quiz 5 pols 3224

Muller v. Oregon

1908 - Supreme Court upheld Oregon state restrictions on the working hours of women as justified by the special state interest in protecting women's health Similar to loch near with men work 80 hours in bakery

Sick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

Concerning the discriminatory enforcement of fire safety regulations in San Francisco. The court held that the equal protection clause applies to persons other than black Americans, also protecting noncitizens who are targets of discrimination by state.

Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada

Concerned public education. Lloyd Gaines, a Missouri resident, had graduated from all-black Lincoln University and applied for admission to the University of Missouri's law school. He was denied admission because of his race. The state did not have a law school for it's African American citizens, so the state offered to send qualified black students to a neighboring state that did not have segregationist policies. The SCOTUS concluded, 7-2 that the Missouri plan to play to pay out-of-state tuition did not meet the obligations imposed by the equal protection clause. The state then moved to create a law school for blacks at Lincoln. Although Gaines imposed little substantive change, it served notice that segregation policies were about to undergo a close evaluation.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971)

Facts: After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court. (i.e., the finger plan) in which the plaintiffs and school board appealed to the supreme court. Since the court of appeals approved the plan. Question for SCOTUS: What are the proper guidelines for courts and school boards to follow when implementing Brown's desegregation order? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting points" for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the courts' remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools. Reaffirmed the broad powers of district courts in implementing desegregation.

Brown v. Board of education 2 (1955)

Facts: After its decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I), which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced constitutional principle. The cases stemmed from many different regions of the United States with distinctive conditions and problems. Question for SCOTUS: What process and timetable should be adopted for the integration of public schools? Conclusion: The Brown I decision shall be implemented "with all deliberate speed." The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were ordered to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged federal district court localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed."

Craig v. Boren (1976) 7-2

Facts: An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and Carolyn Whitener, a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory. Question for SCOTUS: Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women? Conclusion: Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case. In striking down the Oklahoma law, the Court established a new standard for review in gender discrimination cases. More demanding than the lowest standard for review -- rational basis -- but less demanding than the highest standard -- strict scrutiny, the majority articulated an in-between standard -- intermediate scrutiny.

Shelly v. Kraemer (1948) 6-0

Facts: In 1911, a St. Louis, Missouri neighborhood enacted a racially restrictive covenant designed to prevent African-Americans and Asian-Americans from living in the area. In 1945, an African-American family (the Shelleys) moved into the neighborhood. Louis Kraemer brought suit to enforce the covenant and prevent the Shelleys from moving into their house. A similar lawsuit arose in Detroit, Michigan. Both state supreme courts enforced the covenants because they were private rather than state action. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal. Question for SCOTUS: Whether a state's enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant is considered state action for the purposes of equal protection analysis? Conclusion: In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Fred Vinson, the Court held that standing alone, racially restrictive covenants do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Private parties may abide by the terms of such a covenant, but they may not seek judicial enforcement of such a covenant, as that would be a state action. Thus, the enforcements of the racially restrictive covenants in state court violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Sweatt v. Painter (1950) 9-0

Facts: In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to whites, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the state of Texas attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students. Question for SCOTUS: Does the Texas admission policy violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required Sweatt's admission to the University of Texas Law School In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes," which was to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena.

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority (1961) 6-3

Facts: In August 1958 William H. Burton, an African American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, and was denied service solely because of his race. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. Question for SCOTUS: Whether a states lease of restaurant space to a restaurant with racially restrictive policies converts the restaurant's discriminatory policies into action for the purposes of equal protection analysis? Conclusion: In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court concluded that the restaurant, as a recipient of assistance by the parking authority, benefited from the city's aid and constituted an financially integral and indispensable part of the state. As such, the Court found that the restaurant and the parking authority were so physically and financially intertwined that the private entity's conduct could be imputed to the government. Thus, it's discrimination could be considered state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Whittaker, dissented. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate dissenting opinion.

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 6-3

Facts: K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him, arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination "state action." Question for the SCOTUS: whether a states issuance of a liquor license to a private club converts the clubs discriminatory policies into state action such that those policies may be subject to the requirements of the Equal protection clause. Conclusion: No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Moose Lodge's refusal to serve food and beverages to Irvis because he was black did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the state action doctrine did not necessarily apply to all private entities that received benefits or services from the government; otherwise, the Court reasoned, all private associations that received electricity, water, and fire protection would be subject to state regulation. The Court found that the Moose Lodge "a private social club in a private building," and thus not subject to the Equal Protection Clause.

Brown v. Board of Education 1 (1954)

Facts: Mostly centered around eight year old Linda Carol Brown an African American students whose parents wanted her to receive education from a segregated school closer to home rather than making the journey to the school reserved for black students. This case was the consolidation of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D.C. relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites were equal. (This was known as the "separate but equal" doctrine.) Question for SCOTUS: What process and timetable should be adopted for the integration of public schools? Conclusion: Separate but equal educational facilities for racial minorities is inherently unequal violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Separate but equal educational facilities for racial minorities is inherently unequal. violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that "separate but equal" facilities are inherently unequal and violate the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the segregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the education and personal growth of African American children. Warren based much of his opinion on information from social science studies rather than court precedent. The decision also used language that was relatively accessible to non-lawyers because Warren felt it was necessary for all Americans to understand its logic. At the same time, this was not the end of segregation quite yet. The subsequent case Brown 2 focused on bring back the lawyers of the original case to litigate and consolidate a remedy and schedule to resolve the segregation issues.

Reed v. Reed (1971) 7-0

Facts: The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court. Question for SCOTUS: Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."

United States v. Virginia (1996)

Facts: The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court. Question for SCOTUS: Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Conclusion: No. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny," Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. [NOTE: Justice Ginsburg's announcement of the Court's opinion may be considered an address to the American public. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position.]

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 7-1

Facts: Following the lead of Florida, Mississippi, and Texas, Louisiana passed a statute in 1890 ordering the separation of the races on all railroads. A group of black and mixed raced residents formed a the Citizens Committee to Test the constitutionality of the Separate Car Law. The railroads that previously complied with the separation law sided with the group because the separate cars were costly. The attempt to invalidate the law were partially successful when the Louisiana Supreme Court struck down the law as it applied to passengers crossing state lines because it placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. However, left open the question of segregated travel solely within states borders. The group hired a renowned civil rights lawyer and advocate Albion Tourgee to take on the segregation statute. Tourgee believed that the best idea to take on the Intra-state travel they should find a mixed raced individual to violate the segregation statute. Homer Adolph Plessy an active civil rights activist who described himself to be seven-eighths white and one-eighth black. On June 7th, Plessy took on the statute and sat in a rail car that listed whites only. He was arrested for violation of the segregation law. Tourgee moved to block the trial on the grounds that the segregation laws were against the 13th and 14th Amendment. Judge Ferguson denied the motion, and appeal was taken to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The State high court under chief justice Francis Tilou who as governor signed the segregation statute into law two years earlier, denied Plessy's petition and the case moved to the U.S. Supreme Court. Question (for SCOTUS): Is the law ordering segregation on intrastate railroad travel a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee? Conclusion: No, By a vote of 7-1, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause did not guarantee social but rather political equality. Therefore, separate treatment is equal treatment under the 14th Amendment. In an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, the majority upheld state-imposed racial segregation. Justice Brown conceded that the 14th Amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law, but held that separate treatment did not imply the inferiority of African Americans. The Court noted that there was not a meaningful difference in quality between the white and black railway cars. In short, segregation did not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination. In dissent, John Marshall Harlan argued that the Constitution was color-blind and that the United States had no class system. Accordingly, all citizens should have equal access to civil rights.

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950)

McLaurin admitted to graduate school at Univ. of Oklahoma, segregated from white students in fear of interracial relationships, holding was that the procedures were unconstitutional because they would impair and inhibit McLaurin's ability to study, engage in discussion, and exchange views with others, University must make the learning environment equal

Loving v. Virginia, (1967) 9-0

Question: In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years). Question for SCOTUS: Whether a statutory scheme which prohibits marriage on the basis of race alone violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1

The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first choice, the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to the popular schools. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 40% white and 60% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. On appeal, a three-judge panel the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Question for SCOTUS: Whether a public school system which has no history of systemic racial segregation or one which has removed all vestiges of discrimination use race in making school assignment choices? Conclusion: No, no, and yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found the District's racial tiebreaker plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling government interest in university admissions, but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education, the District's plan involved no individualized consideration of students, and it employed a very limited notion of diversity ("white" and "non-white"). The District's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious programs. The Court held that the District's tiebreaker plan was actually targeted toward demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity. The District also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-race-conscious means. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy agreed that the District's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity.

Bolling v. Shape (1954)

The court faced thorny issue of racial segregation in the Washington D.C., public schools. This district of Columbia is not a state, and in the 1950s congress was the ultimate authority over Washington, as it is today. The Equal Protection clause was not applicable there. Given the political situation at the time, the court had to find a way to declare all segregated schools unconstitutional. The Justices found a solution in the due process clause "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." This guarantee of essential fairness applies to the federal government and was used by the justices in Bolling as a bar against racial discrimination. The Fifth Amendment reversely incorporated onto the federal government.