Phil Mind MidTerm BYU

5. Does Descartes ultimately answer Elisabeth? Why or why not?

No. Descartes does not give a good explanation to her of how the soul would move the body. ,,, (Elisabeth of Bohemia)

Divisibility Argument

(1) All extended things are divisible. (2) No minds are divisible. (3) No minds are extended things. (Descartes)

Conceivability Argument

(1) I can conceive that I, a thinking thing, exist without my extended body existing. (2) Anything that I can conceive is logically possible. (3) If it is logically possible that X exist without Y, then X is not identical with Y. (4) I, a thinking thing, am not identical with my extended body. If we can conceive of 2 things as different, they have to be different. (Descartes)

Doubt Argument

(1) I can doubt that my body exists. (2) I cannot doubt that I exist as a thinking thing. (3) If two things are identical, the same things must be true of them. (4) I, a thinking thing, am not identical with my body. (Descartes)

What does Broad take to be the short-coming of strongly-reductive materialism?

(C.D. Broad)

Analytic functionalism

(D.M. Armstrong)

How, according to Armstrong, can a correct conceptual analysis of mental states support identity theory?

(D.M. Armstrong)

causal analysis

(D.M. Armstrong)

What are the distinctions between reductivism, materialism, nonreductivism and nonmaterialism? (248)

(David Chalmers)

What are the responses to the hard problem of consciousness characterized by Chalmers?

(David Chalmers)

What three argument does Chalmers offer against materialism?

(David Chalmers)

materialism

(David Chalmers)

ontological gap:

(David Chalmers)

reductivism

(David Chalmers)

What is the significance of Brentano's distinction between that which is presented and the act of presentation?

(Franz Brentano)

Blindsighter

(Ned Block)

mongrel concept

(Ned Block)

What does Putnam mean by saying he is interested in the "is" of empirical reduction?

(Putnam)

What does Putnam take to be the advantages of his theory, that being in pain is a functional state of the organism, over identity theory? (76)

(Putnam)

What does the phenomenon of parallel evolution tell us about the possibility of multiple realizability? Why is this significant for identity theory?

(Putnam)

What is the Functional Organization of a computational system? (75)

(Putnam)

What role do Turing Machine's play in Putnam's account of mind?

(Putnam)

machine functionalism

(Putnam)

total state of machine

(Putnam)

Why is poison a good example of a causal concept? (82) In what way is it not a good analog for mental concepts? (83)

1. E.g. Poison: concept of something that when introduced into a person causes them to sicken or die 1. We know it is poison because it acts in a certain sort of way 1. E.g. pouring molten lava down a person's throat is a different sort of way 2. Poison is a concept of that, whatever it is, which produces certain effects 3. Produce can be both active and passive 2. Concept of poison is limited because it is too simple. Mental concepts are more logically complex 1. Poison = death 2. Mental state = effects are all the complexities of behaviour that mark off men and higher animals (introspection, mental imagery) 1. Differences in behaviour correlated with differences in mental causes operating 2. E.g. purpose is previously characterised to bring about a particular consequence 1. Armstrong: not only a particular consequence but that consequence in a certain sort of way by utilizing perceptions and beliefs 2. "Purpose" is a mental concept that is accounted for in terms of other mental concepts ("perceptions" and "beliefs") 3. To give a causal analysis of "purpose" is also to give a causal analysis of "perceptions" and "beliefs" 4. Corresponding concepts must be introduced together or not at all 1. E.g. husband and wife 5. But these are different things and thus must have different causal roles (D.M. Armstrong)

4. How is Descartes using the term 'distinction'? How is he using 'unity'? Are they mutually exclusive?

3 notions: Extension, mind, and how they interact. Shows they are conceptually distinct. Cognitively we are compelled to make a distinction. They are absolutely connected, unified. Ship. Descartes think they are not mutually exclusive. But do i think they are? Unity implies that they are together. This mut. Exc. thing is where the tension. They seem mutually exclusive, but descartes thinks the soul and the body are both distinct and totally unified. In other words, the soul and the body are one thing and two things. They are distinct: Descartes gives three arguments to show that cognitively, there is a distinction between mind and body. They are absolutely unified: one single thing. Not like a ship and a sailor but totally one. (Elisabeth of Bohemia)

Intentionality:

? (Franz Brentano)

homunculi-headed robots

A being that looks just like a person, but inside of their head there is a large group of tiny humanoids that on their own are not very intelligent but all serve a small purpose to operate the mind (Ned Block)

4.What is the argument from the logical independence of expressions to the ontological independence of the entities to which they refer? How does it break down in the case of the cloud? Brain processes and consciousness? (57)

A cloud is a cloud from far away, but a mass of particles (mist, fog) up close or when enveloped by it. We have two completely different ways of talking about the cloud, and they certainly aren't the same thing (a mass of particles is not how we would describe a cloud from the Jack and the Beanstalk story, for example). And yet they CAN refer to the same thing (the cloud). So it is with the identity theory. (U.T. Place)

Turing machine

A mathematical model of hypothetical that can use a predefined set of rules to determine a result from a set of variables. (Putnam)

ghost in the machine

A satirical reference to cartesian dualism the invisible mind inside the body that steers and controls it. Basically a satire of the idea that what a person "really" is is an invisible ghost inside a fully mechanical structure (the body) (Gilbert Ryle)

behavioral dispositions

A tendency toward a certain behavior. Used by behaviorism to describe consciousness as in "...consciousness is just behavior and dispositions toward behavior. (Hillary Putnam)

3. What is Descartes' method for determining the nature of the 'I' he has identified?

A) He meditates on what he originally believed himself to be, before starting this training of thought, subtract anything capable of being weakened, even minimally, the arguments now introduced so that what is left is certain and unshakable. First start with "rational animal" but realises he has to further define these all the way down Proposes to concentrate on what spontaneous thought comes to mind when he considers what he is He examines the things that come spontaneously to his mind, or his intuitions. B. "I am a thing that thinks." doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. (Descartes)

Describe the six categories in Chalmers' taxonomy of metaphysical views on consciousness.

A-C are reductive, seeing consciousness as a physical process that requires no expansion of a physical ontology. E-F are nonreductive, consciousness involves something irreducible, and requires expansion or reconception of a physical ontology. More on this later (David Chalmers)

Access-consciousness:

A-consciousness is non-phenomenal consciousness and it is based upon its functionality. Block (2002) maintains that it is used for reasoning, reporting, and the direct control of rational action. One of the relationships between P and A consciousness is that A consciousness reports on the information gathered from P-consciousness. A functional notion of consciousness. Includes rational control of action and speech. Plays a role in reasoning. (Ned Block)

3. Why does Putnam present logical behaviorism as a third option in addition to dualism and materialism? (45)

A. Because it has (or it appears to have) the strengths of both and the weaknesses of neither. It allows one to be wholly materialistic (in the sense that mind states are simply behaviors) and at the same time refer to mind states as something causal (behaviors are causal. B.Behaviors are not strictly physical things (can't touch, move, taste, etc.) but they can be accounted for physically. Presenting new ways to talk about the physical universe. Dualism needs to talk about some OTHER thing, but Behaviorism just talks about the physical in a new way. Has the strengths of dualism (mind is causal) and materialism (simplicity of theory). Avoids the weaknesses of dualism (interaction problem) and materialism (how do we reduce mental states into materials?) (Hillary Putnam)

6. What does Putnam mean by claiming that, "causes (pains) are not logical constructions out of their effects (behavior)"? (48)

A. He means that calling behaviors associated with pain is a logical error. The meaning of pain and what pain is are two separate questions, and logical behaviorism conflates these two things. B. If causes are merely logical constructions out of their effects means causes can be reduced to their effects, but this is wrong. So the behaviorist makes a mistake by reducing causes to effects. When someone makes a claim about having a mental state, it is a logical construction of a behavior. But that isn't what people mean. People mean they are having a mental state, and pain is the cause of it. C. What we mean by pain ISN'T the behavior, but something that usually CAUSES the behavior. D. This would be an interesting observation about what pain means, but it doesn't tell us what pain is. (Hillary Putnam)

2. What does it mean to claim that physical language is universal language?

A. It is a language into which every sentence can be translated. That is, we have a concept of pain, so we can reduce that to something physical. Any meaningful statement can be translated into physical language and behavior. B. Everything we want to talk about we should be able to reduce to the physical (this is reductive materialism). Meaning can be reduced to claims about the physical. (Hillary Putnam)

para-mechanical hypothesis

Another term for the "official doctrine". Everything is explained mechanically except that one thing—Mind. Another term for Cartesian Dualism. A term used to talk about the official doctrine. Everything is explained mechanical, except that one thing (mind). Ghost in the machine. The idea that cartesian dualism reduces most things to the material, except this one thing (mind) that is sort of like a material cause, but isn't. (Gilbert Ryle)

absent qualia objection

Argument: The Absent Qualia Argument 1. Functionalism argues that qualitative states (e.g., pain) are functional states of a system, interrelated to inputs, outputs, and other internal states. 2. If one can imagine a plausible case of a system which realizes the same set of functional states that a person does, yet where we intuitively want to avoid attributing the ability to experience qualitative states to the system, then, prima facie, functionalism is plagued by the problem of liberalism. [from 1] 3. The homunculi head, whether operated by little men or the nation of China, can plausibly be said to realize the same set of functional states as a person, yet intuitively we do not want to attribute the experience of qualitative states to it. 4. Therefore, functionalism is plagued by the problem of liberalism. [3,2] Functionalism as a theory of consciousness cannot account for qualia (Ned Block)

liberalism

Ascribing mental properties to things that do not in fact have them. liberalism is the problem a theory of mentality faces when it attributes mentality to systems which clearly do not have it. (Ned Block)

Identity Theory

Basic idea is that mental states are identical to the associated brain states. Place argues that sensations and brain processes may differ in meaning and yet have the same reference. On this account, the identity of brain states and mental states are treated as contingent and not analytic. Mental states ARE brain states. They are identical to one another, contingently. That is, sensations and brain processes may differ in meaning and yet have the same reference. The identity of brain states and mental states is not analytic, but contingent. (U.T. Place)

3. What is Descartes' basic/primitive notions argument?

Basic notions are like templates on the pattern of which we form all our other knowledge E.g. notion of being, number, duration, extension, thought, union of soul and body There are notions that we use as templates or patterns for our thinking, such as the notions of being, of number, of duration, etc. The notion of extension The notion of thought The notion of their union. Basically that basic notions are axiomatic and can be explored but not proven. I.e. he starts by assuming, in a sense, that his position is correct and explores its implications. We cannot explain notions in terms of each other, and we go amis when explaining things with the "wrong" notion (if it, in fact, belongs to a different notion) So, explaining how the soul moves the body by appealing to our knowledge of how a body moves a body is bound to go wrong. (Elisabeth of Bohemia)

Why does Nagel deny the reducibility of experience?

Because there is something it is like to be conscious it cannot be explained away in a physical reduction If facts of experience (what it is like to be a bat) are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how this experience could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism Human beings necessarily embody their own point of view, limited to their own physical structure that shapes their experience, Nagel believes that it is impossible to fully know from the perspective of another human being The physical structure is something that can be understood from many points of view and by individuals with differing perceptual systems This is not by itself an argument against reduction Certainly the Martian who has no "experience" of visual perception could understand the rainbow but he would never be able to understand the human concept of rainbow There is an objective nature in things that can be accessible to him because he too has a particular point of view and particular visual phenomenology, but there are some that is uniquely accessible to our human point of view Since our human experience is only a TYPE of experience, there could be facts that lie outside our point of view simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type In psychophysical reduction, we are moving away from a subjective point of view to a more objective point of view Aim is to get at truth, where it is assumed that truth depends less on our subjective and more on objective Concepts and ideas applied from our point of view used to infer things beyond themselves This makes no sense If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible from only one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity does not take us nearer to the real but farther away Seeds of objection to reduction are evident to successful cases of reduction When we talk about sound as a wave phenomenon, our experience of sound remains unreduced, rather it is taking up one point of view for another It is a condition of referring to a common reality that the individual experience are not part of the common reality While we are right to leave our point of view aside in seeking a fuller understanding of the world, it remains the essence of the internal world is not merely our point of view on it We are trapped in our human experience (Thomas Nagel)

Phenomenal consciousness

Block (2002) theorises that P-consciousness is based upon perceptual experience, not simply the state of awareness that one is in when one is awake. P-conscious properties can be referred to as 'what it is like' to have states such as pain, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and experiential properties of sensations such as thoughts, desires and emotions (2002, p. 206). Block (2002) also contends that such conscious states can make an intentional difference and can be representational. However, Block also holds that P-conscious states can be held distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property, namely A-consciousness. The subjective qualitative experiential aspect of consciousness. The "What it is like" of consciousness. (Ned Block)

How does Block use the example of Homunculi-Headed Robots to demonstrate that functionalism is also guilty of liberalism?

Block then presents two hypothetical examples of systems which can realize the same functional organization as a person, yet which we are loth to attribute mentality to. This in turn seems to indicate that functionalism falls victim to liberalism (attributing mentality to systems which do not in fact have any). The first hypothetical is a 'homunculi head': a body exactly like yours on the outside, with the same set of neurons leading to the head. Yet in the head, a set of tiny men run an operation, complete with a bulletin board with lights that indicate to sub-sets of the men their job in implementing an internal machine table state (i.e., their job in pushing a button connected to an output neuron and putting a card on the wall indicating the next state, which in turn serves as a guide for other little men) such that the body realizes the same machine table state as you do. All the little men are very dumb. On functionalism, the activity of the homunculi-head indicates that it has mentality just like we do; however, we clearly do not want to attribute experiences of consciousness, pain, and all the rest to the homunculi head. The example seems to indicate that functionalism is bedeviled by the problem of liberalism. The above hypotheticals were directed at machine state functionalism because they made explicit reference to machine table states of a system. But an extrapolation from the examples allows Block to apply the spirit of the hypotheticals to all versions of functionalism, and this extrapolation relates explicitly to qualitative states (rather than mental states in general). All versions of functionalism say that a qualitative state (e.g., a pain) is a functional state. Yet we can imagine beings in the functional state who aren't in pain at all. Thus, functionalism is guilty of liberalism in its extension of the 'is in pain' predicate to a number of systems which don't really feel pain. (Ned Block)

3. Why are we justified in assuming other humans are conscious, according to Huxley? (25)

By analogy of our own experience And also Huxley believes we cannot know if someone else is conscious or not independent of analogy Because we can observe consciousness in ourselves. (Thomas Huxley)

2. What is the significance of the distinction that Descartes makes between the things that we can doubt and the thing that we can't doubt? Epistemologically? Metaphysically?

Can doubt our bodies and beliefs but cannot doubt that we are something that thinks and there is something to be deceived. He can't doubt that he is a being, or that he exists. He can't doubt it because he can think it, it is in his mind. Metaphysically, the "I" necessarily exists when the I can think. (Descartes)

Official doctrine

Cartesian dualism The "standard" belief of mind and body. Every (normal) human has a body and a mind, i.e., a human is both a body and a mind. Bodies are in space and subject to mechanical laws, and a body is a public affair, i.e. can be inspected by external observers. The mind is not in space, nor subject to mechanical laws, nor witnissable by outside observers. In consciousness, self-consciousness, and introspection one is directly and authentically appraised of the present states and operations of the mind, but the operations of the body may be uncertain. The body and mind are usually referred to as being two worlds, one internal and one external, and man is part of both and each. (Gilbert Ryle)

Hard/easy problem of consciousness

Chalmers (page 247). Easy problem is the problem of explaining consciousness in terms of monitoring internal states, controlling behavior, or reporting information. (David Chalmers)

What does Armstrong mean by claiming that secondary qualities are 'unanalyzable'? (86-87)

Colors are complex and irreducible. You cannot give a complete account of redness without talking about redness itself. (D.M. Armstrong)

Cluster-concept

Concepts that can be defined by a whole cluster of criteria. For instance, if pain is a cluster concept, one can say that pain is "schmertz" (a direct synonym), or it is that feeling which is normally evinced by saying "ouch." Or that feeling you normally have when run through with a hot poker, etc. (Hillary Putnam)

4. What is the doctrine of continuity? How does Huxley apply it in his critique of Descartes? (28)

Consciousness comes in degrees from lesser animals to humans. Evolution. B. It is the idea that consciousness (or other things) develop bit by bit, like from childhood to adulthood, or from sleeping to waking, and he thinks it can be applied to animals (it would be strange to say that humans are the only conscious ones if we assume that consciousness came out of nowhere and is not preceded by lesser forms in our genetic ancestors, whose remnants can be found in animals and other creatures). (Thomas Huxley)

How do Block's examples of self-consciousness and monitoring consciousness support his thesis about the ambiguity of the concept 'consciousness'?

Consciousness is a form of internal monitoring. Self consciousness is the concept of self (Ned Block)

explanatory gap

Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. (Nagel, 1974, Levine, 1983) Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. (See Crick (1994).) Still, that identity itself calls out for explanation! Proponents of an explanatory gap disagree about whether the gap is permanent. Some (e.g. Nagel, 1974) say that we are like the scientifically naive person who is told that matter = energy, but does not have the concepts required to make sense of the idea. If we can acquire these concepts, the gap is closable. Others say the gap is uncloseable because of our cognitive limitations. (McGinn, 1991) Still others say that the gap is a consequence of the fundamental nature of consciousness. The gap in our explanation of phenomenal consciousness and the physical. (Ned Block)

4. What does Descartes ultimately attribute to mind? What does he ultimately attribute to body?

Descartes attributes body to extension, being acted upon, never self moving. Mind is active, the thing that wills and acts, that imagines (all the mental state terms). Body = extension, passive (acted upon, not self moving) Perceptions, Imagination. Mind = active, not extended, wills, acts, feels, imagines, thinks, etc. (Descartes)

7. Why does Descartes compare the human body to a clock? How are they different? How are they the same? [How might we connect this with the idea of a cartesian zombie?] (18)

Descartes compares the human body to a clock because he's at a point in the meditations where he wants to show the body and mind are separate (bottom of page 18). If there was no mind in it, the body would (according to Descartes) still perform all its functions (like a wound up clock--automaton-like). It tells us something about the nature of bodies. Also he wants to explain the body in mechanistic terms. (Descartes)

Cartesian Zombie

Descartes talks of automatons; unconscious beings that behave just like conscious beings. The physical cannot tell us that other people have consciousness. Reason tell us so. creatures that are physically identical to conscious beings, but that are not conscious. (Descartes)

Basic/primitive notion

Descartes' term for fundamental concepts. Things that cannot be explained in terms of other things. Mind and body are primitive notions. We cannot explain mind in physical terms, nor the physical in mental terms. He claims that mind is a primitive notion in response to Elizabeth's mental causation objection. He says that we cannot explain mental causation in physical terms. templates/pattern on which we form all knowledge A basic idea. For example, the notion of number, or of extension. An axiomatic idea. "I observe... that all secure, disciplined human knowledge consists only in keeping these notions well apart from one another, and applying each of them only to the things that it is right for. When we try to explain some difficulty by means of a notion that isn't right for it, we are bound to go wrong; just as we are when we try to explain or define one of these notions in terms of another., because each of them is basic [primitive] and thus can be understood only through itself." (21.v.1643, 2) (Elisabeth of Bohemia)

"Is" of definition vs. "is" of composition

Difference between statements about consciousness and statements about brain processes. Smart uses the example of the old packing case that is used as a table. "Both expressions are applicable to and at the same time provide an adequate characterization of the same object". The "is" of definition is necessary, the "is" of composition is contingent. The former are statements like: "Red is a color" or "a square is an equilateral rectangle." Statements of the later are similar to: "his table is an old packing case" or "a cloud is a mass of water droplets or other particles in suspension" or "his hat is an old sheet." (U.T. Place)

What are the easy problems of consciousness? How might we explain them? What is the hard problem? Why can't it be answered in the same ways? (247-248)

Easy: phenomena such as discriminating stimuli, monitoring internal states, controlling behavior. These are easy problems of consciousness because although they are not understood completely, we have headway into explaining them, and there seems to be no insurmountable obstacles on the road to complete understanding of them. No deep problems in principle with the idea that a physical system could be conscious in these senses. Puzzles rather than mysteries. Hard: subjective experience. Something it is like. Qualia, phenomenal experience (David Chalmers)

1. What is Elisabeth's belief about causality in the material world, and why does it matter?

Elizabeth cannot understand how something immaterial can interact with something material. She raises the main worry about Cartesian Dualism, the interaction problem. Causality requires physical interaction, and since mind is not extended, it cannot touch anything, and since it cannot touch anything, it isn't clear how on earth it influences something physical (the body). (Elisabeth of Bohemia)

What is emergentism? How does it differ from epiphenomenalism?

Emergentism is causal. Epi.... is not. (C.D. Broad)

Epiphenomenalism

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive. James (1879), who rejected the view, characterized epiphenomenalists' mental events as not affecting the brain activity that produces them "any more than a shadow reacts upon the steps of the traveller whom it accompanies". (Thomas Huxley)

1. What solution might Place suggest to Putnam's S-Spartan thought experiment?

Even if pain doesn't show up in behavior, it shows up in the physical processes in the brain. So, while the spartans may be able to hide their pain and not let it show through their behaviors, it will still show up in their brains. If we could scan their brains, we would see neurons firing that are associated with being in pain. Look at physical brain states. Fine if it doesn't show up in behavior, since all mental states are also brain states that can be detected. (U.T. Place)

Materialism

Everything is material substance. Materialism is a form of philosophical monism that holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental aspects and consciousness, are results of material interactions. Can be reductive or non-reductive. (Descartes)

Idealism

Everything is mind. No material substance. Idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. (Descartes)

Objective phenomenology

From Nagel. It is a way of describing what experiences really are like as opposed to only describing how they appear to a subject. It is a proposal for a science of consciousness. To get at objective explanations of subjective experiences. (page 224) (Thomas Nagel)

Why does Nagel use the experience of a bat to illustrate the subjective nature of consciousness?

He chose bats because most wouldn't doubt that they have some sort of subjective experience, but their experience is more foreign to us than, say, that of a whale or a dog--especially given that they have sonar perception, a form of perception that we don't have any familiarity with. (even though our sense of smell is much weaker than a dogs, we still can talk about similarities between their experience and ours--we just imagine them smelling things better than we do.) we cannot fathom what it is like to be a bat and get around in the world with sonar perception, and this highlights the issue nagel brings up: if consciousness is a physical phenomenon, we must be able to give an objective account of it, or, in other words, it must be understood from more than one perspective. It seems very difficult to be able to understand a bat if we are not one. (Thomas Nagel)

2. What do you make of Descartes' response to Elisabeth that he was so focused in the Meditations on making the case for the separation of mind and body that he had not actually engaged the project of characterizing their union?

He claims that everyone already knows that mind and body interact, he wanted to emphasize their distinction. (Elisabeth of Bohemia)

2. Why does Huxley think "modern research has brought to light a great multitude of facts, which... render [Descartes' view] far more defensible than it was in his day? (25)

He uses the example of the frog and the soldier to show that "science" supports dualism (epiphenomenalism) We are all but automaton because we can explain everything in material causes. Make the point that Huxley is misinterpreting or misrepresenting Descartes. Some argue that Descartes wrote about the will and mind to appease the church Frogs and other animals can be increasingly "automotized." We can observe very complex behavior arising from unconscious creatures, like frogs moving and keeping balance when parts of the brain are severed, and so forth. B. Used to think that we needed to use the mind to explain physical phenomena. However, science shows that we can explain physical phenomena completely with physical causes. In other words, consciousness needs not (SHOULD not) be part of our explanation of physical phenomena. (Thomas Huxley)

Why does he talk about phantom pains? Broken clocks?

He wanted to argue for the existence of God. God would not deceive us. Various illness present a counter argument. Even a badly made clock/body is working in a predictable way. 1."Zombie, automaton" The possibility of making a clock so complex that it simulates a human's behavior. A human in mechanical terms, and perhaps functional terms as well. I.e. realized identically physically and thus identically functionally. Materialist worldview where mind is soul in a closed world. He is interested in showing how the body can be treated as a separate thing with its own causes and effects. Bottom of 18 first column. 2.Make some claim about the nature of body (acted upon, human = automaton + consciousness) 3.Mind has causal effect on the physical. 4.Make space for god and understand god as not being a deceiver. Why would god build a body that has phantom pains, inaccurate information, etc. Phantom pain like a bad or broken clock. Bodies should not be deceptive. Broken clock still follows mechanical laws. Explanations in the mechanical world for why people's bodies sometimes deceive them. Descartes compares the human body to the clock to explain how the goodness of God would allow us to be deceived. The body is like the clock; it will work as it is made to work. If the body is made well, it will work well. If the body is made poorly, it will work poorly. The body, like the clock, is a machine. It could pheasibly work without the mind (this is how it is like the Cartestian Zombie). Yet, unlike the clock, the body is connected to a mind that gives rise to thoughts. So why does God allow us to be deceived? Take the case of someone who has dropsy. He thirsts even though drinking water would worsen his condition. Descartes basically says we will just have cases where we can be deceived. if a working body has a dry throat, the mind will have the sensation of thirst. This is normally helpful for the body to maintain itself. Yet, it is not always so. So, the body is trying to work like the machine God made it to be (where it thirsts when the throat is dry) because this is usually beneficial. But at times, it will be deceived if the body is ill. Even though we can be deceived, Descartes doesn't think we need to be deceived, for we have memory and reason to know if the body is in error. (Descartes)

What are Descartes' epistemological concerns? What are his metaphysical concerns? Why is the distinction important?

His goal is to provide a foundation for knowledge. He ends up claiming that purely rational beliefs can provide a foundation for knowledge. Some think he was trying to allow for empirical investigations (science) without appealing to the church. Metaphysically, he is concerned with the distinction between mind and body. This distinction between his epistemological and metaphysical concern is important because Mixing metaphysical and epistemological: if i can doubt one thing but not another, these two things must be metaphysically different. It seems like he doesn't make much of a distinction between the two. Descartes requires knowledge to be based on absolute certainty. Any doubt (any conceivable doubt) weakens a position such that it must be discarded as a sure source of knowledge. (Descartes)

What is the connection between Armstrong's 'information sensitive causes' and Putnam's 'total state' of a machine?

ISC refer to purpose. Purposes bring about a certain effect. Total state refers to a set of distinct states connected by probabilities. (D.M. Armstrong)

5. What problems with epiphenomenalism does Smullyan's story of the Unfortunate Dualist highlight?

If after taking the pill, we are exactly the same, then how we would we know if the pill worked? Consciousness doesn't do anything. Seems inelegant. Why posit the existence of something that does nothing? This argument depends on the assumption that consciousness does nothing. But that is a premise in the epiphenomenalist argument. (Thomas Huxley)

7. How does Ryle think the official doctrine creates the problem of access to knowledge of other minds? (37)

If the mind is truly private, then we have no access to it. If we have no access to it, then there is no possible way for us to tell the difference between a sane man and one who is insane, or between a man and a very complex robot. (Gilbert Ryle)

6. Why does Descartes dismiss any attempts by his imagination to understand the 'I'? (11)

Imagination depends on the body while pure intellect does not. He wants to ground knowledge in his intellect because he can doubt his body. Remember, in this discussion, imagination refers to all sensory content, perceptions, images etc. Sensory info is the content of the imagination. Descartes discusses the imaginations attempt to visualize a 1000 sided figure and a 1001 sided figure. Since our imagination cannot picture a difference, it is more susceptible to deception than the understanding. (I wonder if there really is a distinction between the imagination and the understanding.) Descartes assumes that the "I" can be understood, and can be known to him. He starts with the thing he does know: namely that he does in fact exist. I am, I exist. If he wants to know the "I" in a strict sense, he assumes that knowledge of it can thus not depend on things he does not know. So it cannot depend on things he invents in the imagination. What he invents in the imagination is related to the nature of the body, which could be mere dreams. Further, the imagination necessarily imagines something spatial, and Descartes has already established that the "I" can be un-spatial, so the imagination fails to reveal new things about the "I." (Descartes)

2. What does Ryle mean by arguing that the official doctrine involves a category mistake?

It assumes that there is something "mind" over and above the physical. It's like asking to be shown the "University" after having been shown all the buildings on campus. (Gilbert Ryle)

How does Block understand the functionalist critique that behaviorism falls into liberalism? (95)

Liberalism is the problem a theory of mentality faces when it attributes mentality to systems which clearly do not have it. Block thinks behaviorism is such a theory: a behavioral disposition may be necessary for the possession of a certain mental state, but it is not sufficient. (Ned Block)

How does Jackson defend epiphenomenalism?

It doesn't have the interaction problem and there's no glaring reasons why it's a bad idea, even though some may dismiss it because they don't like that they can't explain the usefulness of consciousness. Qualia are such that possession of them does not make any difference in the physical world. One could say that the quale of pain causes us to avoid potential painful situations. He counters this by referring to Hume: we cannot actually see the causal connection between two events. Perhaps our avoidance of pain and our quale of pain are two separate effects that stem from the same cause (like burning a finger on an iron). Another objection: suppose qualia evolved over time, so that we have phenomenal experiences while lower, earlier life forms didn't. If qualia is an effect of evolution, shouldn't it contribute to our survival? (meaning, shouldn't it have an effect on the physical world?) What would be the point of qualia if it contributed nothing to our survival? Jackson's answer: qualia could just be a byproduct of evolution. Perhaps something in our brains evolved that was conducive to survival, and consciousness necessarily goes along with it, even though it doesn't serve a purpose. Aaaand another objection: how can we believe that others have qualia just by looking at behavior if qualia does not cause certain behaviors? Answer: one can trace the cause of one's behavior back to the brain, and then assume that that same brain also causes qualia. Brain is the cause of behavior and qualia. Qualia not the cause of behavior. It is frustrating that we don't know why or how qualia exists, but it seems that we can't avoid admitting they do exist. But this isn't an adequate objection to epiphenomenalism. (Frank Jackson)

2.How does Place argue that the claim "Consciousness is a process in the brain" is both not necessarily true and not necessarily false, but rather a reasonable scientific hypothesis? (56)

It is not necessarily true because statements about consciousness and brain states may be explained in totally different ways, that one could have the one without being aware of the other, or there is nothing self contradictory about saying "X is feeling pain but there is nothing going on in their brain." It is not necessarily false because there is nothing self contradictory about saying consciousness is a process in the brain, same as saying lightning is a motion of electric charges. Here, we must examine the difference between the two types of "is"s. (U.T. Place)

What is Descartes asking when he says: "[M]ay it not perhaps be the case that these very things which I am supposing to be nothing, because they are unknown to me, are in reality identical with the "I" of which I am aware?" (11)

It might be that he is a structure of limbs, or a thin vapour that permeates the limbs. But he cannot know for sure, so he sets these things aside, but does recognize that he MIGHT be these things even though he is discarding them. (Descartes)

1. What might motivate someone to adopt logical behaviorism as a theory of mental events?

Logical behaviorism is a kind of middle way between dualism and materialism. On the one hand, the logical behaviorist can agree with dualists that what goes on in the brain has nothing to do with what we mean when we say someone is in pain. At the same time, the behaviorist can agree with the materialist in denying that ordinary talk of pain, thoughts, etc., involves reference to a "mind" as a substance. Logical positivism is better than dualism because you don't have to deal with mind/body problem. Solves the access problem because all behavior is accessible. So, mind is understandable. (Hillary Putnam)

How is Block's distinction between A-consciousness and P-consciousness as answer to machine functionalism?

Machine functionalism, or, the computational theory of mind, states that the inner workings of the brain are akin to the information processing of a computer. A and P consciousness show that there are functional parts of the mind, but there are also phenomenal parts (Ned Block)

Interactionism

Mental and physical worlds interact with each other. a dualist position which argues that (1) mind and body are separate, but that (2) there is causal interaction between the two. Descartes supports an interactionist view. (Descartes)

Logical behaviorism

Mind is an aspect of behavior. To be in a particular mental state is to be in a particular behavior state. Mind is public, not private. Every statement about a mind event can be translated into physical language. Physical language is a universal language. (Hillary Putnam)

5. What objection does Smart take to be most troubling to his thesis? Why?

Objection 3. The qualities of sensations are something over and above the qualities of brain-processes. That is, we must admit that there exists irreducibly psychic properties, and that these properties may be logically distinct even when talking about the same thing. (J.J.C. Smart)

qualia freak

One who thinks that no physical explanation or information can communicate certain features of perception and sensation. (Frank Jackson)

What is the difference between A-consciousness and P-consciousness? Why is it important?

P-Consciousness describes what it is like to be states. The pertains to what goes on inside states. A-Consciousness is representational and involved in reasoning. It is a functional notation, system realtive. A consciousness: our ability to use the contents of consciousness in reasoning. Being conscious of something means it being accessible for use. P consciousness: has to do with "what it is like." Phenomenal, experiential kinds of experience. Conceptually useful to distinguish, but it looks like mostly we experience both. But there might be some strange examples when we have one but not the other. (Ned Block)

Unfortunate Dualist

Person wants to take a drug that will annihilate the soul or mind entirely, but leave the body functioning exactly as before. Person has drug administered to him without his knowledge... then the next day tries to take the drug as he had planned. He then says: "this stupid drug didn't work!" (Thomas Huxley)

6. How does the phenomenological fallacy cause us to believe that conscious states cannot be identical to brain states?

Phenomenological fallacy: when the subject describes his experience, we assume that he is describing the literal properties of objects on an internal screen (phenomenal field) E.g. when "I see green afterimage" there is literally green on inside me (not on the brain) Phenomenological fallacy depends on: Our descriptions are primarily descriptions of our conscious experience and secondarily descriptions of actual objects Thus we must INFER the second from the first Place: the Reverse is true we begin by describing actual objects then describing our conscious experience Hence we INFER the first (phenomenal properties) from the second (actual physical properties) E.g. "I see a green after-image" means I am having a conscious experience of green, like the green I saw before Or: when we describe an after image as being green, we are NOT saying: "there is something, the after image, which is green." Rather we are saying "I am having the sort of experience which I normally have when I look at a green patch of light." (U.T. Place)

OMG status

The difference between mental things and physical things, their difference in existence, etc. (David Chalmers)

How does Brentanoa respond to the claim that raw feels are mental states without intentionality?

See top of page 482. Hamilton thinks the feeling and the object are fused into one. But this expression of fusion implies that there is duality. Where you cannot speak of an object, you cannot speak of a subject either. (Franz Brentano)

3.What is the purpose of Smart's example of the 'yellowish orange after-image'?

Smart prefers the after image to pain, since pain also entails a "being in distress" state of being. We only want to look at the "mental" event of seeing an after image or of being in pain, not the psychical states that usually go with being in pain. The after-image is a great tool for addressing why mental states can be brain states, and Smart examines several objections one might make, and uses the after image to explain them. (J.J.C. Smart)

How have some argued that functionalism is a incarnation of behaviorism? What does Block offer as the difference? (94-95)

Some argue that functionalism is the natural successor to behaviorism because like behaviorism it highlights mental states in terms of behavioral dispositions. The difference is that functionalism adds to behavioral dispositions with tendencies to experience mental states. As such, functionalism has stricter demands for what constitutes a mental state then behaviorism does because it requires that systems in question possess both certain behavioral dispositions and certinan internal states as well. (Ned Block)

4. What is the difference between the weak and strong versions of logical behaviorism?

Strong: when I say I am in pain, I can actually translate all of the meaning (and not lose anything) into behavior. Weak: when I say I am in pain, some things are lost in "translation," because mind talk is vague, but mind and behavior are the same thing. (Hillary Putnam)

7. Explain the Super-spartans thought experiment. What is it meant to demonstrate?

Super spartans are those who have trained themselves not to show any indication of mental states. Meant to point out that it is completely conceivable that we can have zero behaviors yet the mental states can exist, so they are not one and the same. Contrary to behaviorism? People who train themselves to suppress all pain responses. No behavioral indications of metal states. Critique of behaviorism. Conflation of cause and effect. We talk about mental states as causes and physical states (behaviors) as effects. The conclusion is that the mental states cannot be identical to the behaviors. (Hillary Putnam)

3.b What is the nature of the 'I' that Descartes has identified?

The 'I' he has identified is a thing that thinks; doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, unwills, imagines, and has sensory perceptions (11). B) Nature of the I is a thinking thing, a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions Body: face, hands and arms Known distinctly Determinable shape, definable location, occupy space to exclude other bodies, perceived by touch, sight All the bodily properties can't hold up to a deceiver Soul: sense-perception, thinking Not clear what it is Something tenuous like a wind or fire which permeates the solid parts, power of self-movement, nutrition Only thought holds up to the deceiver (Descartes)

Mathematical archangel

The archangel that knows everything about a pineapple except what it tastes like. (C.D. Broad)

4. What role does language play in Ryle's rejection of the official doctrine?

The category mistake is, essentially, a misuse and misunderstanding of terms and language. Meaningful to say that BYU exists and that the buildings of BYU exist, but we make an error when we assume they exist in the same way. (Gilbert Ryle)

5. What does it mean to say that pain is a cluster concept? What does Putnam argue that we actually mean by the term 'pain'? Answer with reference to his polio example.

The causes of pain vs. the behavior itself. Different from mongrel concept. Cluster concept is more useful than mongrel concept. A. The application of the word pain is controlled by a whole cluster of criteria, all of which can be regarded as synthetic. Thus there is no satisfactory way of answering the question "what does pain mean?" except via an exact synonym. B. "In order to characterize a concept, we need a lot of ways to talk about it, and when talking about just one piece doesn't really capture the whole picture." C. There is a difference between what polio is vs. what causes polio. If we find a virus we can then say that what we thought was polio, in fact, was not (in some cases). Pain is a cluster concept because there are many ways to characterize pain: a feeling of discomfort, what i feel when I hurt myself, agony, we can have physical pain or mental pain, etc. Putnam argues that when we talk about pain, we are referring not to the symptoms of pain, but the causes of pain.Yet, it could be argued that logical behaviorism explains mental states such as pain through its symptoms, not through its causes. Perhaps something over and above the physical causes pain. With the polio example, many doctors used to diagnose polio according to its symptoms. Now they diagnose it according to its actual cause, which is a virus. This is important because doctors back then could not properly diagnose polio because others diseases have similar symptoms. (Hillary Putnam)

multiple realizability

The idea that a the functions of a machine or the functions of consciousness can be implemented in different mediums. (Putnam)

Emergentism

The idea that consciousness emerges from trans-physical laws. (C.D. Broad)

chauvinism

The idea that only brains could be conscious. So creatures without brains could not be conscious. Chauvinism, meanwhile, is the problem faced by a theory which withholds attributing mentality to systems which clearly seem to possess it. Block's example of a theory which falls victim to chauvinism is what he calls 'physicalism': the view that mental state types are equivalent to physical state types (I don't know why he doesn't just say type physicalism, since this is what he is describing); the theory is chauvinist because it denies mentality to any creature which does not have the same physical structures as we do. (Ned Block)

Reductionism

The idea that something can explained away by showing that it is really something else. Saying that the mind reduces to brain processes is just another way of saying that the mind just is those brain processes. It is like water being reduced to H2O. (Thomas Nagel)

What does Brentano argue distinguishes physical phenomena from mental phenomena?

The intentional inexistence of an object distinguishes mental from physical phenomena. (Franz Brentano)

5. What is the purpose of the lightning example?

The lightning example is a little more clear than the cloud example, because (like consciousness) no matter how close to the lightning we get, we will never see the motion of electrical charges, yet we can say that lightning is the motion of electrical charges. (U.T. Place)

Phenonemenological fallacy:

The mistaken idea that the descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment, the 'phenomenal field". (U.T. Place)

1. Explain the steam whistle metaphor for epiphenomenalism.

The train engine, running, produces steam. The steam is a sign that the engine is functioning and is a direct consequence of its functioning, but has no effect on the train itself. So, consciousness arises from the functioning of a complex brain, but has no power over its functioning. (Thomas Huxley)

Dualism:

There are two different worlds; the private world of the mental and the public, observable world of the physical. Reality consists of two substances: material substance (body) and mental substance (thought). Dualism can be either substance or property dualism. In the latter, the body and the mind are together in one substance, but they represent different properties within the same substance. In the former they are two separate substances. (Descartes)

6. What does Ryle mean by claiming that Descartes was "unwittingly adhering to the grammar of mechanics"? (36)

There is a certain kind of logic when we talk about certain things. There is an appropriate way to talk about things. In trying to suggest that the pineal gland as a medium, he gives a mechanical explanation, but that mechanical explanation is an issue of language and is misleading. Magical interaction in one physical place. Mechanical talk to explain something that is non-mechanical. This is a mechanical mistake. (Gilbert Ryle)

4. What does Smart mean by saying that reports about sensations just happen to be reports about brain processes? (62)

There is an objection to identity theory that says mental states cannot be brain states because they are not analytically identical. The peasant can see after images and not know anything about mental states. This ends up not being a problem for identity theory, since smart is able to show that mental states are contingently identical to brain states rather than analytically identical. A great example is lightning. One can look at lightning and know nothing of electricity, but that does not change the fact that lightning IS an electrical discharge. Further, we need not be able to "translate" mental states into brain states and vice-versa. What we are instead claiming is simply that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something (one is really experiencing something), that something is in fact a brain process. In other words, there is nothing over and above brain processes that are mental processes. (J.J.C. Smart)

What is the explanatory gap? How does it help illustrate P-consciousness? (207)

There is not a complete definition of consciousness yet. It is still a mystery of why the brain causes consciousness. We can not describe others experiences or know what it is like to be them. He uses the blindsighted examples to show how there are experiences we can not explain. (Ned Block)

1. What does Ryle mean in saying that the official doctrine is "entirely false not in detail but in principle?" A 'philosophers myth'? (34)

They are in principle false because it is a category mistakes to compare the University tour. Joke about coming home in a sedan and a flood of tears The Division Team Spirit. An unsolvable philosophical problem caused by the philosophers themselves. A. Category mistake B.Because the rest of the world thinks this is obvious. They use language in the ordinary way, but the question is just a bad question. The rest of the world doesn't need to explain mind as distinct from, yet interacting with, the physical world. So the only people who really care are the philosophers, and they are to blame for why the question exists. It's a philosophical metaphysical problem, not a "real" or "normal" problem. I.e. the framing of the question is wrong. Ryle is not denying a premise in Descartes' argument, so he is not denying it in detail. Rather, he is rejecting the way Descartes talks about the mind/body problem in general. Descartes describes mind in terms of negation, ie, non-extended and indivisible. Yet these are physical terms. So Descartes is describing the mental in terms of the physical. The mental is not equivalent to the physical (per the argument made in the Meditations... somehow they are also united...? Anyhow). So Ryle claims that Descartes is making a category mistake because Descartes is using physical terms to talk about mind. (Gilbert Ryle)

3. What is the purpose of the example of the individual doing the university tour? (34)

This is also a category mistake. (Gilbert Ryle)

9. What does it mean to claim that "[t]he belief that there is a polar opposition between mind and matter is a belief that they are terms of the same logical type"? (38)

This is the claim that all dualism comes from a category mistake. Talks about mind and body as totally separate things, but tries to talk about a mechanical interaction between them. Sloopy language. (Gilbert Ryle)

8. What is Descartes trying to accomplish in his introduction of the pineal gland?

This is where the mental and physical interact. He is trying to allow for some interaction between mind and body, or show how the mind can, in fact, push or move the body to willful actions. (Descartes)

Super-spartans

Thought experiment: People with no outward response to pain Individuals who have pain but show absolutely no behavioral evidence that they do so. Also, it is a thought experiment used to disprove behaviorism (Hillary Putnam)

What is the purpose of the example of the mathematical archangel? (113)

To show that knowledge of the physical world is not sufficient to (C.D. Broad)

3. What is the purpose of the example of the old packing-case that is also a table?

To show that some "is" statements are contingent and matters of composition. To maintain that a table cannot be a packing case simply because one has a table and does not have a packing case is to make an argument about "is" of definition. If something is a state of consciousness, it cannot be a brain process, since there is nothing self contradictory in supposing that someone feels a pain where there is nothing happening inside his skull. By the same token we might be led to conclude that a table cannot be an old packing case, since there is nothing self contradictory is supposing that someone has a table, but is not in possession of an old packing case. (U.T. Place)

What is the purpose of Jackson's thought experiments about Fred and Mary?

To show that there is something missing in the physicalist's account. Even when one has all the physical information possible about, say, a color, and the body's response to that color, it is hard to deny that there is still something learned when one experiences color for the first time. He wants to show that qualia are left out of the physicalist story. In the addendum there's a little more about the Mary story. It isn't enough that she learns something upon her release into the colored world. "Before she was let out, she could not have known facts about her experience of red, for there were no such facts to know." Upon release, "she will realize how impoverished her conception of the mental life of others has been all along." "what she did not know until her release is not a physical fact about their experiences. But it is a fact about them. That is the trouble for physicalism" p. 279 (Frank Jackson)

What is the purpose of the sea slug thought experiment?

To show us that perhaps our science or point of view is limited. And to show that physicalists have a too optimistic view of human potential for science and reasoning. Sea slugs have a constrained view of the world because of their underwater environment. Perhaps we, too, are in an "underwater environment"--we may simply not have access to certain facts about the world and being, and an explanation of qualia may be one of those things out of our reach. (Frank Jackson)

What is Chalmers goal in this article? What is his evaluative thesis?

To show why reductive views are wrong and explore which of the nonreductive views are viable. (David Chalmers)

Knowledge argument

Tries to create an argument whose premises are obvious to all. The Fred and Mary arguments. qualia (Frank Jackson)

Type-A/B/C materialism

Type A - the ultimate reductivist. No epistemic gap. No ontological gap (denying that there is more than physical things). Nothing new learned. Type B - No ontological gap. Yes epistemic gap. Willing to grant that something new is learned, but does not necessarily mean a separate thing. This is identity theory. Type C - still reductive, no ontological gap. Epistemic gap is temporary (will be eliminated when science gets better). Type-D/E Dualism The non reductive options. Real option has to be one of these three. D- Dualism. Traditional dualism. Two substances, and mental states have effects. E- Epiphenomenalism, there are two substances, but no causal interaction. Type-F Monism The mental is primary, or something else is primary (both mental and physical can be reduced to it). A better understanding of the universe can unify them. Not trying to reduce the phenomenal to the physical, but perhaps the other way around, or both to some third thing. (David Chalmers)

What is the significance of Nagel's question about whether subjective experience might have an objective nature? (224)

We must find an objective phenomenology, a way to express an experience to someone who does not (or cannot) experience the same thing. Not dependent on empathy or the imagination. (Thomas Nagel)

parallel evolution

When 2 different biological features evolve in different creatures but those features evolve to perform the same function. For example, feathers and hair both evolved for warmth. (Putnam)

1. How do behaviorists understand reports of pain as "a sophisticated wince"? (60)

When reporting pain, we are engaging in an elaborate kind of behavior that has replaced the wince, the cry, or the "ouch." In other words, since the behaviorist believes that mental states are behaviors, a report of pain must be the same as the behavior of having pain, just more sophisticated. (J.J.C. Smart)

2. What role does Occam's razor play in Smart's argument for identity theory? (61)

When two theories explain something, pick the theory that requires the fewest amount of "extra" suppositions, grants the fewest things special ontological states, etc. Dualism contains what Smart calls: "nomological danglers." Nomological danglers dangle. That is, they aren't accounted for in the usual (read: mechanical) laws. We have to suppose extra laws to explain them. If we could explain mind without needing any nomological danglers, then Occam's rule would imply that we should adopt that theory over the other. (J.J.C. Smart)

category mistake

When you compare 2 things that are inappropriate to compare. representing something as belonging to a particular category when it actually belongs to another. Examples of category mistakes: "I've seen all the buildings at BYU, but where is the University?" "I've seen the battalions, squadrons, and so forth, but where is the division? (Gilbert Ryle)

What does Armstrong think philosophy can contribute to the pursuit of knowledge?

Wittingstein: philosophy has no more knowledge, only undo the intellectual knots it itself has created Ryle: philosophy has reduced role, aim is to map our logical geography of our concepts Now: swing back to giving an account of the general nature of things and of man Armstrong: Ryle was wrong Our analysis of concepts is a MEANS to make claims about great questions (actual things) Just because we have skills for assessing arguments, etc. doesn't meant that the objective of philosophy is to do these things Propositions of the philosopher doesn't need to be different from psychologist, etc. But the way the philosopher argues is a special way Philosopher is not competent to argue positive view about materialism, but can neutralise objections by fellow philosophers E.g. can show that "mental states are physical states of the brain" is an intelligible proposition, not self-contradictory Present state of scientific knowledge gives strong evidence that state of our brain completely determines state of consciousness But some believe (a priori) that mental states are not the same as physical states Hence, propose an independently plausible analysis of the concept of a mental state that will allow mental states and physical states to be identified (D.M. Armstrong)

5. How can beliefs in strange metaphysical entities result from category mistakes? (35)

You'll never find "the average taxpayer," though linguistically he may be all around, like a ghost, and present in all sorts of situations. Basically if you ascribe the same physical existence qualities to non-physical things you end up with ghostly metaphysical entities like universities and team spirit. (Gilbert Ryle)

8. How does Ryle's claim, "When two terms belong to the same category, it is proper to construct conjunctive propositions embodying them," apply to the official doctrine? Think of how to answer with reference to the joke, 'She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan chair'. (37)

Your body is doing something and you are in pain, and now we are going to talk about the pain as if its something distinct and something other than physical. But you still have to account for it in the physical picture. (Gilbert Ryle)

Automaton

a robot that looks, acts, behaves, etc. like a conscious being but is, in fact, not conscious. most of human behavior, like that of animals, is susceptible to simple mechanistic explanation. Cleverly designed automata could successfully mimic nearly all of what we do. Thus, Descartes argued, it is only the general ability to adapt to widely varying circumstances—and, in particular, the capacity to respond creatively in the use of language—that provides a sure test for the presence of an immaterial soul associated with the normal human body. (Thomas Huxley)

mental phenomena:

every idea or presentation we require through sense perception or imagination. Feelings, emotions, judgments. ACTS of presentation, not the presented. (Franz Brentano)

Doctrine of Continuity

is the principle that "nature never makes leaps," or that "all natural change is produced by degrees." (Thomas Huxley)

Nomological danglers

something that can't be easily accounted for by the normal rules or laws secondary qualities Color, sounds tastes smells... from John Locke (J.J.C. Smart)

physical phenomena:

that which is presented. A color, a figure, a landscape, etc. (Franz Brentano)