Philosophy (Works)

A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful

1757; Burke; An Introduction on Taste: included as a response to Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste"; three powers--sensation, imagination, and judgment; sensation--laws of Taste are fixed; no man will say that tobacco is sweet even if he is addicted to it; palate can become vitiated, or preferences changed through habit (as tobacco or opium), but the actual tastes are still those of bitterness, even if pleasure accompanies them; imagination--brings great pleasure and pain but only a representative of the senses; copy principle; thus, there must be as great an agreement among the imaginations of men as there is among the sensations; Taste may depend on knowledge--one, never before having seen a sculpture, may be impressed by the first one sees; "so far as Taste is natural, it is nearly common to all"; no disagreement until we compare things, like the relative smoothness of two pieces of marble; Taste is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty, concerning the various relations of these; sensibility and judgment form "taste"

Of the Standard of Taste

1757; Hume; Of the Standard of Taste was a seminal essay on aesthetics that is innovative because it requires Hume to address the apparent relativity of taste, a conclusion that appears to follow from his own assumption that the "good" or "beauty" of a good work of art is identical with the positive human responses it generates. The essay's focus on the subject (the viewer, the reader) rather than the object (the painting, the book) is typical of the British "sentimentalists" or moral sense theorists of the eighteenth century. Unlike the French philosophers of the eighteenth century, who sought an objective definition of beauty, the British school tended to look for the connections between taste and aesthetic judgments. Summary[edit] Hume begins with the observation that there is much variety in people's taste (or the aesthetic judgments people make). However, Hume argues that there is a common mechanism in human nature that gives rise to, and often even provides justification for, such judgments. He takes this aesthetic sense to be quite similar to the moral sense for which he argues in his Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740) and in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). Furthermore, he argues that this still leaves room for the ability to refine one's aesthetic palate. (Fieser, 2006, §2) Hume took as his premise that the great diversity and disagreement regarding matters of taste had two basic sources - sentiment, which was to some degree naturally varying, and critical facility, which could be cultivated. Each person is a combination of these of two sources, and Hume endeavours to delineate the admirable qualities of a critic, that they might augment their natural sense of beauty into a reliable faculty of judgment. There are a variety of qualities of the good critic that he describes, each of which contributes to an ultimately reliable and just ability to judge.

An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation

1789; Bentham; lacks a proof; epistemological problems; Chapter 1: pain and pleasure are all that dictate morality and action, and so law and government; principle of utility: "that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question"--applies to individual and to government; abide by principle of utility when actions augment happiness of community; needless to provide chain of proofs; list of questions clarifying why one would disagree with principle Chapter IV: pleasures and avoidance of pains are objects of legislator; ought to consider 1. intensity 2. duration 3. certainty or uncertainty 4. propinquity or remoteness; 5. fecundity (); 6. purity (); 7. number of people affected; when operating government, run moral calculus on who is likely to be affected and what the sum of pain and pleasure is likely to be; no need to do this with every action, but should be end in sight; not a novel insight; verse at end for help in remembrance of principles Chapter XV: goal of government to avoid evil; punishment for crime necessarily evil—only ought to be admitted if it prevents some greater evil; must not be groundless (having no mischief to prevent), inefficacious (cannot prevent mischief), unprofitable (producing greater mischief than it would prevent), or needless (where mischief may be prevented without it or at cheaper rate); no punishment when: consent given with all parties; net good increased; ex-post-facto law; person reasonably not informed of law; would not prevent future crime, as with infancy, insanity, and intoxication; instruction could be used; immediate principle end of all punishment to control action--either of offenders or others

Foundations of the Science of Knowledge

1795; Fichte;

Science of Logic

1817; Hegel;

The World as Will and Representation

1818; Schopenhauer;

The Philosophy of Right

1820; Hegel;

The Philosophy of History

1837; Hegel;

Either/Or

1843; Kierkegaard;

Fear and Trembling

1843; Kierkegaard; pseudonymous author, Johannes de Silentio--John the Silent or John of Silence; Kierkegaard wrote dissertation on irony--John the Silent writing whole book; epigraph: 'What Tarquinius Superbus said in the garden by means of the poppise, the son understood but the messenger did not'--father wants son to slaughter enemy; indirect communication low opinion of culture/people the aesthetic; the ethical; the religious Either/Or concerns difference aesthetic and ethical with figure of Don Juan; Fear and Trembling concerns difference between ethical and religious A. not tragic hero; tragic heroes comprehensible; A.--paradox, anxiety, passion, silence; tragic hero can speak A. higher than universal Williams concept of responsibility: 1. being cause of an action 2. doing it intentionally 3. one's state when one did it, e.g. intoxicated, maddened 4. one's response *content:* Preface: discusses modern world's cavalier attitude toward doubt and faith--everyone unwilling to stop with doubt, as if doubt easily attained; Descartes attained doubt, but only through long and difficult process; Greek skeptics considered doubt to take a lifetime to acquire; people want to start at this point, the point Descartes attained only by denying himself everything; everyone unwilling to stop with faith, but wants to go further, as if faith itself were something easily attained; faith once considered a task for a lifetime--people today assume they have it, since they all want to go further; Johannes confesses he is not a philosopher--he does not understand the system; points out that even if faith were put into conceptual form, the system could not help us understand it, how it comes to us, or how we come to it; he not tied to system in any way--writes because writing to him is a luxury, more so the fewer readers he has; imagines he'll be ignored, and that the few critics will disdain him; he fears even more that someone will attempt to make sense of his writing by carefully dissecting and systematizing it; pleads with this "enterprising abstracter": this is not the system, nor can it be divided up in such a clinical manner Exordium: tells story of man who deeply admires story of Abraham in Genesis 22, admiring it more and more as he grows older, but understanding it less and less; man wants to witness event to understand how A. did what he did; man ponders four possible scenarios, each accompanied by an analogy to a mother weaning her child; first: A. explains to Isaac that he to be sacrificed, but then pretends to be homicidal psychopath, so son will blame A., not God, for death, and not lose faith in God; man draws analogy to mother blackening her breast to wean child: breast changes, but mother remains same; second: A. did what God told him to do, but reluctantly and uncomprehendingly; forever after, A. changed--unable to feel joy; man draws analogy to mother concealing her breast so child feels it no longer has a mother to draw milk from; third: A. assumes God testing him in different way, to see how dearly he loves his son; A. rides alone to Mount Moriah and begs God's forgiveness for having even considered sacrificing Isaac; man points out that both mother and child mourn over the weaning, as child will never be closer to mother than to her breast; fourth: everything goes as planned, but Isaac sees at last moment that A. clenches knife in despair; forever after, Isaac's faith lost; man remarks that when a mother must wean her child, she has more solid food at hand to feed child; Johannes tells us that man ponders these and many other scenarios, never managing fully to understand Abraham Preliminary Expectoration/Eulogy on Abraham: begins by reflecting on saying "only one who works earns bread"--not true of unjust, external world, but true in world of spirit; we all know A. is great and think this sufficient, yet very few of us willing to do necessary work to understand his story; A. did more than a merchant would do in giving up his money: A. felt anxiety from ethical obligation to son; imagines case of a man, who, hearing a preacher praise A.'s sacrifice, returns home planning to kill his son: man only following words of preacher; preacher failed to convey what made A. great and so condoned this man's behavior; ethical expression of A.'s behavior is that he tried to murder Isaac; religious expression of his behavior that he tried to sacrifice I.; any murderer can emulate A. on ethical level, but to emulate him on a religious level requires faith; if he were to speak about A., J. would first say A. was God-fearing, otherwise God would not have tested him; second, would describe in detail love Abraham had for Isaac, a love far greater than usual love between father and son; third, would note that Abraham was free at every moment to change mind and not sacrifice Isaac; fourth, Johannes would remark that he himself not a man of faith, and though he can speak about A., he could not emulate him; complains no one praises faith; we assume having faith easy compared to doing philosophy, but J. can understand Hegel but not A.; philosophy not faith, nor can it give us faith, nor convince us faith worthless; J. not man of faith and would not have behaved as A.; would be capable of following God's command, but would also think "all is lost" and be sad he has to sacrifice son; would resign himself to fate, but resignation would simply be substitute for faith; further, if he loved his son as A. had, would not have gone in first place; lastly, if he had done as God had said and received I. back at last minute, could never overcome pain of experience and would have trouble being happy with I.; characterizes A. as having faith "by virtue of the absurd": no room for calculation or logic in A.'s faith or God's behavior; A.'s faith takes us step beyond infinite resignation required to give up I.; by virtue of finite double movement of faith, A. gives up I. entirely only to regain him; A.'s story can only teach amazement; people who think they understand story and can be moved to faith by it have misunderstood it and failed to make first movement of resignation, let alone the double movement of faith; A. is paradox from which we cannot derive worldly wisdom; J. has never met a knight of faith, but would not know such a man if he saw one; outwardly, KF just like everyone else: simple, philistine, and bourgeois, showing no sign of infinitude or sorrow; because he has made infinite leap of faith and regained finite, able fully to delight in finite pleasures; compares KF to ballet dancer who can leap and land on ground all while maintaining a particular posture; most of us cling to joys and passions of world--don't bother to involve ourselves in dance; "knight of infinite resignation" leaps beautifully, but awkward in landing--detached himself from grounded world of sensory pleasure; slave of finite v. KIR v. KF--story; man in love with a princess, but union impossible: slave of finite would scream, unable to stand gulf between himself and his desires; KIR would never give up on his love--substance of his life, so allows it to fill him entirely; sees love will never be realized, makes movement of infinity, which requires passion, not reflection; does not forget his love--contradiction to forget substance of one's life; instead, recollects his love; recollection is precisely of pain of denied fulfillment, but through resignation he is reconciled with pain, himself, and eternal consciousness: expresses spiritually what is impossible for him in finite world; she will remain the same to him no matter what she does--if she marries, if he never sees her again--since he keeps her alive to himself in recollection; KIR wholly self-sufficient; if his princess keeps him also in recollection the two will remain spiritually true to one another for eternity; everyone capable of recollection, but must be done with passion; KF behaves similarly in infinitely renouncing his love and reconciling himself to pain; goes one step further and says: "Nevertheless I have faith that I will get her--that is, by virtue of the absurd, by virtue of the fact that for God all things are possible"; impossible to understanding--resigned to that fact--but faith beyond the understanding, and knight has faith; unless resignation antecedent, faith might be confused with aesthetic; infinite resignation takes strength, energy, courage, and spiritual freedom, but anyone can do it; one renounces finite and temporal, thereby gaining eternal consciousness; next movement beyond infinite resignation, by which one regains everything by virtue of the absurd, is incomprehensible; while KIR renounces finite to gain infinite, KF regains finite as well Problema 1: "Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?"; defines the ethical as the universal, as applying to all at all times; ethical is telos, or end goal, of everything outside itself--no telos beyond ethical; telos of individual to become part of universal by annulling his singularity; notes that if ethical is highest we can aspire to, Hegel right in calling individual a "moral form of evil," but wrong not to condemn A. as a murderer; faith is paradox that individual can rise above universal; if this not the case, A. is lost and faith has never existed, "precisely because it has always existed"; faith is a category impervious to thought--cannot be mediated; mediation takes place by virtue of universal; faith above universal; A.'s ethical relationship with I. is that father should love son more than himself; does not follow this ethical principle--not a tragic hero, either murderer or KF; presents three examples of fathers sacrificing children without moving beyond ethical; Agamemnon sacrificed daughter Iphigenia so Greeks could win Trojan War; Jephthah sacrificed daughter because he promised God a sacrifice if he should defeat Ammonites; and Junius Brutus put sons to death for plotting against state; these fathers kill children for good of their people as a whole, and can thus be understood and wept for as THs; A. not related to universal: his is private matter between himself and God; acts only for God's sake (God demands a proof of faith) and for his own sake (to prove his faith), which are one and the same; A. experiences temptation, but temptation is ethical itself, that which might hold him back from duty to God; need for category of the religious; because speech expresses universal, A. can't speak about his ordeal, nor be understood or wept for as TH; might arouse admiration, but also appalls us, since he sins according to ethical; paradox: places himself, as a single individual, in absolute relation to the absolute--not justified by anything universal, but precisely by being a single individual; deed made heroic not by results but by origins and motives that shaped it; A. cannot be justified by result--got I. back--and so can't be understood as hero; to judge greatness qua results to pass over all the anxiety, distress, and paradox involved in deed itself; Mary was also great, since her suffering was personal--had to give birth to God, yet could not speak about it to anyone; we may not understand faith, but not excluded from it; faith a passion, and passion unites all human lives Problema II: "Is there an absolute duty to God?"; again defines ethical as universal--associates with divine and duty to God; every duty one to God insofar as God is the divine is the universal; may be my duty to love my neighbor, and this duty, as an ethical duty, is a duty to the universal and thus to God; but we have no direct relation to God through these duties, only an indirect relation according to which our duties may be traced back to God; Hegel: outer, or exteriority, higher than the inner, as what is outer is publicly expressed, is universal; if so, H. wrong to speak about faith and A. as he does; faith is that paradox that the inner is higher than the outer, that the single individual can relate absolutely to the absolute as a single individual; though not invalidated, ethical becomes relative, and individual's absolute duty is to God; this duty to God, as absolute, cannot be mediated and thus cannot be expressed in universal: if expressible, it would not be faith but spiritual trial; KF cannot make himself understandable, not even to another KF; cites Luke 14:26 as teaching an absolute duty to God: "If any one comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple"; "hate" is often softened to "love less" or "count as nothing"; translation renders something terrible and vigorous into overblown nonsense about being less good to other people; God does not demand we stop loving our family; A. loves I. dearly, but ethical expression of what he does at Mount Moriah is hatred; existing as individual is often considered easy, so universal more laudable goal; if one lives properly under own surveillance, if one speaks with "fear and trembling," one knows existing as individual is most terrible and greatest existence there is; KF must know and value universal, but also know what it's like to be higher than universal, to be alone and misunderstood; A. not seem heroic to others--he seemed mad; KF can address God in second person singular ("thou"), while the TH can only use third person; TH's lot not as difficult as KF's; TH can act, and then is finished, and can rest, knowing that he has achieved universal; KF constantly being tested, and faced with possibility of returning to universal KF distinguished by having passion to remain always in absolute isolation; is an absolute duty to God as he explained it, or not and A. is lost and Luke 14:26 is overblown nonsense Problema III: "Was it ethically defensible for A. to conceal his undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from I.?"; ethical is universal--disclosed; in contrast, individual is hidden; unlike Greek tragedy, which is blind, and thus unaware of its hiddenness, modern drama has become reflective and sees itself; hiddenness no longer a result of hero's ignorance, but is rather hero's free act; relates stories to distinguish between disclosed (ethical), and hidden (aesthetic and religious); first tells of a man and woman in love, but woman married off to another man--keep love a secret; hiddenness is free act, making them responsible to aesthetics, which demands hiddenness, but also rewards it by coincidentally working things out for them; ethics, however, has no room for coincidence--demands disclosure and is offended they should take responsibility for a secret; Euripides' Iphigenia at Aulis--Agamemnon had to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia; aesthetics demands his silence since it unseemly for him to seek comfort in sharing sorrow, yet demands disclosure so he may endure spiritual trial of seeing daughter weep at news; aesthetics provides an outlet in having an old servant tell Iph.; ethics demands disclosure because, as TH, Ag. wedded to universal and keeps nothing hidden; TH and ethical are thoroughly human; Amor and Psyche--Amor impregnated Psyche; Psyche told that if she kept pregnancy secret her child would be divine, but if not, then human; disclosure and TH both human phenomena; hiddenness is realm of demonic and divine; Poetics--bridegroom who consults Oracle and told that he will suffer a calamity in his marriage; three options: first, could remain silent and marry, but would be implicating her in his own disaster by making her partially responsible for the disaster; second, could remain silent and not marry, as aesthetics sanctions, but would be offense to girl and reality of her love; third, could speak up, as ethics sanctions, as he would value disclosure over trying to conceal fate out of concern for girl; can go no further than TH found in the 3rd since prophecy is not a private matter between bridegroom and the god: if he speaks, he will be understood. If he remains silent, it is only because he wants to have an absolute relation to the universal as a single individual. Had the prophecy been a private affair, he couldn't speak because he wouldn't be understood. As a result, the knight of faith finds inner peace, but the aesthetic hero is constantly disturbed by the demands of the ethical. Johannes launches a lengthy discussion of the story of Agnes and the merman. In his version, the merman seduces Agnes and is about to bring her back with him into the sea, but sees humility and faith in her eyes. Unable to violate this innocence, he returns her to her home instead. As in the other examples, the merman has the choice between hiddenness and disclosure. Hiddenness consists in repentance, but this repentance leaves both himself and Agnes unhappy. Agnes genuinely loves him, so she will be unhappy at being deprived of him. He will be unhappy because he also loves Agnes, and because he will be burdened with the new guilt of making her unhappy. Johannes suggests that he might surrender to the demonic element in repentance and try to save Agnes by deceiving her and making her no longer love him. In surrendering to the demonic, the merman becomes the single individual who, as a single individual, is higher than the universal. There are two possibilities according to which the merman could be rescued from the demonic in repentance. On one hand, he can remain hidden and have faith that the divine will save Agnes. On the other hand, he can allow himself to be saved by Agnes and marry Agnes. This movement involves a paradox somewhat similar to Abraham's. The merman's guilt has brought him to make the movement of repentance, which brings him higher the universal. To return to the universal, then, he must make a further movement, by virtue of the absurd, since he cannot return to the universal by his own power. Johannes next turns to the book of Tobit, which tells of Tobias who wants to marry Sarah, whose seven previous husbands have been killed on the wedding night by the demon that loves her. Johannes suggests that the real hero of the story is not Tobias, for having the courage to marry a woman with such a past, but Sarah, for allowing herself to be healed of this past. She is willing to accept the responsibility for Tobias' fate, and she has faith that, if Tobias survives, she won't grow to resent or hate him for being so deeply in his debt. A woman in her position has to endure a great deal of sympathy, and sympathy is a kind of humiliation. Sarah is naturally outside the universal by virtue of being in unique circumstances, and so is naturally in the paradox: she can choose either the demonic or the divine. The demonic expresses itself as contempt for others and hatred of sympathy (as we find in Shakespeare's Richard III . The divine expresses itself in Sarah's faith. Abraham is not an aesthetic hero, since aesthetics demands that he remain silent in order to save someone. In fact, his silence is not meant to save Isaac, but is rather a way of concealing his intention to kill Isaac. Nor is Abraham a tragic hero, since the ethical would demand disclosure. Since he is neither an aesthetic hero nor a tragic hero, Abraham is either higher than the ethical or he is lost. Unlike the tragic hero, Abraham cannot speak and cannot be understood. At any moment he can stop it all and speak, but then his ordeal becomes merely a spiritual trial. There is no way he can explain that the ethical itself is his temptation, nor can he explain the movement of faith. Who would understand that he is planning to kill Isaac, but that he has faith that he will get Isaac back by virtue of the absurd? Genesis attributes only one speech to Abraham on the journey to Mount Moriah. Isaac asks his father why he has no burnt offering, and Abraham simply replies: "God himself will provide the lamb for the burnt offering, my son." These words prompt Johannes to launch a discussion of the value of last words. He suggests that a tragic hero whose heroism lies in action does not need last words: it's unnecessary chatter that distracts from his actions. The intellectual tragic hero on the other hand needs last words: these words are the culmination of his life, the words that make him immortal. A. and intellectual TH have same orientation toward spirit; father of faith--A. needs to say something; yet, per paradox, he cannot; if A. to answer I. with truth of sacrifice, he would be giving up everything; if he to tell Isaac at all he should have done so long before. To say "I don't know" would be a lie, and dishonest. His answer, however, is not a lie, nor is it disclosure. Abraham employs irony, the tool that allows one both to say something and to say nothing. Abraham's answer is not a lie, since, by virtue of the absurd, it is possible that God will provide a lamb, but at the same time, Abraham has made the movement of resignation and he fully intends to sacrifice Isaac. Abraham speaks, but his speech is not understood; reasserts final time that either A. the father of faith and stands above ethical in absolute relation to absolute that cannot be communicated, or A. lost Epilogue: returns once more to assertion that faith is not enough, and that we must go further; suggests that no generation learns essentially human from previous generation: something it must learn on its own; the essentially human is passion, and that with passion we all must begin primitively: we cannot learn love from previous generation, pick up where they left off, and go further; highest passion of all is faith, and with regard to faith we all begin at same place, and no one can go further than faith

The Concept of Anxiety

1844; Kierkegaard;

The Ego and Its Own

1844; Stirner;

The Communist Manifesto

1848; Marx;

On Liberty

1859; Mill;

Utilitarianism

1863; Mill; Bentham not wrong in principle, but other principles supersede them; actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by happiness, pain and the privation of pleasure against intuitionists--"principles of morals are evident a priori" utilitarian--a posteriori agree on moral laws, disagree on evidence and source of authority danger of intuitionism is that is rest on no 'external standard'--enables people to ratify their own prejudices as moral principles Mill's Amendments: 1. puts forth a conception of happiness that is far richer than Bentham's struct calculus of pleasures and pains 2. shows how a principle of utility might be used to ground familiar moral concepts e.g. rights New defenses: Counter against criticism informational requirements being too high--been using these rules for centuries, we just amend them when we find they're wrong Counter against concern that PU itself is unproven takes issue with hedonistic conception of happiness--"doctrine of swine"; does not differentiate between different pleasures treats bodily pleasures equal with others; bodily pleasures easier to obtain that intellectual ones--prioritizes bodily pleasures distinguishes between higher and lower pleasures; assigns greater weight to higher pleasures--tend to have "greater permanency" and "safety" higher one--non-substitutable unquestionable that pleasures that employ one's tiger faculties will be rated superior what does Mill actually count as good? seems to assert PU above perfectionist?--things only good insofar as they exercise the higher faculties undermines egalitarianism of utilitarianism? maximize happiness of elite? Singer: suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad if it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so tryna make a perfect duty out of an imperfect duty? impartiality taken seriously--proximity and distance do not matter diminishing marginal utility of money over-demandingness? utilitarian demands threaten to offend against a requirement of psychological realism--acceptable moral theory must be ones that can be incorporated in to a reasonable and satisfying life plans special obligations to parents/children/family/promisee etc.?

Das Kapital

1867/1885/1894;

The Subjection of Women

1869; Mill/Mill;

The Methods of Ethics

1874; Sedgwick;

Thus Spoke Zarathustra

1885; 1891; Nietzsche;

Beyond Good and Evil

1886; Nietzsche;

Confessions

397 CE; Augustine of Hippo;

Consolation of Philosophy

500 CE; Boethius;

Organon

Aristotle;

Physics

Aristotle;

Politics

Aristotle;

Rhetoric

Aristotle;

Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle; FIX

Poetics

Aristotle; comedy is golden mean of emotions; humans reach well-being by fulfilling our uniquely human activities; mimesis = blind imitation or representation; art is safe arena for emotions; tragic shudder from outline of story; FIX

Of Slavery

Bentham; it is slavery "if the obligation of service be unlimited in point of duration"; one to one ratio of slave to master--perhaps net evil and net good equal; numbers never equal though--net evil considerable; slaves produce less--absence of stimulus of reward and insecurity of their condition; fix a price at which every slave shall have the right to purchase his freedom; free a tenth of the slaves every generation?; emancipation ought to take place by families, rather than by individuals; laves will eventually become free—society moving toward liberty

The Courtier

Castiglione;

The Republic (Cicero)

Cicero; FIX

Guide for the Perplexed

Maimonides;

Mishnah Torah

Maimonides;

On the Dignity of Man

Mirandola; FIX

The Birth of Tragedy

Nietzsche;

On Nature

Parmenides;

Symposium

Plato; both philosophy and poetry are pursuit of love; object of love is to possess the good forever; means is to give birth in beauty; ladder of love--ascent toward knowledge of beauty; knowledge of beauty central to knowledge of virtue presented Aristophanes charitably, better than tragic poet; FIX

Euthyphro

Plato; FIX

Gorgias

Plato; FIX

Meno

Plato; FIX

Parmenides

Plato; FIX

Phaedrus

Plato; FIX

Protagoras

Plato; FIX

Crito

Plato; The dialogue takes place in Socrates' prison cell, where he awaits execution. He is visited before dawn by his old friend Crito, who has made arrangements to smuggle Socrates out of prison to the safety of exile. Socrates seems quite willing to await his imminent execution, and so Crito presents as many arguments as he can in order to persuade Socrates to escape. On a practical level, Socrates' death will reflect badly on his friends--people will think they did nothing to try to save him. Also, Socrates should not worry about the risk or the financial cost to his friends; these they are willing to pay, and they have also arranged to find Socrates a pleasant life in exile. On a more ethical level, Crito presents two more pressing arguments: first, if he stayed, he would be aiding his enemies in wronging him unjustly, and would thus be acting unjustly himself; and second, that he would be abandoning his sons and leaving them without a father. Socrates answers first that one should not worry about public opinion, but only listen to wise and expert advice. Crito should not worry about how his, Socrates', or others' reputations may fare in the general esteem: they should only concern themselves with behaving well. The only question at hand is whether or not it would be just for Socrates to attempt an escape. If it is just, he will go with Crito, if it is unjust, he must remain in prison and face death. At this point, Socrates introduces the voice of the Laws of Athens, which speaks to him and proceeds to explain why it would be unjust for him to leave his cell. Since the Laws exist as one entity, to break one would be to break them all, and in doing so, Socrates would cause them great harm. The citizen is bound to the Laws like a child is bound to a parent, and so to go against the Laws would be like striking a parent. Rather than simply break the Laws and escape, Socrates should try to persuade the Laws to let him go. These Laws present the citizen's duty to them in the form of a kind of social contract. By choosing to live in Athens, a citizen is implicitly endorsing the Laws, and is willing to abide by them. Socrates, more than most, should be in accord with this contract, as he has lived a happy seventy years fully content with the Athenian way of life. If Socrates were to break from prison now, having so consistently validated the social contract, he would be making himself an outlaw who would not be welcome in any other civilized state for the rest of his life. And when he dies, he will be harshly judged in the underworld for behaving unjustly toward his city's laws. Thus, Socrates convinces Crito that it would be better not to attempt an escape. Crito's argument to Socrates[edit] The dialogue begins with Socrates waking up to the presence of Crito in his prison cell and inquiring whether it is early in the day.[1] Crito informs Socrates that it is indeed early and that he, Crito, chose to let Socrates sleep in peace, especially given Socrates' current distressful circumstance of awaiting his own execution. Crito explains that he admires the peaceful manner in which Socrates has heretofore lived and the level of calm that Socrates displays in the face of death. Socrates replies that it is only fitting that he react in such a manner given his age, and expresses surprise that the guard has let Crito into his cell at such an early hour. Crito informs Socrates that he is well-acquainted with the guard and has done him a certain benefaction. Crito relays bad news to Socrates. He tells him that there are eyewitness reports that the ship has come in from Delos, and that tomorrow Socrates will be executed. Socrates rebuffs the report, saying he has had a dream—a vision of a woman in a white cloak telling him that on the third day hence he will go to Phthia, which is a reference to Achilles' threat in the Iliad that he—the mightiest of Greek warriors—might just leave for his home in "fertile" Phthia and be there in "just three days" if the Greeks fail to show him due respect. Socrates says that the meaning of this is perfectly clear - it will be three days until he dies. Crito does not allow Socrates to elaborate the meaning of the dream, but only calls him daimonic; Crito has arrived at this early hour to save Socrates from death. Crito tells Socrates that if he follows through with the execution, people will assume that Crito and friends were too cheap to finance an escape. Crito insists that he will not get into much trouble as a result of having helped Socrates escape, for those who would inform against him are cheaply bought. He adds that if Socrates is afraid of depleting Crito's account, there are foreigners (ξένοι), Simmias and Cebes, who have come to town with money. Moreover, Crito urges, Socrates has support in other cities, including Thessaly, and to be exiled would not be entirely negative. Crito continues with moral appeals. He says that Socrates would be unjustly joining the efforts of his enemies against him. He is choosing the "easiest path" as opposed to the courageous, honorable, and virtuous path, which Crito feels is to flee from certain, unjust death. Socrates would be acting with cowardice if he weren't to resist such injustices. Crito further argues that a father (like Socrates) has an obligation to nurture and educate his children and should avoid orphaning them if at all possible. He tells Socrates that if his sons do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, it will be no thanks to him. Crito adds that the trial should never have taken place and might have been managed differently. He says that the failure to escape will be a ridiculous climax to the whole affair and would be attributed to the shameful cowardice of Socrates' friends.[2] Socrates' responses[edit] Socrates tells Crito that he is one of those people who must be guided by reason, while Crito has insisted that he be obeyed in this matter regardless of whether he has convinced Socrates. Socrates claims that he was serious at his trial about not fearing death. He expresses contempt for the opinions of the masses of mankind who think irrationally and act randomly. Socrates says that the only person whose opinion is of value is the one who understands justice.[3] Money, reputation and feeding children are values of thoughtless men.[4] The question is whether it would be unjust for Socrates to escape, not what people would think about him. Socrates argues that if it is never good to do injustice, then certainly it is never good to do injustice in response to injustice. He says that this premise will be taken as true for the purpose of their discussion.[5] Crito says he agrees with Socrates. This does not answer whether it is just or unjust for Socrates to escape from the prison, so Socrates asks what the Laws would say about his leaving. Socrates claims that the Laws would say that he destroys the city in leaving, and that this would be unjust. The Laws say that a citizen stands in relation to the city as the child does to the parent, as the slave does to his master. The Laws would further say, Socrates says, that he entered into a contract with them by remaining within the city, benefiting from it, and so now cannot justly attack it on account of having been unjustly convicted. Socrates says the laws argue that he tacitly agreed to obey the law by remaining in Athens after having reached maturity, witnessing the structure of the law and how it functions, and raising children of his own in Athens. Socrates does not declare that he is satisfied with the Laws' argument, instead asking Crito whether they mustn't accept it. Crito says they must, and so the dialogue comes to a conclusion.

Phaedo

Plato; The scene is set in Phlius where Echecrates who, meeting Phaedo, asks for news about the last days of Socrates. Phaedo explains why a delay occurred between his trial and his death, and describes the scene in a prison at Athens on the final day, naming those present. He tells how he had visited Socrates early in the morning with the others. Socrates' wife Xanthippe was there, but was very distressed and Socrates asked that she be taken away. Socrates' relates how, bidden by a recurring dream to "make and cultivate music", he wrote a hymn and then began writing poetry based on Aesop's Fables.[3] Socrates tells Cebes to "bid him (his friend) farewell from me; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man" Simmias expresses confusion as to why they ought hasten to follow Socrates to death. Socrates then states "...he, who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to die; but he will not take his own life." Cebes raises his doubts as to why suicide is prohibited. He asks, "Why do you say...that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow one who is dying?" Socrates replies that while death is the ideal home of the soul, man, specifically the philosopher, should not commit suicide except when it becomes necessary.[4] Man ought not to kill himself because he possesses no actual ownership of himself, as he is actually the property of the gods. He says, "I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we men are a chattel of theirs". While the philosopher seeks always to rid himself of the body, and to focus solely on things concerning the soul, to commit suicide is prohibited as man is not sole possessor of his body. For, as stated in the Phaedo: "the philosopher more than other men frees the soul from association with the body as much as possible". Body and soul are separate, then. The philosopher frees himself from the body because the body is an impediment to the attainment of truth.[5] Of the senses' failings, Socrates says to Simmias in the Phaedo: Did you ever reach them (truths) with any bodily sense? -- and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and, in short, of the reality or true nature of everything. Is the truth of them ever perceived through the bodily organs? Or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing he considers?[6] The philosopher, if he loves true wisdom and not the passions and appetites of the body, accepts that he can come closest to true knowledge and wisdom in death, as he is no longer confused by the body and the senses. In life, the rational and intelligent functions of the soul are restricted by bodily senses of pleasure, pain, sight, and sound. [7] Death, however, is a rite of purification from the "infection" of the body. As the philosopher practices death his entire life, he should greet it amicably and not be discouraged upon its arrival, for, since the universe the Gods created for us in life is essentially "good," why would death be anything but a continuation of this goodness? Death is a place where better and wiser Gods rule and where the most noble souls exist: "And therefore, so far as that is concerned, I not only do not grieve, but I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead..., something better for the good than for the wicked."[8] The soul attains virtue when it is purified from the body: "He who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements when they associate with the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge--who, if not he, is likely to attain to the knowledge of true being?"[9] The Cyclical Argument[edit] Cebes voices his fear of death to Socrates: "...they fear that when she [the soul] has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end immediately on her release from the body...dispersing and vanishing away into nothingness in her flight." [10] In order to alleviate Cebes' worry that the soul might perish at death, Socrates introduces his first argument for the immortality of the soul. This argument is often called the Cyclical Argument. It supposes that the soul must be immortal since the living come from the dead. Socrates says: "Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again?". He goes on to show, using examples of relationships, such as asleep-awake and hot-cold, that things that have opposites come to be from their opposite. One falls asleep after having been awake. And after being asleep, he awakens. Things that are hot can become cold and vice versa. Socrates then gets Cebes to conclude that the dead are generated from the living, through death, and that the living are generated from the dead, through birth. The souls of the dead must exist in some place for them to be able to return to life.[11] The Theory of Recollection Argument[edit] Cebes realizes the relationship between the Cyclical Argument and Socrates' Theory of Recollection. He interrupts Socrates to point this out, saying: ...your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that our learning is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had been somewhere before existing in this form of man; here then is another proof of the soul's immortality.[12] Socrates' second argument, the Theory of Recollection, shows that it is possible to draw information out of a person who seems not to have any knowledge of a subject prior to his being questioned about it (a priori knowledge). This person must have gained this knowledge in a prior life, and is now merely recalling it from memory. Since the person in Socrates' story is able to provide correct answers to his interrogator, it must be the case that his answers arose from recollections of knowledge gained during a previous life.[13] The Affinity Argument[edit] Socrates presents his third argument for the immortality of the soul, the so-called Affinity Argument, where he shows that the soul most resembles that which is invisible and divine, and the body resembles that which is visible and mortal. From this, it is concluded that while the body may be seen to exist after death in the form of a corpse, as the body is mortal and the soul is divine, the soul must outlast the body.[14] As to be truly virtuous during life is the quality of a great man who will perpetually dwell as a soul in the underworld. However, regarding those who were not virtuous during life, and so favored the body and pleasures pertaining exclusively to it, Socrates also speaks. He says that such a soul as this is: ...polluted, is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always and is in love with and bewitched by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see, and drink and eat, and use for the purposes of his lusts, the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, but is the object of mind and can be attained by philosophy; do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?[15] Persons of such a constitution will be dragged back into corporeal life, according to Socrates. These persons will even be punished while in Hades. Their punishment will be of their own doing, as they will be unable to enjoy the singular existence of the soul in death because of their constant craving for the body. These souls are finally "imprisoned in another body". Socrates concludes that the soul of the virtuous man is immortal, and the course of its passing into the underworld is determined by the way he lived his life. The philosopher, and indeed any man similarly virtuous, in neither fearing death, nor cherishing corporeal life as something idyllic, but by loving truth and wisdom, his soul will be eternally unperturbed after the death of the body, and the afterlife will be full of goodness.[16] Simmias confesses that he does not wish to disturb Socrates during his final hours by unsettling his belief in the immortality of the soul, and those present are reluctant to voice their skepticism. Socrates grows aware of their doubt and assures his interlocutors that he does indeed believe in the soul's immortality, regardless of whether or not he has succeeded in showing it as yet. For this reason, he is not upset facing death and assures them that they ought to express their concerns regarding the arguments. Simmias then presents his case that the soul resembles the harmony of the lyre. It may be, then, that as the soul resembles the harmony in its being invisible and divine, once the lyre has been destroyed, the harmony too vanishes, therefore when the body dies, the soul too vanishes. Once the harmony is dissipated, we may infer that so too will the soul dissipate once the body has been broken, through death.[17] Socrates pauses, and asks Cebes to voice his objection as well. He says, "I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been...proven; but the existence of the soul after death is in my judgment unproven." While admitting that the soul is the better part of a man, and the body the weaker, Cebes is not ready to infer that because the body may be perceived as existing after death, the soul must therefore continue to exist as well. Cebes gives the example of a weaver. When the weaver's cloak wears out, he makes a new one. However, when he dies, his more freshly woven cloaks continue to exist. Cebes continues that though the soul may outlast certain bodies, and so continue to exist after certain deaths, it may eventually grow so weak as to dissolve entirely at some point. He then concludes that the soul's immortality has yet to be shown and that we may still doubt the soul's existence after death. For, it may be that the next death is the one under which the soul ultimately collapses and exists no more. Cebes would then, "...rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after death."[18] Seeing that the Affinity Argument has possibly failed to show the immortality of the soul, Phaedo pauses his narration. Phaedo remarks to Echecrates that, because of this objection, those present had their "faith shaken," and that there was introduced "a confusion and uncertainty". Socrates too pauses following this objection and then warns against misology, the hatred of argument.[19] The Argument from Form of Life[edit] Socrates then proceeds to give his final proof of the immortality of the soul by showing that the soul is immortal as it is the cause of life. He begins by showing that "if there is anything beautiful other than absolute beauty it is beautiful only insofar as it partakes of absolute beauty". Consequently, as absolute beauty is a Form, and so is the soul, then anything which has the property of being infused with a soul is so infused with the Form of soul. As an example he says, "will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three?". Forms, then, will never become their opposite. As the soul is that which renders the body living, and that the opposite of life is death, it so follows that, "...the soul will never admit the opposite of what she always brings." That which does not admit death is said to be immortal.[20] Socrates thus concludes, "Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world. "Once dead, man's soul will go to Hades and be in the company of," as Socrates says, "...men departed, better than those whom I leave behind." For he will dwell amongst those who were true philosophers, like himself.[21] Legacy[edit] Plato's Phaedo had a significant readership throughout antiquity, and was commented on by a number of ancient philosophers, such as Harpocration of Argos, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Paterius, Plutarch of Athens, Syrianus and Proclus.[22] The two most important commentaries on the dialogue that have come down to us from the ancient world are those by Olympiodorus of Alexandria and Damascius of Athens.[23] The Phaedo has come to be considered a seminal formulation, from which "a whole range of dualities, which have become deeply ingrained in Western philosophy, theology, and psychology over two millennia, received their classic formulation: soul and body, mind and matter, intellect and sense, reason and emotion, reality and appearance, unity and plurality, perfection and imperfection, immortal and mortal, permanence and change, eternal and temporal, divine and human, heaven and earth."[24]

The Republic (Plato)

Plato; fluctuates in complexity; Cephalus represents tradition; FIX

Enneads

Plotinus;

Common Sense

1776; Paine; *context:* ; *significance:* FIX *content:* I. Of the Origin and Design of Government in General, With Concise Remarks on the English Constitution: general comments about government; observes people tend to confuse g. with society; s. always something to strive for, but g. "a necessary evil"; s. fosters fulfillment of our desires, while g. only to keep man from indulging vices; if a country with a g. hampered by oppression, far worse than if such were to occur on its own, since people create and support g.-- thus financing own poor condition; if all acted morally, g. would not be necessary, but since people fallible, g. necessary to protection of life and property; g.'s purpose thus to provide security, and success of a g. judged by extent to which it fulfills this role; purpose of g.: a few people placed in small region cut off from all humanity; unable to live alone--soon interacting to avoid perpetual solitude; together, able to build shelter and feed themselves better; s. created from necessity; no need for law if treat each other well; yet, inevitable defects in moral virtue--need a g.; at first, might designate place to meet for all to discuss public matters; but, as size of s. increases, would need representatives to make law--need to hold frequent elections to ensure that will of representatives aligned with that of people; representation, not monarchy, essential to "strength of government and the happiness of the governed"; his view of government based on principle "that the more simple any thing is, the less likely it is to be disordered"; attacks British constitution--"exceedingly complex," and rife with monarchical and aristocratic tyranny; absurd to think British system consists of branches of g. checking each other II. Of Monarchy and Hereditary Succession: mankind originally in state of equality--present inequalities brought about by some other circumstance; common distinction that lacks any natural or religious basis the division between kings and subjects; distinction, unlike those between male and female or good and evil, not "of heaven"--inquire into origin and consequences; first, no kings; then, ancient Jews copied custom from "heathens" around them--grave mistake, Jews sinned; man only to have God ruling over him--to introduce king who rules like God a grave misdeed; J. asked prophet Samuel for king; S. tried to dissuade J., but they insisted they wanted King like other nations; God assented, even though thought it evil J. should want someone other than God to rule over them; monarchy practice begun in sinfulness; scriptural evidence--clear God in opposition; attacks hereditary succession of m.; since all men born equal, no man could have right to establish his family as forever presiding over others; even if a person deserves certain honors, children may not, and that person has no right to pass them on; also, recent kings of England mostly been bad--indicates that present line of kings does not exercise legitimate power; wonders where power of kings comes from--based on one of three things: election, random selection, or usurpation; if king is chosen by election, all future kings should be chosen in same way, and if king usurped throne, then entire reign illegitimate; either way, h.s. not valid; also h.s. brings other evils--people who see themselves as born into elite existence often "ignorant and unfit"; disputes theory that h.s. reduces civil wars--eight civil wars and nineteen rebellions in Britain's history; m. and h.s. have produced nothing but bad governance and bloodshed III. Thoughts on the Present State of American Affairs; Paine asks the reader to set aside his or her prejudices and judge the comments he is about to make about the situation with an evenhanded manner. He says that while some have argued that because America has flourished under British rule, it is necessary for America to remain tightly bound to Britain. Paine likens this argument to saying that because a baby has flourished on milk, it should never eat meat. Furthermore, he argues that the situation in the colonies would have been even better had various European countries not exerted their power over America. It is argued that Britain has protected the colonies, but Paine points out that Britain protected the colonies for its own financial gain, not out of altruism. Additionally if the colonies had not been dependent on Britain, then they would no longer be enemies with countries that are enemies of Britain. Therefore, Paine argues, the very condition of being Britain's colony is what brought about the need for protection in the first place. Paine also argues that the fact that many Americans are of British descent is irrelevant, as Britain, being an enemy, has no legitimate claim to American allegiance. Reconciliation is not the duty of the colonies. If it were, Paine says, than Britain, half of whose people are of French descent, ought to submit itself to the rule of the French. Paine contends that America will gain nothing by remaining attached to Britain, and that the financial burdens America's present relations with the British impose on some citizens is monumental. Bostonians, for example, are constantly threatened with the theft of their property by British soldiers. Paine also argues that reconciliation with the British will only cause the present situation to repeat itself. Paine says that it will be impossible to return to a state of peace and normalcy under British rule after the battles and financial oppression that have occurred. It is misguided to think that the British will not again impose an oppressive tax. After all, they reintroduced unfair tariffs a year or two after repealing the Stamp Act. Paine states that America is too large and complex to be governed by Britain. American commerce cannot be managed from afar. He adds that it is perverse that a small island should be ruling over a large continent. Paine says that for the colonist not to seek full independence will only temporarily end the struggle, and that the children of those currently in power will later be forced to take up arms against the British. Is that the legacy to leave the children of America? For a while, Paine admits that he thought it possible that reconciliation might occur. However, after the battle of Lexington and Concord, it became clear to him that the situation had deteriorated too much for a reconciliation to occur. Paine begins to set out the details of what he sees as the proper form of government for America. He offers a way of choosing the congress and President and recommends the convening of a "Continental Conference" to produce a "Continental Charter" that will lay down certain laws for the union and ensure the protection of certain fundamental rights. Paine says that the law should reign sovereign in America, and that it is important that the most fundamental laws be inscribed in a constitution. He ends this section with an impassioned plea to break free of the tyranny of the British. IV. On the Present Ability of America, With Some Miscellaneous Reflections: Paine asserts that it is universally acknowledged that America will ultimately separate from Britain, and that the only issue about which anyone disagrees is when this separation will occur. Paine says the time is now, as America has a large number of able men ready to fight in battle. The colonies have the force and the will to break free. Paine also says that the cost of the war can only be justified if the result is complete freedom. It is not worth undertaking the present battle simply for the repeal of some tax laws. Paine says that America is well suited to raise a navy that can rival even the British. Paine gives detailed calculations estimating the cost at roughly 3.5 million pounds sterling. America currently has no national debt and could certainly afford this miniscule debt. Furthermore, Paine argues, America produces the natural resources necessary to undertake the construction of such a navy, and America's coasts are alarmingly unprotected. This navy would both further the commercial prospects of America and provide essential defense. Paine says that the British Navy is spread throughout the world, attending to the various colonies of the Empire, and that an American navy would need only concern itself with protecting the Atlantic coast. If the British continue to rule in America, Paine says, the country will deteriorate. Independence is necessary now while so little of the continent is inhabited. Rather than having the king give out parcels of land to the British elite, it would be better for the colonies to exercise control over their own continent. This land could be used to all sorts of advantages, such as paying down debt. Furthermore, Paine argues, the colonies are now small enough to be united. If too much time elapses, greater numbers of people will occupy a greater part of America. They will be less cohesive, and less willing to work together to declare independence. Paine concludes with a list of four reasons that he thinks demonstrate that the only course of action for the colonies is to pursue complete independence: no country will be able to mediate the dispute between America and Britain as long as America is seen as a part of Britain; neither France nor Spain will help the colonies if they think that their help will be used by the colonists to repair relations with Britain; other countries see the colonies as rebels if they are still part of Britain; and by declaring independence, the colonies could begin to reap the benefits of international alliances and trade. Until the colonies declare independence from Britain, "the continent will feel itself like a man who continues putting off some unpleasant business from day to day, yet knows it must be done, hates to set about it, wishes it over, and is continually haunted with the thoughts of its necessity."

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

1751; Hume;

The Theory of Moral Sentiments

1759; Smith;

Emile

1762; Rousseau;

The Social Contract

1762; Rousseau;

The Wealth of Nations

1776; Smith

Critique of Pure Reason

1781; Kant;

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

1785; Kant;

Critique of Practical Reason

1788; Kant;

Tractatus Theologico-Politicus

1677; Spinoza;

Discourse on Metaphysics

1686; Leibniz;

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

1689; Locke;

Two Treatises of Government

1689; Locke;

Critique of Judgement

1790; Kant;

Phenomenology of Spirit

1807; Hegel;

The Incoherence of the Philosophers

Al-Ghazali;

Metaphysics

Aristotle;

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Hume; FIX

Cratylus

Plato;

On Anger

Seneca; FIX

A Vindication of the Rights of Women

1792; Wollstonecraft;

Proslogion

Anselm;

On the Soul

Aristotle;

The Incoherence of the Incoherence

Averroes;

Proof of the Truthful

Avicenna;

The Book of Healing

Avicenna;

Ecce Homo

Nietzsche;

Discourses

Epictetus; FIX

Meditations

Marcus Aurelius; FIX

Timaeus

Plato;

The City of God

Augustine of Hippo;

Discourse on the Arts and Sciences

1750; Rousseau;

Novum Organum

1620; Bacon;

De iure belli ac pacis

1625; Grotius;

Meditations on First Philosophy

1641; Descartes; FIX

Leviathan

1651; Hobbes;

Pensées

1670; Pascal;

Ethics

1677; Spinoza;

New Essays Concerning Human Understanding

1704; 1765; Leibniz;

Théodicée

1710; Leibniz;

Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

1713; Berkeley; FIX

Monadology

1714; 1720; Leibniz;

A Treatise of Human Nature

1740; Hume;

The Praise of Folly

1511; Erasmus; presaged Reformation; title a pun on Thomas More's last name and Latin word moria--written to amuse More; narrated by Folly herself--stands before a crowd of listeners wearing the costume of a fool; accompanied by her attendants: Philautia (Self-Love), Kolakia (Flattery), Lethe (Forgetfulness), and Anoia (Imbecility); she wonders why no one has praised her before; her intention is to articulate how she brings joy to gods and men first section: marriages and childbirth require men and women to forget the inconvenience they involve; everything joyous or pleasant is a form of folly; children and the elderly most happy and most foolish; the gods are quite foolish yet revered; women are better off than men because they're more foolish; gatherings need folly to be amusing--drinking needed dispel boredom; friendships predicated on folly--needed to ignore vices, and even praise them as virtues; all relationships need folly and flattery to proceed harmoniously; self-love is useful--foolish desire for praise leads to all great projects; folly affords prudence by giving people experience; emotion is useful for good deeds; wise men are far less tolerable at a gathering than a fool; folly is palliative for trials of life; discussion of Socrates--comparison to Christ; foolosophers govern poorly second section: philosophers object that certainty and sciences improve human life and folly is insanity; Folly praises instinct and uncertainty in turn--knowledge and trying to overcome one's natural state create misery, and not all madness is bad; criticizes various academic and social classes--lawyers, doctors, philosophers, gamblers, hunters, superstitious folk, authors of books, poets, businessmen, grammarians, men obsessed with their lineage and ancestry, artists and performers, and even nations and cities themselves; all evince folly in their smugness, silliness, and irrelevance; tone grows more condemnatory as she moves through these classes; theologians most foolish of all--they delight in their convoluted and obscure arguments, mold and reshape the scriptures to fit their theses, seek to inspire awe and reverence in their listeners by circuitous methods of speaking, and ignore the true message of Christ; monks content themselves with rules and good works and forget about the gospel; popes, cardinals, and bishops live a life of luxury; princes ignore what is best for their country and indulge their whims third section: Folly turns to the idea of the Christian fool; the scriptures esteem ignorance and simplicity and decry false wisdom and adherence to the ways of the world; Paul and Christ spoke of meekness and humility; Christ was in fact the biggest fool of all, as he "became sin in order to redeem sinners"; the whole Christian religion bears more of a resemblance to folly than wisdom; a Christian should seek a divine transformation, bordering on madness, and aspire to come close to God; Folly concludes her treatise by reminding her listeners to enjoy life as much as the "most illustrious disciples of Folly"

The Prince

1513; 1532; Machiavelli; The subject matter: New Princedoms (Chapters 1 & 2): describes the subject matter it will handle. In the first sentence Machiavelli uses the word "state" (Italian stato which could also mean "status") in order to neutrally cover "all forms of organization of supreme political power, whether republican or princely". The way in which the word state came to acquire this modern type of meaning during the Renaissance has been the subject of many academic discussions, with this sentence and similar ones in the works of Machiavelli being considered particularly important.[11] Machiavelli said that The Prince would be about princedoms, mentioning that he has written about republics elsewhere (possibly referring to the Discourses on Livy although this is debated), but in fact he mixes discussion of republics into this in many places, effectively treating republics as a type of princedom also, and one with many strengths. More importantly, and less traditionally, he distinguishes new princedoms from hereditary established princedoms.[12] He deals with hereditary princedoms quickly in Chapter 2, saying that they are much easier to rule. For such a prince, "unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him".[13] Gilbert (1938:19-23), comparing this to traditional presentations of advice for princes, wrote that the novelty in chapters 1 and 2 is the "deliberate purpose of dealing with a new ruler who will need to establish himself in defiance of custom". Normally, these types of works were addressed only to hereditary princes. He thinks Machiavelli may have been influenced by Tacitus as well as his own experience, but finds no clear predecessor for this. This categorization of regime types is also "un-Aristotelian"[14] and apparently simpler than the traditional one found for example in Aristotle's Politics, which divides regimes into those ruled by a single monarch, an oligarchy, or by the people, in a democracy.[15] He also ignores the classical distinctions between the good and corrupt forms, for example between monarchy and tyranny. Xenophon, on the other hand, made exactly the same distinction between types of rulers in the beginning of his Education of Cyrus where he says that, concerning the knowledge of how to rule human beings, Cyrus the Great, his exemplary prince, was very different "from all other kings, both those who have inherited their thrones from their fathers and those who have gained their crowns by their own efforts".[16] Machiavelli divides the subject of new states into two types, "mixed" cases and purely new states. "Mixed" princedoms (Chapters 3-5)[edit] New princedoms are either totally new, or they are "mixed" meaning that they are new parts of an older state, already belonging to that prince.[17] New conquests added to older states (Chapter 3)[edit] Machiavelli generalizes that there were several virtuous Roman ways to hold a newly acquired province, using a republic as an example of how new princes can act: to install one's princedom in the new acquisition, or to install colonies of one's people there, which is better. to indulge the lesser powers of the area without increasing their power. to put down the powerful people. not to allow a foreign power to gain reputation. More generally, Machiavelli emphasizes that one should have regard not only for present problems but also for the future ones. One should not "enjoy the benefit of time" but rather the benefit of one's virtue and prudence, because time can bring evil as well as good. Conquered kingdoms (Chapter 4)[edit] A 16th-century Italian impression of the family of Darius III, emperor of Persia, before their conqueror, Alexander the Great. Machiavelli explained that in his time the Near East was again ruled by an empire, the Ottoman Empire, with similar characteristics to that of Darius - seen from the viewpoint of a potential conqueror. In some cases the old king of the conquered kingdom depended on his lords. 16th century France, or in other words France as it was at the time of writing of The Prince, is given by Machiavelli as an example of such a kingdom. These are easy to enter but difficult to hold. When the kingdom revolves around the king, with everyone else his servant, then it is difficult to enter but easy to hold. The solution is to eliminate the old bloodline of the prince. Machiavelli used the Persian empire of Darius III, conquered by Alexander the Great, to illustrate this point and then noted that the Medici, if they think about it, will find this historical example similar to the "kingdom of the Turk" (Ottoman Empire) in their time - making this a potentially easier conquest to hold than France would be. Conquered Free States, with their own laws and orders (Chapter 5)[edit] Gilbert (1938:34) notes that this chapter is quite atypical of any previous books for princes. Gilbert supposed the need to discuss conquering free republics is linked to Machiavelli's project to unite Italy, which contained some free republics. As he also notes, the chapter in any case makes it clear that holding such a state is highly difficult for a prince. Machiavelli gives three options: Ruin them, as Rome destroyed Carthage, and also as Machiavelli says the Romans eventually had to do in Greece, even though they had wanted to avoid it. Go to live there (or install colonies, if you are a prince of a republic). Let them keep their own orders but install a puppet regime. Totally New States (Chapters 6-9)[edit] Conquests by virtue (Chapter 6)[edit] Machiavelli described Moses as a conquering prince, who founded new modes and orders by force of arms, which he used willingly to kill many of his own people. The Bible describes the reasons behind his success differently. Princes who rise to power through their own skill and resources (their "virtue") rather than luck tend to have a hard time rising to the top, but once they reach the top they are very secure in their position. This is because they effectively crush their opponents and earn great respect from everyone else. Because they are strong and more self-sufficient, they have to make fewer compromises with their allies. Machiavelli writes that reforming an existing order is one of the most dangerous and difficult things a prince can do. Part of the reason is that people are naturally resistant to change and reform. Those who benefited from the old order will resist change very fiercely. By contrast, those who can benefit from the new order will be less fierce in their support, because the new order is unfamiliar and they are not certain it will live up to its promises. Moreover, it is impossible for the prince to satisfy everybody's expectations. Inevitably, he will disappoint some of his followers. Therefore, a prince must have the means to force his supporters to keep supporting him even when they start having second thoughts, otherwise he will lose his power. Only armed prophets, like Moses, succeed in bringing lasting change. Machiavelli claims that Moses killed uncountable numbers of his own people in order to enforce his will. Machiavelli was not the first thinker to notice this pattern. Allan Gilbert wrote: "In wishing new laws and yet seeing danger in them Machiavelli was not himself an innovator,"[18] because this idea was traditional and could be found in Aristotle's writings. But Machiavelli went much further than any other author in his emphasis on this aim, and Gilbert associates Machiavelli's emphasis upon such drastic aims with the level of corruption to be found in Italy. Conquest by fortune, meaning by someone else's virtue (Chapter 7)[edit] According to Machiavelli, when a prince comes to power through luck or the blessings of powerful figures within the regime, he typically has an easy time gaining power but a hard time keeping it thereafter, because his power is dependent on his benefactors' goodwill. He does not command the loyalty of the armies and officials that maintain his authority, and these can be withdrawn from him at a whim. Having risen the easy way, it is not even certain such a prince has the skill and strength to stand on his own feet. This is not necessarily true in every case. Machiavelli cites Cesare Borgia as an example of a lucky prince who escaped this pattern. Through cunning political manoeuvrers, he managed to secure his power base. Cesare was made commander of the papal armies by his father, Pope Alexander VI, but was also heavily dependent on mercenary armies loyal to the Orsini brothers and the support of the French king. Borgia won over the allegiance of the Orsini brothers' followers with better pay and prestigious government posts. When some of his mercenary captains started to plot against him, he had them imprisoned and executed. When it looked as though the king of France would abandon him, Borgia sought new alliances. Finally, Machiavelli makes a point that bringing new benefits to a conquered people will not be enough to cancel the memory of old injuries, an idea Allan Gilbert said can be found in Tacitus and Seneca the Younger.[19] Conquests by "criminal virtue" (Chapter 8)[edit] Conquests by "criminal virtue" are ones in which the new prince secures his power through cruel, immoral deeds, such as the execution of political rivals. Machiavelli advises that a prince should carefully calculate all the wicked deeds he needs to do to secure his power, and then execute them all in one stroke, such that he need not commit any more wickedness for the rest of his reign. In this way, his subjects will slowly forget his cruel deeds and his reputation can recover. Princes who fail to do this, who hesitate in their ruthlessness, find that their problems mushroom over time and they are forced to commit wicked deeds throughout their reign. Thus they continuously mar their reputations and alienate their people. Machiavelli's case study is Agathocles of Syracuse. After Agathocles became Praetor of Syracuse, he called a meeting of the city's elite. At his signal, his soldiers killed all the senators and the wealthiest citizens, completely destroying the old oligarchy. He declared himself ruler with no opposition. So secure was his power that he could afford to absent himself to go off on military campaigns in Africa. However, Machiavelli then strongly rebukes Agathocles, stating, "Yet one cannot call it virtue to kill one's citizens, betray one's friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes can enable one to acquire empire, but not glory. [...] Nonetheless, his savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite crimes, do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. Thus, one cannot attribute to fortune or virtue what he achieved without either." Gilbert (1938:51-55) remarks that this chapter is even less traditional than those it follows, not only in its treatment of criminal behavior, but also in the advice to take power from people at a stroke, noting that precisely the opposite had been advised by Aristotle in his Politics (5.11.1315a13). On the other hand, Gilbert shows that another piece of advice in this chapter, to give benefits when it will not appear forced, was traditional. Becoming a prince by the selection of one's fellow citizens (Chapter 9)[edit] These "civic principalities" do not require real virtue, only "fortunate astuteness". Machiavelli breaks this case into two basic types, depending upon which section of the populace supports the new prince. Supported by the great (those who wish to command the people)[edit] This, according to Machiavelli, is an unstable situation, which must be avoided after the initial coming to power. The great should be made and unmade every day at your convenience. There are two types of great people that might be encountered: Those who are bound to the prince. Concerning these it is important to distinguish between two types of obligated great people, those who are rapacious and those who are not. It is the latter who can and should be honoured. Those who are not bound to the new prince. Once again these need to be divided into two types: those with a weak spirit (a prince can make use of them if they are of good counsel) and those who shun being bound because of their own ambition (these should be watched and feared as enemies). Supported by the people (those who wish not to be commanded by the great)[edit] How to win over people depends on circumstances. Machiavelli advises: Do not get frightened in adversity. One should avoid ruling via magistrates, if one wishes to be able to "ascend" to absolute rule quickly and safely. One should make sure that the people need the prince, especially if a time of need should come. How to judge the strength of principalities (Chapter 10)[edit] The way to judge the strength of a princedom is to see whether it can defend itself, or whether it needs to depend on allies. This does not just mean that the cities should be prepared and the people trained; a prince who is hated is also exposed. Ecclesiastical principates (Chapter 11)[edit] Leo X: a pope, but also a member of the Medici family. Machiavelli suggested they should treat the church as a princedom, as the Borgia family had, in order to conquer Italy, and found new modes and orders. This type of "princedom" refers for example explicitly to the Catholic church, which is of course not traditionally thought of as a princedom. According to Machiavelli, these are relatively easy to maintain, once founded. They do not need to defend themselves militarily, nor to govern their subjects. Machiavelli discusses the recent history of the Church as if it were a princedom that was in competition to conquer Italy against other princes. He points to factionalism as a historical weak point in the Church, and points to the recent example of the Borgia family as a better strategy which almost worked. He then explicitly proposes that the Medici are now in a position to try the same thing. Defense and military (Chapter 12-14)[edit] Having discussed the various types of principalities, Machiavelli turns to the ways a state can attack other territories or defend itself. The two most essential foundations for any state, whether old or new, are sound laws and strong military forces.[20] A self-sufficient prince is one who can meet any enemy on the battlefield. He should be "armed" with his own arms. However, a prince that relies solely on fortifications or on the help of others and stands on the defensive is not self-sufficient. If he cannot raise a formidable army, but must rely on defense, he must fortify his city. A well-fortified city is unlikely to be attacked, and if it is, most armies cannot endure an extended siege. However, during a siege a virtuous prince will keep the morale of his subjects high while removing all dissenters. Thus, as long as the city is properly defended and has enough supplies, a wise prince can withstand any siege. Machiavelli stands strongly against the use of mercenaries, and in this he was innovative, and he also had personal experience in Florence. He believes they are useless to a ruler because they are undisciplined, cowardly, and without any loyalty, being motivated only by money. Machiavelli attributes the Italian city states' weakness to their reliance on mercenary armies. Machiavelli also warns against using auxiliary forces, troops borrowed from an ally, because if they win, the employer is under their favor and if they lose, he is ruined. Auxiliary forces are more dangerous than mercenary forces because they are united and controlled by capable leaders who may turn against the employer. The main concern for a prince should be war, or the preparation thereof, not books. Through war a hereditary prince maintains his power or a private citizen rises to power. Machiavelli advises that a prince must frequently hunt in order to keep his body fit and learn the landscape surrounding his kingdom. Through this, he can best learn how to protect his territory and advance upon others. For intellectual strength, he is advised to study great military men so he may imitate their successes and avoid their mistakes. A prince who is diligent in times of peace will be ready in times of adversity. Machiavelli writes, "thus, when fortune turns against him he will be prepared to resist it." The Qualities of a Prince (Chapters 14-19)[edit] Each of the following chapters presents a discussion about a particular virtue or vice that a prince might have, and is therefore structured in a way which appears like traditional advice for a prince. However, the advice is far from traditional. A Prince's Duty Concerning Military Matters (Chapter 14)[edit] Machiavelli believes that a prince's main focus should be on perfecting the art of war. He believes that by taking this profession a ruler will be able to protect his kingdom. He claims that "being disarmed makes you despised." He believes that the only way to ensure loyalty from one's soldiers is to understand military matters. The two activities Machiavelli recommends practicing to prepare for war are physical and mental. Physically, he believes rulers should learn the landscape of their territories. Mentally, he encouraged the study of past military events. He also warns against idleness. Reputation of a prince (Chapter 15)[edit] Because, says Machiavelli, he wants to write something useful to those who understand, he thought it more fitting "to go directly to the effectual truth ("verità effettuale") of the thing than to the imagination of it". This section is one where Machiavelli's pragmatic ideal can be seen most clearly. The prince should, ideally, be virtuous, but he should be willing and able to abandon those virtues if it becomes necessary. Concerning the behavior of a prince toward his subjects, Machiavelli announces that he will depart from what other writers say, and writes: Men have imagined republics and principalities that never really existed at all. Yet the way men live is so far removed from the way they ought to live that anyone who abandons what is for what should be pursues his downfall rather than his preservation; for a man who strives after goodness in all his acts is sure to come to ruin, since there are so many men who are not good. Since there are many possible qualities that a prince can be said to possess, he must not be overly concerned about having all the good ones. Also, a prince may be perceived to be merciful, faithful, humane, frank, and religious, but most important is only to seem to have these qualities. A prince cannot truly have these qualities because at times it is necessary to act against them. In fact, he must sometimes deliberately choose evil. Although a bad reputation should be avoided, it is sometimes necessary to have one. Generosity vs. parsimony (Chapter 16)[edit] If a prince is overly generous to his subjects, Machiavelli asserts he will not be appreciated, and will only cause greed for more. Additionally, being overly generous is not economical, because eventually all resources will be exhausted. This results in higher taxes, and will bring grief upon the prince. Then, if he decides to discontinue or limit his generosity, he will be labeled as a miser. Thus, Machiavelli summarizes that guarding against the people's hatred is more important than building up a reputation for generosity. A wise prince should be willing to be more reputed a miser than be hated for trying to be too generous. On the other hand: "of what is not yours or your subjects' one can be a bigger giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spending what is someone else's does not take reputation from you but adds it to you; only spending your own hurts you". Cruelty vs. Mercy (Chapter 17)[edit] Hannibal meeting Scipio Africanus. Machiavelli describes Hannibal as having the "virtue" of "inhuman cruelty". But he lost to someone, Scipio Africanus, who showed the weakness of "excessive mercy" and who could therefore only have held power in a republic. In addressing the question of whether it is better to be loved or feared, Machiavelli writes, "The answer is that one would like to be both the one and the other; but because it is difficult to combine them, it is far safer to be feared than loved if you cannot be both." As Machiavelli asserts, commitments made in peace are not always kept in adversity; however, commitments made in fear are kept out of fear. Yet, a prince must ensure that he is not feared to the point of hatred, which is very possible. This chapter is possibly the most well-known of the work, and it is important because of the reasoning behind Machiavelli's famous idea that it is better to be feared than loved[21] - his justification is purely pragmatic; as he notes, "Men worry less about doing an injury to one who makes himself loved than to one who makes himself feared." Fear is simply a means to an end, and that end is security for the prince. The fear instilled should never be excessive, for that could be dangerous to the prince. Above all, Machiavelli argues, a prince should not interfere with the property of their subjects, their women, or the life of somebody without proper justification. Regarding the troops of the prince, fear is absolutely necessary to keep a large garrison united and a prince should not mind the thought of cruelty in that regard. For a prince who leads his own army, it is imperative for him to observe cruelty because that is the only way he can command his soldiers' absolute respect. Machiavelli compares two great military leaders: Hannibal and Scipio Africanus. Although Hannibal's army consisted of men of various races, they were never rebellious because they feared their leader. Machiavelli says this required "inhuman cruelty" which he refers to as a virtue. Scipio's men, on the other hand, were known for their mutiny and dissension, due to Scipio's "excessive mercy" - which was however a source of glory because he lived in a republic. In what way princes should keep their word (Chapter 18)[edit] Machiavelli notes that a prince is praised for keeping his word. However, he also notes that a prince is also praised for the illusion of being reliable in keeping his word. A prince, therefore, should only keep his word when it suits his purposes, but do his utmost to maintain the illusion that he does keep his word and that he is reliable in that regard. Therefore, a prince should not break his word unnecessarily. As Machiavelli notes, "He should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, guileless, and devout. And indeed he should be so. But his disposition should be such that, if he needs to be the opposite, he knows how." As noted in chapter 15, the prince must appear to be virtuous, and should be virtuous, but he should be able to be otherwise when the time calls for it; that includes being able to lie, though however much he lies he should always keep the appearance of being truthful. Avoiding contempt and hatred (Chapter 19)[edit] Machiavelli observes that most men are content as long as they are not deprived of their property and women. A prince should command respect through his conduct, because a prince that is highly respected by his people is unlikely to face internal struggles. Additionally, a prince who does not raise the contempt of the nobles and keeps the people satisfied, Machiavelli assures, should have no fear of conspirators. Machiavelli advises monarchs to have both internal and external fears. Internal fears exist inside his kingdom and focus on his subjects, Machiavelli warns to be suspicious of everyone when hostile attitudes emerge. External fears are of foreign powers. The Prudence of the Prince (Chapters 20-25)[edit] Whether ruling conquests with fortresses works (Chapter 20)[edit] Machiavelli mentions that placing fortresses in conquered territories, although it sometimes works, often fails. Using fortresses can be a good plan, but Machiavelli says he shall "blame anyone who, trusting in fortresses, thinks little of being hated by the people". He cited Caterina Sforza, who used a fortress to defend herself but was eventually betrayed by her people. Gaining honors (Chapter 21)[edit] A prince truly earns honor by completing great feats. King Ferdinand of Spain is cited by Machiavelli as an example of a monarch who gained esteem by showing his ability through great feats and who, in the name of religion, conquered many territories and kept his subjects occupied so that they had no chance to rebel. Regarding two warring states, Machiavelli asserts it is always wiser to choose a side, rather than to be neutral. Machiavelli then provides the following reasons why: If your allies win, you benefit whether or not you have more power than they have. If you are more powerful, then your allies are under your command; if your allies are stronger, they will always feel a certain obligation to you for your help. If your side loses, you still have an ally in the loser. Machiavelli also notes that it is wise for a prince not to ally with a stronger force unless compelled to do so. In conclusion, the most important virtue is having the wisdom to discern what ventures will come with the most reward and then pursuing them courageously. Nobles and staff (Chapter 22)[edit] The selection of good servants is reflected directly upon the prince's intelligence, so if they are loyal, the prince is considered wise; however, when they are otherwise, the prince is open to adverse criticism. Machiavelli asserts that there are three types of intelligence: The kind that understands things for itself - which is excellent to have. The kind that understands what others can understand - which is good to have. The kind that does not understand for itself, nor through others - which is useless to have. If the prince does not have the first type of intelligence, he should at the very least have the second type. For, as Machiavelli states, "A prince needs to have the discernment to recognize the good or bad in what another says or does even though he has no acumen himself". Avoiding flatterers (Chapter 23)[edit] This chapter displays a low opinion of flatterers; Machiavelli notes that "Men are so happily absorbed in their own affairs and indulge in such self-deception that it is difficult for them not to fall victim to this plague; and some efforts to protect oneself from flatterers involve the risk of becoming despised." Flatterers were seen as a great danger to a prince, because their flattery could cause him to avoid wise counsel in favor of rash action, but avoiding all advice, flattery or otherwise, was equally bad; a middle road had to be taken. A prudent prince should have a select group of wise counselors to advise him truthfully on matters all the time. All their opinions should be taken into account. Ultimately, the decision should be made by the counselors and carried out absolutely. If a prince is given to changing his mind, his reputation will suffer. A prince must have the wisdom to recognize good advice from bad. Machiavelli gives a negative example in Emperor Maximilian I; Maximilian, who was secretive, never consulted others, but once he ordered his plans and met dissent, he immediately changed them. Prudence and chance[edit] Why the princes of Italy lost their states (Chapter 24)[edit] After first mentioning that a new prince can quickly become as respected as a hereditary one, Machiavelli says princes in Italy who had longstanding power and lost it cannot blame bad luck, but should blame their own indolence. One "should never fall in the belief that you can find someone to pick you up". They all showed a defect of arms (already discussed) and either had a hostile populace or did not know to secure themselves with the great. Fortune (Chapter 25)[edit] As pointed out by Gilbert (1938):206 it was traditional in the genre of Mirrors of Princes to mention fortune, but "Fortune pervades The Prince as she does no other similar work". Machiavelli argues that fortune is only the judge of half of our actions and that we have control over the other half with "sweat", prudence and virtue. Even more unusual, rather than simply suggesting caution as a prudent way to try to avoid the worst of bad luck, Machiavelli holds that the greatest princes in history tend to be ones who take more risks, and rise to power through their own labour, virtue, prudence, and particularly by their ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Machiavelli even encourages risk taking as a reaction to risk. In a well-known metaphor, Machiavelli writes that "it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her down."[22] Gilbert (p. 217) points out that Machiavelli's friend the historian and diplomat Francesco Guicciardini expressed similar ideas about fortune. Machiavelli compares fortune to a torrential river that cannot be easily controlled during flooding season. In periods of calm, however, people can erect dams and levees in order to minimize its impact. Fortune, Machiavelli argues, seems to strike at the places where no resistance is offered, as had recently been the case in Italy. As de Alvarez (1999:125-30) points out that what Machiavelli actually says is that Italians in his time leave things not just to fortune, but to "fortune and God". Machiavelli is indicating in this passage, as in some others in his works, that Christianity itself was making Italians helpless and lazy concerning their own politics, as if they would leave dangerous rivers uncontrolled.[23] Exhortation to Seize Italy and to Free Her from the Barbarians (Chapter 26)[edit] Pope Leo X was pope at the time the book was written and a member of the de Medici family. This chapter directly appeals to the Medici to use what has been summarized in order to conquer Italy using Italian armies, following the advice in the book. Gilbert (1938:222-30) showed that including such exhortation was not unusual in the genre of books full of advice for princes. But it is unusual that the Medici family's position of Papal power is openly named as something that should be used as a personal power base, as a tool of secular politics. Indeed, one example is the Borgia family's "recent" and controversial attempts to use church power in secular politics, often brutally executed. This continues a controversial theme throughout the book.

Utopia

1516; More; Book 1: Dialogue of Counsel[edit] The work begins with written correspondence between Thomas More and several people he had met on the continent: Peter Gilles, town clerk of Antwerp, and Hieronymus van Busleyden, counselor to Charles V. More chose these letters, which are communications between actual people, to further the plausibility of his fictional land. In the same spirit, these letters also include a specimen of the Utopian alphabet and its poetry. The letters also explain the lack of widespread travel to Utopia; during the first mention of the land, someone had coughed during announcement of the exact longitude and latitude. The first book tells of the traveller Raphael Hythlodaeus, to whom More is introduced in Antwerp, and it also explores the subject of how best to counsel a prince, a popular topic at the time. The first discussions with Raphael allow him to discuss some of the modern ills affecting Europe such as the tendency of kings to start wars and the subsequent loss of money on fruitless endeavours. He also criticises the use of execution to punish theft, saying thieves might as well murder whom they rob, to remove witnesses, if the punishment is going to be the same. He lays most of the problems of theft on the practice of enclosure—the enclosing of common land—and the subsequent poverty and starvation of people who are denied access to land because of sheep farming. More tries to convince Raphael that he could find a good job in a royal court, advising monarchs, but Raphael says that his views are too radical and wouldn't be listened to. Raphael sees himself in the tradition of Plato: he knows that for good governance, kings must act philosophically. He, however, points out that: " Plato doubtless did well foresee, unless kings themselves would apply their minds to the study of philosophy, that else they would never thoroughly allow the council of philosophers, being themselves before, even from their tender age, infected and corrupt with perverse and evil opinions. " More seems to contemplate the duty of philosophers to work around and in real situations and, for the sake of political expediency, work within flawed systems to make them better, rather than hoping to start again from first principles. " ... for in courts they will not bear with a man's holding his peace or conniving at what others do: a man must barefacedly approve of the worst counsels and consent to the blackest designs, so that he would pass for a spy, or, possibly, for a traitor, that did but coldly approve of such wicked practices " Book 2: Discourse on Utopia[edit] Map by Ortelius, ca. 1595. Utopia is placed in the New World and More links Raphael's travels in with Amerigo Vespucci's real life voyages of discovery. He suggests that Raphael is one of the 24 men Vespucci, in his Four Voyages of 1507, says he left for six months at Cabo Frio, Brazil. Raphael then travels further and finds the island of Utopia, where he spends five years observing the customs of the natives. According to More, the island of Utopia is " ...two hundred miles across in the middle part, where it is widest, and nowhere much narrower than this except towards the two ends, where it gradually tapers. These ends, curved round as if completing a circle five hundred miles in circumference, make the island crescent-shaped, like a new moon.[7] " The island was originally a peninsula but a 15-mile wide channel was dug by the community's founder King Utopos to separate it from the mainland. The island contains 54 cities. Each city is divided into four equal parts. The capital city, Amaurot, is located directly in the middle of the crescent island. Each city has not more 6000 households, each family consisting of between 10 and 16 adults. Thirty households are grouped together and elect a Syphograntus (whom More says is now called a phylarchus). Every ten Syphogranti have an elected Traniborus (more recently called a protophylarchus) ruling over them. The 200 Syphogranti of a city elect a Prince in a secret ballot. The Prince stays for life unless he is deposed or removed for suspicion of tyranny. People are re-distributed around the households and towns to keep numbers even. If the island suffers from overpopulation, colonies are set up on the mainland. Alternatively, the natives of the mainland are invited to be part of these Utopian colonies, but if they dislike them and no longer wish to stay they may return. In the case of under-population the colonists are re-called. There is no private property on Utopia, with goods being stored in warehouses and people requesting what they need. There are also no locks on the doors of the houses, and the houses are rotated between the citizens every ten years. Agriculture provides the most important occupation on the island. Every person is taught it and must live in the countryside, farming for two years at a time, with women doing the same work as men. Parallel to this, every citizen must learn at least one of the other essential trades: weaving (mainly done by the women), carpentry, metalsmithing and masonry. There is deliberate simplicity about these trades; for instance, all people wear the same types of simple clothes and there are no dressmakers making fine apparel. All able-bodied citizens must work; thus unemployment is eradicated, and the length of the working day can be minimised: the people only have to work six hours a day (although many willingly work for longer). More does allow scholars in his society to become the ruling officials or priests, people picked during their primary education for their ability to learn. All other citizens, however, are encouraged to apply themselves to learning in their leisure time. Slavery is a feature of Utopian life and it is reported that every household has two slaves. The slaves are either from other countries or are the Utopian criminals. These criminals are weighed down with chains made out of gold. The gold is part of the community wealth of the country, and fettering criminals with it or using it for shameful things like chamber pots gives the citizens a healthy dislike of it. It also makes it difficult to steal as it is in plain view. The wealth, though, is of little importance and is only good for buying commodities from foreign nations or bribing these nations to fight each other. Slaves are periodically released for good behaviour. Jewels are worn by children, who finally give them up as they mature. Other significant innovations of Utopia include: a welfare state with free hospitals, euthanasia permissible by the state, priests being allowed to marry, divorce permitted, premarital sex punished by a lifetime of enforced celibacy and adultery being punished by enslavement. Meals are taken in community dining halls and the job of feeding the population is given to a different household in turn. Although all are fed the same, Raphael explains that the old and the administrators are given the best of the food. Travel on the island is only permitted with an internal passport and any people found without a passport are, on a first occasion, returned in disgrace, but after a second offence they are placed in slavery. In addition, there are no lawyers and the law is made deliberately simple, as all should understand it and not leave people in any doubt of what is right and wrong. There are several religions on the island: moon-worshipers, sun-worshipers, planet-worshipers, ancestor-worshipers and monotheists, but each is tolerant of the others. Only atheists are despised (but allowed) in Utopia, as they are seen as representing a danger to the state: since they do not believe in any punishment or reward after this life, they have no reason to share the communistic life of Utopia, and will break the laws for their own gain. They are not banished, but are encouraged to talk out their erroneous beliefs with the priests until they are convinced of their error. Raphael says that through his teachings Christianity was beginning to take hold in Utopia. The toleration of all other religious ideas is enshrined in a universal prayer all the Utopians recite. " ...but, if they are mistaken, and if there is either a better government, or a religion more acceptable to God, they implore His goodness to let them know it. " Wives are subject to their husbands and husbands are subject to their wives although women are restricted to conducting household tasks for the most part. Only few widowed women become priests. While all are trained in military arts, women confess their sins to their husbands once a month. Gambling, hunting, makeup and astrology are all discouraged in Utopia. The role allocated to women in Utopia might, however, have been seen as being more liberal from a contemporary point of view. Utopians do not like to engage in war. If they feel countries friendly to them have been wronged, they will send military aid, but they try to capture, rather than kill, enemies. They are upset if they achieve victory through bloodshed. The main purpose of war is to achieve that which, if they had achieved already, they would not have gone to war over. Privacy is not regarded as freedom in Utopia; taverns, ale-houses and places for private gatherings are non-existent for the effect of keeping all men in full view, so that they are obliged to behave well.

Discourse on Method

1637; Descartes; Part I: Various considerations touching the Sciences[edit] Descartes begins by allowing himself some wit: Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess. A similar observation can be found in Hobbes: "But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share.",[2] but also in Montaigne, whose formulation indicates that it was a common place at the time: "Tis commonly said that the justest portion Nature has given us of her favors is that of sense; for there is no one who is not contented with his share.".[3][4] Descartes continues with a warning: For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite is rightly to apply it. The greatest minds, as they are capable of the highest excellences, are open likewise to the greatest aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than those who, while they run, forsake it.[5] Descartes describes his disappointment with his education: as soon as I had finished the entire course of study... I found myself involved in so many doubts and errors, that I was convinced I had advanced no farther... than the discovery at every turn of my own ignorance.. He notes his special delight with mathematics, and contrasts its strong foundations to the disquisitions of the ancient moralists [which are] towering and magnificent palaces with no better foundation than sand and mud. ".... the reading of good books is like a conversation with the best men of past centuries" Part II: The principal rules of the Method which the Author has discovered[edit] Descartes was in Germany, attracted thither by the wars in that country, and describes his intent by a "building metaphor". He observes that buildings, cities or nations that have been planned by a single hand are more elegant and commodious than those that have grown organically. He resolves not to build on old foundations, or to lean upon principles which, in his youth, he had taken upon trust. Descartes seeks to ascertain the true method by which to arrive at the knowledge of whatever lay within the compass of his powers; he presents four precepts: "The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt. The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution. The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence. And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted."[6] Part III: Morals and Maxims accepted while conducting the Method[edit] Descartes uses the analogy of rebuilding a house from secure foundations, and extends the analogy to the idea of needing a temporary abode while his own house is being rebuilt. The following three maxims were adopted by Descartes so that he could effectively function in the "real world" while experimenting with his method of radical doubt. They formed a rudimentary belief system from which to act before he developed a new system based on the truths he discovered using his method. The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering firmly to the faith in which, by the grace of God, I had been educated from my childhood and regulating my conduct in every other matter according to the most moderate opinions, and the farthest removed from extremes, which should happen to be adopted in practice with general consent of the most judicious of those among whom I might be living. Be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was able. Endeavor always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world, and in general, accustom myself to the persuasion that, except our own thoughts, there is nothing absolutely in our power; so that when we have done our best in things external to us, our ill-success cannot possibly be failure on our part. Part IV: Proof of God and the Soul[edit] Applying the method to itself, Descartes challenges his own reasoning and reason itself. But Descartes believes three things are not susceptible to doubt and the three support each other to form a stable foundation for the method. He cannot doubt that something has to be there to do the doubting (I think, therefore I am). The method of doubt cannot doubt reason as it is based on reason itself. By reason there exists a God, and God is the guarantor that reason is not misguided. Perhaps the most strained part of the argument is the reasoned proof of the existence of God, and indeed Descartes seems to realize this as he supplies three different proofs, including what is now referred to as the ontological proof of the existence of God. Part V: Physics, the heart, and the soul of man and animals[edit] Here he describes how in other writings he discusses the idea of laws of nature, of the sun and stars, the idea of the moon being the cause of ebb and flow, on gravitation, and going on to discuss light and fire. Describing his work on light, he states that he expounded at considerable length what the nature of that light must be which is found in the sun and the stars, and how thence in an instant of time it traverses the immense spaces of the heavens. His work on such physico-mechanical laws is, however, projected into a "new world." A theoretical place God created "somewhere in the imaginary spaces [with] matter sufficient to compose . . . [a "new world" in which He] . . . agitate[d] variously and confusedly the different parts of this matter, so that there resulted a chaos as disordered as the poets ever feigned, and after that did nothing more than lend his ordinary concurrence to nature, and allow her to act in accordance with the laws which he had established." He does this "to express my judgment regarding . . . [his subjects] with greater freedom, without being necessitated to adopt or refute the opinions of the learned." Descartes goes on to say that he "was not, however, disposed, from these circumstances, to conclude that this world had been created in the manner I described; for it is much more likely that God made it at the first such as it was to be." Despite this admission, it seems that Descartes' project for understanding the world was that of re-creating creation—a cosmological project which aimed, through Descartes' particular brand of experimental method, to show not merely the possibility of such a system, but to suggest that this way of looking at the world—one with (as Descartes saw it) no assumptions about God or nature—provided the only basis upon which he could see knowledge progressing (as he states in Book II). Thus, in Descartes' work, we can see some of the fundamental assumptions of modern cosmology in evidence—the project of examing the historical construction of the universe through a set of quantitative laws describing interactions which would allow the ordered present to be constructed from a chaotic past. He goes on to the motion of the blood in the heart and arteries, endorsing the findings of William Harvey though not by name, ascribing them to "a physician of England," but ascribing the motive power of the circulation to heat rather than muscle power. He describes that these motions seem to be totally independent of what we think, and concludes that our bodies are separate from our souls. He does not seem to distinguish between mind, spirit and soul, which are identified as our faculty for rational thinking. Hence the term "I think, therefore I am." All three of these words (particularly "mind" and "soul") can be identified by the single French term "âme." Part VI[edit] Descartes begins by noting, without directly referring to it, the recent trial of Galileo for heresy and the condemnation of heliocentrism; he explains that for these reasons he has been slow to publish.[7] "I remarked, moreover, with respect to experiments, that they become always more necessary the more one is advanced in knowledge; for, at the commencement, it is better to make use only of what is spontaneously presented to our senses." "First, I have essayed to find in general the principles, or first causes of all that is or can be in the world." Secure on these foundation stones, Descartes shows the practical application of "The Method" in Mathematics and the Science.

Areopagitica

1644; Milton; Before presenting his argument, Milton defends the very idea of writing a treatise such as Areopagitica. He compliments England for having overcome the tyranny of Charles I and the prelates, but his purpose is to voice his grievances. Milton defends this purpose, holding that to bring forth complaints before the Parliament is a matter of civil liberty and loyalty, because constructive criticism is better than false flattery.[4] He concludes his introduction by encouraging Parliament to obey "the voice of reason" and to be "willing to repeal any Act" for the sake of truth and upright judgment.[4] Origins of licensing system[edit] Milton begins with historical evidence noting that Ancient Greece and Rome did not adhere to the practice of licensing. In some cases, blasphemous or libellous writings were burnt and their authors punished, but it was after production that these texts were rejected rather than prior to it. Milton's point is that, if a text is to be rejected, it should first be "examined, refuted, and condemned" rather than prohibited before its ideas have even been expressed. Milton points out that licensing was first instituted by the Catholics with the Inquisition. This fact appealed to Parliament's religious beliefs since it was dominated by Protestants, and there were conflicts between the Protestants and Catholics in England; see Protestant Reformation. Milton provides historical examples of the aftermath following the Inquisition, including how there were popes in Rome beginning in the 14th century who became tyrannical licensers. For example, Pope Martin V became the first to prohibit the reading of heretical books, and then in the 16th century the Council of Trent and Spanish Inquisition prohibited texts that were not even necessarily heretical, but only unfavorable to the friars. Use of books and reading[edit] Milton precedes his argument by discussing the purpose of reading. He mentions that Moses, David, and Paul were all learned, which reminds his Protestant audience that being learned involves reading "books of all sorts". He argues that this includes even the "bad" or heretical books, because we can learn from their wrongs and discover what is true by considering what is not true. Milton's point is that God endowed every person with the reason, free will, and conscience to judge ideas for themselves, so the ideas in a text should be rejected by the reader's own choice, not by a licensing authority. Also, the mind is not corrupted simply by encountering falsehood. Milton points out that encountering falsehood can actually lead to virtuous action, such as how St. Paul's converts had privately and voluntarily burned Ephesian books considered to be "magick". Usefulness of licensing order[edit] Milton then argues that Parliament's licensing order will fail in its purpose to suppress scandalous, seditious, and libellous books: "this order of licencing conduces nothing to the end for which it was fram'd". The order was meant to rectify manners by preventing the spread of an "infection" caused by bad books. Milton objects, arguing that the licensing order is too sweeping, because even the Bible itself had been historically limited to readers for containing offensive descriptions of blasphemy and wicked men. Milton also points out that Parliament will not protect the ignorant from bad books by this Order, because the books would more likely have been read by the learned anyhow. Furthermore, whatever bad ideas were written can still be taught through word of mouth or otherwise, so "infection" or corruption is not prevented. Milton's point is that licensing books cannot possibly prevent societal corruption (it is "far insufficient to the end which it intends"), so there is no viable stopping point: "If we think to regulat Printing, thereby to rectifie manners, we must regulat all recreations and pastimes, all that is delightful to man". Finally, Milton also points out that, if there are even licensers fit for making these judgments, then the possibility of error in licensing books is still great, and the amount of time that the job would take is impractical. Harmfulness of licensing order[edit] Milton argues that licensing is "a dishonour and derogation to the author, to the book, to the priviledge and dignity of Learning". This is because many authors will produce a written work with genuinely good intentions only to have it censored by what amounts to a subjective, arbitrary judgment of the licenser. Milton also thinks that England needs to be open to truth and understanding, which should not be monopolised by the government's standards. Faith and knowledge need exercise, but this Order will lead to conformity and laziness. Licensing will hinder discovery of truth by the government's prejudice and custom, because there will always be more truth to be found that we do not yet know of. Milton thinks that licensing could potentially hinder God's plans, since it gives the licenser the power to silence others. Conclusion[edit] Milton recognises individual rights, but he is not completely libertarian in Areopagitica as he argues that the status quo ante worked best. According to the previous English law, all books had to have at least a printer's name (and preferably an author's name) inscribed in them. Under that system, Milton argues, if any blasphemous or libellous material is published, those books can still be destroyed after the fact. "Those which otherwise come forth, if they be found mischievous and libellous, the fire and the executioner will be the timeliest and the most effectuall remedy, that mans prevention can use." Milton seeks a means by which to ensure that authors and publishers remain culpable for any "mischievous" or "libellous" work that they produce. Regardless, Milton certainly is not without remorse for the libellous author, nor does he promote unrestricted free speech. In addition, he admits that his tolerance is limited: "I mean not tolerated Popery, and open superstition, which as it extirpats all religions and civill supremacies, so it self should be extirpat".

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

1748; Hume; context: ; influence: summary: 1. Of the different species of philosophy philosophy can be split into two general parts: natural philosophy and the philosophy of human nature/moral philosophy; latter investigates both actions and thoughts. He emphasizes in this section, by way of warning, that philosophers with nuanced thoughts will likely be cast aside in favor of those whose conclusions more intuitively match popular opinion. However, he insists, precision helps art and craft of all kinds, including the craft of philosophy. 2. Of the origin of ideas: distinguishes between impressions and ideas; "impressions" are sensations, while "ideas" are memories and imaginings; the difference between the two is that ideas are less vivacious than impressions--the idea of the taste of an orange is far inferior to the impression (or sensation) of actually eating one; asserts copy principle--impressions are the source of all ideas; ideas may be either the product of mere sensation, or of the imagination working in conjunction with sensation; According to Hume, the creative faculty makes use of (at least) four mental operations which produce imaginings out of sense-impressions. These operations are compounding (or the addition of one idea onto another, such as a horn on a horse to create a unicorn); transposing (or the substitution of one part of a thing with the part from another, such as with the body of a man upon a horse to make a centaur); augmenting (as with the case of a giant, whose size has been augmented); and diminishing (as with Lilliputians, whose size has been diminished); also mentions the operations of mixing, separating, and dividing; admits that there is one objection to his account: the problem of "The Missing Shade of Blue"; asks us to imagine a man who has experienced every shade of blue except for one; predicts that this man will be able to divine the color of this particular shade of blue, despite the fact that he has never experienced it; Hume brushes problem aside as an exceptional case by stating that one may experience a novel idea that itself is derived from combinations of previous impressions 3. Of the association of ideas discusses how thoughts tend to come in sequences, as in trains of thought. He explains that there are at least three kinds of associations between ideas: resemblance, contiguity in space-time, and cause-and-effect; there must be some universal principle that must account for the various sorts of connections that exist between ideas; he does not immediately show what this principle might be 4. Sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding (in two parts)[edit] In the first part, Hume discusses how the objects of inquiry are either "relations of ideas" or "matters of fact", which is roughly the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. The former, he tells the reader, are proved by demonstration, while the latter are given through experience. (Hume 1974:322) In explaining how matters of fact are entirely a product of experience, he dismisses the notion that they may be arrived at through a priori reasoning. For Hume, every effect only follows its cause arbitrarily—they are entirely distinct from one another. (Hume 1974:324) In part two, Hume inquires into how anyone can justifiably believe that experience yields any conclusions about the world: "When it is asked, What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? it may be replied in one word, experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humor, and ask, What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication." He shows how a satisfying argument for the validity of experience can be based neither on demonstration (since "it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change") nor experience (since that would be a circular argument) Here he is describing what would become known as the problem of induction. 5. Sceptical solution of these doubts For Hume, we assume that experience tells us something about the world because of habit or custom, which human nature forces us to take seriously. This is also, presumably, the "principle" that organizes the connections between ideas. Indeed, one of the many famous passages of the Inquiry was on the topic of the incorrigibility of human custom. In a later chapter, he wrote: "The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of skepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined skeptic in the same condition as other mortals"; provides an account of beliefs. He explains that the difference between belief and fiction is that the former produces a certain feeling of confidence which the latter doesn't 6. Of probability begins with the notions of probability and chance. For him, "probability" means a higher chance of occurring, and brings about a higher degree of subjective expectation in the viewer. By "chance", he means all those particular comprehensible events which the viewer considers possible in accord with their experience. However, further experience takes these equal chances, and forces the imagination to observe that certain chances arise more frequently than others. These gentle forces upon the imagination cause the viewer to have strong beliefs in outcomes. This effect may be understood as another case of custom or habit taking past experience and using it to predict the future 7. Of the idea of necessary connection "necessary connection"--the power or force which necessarily ties one idea to another. He rejects the notion that any sensible qualities are necessarily conjoined, since that would mean we could know something prior to experience. Unlike his predecessors, Berkeley and Locke, Hume rejects the idea that volitions or impulses of the will may be inferred to necessarily connect to the actions they produce by way of some sense of the power of the will. He reasons that, 1. if we knew the nature of this power, then the mind-body divide would seem totally unmysterious to us; 2. if we had immediate knowledge of this mysterious power, then we would be able to intuitively explain why it is that we can control some parts of our bodies (e.g., our hands or tongues), and not others (e.g., the liver or heart); 3. we have no immediate knowledge of the powers which allow an impulse of volition to create an action (e.g., of the "muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits" which are the immediate cause of an action) He produces like arguments against the notion that we have knowledge of these powers as they affect the mind alone. He also argues in brief against the idea that causes are mere occasions of the will of some god(s), a view associated with the philosopher Nicolas Malebranche Having dispensed with these alternative explanations, he identifies the source of our knowledge of necessary connections as arising out of observation of constant conjunction of certain impressions across many instances. In this way, people know of necessity through rigorous custom or habit, and not from any immediate knowledge of the powers of the will. (Hume 1974:361) 8. Of liberty and necessity (in two parts)[edit] Here Hume tackles the problem of how liberty may be reconciled with metaphysical necessity (otherwise known as a compatibilist formulation of free will). Hume believes that all disputes on the subject have been merely verbal arguments—that is to say, arguments which are based on a lack of prior agreement on definitions. He first shows that it is clear that most events are deterministic, but human actions are more controversial. However, he thinks that these too occur out of necessity since an outside observer can see the same regularity that he would in a purely physical system. To show the compatibility of necessity and liberty, Hume defines liberty as the ability to act on the basis of one's will e.g. the capacity to will one's actions but not to will one's will. He then shows (quite briefly) how determinism and free will are compatible notions, and have no bad consequences on ethics or moral life. 9. Of the reason of animals (comparable to man)[edit] Hume insists that the conclusions of the Enquiry will be very powerful if they can be shown to apply to animals and not just humans. He believed that animals were able to infer the relation between cause and effect in the same way that humans do: through learned expectations. (Hume 1974:384) He also notes that this "inferential" ability that animals have is not through reason, but custom alone. Hume concludes that there is an innate faculty of instincts which both beasts and humans share, namely, the ability to reason experimentally (through custom). Nevertheless, he admits, humans and animals differ in mental faculties in a number of ways, including: differences in memory and attention, inferential abilities, ability to make deductions in a long chain, ability to grasp ideas more or less clearly, the human capacity to worry about conflating unrelated circumstances, a sagely prudence which arrests generalizations, a capacity for a greater inner library of analogies to reason with, an ability to detach oneself and scrap one's own biases, and an ability to converse through language (and thus gain from the experience of others' testimonies). 10. Of miracles Main article: Of Miracles The next topic which Hume strives to give treatment is that of the reliability of human testimony, and of the role that testimony plays a part in epistemology. This was not an idle concern for Hume. Depending on its outcome, the entire treatment would give the epistemologist a degree of certitude in the treatment of miracles. True to his empirical thesis, Hume tells the reader that, though testimony does have some force, it is never quite as powerful as the direct evidence of the senses. That said, he provides some reasons why we may have a basis for trust in the testimony of persons: because a) human memory can be relatively tenacious; and b) because people are inclined to tell the truth, and ashamed of telling falsities. Needless to say, these reasons are only to be trusted to the extent that they conform to experience. (Hume 1974:389) And there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of human testimony, also based on experience. If a) testimonies conflict one another, b) there are a small number of witnesses, c) the speaker has no integrity, d) the speaker is overly hesitant or bold, or e) the speaker is known to have motives for lying, then the epistemologist has reason to be skeptical of the speaker's claims. (Hume 1974:390) There is one final criterion that Hume thinks gives us warrant to doubt any given testimony, and that is f) if the propositions being communicated are miraculous. Hume understands a miracle to be any event which contradicts the laws of nature. He argues that the laws of nature have an overwhelming body of evidence behind them, and are so well demonstrated to everyone's experience, that any deviation from those laws necessarily flies in the face of all evidence. (Hume 1974:391-392) Moreover, he stresses that talk of the miraculous has no surface validity, for four reasons. First, he explains that in all of history there has never been a miracle which was attested to by a wide body of disinterested experts. Second, he notes that human beings delight in a sense of wonder, and this provides a villain with an opportunity to manipulate others. Third, he thinks that those who hold onto the miraculous have tended towards barbarism. Finally, since testimonies tend to conflict with one another when it comes to the miraculous—that is, one man's religious miracle may be contradicted by another man's miracle—any testimony relating to the fantastic is self-denunciating historians are generally to be trusted with confidence, so long as their reports on facts are extensive and uniform. However, he seems to suggest that historians are as fallible at interpreting the facts as the rest of humanity. Thus, if every historian were to claim that there was a solar eclipse in the year 1600, then though we might at first naively regard that as in violation of natural laws, we'd come to accept it as a fact. But if every historian were to assert that Queen Elizabeth was observed walking around happy and healthy after her funeral, and then interpreted that to mean that they had risen from the dead, then we'd have reason to appeal to natural laws in order to dispute their interpretation 11. Of a particular providence and of a future state Hume continues his application of epistemology to theology by an extended discussion on heaven and hell. The brunt of this chapter allegedly narrates the opinions, not of Hume, but of one of Hume's anonymous friends, who again presents them in an imagined speech by the philosopher Epicurus. His friend argues that, though it is possible to trace a cause from an effect, it is not possible to infer unseen effects from a cause thus traced. The friend insists, then, that even though we might postulate that there is a first cause behind all things—God—we can't infer anything about the afterlife, because we don't know anything of the afterlife from experience, and we can't infer it from the existence of God. (Hume 1974:408) Hume offers his friend an objection: if we see an unfinished building, then can't we infer that it has been created by humans with certain intentions, and that it will be finished in the future? His friend concurs, but indicates that there is a relevant disanalogy that we can't pretend to know the contents of the mind of God, while we can know the designs of other humans. Hume seems essentially persuaded by his friend's reasoning. 12. Of the academical or skeptical philosophy The first section of the last chapter is well organized as an outline of various skeptical arguments. The treatment includes the arguments of atheism, Cartesian skepticism, "light" skepticism, and rationalist critiques of empiricism. Hume shows that even light skepticism leads to crushing doubts about the world which - while they ultimately are philosophically justifiable - may only be combated through the non-philosophical adherence to custom or habit. He ends the section with his own reservations towards Cartesian and Lockean epistemologies. In the second section he returns to the topic of hard skepticism by sharply denouncing it. "For here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive skepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigor. We need only ask such a skeptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer... a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail." He concludes the volume by setting out the limits of knowledge once and for all. "When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

Summa Theologiae

Aquinas;

The Nature of the Gods

Cicero; FIX

On the Nature of the Universe

Lucretius; FIX

Apology

Plato; FIX