Philosophy Exam 1 (Study Shesh)

Explain the second through sixth case that Danto discusses (all six minus the first, Descartes case), what he takes them to illustrate, and his account of how philosophical problems/issues arise.

From whence do philosophical problems arise? Indiscriminable and difference is not a scientific one. Difference: outside of experience, not determinable in/through experience (alone). Philosophical Question: May be unanswerable; Whether or not answer is true may make no practical difference. Yet, fundamental and important Illustrations Descartes: dreaming vs. being awake. (+) Kant: principle of morality(+) Hume: causality, necessity, and chance. (+) Turing: intelligence and the deception test Berkeley: God, spirits, and the natural world (+) Duchamp: art and non-art. How does the squirrel problem relate to the case of Duchamp's fountain? whether or not you consider it art will depend on what definition of "art" you accept. Fountain is a readymade sculpture produced by Marcel Duchamp in 1917: a porcelain urinal signed "R.Mutt". In April 1917, an ordinary piece of plumbing chosen by Duchamp was submitted for an exhibition of the Society of Independent Artists, the inaugural exhibition by the Society to be staged at The Grand Central Palace in New York. In Duchamp's presentation, the urinal's orientation was altered from its usual positioning.[2][3][4] Fountain was not rejected by the committee, since Society rules stated that all works would be accepted from artists who paid the fee, but the work was never placed in the show area.[5] Following that removal, Fountain was photographed at Alfred Stieglitz's studio, and the photo published in The Blind Man. The original has been lost. The work is regarded by art historians and theorists of the avant-garde as a major landmark in 20th-century art. Sixteen replicas were commissioned from Duchamp in the 1950s and 1960s and made to his approval.[6] Some scholars have suggested that the original work was by a female artist rather than Duchamp, but this is a minority view among historians.[2] "A computer would deserve to be called intelligent if it could deceive a human into believing that it was human." Alan Turing Berkeley Philosopher that believes there is no reason to assume there is physical matter. Primary Qualities(Height, Weight) Berkeley A Empiricists(knowledge is through senses of experience): Believes there is nothing that exist outside the mind. He believes if we do not perceive it, there is no existence. He believes for there to be an object it must have some perceptual image. He believes physical objects are just collections of sensible ideas. Therefore he only believes in a secondary quality. Who was Rene Descartes? What kind of a skeptic was Descartes? he was a french philosopher, he was not a skeptic but produced some of the most devestating skpetical arguments in order to reach his philosophical conclusions; thus he is a methodological skeptic Why did Descartes think that he needed to doubt everything? he subjected all of his beliefs to three waves of skeptical doubt in order to see if he could find one indubitable truth he doubted all beliefs that come via sense experience the remaining beliefs were subjected to the universal belief falsifier: how can anyone tell is they are dreaming or awake? the remaining beliefs were subjected to the universal belief falsifier: the evil demon hypothesis How did Descartes arrive at certainty of truth? "I think therefore I am" (cogito ergo sum) he reasoned that even the activity of doubting or being deceived requires and presupposes that one first exists, therefore he can never be deceived about his own existence Who was Bishop George Berkeley? george berkeley born in Ireland in 1685 studied mathematics, logic, languages, and philosophy. berkeley was instrumental in establishing Kings College (later named Columbia University) city and University in California was named in honor of Berkeley berkeley is defending a position known as idealism, which maintains that ultimate reality is mental or spiritual in nature. berkeley is denying the world of independently existing matter. berkeley's non-physical reality falls into two categories 1) minds 2) ideas perceived by minds thus, All objects we experience are mind-dependent collections of ideas. to be, is to be perceived What did Berkeley think that Locke "got right" about theory of knowledge, and what did Berkeley think that Locke "got wrong"? what locke got wrong: berkeley argues that primary qualities of objects (along with secondary qualities) are also mind-dependent perceptions what locke got right: What is idealism? the position that maintains that ultimate reality is mental or spiritual in nature What is representative realism? the view that we do not directly experience external objects, but their primary qualities (such as shape and size) produce ideas in us that accurately represent these real properties of the objects What did Berkeley think was the causes of our ideas? berkeley thought that our ideas were produced by God What does Kant's Copernican Revolution in epistemology mean? old epistemological view representational Realism real objects exist beyond the veil of perception and cause our ideas of these objects. our ideas necessarily conform to objects beyond the veil of perception. kant's view kant's idealism the mind imposes a rational structure upon the world within the veil of perception. for there to be objects of knowledge at all presupposes that mind is actively synthesizing the raw-data. How does Kant reverse the traditional conception of knowledge? asked how we have universal and objective knowledge How does Kant think the human mind partially constructs knowledge? the mind takes in the raw-data (sense- impressions) through the forms of space and time, and then organized the data into meaningful bits of knowledge according to the categories of the understanding What are the two forms of intuition according to Kant? (Explain) the forms of intuition are operations of the mind by which the mind takes in or perceives data the mind takes in the data through forms of space and time What are the categories of the understanding according to Kant? + examples 1) a priori analytic knowledge- knowledge that is universal (true everywhere), necessarily true (has to be true) and is independent of sense-experience for example, "All bachelors are unmarried males," "All female foxes are vixens." 2) synthetic a posteriori knowledge- knowledge that is contingent (non-necessary), comes from experience, observation and adds something new to the subject. for example, "JFK was assassinated," "Weld county school buses are yellow." The former bits of knowledge synthesizes (brings together) the concepts JFK and assassinated, Weld Co school buses and yellow. Furthermore, the truth of the former statements are demonstrated by sense-observation. 3) synthetic a priori knowledge- this class of knowledge is universal, necessary, but gives us new information about the way the world is. for example, "All events have a cause," "5 + 7= 12," "The shortest distance between two points is a straight line." The former statements are universal (always true) and necessary (has to be true); thus, a priori. However, these statements are not analytic; they are synthetic- they provide us with new information about the way the world is by bringing together two concepts Why does Kant think that we can't have knowledge of freewill, the soul, and God, but we can postulate these entities? kant's program doesn't allow knowledge of the former items. Why not? however, we don't have knowledge that these former items don't exist either. Kant didn't think that we should throw out these ideas (as Hume thought), but rather we are allowed to believe these things especially by the way we live our lives. "I have found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith"- Immanuel Kant Who is David Hume? What are perceptions? David Hume was born 1711 in Edinburgh Scotland. he attended Edinburgh University to study law but changed his interest to philosophy. his most famous philosophical work is An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. hume was an empiricist, he believe that all knowledge about the world comes through the senses. like Locke, Hume thinks that in order to understand knowledge, we need to look at the contents of the mind. thus, the contents of the conscious mind are perceptions. perceptions can be either: impressions or ideas. What are impressions? How does Hume use the term, "ideas"? impressions: are 1) basically sense impressions, which are sense-data like sounds, odors, tastes, visual data etc. 2) psychological impressions like feeling, willing, doubting, loving etc. ideas are faint copies of our impressions accessed by our memory and imagination. What do all of our ideas need to be traced back to in order for them to be considered legitimate? prior impressions What two areas does Hume divide all our human knowledge into? relations of ideas and matters of facts What are "matters of fact" and "relations of ideas"? relations of ideas-refers to the kind of knowledge which is purely a priori and is known not by appealing to the senses but by examining the logical relations among ideas. matters of fact-refers to the kind of knowledge which is a posteriori and is known by sense-experience by appealing to our senses. We observe the world with our senses and then infer matters of fact. From where does most of our knowledge come from, according to Hume? matters of fact Regarding "matters of fact" what idea (Notion) does this rest upon, according to Hume? "matters of fact" depend and rest upon the notion of cause and effect for example, "It is raining outside." The effect- water outside, the cause- rain "The book is on the table." The effect-the book on the table, the cause- somebody out the book there. How does Hume call the notion of causality into question and why is this important? hume points out that we believe all of our impressions are caused by some object beyond the veil of perception, but again Hume would point out that depends upon the notion of cause and effect. however, cause and effect rest upon the principal of induction and the uniformity of nature....but we have no proof that the future will resemble the past. thus, knowledge is not based upon empirical proof, reason, and demonstration but instead upon psychological custom and habit. Does Hume think we have knowledge of the self? hume has now left us in doubt about the external world (the world beyond the veil of perception), but what about the self. Is there reason to believe in the existence of a fixed permanent self? Hume doesn't think so. for Hume, remember legitimate ideas must be able to be traced back to an impression, so do we have an impression of fixed permanent self? no, all we have are sensory impressions or internal psychological states...one following another, but we don't have an impression of self. Kant agrees with Hume's claim that we cannot derive an objective causal order from the subjective order of perceptions, and that we cannot directly perceive causality but only a sequence of events, a constant conjunction. But Kant turns the situation around and argues that we can, however, derive the fact that there is a subjective sequence of perceptions to begin with only with the presupposition that there is an objective causal order of things. That is, that we perceive things in certain order is itself proof that there objectively is a real order and therefore causality that determines that order. Thus Hume was wrong in doubting the existence of causality.

Explain Plato's allegory of the cave. You should first exposit the allegory, and then provide an analysis of its metaphorical meaning.

It's a simple story we can all relate to. A man spends his life in the real world, chained to his couch watching TV all day and snacking on chips that were marketed to him by the commercial interruptions every 12 minutes. He is vaguely happy but somehow dissatisfied with 800 channels of reruns and sitcoms. One day he is released from this and finds himself on Quora during the work day. He basks in the bright light of the brilliant questions and the be-nice compliant answers. He follows many people and he posts witty answers. Though he gets frustrated when people harbor opposing opinions to his. But his heart is full. He returns to the cave, his family and friends, and he speaks of the smart people on Quora how they truly understand the world. They do not get it. He tries to explain how boards really make things better, but yet they are not like Pintrest. And they get frustrated at his madness for they do not sign up for these flash-in-the-pan beta websites. He tells his wife that he wishes he could upvote her dinner. And she leaves the table confused and upset. His friends stop talking to him as he can only share the latest memes they have never seen. He is now divided between the lonely but delightful experience of watching brilliant words magically appear on this screen vs. the real-life physical and human experiences of having a life with others, albeit in the cave of traditional media, where he is no longer really part of their audience. It is the tension of the Illuminati in the world of the common. The curse of the polymath. The loneliness of those who seek community with the inspired. It's kinda like high school -- except in Plato's version the guy gets killed, not beat up in the locker room.It is said by Plato that the world the unenlightened people see is merely an illusion - simply a shadow of reality. Plato's cave may very well be divided into three parts, which are: In the cave, where you would have to imagine the persons as prisoners who are fixed only being able to look at what's in front of them. Behind these prisoners a source of light is placed - in front of this source of light and behind those held as "captives" are figures of real-like things born. Figures of horses, trees or the like. These are merely shadows cast but are believed to be true to the prisoners, as they can not see anything but shadows. Enlightment as being released from the cave. Assume that one of the captives - and only one - is released. He would then see the figures and blinded by the source of light that has been fixed behind him all along he might believe it not to be true and still think that the shadows are real. Imagine this captive, despite his whish to return to the shadows are dragged up out of the cave. At first he would be unable to see, but after some time he would adapt and finally accept that the Sun is the most outstanding thing - the cause of seasons and growth - the unalterable good. Returning to the shadows (the Cave). The now enlightened prisoner would try to explain what he had experienced in the world behind the cave, but he would be considered stupid and his eyes corrupted. Because only he knows what truth is, as his former peers are ignorant to the world behind them - dwelling in the darkness. These are the three parts in which the Allegory of the Cave most often is devided into. One has to distinguish from the life in the cave and the enlightened life out of it. The World of Forms (the cave) and The World of Ideas (the outside world) The outside world only accessible through philosophy and thinking. One can only obtain the truth through philosophy and thinking. The people living in the World of Ideas are obviously philosophers while ordinary, non-philosophers are living in the World of Forms. It describes the philosopher's role in society which is to enlighten and help the ordinary people to the World of Ideas. This has Plato been trying to do through his maieutics (maieutikos) - which is to "give birth" to other people's thoughts - as the truth is hidden in every ones mind, it just needs a little help. Thanks for the A2A. This is a very controversial topic, and can be interpreted in a variety of ways. The most conventional ways of interpreting the Allegory has been very exactly expounded here. Thus, I would like to offer another interpretation that goes beyond epistemology and reference to knowledge — an ontological reading by Heidegger, from his series of lectures On the Essence of Truth. Heidegger splits his interpretation into four parts. In the first stage, people are chained in an underground cave, shackled to face the wall of shadows. Heidegger translate the final sentence of the first stage as: Glaucon: "And so in every way they would take to shadows of the artefacts for the un-hidden?" Socrates: "Inevitably." Being human means to be confined to the hidden, and away from the unhidden. To the prisoners, the shadows are the unhidden, since they do not have a notion of the actual unhidden to compare with. Although there is light from behind, the prisoners have no relation to the brightness since they do not see the light themselves. This stage gives us a clue that there is some sort of unhiddenness that belongs to the being of man (as a condition of his situation). Part Two In the second stage, a certain prisoner gets rid of his shackles and faces the light. Socrates says that what he now sees is more unhidden than the shadows, but it pains his eyes so much that he is tempted to turn back and retreat to the shadows, thinking that they were clearer. Here, unhiddenness is used as in comparison, thus has a gradations and levels. Thus, truth, as unhiddenness, is not simply one end of a binary that excludes each other. Truth exist in levels, and every truth has its time. Also, the freed prisoner is said to have come closer to real things, and therefore, beings. Thus we can also say that the more unhidden it is, the more beingful things appear. These real things that he sees are also said to be more correct, by definition and assertion. Stringing things towards, we can say that truth is the unhiddenness of being, and can be scaled as well. Another clue to take away is that facing the truth (light) requires effort. Prisoners unaccustomed to the effort will turn back to the shadows, where no exertion is needed. Thus the release of the shackles, and the turning to the light, are only the beginnings of the liberation to truth, hence cannot be taken as immediate liberation. Unless the prisoner wills himself to face the truth, the removal of the shackles is never a genuine emancipation. Part Three Here, the dogged prisoner freed is dragged out into the light so as to struggle against the pain of facing it. Soon he becomes accustomed to the light, and he begins to see the prisoners, the shadows, and his environment outside the cave. He begins to think of his previous circumstances and feel sorry for his fellow prisoners, but at the same time he would feel fortunate to be emancipated and would never want to live the same as them again. There are many, many things to take note here. First, the transition to the outside is violent, and requires acclimatisation to illumination. The path to truth is thus full of resistance, but gradually, the process becomes more endurance and eventually a second nature. The process can be fast or slow, depending on how well the prisoner copes with the light. As the prisoner is able to see the source of the light, namely the sun, is gains a wider perspective as compared to the other prisoners stuck in the cave. What lies in the shadows is self-evidence, while what lies outside is the world of Ideas. Heidegger moves into a discussion of the relation between Idea and Light. Plato never tells us that we should know more shadows to reach the truth. In analogy, shadows are still shadows that remain self-evident, and any familiarisation with them does not allow us to reach towards truth better. In the idea, we see what every being is, and how it is, thus the being of beings. Because seeing with light is fundamentally different from seeing of the shadows, Plato calls the latter 'reason', a capacity to perceive things as they are. The essence of the light is thus transparency — it allows beings to reveal their true nature. It is through the brightness of the light that we are able to see beings of beings, thus the condition of the possibility of perception. This means that light is also responsible for the creation of the shadows, but along with the factor of obstruction by beings. Thus, the shadows are fundamentally shapes of beings, but because they are formed by obstructions, they are only captured imperfectly as shadows. Being unshackled and outside of the cave also entails freedom. The prisoner gradually becomes able to look at the sun and realise his previous condition as being untrue. We can say that he is now able to have a wider variety of actions to take, and thus, able to commit to more perspectives than before. If seeing the shadows is a kind of concealment from the truth, then truth is properly termed as deconcealment. Becoming free, perceiving beings as beings, and the widening of perspective are aspects of this deconcealment. This is driven by the will of the prisoner, or properly speaking, the hunger for true knowledge. The essence of unhiddenness is deconcealment, and thus, the essence of truth is deconcealment. This final result of this process altogether is not only seeing things as they are, but also a fundamental understanding of the condition of being. Being deconcealed, the freed prisoner is finally able to understand his environment that the situation that he is in. This is the ultimate takeaway that Heidegger wants to bring us to. Part Four The released prisoner goes back to his cave. Immediately, his vision is filled with darkness as his eyes are not accustomed to the darkness. Upon sharing his opinions with the prisoners, he is mocked and dismissed of his effort to ascent to the outside, since both the released and the shackled prisoner are able to see anyway. More jarringly, the shackled prisoners would attempt to kill the freed prisoner when they are released. Now, death of the liberator comes into the picture. Why does he have to die? Because the liberator, having seen the deconcealed being, is a violent person. In his attempt to free the other prisoners, the liberator is seen as dragging them into pain and suffering not worth working for. Surely, the liberator is justified in his attempt, but the shackled prisoner certainly will never see things as the liberator does. Thus, the liberators that have turned back to release the other prisoners are met with violent ends for their good will. This is also a subtle reminder of Socrates's tragic death. So is there a case whereby the liberator does not die. Yes, only if he does not return to free the other prisoners. Plato calls this freed prisoner that remains at the outside philosopher. The philosopher is someone who has reliable knowledge, and possesses a drive to seek further understanding. This also entails that there is necessarily some detachment of the philosopher from the common man; a detachment that cannot be removed in any wayIn addition to the overarching epistemological message, I think the allegory of the Cave can be taken to present a very familiar message regarding the power of perspective. I answered this here: What was Plato right about? Or in the Republic, the allegory of the cave can be seen as providing a rather powerful and again, prescient view, on the importance of context and the power and possibility of the mind in reshaping the world. The cave provides an example of context: your life, your community, your country, your city, your family, your religion. Each provides context that shapes your perspective, but also creates bias from which it is difficult to escape. Yet there are always those who wish to break out of their perspectives and explore new understanding. The cave can represent dogma, ideology, a fixed perspective of the world, from which we're always looking to break free. At any given time we are in one of these contexts, and our task is to become aware of that. The biggest deception Plato uncovers is for us to believe that who we are, what we do, how we act, and what we believe, is who others are, what they do, how they act, and what they believe. Or worse, who others should be, do, act, and believe. The question is, how to uncover the self deception, how to escape? As Plato points out, there are those who oppose exiting the cave, who take this cave for "reality", and who become hostile towards any effort to enlighten them regarding their deception. The more insistence on alternative perspectives and possibilities, the more hardened and entrenched they become in the righteousness of their way and cause. The Greeks called this Hubris, and for Plato, the overcoming and unmasking of this attitude was the key issue in education, and thus, a central one in philosophy. I'd say he was right about that. THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE BACK NEXT Symbolism, Imagery, Allegory The allegory of all allegories, Plato's Allegory of the Cave is not the rosiest take on the reality of human existence. You might even call it downright bleak: it envisions the world as a dark cave, human beings as trapped prisoners, and all of our experiences as nothing but shadows on a wall. "See human beings as though they were in an underground cave-like dwelling," instructs Socrates, "with its entrance, a long one, open to the light across the whole width of the cave" (514a). The Deets Imagine a cave with a small tunnel of light leading out and hundreds of human beings tied up so that they can't move—they just stare straight ahead all day long (creepy, we know). But they do get a little entertainment: there's a rockin' shadow-puppet show projected on the wall in front of them with a fire burning in the back for light. Since this show is all these poor people can see, they think it's the best, most awesome reality ever. They chat about it, gossip, call people names... you know, the usual. So that's how life goes down in the cave until one day, one of the prisoners manages to break free and begins to figure out what's going on. It takes a while for his eyes to adjust, but gradually, he sees that there is a much brighter speck of light at the end of another tunnel. So out he goes... and wow, you can imagine how amazing and beautiful the real world looks to him compared to that two-dimensional, dark cave he's spent all his life in. Feeling sorry for all his fellow prisoners, the freed prisoner goes back down and explains to everyone that they're all trapped in this massive cave, and everything they think is real is an illusion. Guess what? They think he's nuts. He keeps trying to convince them, and he's finally able to persuade a few... but the rest choose to remain where they are. Deets Decoded All right, so what's the deal with this wacky story? Well, the prisoners in the cave, we're sad to say, are us: human beings. We think the real world around us is the cat's pajamas, but we are oh so wrong. That one prisoner who freed himself and realized this? That dude's a philosopher. Philosophers are brave enough to leave the familiarity of the cave and explore the real world of light. So what's the real world of light? Well, that would be Plato's concept of "the forms," which you can learn more about in our "Forms" section. What you need to know here is that the forms are what Plato believes is true reality. By pursuing philosophical knowledge with courage and persistence, you can get to a place where you can actually see them. Once you do see them, you'll never be satisfied with the ho-hum world most of us see. You'll even try to get your friends to pursue them with you, but like the freed prisoner everyone laughed at, plenty of people just won't believe you. What It All Means Even though Plato's Allegory of the Cave can seem pretty darn bleak, remember that it's meant to be a wake-up call for everyone to stop settling for an imperfect, unexplored life. Since Plato believed that human beings could eventually free themselves and head upwards to the real world by leading a life of philosophical consideration, the Allegory's bleakness is really meant to be motivational, to make people understand how limiting and self-defeating an "unexamined life" can be. It's also meant to remind people that they should be skeptical of everything. Yep, even of what's right in front of your eyes. The key to being a philosophical person is to take everything you encounter in life as an opportunity for scrutiny and self-improvement. Plato was definitely going for shock value with this haunting image—and shock is what he got. The Allegory of Cave has become one of the most unforgettable, talked-about moments in the history of philosophy. In one way or another, almost every major philosophical viewpoint since Plato has responded to, attacked, or reimagined this foundational image of human existence. THE REPUBLIC SYMBOLISM, IMAGERY, ALLEGORY BACK NEXT The Allegory of the Cave The allegory of all allegories, Plato's Allegory of the Cave is not the rosiest take on the reality of human existence. You might even call it downright bleak: it envisions the world as a dark cave... Myth of Metals Famously described as a "noble lie" by Socrates (414c), the myth of metals demonstrates how lying, if it's for the good of a city, can actually be a good thing for ruler to do. (So says Plato, anyw... Myth of Er The myth of Er is essentially the 411 on the afterlife. Just like the myth of metals, it's a "noble lie" meant to convince people who don't, or can't, make their way through the Republic that livin... Justice We're sorry to say that just because you might be a big Law & Order fan, it doesn't mean you're going to have an easy time with Plato's understanding of justice. We often think of justice from... The Ring of Invisibility, or The Ring of Gyges There's no Frodo here, folks: this ring of invisibility goes back way before Tolkien wrote his famous trilogy, or even before Tolkien's great-great-great-great-great grandparents were born.This sto... The Forms Forget college applications—Plato's forms have nothing to do with paperwork. The forms are what Plato believes to be true reality. Suspicious of the imperfections in the world around us, Plato ch... The Imaginary City Also known as the republic itself, Plato's imaginary city has been a source of fascination for both philosophers and authors since the book was written. Part of the reason it has such wide appeal i... Poetry Plato has a long and infamous beef with poetry and poets. Since so much about Plato seems kind of creative, and even literary, readers have puzzled over why Plato is so down on poetry. It's a myste...

Explain how the cogito passage demonstrates a piece of knowledge that withstands the skeptical scenarios presented in the First Meditation.

Meditations on First Philosophy What can be called into doubt The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body The existence of God Truth and Falsity The essence of material things, and the existence of God considered a second time The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body Seven Set of Objections and Replies (with an Appendix to the Fifth Set of Objections and Replies Meditation One: Foundations of Knowledge Scientia vs. cognitio Method of Doubt Aim is scientia Strategy: apply radical doubt to discharge previously held beliefs; find one belief impervious to doubt; use that belief as the foundation upon which to build the rest of beliefs. Doubting Find a reason for doubting a previously held belief. Reasons for doubt will be the skeptical scenarios. First Meditation: skeptical doubts Summary The First Meditation, subtitled "What can be called into doubt," opens with the Meditator reflecting on the number of falsehoods he has believed during his life and on the subsequent faultiness of the body of knowledge he has built up from these falsehoods. He has resolved to sweep away all he thinks he knows and to start again from the foundations, building up his knowledge once more on more certain grounds. He has seated himself alone, by the fire, free of all worries so that he can demolish his former opinions with care. The Meditator reasons that he need only find some reason to doubt his present opinions in order to prompt him to seek sturdier foundations for his knowledge. Rather than doubt every one of his opinions individually, he reasons that he might cast them all into doubt if he can doubt the foundations and basic principles upon which his opinions are founded. Everything that the Meditator has accepted as most true he has come to learn from or through his senses. He acknowledges that sometimes the senses can deceive, but only with respect to objects that are very small or far away, and that our sensory knowledge on the whole is quite sturdy. The Meditator acknowledges that insane people might be more deceived, but that he is clearly not one of them and needn't worry himself about that. However, the Meditator realizes that he is often convinced when he is dreaming that he is sensing real objects. He feels certain that he is awake and sitting by the fire, but reflects that often he has dreamed this very sort of thing and been wholly convinced by it. Though his present sensations may be dream images, he suggests that even dream images are drawn from waking experience, much like paintings in that respect. Even when a painter creates an imaginary creature, like a mermaid, the composite parts are drawn from real things--women and fish, in the case of a mermaid. And even when a painter creates something entirely new, at least the colors in the painting are drawn from real experience. Thus, the Meditator concludes, though he can doubt composite things, he cannot doubt the simple and universal parts from which they are constructed like shape, quantity, size, time, etc. While we can doubt studies based on composite things, like medicine, astronomy, or physics, he concludes that we cannot doubt studies based on simple things, like arithmetic and geometry. On further reflection, the Meditator realizes that even simple things can be doubted. Omnipotent God could make even our conception of mathematics false. One might argue that God is supremely good and would not lead him to believe falsely all these things. But by this reasoning we should think that God would not deceive him with regard to anything, and yet this is clearly not true. If we suppose there is no God, then there is even greater likelihood of being deceived, since our imperfect senses would not have been created by a perfect being. The Meditator finds it almost impossible to keep his habitual opinions and assumptions out of his head, try as he might. He resolves to pretend that these opinions are totally false and imaginary in order to counter-balance his habitual way of thinking. He supposes that not God, but some evil demon has committed itself to deceiving him so that everything he thinks he knows is false. By doubting everything, he can at least be sure not to be misled into falsehood by this demon

Explain Russell's account of the progress of philosophy and the value of philosophy in relation to uncertainty.

Philosophy creates other disciplines such as Astronomy which at one time was thought to be "Gods" in the Sky" Or take into account Neuroscience which at one time was thought to be something else at the time. Once a question has been answered it ceases to be philosophy and becomes another subject. The value of philosophy in relation to uncertainty is Because studying philosophy helps us realize that the world is puzzling. We are not trapped in a box in which only common thought thrives but where wonder and new understandings come about. [The Values of Philosophy] The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very un- certainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the ha- bitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his delib- erate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many pos- sibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never traveled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect. Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, philosophy has a value—perhaps its chief value—through the greatness of the objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal aims resulting from this contemplation. The life of the instinctive man is shut up within the circle of his private interests: family and friends may be in- cluded, but the outer world is not regarded except as it may help or hinder what comes within the circle of instinctive wishes. In such a life there is something feverish and confined, in comparison with which the philo- sophic life is calm and free. The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins. Unless we can so enlarge our interests as to include the whole outer world, we remain like a garrison in a beleaguered fortress, knowing that the enemy prevents escape and that Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction "Enlargement of Self" by Bertrand Russell ultimate surrender is inevitable. In such a life there is no peace, but a con- stant strife between the insistence of desire and the powerlessness of will. In one way or another, if our life is to be great and free, we must escape this prison and this strife.

Explain Russell's distinction between the 'instinctive' person and the life of the 'instinctive person', and contrast them with the 'philosophic' person and the life of the 'philosophic' person. In your explanation, you should also include a discussion of the two different ways that one can approach the world and enlarge the sense of self (i.e. through self-assertion vs. philosophic contemplation).

(c) Enlargement of self takes an objective view to escape from the instinctive circle of the daily round. When you see yourself as a process, you see yourself developing as you will be. (E.g., why are beginners afraid to make mistakes? After all, if one did not make mistakes, one would not be a beginner.) (d) Do not define yourself in reaction to what others say you must do: self-reliance (1) Pursue an interest for its own sake--not what it can do for you. (2) Recognize that there are many possibilities for solutions--not just the pragmatic, dogmatic "right or wrong" opposites. (3) Being motivated for a desire for knowledge lead to a richer view of the world. (e) By way of contrast, the way of self-assertion views the world as a means to its own end and sees the world in terms of itself: pragmatic, dogmatic, instinctive, and direct. (1) On this view, getting results or getting the right answer is more important that understanding how such things are accomplished. (2) This view leads to a limited and impoverished view of the world--there is a lack of creativity and a lack of play with things. (3) If one is self-assertive, then even minor slights are taken personally. There might be other reasons for an individual's behavior that do not involve you. (4) Enlargement of self does not shape such dualisms as the "them against us" mentality." Describe the instinctive person. (a) The instinctive person lives in a prison of his own making--much like an animal. (b) The instinctive person tends not to look beyond what is before him at the moment. (c) Being unaware of the larger world can put our private world in ruins. Self Assertion me is blocked off from world of ideas Philosophic contemplation me and world of ideas are together enlargment of self does not divide universe into two hostile camps (no good v bad, friend v foes) What is the life of the "Instinctive" man? - Concerned only with private interests - Feverish and confined - At odds with the outside world What is the life of philosophic contemplation? - Calm and Free - Views the whole world impartially - Is an enlargement of the self through the understanding of the world Russell warns against self-assertion with respect to philosophic contemplation. Any study that presupposes the objects or character of the knowledge that it seeks sets obstacles in its own path, because such study is self-defeating in its obstinate desire for a certain kind of knowledge. Rather, one must start from the "not-Self" and through "the infinity of the universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity." The union of Self and not- Self constitutes knowledge, not an "attempt to force the universe into conformity with what we find in ourselves." Analysis In his last words of this book, Russell once again discusses the impairing influence of the idealist position. He writes of the "widespread tendency towards the view which tells us that Man is the measure of all things, that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind, and that, if there be anything not created by the mind it is unknowable." This position robs philosophy of its value, "since it fetters contemplation to the Self." This view puts an "impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond." As we have seen, Russell has analyzed away the idealist veil, which took the form of a denial that the physical world existed independent of a mind. In the process, Russell constructed his own veil. Opposing the idealists in The Problems of Philosophy, Russell believed that material objects were real and independent of a mind. He just didn't think that we were acquainted with any of them. Thus, a veil remains intact. [Enlargement of Self] One way of escape is by philosophic contemplation. Philosophic contem- plation does not, in its widest survey, divide the universe into two hostile camps—friends and foes, helpful and hostile, good and bad—it views the whole impartially. Philosophic contemplation, when it is unalloyed, does not aim at proving that the rest of the universe is akin to man. All acqui- sition of knowledge is an enlargement of the Self, but this enlargement is best attained when it is not directly sought. It is obtained when the desire for knowledge is alone operative, by a study which does not wish in ad- vance that its objects should have this or that character, but adapts the Self to the characters which it finds in its objects. This enlargement of Self is not obtained when, taking the Self as it is, we try to show that the world is so similar to this Self that knowledge of it is possible without any admis- sion of what seems alien. The desire to prove this is a form of self-assertion and, like all self-assertion, it is an obstacle to the growth of Self which it desires, and of which the Self knows that it is capable. Self-assertion, in philosophic speculation as elsewhere, views the world as a means to its own ends; thus it makes the world of less account than Self, and the Self sets bounds to the greatness of its goods. In contemplation, on the con- trary, we start from the not-Self, and through its greatness the boundaries of Self are enlarged; through the infinity of the universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity. For this reason greatness of soul is not fostered by those philosophies which assimilate the universe to Man. Knowledge is a form of union of Self and not-Self; like all union, it is impaired by dominion, and therefore by any attempt to force the universe into conformity with what we find in ourselves. There is a widespread philosophical tendency towards the view which tells us that Man is the measure of all things, that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind, and that, if there be anything not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us. This view, if our previous discussions were cor- rect, is untrue; but in addition to being untrue, it has the effect of robbing philosophic contemplation of all that gives it value, since it fetters contem- Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction 7 "Enlargement of Self" by Bertrand Russell plation to Self. What it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, and desires, making an impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond. The man who finds pleasure in such a theory of knowledge is like the man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear his word might not be law. 8 Trinity College, Cambridge, Russell, after being home schooled, a very high Wrangler, and a First Class with distinction in philosophy, took up residence and was later elected a fellow to Trinity College in 1895. Library of Congress The true philosophic contemplation, on the contrary, finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the ob- jects contemplated, and thereby the subject contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or private, everything that depends upon habit, self-interest, or desire, distorts the object, and hence impairs the union which the intellect seeks. By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such personal and private things become a prison to the intel- lect. The free intellect will see as God might see, without a here and now, without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge—knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of pri- vate history do not enter, than the knowledge brought by the senses, and dependent, as such knowledge must be, upon an exclusive and personal point of view and a body whose sense-organs distort as much as they re- veal. Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction "Enlargement of Self" by Bertrand Russell [Freedom of Contemplation] The mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of philosophic contemplation will preserve something of the same free- dom and impartiality in the world of action and emotion. It will view its purposes and desires as parts of the whole, with the absence of insis- tence that results from seeing them as infinitesimal fragments in a world of which all the rest is unaffected by any one man's deeds. The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all, and not only to those who are judged use- ful or admirable. Thus contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts, but also the objects of our actions and our affections: it makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thraldom of narrow hopes and fears. Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and di- minish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philos- ophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good. From the reading. . . "All acquisition of knowledge is an enlargement of self, but this enlargement of self is best obtained when it is not directly sought."

Explain the issue concerning the ambiguous passage regarding his nature as a thinking thing in the Second Meditation, and how Descartes resolves that issue.

A key distinction concerns the source of ideas. In establishing the foundations of knowledge, Descartes began by looking inwards. Innate ideas figured importantly. The idea we have of God, for instance, served as the pivot point for how Descartes established confidence in our beliefs about the physical world. Locke, on the other hand, denied the existence of innate ideas, arguing that our ideas all have their basis in sense experience. Descartes / Meditation 2 - Short Summary In the second mediation of René Descartes' "Mediations on the First Philosophy" (titled: "On the nature of the human mind and that it is easier to understand than bodies") he establishes his Archimedean point of certainty, the Cogito and shows that, contrary to common belief, we know the mind better than we know the world around us (assuming that there is one, doubts still remain at this point of Descartes' argument). In Meditation 1 Descartes offered the "Demon argument" which holds that we can never know if a malicious demon is not tricking us into believing what we hold to be true. Now, in meditation 2, Descartes argues that regardless of how cunning the demon is, he cannot make me think I do not exist, since the apprehension of that thought will make one aware that one is thinking it. Hence one cannot fail to be certain that one exists just when one is thinking (and here comes the famous formulation of the Cogito: "I think therefore I am"). Descartes knows he is at least a mind - a thinking thing. To think in this extended sense is not merely to cogitate but to have any kind of mental act. The distinctness of mind and body is revealed, as mind is not extended and body is; yet Descartes admits he cannot yet tell whether this is a real or merely conceptual distinction. By bringing a piece of wax near a fire, Descartes argues that bodies are not perceived by the senses but by the intellect. The wax loses all the sensible properties it had and gains new ones. If it were nothing more than the sum of these properties, we would have to conclude that one object had been destroyed and another created. The intellect understands the essence of body to be spatial extension, which is preserved (if modified) over the change of sensible properties. After establishing his point of certainty in meditation 2 and escaping some of the radical doubt of meditation 1, Descartes' meditation 3 will continue to reconstruct the world with a little help from God. What is the method of doubt in the first meditation? What about the 2nd? In the first: reject beliefs that are not epistemically certain Second: uncover beliefs that are epistemically certain What is the archimedean point? an epistemically certain belief on which the epistemic certainty of other beliefs can be founded Descartes states that archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing that is certain What are some possible concerns for the archimedean point? Foundationalism vs Coherentism Bootstrapping-using existing resources or beliefs What is foundationalism? There is a set of beliefs that constitute knowledge but not in virtue of their relation to any other beliefs. This is basic knowledge. All other beliefs (if any) that constitute knowledge do so only in virtue of the relations to ones basic knowledge What is coherentism: There is no basic knowledge. All beliefs that constitute knowledge do so in virtue of their relations to other beliefs. What is the cogito and what does he mean by it? I think there for I am: I am, I exist is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind How is the cogito distinctive? Compare I am walking, therefore I am with the person over there is thinking therefore she exists What am I to descartes? I am in the strict sense only a thing that thinks How does descartes establish that he is in the strict sense only a thing that thinks? By the term thought I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it. thought alone is inseparable from me For if it were that I were completely cease from thinking, I would cease to exist. How does descartes explain that the mind is better known than the body? Through the piece of wax Because we can not perceive things correct all the time through the perception but through the use of perception we come to know the mind because we can understand. What does descartes think the case of the wax tells us about each of the following and why? The nature of the wax Our way of perceiving nature of the wax How the mind is known vs how bodies are known Nature of the was is in no way revealed by my imagination but is perceived by the mind alone because the wax can be extended into many more different ways than we would ever be able to imagine. Through the mind Mind is known through use of thought and understanding Bodies unknown because we can only base our knowledge off what we believe and this is not always correct. Thinking implies the existence of? that which thinks. It is impossible to conceive that when there is thinking going on, nothing exists. The cogito simply asserts this necessary connection between the property of existence and the property of thinking in anything capable of thinking. Therefore, one can infer that "X exists" from the truth of the claim "X thinks," and this is the form of the cogito argument Cogito #2 Cogito as performance- the act of thought by which I attempt to doubt my own existence proves that I exist. The attempt to disprove that one exists is ultimately what proves we exist because? It is this act, this performance that proves one cannot fail to exist when one is thinking. How does the Cogito belief lead to the criterion for absolute truth? the cogito has clear and distinct ideas and self-evidence which all dubitable beliefs lack. Descartes proposes that if a belief contains, like the Cogito, all and only clear and distinct ideas, and seems self-evidently true to reason when it considers it then...? that belief is an instance of knowledge. What are clarity, distinctness and self-eidence Clarity: obviousness. An idea is obvious if it is in plain view. the idea is not obscured from the view. Distinctness: the idea cannot be confused with any other idea. Self-evidence: A belief that is self-confirming (it expresses what appears to be a necessary truth given the concepts it contains. What is the proof for me being a thinking thing? I can grasp that I am a thinking thing, and if I were not to think, I would cease to be what I am. Therefore, I know that I am a thinking thing, and that I exist, and I know this is because this belief containing all and only clear and distinct ideas, and that is self-evidently true to my reason when I consider it (I cannot think that it is false). Does Descartes forget the role of sense perception in the wax example? No. We use our senses to get started thinking about the nature of wax. But when we are finished, we are using all and only ideas that we could not have acquired through sense perception. Because we could not get these ideas from sense perception, the beliefs we form using them cannot be based upon our sense perception. Why Descartes thinks our ideas of extension cannot come from sense perception? because they have properties that ideas originating in sense perception lack What is the circle example A circle as used in geometry is a perfect circle unlike all the circles we have seen or touched. No true proposition concerning circles could be either proved true or proved false by pointing to some particular circle. How does Meno's paradox contribute to the circle example? Meno's paradox of knowledge: You cannot acquire the idea of a circle because any process by which you move from not knowing what it is to kn0wing what it is requires you to be able to distinguish between what is and what is not a circle, but to be able to do that just is what it is to have the concept of a circle. To acquire the idea of a circle from sense perception requires you to move from not knowing to knowing the idea, and Meno's paradox shows this is impossible. Why is the nature of wax known by reason and not sense? REal properties of wax, which we can and do know, are infinitary, and sense perception cannot represent that which is infinitary (we cannot "see or touch" infinitely many shapes, for example, yet the wax has the capacity to take infinitely many shapes, and this is one of its essential properties. Descartes tend to build his philisophy from scratch, so he starts that with making a firm foundation that all his philosophy will be built upon later. He believes without the existence of a god we might be decieved in anything, we might be decieved when we say 1+1=2 , he says in the discourse on method that the power that is in the creation of world is inversly proportional with our being decieved in any given moment. That is without a god creating this universe (and it became into creation by chance or cause and effect) we can be deceived in everything we do. but with existence of a god, we are not deceived in everything, because that is not the picture of a god, god must be good. 'I think therefore iam' is true for descartes no matter god exist or not, and his way of proving that is genious. the prove of god however is the second step of his foundation. All of his philosophy have these two as the basis. Can't say about other people, but I know what I think of it. Now, I am not a philosopher. Nevertheless, some people might find an amateur perspective interesting. So here goes nothing. Descartes' epistemology belongs to a stream of philosophical thought known as 'Rationalism'. According to this view, rational introspection (reason) is the source and test of knowledge. Leibniz and Spinoza were other rationalists, and together, these three are known as 'Continental Rationalists'. To understand the wax argument, it is better to have a quick recap of Meditations, his philosophical treatise. There are six Meditations actually. In the first, Descartes introduces the method of doubt (Cartesian doubt). He rejects what his senses tell him, reasoning that his perceptual experiences might as well be an illusion cast by a demon. So, the world might not exist, people might not exist, his body might not exist ... you get the point. In the second, he reasons that he does exist, more precisely, his self (the "I") exists. If it did not, there would be nothing for the demon to deceive. Now comes the wax argument in the second Meditations. It is an attack on 'Empiricism', a view which holds that knowledge is derived from sense experience. In brief (and as far as I could understand it), he is saying that even though wax loses all its properties — shape, smell, taste, etc. — on heating, we know that it is wax. In other words, even though the senses are telling otherwise, our intellect knows that it is wax. In effect, reason is the ultimate arbiter of what our senses perceive to be true. I have to admit that I am not very comfortable with Descartes' reasoning — not with the wax argument per se but with all that prelude to it. (I do not claim that I know better, I am just uncomfortable.) First, his doubt seems extreme to me. Surely, it is a far cry from 'our senses may doubt us' to 'our senses always doubt us'. Maybe his 'doubt' was just a vehicle for him to reach his destination — his cogito — but still. The other thing is that when he finally reaches the conclusion that his self exists, he does not really know who or what his self is. So what enables him to think (is it even a correct term to use here?) that it — his self, the elusive "I" — exists. Later, Georg Lichtenberg remarked that Descartes could have just said that "there are thoughts" or "it thinks". Russell and Wittgenstein seem to support Lichtenberg in this. I also have a big problem with his third Meditation (I stopped reading after this. Maybe some day ...) Anyway, he concludes that since he has a clear and coherent perception of truth (a perfect idea, in other words), this implies a perfect cause, i.e., God. And since God will not deceive us, world must be as our reason tells us it is. A bit of a circular argument, if you ask me. I think that I will take the easy way out and say that I am more of an empiricist, although, if pressed, I am sure that I would founder in that too.

Explain the different modal notions that we covered (necessity, possibility, contingency, etc.) and the logical relations between them. (For example, if a truth is necessary, is it possible? Is it actual? If a truth is contingent, is it necessary?) -Question Ask

A necessary truth is a proposition that is true and cannot be false. A possible truth is a proposition that can be true. A contingent truth is a proposition that is actually true but can be false. A contingent truth is a proposition that is actually true but not a necessary truth. Contingency must be defined as the subset of possibility that excludes necessity. Information philosophy claims that there is no physical necessity. The world is contingent. Necessity is a logical concept, an idea that is an important part of a formal logical or mathematical system that is a human invention. Necessity and contingency are really only well-defined in terms of logical statements. If we accept a biconditional (IFF-THEN) statement as a predicate, then we might say that the presence of the consequent necessitates the antecedent and vice versa. If we accept a conditional (IF-THEN) statement as a predicate, then we might say that the presence of the consequent is a sufficient but not necessary condition for that of the antecedent —that the antecedent is contingent. These are illustrated using the following juxtaposed syllogisms: >>The street is wet if and only if it has rained; the street is wet; it has rained (necessity). >>The street is wet if it has rained; the street is wet; it might have rained (contingency). It is obvious in this case that the first syllogism is contrived, since in the real world rain is not a necessary condition of wet streets, and that the second syllogism more accurately portrays the relationship: for instance, a sprinkler, children throwing water balloons, or someone washing their car variously or all together might have wetted the street. The distinction is useful in certain formal, generally mathematical, systems but real life is much better represented as varying degrees of contingency on an open interval (i.e., discarding the idealist notion of necessity). Colloquially, we tend to round off probabilities and make sweeping statements like, "The Sun will rise tomorrow in the East.", even though the problem of induction and the resulting underdetermination of scientific theory preclude any such absolute certainty. In response to this and other issues, it is wise to adopt the notion of confirmation holism and the paradigm of Instrumentalism. Necessity, then, becomes the sole province of theoretical disciplines which engage in the building and exploration of systems predicated on idealized assumptions. There are two forms of necessity and contingency, de dicto and de re. De dicto necessity is the necessity of a statement being true. If we suppose that statement P is describing a situation, such as "The cat is lying on the sofa". Then the cat could be lying on the sofa, in which case P would be true, and on the other hand it is also possible the cat is not lying on the sofa, in which case P would be false. So that makes P a contingent statement. But the statement "All cats are animals" would be taken to be a necessary statement. There can't be a cat that isn't an animal. When we talk about things having properties, then we're getting into the realm of de re modality. So a wire X may be conducting electricity at time T. Conducting electricity at T would be a contingent property of X because it is both possible for X to conduct electricity and also possible for it to not be conducting electricity. But if X is a metal than it isn't possible for it to not be capable of conducting electricity. So in that case we are talking about an essential or necessary property of X...it's ability to conduct electricity. If we're talking about causality and causal properties, then we may be talking about de re modality. For example, if we say that this chunk of stuff X is capable of exploding, then we're attributing a certain causal power or capacity to X. When we talk about the propensities or potentialities of things, we're talking about the possible things that can happen to them or what they could do. So in this case we seem to be talking about de re modality, de re possibility. Quarks are small and coloured Contingent If snow is white, then grass is green Contingent If Ottawa is in Colombia, then Ottawa is in Colombia Necessary Truth Quarks are coloured and not coloured Necessary Falsehood Pluto is a Planet, or it isn't Necessary Truth One plus one equals two Contingent Contingent-being that could not have been. Existence depends on others existence. Doesn't exist on other possible worlds, so exists in some worlds but not all. Necessary-being that could not not have been. Must exists on all possible worlds. "Possible world"-a way a world might have been. Necessity (and Contingency) Physical necessity is the ancient idea that everything that has ever happened and ever will happen is necessary, and can not be otherwise. It is known also as actualism. The only thing that can possibly happen is what actually happens. Necessity is often opposed to chance and contingency. In a necessary world there is no chance. Everything that happens is necessitated, determined by the laws of nature. There is only one possible (necessary!) future. The great atomist Leucippus stated the first dogma of determinism, an absolute necessity. "Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity." Contingency is the idea that many things or events are neither necessary nor impossible. Possibility is normally understood to include necessity. If something is necessary, it is a fortiori possible. Contingency must be defined as the subset of possibility that excludes necessity. Information philosophy claims that there is no physical necessity. The world is contingent. Necessity is a logical concept, an idea that is an important part of a formal logical or mathematical system that is a human invention. Like certainty, analyticity, and the a priori, necessity and necessary truths are useful concepts for logicians and mathematicians, but not for a metaphysicist exploring the fundamental nature of reality, which includes irreducible contingency. The Logical Necessity of the Analytic and the A priori Consider the simple analytically true proposition, "A is A." Or perhaps the logical and mathematical statement that "1 = 1." Most philosophers cannot imagine denying these true statements. But information philosophy now puts them in the correct historical perspective of new information creation and human knowledge acquisition. Both these facts became known long before humans developed the logical and mathematic apparatus to declare them a priori and analytic. Willard Van Orman Quine's claim that all knowledge is synthetic is correct from this perspective. And since nothing in the world was pre-determined to happen, this acquisition of knowledge was ultimately contingent. We can loosely call some knowledge synthetic a priori (Kant) or even necessary a posteriori (Kripke) if we find these descriptions useful, but neither is metaphysically true. Of course truth itself is another human invention. So we should probably say metaphysically valid, where validity is defined as a procedure within our axiomatic metaphysical apparatus. Information metaphysics begins by establishing the meaning of intrinsic information identicals, so we can provide an axiomatic ground for "A is A" and "1 = 1," which are usually considered fundamental laws of thought. See Identity. The Logical Necessity of Necessity Gottfried Leibniz gave us the best definition of logical necessity in his discussion of necessary and contingent truths. Beyond a priori and analytic, this is metaphysical necessity. An affirmative truth is one whose predicate is in the subject; and so in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the notion of the predicate is in some way contained in the notion of the subject An absolutely necessary proposition is one which can be resolved into identical propositions, or, whose opposite implies a contradiction... This type of necessity, therefore, I call metaphysical or geometrical. That which lacks such necessity I call contingent, but that which implies a contradiction, or whose opposite is necessary, is called impossible. The rest are called possible. In the case of a contingent truth, even though the predicate is really in the subject, yet one never arrives at a demonstration or an identity, even though the resolution of each term is continued indefinitely...

Explain the difference between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge.

A priori vs A posteriori A Priori: a proposition whose justification does not rely upon experience. Moreover, the proposition can be validated by experience, but is not grounded in experience. Therefore, it is logically necessary. A Posteriori: a proposition whose justification does rely upon experience. The proposition is validated by, and grounded in, experience. Therefore, it is logically contingent. What is the difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge? A priori knowledge is prior to sense experience (thus 'priori'). ... In contrast, a posteriori knowledge is gained only after sense experience has already occurred (i.e., once sense experience is behind us or 'posterior'). Apriori Knowledge -Knowledge that we can be 100% sure of. -Something we know without experience -True in all situations -Limited amount of things we can know A posteriori Knowledge -Not 100% certain -Something we know due to experience -Alot more we can know, but not necessarily 100% certain -Not always true in every instance Example of Apriori A mother has a child Example of aposteriori knowledge The dog is brown a posteriori grass is green a priori if god is the perfect being he must exist a priori analytic statement a posteriori synthetic statements a posteriori sun will come up in the morning a priori squares/circles dont exist a priori i think therefore i am a posteriori it si often argued that only these kinds of statements are informative a priori all bachelors are unmarried men

Explain Russell's characterization of the 'practical' man and its relevance to understanding the value of philosophy.

He/she recognizes only material needs, realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious to the necessity of providing food for the mind. Basically, man is choosing to be ignorant Basically, without this freedom, we cannot see the significance of abstractions and ideas. We are limited only to basic knowledge of the world and thus we cannot explore the unknown world around us. (a) A Philistine: a person deficient in liberal culture; one whose interests are material and commonplace. (b) The instinctive man is practical as is the man of self-assertion described later. He is not interested in providing for society and not interested in "goods for the mind." (1) His friendships are "friendships of utility," not Aristotle's "friendships of the good." He is interested in people for what they can do for him. (2) He is interested in "the answer" rather than how one gets the answer. Why not live one's life as a practical person? The practical person recognizes material needs; he is less aware of goods of the mind. For example, philosophy can give a different kind of value to life—not something superadded to material value, but a value intrinsically different. Consider what Socrates said about "tending your soul." as a means to a life of excellence. The philosophical mind has an awareness that goes beyond the daily round to an understanding of life and the world. Generally the practical person does not recognize basic truths about everyday life such as... In general, choices cannot justified by their consequences. Perception is not reality. How things appear to be is less important than how they are. The excuse that "things turned out all right" is not always sufficient. Often, the practical person is unaware of true consequences. You can be right for the world, even though the world is not right for you. The practical person often does not notice the world and the people in it because of his own worries that tend to feed upon themselves.

Explain Danto's account of the history of philosophy and his account and characterization of philosophy and philosophical problems/questions. In doing so, be sure you explain his account of the distinction between appearance and reality, the philosophical and non-philosophical versions of the distinction (two kinds of illusions), and how that figures into understanding the nature of philosophical questions as philosophical.

History of Philosophy and Nature of Philosophical Problems Danto: Philosophical mistake is holistic and a confusion of appearance vs. reality. Major philosophers in history always claim philosophers of almost entirely wrong. Philosophical Problem: Must be possible to imagine solution will consist of showing how appearance has been taken for reality. Philosophical question: answer makes a distinction between appearance and reality, and explains how former was (mis)taken for latter. Two Kinds of Illusions Appearance and Reality Illusion is what merely appears to be the case differs from what really is the case Within experience Mirages; poisons; dreams; etc. 'Outside' experience Distinction is between the whole of experience and what is outside of experience. What late art critic and former MTSU Lyceum speaker said a urinal can be a work of art if properly interpreted? arthur danto What does Danto mean when he claims that we may need another theory in order to identify art? In today's world artistic art theories often "make art possible" that wasn't possible prior to the theory. These days one might not be aware that they're looking at a work of art because there's no theory that tells him he his. When new theories of art come about it broadens the definition of what art it. Why does he speak of IT and RT? For some modern art you need a theory to recognize it as art. IT suggests post-impressionist painting are not really art, or flawed art. IT is the imitative theory, which says art is imitative. IF the IT were true than any mirror image would also be a work of art, which isn't true. A lot of new modern art challenged IT, so there needed to be a new theory. RT came about and tried to work to make other things/objects count as art. Something that new new is considered art according to RT. The work of art shouldn't be imitative. Explain why he thinks theory is a friend of the contemporary artists and expands the possibilities of art. He think theories add more predicates and the possibilities increase immensely. Art is always changing, so artist are helping advance the theory of RT. With more theories on the rise more things are consider good works of art.

Explain the initial set of distinctions/principles that we covered in the first slide on philosophical methods.

Important Distinctions and Principles Thinking that P does not necessarily entail that P. The question of what is and how we know are distinct. Reasoning can be done correctly or incorrectly. Correct reason follows the laws of reason (logic); incorrect reason fails to follow the laws of reason (logic). Questioning can be done for several reasons: To cast and express doubt on the truth of something. To present a puzzling issue or problem. To direct our attention to a possible place where our understanding can be deepened and enriched. An argument is a way of articulating reasons, consisting of statements, at least one of which follows from or is supported by at least one other. Conclusion: the statement that follows or is supported by another. Premise: the statement from which follows or that supports the conclusion. To clarify arguments, it is useful to list out the argument by numbering the premises, and then placing the conclusion at the end. Sometimes, we place the premise numbers after the conclusion to make it clear which statements support or entail it. Validity: an argument is valid if the conclusion would have to be true if all of the premises were true. An argument is valid if it is impossible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false Soundness: an argument is sound if it is valid and all of its premises are actually true. An argument is sound if it satisfies two conditions: (1) it is valid; (2) all premises are in fact true. Must avoid fallacies, where a fallacy is a mistake or error in reasoning, or some sort of flaw in rational persuasiveness. Some Fallacies and other Rhetorical Strategies Arguing against to establish one's own position on the issue. Defending one's view from an attack in order to establish one's position. Argument from Ignorance / Misplacing Burden of Proof. Asking (rhetorical) questions in order to show someone wrong. Deductive and Inductive A deductive argument is one that aims at guaranteeing the truth of the conclusion based on the premises given. An inductive argument is one that aims at supporting or increasing the probability of the truth of the conclusion based on the premises given. Validity and soundness apply to deductive arguments. Inductive arguments are assessed statistically. Strength and Cogency. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions A conditional is an if-then statement. A necessary condition is a condition that must be satisfied. The 'THEN' part states the consequent condition; this also specifies a necessary condition. A sufficient condition is a condition that is enough or sufficient for something. The 'IF' part states the antecedent condition; this also specifies a sufficient condition. A priori and a posteriori A priori knowledge (or truth or proposition) is knowledge that has its status as knowledge in a way that is independent of all sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge (or truth or proposition) is knowledge that has its status as knowledge in a way that is dependent on sensory experience. Modality A necessary truth is a proposition that is true and cannot be false. A possible truth is a proposition that can be true. A contingent truth is a proposition that is actually true but can be false. A contingent truth is a proposition that is actually true but not a necessary truth.

Explain the problem of other minds.

Philosophers are concerned about justified knowledge. They want to look at the things we think we know and ask if we are justified in believing those things. A few people have mentioned external world skepticism. External world skepticism gets its hold on people because of questions like, "What if it was all a dream?" It points out that when we're dreaming, we're just as certain that the things we are interacting with exist externally to us as we are when we are awake. It could all not exist external to our minds and be a product of our own imagination. Remember that philosophers rarely advocate for skepticism. A few other people have mentioned Descartes, but Descartes used skepticism as a tool. He wanted to show he could be skeptical of everything he possibly could, and tried to find ways to argue for an external world from deep doubt and skepticism. Skepticism challenges us to take the beliefs we commonly hold and find a way to justify them. Skepticism presents a problem to us when we try to justify those beliefs and then fail to do so. The problem of other minds presents its own challenges of justification, even if we grant some other assumptions like the existence of an external world. Here's one important fact about other minds that gives rise to the problem: We have no perceptual access to the contents of other people's minds. Skepticism of an external world requires us to distrust our very basic senses. It requires us to think that everything I am always experiencing is false. It's hard to distrust our experiences of objects around us. They have visceral effects and provide us with vivid sensory experiences. In the case of other minds, you aren't being required to distrust something so basic to our experience. You are being asked to distrust something else. You are being asked to distrust that when you are talking to a being who looks like you, that being might not actually be like you at all. They might be what David Chalmers calls, 'Philosophical Zombies.' We never gain direct and immediate access to other people's minds. We can only guess what they are going through, based upon our own experience of our own minds. We make the assumption that because they look like us, they must be like us. But then how do we justify that assumption? It's hard to say, because we have no direct access to others' minds. And this is the creation of the problem of other minds.

Explain the general distinction between appearance and reality, and explain Plato's account of the distinction between appearance and reality. In doing the latter, be sure that you also include an explanation of the key notions/concepts he uses to make and explain the distinction, and his theory of forms in relation to the distinction.

Plato's Theory of Forms asserts that the physical realm is only a shadow, or image, of the true reality of the Realm of Forms. So what are these Forms, according to Plato? The Forms are abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that transcend time and space; they exist in the Realm of Forms. Plato's Theory of Forms Particulars are individual things or instances of a kind. Participates in or is an instantiation of a Form/Universal Imperfect or pale reflections of their respective Form/Universal. Universals are the kind, or nature/essence Form; Idea Knowledge of a particular requires knowledge of universal Appearance and Reality Appearance: how something appears or seems to us; how things seems or appear. Reality: how something really is; what is real Self-centered view: how it appears to me is how it really is Appearance often does not match with reality Plato on Appearance and Reality The sensible world is the world of appearance. Particular individuals. Change The intellectual world is the world of true reality, or forms. Universal natures. Unchanging Perfection, Imperfection, and Knowledge (as understanding) In the allegory, Plato likens people untutored in the Theory of Forms to prisoners chained in a cave, unable to turn their heads. All they can see is the wall of the cave. Behind them burns a fire. Between the fire and the prisoners there is a parapet, along which puppeteers can walk. The puppeteers, who are behind the prisoners, hold up puppets that cast shadows on the wall of the cave. The prisoners are unable to see these puppets, the real objects, that pass behind them. What the prisoners see and hear are shadows and echoes cast by objects that they do not see. Here is an illustration of Plato's Cave: The allegory of all allegories, Plato's Allegory of the Cave is not the rosiest take on the reality of human existence. You might even call it downright bleak: it envisions the world as a dark cave, human beings as trapped prisoners, and all of our experiences as nothing but shadows on a wall. "See human beings as though they were in an underground cave-like dwelling," instructs Socrates, "with its entrance, a long one, open to the light across the whole width of the cave" (514a). The Deets Imagine a cave with a small tunnel of light leading out and hundreds of human beings tied up so that they can't move—they just stare straight ahead all day long (creepy, we know). But they do get a little entertainment: there's a rockin' shadow-puppet show projected on the wall in front of them with a fire burning in the back for light. Since this show is all these poor people can see, they think it's the best, most awesome reality ever. They chat about it, gossip, call people names... you know, the usual. So that's how life goes down in the cave until one day, one of the prisoners manages to break free and begins to figure out what's going on. It takes a while for his eyes to adjust, but gradually, he sees that there is a much brighter speck of light at the end of another tunnel. So out he goes... and wow, you can imagine how amazing and beautiful the real world looks to him compared to that two-dimensional, dark cave he's spent all his life in. Feeling sorry for all his fellow prisoners, the freed prisoner goes back down and explains to everyone that they're all trapped in this massive cave, and everything they think is real is an illusion. Guess what? They think he's nuts. He keeps trying to convince them, and he's finally able to persuade a few... but the rest choose to remain where they are. Deets Decoded All right, so what's the deal with this wacky story? Well, the prisoners in the cave, we're sad to say, are us: human beings. We think the real world around us is the cat's pajamas, but we are oh so wrong. That one prisoner who freed himself and realized this? That dude's a philosopher. Philosophers are brave enough to leave the familiarity of the cave and explore the real world of light. So what's the real world of light? Well, that would be Plato's concept of "the forms," which you can learn more about in our "Forms" section. What you need to know here is that the forms are what Plato believes is true reality. By pursuing philosophical knowledge with courage and persistence, you can get to a place where you can actually see them. Once you do see them, you'll never be satisfied with the ho-hum world most of us see. You'll even try to get your friends to pursue them with you, but like the freed prisoner everyone laughed at, plenty of people just won't believe you. What It All Means Even though Plato's Allegory of the Cave can seem pretty darn bleak, remember that it's meant to be a wake-up call for everyone to stop settling for an imperfect, unexplored life. Since Plato believed that human beings could eventually free themselves and head upwards to the real world by leading a life of philosophical consideration, the Allegory's bleakness is really meant to be motivational, to make people understand how limiting and self-defeating an "unexamined life" can be. It's also meant to remind people that they should be skeptical of everything. Yep, even of what's right in front of your eyes. The key to being a philosophical person is to take everything you encounter in life as an opportunity for scrutiny and self-improvement. Plato was definitely going for shock value with this haunting image—and shock is what he got. The Allegory of Cave has become one of the most unforgettable, talked-about moments in the history of philosophy. In one way or another, almost every major philosophical viewpoint since Plato has responded to, attacked, or reimagined this foundational image of human existence. Plato realizes that the general run of humankind can think, and speak, etc., without (so far as they acknowledge) any awareness of his realm of Forms. The allegory of the cave is supposed to explain this. In the allegory, Plato likens people untutored in the Theory of Forms to prisoners chained in a cave, unable to turn their heads. All they can see is the wall of the cave. Behind them burns a fire. Between the fire and the prisoners there is a parapet, along which puppeteers can walk. The puppeteers, who are behind the prisoners, hold up puppets that cast shadows on the wall of the cave. The prisoners are unable to see these puppets, the real objects, that pass behind them. What the prisoners see and hear are shadows and echoes cast by objects that they do not see. Here is an illustration of Plato's Cave: From Great Dialogues of Plato (Warmington and Rouse, eds.) New York, Signet Classics: 1999. p. 316. Such prisoners would mistake appearance for reality. They would think the things they see on the wall (the shadows) were real; they would know nothing of the real causes of the shadows. So when the prisoners talk, what are they talking about? If an object (a book, let us say) is carried past behind them, and it casts a shadow on the wall, and a prisoner says "I see a book," what is he talking about? He thinks he is talking about a book, but he is really talking about a shadow. But he uses the word "book." What does that refer to? Plato gives his answer at line (515b2). The text here has puzzled many editors, and it has been frequently emended. The translation in Grube/Reeve gets the point correctly: "And if they could talk to one another, don't you think they'd suppose that the names they used applied to the things they see passing before them?" Plato's point is that the prisoners would be mistaken. For they would be taking the terms in their language to refer to the shadows that pass before their eyes, rather than (as is correct, in Plato's view) to the real things that cast the shadows. If a prisoner says "That's a book" he thinks that the word "book" refers to the very thing he is looking at. But he would be wrong. He's only looking at a shadow. The real referent of the word "book" he cannot see. To see it, he would have to turn his head around. Plato's point: the general terms of our language are not "names" of the physical objects that we can see. They are actually names of things that we cannot see, things that we can only grasp with the mind. When the prisoners are released, they can turn their heads and see the real objects. Then they realize their error. What can we do that is analogous to turning our heads and seeing the causes of the shadows? We can come to grasp the Forms with our minds. Plato's aim in the Republic is to describe what is necessary for us to achieve this reflective understanding. But even without it, it remains true that our very ability to think and to speak depends on the Forms. For the terms of the language we use get their meaning by "naming" the Forms that the objects we perceive participate in. The prisoners may learn what a book is by their experience with shadows of books. But they would be mistaken if they thought that the word "book" refers to something that any of them has ever seen. Likewise, we may acquire concepts by our perceptual experience of physical objects. But we would be mistaken if we thought that the concepts that we grasp were on the same level as the things we perceive. Plato's "Allegory of the Cave" is a reflection on the distinction between appearance and reality. Plato argues that there is the world of appearances and there is the real world. Plato does not have a brute distinction between appearance and reality. For example, even people with opinions, which Plato believes is the lowest form of knowledge, can still know some kind of truth. It is just that in the Allegory of the Cave, the focus is on the person who can reach the highest level of knowledge. It is not as if the world of appearances is completely false. The world of appearances is the world we see through our sensory organs: sight, touch, taste, smell and so on. However, Plato argues that there must be a suprasensible world above and beyond this world of appearances. In other words, what makes this sensory world with its multitude of difference even possible. Similarly, Bertrand Russell in his 1912 book The Problems of Philosophy argues that this is a problem in philosophy and he too makes a distinction between appearance and reality. Russell makes the distinction differently from Plato. Russell's work is founded on doubt, while Plato's theory is founded on ascent. In fact, if you scan both texts, the word "ascent" appears in the Republic many times, while Russell does not even cite Plato at all. Russell relies on a different approach: how does one know that anything is real.... The theory of Forms or theory of Ideas[1][2][3] is a philosophical theory, concept, or world-view, attributed to Plato, that the physical world is not as real or true as timeless, absolute, unchangeable ideas.[4] According to this theory, ideas in this sense, often capitalized and translated as "Ideas" or "Forms",[5] are the non-physical essences of all things, of which objects and matter in the physical world are merely imitations. Plato speaks of these entities only through the characters (primarily Socrates) of his dialogues who sometimes suggest that these Forms are the only objects of study that can provide knowledge. The theory itself is contested from within Plato's dialogues, and it is a general point of controversy in philosophy. Whether the theory represents Plato's own views is held in doubt by modern scholarship.[6] However, the theory is considered a classical solution to the problem of universals. The early Greek concept of form precedes attested philosophical usage and is represented by a number of words mainly having to do with vision, sight, and appearance. Plato uses these aspects of sight and appearance from the early Greek concept of the form in his dialogues to explain the Forms and the Good.

According to Russell, what is the common misconception about philosophy, and how does that misconception arise?

That philosophy is useless because of its focus on questions that have no answers is a common misconception about the study of philosophy. -Misconception of the kinds of goods phil. aims to attain. This chapter is an eloquent vindication for the practice of philosophy. Russell explicitly addresses the "practical man" who only recognizes philosophy as a pursuit of "hair-splitting distinctions" and irrelevant trifling. Viewing philosophy thus is a result of having a "wrong conception of the ends of life" and "the kinds of goods which philosophy strives to achieve." Russell contrasts the utility of philosophy with that of the physical sciences. Scientific study has far-reaching effects on mankind, through inventions, while philosophic study primarily affects the lives of those who study it, and only indirectly affects others through them. The principal value of philosophy is thus to be found in its disciples. Russell would have his reader free her mind of practical prejudices. Whereas the practical man would only attend to food for the body and material needs, the philosophic attitude also recognizes the need for food for the mind. The aim of philosophy is the achievement of knowledge through criticism, "which gives unity and system to the body of sciences." However, philosophy does not maintain a substantial body of definite knowledge in the sense that history, mathematics, or the physical sciences do. Part of the reason why philosophy does not bear such a body of evidence is because when definite knowledge on a subject becomes possible, it splits off forming another discipline. Study of the heavens, of natural sciences, and the human mind originated in philosophic investigation and now assume the figures of astronomy, physics, and psychology. Thus, with respect to definite answers, "the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real." Yet, part of the uncertainty in philosophy derives from the very nature of the questions that it undertakes to answer. These questions address most profound human interests: "Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Is consciousness a permanent part of the universe, giving hope of indefinite growth in wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on a small planet on which life must ultimately become impossible? Are good an evil of importance to the universe or only to man?" Besides the magnitude of these questions, the various answers which philosophy suggests are usually not "demonstrably true." Still, the pursuit of philosophy is not merely to suggest answers to these questions but to make us sensitive to their importance and to keep us conscious of a "speculative interest in the universe," which we might otherwise forget. Even though some philosophers have developed programs of thought that do offer a definite set of conclusions about religious belief, human knowledge, and other issues, Russell urges that such attempts are usually unwise dogmatic declarations. Consistent with the thought of his other chapters, he claims that we cannot hope for definite answers or even high degrees of certainty. In fact, he theorizes, the value of philosophy appears in its very uncertainty. He persuasively writes, "the man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation of consent of his deliberate reason." This way of thinking is closed to speculation or theory about possibility. Philosophizing, on the other hand, allows us to see even the most ordinary things in unfamiliar light. Though such consideration diminishes our faulty certainty about the world, it suggest numerous possibilities "which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom." Though we lose a little of our confidence as to what things are, we gain knowledge of what they may be. Philosophy banishes "arrogant dogmatism" and liberates "our sense of wonder." Philosophic thought also has a value by virtue of the things it contemplates and the distinctness of those things from "personal aims" and "private interests." Philosophy lets in the outside world and enlarges out interest. Russell writes, "in one way or another, if our life is to be great and free, we must escape this prison" of our private world. Russell's belief is that everything that depends on the private world "distorts the object" of contemplation and prevents the union of the object and the intellect. Philosophic contemplation sponsors this escape by enlarging the Self. Russell holds that the primary value of philosophy is not in any kind of definite answer, but exists in the questions themselves. He concludes that, "through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great."

Explain the basic structure of an argument, what the parts of an argument are supposed to do, and the difference between validity and soundness. Be able to distinguish between them and understand the relation between them. Also, be able to understand the two concepts in application to arguments. For instance, if an argument has a false conclusion, does that mean that it is not valid? If all of the premises of an argument are false, and the conclusion is false as well, can the argument still be valid? If an argument is sound, does it have to have a true conclusion?

The Basic Structure of Argument. - Basically, argument is a claim defended with reasons. It is composed of a group of statements with one or more statements (premises) supporting another statement (conclusion). - A sentence declaring something that can be true or false. An argument is a way of articulating reasons, consisting of statements, at least one of which follows from or is supported by at least one other. Conclusion: the statement that follows or is supported by another. Premise: the statement from which follows or that supports the conclusion. Validity: an argument is valid if the conclusion would have to be true if all of the premises were true. An argument is valid if it is impossible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false Soundness: an argument is sound if it is valid and all of its premises are actually true. An argument is sound if it satisfies two conditions: (1) it is valid; (2) all premises are in fact true. Must avoid fallacies, where a fallacy is a mistake or error in reasoning, or some sort of flaw in rational persuasiveness. Validity refers to the syntactic (structural) side of logic. If a logical argument is well-formed - no errors in logic, no fallacies, no structural problems - it is valid. The conclusion may be true or false, depending on whether the individual premises used are true or false, but the logic is valid, regardless. Validity has nothing to do with semantics (meanings) Soundness is about semantics (meaningfulness). A sound argument must be valid in the above sense, but beyond that each of its premises must make sense in some context. "All unicorns are purple, Effie is a unicorn, therefore Effie is purple" is a valid argument, but not a sound one (unicorns do not exist, so we cannot meaningfully say they are purple) "All rhinos are pachyderms, Rupert is a rhino, therefore Rupert is a pachyderm" is both valid and sound "All rhinos are pachyderms, all elephants are pachyderms, therefore all elephants are rhinos" is neither valid nor sound (it contains a logical fallacy that destroys the validity and thus the soundness of the argument) An argument is valid if the conclusion necessarily follows the premises, regardless of the veracity of these premises. An argument is sound if the conclusion necessarily follows the premises and the premises are true. All sound arguments are valid, some valid arguments are sound. 1.4 Validity and Soundness A deductive argument proves its conclusion ONLY if it is both valid and sound. Validity: An argument is valid when, IF all of it's premises were true, then the conclusion would also HAVE to be true. In other words, a "valid" argument is one where the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. It is IMPOSSIBLE for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. Here's an example of a valid argument: 1. All philosophy courses are courses that are super exciting. 2. All logic courses are philosophy courses. 3. Therefore, all logic courses are courses that are super exciting. Note #1: IF (1) and (2) WERE true, then (3) would also HAVE to be true. Note #2: Validity says nothing about whether or not any of the premises ARE true. It only says that IF they are true, then the conclusion must follow. So, validity is more about the FORM of an argument, rather than the TRUTH of an argument. So, an argument is valid if it has the proper form. An argument can have the right form, but be totally false, however. For example: 1. Daffy Duck is a duck. 2. All ducks are mammals. 3. Therefore, Daffy Duck is a mammal. The argument just given is valid. But, premise 2 as well as the conclusion are both false. Notice however that, IF the premises WERE true, then the conclusion would also have to be true. This is all that is required for validity. A valid argument need not have true premises or a true conclusion. On the other hand, a sound argument DOES need to have true premises and a true conclusion: Soundness: An argument is sound if it meets these two criteria: (1) It is valid. (2) Its premises are true. In other words, a sound argument has the right form AND it is true. 1 Note #3: A sound argument will always have a true conclusion. This follows every time these 2 criteria for soundness are met. Do you see why this is the case? First, recall that a sound argument is both valid AND has true premises. Now, refer back to the definition of "valid". For all valid arguments, if their premises are true, then the conclusion MUST also be true. So, all sound arguments have true conclusions. Looking back to our argument about Daffy Duck, we can see that it is valid, but not sound. It is not sound because it does not have all true premises. Namely, "All ducks are mammals" is not true. So, the argument about Daffy Duck is valid, but NOT sound. Here's an example of an argument that is valid AND sound: 1. All rabbits are mammals. 2. Bugs Bunny is a rabbit. 3. Therefore, Bugs Bunny is a mammal. In this argument, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is necessarily true (so it is valid). AND, as it turns out, the premises ARE true (all rabbits ARE in fact mammals, and Bugs Bunny IS in fact a rabbit)—so the conclusion must also be true (so the argument is sound). If an argument is sound, then it is valid and has all true premises. Since it is valid, the argument is such that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. A sound argument really does have all true premises so it does actually follow that its conclusion must be true. 3. If a valid argument has a false conclusion, then at least one premise must be false. TRUE: A valid argument cannot have all true premises and a false conclusion. So if a valid argument does have a false conclusion, it cannot have all true premises. Thus at least one premise must be false. Deductive Concepts I. Deduction vs. Induction A. Deductive Form: The premises are intended to provide conclusive reasons or proof of the conclusion. B. Inductive Form: The premises are intended to provide compelling but not conclusive reasons for the conclusion. II. Validity A. Good Deductive Form = Validity B. Definitions (these definitions are just two different ways of saying the same thing) 1. An argument is valid =df If all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. 2. An argument is valid =df It is impossible for all the premises to be true but the conclusion false. C. Validity (in the technical sense just defined) applies only to arguments, never to individual claims. D. Validity is completely determined by an argument's structure, not its content. If some argument is valid, then every argument with the same structure is also valid. III. Soundness A. Good Deductive Form + Good Content = Soundness B. Definition: An argument is sound =df It is valid and has all true premises. C. If an argument has one or more false premises or it is not valid, then the argument is not sound. D. Like validity, soundness (in the technical sense just defined) applies only to arguments, never to individual statements/claims. IV. True/False Questions 1. A valid argument must have a true conclusion FALSE: A valid argument must have a true conclusion only if all of the premises are true. So it is possible for a valid argument to have a false conclusion as long as at least one premise is false. 2. A sound argument must have a true conclusion. TRUE: If an argument is sound, then it is valid and has all true premises. Since it is valid, the argument is such that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. A sound argument really does have all true premises so it does actually follow that its conclusion must be true. 3. If a valid argument has a false conclusion, then at least one premise must be false. TRUE: A valid argument cannot have all true premises and a false conclusion. So if a valid argument does have a false conclusion, it cannot have all true premises. Thus at least one premise must be false. 4. If an invalid argument has all true premises, then the conclusion must be false. FALSE: It is possible for an invalid argument to have all true premises and a true conclusion. Ex: P1: All dogs are mammals. P2: All terriers are mammals. C: All terriers are dogs. This argument really does have all true premises and a true conclusion, but still it is invalid—because it is possible for an argument with this structure to have true premises and a false conclusion: Ex: P1: All dogs are mammals. P2: All cats are mammals. C: All cats are dogs. 5. If an argument has all true premises and a true conclusion, then it is valid. FALSE: It is possible for an argument to have all true premises and a true conclusion but still be invalid. See above (#4). 6. If an argument has all true premises and a false conclusion, then it is invalid. TRUE: A valid argument cannot possibly have all true premises and a false conclusion. If some argument really does have all true premises and a false conclusion, then it is obviously possible for such an argument to have true premises and a false conclusion. So the argument is invalid. If something is part of an argument but not the conclusion, then it must be a premise A valid argument can have false premises; and it can have a false conclusion. But if a valid argument has all true premises, then it must have a true conclusion. Today I spent some time reviewing my Formal Logic course for my up coming exam. I came across a section that I have never really explored in any proper depth... the difference between a valid argument and a sound argument. Here go some notes I made... What is an argument? In this case we are not referring to a verbal fight, but more what we call a set of premise followed by a conclusion. Before we go further we need to understand what a premise is... a premise is a statement that an argument claims will induce or justify a conclusion. Think of a premise as an assumption that something is true. So, an argument can consist of one or more premises and a conclusion... When is an argument valid? An argument can be either valid or invalid. An argument is valid if, and only if, it is impossible for there to be a situation in which all it's premises are TRUE and it's conclusion is FALSE. It is generally easier to determine if an argument is invalid. Do this by applying the following... Assume that all the premises are true, then ask yourself if it is now possible for the conclusion to be false. If the answer is "yes," the argument is invalid. If it's "no," the argument is valid. Example 1... P1 - Mark is Tall P2 - Mark is a boy C - Mark is a tall boy Walkthrough 1... Assume Mark is Tall is true and also assume that Mark is a boy. Based on these two premises, the conclusion is also true - Mark is a tall boy, thus the it is a valid argument. Let's make this an invalid argument... Example 2... P1 - Mark is Tall P2 - Mark is a boy C - Mark is a short boy Walkthrough 2... This would be an invalid argument, since from the premises we assume that Mark is tall and he is a boy, and then the conclusion goes against this by saying that Mark is short. Thus an invalid argument. When is an argument sound? An argument is said to be sound when it is valid and all the premises are indeed true (not just assumed to be true). Rephrased, an argument is said to be sound when the conclusion will follow from the premises and the premises are indeed true in real life. In example 1 we were referring to a specific person, if we generalized it a bit we could come up with the following example. Example 3 P1 - All people called Mark are tall P2 - I know a specific person called Mark C - He is a tall person In this instance, it is a valid argument (we assume the premises are true, which leads to the conclusion being true), but the argument is NOT sound. In the real world there must be at least one person called Mark who is not tall. Something also to note, all invalid arguments are also unsound - this makes sense, if an argument is not valid, how on earth can it be true in the real world. What happens when the premises contradict themselves? This is an interesting one... An argument is valid if, and only if, it is impossible for there to be a situation in which all it's premises are TRUE and it's conclusion is FALSE. When premises are contradictory, the argument is always valid because it is impossible for all the premises to be true at one time. Lets look at an example.. P1 - Elvis is dead P2 - Elvis is alive C - Laura is a woolly mammoth This is a valid argument, but not a sound one. Think about it. Is it possible to have a situation in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false? Sure, it's possible to have a situation in which the conclusion is false, but for the argument to be invalid, it has to be possible for the premises to all be true at the same time the conclusion is false. So if the premises can't all be true, the argument is valid. (If you still think the argument is invalid, draw a picture in which the premises are all true and the conclusion is false. Remember, there's only one Elvis, and you can't be both dead and alive.) Update: To anyone who thinks that the definition of sound argument, and the definition of valid argument, are matters of debate: Google them. There is one, and only one, definition for each. You won't find other definitions unless you're looking on Quora. Sources: My academic studies were centered around mathematics, logic (including propositional logic, which is what the above question is referring to) and analytical philosophy. Do not believe anyone who says an argument can be sound and have false premises or a false conclusion. A sound argument A has all true premises and B has a conclusion that follows from the premises using the proper rules of inference (validity). One answerer brought up a point about missing context. If missing context makes the conclusion SEEM true, and it's NOT true, then the argument is NOT sound. What you can say about the conclusion in this case is that it's CONSISTENT WITH THE PREMISES. It does NOT logically follow from the premises, so the argument is not valid. Therefore, it's not sound either. here is one: Premise # 1- All white cats are clever Premise # 2- my cat Lucky is white Conclusion- my cat Lucky is clever If we suppose for this example that Lucky is indeed clever, and is white, then the conclusion is true. But premise # 1 is an unreliable generalisation, as there are surely some white cats in existence that are not clever. In the example given, the conclusion "my cat Lucky is clever clearly follows from the two premises, and so the argument is "valid". That is to say that IF the two premises were indeed true THEN the conclusion would also be true. But as it happens, premise # 1 is not true, so the argument is not "sound". https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9KuZbHVXSg

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What is a Real Distinction? It is important to note that for Descartes "real distinction" is a technical term denoting the distinction between two or more substances (see Principles, part I, section 60). A substance is something that does not require any other creature to exist—it can exist with only the help of God's concurrence—whereas, a mode is a quality or affection of that substance (see Principles part I, section 5). Accordingly, a mode requires a substance to exist and not just the concurrence of God. Being sphere shaped is a mode of an extended substance. For example, a sphere requires an object extended in three dimensions in order to exist: an unextended sphere cannot be conceived without contradiction. But a substance can be understood to exist alone without requiring any other creature to exist. For example, a stone can exist all by itself. That is, its existence is not dependent upon the existence of minds or other bodies; and, a stone can exist without being any particular size or shape. This indicates for Descartes that God, if he chose, could create a world constituted by this stone all by itself, showing further that it is a substance "really distinct" from everything else except God. Hence, the thesis that mind and body are really distinct just means that each could exist all by itself without any other creature, including each other, if God chose to do it. However, this does not mean that these substances do exist separately. Whether or not they actually exist apart is another issue entirely. 2. Why a Real Distinction? A question one might ask is: what's the point of arguing that mind and body could each exist without the other? What's the payoff for going through all the trouble and enduring all the problems to which it gives rise? For Descartes the payoff is twofold. The first is religious in nature in that it provides a rational basis for a hope in the soul's immortality [because Descartes presumes that the mind and soul are more or less the same thing]. The second is more scientifically oriented, for the complete absence of mentality from the nature of physical things is central to making way for Descartes' version of the new, mechanistic physics. This section investigates both of these motivating factors. a. The Religious Motivation In his Letter to the Sorbonne published at the beginning of his seminal work, Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes states that his purpose in showing that the human mind or soul is really distinct from the body is to refute those "irreligious people" who only have faith in mathematics and will not believe in the soul's immortality without a mathematical demonstration of it. Descartes goes on to explain how, because of this, these people will not pursue moral virtue without the prospect of an afterlife with rewards for virtue and punishments for vice. But, since all the arguments in the Meditations—including the real distinction arguments— are for Descartes absolutely certain on a par with geometrical demonstrations, he believes that these people will be obliged to accept them. Hence, irreligious people will be forced to believe in the prospect of an afterlife. However, recall that Descartes' conclusion is only that the mind or soul can exist without the body. He stops short of demonstrating that the soul is actually immortal. Indeed, in the Synopsis to the Mediations, Descartes claims only to have shown that the decay of the body does not logically or metaphysically imply the destruction of the mind: further argumentation is required for the conclusion that the mind actually survives the body's destruction. This would involve both "an account of the whole of physics" and an argument showing that God cannot annihilate the mind. Yet, even though the real distinction argument does not go this far, it does, according to Descartes, provide a sufficient foundation for religion, since the hope for an afterlife now has a rational basis and is no longer a mere article of faith. b. The Scientific Motivation The other motive for arguing that mind and body could each exist without the other is more scientifically oriented, stemming from Descartes' intended replacement of final causal explanations in physics thought to be favored by late scholastic-Aristotelian philosophers with mechanistic explanations based on the model of geometry. Although the credit for setting the stage for this scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy dominant at Descartes' time should go to Thomas Aquinas (because of his initial, thorough interpretation and appropriation of Aristotle's philosophy), it is also important to bear in mind that other thinkers working within this Aristotelian framework such as Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Francisco Suarez, diverged from the Thomistic position on a variety of important issues. Indeed, by Descartes' time, scholastic positions divergent from Thomism became so widespread and subtle in their differences that sorting them out was quite difficult. Notwithstanding this convoluted array of positions, Descartes understood one thesis to stand at the heart of the entire tradition: the doctrine that everything ultimately behaved for the sake of some end or goal. Though these "final causes," as they were called, were not the only sorts of causes recognized by scholastic thinkers, it is sufficient for present purposes to recognize that Descartes believed scholastic natural philosophers used them as principles for physical explanations. For this reason, a brief look at how final causes were supposed to work is in order. Descartes understood all scholastics to maintain that everything was thought to have a final cause that is the ultimate end or goal for the sake of which the rest of the organism was organized. This principle of organization became known as a thing's "substantial form," because it was this principle that explained why some hunk of matter was arranged in such and such a way so as to be some species of substance. For example, in the case of a bird, say, the swallow, the substantial form of swallowness was thought to organize matter for the sake of being a swallow species of substance. Accordingly, any dispositions a swallow might have, such as the disposition for making nests, would then also be explained by means of this ultimate goal of being a swallow; that is, swallows are disposed for making nests for the sake of being a swallow species of substance. This explanatory scheme was also thought to work for plants and inanimate natural objects. A criticism of the traditional employment of substantial forms and their concomitant final causes in physics is found in the Sixth Replies where Descartes examines how the quality of gravity was used to explain a body's downward motion: But what makes it especially clear that my idea of gravity was taken largely from the idea I had of the mind is the fact that I thought that gravity carried bodies toward the centre of the earth as if it had some knowledge of the centre within itself (AT VII 442: CSM II 298). On this pre-Newtonian account, a characteristic goal of all bodies was to reach its proper place, namely, the center of the earth. So, the answer to the question, "Why do stones fall downward?" would be, "Because they are striving to achieve their goal of reaching the center of the earth." According to Descartes, this implies that the stone must have knowledge of this goal, know the means to attain it, and know where the center of the earth is located. But, how can a stone know anything? Surely only minds can have knowledge. Yet, since stones are inanimate bodies without minds, it follows that they cannot know anything at all—let alone anything about the center of the earth. Descartes continues on to make the following point: But later on I made the observations which led me to make a careful distinction between the idea of the mind and the ideas of body and corporeal motion; and I found that all those other ideas of . . . 'substantial forms' which I had previously held were ones which I had put together or constructed from those basic ideas (AT VII 442-3: CSM II 298). Here, Descartes is claiming that the concept of a substantial form as part of the entirely physical world stems from a confusion of the ideas of mind and body. This confusion led people to mistakenly ascribe mental properties like knowledge to entirely non-mental things like stones, plants, and, yes, even non-human animals. The real distinction of mind and body can then also be used to alleviate this confusion and its resultant mistakes by showing that bodies exist and move as they do without mentality, and as such principles of mental causation such as goals, purposes (that is, final causes), and knowledge have no role to play in the explanation of physical phenomena. So the real distinction of mind and body also serves the more scientifically oriented end of eliminating any element of mentality from the idea of body. In this way, a clear understanding of the geometrical nature of bodies can be achieved and better explanations obtained. 3. The Real Distinction Argument Descartes formulates this argument in many different ways, which has led many scholars to believe there are several different real distinction arguments. However, it is more accurate to consider these formulations as different versions of one and the same argument. The fundamental premise of each is identical: each has the fundamental premise that the natures of mind and body are completely different from one another. The First Version The first version is found in this excerpt from the Sixth Meditation: [O]n the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing [that is, a mind], and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it (AT VII 78: CSM II 54). Notice that the argument is given from the first person perspective (as are the entire Meditations). This "I" is, of course, Descartes insofar as he is a thinking thing or mind, and the argument is intended to work for any "I" or mind. So, for present purposes, it is safe to generalize the argument by replacing "I" with "mind" in the relevant places: I have a clear and distinct idea of the mind as a thinking, non-extended thing. I have a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended, non-thinking thing. Therefore, the mind is really distinct from the body and can exist without it. At first glance it may seem that, without justification, Descartes is bluntly asserting that he conceives of mind and body as two completely different things, and that from his conception, he is inferring that he (or any mind) can exist without the body. But this is no blunt, unjustified assertion. Much more is at work here: most notably what is at work is his doctrine of clear and distinct ideas and their veridical guarantee. Indeed the truth of his intellectual perception of the natures of mind and body is supposed to be guaranteed by the fact that this perception is "clear and distinct." Since the justification for these two premises rests squarely on the veridical guarantee of whatever is "clearly and distinctly" perceived, a brief side trip explaining this doctrine is in order. Descartes explains what he means by a "clear and distinct idea" in his work Principles of Philosophy at part I, section 45. Here he likens a clear intellectual perception to a clear visual perception. So, just as someone might have a sharply focused visual perception of something, an idea is clear when it is in sharp intellectual focus. Moreover, an idea is distinct when, in addition to being clear, all other ideas not belonging to it are completely excluded from it. Hence, Descartes is claiming in both premises that his idea of the mind and his idea of the body exclude all other ideas that do not belong to them, including each other, and all that remains is what can be clearly understood of each. As a result, he clearly and distinctly understands the mind all by itself, separately from the body, and the body all by itself, separately from the mind. According to Descartes, his ability to clearly and distinctly understand them separately from one another implies that each can exist alone without the other. This is because "[e]xistence is contained in the idea or concept of every single thing, since we cannot conceive of anything except as existing. Possible or contingent existence is contained in the concept of a limited thing..." (AT VII 166: CSM II 117). Descartes, then, clearly and distinctly perceives the mind as possibly existing all by itself, and the body as possibly existing all by itself. But couldn't Descartes somehow be mistaken about his clear and distinct ideas? Given the existence of so many non-thinking bodies like stones, there is no question that bodies can exist without minds. So, even if he could be mistaken about what he clearly and distinctly understands, there is other evidence in support of premise 2. But can minds exist without bodies? Can thinking occur without a brain? If the answer to this question is "no," the first premise would be false and, therefore, Descartes would be mistaken about one of his clear and distinct perceptions. Indeed, since we have no experience of minds actually existing without bodies as we do of bodies actually existing without minds, the argument will stand only if Descartes' clear and distinct understanding of the mind's nature somehow guarantees the truth of premise 1; but, at this point, it is not evident whether Descartes' "clear and distinct" perception guarantees the truth of anything. However, in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes goes to great lengths to guarantee the truth of whatever is clearly and distinctly understood. This veridical guarantee is based on the theses that God exists and that he cannot be a deceiver. These arguments, though very interesting, are numerous and complex, and so they will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that since Descartes believes he has established God's inability to deceive with absolute, geometrical certainty, he would have to consider anything contradicting this conclusion to be false. Moreover, Descartes claims that he cannot help but believe clear and distinct ideas to be true. However, if God put a clear and distinct idea in him that was false, then he could not help but believe a falsehood to be true and, to make matters worse, he would never be able to discover the mistake. Since God would be the author of this false clear and distinct idea, he would be the source of the error and would, therefore, be a deceiver, which must be false. Hence, all clear and distinct ideas must be true, because it is impossible for them to be false given God's non-deceiving nature. That said, the clarity and distinctness of Descartes' understanding of mind and body guarantees the truth of premise 1. Hence, both "clear and distinct" premises are not blunt, unjustified assertions of what he believes but have very strong rational support from within Descartes' system. However, if it turns out that God does not exist or that he can be a deceiver, then all bets are off. There would then no longer be any veridical guarantee of what is clearly and distinctly understood and, as a result, the first premise could be false. Consequently, premise 1 would not bar the possibility of minds requiring brains to exist and, therefore, this premise would not be absolutely certain as Descartes supposed. In the end, the conclusion is established with absolute certainty only when considered from within Descartes' own epistemological framework but loses its force if that framework turns out to be false or when evaluated from outside of it. These guaranteed truths express some very important points about Descartes' conception of mind and body. Notice that mind and body are defined as complete opposites. This means that the ideas of mind and body represent two natures that have absolutely nothing in common. And, it is this complete diversity that establishes the possibility of their independent existence. But, how can Descartes make a legitimate inference from his independent understanding of mind and body as completely different things to their independent existence? To answer this question, recall that every idea of limited or finite things contains the idea of possible or contingent existence, and so Descartes is conceiving mind and body as possibly existing all by themselves without any other creature. Since there is no doubt about this possibility for Descartes and given the fact that God is all powerful, it follows that God could bring into existence a mind without a body and vice versa just as Descartes clearly and distinctly understands them. Hence, the power of God makes Descartes' perceived logical possibility of minds existing without bodies into a metaphysical possibility. As a result, minds without bodies and bodies without minds would require nothing besides God's concurrence to exist and, therefore, they are two really distinct substances. The Second Version The argument just examined is formulated in a different way later in the Sixth Meditation: [T]here is a great difference between the mind and the body, inasmuch as the body is by its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. For when I consider the mind, or myself in so far as I am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself; I understand myself to be something quite single and complete....By contrast, there is no corporeal or extended thing that I can think of which in my thought I cannot easily divide into parts; and this very fact makes me understand that it is divisible. This one argument would be enough to show me that the mind is completely different from the body.... (AT VII 86-87: CSM II 59). This argument can be reformulated as follows, replacing "mind" for "I" as in the first version: I understand the mind to be indivisible by its very nature. I understand body to be divisible by its very nature. Therefore, the mind is completely different from the body. Notice the conclusion that mind and body are really distinct is not explicitly stated but can be inferred from 3. What is interesting about this formulation is how Descartes reaches his conclusion. He does not assert a clear and distinct understanding of these two natures as completely different but instead makes his point based on a particular property of each. However, this is not just any property but a property each has "by its very nature." Something's nature is just what it is to be that kind of thing, and so the term "nature" is here being used as synonymous with "essence." On this account, extension constitutes the nature or essence of bodily kinds of things; while thinking constitutes the nature or essence of mental kinds of things. So, here Descartes is arguing that a property of what it is to be a body, or extended thing, is to be divisible, while a property of what it is to be a mind or thinking thing is to be indivisible. Descartes' line of reasoning in support of these claims about the respective natures of mind and body runs as follows. First, it is easy to see that bodies are divisible. Just take any body, say a pencil or a piece of paper, and break it or cut it in half. Now you have two bodies instead of one. Second, based on this line of reasoning, it is easy to see why Descartes believed his nature or mind to be indivisible: if a mind or an "I" could be divided, then two minds or "I's" would result; but since this "I" just is my self, this would be the same as claiming that the division of my mind results in two selves, which is absurd. Therefore, the body is essentially divisible and the mind is essentially indivisible: but how does this lead to the conclusion that they are completely different? Here it should be noted that a difference in just any non-essential property would have only shown that mind and body are not exactly the same. But this is a much weaker claim than Descartes' conclusion that they are completely different. For two things could have the same nature, for example, extension, but have other, changeable properties or modes distinguishing them. Hence, these two things would be different in some respect, for example, in shape, but not completely different, since both would still be extended kinds of things. Consequently, Descartes needs their complete diversity to claim that he has completely independent conceptions of each and, in turn, that mind and body can exist independently of one another. Descartes can reach this stronger conclusion because these essential properties are contradictories. On the one hand, Descartes argues that the mind is indivisible because he cannot perceive himself as having any parts. On the other hand, the body is divisible because he cannot think of a body except as having parts. Hence, if mind and body had the same nature, it would be a nature both with and without parts. Yet such a thing is unintelligible: how could something both be separable into parts and yet not separable into parts? The answer is that it can't, and so mind and body cannot be one and the same but two completely different natures. Notice that, as with the first version, mind and body are here being defined as opposites. This implies that divisible body can be understood without indivisible mind and vice versa. Accordingly each can be understood as existing all by itself: they are two really distinct substances. However, unlike the first version, Descartes does not invoke the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas to justify his premises. If he had, this version, like the first, would be absolutely certain from within Descartes' own epistemological system. But if removed from this apparatus, it is possible that Descartes is mistaken about the indivisibility of the mind, because the possibility of the mind requiring a brain to exist would still be viable. This would mean that, since extension is part of the nature of mind, it would, being an extended thing, be composed of parts and, therefore, it would be divisible. As a result, Descartes could not legitimately reach the conclusion that mind and body are completely different. This would also mean that the further, implicit conclusion that mind and body are really distinct could not be reached either. In the end, the main difficulty with Descartes' real distinction argument is that he has not adequately eliminated the possibility of minds being extended things like brains. 4. The Mind-Body Problem The real distinction of mind and body based on their completely diverse natures is the root of the famous mind-body problem: how can these two substances with completely different natures causally interact so as to give rise to a human being capable of having voluntary bodily motions and sensations? Although several versions of this problem have arisen over the years, this section will be exclusively devoted to the version of it Descartes confronted as expressed by Pierre Gassendi, the author of the Fifth Objections, and Descartes' correspondent, Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. Their concern arises from the claim at the heart of the real distinction argument that mind and body are completely different or opposite things. The complete diversity of their respective natures has serious consequences for the kinds of modes each can possess. For instance, in the Second Meditation, Descartes argues that he is nothing but a thinking thing or mind, that is, Descartes argues that he is a "thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions" (AT VII 28: CSM II 19). It makes no sense to ascribe such modes to entirely extended, non-thinking things like stones, and therefore, only minds can have these kinds of modes. Conversely, it makes no sense to ascribe modes of size, shape, quantity and motion to non-extended, thinking things. For example, the concept of an unextended shape is unintelligible. Therefore, a mind cannot be understood to be shaped or in motion, nor can a body understand or sense anything. Human beings, however, are supposed to be combinations of mind and body such that the mind's choices can cause modes of motion in the body, and motions in certain bodily organs, such as the eye, cause modes of sensation in the mind. The mind's ability to cause motion in the body will be addressed first. Take for example a voluntary choice, or willing, to raise one's hand in class to ask a question. The arm moving upward is the effect while the choice to raise it is the cause. But willing is a mode of the non-extended mind alone, whereas the arm's motion is a mode of the extended body alone: how can the non-extended mind bring about this extended effect? It is this problem of voluntary bodily motion or the so-called problem of "mind to body causation" that so troubled Gassendi and Elizabeth. The crux of their concern was that in order for one thing to cause motion in another, they must come into contact with one another as, for example, in the game of pool the cue ball must be in motion and come into contact with the eight-ball in order for the latter to be set in motion. The problem is that, in the case of voluntarily bodily movements, contact between mind and body would be impossible given the mind's non-extended nature. This is because contact must be between two surfaces, but surface is a mode of body, as stated at Principles of Philosophy part II, section 15. Accordingly, the mind does not have a surface that can come into contact with the body and cause it to move. So, it seems that if mind and body are completely different, there is no intelligible explanation of voluntary bodily movement. Although Gassendi and Elizabeth limited themselves to the problem of voluntary bodily movement, a similar problem arises for sensations, or the so-called problem of "body to mind causation." For instance, a visual sensation of a tree is a mode of the mind alone. The cause of this mode would be explained by the motion of various imperceptible bodies causing parts of the eye to move, then movements in the optic nerve, which in turn cause various "animal spirits" to move in the brain and finally result in the sensory idea of the tree in the mind. But how can the movement of the "animal spirits," which were thought to be very fine bodies, bring about the existence of a sensory idea when the mind is incapable of receiving modes of motion given its non-extended nature? Again, since the mind is incapable of having motion and a surface, no intelligible explanation of sensations seems possible either. Therefore, the completely different natures of mind and body seem to render their causal interaction impossible. The consequences of this problem are very serious for Descartes, because it undermines his claim to have a clear and distinct understanding of the mind without the body. For humans do have sensations and voluntarily move some of their bodily limbs and, if Gassendi and Elizabeth are correct, this requires a surface and contact. Since the mind must have a surface and a capacity for motion, the mind must also be extended and, therefore, mind and body are not completely different. This means the "clear and distinct" ideas of mind and body, as mutually exclusive natures, must be false in order for mind-body causal interaction to occur. Hence, Descartes has not adequately established that mind and body are two really distinct substances. 5. Descartes' Response to the Mind-Body Problem Despite the obviousness of this problem, and the amount of attention given to it, Descartes himself never took this issue very seriously. His response to Gassendi is a telling example: These questions presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and the body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other (AT VII 213: CSM II 275). So, Descartes' response to the mind-body problem is twofold. First, Descartes contends that a response to this question presupposes an explanation of the union between the mind (or soul) and the body. Second, Descartes claims that the question itself stems from the false presupposition that two substances with completely different natures cannot act on each other. Further examination of these two points will occur in reverse order. Descartes' principles of causation put forward in the Third Meditation lie at the heart of this second presupposition. The relevant portion of this discussion is when Descartes argues that the less real cannot cause something that is more real, because the less real does not have enough reality to bring about something more real than itself. This principle applies on the general level of substances and modes. On this account, an infinite substance, that is, God, is the most real thing because only he requires nothing else in order to exist; created, finite substances are next most real, because they require only God's creative and conservative activity in order to exist; and finally, modes are the least real, because they require a created substance and an infinite substance in order to exist. So, on this principle, a mode cannot cause the existence of a substance since modes are less real than finite substances. Similarly, a created, finite substance cannot cause the existence of an infinite substance. But a finite substance can cause the existence of another finite substance or a mode (since modes are less real than substances). Hence, Descartes' point could be that the completely diverse natures of mind and body do not violate this causal principle, since both are finite substances causing modes to exist in some other finite substance. This indicates further that the "activity" of the mind on the body does not require contact and motion, thereby suggesting that mind and body do not bear a mechanistic causal relation to each other. More will be said about this below. The first presupposition concerns an explanation of how the mind is united with the body. Descartes' remarks about this issue are scattered across both his published works and his private correspondence. These texts indicate that Descartes did not maintain that voluntary bodily movements and sensation arise because of the causal interaction of mind and body by contact and motion. Rather, he maintains a version of the form-matter theory of soul-body union endorsed by some of his scholastic-Aristotelian predecessors and contemporaries. Although a close analysis of the texts in question cannot be conducted here, a brief summary of how this theory works for Descartes can be provided. Before providing this summary, however, it is important to disclaim that this scholastic-Aristotelian interpretation is a minority position amongst Descartes scholars. The traditional view maintains that Descartes' human being is composed of two substances that causally interact in a mechanistic fashion. This traditional view led some of Descartes' successors, such as Malebranche and Leibniz (who also believed in the real distinction of mind and body), to devise metaphysical systems wherein mind and body do not causally interact despite appearances to the contrary. Other philosophers considered the mind-body problem to be insurmountable, thereby denying their real distinction: they claim that everything is either extended (as is common nowadays) or mental (as George Berkeley argued in the 18th century). Indeed, this traditional, mechanistic interpretation of Descartes is so deeply ingrained in the minds of philosophers today, that most do not even bother to argue for it. However, a notable exception is Marleen Rozemond, who argues for the incompatibility of Descartes' metaphysics with any scholastic-Aristotelian version of mind or soul-body union. Those interested in closely examining her arguments should consult her book Descartes's Dualism. A book arguing in favor of the scholastic-Aristotelian interpretation is entitled Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature; Chapter 5 specifically addresses Rozemond's concerns. Two major stumbling blocks Rozemond raises for the scholastic-Aristotelian interpretation concern the mind's status as a substantial form and the extent to which Descartes can maintain a form of the human body. However, recall that Descartes rejects substantial forms because of their final causal component. Descartes' argument was based on the fact (as he understood it) that the scholastics were ascribing mental properties to entirely non-mental things like stones. Since the mind is an entirely mental thing, these arguments just do not apply to it. Hence, Descartes' particular rejection of substantial forms does not necessarily imply that Descartes did not view the mind as a substantial form. Indeed, as Paul Hoffman noted: Descartes really rejects the attempt to use the human soul as a model for explanations in the entirely physical world. This makes it possible that Descartes considered the human mind to be the only substantial form. At first glance this may seem ad hoc but it is also important to notice that rejecting the existence of substantial forms with the exception of the mind or rational soul was not uncommon amongst Descartes' contemporaries. Although the mind's status as a substantial form may seem at risk because of its meager explicit textual support, Descartes suggests that the mind a "substantial form" twice in a draft of open letter to his enemy Voetius: Yet, if the soul is recognized as merely a substantial form, while other such forms consist in the configuration and motion of parts, this very privileged status it has compared with other forms shows that its nature is quite different from theirs (AT III 503: CSMK 207-208). Descartes then remarks "this is confirmed by the example of the soul, which is the true substantial form of man" (AT III 508: CSMK 208). Although other passages do not make this claim explicitly, they do imply (in some sense) that the mind is a substantial form. For instance, Descartes claims in a letter to Mesland dated 9 February 1645, that the soul is "substantially united" with the human body (AT IV 166: CSMK 243). This "substantial union" was a technical term amongst the scholastics denoting the union between a substantial form and matter to form a complete substance. Consequently, there is some reason for believing that the human mind is the only substantial form left standing in Descartes' metaphysics. Another major stumbling block recognized by Rozemond is the extent to which, if any, Descartes' metaphysics can maintain a principle for organizing extension into a human body. This was a point of some controversy amongst the scholastics themselves. Philosophers maintaining a Thomistic position argued that the human soul is the human body's principle of organization. While others, maintaining a basically Scotistic position, argued that some other form besides the human soul is the form of the body. This "form of corporeity" organizes matter for the sake of being a human body but does not result in a full-fledged human being. Rather it makes a body with the potential for union with the human soul. The soul then actualizes this potential resulting in a complete human being. If Descartes did hold a fundamentally scholastic theory of mind-body union, then is it more Thomistic or Scotistic? Since intellect and will are the only faculties of the mind, it does not have the faculty for organizing matter for being a human body. So, if Descartes' theory is scholastic, it must be most in line with some version of the Scotistic theory. Rozemond argues that Descartes' rejection of all other substantial forms (except the human mind or soul) precludes this kind of theory since he cannot appeal to the doctrine of substantial forms like the Scotists. Although Descartes argues that bodies, in the general sense, are constituted by extension, he also maintains that species of bodies are determined by the configuration and motion of their parts. This doctrine of "configuration and motion of parts" serves the same purpose as the doctrine of substantial forms with regards to entirely physical things. But the main difference between the two is that Descartes' doctrine does not employ final causes. Recall that substantial forms organize matter for the purpose of being a species of thing. The purpose of a human body endowed with only the form of corporeity is union with the soul. Hence, the organization of matter into a human body is an effect that is explained by the final cause or purpose of being disposed for union. But, on Descartes' account, the explanatory order would be reversed: a human body's disposition for union is an effect resulting from the configuration and motion of parts. So, even though Descartes does not have recourse to substantial forms, he still has recourse to the configuration of matter and to the dispositions to which it gives rise, including "all the dispositions required to preserve that union" (AT IV 166: CSMK 243). Hence, on this account, Descartes gets what he needs, namely, Descartes gets a body properly configured for potential union with the mind, but without recourse to the scholastic notion of substantial forms with their final causal component. Another feature of this basically Scotistic position is that the soul and the body were considered incomplete substances themselves, while their union results in one, complete substance. Surely Descartes maintains that mind and body are two substances but in what sense, if any, can they be considered incomplete? Descartes answers this question in the Fourth Replies. He argues that a substance may be complete insofar as it is a substance but incomplete insofar as it is referred to some other substance together with which it forms yet some third substance. This can be applied to mind and body as follows: the mind insofar as it is a thinking thing is a complete substance, while the body insofar as it is an extended thing is a complete substance, but each taken individually is only an incomplete human being. This account is repeated in the following excerpt from a letter to Regius dated December 1641: For there you said that the body and the soul, in relation to the whole human being, are incomplete substances; and it follows from their being incomplete that what they constitute is a being through itself (that is, an ens per se; AT III 460: CSMK 200). The technical sense of the term "being through itself" was intended to capture the fact that human beings do not require any other creature but only God's concurrence to exist. Accordingly, a being through itself, or ens per se, is a substance. Also notice that the claim in the letter to Regius that two incomplete substances together constitute a being through itself is reminiscent of Descartes' remarks in the Fourth Replies. This affinity between the two texts indicates that the union of mind and body results in one complete substance or being through itself. This just means that mind and body are the metaphysical parts (mind and body are incomplete substances in this respect) that constitute one, whole human being, which is a complete substance in its own right. Hence, a human being is not the result of two substances causally interacting by means of contact and motion, as Gassendi and Elizabeth supposed, but rather they bear a relation of act and potency that results in one, whole and complete substantial human being. This sheds some light on why Descartes thought that an account of mind-body union would put Gassendi's and Elizabeth's concerns to rest: they misconceived the union of mind and body as a mechanical relation when in fact it is a relation of act and potency. This avoids Gassendi's and Elizabeth's version of this problem. This aversion is accomplished by the fact that modes of voluntary motion (and sensations, by extrapolation) should be ascribed to a whole human being and not to the mind or the body taken individually. This is made apparent in a 21 May 1643 letter to Elizabeth where Descartes distinguishes between various "primitive notions." The most general are the notions of being, number, duration, and so on, which apply to all conceivable things. He then goes on to distinguish the notions of mind and body: Then, as regards body in particular, we have only the notion of extension, which entails the notions of shape and motion; and as regards the soul on its own, we have only the notion of thought, which includes the perceptions of the intellect and the inclinations of the will (AT III 665: CSMK 218). Here body and soul (or mind) are primitive notions and the notions of their respective modes are the notions "entailed by" or "included in" these primitives. Descartes then discusses the primitive notion of mind-body union: Lastly, as regards the soul and the body together, we have only the notion of their union, on which depends our notion of the soul's power to move the body, and the body's power to act on the soul and cause its sensations and passions (AT III 665: CSMK 218). In light of the immediately preceding lines, this indicates that voluntary bodily movements and sensations are not modes of the body alone, or the mind alone, but rather are modes of "the soul and the body together." This is at least partially confirmed in the following lines from Principles, part I, article 48: But we also experience within ourselves certain other things, which must not be referred either to the mind alone or to the body alone. These arises, as will be made clear in the appropriate place, from the close and intimate union of our mind with the body. This list includes, first, appetites like hunger and thirds; secondly, the emotions or passions . . . (AT VIIIA 23: CSM I 209). These texts indicate that the mind or soul is united with the body so as to give rise to another whole complete substance composed of these two metaphysical parts. And, moreover, this composite substance now has the capacity for having modes of its own, namely, modes of voluntary bodily movement and sensation, which neither the mind nor the body can have individually. So, voluntary bodily movements are not modes of the body alone caused by the mind, nor are sensations modes of the mind alone caused by the body. Rather, both are modes of a whole and complete human being. On this account, it makes no sense to ask how the non-extended mind can come into contact with the body to cause these modes. To ask this would be to get off on the wrong foot entirely, since contact between these two completely diverse substances is not required for these modes to exist. Rather all that is necessary is for the mind to actualize the potential in a properly disposed human body to form one, whole, human being to whom is attributed modes of voluntary movement and sensation. Although the scholastic-Aristotelian interpretation avoids the traditional causal interaction problem based on the requirements of contact and motion, it does run up against another version of that problem, namely, a problem of formal causation. This is a problem facing any scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind or soul-body union where the soul is understood to be an immaterial substantial form. Recall that the immaterial mind or soul as substantial form is suppose to act on a properly disposed human body in order to result in a full-fledged human being. The problem of formal causal interaction is: how can an immaterial soul assubstantial form act on the potential in a material thing? Can any sense be made of the claim that a non-extended or immaterial things acts on anything? Descartes noticed in a letter to Regius (AT III 493: CSMK 206) that the scholastics did not try to answer this question and so he and Regius need not either. The likely explanation of their silence is that the act-potency relation was considered absolutely fundamental to scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy and, therefore, it required no further explanation. So, in the end, even if Descartes' theory is as described here, it does not evade all the causal problems associated with uniting immaterial souls or mind to their respective bodies. , However, if this proposed account is true, it helps to cast Descartes' philosophy in a new light and to redirect the attention of scholars to the formal causal problems involved. Descartes' rationalism Rationalists claim that we have a priori knowledge of synthetic propositions, i.e. knowledge of matters of fact that does not depend upon sense experience. They argue that there are two key ways in which we gain such knowledge: 1. weknowcertaintruthsinnately,e.g.aspartofourrationalnature;and/or 2. wehaveaformofrational'intuition'or'insight'whichenablesustograspcertain truths intellectually. Descartes is a rationalist in both these ways. Many rationalists add that the synthetic a priori knowledge we gain through reason or innately cannot be arrived at in any other way. They may also argue that is superior, for example by being more certain, to the knowledge or beliefs we gain through the senses. Descartes agrees with this, too. RATIONAL INTUITION Descartes' theory of clear and distinct ideas is his account of rational 'intuition'. At the heart of the idea of rational intuition is the view that you can discover the truth of a claim just by thinking about it. The first claim Descartes defends this way is the cogito. He arrives at the cogito by pure reasoning, and we are supposed to recognise that it is true just by considering it. Descartes then goes on to argue that he, as a mind, can exist without having a body. It is therefore possible for minds to exist without bodies. This is a second claim Descartes believes he can establish by a priori reasoning. How do we know about bodies, physical objects? First, how do we know what physical objects are, i.e. what are we talking about? We might say we discover their nature through sense experience. But in the wax argument, Descartes argues that sense experience gives us only a confused idea of physical objects. In fact, we discover what physical objects are by analysing our concept of a physical object. In this way, and not through the senses, we discover that the essential nature of a physical object is to be 'extended', i.e. to exist in space, with a size, shape and location. Knowing the external world exists Second, how do we know whether bodies - do physical objects - exist? They cause our experiences, we reply. But using the method of doubt, Descartes first argues that we don't know what causes our experiences - it could be a demon. So Descartes must work to once again secure our knowledge of the external world. The argument spans the whole of the Meditations, and takes in arguments about the understanding and the senses, the existence of God, the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, and human nature. In the handout on 'The essential natures of mind and body', we discussed Descartes' wax example. On its own, this doesn't show that physical objects really are extended. But in Meditation V, Descartes asserts the principle that we can know that what we can clearly © Michael Lacewing and distinctly conceive is true. So physical objects really are extended, if they exist at all. In Meditation VI, Descartes argues that they do exist, and he seeks to establish that we can and do have knowledge of the physical world, including of course, our own bodies. He first considers whether we can know bodies exist from our imagination. Unlike operations of the intellect, imagination uses images that it has apparently derived from the senses or created for itself, and it requires effort. Both of these features could be explained if we have bodies. So we 'probably' have bodies, but this is hardly a proof. He turns, then, to consider perception. We have experiences which appear, very forcefully, to be experiences of a world external to our minds, whether they are experiences of our own body or of other bodies. These experiences produce ideas without our 'contribution', i.e. they are involuntary. Among our perceptual experiences are sensations and feelings. We notice that we perceive we have bodies, and that our bodies can be affected in many beneficial and harmful ways, which we experience through our bodily appetites, feelings and emotions. Our faculties of feeling and sensation would seem to be dependent on our having bodies. But, again, this is not a proof. So Descartes considers the matter from another angle. These experiences are involuntary, and if they were caused by our own minds, they would be voluntary. Because we know our own minds, we would know if they were voluntary. So they are not caused by ourselves. They must therefore have some cause which is sufficient to cause them. The options are: a real external world or God. If the cause was God, this would mean that God was a deceiver because He would have created us with a very strong tendency to believe something false. But we know that God is not a deceiver. So there must really be an external world. So what can we know about the external world, having demonstrated that it exists? Descartes argues that God has set us up to learn from nature. Nature teaches us through sensation that we have bodies, and through perception that there are other bodies. This can't simply be the abstract truth that a physical world exists. It must the stronger claim that, in many of our experiences, we are actually confronted with physical objects. Our senses, then, will not be set up so that, with careful employment and the search for clarity and distinctness, they would systematically lead to error. This doesn't mean that any particular belief based on our senses is certain - we can still make mistakes. But unless perceptual experience was generally reliable, when we do what we can to avoid error, it would be difficult for Descartes to defend that we can trust what we learn from nature. Descartes offers two arguments, both a priori, for the existence of God - one is the Trademark argument and the other is the ontological argument. Since he believes he has demonstrated that God exists, he concludes that we know the external world of physical objects exists. Not because sense experience shows us that it does, but through a priori intuition and reasoning. KNOWING ABOUT THE EXTERNAL WORLD This does not, however, mean that that world is just as perception represents it. First, Descartes does not claim that the external world is as we commonly think it is. His argument has established that the physical world exists and is an extended world. But the wax argument established that extension and changeability is all that is of the essence of the physical world. Descartes' representative realist theory of perception argues that all other properties, of colour, smell, heat, and so on, aren't actually properties of physical objects at all, at least not considered on their own. Rather, 'all I have reason to believe is that there is something in [the external body] which excites in me these feelings' (161). We shouldn't think that the 'something' is itself colour, smell, and so on. The external world is a world of geometry, as physical objects only have spatial properties (e.g. size, shape, motion). It is on the basis of its spatial properties that we judge, as in the wax example, that some physical object is in fact present. But we must accept that our particular perceptions of the world are often confused. God's assurance doesn't mean we are always able to avoid error: 'because the necessities of action often oblige us to make a decision before we have had the leisure to examine things carefully, it must be admitted that the life of man is very often subject to error in particular cases' (168-9). Furthermore, even with caution and recourse to clear and distinct ideas, we can still make mistakes since our nature is fallible. Poor conditions of perception, such as bad light, confused thinking, prejudice, and other factors means that we can make mistakes; this does not make God a deceiver, because these are mistakes we must take responsibility for. INNATE IDEAS In the arguments regarding physical objects and God, Descartes takes the concepts, or ideas, of PHYSICAL OBJECT and GOD for granted. (When referring to a concept, I put the word in capital letters.) Where do these concepts come from? In his Trademark argument for the existence of God, he says there are three possible sources for a concept: that we have invented it (it is 'fictitious'), that it derives from something outside the mind (it is 'adventitious'), or that it is innate. By 'innate', he doesn't mean we have it from the birth in the sense that a baby can think using this concept. It would be very strange in babies could think about God but didn't yet have a concept of power or reality or love! Innate ideas are ideas that the mind has certain capacities to use, and which can't be explained by our experience. To defend his claim that these ideas (of GOD and PHYSICAL OBJECT) are innate, Descartes needs to show that they cannot be explained by sense experience. And this is what his arguments try to do. Sense experience cannot tell us the essential nature of physical objects; it is an idea that we must use the intellect to analyse. How did it come to be part of the intellect? It is innate. Likewise with GOD. ASSESSING DESCARTES' RATIONALISM As we have seen, there are many objections to Descartes' arguments. But what do such objections show about Descartes' rationalism? Is his method of doing philosophy wrong? Descartes has done his best find what he thinks, using reasoning, is certain. His arguments are supposed to be deductive, and his premises established by rational intuition. But philosophers have still been able to point out unjustified assumptions and inferences. If intuition and deductive reasoning do not give us knowledge, then his rationalism is in trouble. Before we become sceptical about intuition and reasoning, we should ask this: how have philosophers come up with objections to Descartes? It certainly isn't by using sense experience! So the objections themselves use the same kind of reasoning as Descartes. Only better reasoning, we hope. The objections cannot be objections to the way Descartes reasoned, only objections to the conclusions he drew. But this is too generous, we can argue. Certainly, there is nothing wrong with using deductive reasoning; and we can use it to show that Descartes' arguments are faulty. But that doesn't mean we should also accept that there is such a thing as rational intuition or that Descartes' theory of clear and distinct ideas is correct. Someone like Hume would argue that we can only perceive the truth of a claim just by thinking about it when that claim is analytic. Our ability to tell that it is truth is not about insight; it is simply because the claim is made true by the meanings of the words it contains. On this view, one reason Descartes' arguments fail is because many of his 'clear and distinct' ideas are not analytic, but contain some hidden assumption, and so can be challenged. The certainty Descartes is after can only be found in analytic truths, not through rational intuition. This can all be debated. Do Descartes' arguments fail or can he meet the objections? We will have to see. Is he wrong about rational insight? Can we not use a priori reason to discover the truth of (some) synthetic propositions, or is a priori reason limited to analytic truths? Are there any innate ideas? cogito transition of argument Essence property or set of properties that make an entity or substance what it fundamentally is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity. cogito, ergo sum I think, therefore I exist rationalism opinions and actions should be based on reason and knowledge rather than on religious belief or emotional response. empirisim sense experience is the ultimate source of all our concepts and knowledge. Epistemology studying the nature, sources and limits of knowledge Mind and Body Mind and body are distinct and separable. Mind is nonphysical Dualism: there are two kinds of foundation, mind and body. This means that the mental can exist outside of the body, and the body cannot think. Distinction between mind and body in meditation 4: I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking, non-extended thing, and a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended and non-thinking thing. Whatever I can conceive clearly and distinctly, God can so create. Philosophical aims and methods To reconstruct all of human knowledge by eliminating all prior opinions Method of doubt Find doubt in all preexisting opinions and boil it down to only believing in basic beliefs. From the basics, we can derive further knowledge The basis for this argument is "I think, therefore I am" He did this because he thought that sensory experience, the primary mode of knowledge, can deceive us so it must be doubted Structure of meditations and the importance and role of argument for god's existence in the overall structure of the meditations The meditations build off each other and they lead into each other. God is meditation 3 to 6 and he uses the notion of god to prove conclusions and dispel his doubts. He rids the evil demon doubt by saying that a benevolent god exists, so he would not let him get deceived because god is the highest form of reality. He uses for with the clear and distinct perception proof Clear and distinct perception. The role the Rule of Clear and Distinct Perception plays in the structure of the Meditations. Key: 'Everything that I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.' God exists through the clear and distinct perceptions, and he proves that clear and distinct perceptions are true because of the existence of god P1) If God exists, then he is no deceiver P2) If God is no deceiver, then all I clearly & distinctly perceive will be true P3) God exists P1) All I clearly & distinctly perceive is true P2) I clearly & distinctly perceive the idea of God P3) The idea of God is true Cartesian circle problem The conclusion of one argument exists as a premise in the other, and vice versa. The argument goes in a circle The threat of Skepticism In first mediation The first meditation hypothesis that there is a powerful evil demon who renders his beliefs about the world false, while making it seem to him just as if they are true. The challenge Descartes raises is: how can we know that the evil demon hypothesis is false, if such a scenario is indistinguishable from what we take to be our actual scenario? Skepticism about the external world, then, is the thesis that knowledge of (or justified belief) about the external world is impossible. The senses are sometimes deceptive..." {Does Descartes endorse this as a good reason for doubt in the First Meditation?} Descartes shows that we can use our senses to help us understand the true nature of things, but the senses alone are inadequate to determine truth (since they are often deceived), and that all that may be known with certainty (truth) are those things we know by our judgment, thinking, and understanding of them in our minds. Rely on the mind rather than the body Dream argument There is no way to distinguish being awake and dreaming. This world can make situations that are like dreams But when I distinctly see where things come from and where and when they come to me, and when I can connect my perceptions of them with my whole life without a break then I can be certain that when I encounter these things I am not asleep but awake Evil demon Descartes argued that all his senses were lying and since your senses can easily fool you, his idea of an infinitely powerful being must be true as that idea could have only been put there by an infinitely powerful being which would have no reason to be deceitful to him. His point is to demonstrate that the senses can be deceived. If we cannot trust our senses to convey true information about the world around us, then we also can't trust deductions we've made on the grounds of sense perception Defeating these arguments They believed that all knowledge comes to us through the senses. Descartes and his followers argued the opposite, that true knowledge comes only through the application of pure reason. His clear and distinct perceptions allow for him that anything that can be observed through clear and distinct perceptions is part of the essence of what is observed. Thought and reason, because they are clearly perceived, must be the essence of humanity Proof of god Idea of god It has to have a cause, and something can't come from nothing Idea of god has the highest reality I don't fully understand this idea because I am a finite being Something w the highest degree of reality could be the cause of my idea of god So something with the highest degree of reality must exist and be the cause of this idea Since god is the highest degree of reality he must exist Something that has the highest degree of reality An absolutely perfect being is benevolent So god is good God would not deceive me Ideas in this proof Validating Clear and distinct perception Our god is a perfect being It is more perfect to exist than to not exist Therefore, god must exist Something can't come from nothing God would not deceive us Could an evil demon be deceiving Descartes about any of the premises? (Why does this question matter?) Because he based that god is a benevolent high reality undeceiving being based on clear and distinct perceptions. So, if he is wrong about this, he could be getting deceived by a evil demon. problem of cartesian circle Descartes uses God to prove the truth of clear and distinct perceptions and also uses clear and distinct perceptions to prove the existence of God. How does Descartes know that he exists? (What exactly has he proven in this argument?) I think therefore, I exist. He is proving that since he is able to think, he is a being with a distinct mind and body which are seperate ideas Descartes' discovery about his nature in Meditation II. "I am a thinking thing." Since he knows he is a thinking thing, he knows he has a mind Dualism. Descartes' argument for dualism (Meditation VI) The thinking mind and the extended body are distinct substances When you feel pain that is your body not your mind It is possible for one to exist without the other Causal interaction between mind and body Feeling pain when you go up to the fire Union of mind and body it is through sensations (i.e., pain, hunger, thirst), and not by an intellectual inspection, that we are aware of the needs of our body How Descartes attempts to prove that there are objects outside of his mind that substantial forms organize matter for the purpose of being a species of thing. species of bodies are determined by the configuration and motion of their parts. The nature (essence) of physical objects They are made up of stuff and put in that order to be that thing... The Piece of Wax. What is the point of this example? He first considers what he can know about the piece of wax by means of the senses: its taste, smell, color, shape, size, hardness, etc. The Mediator then asks what happens when the piece of wax is placed near the fire and melted. All of these sensible qualities change, so that, for instance, it is now soft when before it was hard. Nonetheless, the same piece of wax still remains. Our knowledge that the solid piece of wax and the melted piece of wax are the same cannot come through the senses since all of its sensible properties have changed. Instead, he concludes, he knows the wax by means of the intellect alone. His mental perception of it can either be imperfect and confused--as when he allowed herself to be led by his senses and imagination-- or it can be clear and distinct--as it is when he applies only careful mental scrutiny to his perception of it. Our relation to physical objects in sensory perception Mental perception of objects can be imperfect and confused What happened in descartes and the meditations? - first meditation --goal is to establish the foundations for scientia (knowledge that is absolute certain) - second meditation --cogito. I am able to think, therefore I exist. what is the wax argument? He considers how we come to know of a piece of wax just taken from a honeycomb: through the senses or by some other means? We can by our senses Our knowledge that the solid piece of wax and melted piece of wax are the same cannot come through the senses since all of its sensible properties have changed Cant come by all the infinite ways wax can be shaped through imagination He knows the wax by means of intellect alone What is the cogito argument? The nature of the human mind and how it is better known than the body What he sees does not exist, that his

Explain the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions, what part of a conditional statement specifies a sufficient condition and which part a necessary condition. Also, be prepared to apply these concepts in practice.

Necessary vs Sufficient Necessary condition: a condition that must be satisfied in order for X to occur/obtain. Sufficient condition: a condition that, if satisfied, guarantees that X occurs/obtains. Necessary Condition We've already said that "If A, then B," means that if we have A, then we know that B must follow. But then we also said that "A, only if B" means that if we do not have B, then we will not have A. These two conditional claims, "If A, then B" and "A, only if B" refer to two different kinds of conditions: necessary conditions and sufficient conditions. Necessary Condition Having gasoline in my car (I have a gasoline engine) is a necessary condition for my car to start. Without gasoline (x) my car (y) will not start. Of course, having gasoline in the car does not guarantee that my car will start. There are many other conditions needed for my car to start. Necessary Condition Having oxygen in the earth's atmosphere is a necessary condition for human life. Certainly, having oxygen will not guarantee human life. There are many other conditions needed for human life other than oxygen in the atmosphere. Necessary Condition Being 18 years of age is a necessary condition for being able to buy cigarettes legally in North Carolina. Of course, being 18 does not guarantee that a person will buy cigarettes. There are many other conditions that lead to a person buying cigarettes than being 18 years of age. Sufficient Condition If we say that "x is a sufficient condition for y," then we mean that if we have x, we know that y must follow. In other words, x guarantees y. Sufficient Condition Earning a total of 950 points (95%) in this Critical Thinking class is a sufficient condition for earning a final grade of A. If you have 950 points for the course, then it must follow that you will have a final grade of A. Sufficient Condition Pouring a gallon of freezing water on my sleeping daughter is sufficient to wake her up. If I pour the gallon of freezing water on her then its guaranteed that she will wake up. Sufficient Condition Rain pouring from the sky is a sufficient condition for the ground to be wet. Sunlight is a necessary condition for the roses to bloom, since without sunlight it would be impossible for the roses to bloom. It is not a sufficient condition, though, because sunlight alone does not guarantee that the roses will bloom. Is sunlight a necessary or sufficient condition for the roses to bloom? Being a male is a necessary condition for being a father since it is imposible to be a father without being a male. Being a male is not a sufficient condition, however, since being a male does not guarantee that a male will be a father. Is being a male a necessary or sufficient condition for being a father? Having a flu virus is sufficient for being sick, but not necessary since there are other ways to be sick besides having a flu virus. Is having the flu virus in your blood a necessary or sufficient condition for being sick? (with the exception of a very small number of students) For most people attending class regularly and punctually is a necessary condition for being successful in class. Is attending class regularly and punctually a necessary or sufficient condition for being successful in class? Being 20 years old is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a college student. One can be a college students without being 20 years old, and there are other ways to be a college student than being 20 years old. Is being 20 years old a necessary or sufficient condition for being a college student? Completing all of your requirements is both a necessary and sufficient condition for earning your degree. Without completing all requirements, it is impossible to earn a degree, and completing all requirements guarantees earning a degree. Is completing all the requirements of your degree program a necessary or sufficient condition for earning your degree? Sufficient Condition Is being a square a necessary or sufficient condition for being a rectangle? Necessary Condition Is being a rectangle a necessary or sufficient condition for being a square? Sufficient Condition Is being a mother a necessary or sufficient condition for being a female? Necessary Condition Is being a female a necessary or sufficient condition for being a mother? Not either, because a chimpanzee, for example, may have two arms, but it is not a human being. A war veteran may have lost both his arms, but he is a human being even so. Is having two arms necessary or sufficient condition for being a human being? A necessary condition is a condition that must be satisfied. The 'THEN' part states the consequent condition; this also specifies a necessary condition. A sufficient condition is a condition that is enough or sufficient for something. The 'IF' part states the antecedent condition; this also specifies a sufficient condition. Every time A is present, you're guaranteed that B is present as well. But it is not the case that every time B is present, you're guaranteed that A is present. Sufficient condition There cannot be B without A existing as well, but the presence of A does not guarantee the presence of B Necessary condition B is a necessary condition of A A is a sufficient condition of B. Then B is a sufficient condition of A A is a necessary condition of B. Then B is a necessary and sufficient condition of A A is both a necessary and sufficient condition of B. Then Means that A is a sufficient condition of B "If A then B" Means that A is a necessary condition of B "Only if A then B" Means that A is a necessary and sufficient condition of B "If and only if A, then B" The sufficient conditions for being a member of the class under the concept to be defined- but it fails to state the necessary conditions A definition that is too narrow states (in the defining phrase) The necessary conditions for being a member of the class under the concept to be defined- but it fails to state the sufficient conditions A definition that is too broad states (in the defining phrase) Necessary We can say that being two-legged is the .. condition for being human Sufficient Being human is the .. condition for being two-legged Necessary The conditions an instance of some kind of thing or phenomenon must satisfy to count as an instance of that kind Sufficient The conditions for counting as an instance of some kind of thing or phenomenon such that satisfying them is enough for the thing to count as an instance of that kind Necessary Completing all the assignments for Phil 3 is ______ for passing Sufficient Having the flu virus in your blood is _____ for being sick Both necessary and sufficient Completing all the requirements for your degree is ____ for graduating Sufficient If ( you live in Santa Barbara ), then you live in California Necessary If you live in Santa Barbara, then ( you live in California )

What is solipsism? Why is it a concern, and what considerations seem to lead to it?

Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds Solipsism is sometimes expressed as the view that "I am the only mind which exists," or "My mental states are the only mental states." However, the sole survivor of a nuclear holocaust might truly come to believe in either of these propositions without thereby being a solipsist. Solipsism is therefore more properly regarded as the doctrine that, in principle, "existence" means for me my existence and that of my mental states. Existence is everything that I experience -- physical objects, other people, events and processes -- anything that would commonly be regarded as a constituent of the space and time in which I coexist with others and is necessarily construed by me as part of the content of my consciousness. For the solipsist, it is not merely the case that he believes that his thoughts, experiences, and emotions are, as a matter of contingent fact, the only thoughts, experiences, and emotions. Rather, the solipsist can attach no meaning to the supposition that there could be thoughts, experiences, and emotions other than his own. In short, the true solipsist understands the word "pain," for example, to mean "my pain." He cannot accordingly conceive how this word is to be applied in any sense other than this exclusively egocentric one. Table of Contents The Importance of the Problem Historical Origins of the Problem The Argument from Analogy The Physical and the Mental Knowing Other Minds The Privacy of Experience The Incoherence of Solipsism References and Further Reading 1. The Importance of the Problem No great philosopher has espoused solipsism. As a theory, if indeed it can be termed such, it is clearly very far removed from common sense. In view of this, it might reasonably be asked why the problem of solipsism should receive any philosophical attention. There are two answers to this question. First, while no great philosopher has explicitly espoused solipsism, this can be attributed to the inconsistency of much philosophical reasoning. Many philosophers have failed to accept the logical consequences of their own most fundamental commitments and preconceptions. The foundations of solipsism lie at the heart of the view that the individual gets his own psychological concepts (thinking, willing, perceiving, and so forth.) from "his own cases," that is by abstraction from "inner experience." This view, or some variant of it, has been held by a great many, if not the majority of philosophers since Descartes made the egocentric search for truth the primary goal of the critical study of the nature and limits of knowledge. In this sense, solipsism is implicit in many philosophies of knowledge and mind since Descartes and any theory of knowledge that adopts the Cartesian egocentric approach as its basic frame of reference is inherently solipsistic. Second, solipsism merits close examination because it is based upon three widely entertained philosophical presuppositions, which are themselves of fundamental and wide-ranging importance. These are: (a) What I know most certainly are the contents of my own mind - my thoughts, experiences, affective states, and so forth.; (b) There is no conceptual or logically necessary link between the mental and the physical. For example, there is no necessary link between the occurrence of certain conscious experiences or mental states and the "possession" and behavioral dispositions of a body of a particular kind; and (c) The experiences of a given person are necessarily private to that person. These presuppositions are of unmistakable Cartesian origin, and are widely accepted by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. In tackling the problem of solipsism, one immediately grapples with fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind. However spurious the problem of solipsism per se may strike one, these latter issues are unquestionably important. Indeed, one of the merits of the entire enterprise is the extent that it reveals a direct connection between apparently unexceptionable and certainly widely-held common sense beliefs and the acceptance of solipsistic conclusions. If this connection exists and we wish to avoid those solipsistic conclusions, we shall have no option but to revise, or at least to critically review, the beliefs from which they derive logical sustenance. 2. Historical Origins of the Problem In introducing "methodic doubt" into philosophy, René Descartes created the backdrop against which solipsism subsequently developed and was made to seem, if not plausible, at least irrefutable. For the ego that is revealed by the cogito is a solitary consciousness, a res cogitans that is not spatially extended, is not necessarily located in any body, and can be assured of its own existence exclusively as a conscious mind. (Discourse on Method and the Meditations). This view of the self is intrinsically solipsistic and Descartes evades the solipsistic consequences of his method of doubt by the desperate expedient of appealing to the benevolence of God. Since God is no deceiver, he argues, and since He has created man with an innate disposition to assume the existence of an external, public world corresponding to the private world of the "ideas" that are the only immediate objects of consciousness, it follows that such a public world actually exists. (Sixth Meditation). Thus does God bridge the chasm between the solitary consciousness revealed by methodic doubt and the intersubjective world of public objects and other human beings? A modern philosopher cannot evade solipsism under the Cartesian picture of consciousness without accepting the function attributed to God by Descartes (something few modern philosophers are willing to do). In view of this it is scarcely surprising that we should find the specter of solipsism looming ever more threateningly in the works of Descartes' successors in the modern world, particularly in those of the British empiricist tradition. Descartes' account of the nature of mind implies that the individual acquires the psychological concepts that he possesses "from his own case," that is that each individual has a unique and privileged access to his own mind, which is denied to everyone else. Although this view utilizes language and employs conceptual categories ("the individual," "other minds," and so forth.) that are inimical to solipsism, it is nonetheless fundamentally conducive historically to the development of solipsistic patterns of thought. On this view, what I know immediately and with greatest certainty are the events that occur in my own mind - my thoughts, my emotions, my perceptions, my desires, and so forth. - and these are not known in this way by anyone else. By the same token, it follows that I do not know other minds in the way that I know my own; indeed, if I am to be said to know other minds at all - that they exist and have a particular nature - it can only be on the basis of certain inferences that I have made from what is directly accessible to me, the behavior of other human beings. The essentials of the Cartesian view were accepted by John Locke, the father of modern British empiricism. Rejecting Descartes' theory that the mind possesses ideas innately at birth, Locke argued that all ideas have their origins in experience. "Reflection" (that is introspection or "inner experience") is the sole source of psychological concepts. Without exception, such concepts have their genesis in the experience of the corresponding mental processes. (Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.i.4ff). If I acquire my psychological concepts by introspecting upon my own mental operations, then it follows that I do so independently of my knowledge of my bodily states. Any correlation that I make between the two will be effected subsequent to my acquisition of my psychological concepts. Thus, the correlation between bodily and mental stated is not a logically necessary one. I may discover, for example, that whenever I feel pain my body is injured in some way, but I can discover this factual correlation only after I have acquired the concept "pain." It cannot therefore be part of what I mean by the word "pain" that my body should behave in a particular way. 3. The Argument from Analogy What then of my knowledge of the minds of others? On Locke's view there can be only one answer: since what I know directly is the existence and contents of my own mind, it follows that my knowledge of the minds of others, if I am to be said to possess such knowledge at all, has to be indirect and analogical, an inference from my own case. This is the so-called "argument from analogy" for other minds, which empiricist philosophers in particular who accept the Cartesian account of consciousness generally assume as a mechanism for avoiding solipsism. (Compare J. S. Mill, William James, Bertrand Russell, and A. J. Ayer). Observing that the bodies of other human beings behave as my body does in similar circumstances, I can infer that the mental life and series of mental events that accompany my bodily behavior are also present in the case of others. Thus, for example, when I see a problem that I am trying unsuccessfully to solve, I feel myself becoming frustrated and observe myself acting in a particular way. In the case of another, I observe only the first and last terms of this three-term sequence and, on this basis, I infer that the "hidden" middle term, the feeling of frustration, has also occurred. There are, however, fundamental difficulties with the argument from analogy. First, if one accepts the Cartesian account of consciousness, one must, in all consistency, accept its implications. One of these implications, as we have seen above, is that there is no logically necessary connection between the concepts of "mind" and "body;" my mind may be lodged in my body now, but this is a matter of sheer contingency. Mind need not become located in body. Its nature will not be affected in any way by the death of this body and there is no reason in principle why it should not have been located in a body radically different from a human one. By exactly the same token, any correlation that exists between bodily behavior and mental states must also be entirely contingent; there can be no conceptual connections between the contents of a mind at a given time and the nature and/or behavior of the body in which it is located at that time. This raises the question as to how my supposed analogical inferences to other minds are to take place at all. How can I apply psychological concepts to others, if I know only that they apply to me? To take a concrete example again, if I learn what "pain" means by reference to my own case, then I will understand "pain" to mean "my pain" and the supposition that pain can be ascribed to anything other than myself will be unintelligible to me. If the relationship between having a human body and a certain kind of mental life is as contingent as the Cartesian account of mind implies, it should be equally easy - or equally difficult - for me to conceive of a table as being in pain as it is for me to conceive of another person as being in pain. The point, of course, is that this is not so. The supposition that a table might experience pain is a totally meaningless one, whereas the ascription of pain to other human beings and animals that, in their physical characteristics and/or behavioral capabilities, resemble human beings is something which even very young children find unproblematic. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I. § 284). How is this to be accounted for? It will not do, in this context, to simply respond that a table does not have the same complex set of physical characteristics as a human body or that it is not capable of the same patterns of behavior as a human body. Because the Cartesian position implies that there is no logical connection between the mental and the physical, between the possession of a body of a particular kind and the capability for consciousness. Physical differentiation can and must be acknowledged, but it can play no role in any explanation of what it is to have a mental life. I am surrounded by other bodies, some of which are similar to mine, and some of which are different. On Cartesian principles such similarities and such differences are irrelevant. The question as to whether it is legitimate for me to ascribe psychological predicates to entities other than myself, which the argument from analogy is designed to address, cannot hinge on the kind of body that I am confronted at a given time. Malcolm, N. (a)). Assuming the validity of the Cartesian position, we have to infer that it makes as much or a little sense, on these premises, to attribute any psychological predicate to another human being as it does to attribute it to a table or a rock. On these premises, it makes no sense to attribute consciousness to another human being at all. Thus on strict Cartesian principles, the argument from analogy will not do the work that is required of it to bridge the gulf between my conscious states and putative conscious states that are not mine. Ultimately, it must be confessed that on these principles I know only my own mental states and the supposition that there are mental states other than my own ceases to be intelligible to me. It is thus that solipsism comes to seem inescapable. If the above argument is valid, it demonstrates that the acceptance of the Cartesian account of consciousness and the view that my understanding of psychological concepts derives, as do the concepts themselves, from my own case leads inexorably to solipsism. However, it may fairly be said that the argument accomplishes more than just this. It can, and should, be understood as a reductio ad absurdum refutation of these Cartesian principles. Viewed from this perspective, the argument may be paraphrased as follows: If there is no logical connection between the physical and the mental, if the physical forms no part of the criteria that govern my ascription of psychological predicates, then I would be able to conceive of an inanimate object such as a table as having a soul and being conscious. But I cannot attach any intelligibility to the notion of an inanimate object being conscious. It follows therefore that there is a logical connection between the physical and the mental: the physical does form part of the criteria that govern my ascription of psychological words. 4. The Physical and the Mental What then is this logical connection between the physical and the mental? This question can best be answered by reflecting, for example, on how a cartoonist might show that a particular table was angry or in pain. As indicated above, it is impossible to attach literal meaning to the assertion that a given inanimate object is angry or in pain, but clearly a certain imaginative latitude may be allowed for specific purposes and a cartoonist might conceivably want to picture a table as being angry for humorous reasons. What is significant in this connection, however, is that to achieve this effect, the cartoonist must picture the table as having human features - the pictured table will appear angry to us only to the extent to that it possesses the natural human expression of anger. The concept of anger can find purchase in relation to the table only if it is represented as possessing something like a human form. This example demonstrates a point of quite fundamental importance: so far from being acquired by abstraction from my own case, from my own "inner" mental life, my psychological concepts are acquired in a specifically intersubjective, social, linguistic context and part of their meaning is their primary application to living human beings. To put this slightly differently, a person is a living human being and the human person in this sense functions as our paradigm of that which has a mental life; it is precisely in relation to their application to persons that we learn such concepts as "consciousness," "pain," "anger," and so forth. As such, it is a necessary and antecedent condition for the ascription of psychological predicates such as these to an object that it should "possess" a body of a particular kind. Wittgenstein articulated this point in one of the centrally important methodological tenets of the Investigations: Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. (I. § 281). Consequently, the belief that there is something problematic about the application of psychological words to other human beings and that such applications are necessarily the products of highly fallible inferences to the "inner" mental lives of others, which require something like the argument from analogy for their justification, turns out to be fundamentally confused. The intersubjective world that we live with other human beings and the public language-system that we must master if we are to think at all are the primary data, the "proto-phenomena," in Wittgenstein's phrase. (I. § 654) Our psychological and non-psychological concepts alike are derived from a single linguistic fountainhead. It is precisely because the living human being functions as our paradigm of that which is conscious and has a mental life that we find the solipsistic notion that other human beings could be "automatons," machines devoid of any conscious thought or experience, bizarre and bewildering. The idea that other persons might all in reality be "automatons" is not one which we can seriously entertain. 5. Knowing Other Minds We are now in a position to see the essential redundancy of the argument from analogy. First, it is a misconception to think that we need any inferential argument to assure us of the existence of other minds. Such an assurance seems necessary only so long as it is assumed that each of us has to work "outwards" from the interiority of his/her own consciousness, to abstract from our own cases to the "internal" world of others. As indicated above, this assumption is fundamentally wrong - our knowledge that other human beings are conscious and our knowledge of their mental states at a given time is not inferential in nature at all, but is rather determined by the public criteria that govern the application of psychological concepts. I know that a person who behaves in a particular way - who, for example, gets red in the face, shouts, gesticulates, speaks vehemently, and so forth - is angry precisely because I have learned the concept "anger" by reference to such behavioral criteria. There is no inference involved here. I do not reason "he behaves in this way, therefore he is angry" - rather "behaving in this way" is part of what it is to be angry and it does not occur to any sane person to question whether the individual who acts in this way is conscious or has a mental life. (Investigations, I. § 303; II. iv., p. 178). Second, because the argument from analogy treats the existence of the mental lives of other living human beings as problematic, it seeks to establish that it is legitimate to infer that other living human beings do indeed have mental lives, that each one of us may be said to be justified in his confidence that he is surrounded by other persons rather than "automatons." The difficulty here, however, is that the argument presupposes that I can draw an analogy between two things, myself as a person and other living human beings, that are sufficiently similar to permit the analogous comparison and sufficiently different to require it. The question must be faced, however, is how or in what respects am I different from or similar to other human beings? The answer is that I am neither. I am a living human being, as are these others. I see about me living human beings and the argument from analogy is supposed to allow me to infer that these are persons like myself. However, the truth is that I have no criterion for discriminating living human beings from persons, for the very good reason that persons are living human beings - there is no conceptual difference between the two. Since the argument acknowledges that I know living human beings directly, it thereby implicitly acknowledges that I know other persons directly, thus making itself functionally redundant. (Malcolm, N. op. cit.). A final, frequently-encountered objection to the argument from analogy derives from the work of Strawson and Malcolm: the argument attempts to move inferentially from my supposed direct knowledge of my own mental life and "inner" states to my indirect knowledge of the mental states of others. It thus presupposes that I know what it means to assign mental states to myself without necessarily knowing what it means to ascribe them to others. This is incoherent. To speak of certain mental states as being mine in the first place is to discriminate them from mental states that are not mine and these, by definition, are the mental states of others. It follows, therefore, that in a fundamental sense the argument from analogy cannot get off the ground: one cannot know how to ascribe mental states to oneself unless one also knows what it means to ascribe mental states to others. Plausible as this objection seems at first sight, it is (ironically, on Wittgensteinian criteria) quite mistaken. For it is not the case that when I am in pain I first identify the pain and subsequently come to recognize that it is one that I, as distinct from someone else, have. The personal pronoun "I" in the locution "I am in pain" is not the "I" of personal individuation - it does not refer to me or discriminate me as a publicly situated person as distinct from others. (The Blue Book and Brown Books, pp. 67-69; also Investigations, I. § 406). The exponent of the argument from analogy is not guilty of the charge of presupposing the very thing that he is endeavoring to demonstrate, as both Strawson and Malcolm suggest. Wittgenstein in fact considered that there is a genuine asymmetry here, in relation to the ascription of psychological predicates to oneself and to others, which is dimly perceived but misrepresented by those who feel the need of the argument from analogy. Whereas one ascribes psychological states to others by reference to bodily and behavioral criteria, one has and requires no criteria at all to self-ascribe or self-avow them. (Investigations, I. § 289-290). Thus the exponent of the argument from analogy sees, quite correctly, that present-tense, first-person psychological assertions such as "I am in pain" differ radically from third-person psychological predicate ascriptions, but thinks of the former as descriptions of "inner" mental states to which he alone has a privileged access. This is crucially wrong. Such uses of the word "I" as occur in present-tense, first-person psychological assertions do not identify a possessor; they do not discriminate one person from amongst a group. As Wittgenstein puts it, To say "I have pain" is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning is. (The Blue Book and Brown Books, p. 67; also Investigations, I. § 404.). To ascribe pain to a third party, on the other hand, is to identify a concrete individual as the possessor of the pain. On this point alone Wittgenstein concurs with the exponent of the argument from analogy. However, Wittgenstein here calls attention to the fact that the asymmetry is not one that exists between the supposedly direct and certain knowledge that I have of my own mental states as distinct from the wholly inferential knowledge which, allegedly, I have of the mental states of others. Rather, the asymmetry is that the ascriptions of psychological predicates to others require criterial justificatory grounds, whereas the self-avowals or self-ascriptions of such predicates are criterionless. It thus transpires that the argument from analogy appears possible and necessary only to those who misapprehend the asymmetry between the criterial bases for third-person psychological predicate ascription and the non-criterial right for their self-ascription or self-avowal for a cognitive asymmetry between direct and indirect knowledge of mental states. The Cartesian egocentric view of the mind and of mental events that gives rise both to the specter of solipsism and attempts to evade it by means of the argument from analogy has its origins in this very misapprehension. 6. The Privacy of Experience What then of solipsism? To what extent does the foregoing undermine it as a coherent philosophical hypothesis, albeit one in which no-one really believes? Solipsism rests upon certain presuppositions about the mind and our knowledge of mental events and processes. Two of these, the thesis that I have a privileged form of access to and knowledge of my own mind and the thesis that there is no conceptual or logically necessary link between the mental and the physical, have been dealt with above. If the foregoing is correct, both theses are false. This leaves us with the final presupposition underlying solipsism, that all experiences are necessarily (that is logically) private to the individual whose experiences they are. This thesis - which, it is fair to say, is very widely accepted - also derives from the Cartesian account of mind and generates solipsistic conclusions by suggesting that experience is something that, because of its "occult" or ephemeral nature, can never literally be shared. No two people can ever be said to have the same experience. This again introduces the problem of how one person can know the experiences of another or, more radically, how one can know that another person has experiences at all. Wittgenstein offers a comprehensive critique of this view. He attacks the notion that experience is necessarily private. His arguments against this are complex, if highly compressed and rather oracular. (For more detailed accounts, see Kenny, A., Malcolm, N. (b), Vohra, A.). Wittgenstein distinguishes two senses of the word "private" as it is normally used: privacy of knowledge and privacy of possession. Something is private to me in the first sense if only I can know it; it is private to me in the second sense if only I can have it. Thus the thesis that experience is necessarily private can mean one of two things, which are not always discriminated from each other with sufficient care: (a) only I can know my experiences or (b) only I can have my experiences. Wittgenstein argues that the first of these is false and the second is true in a sense that does not make experience necessarily private, as follows: Under (a), if we take pain as an experiential exemplar, we find that the assertion "Only I can know my pains" is a conjunction of two separate theses: (i) I (can) know that I am in pain when I am in pain and (ii) other people cannot know that I am in pain when I am in pain. Thesis (i) is, literally, nonsense: it cannot be meaningfully asserted of me that I know that I am in pain. Wittgenstein's point here is not that I do not know that I am in pain when I am in pain, but rather that the word "know" cannot be significantly employed in this way. (Investigations, I. § 246; II. xi. p. 222). This is because the verbal locution "I am in pain" is usually (though not invariably) an expression of pain - as part of acquired pain-behavior it is a linguistic substitute for such natural expressions of pain as groaning. (I. § 244). For this reason it cannot be governed by an epistemic operator. The prepositional function "I know that x" does not yield a meaningful proposition if the variable is replaced by an expression of pain, linguistic or otherwise. Thus to say that others learn of my pains only from my behavior is misleading, because it suggests that I learn of them otherwise, whereas I don't learn of them at all - I have them. (I. § 246). Thesis (ii) - other people cannot know that I am in pain when I am in pain - is false. If we take the word "know" is as it is normally used, then it is true to say that other people can and very frequently do know when I am in pain. Indeed, in cases where the pain is extreme, it is often impossible to prevent others from knowing this even when one wishes to do so. Thus, in certain circumstances, it would not be unusual to hear it remarked of someone, for example, that "a moan of pain escaped him" - indicating that despite his efforts, he could not but manifest his pain to others. It thus transpires that neither thesis (i) nor (ii) is true. If we turn to (b), we find that "Only I can have my pains" expresses a truth, but it is a truth that is grammatical rather than ontological. It draws our attention to the grammatical connection between the personal pronoun "I" and the possessive "my." However, it tells us nothing specifically about pains or other experiences, for it remains true if we replace the word "pains" with many other plural nouns (e.g. "Only I can have my blushes"). Another person can have the same pain as me. If our pains have the same phenomenal characteristics and corresponding locations, we will quite correctly be said to have "the same pain." This is what the expression "the same pain" means. Another person, however, cannot have my pains. My pains are the ones that, if they are expressed at all, are expressed by me. But by exactly the same (grammatical) token, another person cannot have my blushes, sneezes, frowns, fears, and so forth., and none of this can be taken as adding to our stockpile of metaphysical truths. It is true that I may deliberately and successfully keep an experience to myself, in which case that particular experience might be said to be private to me. But I might do this by articulating it in a language that those with whom I was conversing do not understand. There is clearly nothing occult or mysterious about this kind of privacy. (Investigations, II. xi, p. 222). Similarly, experience that I do not or cannot keep to myself is not private. In short, some experiences are private and some are not. Even though some experiences are private in this sense, it does not follow that all experiences could be private. As Wittgenstein points out, "What sometimes happens could always happen" is a fallacy. It does not follow from the fact that some orders are not obeyed that all orders might never be obeyed. For in that case the concept "order" would become incapable of instantiation and would lose its significance. (I. § 345). 7. The Incoherence of Solipsism With the belief in the essential privacy of experience eliminated as false, the last presupposition underlying solipsism is removed and solipsism is shown as foundationless, in theory and in fact. One might even say, solipsism is necessarily foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing that he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria and a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough. As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all. Given this, it is scarcely surprising that those philosophers who accept the Cartesian premises that make solipsism apparently plausible, if not inescapable, have also invariably assumed that language-usage is itself essentially private. The cluster of arguments - generally referred to as "the private language argument" - that we find in the Investigations against this assumption effectively administers the coup de grâce to both Cartesian dualism and solipsism. (I. § 202; 242-315). Language is an irreducibly public form of life that is encountered in specifically social contexts. Each natural language-system contains an indefinitely large number of "language-games," governed by rules that, though conventional, are not arbitrary personal fiats. The meaning of a word is its (publicly accessible) use in a language. To question, argue, or doubt is to utilize language in a particular way. It is to play a particular kind of public language-game. The proposition "I am the only mind that exists" makes sense only to the extent that it is expressed in a public language, and the existence of such language itself implies the existence of a social context. Such a context exists for the hypothetical last survivor of a nuclear holocaust, but not for the solipsist. A non-linguistic solipsism is unthinkable and a thinkable solipsism is necessarily linguistic. Solipsism therefore presupposes the very thing that it seeks to deny. That solipsistic thoughts are thinkable in the first instance implies the existence of the public, shared, intersubjective world that they purport to call into question.

Explain Plato's distinction between knowledge and mere belief and his discussion of the distinction between appearance and reality in relation to the good (i.e. what is good).

What is the highest of Plato's Forms? What, in Plato, best corresponds to our concept of God? by Forms, Plato does not mean something visible. Forms - the belief in a transcendent world of eternal and absolute beings, corresponding to every kind of thing that there is, and causing in particular things their essential nature. The highest of Plato's forms is the most real of the Good. ----- As existing in God's mind from all eternity, the forms provided the pattern for all that He would create. Moreover, these eternal ideas of God's were MORE real than existing things since without God first thinking it, there would be no creation. What is Plato's basic view of reality? It must be a reality independent of what we think. Has 2 basic parts: being and becoming, but there are subdivisions of the parts. Reality is a continuum, ranging from the least real (the realm of mere images) to the most real (the highest of the forms), culminating in the form of the Good. The higher the form the greater the reality. Image of the divided line Plato concludes... True knowledge must exist in a non-physical realm Plato writings The republic What does Plato address through his analogy of the cave? His beliefs about learning and the relation between the world of appearances and reality. What does he say the body is? A prison in which the soul is trapped. Difference between knowledge gained through senses and reason? Senses- no more than an opinion as can be mistaken Reasoning-philosophically certain What does the allegory of the cave make contrast between? people who only see appearances but mistake them for the truth and those who really do see the truth In the allegory of the cave what do The Prisoners show? Humanity In the allegory of the cave what do The Shadows show? - What humans believe to be real - Of objects highlighting they're meaningless (far away from finding true knowledge) -objects carry by politicians, fooling and lying to us to prevent us finding the truth - they're not vivid, they flicker emphasising that politicians mock how we're easily led, shouldn't trust our senses In the allegory of the cave what does The Cave show? World of Appearances, material world which we live in, a world of limitations and in darkness highlighting our lack of knowledge and how we're held back by our assumptions. There's no good there, only bad. In the allegory of the cave what does The outside World show? The world of the Forms In the allegory of the cave what does The Sun show? The form of the good In the allegory of the cave what does the journey out of the cave show? Philosophers quest for knowledge In the allegory of the cave what does the return to the prisoners show? Death of Socrates,Human ignorance and philosophers rejection. Journey out of cave - dazzle by light - explain First reaction to philosophical questioning is puzzlement. Becomes used to the light and realises his former view or reality was inaccurate so questions beliefs. 'Forced' outside - explain word use Hard to accept what they've always known isn't actually true Parallel between Sun and Form of the good FoG commonly referred to as enlightenment, without the sun we couldn't see and without the FoG we cannot understand other forms Symbolic meaning can see stars before daylight FoG so complex, must question things and accept/understand other forms before reaching 'enlightenment'. What is Eikasia? Comes from 'Eikon' meaning in the image of or likeness. Plato uses to explain state of mind such as opinion What do the prisoners see in the cave? Images of other images, nothing real however they trust that this is reality, never thinking twice as to whether there's anything greater. Prisoners believed shadows were real - what did this tell us about humanity? Our minds are empty without philosophy,we're ignorant and never question anything, only accept and believe what governments are telling us. Difference between the two realms First, there is the physical world, the world that we can observe with our five senses. And second, there is a world made of eternal perfect "forms" or "ideas." What are 'forms'? Plato says they are perfect templates that exist somewhere in another dimension (He does not tell us where). These forms are the ultimate reference points for all objects we observe in the physical world. They are more real than the physical objects you see in the world. What is the theory of the forms based upon? What is real and what is not, the world of appearances vs the world of the forms Explain how we know the perfect creature This theory is important for understanding and objects true nature. For example, a cat is not a dog and not a mouse, but yet it has four legs and a tail like the other two animals have, so how is it that we can distinguish a cat from a dog of a mouse? Plato believed that each animal has a perfect form, the cat has perfect cat-ness that makes us recognise a cat when we see one. This perfect cat-ness is only found in the "World of forms" which God created as the ideal cat, this cat is the only real cat and all the others are just shadows of it. What is a form? The unseen reality behind any concept or object Why can we understand and classify things in the real world? As we have a priori knowledge from the world of the forms Outline of Plato's contrast of knowledge and opinion: Knowledge is a mental faculty/power that allows us to apprehend "being" (i.e., reality). Ignorance is the opposite of knowledge. Opinion is subject to error, but knowledge is not. Opinion differs from knowledge Different faculties involve different "spheres" (areas they govern). Opinion involves a different faculty, and has a different subject-matter. Particular objects are subject to "opposite names." For example: The same house is beautiful to one person, ugly to another, and the same person is at one time young, at another time old. Particulars are in the region between being and not-being. Particulars are the subject-matter of opinion Particulars are the subject-matter of opinion. Eternal and immutable natures are the subject-matte of knowledge. Opinion can possibly be true, in which case it serves as a succesful guide to action (and this explains how Athens' heroes were good, they had correct opinions). But even true opinion, because it is only opinion, cannot be defended, and thus "like a runaway slave" flees when attacked. However, knowledge differs from mere opinion in that it can be defended by a logos, a rational explanation of why that opinion is true. Thus emerges the formula that knowledge is true opinion accompanied by a logos, or as it came to be expressed in the Western tradition, as "justified true belief." This means that the real difference between opinion and knowledge lies in the "justification" (the logos). An opinion can become justified by showing how it can be deduced from other premises, if those premises are true. But no matter how validily we reason, Socrates saw that we cannot justify any opinion unless we start from premises known to be true, rather than just assumed as "hypotheses" in the way the mathematician assumes certain axioms. The series of justifications would seem to be infinite unless some "first" premises can be known directly and not inferred from "higher" premises. How can we attain knowledge of such premises which are not merely possibly true, like a mere hypothesis, but are necessarily true? Thus, we can assume that, there are three minimum conditions for knowledge. They are, 1. True (it must be true) 2. Believe (we must actually believe it. Belief must be consciously held), 3. Justification is present (there must be sufficient evidence for it). Therefore, what is known has to be fact and thus true must come from the regard of the person acknowledging it as truth. The person must have an adequate basis for believing it, that is, have sufficient justification for believing it. The purpose of belief is to represent the world accurately. Therefore, belief serves its role only if the formation, retention and revision of belief are sensitive to what one takes to be one's evidence. In the definition of belief, "Belief is a species of propositional attitude distinguished by their having the mind-to-world direction of fit". Most philosophers have assumed that belief is an inner state of mind, directly accessible to introspection and distinct from, though casually related to, the believer's behavior. Thus, belief play a central role in theoretical reasoning (reason about what is so) and hence in practical reasoning (reason about what to do). We, therefore, need to know what we can do and how we can do is related to what we want. When seeking knowledge of these things we seek true belief about them. Thus, what we do is conditioned by what we believe. Belief issues in behavior only in conjunction with appropriate other propositional attitudes. In support of this theory, is the fact that not only can others check our claims to believe by considering whether we behave appropriately, but we ourselves may also take the results of such a test to overrule claims to believe that which we have sincerely made.Knowledge and belief are not only distinct attitudes but they also have a distinct and proprietary objectives. Whereas, belief can be true or false, knowledge is neither. But belief is a necessary condition for knowledge.Knowledge is acquired by deriving beliefs from other beliefs (foundation beliefs).Therefore, we accept belief(s)as a foundational principle because; 1. They are innate, 2.they are beliefs about present conscious experience, 3. They are beliefs that belong to our sense of experience. 4. They are self-evident. Plato distinguished between knowledge (episteme) and opinion (doxa). This distinction is closely related to Plato's Theory of Forms. So to give you an example: "Basketballs are round" According to the Theory of Forms, then basketballs are not round, they are merely participating in the form of 'Roundness'. In other words, they are merely an earthly reflection of the real reality: The reality of the intelligible forms such as 'roundness', 'beauty', etc. Only the form of 'beauty' is truly beautiful, everything else are just reflections of beauty. Now anyone who does not 'know' this and thus thinks that basketballs are actually round, they are not in the realm of knowledge (episteme) but in the realm of opinion (doxa). Essentially, only Philosophers can really have knowledge as they see how the earthly things are just mere reflections of the true reality; unlike sophists etc. The only thing to be known, and thus to be counted as knowledge, are the forms. That's why the Kings should be Philosophers, and the Philosophers Kings, because how else would people, who literally have no knowledge, run a society?The difference between a belief, which is sometimes called opinion, and a belief that qualifies as knowledge is explored in the dialogue by Plato called Theaetetus. The participants of the dialogue agree that an opinion must be 'true' for the opinion to qualify as knowledge because if the opinion, or belief, turned out to be false we would not regard that opinion to have ever been knowledge. Even though having a true belief is necessary for having knowledge it is not sufficient. Something else is needed for a true belief to be regarded as knowledge. This extra something appears to come in two forms which are both connected with consistency. The particular true-belief must also be consistent with a relevant more general network of understanding which is either that of the personal understanding of the particular believer-knower, or else, must be judged to be consistent with the believer-knower's belief of the general ways of understanding of the community of believer-knowers that he or she wishes to participate in discourse with and be approved by. Such consistency relations are called 'justification' in the theory of knowledge. The first type is connected to the way that each person maintains their own unified theory-of-the-world. Each new item of experience must be rationally integrated into their general way of understanding the world. When a magic trick is observed, the observer is not satisfied until they understand how the trick was done. The second type of justification is really perhaps only an illusion of knowledge because it involves the observation of consistency without personal understanding, such as regarding a belief to be knowledge because it is consistent with the statements of an authority or expert. Being aware that particular other people have beliefs who behave as if they understand them is not the same as having personal understanding oneself. Knowing that a heart surgeon has a successful record of operations is a different knowledge to the knowledge that the heart surgeon uses to succeed in his work. Going with the herd because the herd is going is not the same as knowing where one is going. In this way, distinctions can be made between having a belief or opinion and having knowledge. It should be noted that, contrary to frequent usage, belief and knowledge are not mutually exclusive. Knowledge requires belief. The belief must also be true and the true-belief must also be justifiable with a reasoned understanding or account. Each of these three conditions are necessary for knowledge. It has been noticed since Plato first wrote Theaetetus that someone can have a 'reasonable account' in which the justification itself is false or mistaken, in which case the ascription of 'knowledge' would seem to be wrong. An example of an "illusory justification" might be the case of someone who walks past a broken clock at the same time each day who, from seeing several other clocks immediately before and after, believes that it has been verified that the clock is working correctly when in fact the clock had displayed that very time and none other for many years. It just happened to be the precise time at which the person was observing it.

What does Descartes conclude regarding the question of his nature (i.e. what he is)? How does Descartes argue for his conclusion?

The Nature of Mind How is the nature/essence of a thing to be known? Know its characteristic activity/function To know that I think is to know that I exist. Knowledge of thought is sufficient for knowledge my existence. Knowledge of thought is necessary for knowledge of my existence. So, thinking must be an activity that determines the essence of the cogito But am I only a thinking thing? "I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks" What is the Argument? Argument appears to be: I doubt that bodies exist (and hence I am a body) I do not doubt that I am thinking Hence, I am only a thing that thinks, not a body. If that's right, then argument is bad: I doubt that I am in Greenland. I do not doubt that I am on Earth. Hence, I am only on Earth and not in Greenland OR I doubt that he can fly (or that anyone can fly) I do not doubt that he can write great stories Hence, he is a thing that writes great stories only, not something that can fly. Possible Solution Ambiguity in passage: "I am, then, in the strict sense only <tantum praecise> a thing that thinks" I am, in the strict sense, only a thing that thinks. ('only' modifies I am) I am, in the strict sense only, a thing that thinks. ('only' modifies strict sense) What is meant: "Praecise" is in abstraction, in an abstracted sense. What I am, only insofar as I can know for certain now, is a thing that thinks. I may also be something that has a body. Meditation Two: the cogito Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is not something else which does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts? In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. The Cogito Passage Interpreted Straight Deductive Argument Interpretation: Cogito Passage is an Argument I am thinking If I am thinking, then I exist. Therefore, I exist. Problem: Premise 2 is not certain or begs the question; what makes it true beyond all doubt? Direct Intuition Interpretation: Cogito Passage is not an argument Intueor: Immediate Grasping, Intuiting, Understanding. Example: grasping a three-angled polygon. In grasping thought, one grasps in the same mental act existence. Meditation Two: Quid Sum? "But what shall I now say that I am, when I am supposing that there is some supremely powerful and, if it is permissible to say so, malicious deceiver, who is deliberately trying to trick me in every way he can? Can I now assert that I possess even the most insignificant of all the attributes which I have just said belong to the nature of a body? I scrutinize them, think about them, go over them again, but nothing suggests itself; it is tiresome and pointless to go through the list once more. But what about the attributes I assigned to the soul? Nutrition or movement? Since now I do not have a body, these are mere fabrications. Sense-perception? This surely does not occur without a body, and besides, when asleep I have appeared to perceive through the senses many things which I afterwards realized I did not perceive through the senses at all. Thinking? At last I have discovered it - thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist - that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist. At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason - words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said - a thinking thing."

How does philosophy differ from other disciplines, especially with respect its aims and methods? How do philosophical questions differ from questions asked in other disciplines? What is Philosophy?

exists when and where definite knowledge does not. Philosophy doesn't rely on experiments or observations, and it doesn't have a formal method of proof Even field of scholarship has its own methodologies, its own method of 'proof', and its own method of asking the right question that leads to further understanding. The difference between philosophy and social science is no exception. In particular, philosophy concerns a great many things that social science does not. And the methodology is very different, too. The best social science relies on statistics to apply the scientific method to the science. Philosophy does not. On the use of statistics, Fisher may have been overly optimistic, but I still think a lot of what he said in R A Fisher: Statistical Methods Introduction still holds true, at least for the best social science. Philosophers differ from other disciplines seeking knowledge in that they seek to understand knowledge in general: they seek to understand what knowledge itself is. Philosophy is the critical, analytical, and purely theoretical study of man, his environment, cosmos, religion. It is also the love of wisdom. It is different from the studies of other subjects because: 1) It studies every other subject. Philosophy, does not have a specialised or cut out subject matter like other subjects. there is philosophy of law, philosophy of biological science, philosophy of cosmos, philosophy of religion, philosophy of morals, philosophy of science and many others. 2) Philosophy has many schools of thought compared to other subjects. Ranging from empiricism,rationalism, relativism, objectivism, functionalism, pragmatism and even behaviourism,just to name a few. 3) Philosophy makes you question all your basic assumption. it invites you to think rationally and critically on any and all subject matter, be it material or immaterial. Hence why it is sometimes called an abstract science. It raises the bar of the kinds of question society demands to be asked. 4) Philosophy also studies the basic and underlining principles guiding the other subjects and it does not just accept anything for the sake of accepting. What is the relationship of philosophy and science? Philosophy and religious faith? Philosophy and history, art, psychology, anthropology, politics, and literature? Is philosophy a single path and all other paths are different? Let's look at science for example, Science is using experimental or mathematical proofs to try and determine the nature of the universe, It uses facts and data to prove something. Then we have Philosophy, In Philosophy, we use rational thinking, logic and thought experiments to try and argue for a specific case, as there really is no right and wrong answer, since it is impossible to find one in the first place. For example, using mathematical reasoning to find the meaning of life. It's impossible. This is why age old philosophical questions such as "Do we have freewill" or "Does God Exist" have been debated for hundreds if not thousands of years, there is no way to prove something in Philosophy, only argue for it. Actually, historically, 'philosophy' (which means the Greek 'love of wisdom') was first used of Pythagoras, 6th century BCE) was the term used for many forms of inquiry we would (today) call geometry, mathematics, cosmology (the origin and nature of the cosmos), the history of ideas, politics, ethics, our relationship with the good, the true and the beautiful, the sacred (including the existence of God or gods), the significance of birth, aging, death, and the possibility of life after life, and more. The widespread, comprehensive nature of philosophy is reflected today in the fact that any person who receives a "Ph.D." is technically receiving a doctorate in philosophy (Ph.D. stands for doctor philosophiae in Latin). Philosophy, today, may be practiced in a way that links and is in partnership with multiple other disciplines. The different fields of inquiry (law, medicine, logic, theology, mathematics, the natural sciences, psychology, etc.) came to form their own disciplines over time as they emerged as distinctive forms of inquiry with their own philosophical presuppositions. So, in the practice of law, one assumes the existence of persons in society who are capable of rational disputes over responsibility and the importance of comparing the cogency of different models of governance. If, rather than assume such a 'common sense' perspective, one wants to question whether any of our perceptions and beliefs about reality are reliable this would not be a question for lawyers, but a question that would be addressed in what is often called epistemology (or the theory of knowledge). You will find below some observations on the relationship of philosophy to: Science Religious faith History Art Psychology Literature Though many other areas are equally significant. Philosophy and science: the term "science" emerged in English in the 19th century. Earlier, someone we called a scientist would be called a natural philosopher. In fact, Darwin thought of himself as a natural historian. The sciences themselves may be thought of as based on a philosophy of nature and inquiry, an account of observations and hypotheses, confirmation and falsification, reason and reliability. The history of science was, from the beginning in Ancient Greece, virtually inseparable, but today the sciences are often thought of as providing an increasing body of evidence and theories that are vital for philosophical reflection. For example, is biological evolution (and chemistry and physics) able to account for ethics and religion? Moreover, the value of science is frequently a topic for philosophical inquiry. In the history of science one may also see the influence and study of human life, animal consciousness, space and time that have important implications for our values and the meaning of life. A good philosophy department, in our view, is one that takes seriously both the intrinsic value of philosophy as a field, while also appreciating how bc1e50abb0875b616b9fe46ddbc92227philosophy plays a role in all other disciplines -for example, physics rests on or involves a worldview or philosophy of the physical and methods- and how students with non-philosophy majors can benefit from taking one or more courses in philosophy. Science majors may particularly be drawn to courses in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of space and time, the Making of the Modern Mind, for example. An art major may benefit from the course Aesthetics, offered by the Philosophy Department, which focuses on the philosophy of art. THE ART OF WONDERING James Christian, PhD The following pages may cause you to wonder That's what philosophy is. Wondering. To philosophize is to wonder about life--- about right and wrong, love and loneliness, war and death, about freedom, truth, beauty, time... and a thousand other things. To philosophize is to explore life. It means breaking free to ask questions. It means resisting easy answers. To philosophize is to seek in oneself the courage to ask painful questions. But if, by chance, you have already asked all your questions, and found all the answers--- if you're sure you know right from wrong, and whether God exists, and what justice means, and why men fear and hate and pray--- if indeed you have done your wondering about freedom and love and loneliness and those thousand other things, then the following pages will waste your time. Philosophy is for those who are willing to be disturbed with a creative disturbance. Philosophy is for those who still have the capacity for Wonder! ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- About Philosophy Lou Reich, PhD "Philosophy" is a highly personal undertaking. It is possible to come to answers that actually work, for you. It is possible to have well thought through positions that recognize the existence of contrary views. You can "cut your teeth," so to speak, on having well thought through views by critiquing other people's well thought through views. It is, of course, easier to sit back and "criticize" another's views rather than to offer a reasoned critique of one's own. But in trying to do that we can develop our own views with the input of thinkers concerned with the same kinds of issues that we are concerned with, and whose thought can be food for our thought. There must be an element of judgment involved in the undertaking. I cannot make yours, and you cannot make mine. But we can reason with each other ( offer reasons for our conclusions ), and even if we disagree on certain things we can come away respecting each other as reasonable people. As I said at the beginning of the Course, it is not as if one could say that, " Philosophy says this about that." As an exploration of life, philosophy is ongoing as long as we live and breathe. Exploring life's "nooks and crannies" along the way is not a bad way of being human. Trying to understand; seeking good reasons to answer our questions one way or the other, and not accepting "easy answers" to our deepest questions merely or solely on the basis of emotional satisfaction---these things constitute a part of both the challenge and the dignity of being human! [Philosophical Questions] This is, however, only a part of the truth concerning the uncertainty of philosophy. There are many questions—and among them those that are of the profoundest interest to our spiritual life— which, so far as we can see, must remain insoluble to the human intellect unless its powers become of quite a different order from what they are now. Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Is conscious- ness a permanent part of the universe, giving hope of indefinite growth in wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on a small planet on which life must ultimately become impossible? Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? Such questions are asked by philosophy, and var- iously answered by various philosophers. But it would seem that, whether answers be otherwise discoverable or not, the answers suggested by phi- losophy are none of them demonstrably true. Yet, however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge. Many philosophers, it is true, have held that philosophy could establish the truth of certain answers to such fundamental questions. They have sup- posed that what is of most importance in religious beliefs could be proved by strict demonstration to be true. In order to judge of such attempts, it is necessary to take a survey of human knowledge, and to form an opinion as to its methods and its limitations. On such a subject it would be unwise to pronounce dogmatically; but if the investigations of our previous chap- ters have not led us astray, we shall be compelled to renounce the hope of finding philosophical proofs of religious beliefs. We cannot, therefore, include as part of the value of philosophy any definite set of answers to such questions. Hence, once more, the value of philosophy must not de- pend upon any supposed body of definitely ascertainable knowledge to be acquired by those who study it. [Philosophy and Science] Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowl- edge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical ex- amination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction 3 "Enlargement of Self" by Bertrand Russell you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes pos- sible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astron- omy, was once included in philosophy; Newton's great work was called "the mathematical principles of natural philosophy". Similarly, the study of the human mind, which was a part of philosophy, has now been sepa- rated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.

Explain the deductive-argument (DA) and the direct-intuition (DI) interpretations of the cogito passage. Explain the problem associated with DA, and how DI seems to get around that problem.

iniate = are iniate show that they can not be explained by sense experience. Sense experiences can't tell us about anything. A deductive argument is an argument that is intended by the arguer to be (deductively) valid, that is, to provide a guarantee of the truth of the conclusion provided that the argument's premises (assumptions) are true. in a deductive argument, the premises are intended to provide such strong support for the conclusion that, if the premises are true, then it would be impossible for the conclusion to be false. An inductive argument is an argument that is intended by the arguer merely to establish or increase the probability of its conclusion. In an inductive argument, the premises are intended only to be so strong that, if they were true, then it would be unlikely that the conclusion is false. Skeptical Scenarios Illusion Case Anything that has deceived you even once is never to be fully trusted again. The senses have deceived on more than one occasion. Therefore, the senses are never to be fully trusted again. Madman Dreaming Case To dream that one is sensing is to merely appear that one is sensing. We cannot be certain that we are not dreaming. Hence, we cannot be certain if we are actually sensing or merely appearing to be sensing. Painting God & Nature Evil Genius Case An evil genius may be causing me to be merely appearing to be sensing by manipulating me. I cannot be sure that such an evil genius does not exist. Hence, I cannot be sure that I am merely appearing to be sensing. The Target of the Doubts Casting doubt on sensory beliefs Sensory knowledge requires the following: proper function and use of the senses. knowledge/certainty that one is sensing X Skeptical scenarios causes uncertainty with respect to 1a and 1b. Hence, uncertainty about skeptical scenarios causes uncertainty about purported sensory knowledge. (1,2) What main question does Descartes set out to answer in the Meditations? Why is this question so important to Descartes? What is he seeking by asking this question? Explain the Cartesian Method of Doubt, its purpose, and employment of skepticism. -What, if anything, can I know with certainty? -This is so important because he has discovered some of his prior beliefs are false and wants to know what is true and not with certainty. -Cartesian Method of Doubt- Universal and hyperbolic skepticism through which Descartes carefully and rigorously examines all of his previous beliefs subjecting them to as much skepticism as possible, eliminating anything and everything that is in any way dubitable. Present & explain the Small and Distant Things Argument. What does this argument attempt to prove? -P1 if something is very small and or far away then I cannot trust my senses to give an accurate account of the true nature of that thing. P2. The thing is very small and far away C1. I cannot trust my senses to give an accurate picture of account of the true nature of that thing. -Basically this is taking away from the validity of our senses specifically what we see -Deductive, valid modus ponens, sound. Present and explain the Dream argument. What does this argument attempt to prove? What evidence does it offer? Is it a good argument? What conclusion can we draw about Descartes' basic philosophical views in virtue of this argument? -P1. If there is no distinguishing marks between dreaming and waking then it's possible to be dreaming when I think im awake. P2 If its possible to be dreaming when I think im awake then there's reason to doubt any and all information from the senses. C1. If there are no distinguishing marks between dreaming and waking then there's reason to doubt any and all information from the senses. Deductive, valid hypothetical syllogism, sound P3 There are no distinguishing marks between dreaming and waking. C2 There is reason to doubt any and all info from sense experience. Deductive, valid modus ponens, sound -This proves that there is reason to doubt any and all information from the senses based on the fact that given sense experience could occur in a dream. -This shows Descartes is not an empiricist, knowledge is not bases on experience. Dream argument eliminates all knowledge of the physical world, and the physical sciences. Present and explain the Evil Genius Argument. What does this argument attempt to prove? -P1 If it's possible for there to be an evil genius constantly deceiving me then there's reason to doubt a priori truths along with info from sense experience. P2 It is possible for there to be an evil genius constantly deceiving me. C1 There is reason to doubt a priori truths along with information from sense experience. Deductive, Valid, modus Ponens, Sound -Is used to try to prove that there's reason to doubt a priori truths along with information form the senses. -After this point it seems that the only belief that Descartes is left with is Epistemological skepticism. What is the Cogito "argument"? Explain why technically speaking the Cogito isn't really an argument but rather a self-evident assertion. Explain the point of the Cogito and whether it succeeds in meeting its aim even though it doesn't work as an argument. Explain why the Cogito can only work in the first person, present tense formulation. Explain why the "I" in the Cogito is an inessential I. Explain why any mode of thought but only modes of thought suffice for the Cogito. Explain the significance of the Cogito to Descartes' overall philosophical project. What conclusions can be drawn about Descartes' basic philosophical commitments in both epistemology and metaphysics in light of this argument? -Its not an argument because its circular reasoning or begging the question. -Its an a priori truth because he knows with certainty that since he can think, he does exist as a thinking thing. -I think therefore I am. Cogito ergo sum - This only works in the 1st person present tense. You cannot know for sure if someone else is thinking, or even the fact that they are real because we still cannot trust the senses at this point. Also cannot for for past tense because what we believe to be the past could have been a dream. -I exist as a thinking thing shows he is not a Materialist (Only physical substance) -This saves Descartes from Epistemological skepticism, and shows that he is a Foundational Rationalist. Does Descartes believe that life is just a dream? Does he believe that we are always deceived by an evil genius? Is Descartes an epistemological skeptic? Explain your answers. -After he rebuilds his argument he does not believe we are just in a dream and that we are not being deceived by an evil genius. Explain how Descartes' argues for Cartesian (aka mind/body) dualism beginning with the foundation of the Cogito and ultimately arguing to the existence of body via God as the intermediate step. Evaluate the validity and soundness of Descartes' argument for dualism and how this impacts his overall success in reaching his conclusion. What secondary argument does Descartes offer to try to prove that mind is not reducible to body? -After the cogito foundation he attempts to establish that there is a perfect being, stating that he is an imperfect thinking thing with an idea of perfection that can only come from something perfect, therefore a perfect being (God) must exist. P1-If I have reason to doubt, then I am not perfect P2-I have reason to doubt C1-I am not perfect Valid Modus ponens, a priori, False Premise, Unsound, the idea that perfection can only come from something perfect is not correct. -Then from that he attempts to argue for Cartesian Dualism, -P1 If God is perfect then God would not allow mass deception P2. If no mass deception then we can trust clear and distinct ideas as true. P3 I have a clear and distinct idea that Body exists C1 Body Exists -This shows he is also and Interactionist. -Mind/body problem: How do these 2 Distinct substances, one that is physical in space and another that is not, how do they connect? -There's not really an answer, some see this problem as a way to reject Cartesian dualism. What is the mind/body problem? How does this difficulty present a challenge to Cartesian Dualism/Interactionism? How does Descartes respond to this concern? Is this a sufficient response? What metaphysical alternative might modern scientists favor to avoid the mind/body problem? Explain your answers Mind/body problem: How do these 2 Distinct substances, one that is physical in space and another that is not, how do they connect? -There's not really an answer, some see this problem as a way to reject Cartesian dualism. What "isms" does Descartes endorse from the list of philosophical ideas presented above? Support your answer using the Cartesian arguments from the Meditations and/or the Discourse on Method. -Foundationalism- Cogito -Rationalism-Cogito -Cartesian Dualism- God would not allow mass deception -Interactionist- God would not allow mass deception