for domestic actors of UNSC action, legitimacy helps avoid balancing / consequences Model: - China and Russia should only abstain when the US has credible outside options - Abstention signals to domestic audiences that they disapprove without blocking - This is a model that works after the 1990s and in a world with only one superpower; before that everything was vetoed b/c of the US-SU rivalry Cases: - The UNSC permanent member lineup has shifted from 3:1:1 with US, FR, GB against Russia and China in the middle to 2:1:2 with the US and GB against China and Russia and FR in the middle; the result is the US needing to satisfy an ally with divergent preferences and at least one veto player with opposing preferences - See Libya for a recent case

Keohane (1984) -- After Hegemony INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, GEOPOLITICS, AND TRADE POLICY

Question: Under what conditions can independent countries cooperate in the world political economy? In particular, can cooperation take place without hegemony and, if so, how? Argument: - In line with Institutionalism, Keohane argues that cooperation can under some conditions develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that institutions, broadly defined, affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge - Cooperation: situation of mutual adjustment rather than common interest outweighing conflicting ones; cooperation often fails despite common interests, especially when uncertainty is great and actors have different access to information - Institutions must reduce information asymmetries and uncertainty Rational Choice: - Assumes with Realists that actors are rational egoists - He argues that rational choice helps to show why institutions are significant in world politics and even crucial to successful cooperation Re: Kindleberger/Krasner: - Collective action problems are mitigated by small number of negotiating states (i.e. oligopolistic cooperation can mirror hegemon in Kindleberger) - A hegemon may help to create shared interests via rewards for cooperation and punishment for defection, but where no hegemon exits, similar rewards and punishments can be provided if conditions are favorable (i.e. relatively small number of actors that can monitor compliance with rules and follow strategies that encourage certain behavior) Functionalism: - Institutions are formed as ways to overcome the deficiencies that make it impossible to consummate even mutually beneficial agreements - Effects - like welfare gains - explain the cause Coase Theorem: - Three conditions for it to hold (none hold in IR): (1) legal framework establishing liability for actions; (2) zero transaction costs; (3) perfect information - Without consciously designed institutions, these problems thwart cooperation; international regimes perform the functions of establishing patterns of legal liability, providing relatively symmetrical information, and arranging the costs of bargaining so that specific agreements can more easily be made Advantages of Regimes: - Regimes have increased the costs of illegitimate and decreased the cost of legitimate bargains (think PTAs and the WTO) - Regimes decrease the costs of negotiation: establishing the rules and principles at the outset makes negotiation efficient and preferable - International institutions that facilitate transparency and effective monitoring (or international regimes with norms of reciprocity that facilitate non-negotiated adjustments) can reduce instances of free-riding and defection - Economies of scale: once a regime has been established, the marginal cost of dealing with each additional issue will be lower than without a regime - "Nested regimes" - regimes allow side payments and linkages between clusters of issues so long as they are dealt with in the same regime - International regimes are useful to governments because their function is to make human actions conform to predictable patterns (hold-up) - Regimes facilitate agreements by raising the anticipated costs of violating others' property rights, by altering transaction costs through the clustering of issues, and by providing reliable information to members - Regimes tend to evolve rather than die (Gray?) - Regimes do limit the ability of actors in a strong bargaining position to take advantage of the situation (Stone?) Asymmetric Information - Awareness that others have greater knowledge than oneself and are therefore capable of manipulation is a barrier to negotiation - Regimes may provide information to members symmetrically reducing the risks of agreement Moral Hazard - There is a concern that IMF as insurance may incentivize carelessness in the financial sector Irresponsibility - Some actors may make commitments they are not able to carry out (i.e. time inconsistency) - Self-selection: for certain types of activities, weak states with much to gain and little to give may have more incentive to participate than strong ones but less incentive to actually spend funds on R&D; without the strong, the regime fails - Uncertainty, public goods, and free-riding Problems: - Functionalism is time-inconsistent because it attributes present success with past institutional design and creation; mission creep further complicates the problem - Under functionalism, why do some IOs evolve while others are stuck in the past? - Tension between path dependence and institutional autonomy

Walter (1997) -- The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement CIVIL WAR

Question: Unlike interstate wars, civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlements. Why are domestic enemies unable to negotiate successfully? Argument: - Walter argues that civil war negotiations rarely end in successful peace settlements because credible guarantees on the terms of the settlement are almost impossible for combatants to arrange by themselves - Negotiations do not fail because of indivisible stakes, irreconcilable differences, or high cost tolerances that make compromise impossible, as many people argue i.e. they do not fail because bargains cannot be struck - Adversaries often compromise on the basic issues underlying their conflict, and they frequently find mutually acceptable solutions to their problems - Negotiations instead fail because civil war opponents are asked to do what they consider unthinkable - At a time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to enforce a contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm, and disengage their military forces and prepare for peace; but once they lay down their weapons and begin to integrate their separate assets into a new united state, it becomes almost impossible to either enforce future cooperation or survive attack - In the end, negotiations fail because civil war adversaries cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms; only when an outside enforcer steps in to guarantee the terms do commitments to disarm and share political power become believable; only then does cooperation become possible - Third party guarantors can change the level of fear/insecurity that accompanies treaty implementation and thus facilitate settlement - Third parties can guarantee that groups will be protected, terms respected, and promises kept - They can ensure that the payoffs from cheating no longer exceed the payoffs from executing the terms of the agreement - Once cheating becomes difficult and costly, promises to cooperate gain credibility and cooperation becomes more likely - How do third party guarantors become credible? Three basic conditions: 1. They have a self-interest in upholding the promise (i.e. old colonial ties, strategic interest, economic investment). 2. Must be willing to use force if necessary, and its military capacity has to be enough to punish the violators 3. Has to signal resolve: can station a lot of troops in the country, or can have troops there as a trip wire Problems: - The three conditions rarely hold, especially under the UN

Chwieroth (2007) -- Neoliberal Economics and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets FINANCE, MONEY, AND DEBT

Question: What accounts for the increased willingness of governments in emerging markets to liberalize controls over international capital movements? Main Argument: - One critical mechanism shaping policy decisions is the formation of a coherent team of neoliberal economists; the rise and spread of neoliberal ideas that prioritized liberalization as a policy choice - Professional training in economics shapes an individual's preferences by promoting, both implicitly and explicitly, a particular set of causal and normative beliefs - Economists then advocate via negotiation and persuasion this set of causal and normative beliefs about how the economy operates and how it should be organized; they socialize and make obvious the policy options available to leaders - Coherence in a policymaking team increases consistency and the likelihood that neoliberal economists can turn shared ideas into policy (i.e. liberalization) - Other explanations that are tested: (1) credibility model: politicians appoint neoliberal economists to signal to official and private creditors that the government is creditworthy and committed; (2) political model: politicians appoint economists whose interpretations resonate with their own beliefs and /or are likely to further their careers RD: - New data set that codes the professional training of more than 1500 policymakers in emerging markets - uses it to assess the relative importance of his argument quantitatively on a sample of 29 emerging markets 1977-1999 - Two-stage design: (1) explores the factors driving appointments; (2) instruments to control for nonrandom selection of economists are developed and incorporated Findings: - Credibility concerns and political interests affect appointments, but official and market sentiment is likely to condition how some politicians interpret their policy options, and economists, who help create this sentiment, exploit it to secure appointments - Formation of a coherent policymaking team of neoliberal economists significantly influenced the decision to liberalize

Tilly (1990) -- Coercion, Capital, and European States THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Question: What accounts for variation in state type in Europe since AD 990? Why did the nation state prevail? Argument: - Coercive-extraction model: state emerged from the need for resource extraction; states extract capital via coercion, build the war-making apparatus, and further increase coercive might and military success, leading to more extraction - The coercion is done primarily by soldiers and landlords - War made the state and the state made war: war/conquest leave ruler responsible for administration of territory, goods, and people acquired; state then extracts and fights more - War and the state then lead to nationalism, popular sovereignty - State did not emerge by purposive design but organically out of the incentive structures of war-making (i.e. Darwinian) - Capital-coercive model: capital absorbed into state rather than decentralized; contrasts with capital-intensive (small trading states seeking trade monopolies) and coercion-intensive (coercion from elites and local power sources, not the state, and focus on settlement, enslavement, extraction) - Contrast with Africa - territory was valuable in Europe leading to expansion impetus unlike Africa where labor, not land, was the scarce resource (Herbst)

Mayer (1984) -- Endogenous Tariff Formation SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Question: What are the determinants of tariff rates? Background: Standard assumption on factor ownership states that each person owns one factor of production only. Assumes that all owners of a given factor form a well-defined interest group whose membership is independent of existing tariff rates. This exogenously imposes voter allegiances as opposed to allowing them to emerge endogenously. Takeaways: Factor ownership spans multiple factors; voting rules matter for translating factor endowments into trade policy; resistance to tariffs increases as the existing tariff rate increases (i.e. trade policy is dependent on starting policy); tariffs are set by deviation b/w national endowment and median voter endowment Argument: - Alternative set of determinants of tariff rates in a general equilibrium model - Evaluates the dependence of actual tariff rates on factor-ownership distribution, voter eligibility and participation rules, and the degrees of factor mobility and industry diversification in the economy - Mayer alters standard assumptions by allowing individuals to own more than one factor of production, and allowing factor-ownership shares to differ across people; this means that a given tariff change will no longer be fixed, but will depend on the prevailing tariff rate - A tariff equilibrium is attained when no majority can be found to push for either an increase or a reduction in the existing rate. Where this tariff is depends on the underlying factor-ownership distribution. Each factor owner has an optimal tariff rate uniquely related to the individual's factor ownership - Given a particular distribution of factor ownership, tariff equilibria are affected by voter eligibility rules and participation costs. Some factor owners might be likelier to vote than others. Findings: - Under HO, the greater the difference between individual and national endowment ratios, the greater the deviation of individually optimal tariff rates from free-trade policy - Under majority voting, a tariff on capital-intensive imports will be voted in if the majority of people has capital-labor ownership ratios that exceed the capital-labor endowment of the country. In a situation with no voting costs, the outcome tariff reflects the median factor owner's optimal level of protection. Voting rules change the identity of the median voter and thereby the ultimate tariff policy. If "capital poor" people are excluded, eligible voters are likelier to protect the interests of capital owners (e.g., a tariff on capital will be voted in) - The push for protection isn't unlimited because resistance to tariffs increases and the forces supporting tariffs weaken as the tariff rate further departs from zero - For small industries to obtain tariff protection, it is crucial that each person's specific factor ownership be relatively concentrated in one industry and that there be voting costs

AJR (2001) -- The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH

Question: What are the fundamental causes of large differences in income per capita across countries? Argument: - In places where European colonizers expected high mortality rates, they could not settle and chose to set up extractive institutions; the institutions persisted to the present - These institutions should have a substantial impact on present income per capita - Mortality -> settlements -> institutions -> income - There were different types of colonization policies which created different institutions: (1) extractive: transfer resources to the colonizing state; (2) settlement: transplant European institutions to colony - In places where disease environment was not favorable to European settlement, the cards were stacked against the creation of Neo-Europes - The colonial state and institutions persisted even after independence where Europeans settled RD: - Expected European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions: data on the mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and sailors stationed in the colonies between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries - Europeans were well-informed about the mortality rates at the time - IV: current institutions as measured by protection against "risks of expropriation" index from Political Risk Services (since main concern is property rights and power checks) - Instrumented by settler mortality rates - DV: per capita income Findings: - Mortality rates experienced by settlers explains 25 percent of variation in current institutions - Exclusion restriction holds because disease environment has limited effect on natives (they are immune to native diseases) - There is a substantial negative relationship between institutions and per capita income - No direct effect of mortality rates on economic outcomes in over-identification tests Albouy (2012) Critique: - AJR often used neighboring disease environments as proxies despite substantial cross-border variation (only 28/64 have mortality rates for within their own borders) - Clustering errors kills the results - The mortality rates never come from actual European settlers, although some settler rates are available in the authors' sources; instead they come primarily from European and American soldiers in 19th century; soldiers in barracks vs. campaign is different; campaign is used more often in countries with higher expropriation risk - Bishop data organized by climate not location - AJR response is weak; it is clear that results are pretty sensitive to coding and they do not adequately deal with the theoretical critiques Problems: - Exclusion restriction might not hold: past disease environment might be a proxy for sewage treatment, hospitals, infrastructure; these problems persist and create environments conducive to appearance of new diseases (see Ebola) which then affect per capita income - Institutions for them are a black box; they do not show that they persist through independence

Gourevitch (1978) -- Politics in Hard Times ECONOMIC CRISES

Question: What are the politics of support for different economic policies in response to large changes in in the international economy? Gourevitch seeks to understand the politics of policy choice through a "political sociology of political economy"—by looking at the politics of support for different economic policies in response to large changes in in the international economy. When national economies are interdependent, crises are international. Gourevitch says each crisis is characterized by a particular sequence of events. In the prosperous years before a crisis, a policy approach and support coalition developed. When the crisis hits, both the policy and coalition are challenged, opening up the "system of relationships" and making politics and policy more fluid. A resolution is then reached, "closing" the system for a time, until the next crisis. Method: - A comparative method, contrasting the crises of 1873-96, 1929-49, and the 1970s and 1980s. - Specifically, he compares the responses of France, Germany, Sweden, the US, and the UK. In the 1873-96 crisis, three types of coalitions developed: - An anti-corn-law coalition (the UK), where producers in industry, finance, agriculture, and labor sustained a policy of liberal adaptation to the international economy - An iron-rye alliance (Germany), in which elements of industry and agriculture combined to interpose a stratum of protection against the international economy - An anti-populist coalition (the US), in which industry and labor combined against commodity agriculture and traders In the crisis of 1929-49, the following realignments happened: - Social democracy (UK, US, Sweden), bringing together labor, agriculture, and elements of business around the constitutionalist historic compromise through policies of demand management, welfare, and stabilization - Fascism (Germany), with a different mix of mass support, agriculture, and business that excluded organized labor and produced highly repressive regimes (this path was ultimately destroyed via military intervention, opening the way to the spread of the social democratic model) See for cases.

Johns and Wellhausen (2015) -- Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment FDI

Question: What determines the likelihood that a host government will violate or honor the property rights of a foreign firm? Main Argument: - Host governments are less likely to violate the property rights of firms that are more tightly linked with other firms in the host economy - Economic links, like supply chains, create a common roof that protects foreign investors in host countries that lack strong institutions to protect property rights - Supply chains link the activities of firms: when a host government breaks a contract with one firm, other firms in the supply chain are harmed, giving partner firms an incentive to protect one another's property rights Hypotheses: - H1: A host government is less likely to break its contract with a firm if the firm purchases more goods in the host country - H2: A host government is less likely to break its contract with a firm if the firm is located in an industry in which the host government does not have operational expertise - H3: A host government is less likely to break its contract with a firm that has made larger investments in the host's economy RD: - Cross-national data on investment arbitration - A survey of US multinational subsidiaries in Russia - Case studies from Azerbaijan Findings: - Foreign firms that are more tightly linked with other firms in the host economy are less likely to face government interference with property rights - H1: In countries with more US supply chain activity, US MNCs take fewer international legal actions against host governments - H1: Respondents at firms with lower proportion of Russian suppliers report significantly more breach - H2: Positive relationship between interaction between firm and SOEs, but insignificant - H3: No support for H3 in survey - Implication: one benefit of outsourcing in developing and transition economies is the creation of a network of partner firms that protect each other's property rights

Ruggie (1983) -- Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity (Review of Waltz) THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Waltz Recap: - Waltz has three analytical components of structure: (1) the ordering of the system; (2) the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions; (3) degree of concentration or diffusion of capabilities within the system - Waltz does not have a theory of change - Internationally, only the first and third hold b/c states are like units - Collaboration occurs only in ways strongly conditioned by anarchy - International system is like a market; the units can not control it Argument: - Waltz offers no means to account for the shift from the medieval to the modern international system b/c he drops the second component, the differentiation of units - There are patterns of differentiation of the units such as monarchies, city-states, knightly orders, the church, etc. - In the medieval case, the units viewed themselves as municipal embodiments of a universal community (heteronomy) - Sovereignty ushered in the modern state system (per Gilpin, a change within the system) - Rescuing the second dimension allows us to fashion a more comprehensive view of the "world system" including both its political and economic dimensions - The key is bringing in property rights as a way to differentiate units

Ballard-Rosa (2016) -- Hungary for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Debt Default FINANCE, MONEY, AND DEBT

Question: What drives autocrats to default on their sovereign debt? Argument: - Survival incentives: self-interested elites, fearful of threats to their tenure because of urban unrest, may be willing to suffer the long-term borrowing costs that defaulting creates rather than risk the short-term survival costs of removing cheap food policies for urban consumers - Autocrats in times of crisis may be forced to choose between cheap food and default - Locational biases: it is easier to mobilize for protest in densely populated areas (cities) - Urban bias often results in significant food subsidies for urban consumers; legacy of bread riots and the centrality of food in the consumption bundle (see Bates 1981; Herbst 2000) - Mandated low prices for food come at the expense of rural agricultural producers (Bates 1981) - Often involves heavily subsidizing imported food as well Hypotheses: - H1: Greater reliance on food imports should be linked with sovereign default in autocracies - H2: Higher rates of urbanization should be linked with sovereign default in autocracies RD: - Panel data covering 43 countries from 1960-2009 - Uses world food commodity prices to instrument for cost of food imports - Historical cases of default in Zambia and Peru Findings: - Autocracies that are more reliant on imported food and that are more urbanized are significantly more likely to be in default on their external sovereign debt - This effect is regime contingent and is reversed when considering democratic default

Fearon and Laitin (2003) -- Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War CIVIL WAR

Question: What explains the recent prevalence of violent civil war around the world? Argument: - Insurgency: small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas - We ought to understand the period in terms of insurgency or guerrilla warfare - The factors that explain which countries are at risk for civil war are the conditions that favor insurgency including poverty (favors rebel recruitment), political instability, rough terrain, and large populations Rebutting Literature: - Not due to the end of the Cold War and the associated changes to the system - Not due to greater degrees of ethnic or religious diversity - Not predictable based on where ethnic or political grievances are strongest Hypotheses: - Financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments (low GDPPC) render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing and inept counterinsurgency - Rebel insurgency favored by rough terrain, rebels with local knowledge of the population superior to the government's, and large population - other factors favoring insurgency are foreign base camps, financial support, and training - Civil war may require only a small number with intense grievances to get going (collective action) and can therefore occur even in democracy and without obvious and large societal cleavages Findings: - Show that the current prevalence of civil war is the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950s and 1960s rather than a sudden change associated with the post-Cold War order - Controlling for per capita income, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil violence

Morrison (2012) -- Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, GEOPOLITICS, AND TRADE POLICY

Question: What is the effect of the distribution of power on global economic openness? Argument: - There hasn't been a robust challenge to the hegemonic stability theorists' claim that trade liberalization is least likely in a system populated by large, unequally developed states - Morrison challenges hegemonic stability theorists' use of "openness" as a DV, favoring "commercial strategy" - Britain first pursued openness in the 1780s (Krasner claims not until 1820s), as a threatened power in a hostile multipolar system - The shift towards openness long preceded hegemony, in a multipolar world that hegemonic stability theorists claim would be least likely to initiate this shift, and it included friend and foe alike - Britain's shift depends on a previously unnoticed variable: the influence of an enterprising intellectual (Adam Smith) on a key policymaker (William Petty, Earl of Shelburne) at a critical juncture (American Revolutionary War) - Morrison rejects materialist accounts, adopting the "idiographic" counterfactual that if Shelburne had not engaged Smith's ideas, the American Revolutionary War would've ended on vastly different terms (i.e., Britain would not have capitulated after its defeat at the Battle of Yorktown in 1781) - Yorktown was hardly Britain's wartime nadir; its loss at Saratoga in 1777 was equally costly from a military perspective Relation to other stuff: - Might mirror Keynes/White and BW

Ikenberry (2001) -- After Victory FUTURE OF IR

Question: What kind of world order did the United States seek to establish? Argument: - Institutions are not just rules or norms; they are used by great powers to create an order suitable to strongest states (situates argument somewhere between realism and liberalism) - After each major war, the great power manipulates or creates new institutions to create new international order that benefits its needs - Liberal theory: democracy, open market, institutions with America as benign hegemon US Objectives: 1. Democratization (in the mold of DPT) 2. An open, multilateral economic order 3. Containment of communist threats Order Building: 1. Containment order - Balance of power - Nuclear deterrence - Ideological competition 2. Liberal institutional order - Economic openness - Political reciprocity - Multilateral agreements METHOD/FINDINGS: Economic openness: Bretton Woods system - Institution designed to mitigate money relations between states - World Bank and IMF established; fund reconstruction projects in Europe and Asia; monitor economic developments in each member state to avoid global economic crises; make sure each country has decent balance of payments record (import/export balance) - Establishment of fixed exchange rate system (dollar pegged to gold and the rest pegged to the dollar) Defense and security: European resistance to the "third force" idea and American reluctance to commitment - GB wanted to protect colonial possessions and economic preference system; France wanted clear US security commitment - Americans reluctant to commit; wanted to stay out of Europe; only a temporary commitment for recovery; eventually we have NATO and ECSC - Strategic restraint: limits on American hegemonic power; provision of reassurance - US will not exercise arbitrary power; restrain power in institutional settings to project American ideals though Stone (2008) disagrees

Tomz (2007) -- Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach AUDIENCE COSTS AND CREDIBILITY

Question: What makes international threats credible? Why, how, and under what conditions do domestic audiences make commitments credible? Audience costs: shorthand for the surge in disapproval that would occur if a leader made commitments and did not follow through Argument: - It is difficult to test audience costs directly because of strategic selection bias: leaders take audience costs into account when making decisions regarding international crises - Tomz uses public opinion surveys to circumvent the selection effect problem inherent in testing audience cost theory Method: People are either assigned to a control group and told that there is a crisis but the president doesn't get involved, or they are assigned to a treatment group where the president gets involves and escalates, but ultimately backs down. Participants are asked whether they approve or disapprove of the situation. Key Findings: - Tomz finds that audience costs exist and become larger as crises proceed - People disapprove of leaders who make threats and then back down, and this disapproval increases as leaders escalate from threats to use of force - Citizens who are politically active (and therefore more likely to participate in punishing a leader who backs down) are especially responsive to audience costs logic - Domestic audiences disapprove of backtracking against all types of regimes, with varying motivations, and military power, whether or not the national interest is at stake. - Tomz also finds that audience costs matter because people care about the international reputation of their leader and country Problems: - External validity: surveys make issues more salient than real life; notwithstanding the rigorous design of Tomz's experiment, the relevance of his findings to the real world of politics is in doubt (Snyder and Borghard 2011)

Przeworski and Limongi (1997) -- Modernization: Theories and Facts AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND TRANSITIONS

Question: What makes political regimes rise, endure, and fall? Do democracies emerge as a consequence of economic development? Goal: To distinguish two theories—both put forth by Lipset—that relate economic development and democracy. Modernization theory is endogenous where the alternative is exogenous. Modernization Theory (endogenous): - Saying that democracy comes out of economic development in a country is the same as saying dictatorship in a country is killed by economic development - An autocracy develops and becomes democratic after development reaches some "threshold" - As the society becomes more complex, systems can no longer be run by command. One general process of which democratization is the final stage. One would expect to see poor authoritarian countries developing and then turning into democracies once they reached some threshold of development. Alternative Theory (exogenous): - Democracy is established randomly, but only survives in "modern" countries - it's not a process of modernization that brings about the democracy - So democracy survives if a state is modern, but democratization is not related to development Intuitive logic: in poor countries, the value of becoming a dictator is greater and the accumulated cost of destroying capital stock is lower. In wealthy countries, by contrast, the gain from getting all rather than a part of total income is smaller and the recuperation from destruction is slower. Hence, struggle for dictatorship is more attractive in poorer countries. Findings: - It seems like dictatorships have a bell-shaped instability curve - they are stable when they are poor and relatively rich, and in the middle (kind of rich) they are unstable. This refutes modernization theory. - The data does confirm the second theory, that in rich countries democracies are more likely to survive. - What actually destabilizes regimes is economic crisis; democracies, especially poor democracies, are extremely vulnerable to regime change due to economic crisis. With development, democracy can survive even in poor countries.

Kindleberger (1986) -- The World in Depression 1929-1939 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, GEOPOLITICS, AND TRADE POLICY

Question: What produced the world depression of 1929 and why was it so widespread, so deep, and so long? Argument: - The international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and US unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it by discharging five functions: (1) maintaining a relatively open market for distress goods; (2) providing countercyclical, or at least stable, long-term lending; (3) policing a relatively stable system of exchange rates; (4) ensuring the coordination of macroeconomic policies; (5) acting as a lender of last resort by discounting or otherwise providing liquidity in financial crisis - In 1929, 1930, and 1931, Britain could not act as a stabilizer, and the US would not - These functions must be organized and carried out by a single country that assumes responsibility for the system - if this is done, the economic system is capable of making adjustments to fairly serious dislocations by means of the market mechanism - Collective action problem: when every country turned to protect its private investment, the world public interest went down the drain, and with it the private interests of all - Leadership is necessary in the absence of delegated authority Problems: - The IMF does all these things now, yet we still have Asian Debt Crisis, recession of 2008 - Are we setting ourselves up for another financial crisis given waves of protectionism and the stagnation of promising international arrangements like TPP and the Doha round? US able/unwilling?

Weisiger (2013) -- Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflict STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Question: What separates the few unusually destructive wars from the many that are limited, either in duration or in intensity? Main Argument: - There are multiple logics of war. Unraveling the logics of different causes of war allows us to explain the variation in war duration and severity. - Weisiger works from the bargaining model of war and examines three causal mechanisms: (1) divergent expectations and mutual over-optimism, (2) principal-agent problems in domestic politics (e.g. diversionary wars), and (3) commitment problems that generate an inability to trust one's opponent to live up to a political agreement. Findings: - Commitment problems produce unusually long and deadly wars. These wars often occur when a declining power is concerned that a rising power will eventually renege on an agreement, and thus launches a war to prevent the rising power from continuing to accumulate power. If fear of decline is a cause of war, then war will continue until that fear is addressed (either the decline being prevented or it clearly occurring). Preventing a decline from occurring will typically require an unusually large victory, meaning the declining power's aims will be unusually ambitious. Fighting can therefore be long-lasting, even if it is quite intense. Dispositional commitment problems are similar but rare - when you think the other side is not deterred by the cost of war. - Non-commitment problem wars tend to be more limited in duration or intensity. In the informational mechanism (Fearon 95), fighting arises because the two sides have conflicting expectations about how the war will go (disagree about relative strength or resolve). This uncertainty is resolved over the course of the conflict, causing leaders to revise expectations and demands, bringing them closer together until a settlement is reached. Fighting thus inevitably leads to settlement, more quickly when the fighting is intense. - Wars driven by domestic politics (wars that the public would not have chosen in the leader's stead) are also limited. Leaders can start wars not in the public interest, like diversionary wars, but their ability to continue them depends on whether they can hold onto power and avoid being forced into a settlement that would be in the interests of her public. A leader's ability to sustain this type of war depends critically on her informational advantage over the public. The revelation of information as the war continues limits the degree to which the leader can plausibly claim that continued fighting is in the public's interest.

Stasavage (2007) -- Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274-1785 FINANCE, MONEY, AND DEBT

Question: What stimulated economic growth and sovereign borrowing credibility in Europe? Argument: - A common argument is that constraining political institutions stimulated investment, innovation, growth, and long-term government borrowing by protecting property rights - Beyond the constitution-credibility hypothesis, Stasavage tests the "city-state/merchant power hypothesis," which holds that in city-states, merchants would be much more likely to be politically dominant when compared with larger territorial states where they would be out-numbered by landowners among the political elite As merchants were the primary source of credit for sovereign borrowers, one should expect that city-states were better able to access credit at low interest rates than larger territorial states. The political power of merchants could also be used to ensure that city-states would repay their debts. - Stasavage tests a third hypothesis, an interaction between state type (city-state or territorial state) and constitutional regime. According to this hypothesis, borrower credibility depended both on the existence of a city-state and the existence of a constraining constitution. Merchants would likely have been particularly influential in city-states where the prince was constitutionally constrained and where there was some guaranteed representative of elite interests in the policymaking process. In territorial states, such representation would have less of an impact given the relatively small size of the elite merchant constituency compared to landowners - In sum, where merchants had political power, the government was bound to repay Findings: - Quantitative analysis indicates that city-states paid lower interests rates on their debt than territorial states. Consistent with the idea that merchants were more likely to hold political power in city-states than in larger states - Less indication that constitutional checks were unconditionally associated with lower borrowing costs. However, there is some evidence of an interaction effect between state type and constitution. The city-states that paid the lowest interest rates were those with republican institutions and those that were in regions where princely overlords were constrained

Milner (1997) -- Interests, Institutions, and Information INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Question: When and under what terms are countries able to coordinate their policies in an issue area? Why are certain countries better able to cooperate at certain times? Argument: - Building on Putnam (1988) Milner provides an integrated (two-level) theory of the conditions under which international cooperation will emerge. - She rejects the traditional unitary actor assumption in favor of a conceptualization of the state as an agent of three competing domestic pressures: the executive, the legislature and relevant interest groups - It is the internal political dynamic among these three sets of domestic actors, and not just international power politics or economic interdependence, that determines the extent to which states are willing to engage in international cooperation - Rebuttal to realism and institutionalism: uses the interaction of the distributions of interests, of information, and of decision-making powers to inform our understanding of the negotiation and ratification of international cooperative arrangements - International factors still matter, since domestic political leaders must reflect on the need for international cooperation and the possibility of retaliation in issue areas that exhibit policy externalities. Conclusions: - First, systemic approaches to international relations, including realism, have exaggerated the extent of international cooperation. Relative to the state-as-unitary-actor approach, the introduction of domestic politics never improves the chances of cooperation - Second, interest groups are important not because of their ability to apply political pressure, but because they can transmit information to uninformed actors. Contrary to most game-theoretic approaches, Milner argues that imperfect information, rather than impeding cooperation, makes it more likely (possibly b/c government knows little about the issue area) - Third, changes in the ratification procedure (i.e., a popular referendum rather than a legislative vote; a supermajority rather than a majority vote) made after an agreement has been signed will scuttle the chances for ratification - Fourth, cooperation is likely if a dovish actor is in charge

Bechtel and Schneider (2010) -- Eliciting Substance from 'Hot Air': Financial Market Responses to EU Summit Decisions on European Defense IOs SECURITY

Question: Whether and how decisions made during EU summit meetings affect the European defense industry Argument: - Summit outcomes that strengthen the ESDP lead to an increase in the return on defense stocks - Multilateral decisions can have considerable economic and financial repercussions; investors react positively to a successful strengthening of Europe's military component (a vital part of the intensified cooperation within the European Security and Defense Policy) since such decisions increase demand for military products / raise the expected profits in the European defense industry - Abnormal return: return to defense firms during a summit meeting that cannot be explained by movements in other financial assets; increases if EU summit decisions provide investors with information that they consider to be good news for future profitability - Investors differentiate between summits that resulted in significant steps toward the buildup of a "European army" and those on which defense was an issue, but no agreement was reached - Pooling military resources and making defense forces more effective allows European leaders to increase their international bargaining power including political weight toward the United States Method: - Event study of the economic impact of a wide range of political phenomena that affect shareholder wealth through their impact on firm and industry performance - Abnormal return is the difference between the observed return and a control series of synthetic returns representing the return we would expect in the absence of a summit meeting - Controls for overall flux in the stock market that could come from economic outcomes from the EC summit; control is done by counting Financial Times articles before and after the summit Problem: How transparent are the meetings? To what extent do returns affect conjecture?

Acharya (2004) -- How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Question: Which and whose ideas matter when it comes to norm diffusion in world politics? Argument: - Proposes a dynamic explanation of norm diffusion that describes how local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure that norms fit with the agents' cognitive priors and identities - calls this "congruence building" or localization - Variation in norms' acceptance, indicated by changes they produced in the goals and institutional apparatuses of the regional group, could be explained by the differential ability of local agents to reconstruct the norms to ensure a better fit with prior local norms, and the potential of the localized norm to enhance the appeal of some of their prior beliefs and institutions - Localization is more likely than displacement when it competes with a strong identity norm or existing approaches are considered inadequate but not harmful Two Goals for Norm Recipients: - Goal was to strengthen and not replace existing institutions with the infusion of new pathways of legitimation - Deeply ingrained beliefs could not be easily sacrificed without incurring social and political costs RD: - Compares the impact of two transnational norms on ASEAN - Proposal 1: emerged in early 1990s; sought the creation of a multilateral security institution for the Asia Pacific on the basis of the "common security" norm; originated in Cold War Europe and was reframed as "cooperative security" in Asia Pacific discourses; resonated with existing norms of multilateralism and acceptance - Proposal 2: emerged in late 1990s; sought to develop ASEAN's role in addressing transnational problems that would require it to go beyond traditional adherence to the norm of noninterference in internal affairs of members; normative roots in post-CW notions of humanitarian intervention; conflicted with norms of non-intervention Could be an interesting way to argue against Johnston - China will only accommodate Western norms that are easily integrated into existing normative frames Problem: realism depends on the existence of states

Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse (2015) -- Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization LAW, NORMS, AND RIGHTS

Question: Why do countries join international human rights institutions, when membership often yields few material gains and constrains state sovereignty? Main Argument: - Entering a human rights institution can yield substantial benefits for democratizing states; emerging democracies can use the "sovereignty costs" associated with membership to lock in liberal policies and signal their intent to consolidate democracy; relates closely to Moravcsik (2000) on ECHR - But the magnitude of these costs varies across different human rights institutions, which include both treaties and IOs - Democratizing states have a big incentive to enter HR institutions that extract more substantial membership costs - bearing the costs signals that their commitment to liberal policies and the consolidation of democracy is not "cheap talk" - They also can use these costs to help lock in liberal policies and to respond to pressure from industrialized democracies - Stable democracies may enter these institutions to respond to domestic pressure or as a part of foreign policy, but they have less incentive - Autocracies are least likely to join Method: - New dataset on HR institutions (36 treaties and 57 IOs) 1945-2000 and an original measure of sovereignty costs - DV1: odds of joining an HR institution - DV2: sovereignty costs are measured by ten indicators of precision, delegation, and obligation per Abbott and Snidal (2000) - IV: democratization as measured by five year change in polity Findings: - Democratizing states tend to join HR institutions that impose greater constraints on state sovereignty - Stable democracies and autocracies are less likely to join costly HR institutions, though all three types of governments readily join low-cost institutions (connects to Hafner-Burton 2013)

Hafner-Burton (2013) -- Making Human Rights A Reality LAW, NORMS, AND RIGHTS

Question: Why do human rights violations endure despite the expansion of global efforts at human rights promotion? Setup: - Human rights: basic rights and freedoms to which all people are entitled regardless of nationality, sex, ethnic origin, race, religion, language, or other status - Key principles are universality and indivisibility Problems with the Current System: - The international human rights regime is both a successful articulator of global norms and also a gridlocked promoter, almost powerless to put its own goals into practice - There is a crisis of legitimacy and relevance because the regime is packed with countries that have no intention (or ability) to honor its norms - The current system protects human rights only in special circumstances - settings where the worst human rights abuses are least likely to occur - Law is obeyed when rules coincide with how states would act without the laws (coincidence), but the regime is bad at making states fear punishment for breaking the law (coercion) and making states internalize values (persuasion) see Mearsheimer! - Abusers are not madmen - they are ordinary people responding to the incentives and opportunities in their environment - A big part of the argument here is that some contexts and countries can't be helped, and we should pretty much leave them alone Proposed Solutions: - She suggests that the regime must move away from universality and introduce reforms to increase both its legitimacy and deterrence capacity - Law should exist alongside threat of sanction, offer of reward, diplomacy, and other forms of power that stewards use to promote human rights - Power is a limited resource that can contravene legitimacy, so it is crucial that states and non-state actors make choices about where they can use their power with maximum effect - a process she calls triage - This strategic approach to human rights will be easier to implement unilaterally and in small groups of stewards rather than in the universal UN Three main contentions: - The tendency to swell the list of countries that are party to international human rights agreements along with the list of rights themselves is problematic: more laws and members erode legitimacy if they lead to low compliance - Solutions require relying heavily on the actors that can have the largest impact on patterns of abuse; this begins with steward states or states that tend to have good human rights records at home and also face public pressure to advance human rights overseas; stewards can back law with power and work with NGOs and NHRIs - Stewards can become more strategic in how they allocate resources, and this is where triage comes in i.e. concentrate resources where they can make a difference Relation to other stuff: - In line with Simmons b/c screening only works if agreements are not universal

Fazal (2004) -- State Death in the International System STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY STRUCTURE/AGENCY

Question: Why do states die? Main Argument: - Buffer states (b/w two rivals w/ no ocean) are more likely to die - Rivals can't credibly commit to protect a buffer given fear that the adversary will conquer it (PD) - Contra-Waltz, survival is not a choice, and geopolitics can overwhelm state attributes - Blow to neorealism because it is all structure (some states have no agency) RD: - Hazard model controlling for post-1945, capabilities, alliances - Rivals are dyads with > 5 MIDs - Cases: Partitions of Poland and Dominican occupations Finding: - Buffers are much more likely to die; power is only weakly significant; alliances have no effect (external balancing does not work) Problems: - State death ceases post-1945 - Could the buffer bandwagon with one rival? Walt (1987) on extremely weak/vulnerable states

Davis (2012) -- Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING

Question: Why do states turn to international courts to resolve their disputes? Main Argument: - Countries choose international courts to achieve better outcomes; it is a shift in process and not an abdication of sovereignty - States use international courts to manage domestic political pressure and pursue international cooperation; a willingness to bear the costs of going to court signals that the government gives priority to enforcement - Adjudication is a release valve that allows governments to respond to multiple competing interests while avoiding a trade war - costly signal to domestic and foreign audiences of the government's support for exporter interests - Most likely to occur in democracies where different interests between executive and legislature generate uncertainty about whether the government will deliver on market-opening commitments - Democracies are more likely to file legal complaints against trade barriers and select their cases based on the political influence of affected industries - the government is responsive to corporate interests and signals resolve to the other party; they have less freedom to negotiate settlements out of court Hypothesis: - Democratic states will have the greatest demand for adjudication and initiation of cases will vary as a function of electoral balance and government structure Findings: - States with high checks and balances are most frequent users of adjudication - Domestic politics in terms of institutions of the complainant and defendant and geopolitics in terms of alliance relations between trade partners shape pattern of disputes - Case studies of US and Japanese trade relations - US is hamstrung by the executive and initiates more disputes where Japan has flexibility to negotiate out of court - Adjudication is effective - it increases the probability of progress to resolve the complaint by one-third and is correlated with quicker removal of the barrier; this is even true for small states

Goddard (2008) -- When Right Makes Might STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Question: Why do states underbalance in IR? Argument: - We should look not just to the external GPs, but to the rising power to determine why balancing may not occur - In the case of Prussia, its legitimation strategies - the way it justified expansion - undermined a potential balancing coalition - Legitimation strategy: use of rhetoric that appeals to public, recognized norms and rules to persuasively justify a state's FP - Prussia raised the ontological cost of balancing by framing their strategy in terms of rival identities - Prussia appealed to shared norms and rules by choosing rhetoric that would resonate with the great powers; this effectively countered opposition to its rise, ensuring an almost costless expansion Failure of Alternative Explanations: - States were uncertain of Prussia and fearful (they did not think it was peaceful) - There was no buck-passing or miscalculation - There was no disunity among rival powers Details: - There is no sense balancing a state with limited aims; rising states can exploit uncertainty around power transitions by invoking shared rules/norms - Not rationalist: a strategy's success depends on not on its credibility and costliness; rhetoric has the causal power and is dependent on resonance - To set a trap, the state using the opposition states' own words to justify its policies

Simmons (2009) -- Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics LAW, NORMS, AND RIGHTS

Question: Why should a government commit itself to an international legal agreement to respect the rights of its own people? Argument: - The primary reason is the government anticipates its ability and willingness to comply; they support the treaty goals and want to implement them - Polities participate most readily and enthusiastically in treaty regimes that reflect values consonant with their own - Treaties "screen" participants that leave a pool of adherents that generally are likely to support their goals; selection effect - Note that they are not perfect screens: Countries prefer to avoid the social and political pressures of remaining aloof from popular human rights accords - The most significant claim the book makes is that, regardless of their acknowledged role in generally separating the committed human rights defenders from the worst offenders, treaties also play a crucial constraining role; treaties constrain b/c they help define the size of the expectations gap when governments fail to live up to their provisions Treaties change the national agenda in three mechanisms: 1. Effect elite-initiated agendas: changes the national agenda and raises issues 2. Support litigation: litigation is possible where treaties have a status of law and where the judiciary is independent 3. Spark political mobilization: treaties provide political, legal, and social resources to individuals and groups who desire government accountability Polity matters: - In stable autocracies, citizens have the motive but not the means to mobilize - In stable democracies, they have the means but lack a motive - Where institutions are most fluid the expected value of importing external political rights agreement is quite high Relation to other stuff: - This is a case where NGOs would matter

Hiscox (1999) -- The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICY

Question: Why was the RTAA never overturned? Argument: - An escape from the protectionist political trap is likely only if some change in the institutions that govern policymaking can provide greater political weight to members of the large free-trade bloc - Divisions in the Republican base reflected the dramatic, exogenous effects of WWII on US export and import-competing industries as well as longer-term shifts in US comparative advantage and in party constituencies Two magic bullets: - Members of Congress recognized that the existing rules produced sub-optimal results because of logrolling and chose to delegate authority to the executive branch to ensure more efficient policies - Leaders of the democratic party, hoping to make trade liberalization more lasting, chose to base it on reciprocal concessions that would solidify support from export interests No Magic Bullet: - The Congressional bullet is insufficient - those that voted for Smoot-Hawley voted against the RTAA - The export mobilization point (BGW) is also insufficient - there is generally a huge collective action problem among export interests because lower tariffs are largely a public good More contra-BGW: - Republicans have become more pro-free trade, but Democrats have simultaneously become protectionists - Industries favoring protection did not disappear, and indeed they often gained protection Findings: - Parties differ over trade policy because they draw support unevenly from different regions and hence from owners of different types of factors - WWII brought the drastic, temporary reduction in import competition for US manufacturers and the tremendous expansion in export demand preventing the GOP from repealing RTAA through the 1950s; the US comparative advantage also shifted to capital-intensive production, leading GOP to support liberalization - By the early 1960s Republicans and Democrats both were internally divided on the issue as import competition increased from Asia and Europe; there were divisions within parties based on where they drew geographic support, and the industry composition became more solid with time - So the key to the resilience of RTAA reform is linked to a breakdown in party unity as the postwar boom subsided - a breakdown linked to the growing diversity among societal coalitions in each party's core constituency

Powell (2015) -- Nuclear Brinksmanship, Limited War, and Military Power STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Question: does the balance of military power affect deterrence and the dynamics of escalation? Context: - Response to Schelling, Snyder and Diesing, Jervis ignoring conventional power balance. - During the Cold War, many argued (via brinksmanship) that the balance of conventional power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was not very important. - Deterrence depended on the balance of resolve, of states' relative willingness to run the risk of nuclear escalation, rather than on the balance of military strength (Jervis 1979/1984, Schelling 1966, Glaser 1990). Argument: - States in the midst of nuclear crises frequently appear to face a fundamental tradeoff between bringing more military power to bear and raising the risk of escalation to nuclear war - The more power a state brings to bear, the greater the probability of prevailing if events remain under control and the situation doesn't escalate to nuclear war - But bringing more power to bear makes the conflict less stable in that it increases the potential risk of uncontrolled escalation RD: game model Findings: - A state's resolve is the highest risk of an all-out nuclear war that it would be willing to run in order to win (but the challenger brings less power to bear the likelier it is that the balance of resolve favors the defender) - There are bounds on the claim that the balance of military power is irrelevant. Even if the assumption about the lack of a tradeoff holds reasonably well in the US-Soviet case, it may not for India-Pakistan, China-US, US-rogue states. - Stability-instability paradox. Greater instability, defined as a sharper tradeoff between power and risk, does not make conflict at all lower levels of violence less likely as is commonly argued. Rather, greater instability makes conflict at higher levels of violence less likely and more likely at lower levels. - States that are weaker but more resolute have an incentive to adopt doctrines and deploy forces that make the use of force riskier and thus easier to transform a contest of strength into a test of resolve. A strong but less resolute state has the opposite incentive. Apparent with NATO's behavior during the Cold War and recent developments of India and Pakistan's forces and doctrines. - Weak states can use nuclear weapons to blackmail stronger states.

Davis (2004) -- International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICYMAKING BARGAINING

Question: why do some negotiations result in deals while others result in deadlock? Argument: - Issue Linkage: when issues are simultaneously discussed for joint settlement - Issue linkage counteracts domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes - Institutions bolster the credibility of the linkage to make it more effective, so the institutional context matters as well - The more institutionalized the linkage is across sectors, the more effective the linkage - Institutions encourage issue linkage; they can publicize the issue linkage to create a focal point and signal domestic groups Even when there is strong opposition to liberalization, several factors facilitate issue linkage: - Broad agenda encourages wider participation and greater potential gains from liberalization - Protectionist interests face high costs to mobilize early in the negotiations - Uncertainty about outcomes is also relevant here Findings: - Issue linkage can bring liberalization even when it would be least expected in sensitive areas - Agriculture is an area that is generally protected - An increase in the linkage variable from lowest to highest point causes a 64 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of major liberalization in Japan; the same figure is 0.5 for EU negotiations Problems: - Issue linkage is an endogenous variable (to desire for an agreement) so it may not be causal

Dai (2002) -- Information Systems in Treaty Regimes IOs

Questions: Do states have interests in monitoring? How do they pursue cost-effective monitoring arrangements? Argument: - Monitoring is needed because of asymmetric information: only the noncomplying state has information about its compliance; monitoring bridges the gap - Two factors - the common or divergent interests of noncompliance victims and their states and the presence or absence of non-compliance victims as low-cost monitors - provide a concrete handle for addressing the above question - Interests: need to ask who the noncompliance victims are and then whether the government has an incentive to protect them - Low-cost monitors: need to determine whether or not noncompliance occurs and be able to trace blame to one actor - The article focuses on monitoring arrangements rather than enforcement mechanisms because monitoring is a precondition for enforcement Key Findings: - State and victims monitor only when interests are aligned and victims are low-cost monitors (GATT) - When interests are aligned but no low-cost monitors are available, treaty orgs can monitor (IMF) - NGOs plug a crucial hole in decentralized regimes by mobilizing resources to bring violations to light (victims/NGOs monitor HR; NGOs only monitor the environment) - On the GATT: states have an incentive to protect domestic producers and export-oriented and import-competing firms are in a good position to detect the effect and source of noncompliance Problems: - Actors can now use Internet to self-monitor - States are modeled as unitary actors

Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) -- Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination IMMIGRATION

RD: - Microlevel data from Switzerland where some municipalities used closed ballot referendums (until 2003) to decide on the citizenship applications of foreign residents - Majority "yes" votes were granted citizenship - Dataset covers 2400 recorded naturalization referendums 1970-2003 - Immigrant attributes were collected from official applicant descriptions that voters received before each referendum Findings: - Naturalization decisions vary dramatically with immigrants' attributes; country of origin determines naturalization success more than any other applicant characteristic, including language skills, integration status, and economic credentials - The average proportion of "no" votes is about 40% higher for applicants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey compared to observably similar applications from richer northern and western European countries - The rewards for economic credentials are higher for applicants from disadvantaged regions, and origin-based discrimination is much stronger in more xenophobic areas This is very similar to Gaikwad and Nellis (2017)

Schelling (1960) -- The Strategy of Conflict STRATEGY AND BARGAINING UNDER ANARCHY

Schelling's Hard Core - Distributional bargaining: situations in which a better bargain for one means less for the other; chicken - Pure bargaining is bargaining in which each party is guided mainly by his expectations of what the other will accept; concessions occur because one party thinks the other will not concede - Commitment: device to leave the last clear chance to decide the outcome with the other party in a manner that he fully appreciates; it rigs the incentives so the other party must choose in one's favor (see speeding up in chicken) - Minimax Solution: can be achieved without cooperation (49) Hypotheses: - The first move is an advantage; it restricts the choice of the second actor - Constraints or the power to bind oneself give the bound party the advantage in bargaining (as in Congress binding the President) - You can bind yourself to third parties - The credibility of a threat is dependent on how visible to the threatened party the inability of the threatening party to rationalize his way out of the commitment once it fails his purpose is (states must both make a credible commitment and communicate it effectively) - He introduces the concept of audience costs so long as negotiations are public; bigger in democracies than autocracies - Credible commitments in bargaining can lead to stalemate - neither side can move Two Types of Threats: - The threat in response to an unfavorable move by an adversary that you always have an incentive to carry out - The threat that is used to deter by promise of mutual harm that you do not want to carry out (must carry out to the point of no return) - It can be useful to decompose a threat; punishing a small transgression signals commitment

Elman and Elman (2002) -- How Not to Be Lakatos Intolerant THEORIES OF IR

Scientific disciplines are each a series of scientific research programs (SRPs) with four elements Hard core: unchanging, privileged constant Negative heuristic: forbids knowledge from being directly challenged or tested Positive heuristic: a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints that guides the production of specific theories within the SRP; provides ideas about how to add specificity, draw inferences, introduce new assumptions, or recalibrate when testing threatens the core Protective belt: bears brunt of empirical testing; auxiliary hypotheses developed in accordance with the positive heuristic that can be changed or even replaced in order to defend the core Problem-shifts are degenerative rather than progressive when: (1) no novel predictions; (2) no evidential verification; (3) auxiliary hypotheses modified in a way that does not accord with positive heuristic (as in patchwork theories) Changing something to accommodate an anomalous fact is degenerative (ad hoc 1), unless you can generate a novel prediction in the process of changing the theory. If you do make a novel prediction, but you don't (or can't) find a way to test it, this is also degenerative (ad hoc 2). If you change your theory without some unifying idea behind the shift (ad hoc 3) you may be finding new facts, but it's not a genuine research program. Elman & Elman emphasize that good science requires more than salvaging theories from disconfirming evidence. Explaining things that are already known counts for nothing, and you can't double-count old facts or use the same case to generate both theory and test (i.e. Walt 1997 uses BoT to predict "novel facts" about alliance behavior that also predict values of the same DV)

Keck and Sikkink (1998) -- Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics LAW, NORMS, AND RIGHTS

Setup: - Docus on transnational advocacy networks (TANs), defined as including "those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services" Argument: - Transnational activist networks influence human rights practices by allowing for the boomerang model, where a domestic group in a repressive state passes information to a group in another state, which then pressures its government to pressure the original government to reform its human rights practices - There are four types of politics that these networks use to affect change: information (generate politically useable information), symbolic (call upon symbols that make sense of a situation for an audience far away), leverage (ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members can't have influence) and accountability (effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies/principles) - Types/stages of network influence: issue creation and agenda setting, influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations, influence on institutional procedures, influence on policy change in "target actors" (states, IOs, private companies, etc.), influence on state behavior - In Latin America, governments did pressure Latin American countries to reform their human rights practices, but they weren't even paying attention to the issue until advocacy networks brought the issue of disappearances to public attention. This also worked because the states were vulnerable and unable to impose costs on the foreign governments that pressured them - Success is highest with issues (1) involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals (when there is a clear story about who is responsible) and (2) involving legal equality of opportunity

Lake (1996) -- Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Setup: - Grand strategy is a state's theory about how it can best "cause" security for itself - Alliances and empires are best thought of not as separate theoretical propositions, but rather as means of capability aggregation Argument: - Neither realism, nor regime type, nor ideology can explain the variance in security architectures pursued by the US (anarchic alliances) and USSR (informal empire) - States manufacture security via relational contracts that range from anarchic alliance to hierarchic empire (on a spectrum) - Opportunism and governance costs structure how states choose among alternatives - Under hierarchy, opportunism declines while governance costs increase - Opportunism may thwart alliances while stimulating formal empires. However, governance costs are also essential to understanding any manifestation of grand strategy Theory: - Security relations tend to be contract-based in some form, depending where on the alliances-protectorates-empire continuum one falls - In this relational contracting, transactions are the units of analysis and parties choose the relations that maximize their resources - Opportunism by partners (whether abandonment, entrapment, or exploitation) assumes the pursuit of individual advantage wherever possible and is costly in increasing asset specificity - The likelihood of opportunism is itself a function of the governance structure; the more hierarchical the relationship, the lower the probability of opportunism - Meanwhile, governance costs take three forms: distorted incentives for the subordinate partner; safeguards on the dominant state; and coercion where each is a function of how much residual control each party retains via the relevant contract and all increase with hierarchy Case / Findings: - The core point is that the US faced a low risk of opportunism and high governance costs after WWII, but the USSR faced the opposite - The Soviets exercised far greater control within their domain, yet had to worry about opportunism even though the control of satellite states was a sunk cost - The US, by contrast, bore significant governance costs in occupying Germany / Japan for a time but was able to avoid entrapment / exploitation by retaining its freedom of response, securing a European commitment for NATO to be led by an American general, and using Articles III & V to entrench mutual defense and assistance

Hafner-Burton (2005) -- Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression IOs TRADE & HUMAN RIGHTS

Setup: - Hard laws: tie agreement benefits to member compliance with specific human rights - Soft laws: only vaguely tied to market access and unconditional on member action Main Argument: - PTAs improve human rights through coercion by supplying the resources needed to change actors' incentives to promote reforms not otherwise implemented; quasi-autonomous from WTO - Three Hypotheses: (1) commitment to HRAs and (2) PTAs supplying soft human rights standards (not tied to market benefits) do not systematically produce improvement in human rights behaviors, while (3) state commitment to PTAs supplying hard human rights standards does often produce better practices - In human rights, hard laws are essential and change in repressive behavior requires legally binding obligations that are enforceable - HRAs are soft and use persuasion rather than coercion; persuasion requires convincing argumentation, a long-time horizon, simultaneous targeting of multiple actors, and access to target abusers - When PTAs offer hard laws, they are effective coercive tools; when they offer only soft laws, they are ineffective at improving HR - In HR, defectors shirk purposefully and for gain Coercion works b/c: - It provides stronger incentives - It does not require actors to change their preferences, it merely changes the cost-benefit analysis for repressive behavior - Coercion can take place over a shorter time horizon - Coercion can change a variety of different repressive actors' behavior when they value gains of cooperation over gains of repression - Coercion does not require direct and repeated access to target repressors Method: - Multivariate analyses show that repressors are no more likely or less likely than protectors to select agreements with hard standards - Poor democratizing states are most likely to choose hard deals; there is no difference between repressive states' selection of hard compared to soft standards

Mearsheimer (2014) -- Update to Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Chapter 10 on China's Rise) FUTURE OF IR

Setup: - He sees Russia and China as GPs, though the power asymmetry with the US is such that the US has been able to focus on minor wars / terrorists Argument: - China cannot rise peacefully; if China continues to grow at the current economic clip, the US, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam will need to contain China - Mearsheimer considers a world where China is relatively more powerful than and absolutely as powerful in economic and military terms as the United States Offensive Realism in Brief: - Five assumptions: 1. States are the key actors 2. All states have offensive military capabilities 3. States are never certain about the intentions of other states 4. States rank survival as primary goal 5. Anarchy - States as rational actors - States fear each other (no watchman) and must look out for their own survival - The more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely its survival will be at risk; ultimate goal is to be the hegemon and to prevent the rise of other regional hegemons - Global hegemony is not possible b/c of stopping power of water - If another regional hegemon appears, goal is to end its hegemony expeditiously The American Pursuit of Hegemony: - The US brutally expanded its country in the 18th and 19th centuries; model for Hitler - US also expelled other great powers out of the Western hemisphere - Four other potential regional hegemons: Wilhelmine Germany, imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union - The US was crucial in dismantling and defeating each foe Chinese Realpolitik: - China does not need additional territory to be a regional hegemon (they have a ton) - US has wielded a heavy hand in the Western hemisphere; China will expel the US from the Pacific region and the South China Sea conflict - China hopes to push the US beyond the first and second island chains i.e. to cut off US naval support to Korea, Japan, and the Philippines - Coercion is the best way for China to resolve disputes on favorable terms - China has acted unilaterally to start redirecting rivers to the dismay of other states - China will have good reason to interfere in the politics of the Americas, causing the US trouble in its backyard and stunting US projection of power - US and China may conflict in the Persian Gulf and Africa, two areas of strategic interest - There is support in China for a blue water navy to project power and dominate shipping and trade routes (key straits leading to the Indian Ocean) Why China Cannot Disguise its Rise: - China cannot continue a dialogue of peace and rise; this is because other states cannot be sure of China's true intentions - Security dilemma: moves seen as defensive in Beijing are offensive in D.C. - China has provoked nationalism and consolidation of power under Xi - Population means China can have more latent power than any other potential hegemon in history with only a per capita GNI equivalent to Hong Kong or South Korea The Coming Balancing Coalition: - The US will contain China like the Soviet Union, and Russia and Japan will align - US should pursue containment starting with an alliance coalition like NATO with China's neighbors - The US can continue to trade with China, though the relationship will be competitive - US is an offshore balancer, but they must come onshore when the local powers cannot contain the potential hegemon itself; local powers are located far from China (need US coordination) and they are relatively weak (need US intervention, not buckpassing) - Three alternatives to offshore balancing: 1. Preventive war: not feasible because of Chinese nuclear deterrent, inability to invade mainland China, and problems with a nuclear strike 2. Policies aimed at slowing Chinese economic growth: no practical way to slow China's economy without self-inflicting damage, plus other countries would fill the vacuum (seeing it today) 3. Rollback: topple regimes friendly to China and foment trouble inside China What Would Security Competition Look Like? 1. Crises 2. Arms races 3. Proxy wars 4. Rollback 5. Bait-and-bleed 6. Bloodletting 7. Government officials and think-tanks identify the other side as the main enemy 8. Travel restrictions on visitors 9. Barring Chinese students from US universities central to military research 10. Export controls on dual-use goods 11. Substantial economic intercourse could remain 12. Cooperation on some issues, but conflictual root relationship Is War Likely? - Geography and the distribution of power make war more likely than in the Cold War despite the same nuclear deterrent - Europe had a central front; Asia instead has a number of places where war may break out but where the magnitude would be less great than Europe 1945-1990 - Nuclear weapons are not as scattered throughout Asia, so less likely to play a key role - Potential conflicts: Korea, Senkaku Islands, Taiwan, South China Sea Polarity and War: - Asia is a multipolar system: it will be unbalanced with India, China, Russia, US, Japan all qualifying as GPs and China as the potential hegemon - Greater potential for miscalculation, more conflict dyads, imbalances of power - Unbalanced MP is the most dangerous distribution of power Communism and Nationalism - Hypernationalism: essentially heuristic out-group stuff; belief that other nations are inferior and dangerous and must be dealt with harshly - Created by intense security competition - Nationalistic accounts paint China as a helpless victim of aggression by GPs Confucian Pacifism: - Like liberalism in the US, Confucianism allows China to sound moral and act like realists - Really, as Johnston says, Chinese are realists Economic Interdependence: - Economic interdependence inextricably bounds China to the economies of its potential rivals - Three problems: 1. Theory depends on permanent prosperity, but downturns induce war 2. Victory in war may bring substantial economic and strategic benefits greater than the costs of losing an interdependent trade partner 3. Economically interdependent countries can sometimes fight wars and still avoid significant economic costs (see Davis and Meunier 2011) 4. Chinese wars may be limited in scope, they may not fight multiple partners at once, states at war may not break off economic relations with one another, etc.

Brooks and Wohlforth (2008) -- World Out of Balance EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Setup: - In this framework, power constitutes material resources and unipolarity is an arrangement in which a single state (1) commands an especially large share of all resources and (2) excels in all component elements of state capability i.e. population and territory, resource endowment, economic capacity, military might, and organizational-institutional competence - Constraints vary in their conditionality (how easy they are to avoid) and strength (the range of policies to which they apply and how malleable they are) - Constraints can be structural, strongly or weakly conditional, or inoperative Argument: - The United States does not face significant external constraints on its power, whether stemming from international institutions, balancing dynamics, global economic interdependence, or legitimacy - These constraints do not bind under unipolarity in the same way they did under bipolarity, as the concentration of power makes them inoperative - The US can sustain its security commitments around the globe; it remains well-positioned to reshape the international system to advance its security interests; and unilateralism isn't prohibitively costly (though that doesn't mean it is wise - substance matters more than process) Theory: - The authors bracket domestic politics and institutions (they're card-carrying realists, after all) to evaluate the argument that "rising power meets rising constraints" - This is a surprisingly common thread in most realist, institutionalist, constructivist, and liberal approaches to IR, but the authors argue that such convergence is based on the limitations of existing theories for explaining the current moment - Realism predicts that power begets countervailing power (balancing) - Institutionalism pushes states to maintain a "multilateral reputation" - they must accept the rules of the game to ensure others' cooperation - Constructivism argues that stable political power rests on legitimacy - Liberalism points to the opportunity cost of reduced access to the world economy - While policy discussions often hinge on whether the US should pursue offshore balancing (retrenchment), engagement (status quo), or primacy (expansion), it generally does not address a second question raised in Gilpin (1981) - whether the US ought to consider changing the international system in ways consistent with an expected net gain - This could arise from increased economic influence and continued control over the rules of the game rather than territorial aggrandizement - Scholars have largely ignored this question because unipolarity was initially supposed to be fleeting, since the US was judged to be in decline during the 1980s - Even once it became clear that unipolarity wasn't going anywhere, scholars either assumed that such efforts would be fruitless and costly given systemic constraints (Ikenberry) OR that the current arrangement was not necessarily perfect but certainly satisfactory (Jervis)

Tomz (2007) -- Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries FINANCE, MONEY, AND DEBT

Setup: - International debt contracts raise serious credibility problems; in a given year 10% of governments fail to meet obligations to foreign bondholders and commercial banks - Literature offers two major perspectives:: (1) repeat play: leaders cooperate today to ensure good future relations; (2) issue linkage: connects behavior in one area to threat of sanctions in another Tomz proposes a reputational theory that builds on models of repeat play but modifies them by conjoining two key features: incomplete information and political change - Relaxes assumption of complete information about preferences of foreign governments and allows preferences to change over time - Investors continually update beliefs about type of government they confront - Complete information leaves no room for changes in impressions (learning) but governments face swings in public opinion and regime ideology - Concerns about reputation motivate countries to repay and inspire investors to lend - The key is that investors change beliefs when governments act surprisingly - Past seems to matter very little in empirical work Three types of debtors: - Stalwarts: strongest preferences for repayment due to long time horizons, weak anti-payment coalitions, and high value of foreign capital - Fair-weathers: intermediate preferences - pay in good times, but not in bad - Lemons: receive very little utility from repayment The terms of loans reflect beliefs about government type: - Interest rates: increased to account for risk, but counterproductive above certain level because they then create incentives for default - Controlling risk: collateral and pledged assets under foreign bank supervision - Avoiding risk by refusing to lend under particularly bad conditions (lemons) Criticism: - Daryl Press and "current calculus" theory suggests that decisions makers can measure the preferences and abilities of foreign governments directly and in real time; predictive power of current intelligence exceeds that of history - Sometimes current intelligence is cheap and that cues like regime type, leader transition, protests, stability, party type, etc. can give better insights especially in the early part of a regime's tenure

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) -- Attitudes toward Highly-Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment IMMIGRATION

Setup: - LMC model predicts that natives will be most opposed to immigrants who have skill levels similar to their own - Fiscal burden model anticipates that rich natives oppose low-skilled immigration more than poor natives, and that this gap is larger in states with greater fiscal exposure (in terms of immigrant access to public services) Argument: - The fiscal burden adaptation of FP model assumes that low-skilled immigrants impose a substantial burden on public finance where highly skilled immigrants are net contributors in terms of taxes - The poor might fear competition for benefits where the rich fear taxation RD: - Unique survey experiment that explicitly and separately examines individuals' attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigrants - Educational attainment is the measure of skill levels - For the financial burden test - utilize cross-state variation in share of welfare-reliant immigrants and generosity of the welfare system Findings: - Both low-skilled and highly skilled natives strongly prefer highly skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants, and this preference is not decreasing in natives' skill levels - Support for both highly skilled and low-skilled immigration is strongly increasing in respondents' skill levels; effect is non-linear i.e. the big jump is between college education and not - There seems to be no variation in the premium attached to highly skilled immigrants across respondents' skill level - In states with high fiscal exposure, poor (rich) natives are more (less) opposed to low-skilled immigration than they are elsewhere, indicating that concerns among poor natives about constraints on welfare benefits as a result of immigration are more relevant than concerns among the rich about increased taxes; in high fiscal exposure states, the premium attached to highly skilled immigration relative to low-skill immigration is decreasing in income - In sum, material self-interest does not appear to be a powerful determinant of anti-immigrant sentiment

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) -- Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy IMMIGRATION

Setup: - Literature review is inconclusive: (1) H-O says immigrants sometimes have no impact on native wages; (2) FP predicts immigration pressures the wages of similarly skilled workers nationwide; (3) area analysis predicts immigrants pressure wages of similarly skilled natives who reside in gateway communities where immigrants settle - HO: If the country is large, wages change as well as the output mix: the relative price of non-skill-intensive products declines, which lowers (increases) wages for unskilled (skilled) workers (and supply declines if no wage change) - FP: Assumes single aggregate output sector; there can be no output-mix changes to help absorb immigrants, only wage changes; low-skilled immigrants decrease the real wages of native low-skilled workers as new immigrants price themselves into employment, and the real wages of highly skilled workers will rise - AA: Assumes distinct, geographically segmented labor markets within country; areas where immigrants concentrate show bigger effects Argument: - Two assumptions: (1) current factor income is a major determinant of people's economic well-being; (2) US citizens think that current immigrant inflows increase the relative supply of less-skilled workers - They think the economic determinants of an individual's immigration-policy preferences depend on how an immigration-induced shift in the US relative endowment towards less-skilled workers affects that individual's factor income Method: - 1992, 1994, and 1996 NES surveys - To show that occupation wage and education years measure labor-market skills, they show that the correlation between these regressors and immigration opinion holds among only labor-force participants Findings: - Less-skilled workers are significantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflows into the US - Over the time horizons that are relevant to individuals when evaluating immigration policy, individuals think that the US economy absorbs immigrant inflows partly by changing wages - They form opinions in accord with interests as labor force participants consistent with H-O (where immigration affects both wages and output mix) and the FP labor model (just wages) - No evidence that the relationship between skills and immigration opinions is stronger in high-immigration communities inconsistent with area-analysis labor model

MacDonald (2014) -- Networks of Domination: The Social Foundations of Peripheral Conquest in International Politics EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Setup: - Patterns of collaboration and resistance help explain which strategies conquerors can employ and when these strategies will be successful - The conqueror's strategy is to exploit access to local assets to overcome the logistical constraints imposed by distance and prey upon local vulnerabilities to prevent local resistance and collaboration (as in Nexon) - But not all conquerors succeed in adopting and executing strategies to overwhelm peripheries Argument: - The success of these strategies is a function of, first, the availability of local collaborators; these collaborators act as intermediaries and intelligence sources, provide legitimating narratives, and ease extraction of local assets - But intermediaries face a dilemma: collaboration provides many benefits, but it can expose oneself to local retribution; the conqueror needs to make a credible commitment to a collaborators' protection - A key factor is thus the density of social ties connecting aspiring conquerors to local elites. Collaborators may be either local allies (weaker and more temporary links) or local intermediaries (stronger and more permanent links) - Second, success is a function of the extent of local fragmentation. Fragmented societies have trouble organizing resistance. They are susceptible to selective repression and positive inducements. The key factor here is the density of social ties connecting prominent elites to each other. An increased number of interactions increases their ability to form collective narratives of resistance and share its burdens. Disconnected elites have a greater incentive to free ride or tolerate conquest. - What is unique about MacDonald's argument is that collaboration and resistance share a common social foundation: the configuration of social ties connecting peripheral elites to each other and to external powers; there are two forms of social ties: sparse (weak ties to a few indigenous elites) and dense (strong ties to many indigenous elites) Method: - Case study of the British conquest in India Findings: - The British overwhelming Indian resistance was not simply a function of the superior technology or skill of its military forces, but the capacity of the British to exploit ties with local intermediaries as well as fragmentation within Indian states - Dense social ties with local Indian elites allowed the East India Company to raise and supply sizable armies, cultivate a vast network of intelligence assets, and develop legitimizing narratives - Fragmentation within India, particularly between different classes of elites, inhibited organization of a coherent resistance. It is thus a paradigmatic case of local collaboration and fragmentation combining to facilitate peripheral conquest

MacDonald and Parent (2011) -- Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Setup: - Retrenchment is a policy of retracting grand strategic commitments in response to declining relative power - It is distinct from hegemonic change or appeasement / surrender - Previous scholarship suggests that retrenchment is a slippery slope at the international level (Gilpin, Copeland) and politically difficult at the domestic level due to fragmentation, entrenched interests, and sclerotic institutions Argument: - Much commentary on US decline and the prospects for retrenchment is rather grim - In a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment, the authors examine 18 cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and make three points 1. Peaceful retrenchment is the most common response 2. The magnitude of relative decline explains the extent of retrenchment 3. The rate of decline explains what forms retrenchment will take - great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate disputes; they moderate their ambitions and offer concessions accordingly, but retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation Theory: - From a neorealist perspective, the authors argue that states respond to negative feedback and retrench in proportion to their rate of decline relative to other great powers - But contra Waltz, they suggest that neorealism can be a theory of foreign policy because it predicts either internal or external balancing in response to shifts in the balance of power - If retrenchment is a form of balancing, then states facing relative decline will undertake one or both activities in response Method: - The authors look for instances of acute relative decline as a function of world GDP share since 1870; this decline must decrease the given state's ordinal ranking and persist for at least five years - They measure the extent of retrenchment both qualitatively (expand commitments vs. high, medium, or low degrees of retrenchment) and quantitatively (changes in defense spending and personnel, new alliance agreements signed, behavior in militarized disputes) - The case studies examine France in 1924 and Britain in 1946. Both involve declining great powers emerging from costly wars with unsustainable external commitments. However, Britain's acute decline was much more significant than France's, a challenge which led London to aggressively curtail its international commitments (successfully and peacefully)

Steinberg (2002) -- In the Shadow of Law and Power? Consensus- Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO IOs TRADE

Setup: - Three types of decision-making rules for non-judicial action: (1) Majoritarian: decisions are taken by majority vote of member states; (2) Weighted Voting: decisions are taken by majority with each state assigned votes in proportion to its population, financial contribution to the organization, etc.; (3) Sovereign Equality: formally negate status, offer equal representation and voting power in international organizations, and take decisions by consensus or unanimity of the members - The consensus practice emerged in the 1950s as a response to the en masse accession of developing countries that had a supermajority together to force their agenda; weighting was unnecessary due to the underlying power of the US Questions: Why would powerful entities like the EC and US support a consensus decision-making rule in an organization like the GATT/WTO, which generates hard law? How have the EC and US dominated GATT/WTO outcomes in the face of a consensus decision-making rule? Main Argument: - When GATT/WTO bargaining is law-based, states take procedural rules seriously, attempting to build a consensus that is Pareto-improving, yielding market-opening contracts that are roughly symmetrical - When GATT/WTO bargaining is power-based, states bring to bear instruments of power that are extrinsic to rules (instruments based primarily on market size) invisibly weighting the decision-making process and generating outcomes that are asymmetrical and may not be Pareto-improving - Trade rounds have been launched through law-based bargaining that has yielded equitable contracts designating the topics to be addressed, but rounds have been concluded through power-based bargaining that has yielded asymmetrical contracts favoring the interests of powerful states - Side payments allow consensus for contract asymmetry; package deal where a decision is taken simultaneously on different issues to achieve consensus - Weaker states may be coerced by threats to make them worse off; threat of sanction in the case of one state; threat of leaving the organization in the case of a group Problems: - Issue linkage is actually very difficult at the WTO; the only people that are there are trade people, so you are unable to link with finance, industry, etc.

Lyall (2009) -- Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya CIVIL WAR

Setup: - Traditional argument: indiscriminate violence solves the collective-action problem facing insurgents by forcing would-be free riders to seek sanctuary in rebels' arms - Spiral model: action and reaction facilitating insurgent mobilization and widening the war's geographic scope and destructiveness - Action creates grievances among individuals and it drives individuals into insurgency out of a need for protection (can't free ride) A Theory of Indiscriminate Violence (IV): - Insurgent weakness may result from IV; the organization must survive in the face of state coercion - Two mechanisms: (1) creates enormous logistical problems for insurgencies i.e. protection of refugees, supply lines, concentration of forces, reduction of tax base and degradation of materials; (2) undermines effectiveness by driving a wedge between locals and insurgents b/c they may blame insurgents rather than the government - Underscores that the insurgents cannot protect the population and that its continued presence endangers noncombatants Observable implication: - Once victimized, populations will record fewer insurgent attacks relative both to prior levels of violence and to non-victimized populations Method: - Estimates indiscriminate violence's effect on subsequent patterns of insurgent attacks across matched pairs of similar shelled and non-shelled villages; DID design - Endogeneity: is violence a cause of insurgency or a response to earlier insurgency? - Selection effects: severe where we only observe failures; we need negative cases where people choose not to be insurgents to avoid bias - Two counterfactuals at work: 1. We want to know how many more insurgents would have been created had violence not been used 2. We also want sufficient data to match shelled areas with a comparable but non-repressed village to examine changes in patterns of insurgent violence - DV: attack defined as an insurgent-initiated attack against Russian or pro-Russian Chechen proxy forces, their local representatives, and civilians at the village level; operationalized as the difference in mean number of insurgent-initiated attacks during identical post-shelling and pre-shelling time periods - IVs: three triggers tested: lethality, destructiveness, and frequency of shelling Findings: - Counterintuitive: shelled villages experience a 24 percent reduction in post-treatment mean insurgent attacks relative to control villages - Commonly cited "triggers" for insurgent retaliation, including the lethality and destructiveness of indiscriminate violence, are either negatively correlated with insurgent attacks or statistically insignificant

Mearsheimer (1995) -- The False Promise of International Institutions IOs

Setup: - Institutions are a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other - They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior typically formalized in international agreements and usually embodied in organizations with their own personnel and budgets Realism: - States operate through institutions, but these rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based on the international distribution of power - Institutions are arenas for acting out power relationships (i.e. NATO, which is an institution but also a manifestation of the bipolar balance of power) Liberalism: - Focuses on explaining cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed - Institutions can help them engage in goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be - Largely concentrates on economic and environmental issues, not security issues - According to these theorists, the principle obstacle to cooperation among states with mutual interests is the threat of cheating, and institutions can help solve this problem because they can assure states they won't get cheated on. Potential cheaters must think they will get caught, and potential victims are given the means to punish cheaters and early warning of cheating - Institutions can make four major changes to the contractual environment: (1) Institutionalized iteration, where states interact a lot and so raises the costs of cheating by creating the possibility that states could get payback in the future, and rewards states that have good reputations (2) Rules can tie together interactions between states in different issue areas using issue linkage to create greater interdependence (3) Raises the amount of information available to states, which increases the likelihood that cheaters will get caught early on (4) Rules reduce the transaction costs of individual agreements by increasing institutional support for states during negotiation Argument: - Liberals are right that cheating is a barrier to cooperation, but so are relative gains concerns, which liberals don't consider - Liberals say that they don't deal with security cooperation, and so relative gains concerns don't apply, but the economy is intertwined with the military and so you can't say liberals focus on the economy but not security (Gowa & Mansfield 1993) - A lot of trade theory deals with relative gains, so even saying they only focus on the economy is not a good defense for disregarding relative gains - Mearsheimer argues that there is no evidence that states cooperate through institutions when they seriously care about relative gains - There is little evidence that institutions have facilitated cooperation that would not have occurred in the absence of institutions - A false belief in international institutions can harm international politics because it leads to failures when states rely on institutional solutions

Wendt (1992) -- Anarchy Is What States Make of It THEORIES OF IR

Social constructivism! Interactions between units transform the units themselves. Identities are inherently relational. Problematizes deduction of self-help from anarchy. Problem with Realism and Liberalism: - They treat the identities and interests of states as exogenously given and focus on how behavior generates outcomes - Anarchy need not mean self-help Arguments: - Self-help and power politics do not follow logically or causally from anarchy - Self-help stems from process, not structure - People act toward objects based on meaning (i.e. friend vs. enemy) - Actors acquire identities -- relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self in relation to others (fits with rationalism) - Interests are formed based on institutional roles and social discourse -- State A gesture -> State B conjecture (based on State A's gesture and capabilities) -> State A Response - Institutions form where actors internalize identities and interests and they become stable Three Cultures of Anarchy: - Hobbesian (realist): states view each other as enemies; no right to sovereignty; relative gains; power maximization; constant state of war - Lockean: states view each other as rivals; sovereignty; absolute gains; cooperation is possible; war is limited - Kantian: self-help does not hold; states view each other as friends; norm of non-violence; collective security Steps to Identity Change: - Breakdown of consensus - Critical examination of olds ideas of self/other - Change the identities and interests of the others that reinforce the status quo system Problems: - There is no beginning in constructivism, so where does the interaction start? - Is constructivism a theory (falsifiable)? What are the testable predictions? - It is like rationalism -- a sociological vs. microeconomic framework with no predictions

Barrett (2003) -- Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Policy Making ENVIRONMENT

Summary: - Environmental cooperation is a PD, and cooperation is attained when the rules of the game can be changed. Free-riding is the big problem On Externalities: - Actions taken unilaterally do not determine outcomes; interdependence creates unintentional transnational externalities; still they can provoke an aggressive response by harmed parties - Unidirectional externality: one party negatively affects another but not vice versa, meaning it is by definition asymmetric - Reciprocal externality: every country imposes externalities on all others that share a resource (global climate change and ozone depletion) - Externalities can impinge on utility and production relationships; unilateralism is likely to sustain only inefficient outcomes The Model: - States are the primary players in the international system, and their actions are interdependent; they act based partially on behavior of other states - Assumes that states are unitary and monolithic - Incentives to free ride in repeated games tend to cause deterioration of cooperation - Transparency and communication should not remove the dilemma, but in practice, group negotiation can lead to cooperation i.e. "spirit of Montreal" - Punishment for defection along with third party enforcement can negate the dilemma, but international cooperation is generally self-enforcing - There is a distinction between intra- and transnational constraints; within countries, the government can intervene, but between countries, there is no one to dictate policy Why are agreements kept without third party enforcement? - Mutual affection: the parties care about each other - Trust/loyalty: if you believe others are trustworthy, you may cooperate - Mutual enforcement: repeated games might lead to cooperation Commitment: - States are unable to credibly commit to cooperation; both threats and promises follow this logic; and the threat/promise must be both credible and public knowledge Strategy: - States must strategically manipulate their incentives if cooperation is to succeed - In the whaling case, for example, legislation tied the President's hands to make the threat of an embargo credible and the action was extremely harmful to offender Independence and Dominance: - A hegemon might be able to coerce other states into cooperation, but Keohane (1984) shows that hegemon is neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperation; hegemons are big polluters - Realism: zero-sum games exacerbate the PD as does concern for relative gains Preferences and Morals: - States are not Kantian, but might behave in a Kantian way because they can achieve Pareto efficient outcomes by doing so - Side payments might sustain cooperation - if countries cooperate fully and side payments are allowed, countries will seek to maximize joint payoffs Discussion: - Can develop rules of the game such that there is no longer a PD; once countries join the treaty, there are no incentives to defect - If any one country defects, the whole treaty falls apart; this binding constraint gives everyone an incentive to abide - There should not be much optimism for a treaty continuing once countries deviate

Copelovitch and Putnam (2014) -- Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation IOs RATIONAL DESIGN

Summary: - All else equal, a larger number of prior agreements increases the probability that new agreements will be of finite duration, reduces the probability that new agreements will contain exit clauses, and reduces the probability that they will contain dispute settlement clauses - Koremenos (2005) says that set durations indicate more uncertainty; CP say the opposite Argument: - Response: Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) - Important element missing from rational design theories of international agreements: "institutional context" defined as the presence or absence of existing and prior agreements between prospective partners in "new" cooperation - Prior design successes should influence the terms of additional cooperation - Institutional context is a significant determinant of key design features including ex ante limitations on agreement duration, exit clauses, and third-party dispute resolution provisions - Variation in institutional context should systematically influence the existence and severity of the forms of uncertainty that KLS identify as the central drivers of variation in agreement design: uncertainty over the preferences of other actors, uncertainty over their behavior, and uncertainty about the state of the world - KLS argue that as uncertainty about the distribution of future gains from cooperation increases, states are more likely to incorporate certain elements into their agreements (shorter duration and exit clauses) - In contrast to KLS, their approach allows prior institutional arrangements between negotiating parties to influence the issue-related uncertainties Results: Agreement Duration - Institutional context is positively correlated with inclusion of ex ante time limitations in negotiated agreements and negatively correlated with the inclusion of exit clauses and third-party dispute settlement procedures - The number of prior agreements between two states is significantly correlated with agreement duration, and a larger number of prior agreements increases the probability that the current agreement will include an ex ante time limitation - Context-rich dyads view the ability to easily make short-term commitments as an opportunity for increased mutual gains rather than a hedge against individual losses; suggests a longer shadow of the future and less concern about uncertainty - Uncertainty only increases the probability of a finite agreement in cases when states have signed one or more prior agreements - States with more extensive records of past cooperation are less likely to include dispute settlement clauses in new treaties - Uncertainty has a positive and significant effect only at low levels of prior agreements; distribution of future gains concerns mitigated by past agreements

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) -- Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Summary: College education is linked to cosmopolitanism and knowledge of the benefits of trade which create pro-trade opinion Key Findings: - The impact of education on attitudes toward trade is identical among respondents in the active labor force and those who are not (including retirees) so it is not a self-interest story - If being paid does not mediate the effect, then it is likely not the result of income-based calculations or distributional concerns - While college education increases support for trade, increases in other types of education do not increase support for trade despite increased skill levels - Information also makes college graduates less prone to nationalist and anti-foreign sentiments often linked with protectionism (i.e. Mansfield and Mutz); socialized to a more cosmopolitan and tolerant view of the world Argument: - They posit that exposure to economic ideas and information among college-educated individuals plays a key role in shaping attitudes toward trade and globalization Method: - Data sources: NES and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) which correspond to those used by Scheve/Slaughter and Mayda/Rodrik In tension with Mayda and Rodrik (2005) Problems: - Couldn't retirees be concerned about past earnings (sticky opinions) or the earnings of those similar to themselves consistent with HO?

Krasner (1991) -- Life on the Pareto Frontier IOs

Summary: Even if you accept, as neoliberal institutionalists do, that cooperation can occur, power is still relevant in determining the shape of cooperation Goal: explores how power shapes cooperation ARGUMENT: There are 4 possible configurations of interests between players: 1. Zero-sum (all gains for one player are losses for the other) 2. Harmony (players converge without need for coordination) 3. Common Aversion (coordination game) 4. Common Interest Cooperation regimes are impossible for zero-sum (no point in talking because there is no room for agreement) and unnecessary for harmony (no point in talking because there is no issue of contention) Coordination games can also involve "battle of the sexes" game where actors are better to coordinate, but they also have preferences on which point to agree to. So they can get to the Pareto frontier, but they cannot agree to which point on this frontier. The resolution to this Pareto problem can be resolved through force: 1. Power can determine who gets to play the game. Less powerful actors are often simply not invited to the table 2. Power can be used to dictate the rules of the game (like who moves first). A more powerful actor will often simply preempt everyone else 3. Power can be used to change the payoff matrix, by linking the issue to another issue CASE: - Krasner applies this to global communications regimes such as telecom, electromagnetic spectrum, remote sensing (ex: satellite imaging), and TV and radio broadcasting - In remote sensing and broadcasting, there were no regimes because the powerful states simply set the rules of the game on their own. They were not dependent on others - With regards to electromagnetic spectrum and telecommunications, there were regimes, because they involved a pure coordination game. If you don't coordinate who uses which band you get static on the airwaves which no one can use - Global communications have not been characterized by Nash equilibrium that are Pareto- suboptimal. Rather, it is a question of what point along the Pareto frontier that should be chosen. Power plays a role in determining which point is chosen

Fearon and Wendt (2002) -- Rationalism v. Constructivism STRUCTURE/AGENCY

Summary: In some cases they offer rival hypotheses, in others they seem complementary, in others they are redundant. The most fruitful framing of `rationalism v constructivism' is a pragmatic one, treating them as analytic lenses for looking at social reality Material vs. Ideational: - Rationalists are about material factors (people act on the basis of material self-interest) and constructivists are about ideas (people act on the basis of norms or values) - In reality, both think ideas matter insofar as preferences/interests are ideas Logic of consequences vs. logic of appropriateness: - The former is acting on consequences based on preferences and the latter on appropriateness based on habit or role - Sometimes you don't violate norms because you fear consequences (so maybe it can be) - Empirically, people do both, and there can be a comparative advantage to both approaches. Norms as useful vs. norms as right: - Rationalists argue that people follow norms only when useful to do so, whereas constructivists allow that people can be motivated by what they consider to be right or legitimate - "Thin" rationalism allows interpreting norms as preferences. "Thick" rationalism could indeed lead to rival hypotheses 3 reasons NOT to treat as rivalry: - Humans don't always follow one motivation or another. - Empirically is may be impossible to discriminate between the views, especially when the two often predict the same outcome - The two motivations may interact with each other over time in either direction

Nexon and Wright (2007) -- What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate? EMPIRE, HIERARCHY, AND UNIPOLARITY

Summary: Intermediaries are like brokers in patronage systems. This supposes a lot of agency in setting up imperial networks and exploiting them. The broker can use a multi-vocal strategy by creating a sort of Rorschach blot, a vague identity that different targets interpret in different ways Argument: - Ideal-typical empires differ from hegemonic and unipolar orders because they combine two features: (1) rule through intermediaries and (2) heterogeneous contracting between imperial centers and constituent political communities - Empires resemble a "rimless" hub-and-spoke system; cores are connected to the peripheries, but the peripheries themselves are unconnected - In an imperial system, divide-and-rule replace balance-of-power politics; inter-societal relations supplant interstate relations - Characterized by use of local intermediaries (and concomitant principal-agent problems) and local processes of divide-and-rule - Empires face the problem of legitimating their rule. They resort to heterogeneous contracts that specify varied rights and privileges to different peripheries. Empires engage in multi-vocal signaling, projecting different identities and commitments to different audiences - The most important difference between unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial system is the intensity and density of network ties 1. In a unipolar system, interstate ties are weak and sparse; relations resemble "billiard balls colliding" insofar as there is strong collective identification within states and distinct national identities 2. In a hegemonic system, systems are hierarchical but not anarchic (as in unipolarity theory). There is greater interdependence, with cross-cutting political ties among states and limited economic specialization. There are networks of security guarantees. There are also "constitutional orders," a particular form of hegemonic order organized around agreed-upon legal and political institutions that allocate rights and limit the exercise of power within the system. Institutions serve as social sites for reciprocal ties of authority between the hegemonic and lesser powers. Formal & reciprocal ties connect all relevant actors (stronger ties than those in traditional hegemonic systems) 3. In an imperial system, there is a distinctive core-periphery structure. The empire operates through indirect rule, with the use of (quasi-)autonomous intermediaries (higher levels of autonomy when the empire is informal). The core engages in heterogeneous contracting, with asymmetric agreements backed by the threat of imperial sanction and negotiated on the basis of the superior resources of imperial cores. The core occupies a "brokerage position" between local intermediaries and aggregate peripheries; they negotiate relations among peripheries, giving them a substantial advantage in power and influence. Cores engage in across-segment divide and rule to prevent the formation of countervailing coalitions. The differentiation of peripheries serves as a firewall against the spread of resistance. This strategy is counteracted by decreased differentiation and exogenous or endogenous triggers for simultaneous resistance (e.g., economic shocks or widespread social movements) - The core, in its central brokerage position, is buffeted by powerful cross-pressures. The more segmented empires are, the easier divide and rule is, but the more intense cross pressures are. The core can use side payments, but this accumulates obligations and drains imperial resources. It can also use multi-vocal signaling (the Protestant Reformation complicated this, as you couldn't simultaneously signal as both a Protestant and Catholic state) - Imperial authorities can avoid local entanglements if local intermediaries are vested with some power and autonomy. This system can be used to create plausible deniability. The downsides are that this system is inefficient, with mounting principal-agent problems, and intermediaries may gain asymmetric leverage over relations between core authorities and imperial subjects. They can enrich themselves or break away from imperial control - Intermediaries can be used to develop divide-and-rule systems within segments. They can develop a privileged class of local actors. Or they can triangulate among actors

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) -- What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preference? SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Summary: factor type matters but employment sector does not Key Findings: - Factor type (HO) dominates industry of employment (RV) in explaining support for trade barriers; consistent with HO, and there is relatively high inter-sectoral labor mobility in the US - Lower skill workers, measured by education or average occupation earnings, prefer barriers to trade - Home ownership also matters - home owners in counties with a manufacturing mix concentrated in comparative disadvantage industries support trade barriers (independent of the income effect); because people save and invest in a wide range of assets, trade-policy preferences may hinge on factor income as well as asset ownership; intuition is that comparative disadvantage regions experience less economic activity and therefore depressed housing prices and value - Employment in industries more exposed to trade, measured by tariffs or exports, is not strongly correlated with support for new barriers - Women, democrats, and union members are more likely to support trade barriers Method: - American National Election Studies (NES) 1993 Problems: - They argue that asking about trade generally, as opposed to a specific policy, should prevent respondents from giving opinions linked to specific countries - this is likely not true

Mansfield and Mutz (2009) -- Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Voting, and Out-Group Anxiety SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Summary: sociotropic sentiments and out-group anxieties are the main drivers of trade opinion Key Findings: - Using two representative national surveys of Americans, they find no evidence for RV or HO - Ethnocentrism and isolationism wipe out the effect of education on trade opinion; they also show that college effect is not linked to knowledge of economics or econ classes - They do find that education is positively correlated with pro-trade opinion, but the effects are less representative of skill than of individuals' anxieties about involvement with out-groups in their own country and beyond - Trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the US economy as a whole is affected by trade - There is little support for free trade from people who believe the US should be isolationist more broadly and from those who feel their ethnic/racial group is superior Argument: - People have trouble understanding the connection between personal economic well-being and government policy - Sociotropic concerns shape trade attitudes independent of self-interest - Specific factors model is hard to test because there is little data on employment sector - Simple demographics explain more than Scheve/Slaughter or Mayda/Rodrik models - They believe education is a poor proxy for skill level because well-educated people are different than less-educated people in a number of ways as in ethnocentricism, out-group dynamics, or isolationist foreign policy preferences - Authors ought to use indices of survey responses! Method: - Telephone survey as part of the National Annenberg Election Study (NAES) during summer 2004, and the other was an Internet survey by Knowledge Networks (KN) in summer 2007 - Construct indices of trade preferences - Note: this is only US data relative to Mayda/Rodrik and Hainmueller/Hiscox

Mayda and Rodrik (2005) -- Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others SOCIETAL COALITION MODELS OF TRADE

Summary: values and narrow self-interest matter Key Findings: - In line with HO/SS, individuals with higher human capital oppose trade restrictions, but only in countries that are well-endowed with human capital; does not square well with the idea that education means people know the benefits of trade or understand comparative advantage - all are selfish - Preferences of trade are associated with trade exposure; individuals in non-traded and comparative advantage sectors are pro-trade and those in comparative disadvantage sectors are protectionist (in line with RV) - An individual's relative economic status has a strong positive association with pro-trade attitudes - Non-economic determinants like values and identities play a role in trade attitudes (i.e. neighborhood attachment and nationalism) - There is evidence to suggest trade policy maps from trade preferences or vice versa Method: - International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and World Values Survey (WVS) - Education as a skill-level proxy and GDPPC for factor endowment of skilled labor

Wohlforth et al. (2007) -- Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

Terms: - BoP: holds that hegemonies do not form because perceived threats of hegemony over the system generate balancing behavior - Hegemony: any situation in which one great power has amassed sufficient capabilities to predominate over the others (160) - Unipolar Threshold: point at which balancing the hegemon becomes prohibitively costly Balancing fails because: - Collective action problems (i.e. free riding) - Political obstacles within states prevent emulation of successful power-generating actions - There is uncertainty about which state poses the biggest threat Hegemonies form when: - The rising hegemon develops the ability to incorporate and administer conquered areas - The boundaries of the international system remain stable and no new powers emerge from outside the system RD: - Eight cause studies outside of modern Europe - Ancient Near East system (900-600 BC); Greek city-state system and Persia (500-330 BC); Eastern Mediterranean system (300-100 BC); Ancient Indian system (500-200 BC); Ancient Chinese system (656-221 BC); East Asian system (1000-1800); American system (1300-1600). - States are bad at balancing outside of European context. Findings: - Findings are inconsistent with any theory that predicts a tendency of the international system toward balance - Sustained hegemonies routinely form, and balancing is relatively insignificant in explaining the emergence of non-hegemonic outcomes

Russett and Oneal (2001) -- Triangulating Peace DEMOCRATIC PEACE

The Kantian Triangle! This book argues that democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions work together to promote international peace. Vicious Cycles exist in world politics, like the security dilemma. However, there also exist Virtuous Circles, a set of political, economic, and social institutions designed to reinforce one another and promote peaceful relations. Democracy: - Democracies rarely fight each other (this is a probabilistic point, not an iron law); they are also less likely to threaten each other during crises with the 1999 Kargil War being the main exception - Democracies are more peaceful in general than authoritarian political systems - Democracies are more likely to join international organizations - Democracies also tend to be capitalist - Wars between autocratic dyads or between democracies and autocracies are still likely - In contrast with the findings of Mansfield and Snyder (1995), democratizing states are no more prone to war than are established democracies. The promotion of democracy should therefore go some way to promoting peace internationally (but they don't test big swings) Economic Interdependence: - Economically important trade and investment limit the likelihood that a state will use force against its commercial partner - Economic interdependence tends to spur the creation of international organizations to facilitate trade - It is not only industry leaders that become domestic influences for peace, it is also those citizens that come to depend on imported goods - Openness and exports/GDP matter; development does not IOs: - IOs make a direct contribution to preventing and resolving conflicts between countries - Countries that are both members of IOs are also less likely to go to war against each other - IOs tend to support and promote democracy Triangle: - The existence of peace tends to reinforce democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations. However, the "Kantian triangle" of democracy, economic interdependence, and IOs tends to operate more strongly in Europe and North America than in Asia and Africa - Conceive of the international system as a multilevel system that doesn't just incorporate states, but other actors as well (IGOs, INGOs), that influence states to behave in certain ways and constrain their behaviors. The system is dynamic, in that it can evolve and isn't stuck in one equilibrium. Problems: - Ikenberry critique: the book doesn't explain how these complex orders emerge in the first place (although they do attribute creation of a virtuous circle to European leaders after WWII who set up reinforcing system of political, economic, and social institutions)

Jervis (1978) -- Cooperation under the Security Dilemma THEORIES OF IR

The big frame is the stag hunt - need to work together to get the stag instead of the rabbit. PD is an intensified version of the stag hunt. Want to move toward SH from PD to get cooperation. Security dilemma: - The means by which one state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others - Anarchy leads to behavior making everyone worse off (the only rational response is to defect) - States fear being taken advantage of, so anything that decreases cost of exploitation or increases benefits from cooperation ameliorates SD - Security is subjective (i.e. felt by each state) and they differ on how much security they want (i.e. how much you fear a partner defecting) Offense/Defense Theory: - OD theory is made up of OD advantage and OD distinguishability: - When OD are easily distinguishable, it is possible for security-seeking states to increase their security without aggravating the SD - SD holds under OD indistinguishability - When SD holds and O has advantage (i.e. when war is expected to be profitable, frequent, and short), the only way to ensure security is through expansion - When defense has the advantage and states are of equal size, the SD is mitigated and cooperation is possible (states can differentiate into status quo and aggressors) - Technology and geography shape O/D advantage (D has prevailed post-WWI) - See 2X2 if confused

Ruggie (1982) -- Embedded Liberalism IOs

The term "embedded liberalism" is credited to John Ruggie. It refers to the economic system which dominated worldwide from the end of World War II to the 1970s. At the end of World War II, the primary objective was to develop an economic plan that would not lead to a repeat of the Great Depression during the 1930s. The plan that was created was liberalism, but embedded within a regulatory and social framework to protect the people from the negative effects of the free market a la Keynes, who was important in setting up this system (or White) Setup: - International regimes: social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations - International regimes limit the discretion of their constituent units to decide and act on issues that fall within the regime's domain - Can think of them as part of the "language of state action" - Analytical components of regimes: principles, norms, rules, and procedures Argument: - Focuses on how the regimes for money and trade have reflected and affected the evolution of the international economic order since WWII - Makes three arguments that yield interpretations of central features of the postwar international economic order that is distinct from the prevailing view: 1. "Structure" of international political authority: - Political authority is the fusion of power with legitimate social purpose. We need both of these dimensions in order to say anything about the actual content of international economic orders - Using these dimensions, he characterizes the international economic order as "embedded liberalism," which is different from both its classical ancestor and its predecessor 2. Relationship between economic regimes and international transaction flows: - The emergence of several specific developments in transnational economic activities can be accounted for at least in part by their perceived first-order contribution to the regimes for trade and money - Regimes provide part of the context that shapes the character of transnationalization 3. Change in and of regimes: - Classical liberalism postulates that regimes change when economic hegemons ascend or decline, and that regimes can become either more open or more closed - But, if power and purpose don't covary, then there are two potential sources of change and no one-to-one correspondence between source and direction of change

Kang (2003) -- Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations THEORIES OF CHANGE/STATES

This is a reply to Acharya (2003) Argument: - Acharya criticizes Kang (2003) for historical determinism and overlooking how shared norms / institutional linkages might mitigate rivalry in Asia - To Kang, Acharya's reply shows how scholars tend to dismiss the possibility that the Asian experience might induce revisions to European-derived theories and pay little attention to the history of Asian IR - Kang shows that (1) he is not claiming an exceptional role for Asia; (2) hierarchy is a well-developed branch of IR theory; and (3) Asia's empirical record illustrates the importance of Asian history for IR - Hierarchy is grounded in the work of Schweller (1994), Powell (1999), and Glaser (1997) as well as Hegemonic Stability Theory Realism struggles to explain six empirical anomalies in Asian IR: - The region's smallest and weakest powers (Taiwan and North Korea) have historically created the biggest threats (resolve maybe a la Schelling and Snyder and Diesing?) - Taiwan is not recognized as sovereign, yet it is often treated as such - Asia has three Leninist states (China, Vietnam, North Korea) which have survived despite the collapse of communism in Europe - Japan and South Korea have been reluctant to get involved with the Taiwan issue, rather than balance China (realism) or support Taiwan (liberalism) - The Philippines ejected the US from its bases after the Cold War at a time when it was enjoying tremendous security benefits - South Korea has every reason to be fully incorporated into the US alliance system, yet waffles in the relationship based on fluctuating threat perception re: North Korea

Jervis (1970) -- The Logic of Images PERCEPTION AND SIGNALING

Topic: The way states can affect the images others have of them and thereby exercise influence without paying the high cost of altering their own major policies; only looking in this study about how states can do this "on the cheap" Setup: - A decision-maker's image of another actor can be defined as those of his beliefs about the other that affect his predictions of how the other will behave under various circumstances - The image of a state can be a major factor in determining whether and how easily the state reaches its goals - States don't have to give proof that the image is accurate, or their image would depend entirely on its actions Signals: - Signals are statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors - Signals are issued mainly to influence the receiver's image of the sender - Signals do not provide inherent credibility, and the costs of issuing deceptive signals are deferred until such a time as it is proven that the signals were misleading Indices: - Indices are statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor's capabilities or intentions - Behavior that constitutes an index is believed by the perceiver to tap dimensions and characteristics that will influence or predict an actor's later behavior and to be beyond the actor's control (i.e. for the purpose of projecting a misleading image) Argument: - Actors will try to use indices to verify or disconfirm what others are trying to communicate through signals - Two problems in doing this: (1) the perceived link between an index and a behavior might be wrong, and indices can change in meaning over time and vary from actor to actor; (2) indices can sometimes be manipulated, or used to project the desired image by undermining the observers' assumption that the behavior which is the index either cannot be or is not being consciously controlled by the actor to give an impression the actor wants the observer to have

Schultz (1999) -- Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Two Approaches: - Institutional Constraints Approach: institutions promoting accountability and competition tend to increase the political risks associated with waging war; even if state leaders do not suffer personally from war, they can suffer politically - Informational Perspective Approach: related to the idea that democratic institutions reveal information about the government's political incentives in a crisis by increasing the transparency of the policy process and/or by improving a government's ability to send credible signals; democracy facilitates peaceful conflict resolution by overcoming informational asymmetries that can cause bargaining to break down; democracies generate higher audience costs (Fearon 1994) Predictions: - The institutional constraints argument suggests that democratic leaders generally face higher political costs for waging wars; the result is that when a state is challenged by a democracy, they doubt whether the challenge will be carried out; states should be more likely to resist when threatened by a democracy - The informational perspective suggests that democratic governments are better able to reveal their true preferences in a crisis; relative to non-democracies, they are less likely to engage in bluffing behavior, meaning that the threats they do make are more likely to be genuine; the target of a threat made by a democracy should be less inclined to resist Findings: - Data on militarized disputes from 1816 to 1980 - The odds of reciprocation are lower when the initiating state is a democracy than not, a result consistent with the information perspective - The effect is substantively significant: a regime shift in the initiating state from non-democracy to democracy has an equivalent effect on the probability of reciprocation as a shift in power status from minor to major power - Democracies can overcome some of the Fearon 1995 problems about private information and incentives to misrepresent

Morrow (1994) -- Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information IOs

Two pairs of matched problems obstruct international cooperation: - Sanctioning and monitoring problems exacerbate one another; applying the proper sanctioning strategy is problematic when compliance is difficult to monitor, and monitoring is more difficult when sanctions and uncooperative behavior are similar - Distribution and information problems occur if the actors cannot agree on how they will cooperate: precedes sanctioning and monitoring; distributional problems occur when actors prefer different solutions; information problems occur when actors are uncertain of the value of the available solutions and would benefit from sharing knowledge; when combined, the problems confound because distributional interests prevent the honest sharing of information - International regimes provide forums for negotiations and are believed to assist international cooperation by facilitating the convergence of actor expectations; the norms, practices, and institutions of a regime assist actors in anticipating other's actions - This allows actors to essentially pick an equilibrium; a weak view of institutions because they just choose among possible outcomes, but it requires no enforcement mechanism - Players must agree on the form and understanding of messages for communication to increase the chance of cooperation; requires a forum and shared interpretation i.e. common knowledge - Diffuse reciprocity: this is when the players anticipate they will be compensated for short-term losses in the long term, so they cooperate even when cooperation entails a short-term loss Method: - Model as the battle-of-the-sexes where the distributional problem is the willingness to forgo any agreement in an effort to secure one's preferred outcome - Distributional problems create incentives for lying and exacerbate the information problem Five Takeaways from Model: - Combination of distributional and informational problems impedes the solution of either - Leadership solutions to coordination problems always exist, but leadership here is very different from hegemonic provision of public goods - Actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy even without a shadow of the future - Diffuse reciprocal strategies arise naturally in coordination problems through the actors' pursuit of their own interests - Norms and institutions are intertwined within a successful regime Four Equilibria: - Babbling equilibrium: lacks any effective regime; each player sends the same message regardless of the signal, so it conveys no information - Pure coordination equilibrium: solves only the distribution problem; players make no use of private information and communicate purely to coordinate moves - Communicative equilibrium: players' messages correspond to the signals they have received; this is the best outcome generally speaking - Leadership equilibrium: players send their messages sequentially giving them different roles; one player sends a message about its signal, the second player then says what move it will play Note: none of the models can solve both the distribution and information problem