Philosophy of Mind Exam 3

Recall, what are the objections to identity theory?

Objections from Ignorance, Privacy, and First-Person authority. Functionalism arguable does somewhat better with respect to all of these objections

Argument for the objection from intentional properties

P1: I am thinking about a unicorn P2: There is a unicorn in my mind P3: There is no unicorn in my brain C: My thought is not a state of my brain

Argument for the objection from phenomenal properties

P1: I am vividly imagining a red apple bouncing up and down. P2: My mental image is red. P3: There is nothing red in my brain C: My mental image is not a state of my brain

The multiple realizability objection to identity theory

P1: If mental property M = physical property P, then necessarily, every token that has M-property, has P-property P2: It is not the case that necessarily, every token that has M-property, has P-property. C: Therefore, mental property M ≠ physical property P

What are tokens?

Particulars, substances, individuals A particular instance/episode/event is a mental token Ex: MY belief that Paris is in France --> 1 mental token. YOUR belief that Paris is in France --> 1 mental token The mental type of both of these tokens: belief

Physicalist Funcitonalism

Physicalism: all properties are either physical properties or fixed by the physical properties. Where the physical properties are those that figure in the best theory of physics

Physicalisms

Physicalism: everything is physical Token physicalism (about the mind): every mental particular (event, object, etc.) has some physical properties. Type physicalism (about the mind): every mental property (universal, type) is a physical property

What denies what?

Property dualism denies substance dualism and supervenience physicalism Supervenience physicalism denies property dualism Supervenience physicalism denies type physicalism Substance dualism denies physicalism

Are most functionalists ROLE or REALIZER functionalists?

ROLE, because of the thesis of the multiple realizability of the mental

Symbols

Symbols carry meaning, have intentional context (i.e. what it's about) Have semantic and syntactic properties (syntactic properties are formal properties, i.e. properties of physical shape or form) (semantic properties are its intentional properties, what it's about) Certain semantic relations between symbols and sentences can be respected without attention to, or even knowledge of, what those symbols are about (i.e. a computer can be causally sensitive to the syntax of symbols, and it can respect certain semantic relationships between them)

Anti-reductionism about intentional psychology is:

the view that intentional psychology (i.e. any theory that explains agents' behavior in terms of their propositional attitudes) is irreducible to any natural science (i.e. intentional psychology's theoretical entities are not equal to the theoretical entities of any natural science, AND intentional psychology's laws cannot be expressed by the laws of any natural science)

Phenomenality

Functionalism doesn't just abstract away from neural properties in characterizing mental properties. It abstracts away from qualitative properties as well

Causal properties are relational properties

For the functionalist, mental properties are causal relations between mental states, stimuli, and behavior

Grain objection

"Of course if you classify mental properties coarsely and neural properties finely then it will turn out that mental kids arrant neural kinds" "But that's just an artifact of the way you chose to classify the properties" What are alternatives to the grain objection? 1. Characterize neural states more coarsely/abstractly 2. Characterize mental kinds more finely What IS the right way to classify mental and neural properties? Ultimately the psychofunctionalist and the mind-braid identity theorist agree: it's a broadly empirical question. The right way is in whatever way our developed mind and brain sciences do classify them

Main points about identity theory

- Physicalist view of the mind (consistent with physicalism; all properties are physical properties) - Causal efficacy: mental states are causally efficacious (and therefore exist -- causal efficacy refers to an agent's ability to cause something) - Reduction: for any mental property, there is a physical property with which it is necessarily identical (all mental properties can be reduced to physical properties). For example: Pain can be reduced to Periacqueductal gray activity. This applies virtually invariant correlations between pain and periacqueductal gray activity

All functionalists offer..

..."a relationship account of mental properties that abstracts them from the physical structure of their bearers."

Thinking is....

....rule governed manipulation of symbols in a way that respects their semantic properties but is causally sensitive to only their syntactic property

Why is it tempting to think that the mind contains representations?

1. Because we understand what activity in different regions of the brain represents 2. Because we can think about and experience things that aren't there 3. Because most natural systems carry information 4. Because animal behavior isn't directly caused by the external world, but by how animals take the world to be 5. Because mental representations might help us make sense of the fact that we apparently think about and experience things that can't be found in the brain

Why do functionalists like to say that brains are like computers?

1. Brains --> mental activities Computer software programs, operations Multiple realizability (different kinds of brains/physical systems can run the same mental processes) 2. Computers are special kinds of machines

Where should we get our theory of mind? 2 options

1. Folk psychology - "folk functionalism" 2. Scientific psychology - "psychofunctionalism" (Fodor)

3 key features of intentionality

1. Non-factivity (mental reps can be true or false...and what directly controls your behavior is how you take things to be - whether you do so rightly or wrongly) 2. Non-existential (in fact you can represent things that aren't present, that may not eve exist - and the specific contents of your representations) 3. Aspective (representing is always representing as: two people looking at the same thing can still see different things)

What is an algorithm,?

A purely mechanical means of calculating value of function; at each step, there is only ONE thing to do, no guesswork or insight required

What is a functional property?

A stage, process, or component of the object/system satisfying a particular causal role (doing a "job") EXAMPLE - Signaling left (in a car) - can be done with the blinker, can be done with you arm - Being a clock - digital clock, Big Ben, analogue clock (basically all clocks, if they tell time, regardless of what they're made of) - Being CEO Can be had by different objects/systems at the same time or different times Things that AREN'T functional properties: - being a cat - being water - being meatloaf

Supervenience physicalism

AKA STRONG token physicalism Denies property dualism Mental properties of the world are fixed by the physical properties of the world Rules out property dualism Supervene: (of a fact or property) be entailed by or consequent on the existence or establishment of another. A-properties supervene on B-properties iff: - The A-properties CANNOT change without a change in the B-properties, but - The B-properties CAN change without a change in the A-properties Ex: assume that moods supervene on neurotransmitter levels. I feel really depressed My mood couldn't change without a change in my neurotransmitter levels...but my neurotransmitter levels could undergo some change without changing my mood.

Property Dualism

AKA WEAK token physicalism Denies substance dualism

What is intentional psychology?

Any psychological theory or practice that explains behavior by appealing to discrete representational states. Note: Churchland is an eliminativist about intentional psychology generally

Ceramic knife

Ceramic (physical type) Tool (functional)

How is the mental functional?

Consider pain. Being in pain is associated with certain inputs and certain outputs, just like being a CEO. Typical inputs: tissue damage, pressure, extremes of temperature, etc Typical outputs: belief that one is in pain, anxiety, avoidance behavior, groaning, etc According to functionalists, any system that is disposed to respond to the above sorts of inputs with the above sorts of outputs is in pain!

What is original intentionality?

Content/meaning does NOT require an interpreter

SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONALISM AND PHYSICALISMS

DUALISM: - Central claim: relationship to immaterialism about the mind - Opposes a relationship to token physicalism about the mind - Opposes a relationship to type physicalism about the mind - Opposes a relationship to supervenient physicalism about the mind IDENTITY THEORY - Opposes a relationship to immaterialism about the mind - Entails a relationship to token physicalism about the mind - Central claim: relationship to type physicalism about the mind - Entails a relationship to supervenient physicalism about the mind FUNCTIONALISM - Compatible with the idea of there being a relationship to immaterialism about the mind - Compatible with the idea of there being a relationship to token physicalism about the mind - Opposed to the idea of there being a relationship to type physicalism about the mind - Compatible with the idea of there being a relationship to supervenient physicalism about the mind

Functional properties

Functional properties are abstract relative to physical properties Functionalitsts think that psychological properties are abstract

Thesis of the multiple realizability of the mental

Each mental kind could stand in relation R to multiple distinct physical kinds. Multiple distinct physical kinds could stand in relation R to the same mental mind. Suppose that every time someone says they're in pain, we observe PAG activity in their brain. Pain is connected to PAG by some relation R. What is R for the Cartesian Dualist? Bidirectional causal relationship What is R for the parallelist? Correlation What is R for the identity theorist? Identical For example. PAIN is the mental kind. It stands in relation R with PAG (in humans) and in relation R with SOP (in octopuses) If multiple distinct physical kinds could stand in relation R to the same mental kind, then relation R cannot be identity! Why? Because the identity is transitive. Rather, relation R is realization (or implementation) Note: If P1 and P2 both stand in relation R to M, and if P1 ≠ P2, then R ≠ identity. Pain is a causal property, not identical with any one physical property. The causal properties of different states of pain can be implemented by different physical systems. Note: pain is a causal property. Solubility is a causal property. Pain isn't the property of undergoing PAG activity or SOP activity. Solubility isn't the property of being NaCl. Casual properties are not identical with any one physical property. Parallelism rejects this, but identity theory and epiphenomenalism both accept it.

Who accepts this position: "There will be no successful scientific theory that inherits its core theoretical entities from folk psychology: no theory some of whose theoretical terms are intentional and phenomenal properties."

Eliminativist PS Fodor would object to it

What is ontological reductionism?

Entities of a given, "higher-level" kind, are nothing more than collection or arrangements of entities of a different, "lower-level" or more "basic" kind

Who accepts this position: "The only real (or instantiated) properties are those that figure in the laws of successful scientific theories"

Epistemological naturalists

What is token physicalism about the mind?

Every mental particular has some physical properties

Functionalism vs Physicalism

Functionalists tend to be strong token/supervenience physicalists Functionalism itself is nonetheless compatible with both substance dualism and property dualism! Because physical properties can supervene on different things. Also - All properties are fixed by but not identical with physical properties - Supervenience physicalism (says that all properties are determined or fixed by physical properties, NOT that all properties are physical properties!) is compatible with multiple realizability. Physical properties could change without mental properties changing....i.e. multiple physical properties are compatible with the same mental properties. Functionalism is only opposed to type physicalism!

What is a function?

Given particular inputs, only a single correct output

What do each of the 3 theorists think about the question of: will psychology reduce to neuroscience?

ID Theorists: YES (neuroscientists will find, in the brain, the mental states and processes folk psychologists have been talking about for millennia) Functionalists: it would be surprising (and no more than a coincidence) if so. But who cares? No one expects economics to reduce to physics, and no one thinks less of economics for it. Eliminativists: NO (folk psychology is a bad theory.....the things it posits inside us aren't really there)

Reminder: difference between intentional properties and phenomenal properties

Intentional properties - aboutness Phenomenal properties - the properties of your experience

What makes a bunch of instances (tokens) of feeling pain, all of the type PAIN?

Intuitively: all of those tokens have similar outputs / "symptoms" Now that we know Identity Theory: all of those tokens are of the same neural type The functionalist would answer that all of those tokens have pain effects: behavioral effects (crying out, wincing, avoidance behavior) and mental effects (nausea, anger).

Why is Identity Theory called the TYPE identity theory?

It holds that types of mental states have types physical states!

The special sciences; e.g. economics

It may be a law that, if you increase the supply of currency circulating in an economy, prices will rise

What is theoretical reductionism?

Laws of one theory (the "reduced", "higher-level" theory) can be expressed by laws of another theory (the "reducing," "basic" theory). The theoretical entities of the "higher-level" theory can be identified with (connected via "bridge laws" to) the theoretical entities of the more basic theory

"Who is Ariel?" analogy

Let's say that an actress, Wanda Peters, plays Ariel in a play. Realizer functionalists: Ariel is the person playing the Ariel role. Wanter Peters = Ariel. Why Wanda Peters? Because she's the one who does all the Ariel things. Role functionalists: Ariel is the Ariel role in The Little Mermaid. Wanda Peters acts in this role in performances of the play, but Wanda isn't the role, she just fills the role by doing all the Ariel-defining things.

Type Identity Theory vs Functionalism Physicalism

Many philosophers rejected type identity theory not for any form of dualism, but for a different kind of physicalism: TOKEN physicalism! This says that each mental token is identical with some physical token, but mental types are not physical types

Mental properties as abstract

Mental properties are causal properties

How do functionalists characterize mental kinds?

Mental states are states of systems. Each mental state gets its type identity from its relationships to other states of the system, and to inputs/stimuli and outputs/behavior...as specified by a theory.

Role Functionalism vs. Realizer Functionalism

Role functionalism about mental state S*: S* is the state of having some state Sx that has certain causal properties. In human beings, Sx is a brain state, Bx. So Bx realizes S*. Realizer functionalism about mental state S*: S* is the state that has certain causal properties. In human beings, the state that has the properties is a brain state, Bx. So Bx is S*.

Main points about Functionalism

Same as Identity theory: - Causal efficacy (mental states are causally efficacious, and therefore exist) - The mental as functional: for any mental property, there is a functional property with which it is necessarily identical - Consistent with physicalism: all properties are physical properties or ARE REALIZED BY PHYSICAL PROPERTIES Different from identity theory - Irreducibility: mental properties are distinct from physical properties - Multiple realizability: distinct physical properties can realize the same mental property

Functionalism is anti-reductionist

Scientific psychology cannot be reduced to neuroscience

Intentionality

The concepts of representation and intentional context are essential to functionalism. But it's not clear how states of the brain could REALLY have meaning (While symbols of a computer don't)

Where does the Identity theorist, functionalist, and eliminativist disagree?

The identity theorists thinks that Scientific Psychology will reduce to neuroscience The functionalist and eliminative disagree: Scientific Psychology won't reduce to neuroscience. The functionalist thinks that's to be expected: after all, economics doesn't reduce to physics, either. The eliminativist thinks that this is a bad sign for scientific psychology.

What is negative ontology?

The study or account of what things don't exist

Eliminativism

There is no need to scientifically explain either intentional or phenomenal properties...because intentional and phenomenal properties don't exist

Physicalist functionalists

They accept token identities between m tokens and n tokens!

Identity theorist, functionalist, and eliminativist on folk psychology

They all agree about the nature of folk psychology, that FOLK PSYCHOLOGY IS A THEORY. Because folk psychology is a theory, it is a candidate for theoretical reduction to a natural science: neuroscience Folk psychology contains laws relating mental states - the theoretical entities of folk psychology - to each other, and to stimuli and behavior, laws like: - A person who suffers a sudden sharp pain will wince - A person who is angry will tend to become generally impatient The identity theorist and the functionalist agree that we need a psychological theory that's better than folk psychology: we need a scientific psychological theory.

Computational Representational Theory of Thought

Thinking is computation over representation

Objection to Identity Theory from Multiple Realizability

This is an objection to Identity Theory from FELLOW PHYSICALISTS. Says that Identity Theory doesn't account for Multiple Realizability! Such as the multiple realizability of pain. Example: Periacqueductal gray activity realizes pain Localized octopus-brain activity realizes pain Localized ET brain-actitivty realizes pain Each of these physical properties realizes pain in virtue of being causally related to other physical properties in the right way

Is functionalism a physicalist theory?

This question is difficult to answer for two main reasons: 1. There are many proposed varieties of physicalism 2. Functionalism is compatible with most of them, but doesn't require any of them

Language of Thought hypothesis

Thoughts are sentences in a special language, a language of thought. These sentences are "written" in the brain: not in ink or lead, obviously, but in patterns of chemico-electrical activity

What does it mean to naturalize something?

To naturalize a phenomenon is to show that it is reducible to something explicable by the natural sciences. Note: intentional properties are difficult to naturalize

What are types?

Universals, properties, classes "Mental properties" and "mental kinds" are just other words for mental types

What is derived intentionality?

What a symbol has if it's having that intention/meaning requires an interpreter

Touch up on FODOR, CHURCHLAND, and DENNETT

What can science in general tell us about what exists? Note: Fodor & Churchland agree: if there is no developed scientific theory postulating mental properties ... Then mental properties aren't real

What makes a token of a given functional kind?

What it does

What makes a token of a given physical type?

What it's made of

Review of PHYSICALIST FUNCTIONALIST

Will folk psychology reduce to neuroscience? NO If folk psychology didn't reduce to neuroscience, would non-reduction imply that mental properties aren't instantiated by physical states or events inside us? NO If mental properties aren't instantiated by physical states or events...does that mean folk psychology is a bad theory? YES

Review of ELIMINATIVIST

Will folk psychology reduce to neuroscience? NO If folk psychology didn't reduce to neuroscience, would non-reduction imply that mental properties aren't instantiated by physical states or events inside us? Yes If mental properties aren't instantiated by physical states or events...does that mean folk psychology is a bad theory? YES

Review of IDENTITY THEORY

Will folk psychology reduce to neuroscience? YES If folk psychology didn't reduce to neuroscience, would non-reduction imply that mental properties aren't instantiated by physical states or events inside us? YES If mental properties aren't instantiated by physical states or events...does that mean folk psychology is a bad theory? YES

Functional properties are ABSTRACT relative to physical properties. Why abstract?

With abstraction comes generalizability and thus explanatory and predictive power.