SAMS Oral Comps 13-01

6. (AoD) Using theory, history, and doctrine explain the relationship between conceptual and detailed planning.

Argument: Army operational planning consists of both conceptual and detailed planning as part of the integrated planning process. Planning is incomplete without both elements. Theory: Schon - Reflection in Action; Lawson - Analysis, Synthesis, Evaluation; Iteration; Bar Yam - complex systems - a new approach to science, which studies how relationships between parts give rise to be like the behaviors of the system and how the system interacts and forms relationships with its environment. (24); Emergence - The existence of a collective behavior, especially one which is difficult to relate to the behavior of the parts: emergent behavior. History: Wedemeyer: Given the task to "calculate the nation's total production requirements for the defeat of 'potential enemies' of the United States." With little guidance he first needed to understand the environment, propose a strategy, and frame the problem broadly. He devised a concept of operations across multiple theaters in order to appreciate the operational environment and the desired end state the mobilization was intended to satisfy. This all needed to be accomplished before he could complete his detailed planning and document his answers in the "Victory Program." Field Marshal Viscount Slim (Defeat Into Victory) used both conceptual and detailed planning in his operations process during his operations in Burma 1942-1945. After being driven out of Burma, he sought to understand the problem and environment as he and his staff generated a possible solution. The initial defeat compelled him to reframe his understanding of each frame. T.E. Lawrence also used both conceptual and detailed planning in his operations process in the Hejaz. Ch XXXIII captures the entire planning process and associated theory: environmental/problem/solution frame, assessment, reflection in action, complexity, systems, a systems approach, social complexity, asymmetry. Doctrine: FM 5-0, Chapter 2 Conceptual planning - Developing tactical and operational concepts for the overall conduct of military operations is conceptual planning. Understanding the operational environment and the problem, determining the operation's end state, establishing objectives, and sequencing the operation in broad terms all illustrate conceptual planning. Conceptual planning helps answer questions of what to do and why. In general, conceptual planning focuses heavily on synthesis supported by analysis. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to the art of operations and is the focus of the commander with staff support. The battle command activities of understanding and visualization are key aspects of conceptual planning. Detailed planning - Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with the science of war and falls under the purview of the staff, focusing on specifics of execution. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, synchronizing, and directing the force. Unlike conceptual planning, detailed planning does not involve establishing end state conditions and objectives; instead, it works out actions to accomplish the commander's intent and concept of operations.

27. (EOA) Moltke has stated that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. Agree or disagree and provide examples.

Argument: Plans are not made to be set in stone and should not be expected to not change. Plans are not, or should not be, meant to be a step-by-step approach with no variation as a means to achieving the desired. Eisenhower is quoted as saying "Plans are nothing, planning is everything." The act of planning, both conceptual and detailed, provide an increased understanding of the environment, a clear picture of the military problem, and a broad operational approach as well the detailed plan of action to accomplish the desired objectives. However, given the warfare is a complex system that is extremely dependent and sensitive to initial conditions. It is vitally important that plan itself includes and assessment process and the ability to adapt quickly in the face of changing circumstances. Theory: Clausewitz fog and friction; chance and probability; enemy gets a vote. Chaos theory - sensitivity to initial conditions; Boyd - OODA \ History: GEN Cornwallis and his operations against Nathaniel Green: Fabian Strategy, Battle of Cowpens (stood and fought); Napoleon at the Battle of Jena and Auerstadt; Lee at Gettysburg against Meade; Pershing in the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne. Doctrine: FM 5-0, Chapter 2: PLANNING IS CONTINUOUS 2-64. Even after the operation order is issued, planning continues throughout the operations process. Since situations (or the information available about them) continuously change, plans are revised as time allows and variations (options or branches) continue to be developed. Accurately predicting an operation's outcome is difficult, as is anticipating the possible contingencies. As planners develop a solution to a problem, the problem changes. Continuous planning enables organizations to adjust from an existing concept of operations based on a common understanding of the situation and the expected result. Based on their assessment, the commander and staff refine and revise the plan during preparation and execution. Four Pitfalls to Planning: • Attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future. • Trying to plan in too much detail. • Using planning as a scripting process. • Institutionalizing rigid planning methods. German military theorist Helmut von Moltke the Elder said, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." This phrase has worked its way into the US Army vernacular and is generally accepted amongst military professionals today. Despite its widespread acceptance, the question must be asked - was von Moltke correct and does this idea remain valid today? The answer is a resounding yes. Moltke built upon the idea of an earlier, and also widely cited, military theorist - namely Carl von Clausewitz. In his unfinished work, Vom Krieg, Clausewitz defined and described the impact of fog and friction in war. Friction has three primary causes - war's demanding physical efforts, the danger of war itself and the fog (i.e. unclear information) present in battle. Clausewitz explained the impact of friction by stating, "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." Anyone who has experienced combat can speak to the validity of Moltke's statement. Military history is replete with examples. During EOA, SAMS students studied several engagements where the plan did not survive first contact with the enemy. Battle of Westport - The planned objective of the Confederate raid changes numerous times based upon the realities on the ground (i.e. the state of the Confederate forces, the unanticipated strength of the Union Army, the defensive works in major urban areas, the failure of the Missouri populace to rally 'round the Stars and Bars). WWI - The warring nations anticipated a short war, ala the Franco-Prussian War, and built their plans without considering the changes in military technology since 1870-71 (machine guns, barbed wire, artillery improvements). WWII - French plan to refight WWI from the Maginot Line. Mechanized German forces simply drive around it and defeat France in 6 weeks. German plans for another lighting war against Russia collapse due to late start (Italy needs help in Greece), Hitler underestimating Russian resolve, Einsatzgruppen units alienate liberated populace, exceedingly harsh Soviet winter.

35. (EX) You are the Brigade Commander. Explain your role in the Army's Military Decision Making Process and how you will ensure your staff meets your intent and your higher headquarters' mission requirements.

As the brigade commander, I am a key and integrated participant in the planning process. The commander uses MDMP to build plans and orders for extended operations, as well to develop orders for short-term operations within the framework of a long-range plan. The MDMP can be conducted based on a design concept or based on a higher order or directive without the benefits of formal design activities preceding the MDMP. (5-0, 2-43) Depending on the complexity of the problem and time available, design may be used (prior too or in conjunction with MDMP) by the commander and staff. (FM 5-0, 2-46) The commander personally leads both the conceptual and the detailed portions of planning. (FM 5-0, 2-39) Design enables the commander to view a situation from multiple perspectives, drawing on a variety of sources to gain situational knowledge and understanding, and to leverage subject matter experts while formulating greater personal understanding of the operational environment. Design assists the commander and staff to generate change from an existing situation to a desired objective or condition. (FM 5-0, 3-3) The commander, as a member/ leader of the "design team," approves the design concept; consisting of problem statement, initial commander's intent, mission narrative, and commander's planning guidance. The design concept then serves as the foundation for more detailed planning. (FM 5-0, 2-42) Commanders ensure the approaches to planning meet requirements of time, simplicity, and level of detail. They ensure that all plans comply with domestic and international law. Commanders also ensure the product is relevant and suitable for subordinates. Generally, the more involved commanders are in planning, the faster the commander and staff can plan. (FM 5-0, 2-52) The commander provides his/her visualization of their situational understanding of the operational environment and determine what the desired end state the unit is to achieve to meet mission success/accomplishment. (FM 5-0, 2-53) Fundamentals of Effective Planning (FM 5-0, 2-50): • Commanders focus planning. • Commanders plan for full spectrum operations. • Commanders continuously test the validity of assumptions. • Commanders avoid planning pitfalls. The commander is the most important participant in the MDMP. More than simply decision-makers in this process, commanders use their experience, knowledge, and judgment to guide staff planning efforts. While unable to devote all their time to the MDMP, commanders remain aware of the current status of the planning effort, participate during critical periods of the process, and make sound decisions based on the detailed work of the staff. During the MDMP, commanders focus their battle command activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing (5-0, B-2). Key inputs into MDMP by the Commander: o Design Conceptual Planning o Commander's Initial Guidance (Step 1 - Receipt of Mission) o Approval of initial commander's intent, planning guidance, CCIRs and EEFIs (Step 2 - Mission Analysis) o Revised planning guidance (Step 3 - COA Development) o COA Selection, approval of refined commander's intent, CCIR, and EEFI (Step 6 - COA Selection) o Orders Approval (Step 7 - Orders Production)

5. (SDM) Using Joint Pubs 3.0 and 5.0, the CJCSM JOPES volumes 1 and 2 and FMs 3.0 and 5.0, assess the degree to which current doctrine rests on systems thinking, and the level to which current doctrine reflects a detailed and useful application of systems thinking. Be precise in defining terms and illustrate the concepts with evidence from both doctrinal and non-doctrinal material presented in both SDM and in other courses throughout AMSP.

BLUF. Systems thinking is about seeking interrelationships with other systems, not just things. Processes rather than simple structures. Problem is seeing parts as opposed seeing wholes. It is about how learning organizations think about the world. (Checkland and Poulter). Unhealthiness in the world today is directly proportional to our lack of ability to see it as a whole. (Bar Yam). Doctrine. Environmental Frame. FM 5.0. Military deals with violent edge of social systems. Methodologies help you UNDERSTAND problems. 1. Understand the Environment (Use tools) 2. Define the problem in relation to the environment 3. Define the solution frame. 4. Reframe when theories are found faulty or regular review. Readings. Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline. Checkland, P. and J. Poulter. Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account of SSM. Russell Ackoff Lectures on Systems Thinking. Bar-Yam, Y. Making Things Work: Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World, Bousquet, A. The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity. Reframe. This is about learning organizations. Learning does not stop after actions are taken. Learning ties into reflection. Action doesn't mean action complete. Conceptual planning continues after details planning. Unit needs time for reflection. Detail Complexity—simply lots of variables Dynamic Complexity—cause and effect which is more subtle, or complex, adaptive systems. Dynamic Complexity. Survival is the key to a system. Has to learn, to change, to communicate. Change relates to the survival, which seeks balance. When learning and communication occurs, this is feedback. Two kinds of feedback, balancing (negative feedback) and reinforcing (positive feedback). What are Delays? Time required to achieve balance. Growth. The system also tries to grow, which cause imbalance temporarily, causing resistance to growth. There are internal and external limits. Shocks to the system cause internal and external adjustments to occur more rapidly. Effects. When we take action within a system, we do not understand the effects, because of delays. Soft Systems Methodology (SSM). An action oriented process....(p4). A method is the way to do something. Methodology is an approach to how to do business. (Boyd, Osinga, Parsa, Elements of Design, Kuhn, Gaddis, Bousquet, Linn, R. Smith) It is not a solution. A way to frame a problem. SSM is to "learn your way through" something. GOALS- Better Understand. Learn. A structured, organized approach. Checkland and Poulter Model Analysis 1—Intervention (Roles represented: Client, Practitioner, Issue Owners) Analysis 2—Social (Roles, Norms, Values). Creating Solutions culturally Feasible/Acceptable. Analysis 3—Power. Power is a commodity. Getting it. Losing it. Defending it. World View is different, Private vs. Commander. Rich Picture. ID stake holders, values, roles and norms. Trying to get arms wrapped around the system. You can move teams around? Making things Work: Discussion (Bar Yam): Insights from complex systems research about emergence, complexity, patterns, networks and evolution. Globalization means interconnectedness, but there are inhibitors and activators in the global domain. Boundaries are inhibitors. You can have interconnectedness and also have boundaries. In fact, the more interconnectedness, the more boundaries and controls maybe required. Structural, Informational, and Physical Boundaries The Scientific Way of Warfare: Bousquet Discussion. The way to success is embracing uncertainty. Chapter 6. Chaos Theory to Complexity Science. Networks near the edge of chaos, this compromise between order and surprise -- is best able to coordinate complex activities and best able to evolve. -Stuart Kauffman

22. (EOA) What are the challenges of command at the operational level? How do they differ from tactical command? Give examples from the course.

FM 3-0, Operations, admits that the levels of war have no finite limits or boundaries (para 7-5). These levels are characterized by the different responsibilities and actions performed at each echelon of military headquarters. The headquarters at each level of war have different perspectives, requirements, and constraints associated with them and different horizons for planning, preparation, and execution. "Operational-level commanders typically synchronize the activities of military and civilian organizations and agencies across large areas. Tactical commanders focus primarily on employing combined arms within an area of operations. They sometimes work with civilian agencies on political, informational, and economic issues. Often, tactical commanders receive missions that divert combat power from tasks that seem more urgent at lower levels. It is a commander's responsibility to recognize and resolve this tension." (para 7-6) "A string of tactical victories does not guarantee success at the operational and strategic levels. Tactical success, while required to set operational conditions, must be tied to achieving the strategic end state. Wars are won at the operational and strategic levels; yet without tactical success, a major operation cannot achieve the desired end state. Commanders overcome this tension through open and continuous dialog, a thorough understanding of the situation across the levels of war, and a shared vision that integrates and synchronizes actions among the echelons." (para 7-7) "The operational level links employing tactical forces to achieving the strategic end state. At the operational level, commanders conduct campaigns and major operations to establish conditions that define that end state. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. Major operations are not solely the purview of combat forces. They are typically conducted with the other instruments of national power. Major operations often bring together the capabilities of other agencies, nations, and organizations." (para7-12) "Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose commanders employ major forces. Operational commanders position and maneuver forces to shape conditions in their area of operations for their decisive operation. Commanders exploit tactical victories to gain strategic advantage or reverse the strategic effects of tactical losses." (para 7-13) One way to describe the difference between tactical and operational command is that tactical commanders must do things right, while operational commanders must do the right things. At the operational level, commanders must decide which campaigns and major operations, conducted when and where, will achieve the strategic objectives. At the tactical level, commanders must fight and win their battles and engagements in order to achieve the objectives of the campaigns and major operations. It is often said that GEN Westmoreland's conduct of the Vietnam War was a string of tactical successes resulting in operational and strategic failure (EOA 13). Conversely, MG Nathaniel Greene and his forces "lost" nearly every engagement during the 1780-1781 campaign of the American Revolutionary War, but ultimately achieved operational and strategic success (EOA 1).

33. (EX) FM 3-0 makes explicit the simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability (outside U.S.) or civil support (inside the U.S.) tasks a central feature of the Army's operational concept. Explain the value of a concept that requires the simultaneous combination of three types of operations.

FM 3-0's articulation of the need to simultaneously execute elements of full spectrum operations (FSO, definition para. 3-2) encapsulates what in theory the Army should be able to do and puts a name on what it has in fact been doing to some degree over the course of its history. The Army takes for granted the need to train both offensive and defensive tasks. The Army has been asked to also simultaneously conduct tasks, which fall under today's categories of stability and civil support operations; these tasks include civil security and control and support to civil law enforcement. See for example Union Army operations in New Orleans and other southern cities during the American Civil War and any number of security issues between Native Americans and settlers on the frontier from the 1700s-1900s, all done in conjunction with offensive and defensive operations. As long as the Army operates among a population, it will need to train to conduct civil security and assist local law enforcement with this task. Simultaneous execution of elements of FSO is also valuable in its ability to empower commanders to exercise mission command, the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. Mission command provides subordinates latitude to accomplish the mission as they see fit within the commander's intent. Subordinates need this freedom of action to be able to react to, as Chapter 2 of FM 3-0 describes, sudden changes in the level of violence that may precipitate a shift from one type of operation to another. The concept of FSO is flexible enough to accommodate the Army's emphasis on the ability to practice mission command. Nevertheless, being able to simultaneously execute elements of FSO requires a commander to be able to prioritize tasks for training and execution. Army units can not do all tasks across all four types of operations either simultaneously or well. The Army still has little expertise across the board in certain stability operations tasks. It is up to the commander to pick what tasks he needs to accomplish based on directives and the context of the situation and train to and execute those specific tasks, often simultaneously, to fulfill the spirit of FSO. One way to prioritize tasks is to focus on those that are common to all four types of operations: developing intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, information operations, protection, and area and route security (FM 3-0, para. 3-119). Doing these common tasks well can help a unit preclude surprise and enable them to better anticipate shifts in the level of violence. Leveraging individual expertise within the unit and from JIIM partners remains the other main way the commander prepares for situations in which he has accepted risk in terms of lower training priority. The bottom line: commanders must interpret their particular niche of FSO and how they are going to train to and execute elements thereof. Sources: Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 27 February 2008), Chapters 2 and 3; see also Change 1, 22 February 2011. Paragraph citations above are the same in both versions.

26. (EOA) Discuss the cognitive tension between strategy, operations, and tactics. Provide at least one example from the course.

Military strategy is derived from policy and national, or grand strategy. Strategy itself is not about battle or any tactical action; the aim of the strategist is not to seek battle, it is to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself achieve a decision in support of policy goals, the strategy's continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. (Liddell Hart 325). Operations link strategic goals to tactics. Tactics is defined as the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (FM 3-0), and includes military actions in battles and engagements. Strategy sets the conditions and shapes boundaries for the tendency of tactical success; operations link the tactics to the strategy. There is a tension between strategy and tactics. In many ways they are opposites, linked only through operations (Dolman, Pure Strategy, 14). Shimon Naveh may have said it best when describing the tension between strategy and tactics as the tension between steering a whole system toward a goal, and steering individual parts. The individual parts have to be steered, but this causes the tension because it is difficult to keep individual goals pushing the whole toward the overall goal. This requires a controlled disequilibrium in the organization as a whole. Headquarters at the operational level of war control the disequilibrium. Assuming an appropriate strategy, the operational level is dominant in war because it serves to control the tactics toward the strategic end (Naveh 9). Operations are defined in reference to strategy and tactics, which is why there is not a cognitive tension between operations and the strategy or tactics. Operations serves to remove the tension between the strategic aim and tactical missions (Naveh 13). Without it, even a tactically excellent army would not be able to bring about strategic effects. An example of the tension between strategy and tactics occurred with Moltke and Bismarck at Königgrätz. Moltke's subordinate commanders were winning tactically, and they were arranged to provide operational success. The Prussians could have continued south to seize all of Austria. Instead, Bismarck kept Moltke from advancing, even though he would have enjoyed tactical success, in deference to strategic aims. Bismarck understood that stopping and allowing Austria to survive would be palatable to the rest of the European powers and gave Prussian victory a better chance of "sticking." If they had pursued, they would have had temporary success but, paradoxically, left themselves with too much territory to defend, an Austria and Hungary rife with ethnic and other problems, and the rest of Europe with legitimate reason to attack Prussia. By not advancing, Prussia was able to unite the German states under Prussian control. Bismarck's purposeful operational limitation of tactical success brought about favorable strategic conditions. His decision resolved the tension between tactical and strategic goals. Arthur Grant, Operational Art and the Gettysburg Campaign; Craig, Battle of Königgrätz; Citino, The German Way of War; Dolman, Pure Strategy; Liddell-Hart, Strategy; Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence

21. (EOA) Using a historical example and the doctrinal principles of mission command, explain how a commander and his staff developed and conducted a successful campaign.

Mission Command: The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to accomplish full spectrum operations. It uses the art of command and the science of control, supported by staffs, to integrate the war-fighting functions and enable agile and adaptive commanders, leaders and organizations. Operational Art is: The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs - supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience - to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war (JP 3-0). Example: U.S. Grant in 1864-1865 Grant was able to link the desired strategic objective (Lincoln desired to preserve the Union and by 1864 he understood that it would require exhausting the Confederates, to tactical tasks through operational art. (Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War, p 485) • Grant's use of mission command is very much influenced by the industrial revolution...the advent and utility of trains, the telegraph, and weapons of increased lethality facilitated the U.S. being able to move away from the single dense mass‖ and instead rely on mission command. • • Through Operational Art and Mission Command, Grant was able to synthesize developments in tactics and strategy around the dominant problem of mid-nineteenth-century field command: the threat of positional trench warfare, and efforts to sustain the mobility of armies in the field. • Grant 's mission command enabled the employment of several independent field armies distributed in the same theater of ops (facilitated the use of both the direct and indirect approaches to attack the enemies COG) ex. Grant fixed and attritted Lee in Virginia (direct approach) while simultaneously Sherman destroyed the Confederates LOCs and resources (indirect approach) - See Schneider, James. The Loose Marble and the Origins of Operational Art • Employment of quasi-army group headquarters to control them • Log structure to support distributed ops • Integrated design of a distributed campaign plan • Conduct of distributed ops • Strategic employment of cavalry • Deep strike • Conduct of joint ops • Execution of distributed free maneuver • Continuous front • Distributed battlefield • Exercise of field command by officers of operational‖ vision....and disciplined initiative . o Signal Corps now supporting Grant: Allow for improved strategic communication with field commanders Numbers and resources do not dictate the outcome of wars. Utilization, execution, and the will to win determine victory. The quality of the management of available resources and the quality of the strategy and its direction profoundly influence these factors (Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War, p.19). Grant initially attempted to cross geographic obstacles to gain superior positioning against Vicksburg by crossing the river, attacking strong points, and digging canals to establish alternate lines of communication. Grant's attempts failed, and he began to suffer increased tensions from Lincoln and his contemporaries. Grant, in the depths of military entropy, adapted to his circumstances and seized upon emergent strategy by cutting his supply lines and crossing the river at a seemingly inferior location. Using speed, surprise, maneuver, and tempo, Grant outmaneuvered Pemberton's forces and quickly changed the entire balance of the battle by trapping Pemberton's forces within the Vicksburg stronghold.

10. (AoD) Discuss the function and utility of narrative in design as well as its relationship to discourse. Focus on defining what narrative and discourse are, what comprises them, how you 'do' them, how they function, and how they inform design.

Narrative is a contrast to a conventional description, it goes beyond lists of facts and assumptions. (AoD, 31). Creative thinking is critical to building a narrative. (AoD 65). Metaphor provides an organizing logic for narrative. Narrative is a story that is constructed, intentionally or unintentionally. Its purpose is to give meaning to artifacts. So to narrate is to engage in the process of and production of a story by proposing a question in relation to the artifacts themselves. What is the meaning of what I see? Where does this story begin and end? How do different possible boundaries of this story in time and space change my understanding of what I am considering? Why has this happened? To narrate is to develop a technique consciously and self-consciously giving a plot to artifacts and events that determine the course of a story. Narrative is meaning ascribed to data. It asks 'why' and answers 'because' as it reconfigures time, space, events and artifacts. Narrative construction - conscious bounding of events and artifacts in time and space - produces an understanding of the logic of what is observed. (AoD,72) Design distinguishes itself from conventional planning in its goal of understanding - systemic explanation - rather than complete knowledge of the facts. Narrative is a mechanism for producing systemic understanding. Once one grasps that narrative is the connection of data and meaning through plot, it becomes clear that information - complete as it may be even temporarily - is incomplete itself because there is no inherent meaning in a collection of facts. Narrative is an important resource for the designer as a tool for developing self-awareness. Narrative is a product in the process of design that communicates the design team's explanation of the environment, the problem, and the solution - with the logic of that explanation uniting understanding, context, and action. (AoD, 73) Discourse: (AoD 76-80) Narrative gets value from discourse and can only function in relation to discourse. Discourse is essential to narrative creation and refinement, and to producing a common understanding both within the design team and with the strategic sponsor. It is a reasoning process that incorporates the complete range of objects, events, attributes, relations, that are expressed, assumed or implied, in discussion. It is a technique that intends to establish fact in an event or situation under consideration. Discourse is central to design as a mode of learning and because in its nature it is central to generating understanding. If creativity is a result of combining the known with the unknown through reconfiguration - unbounding and rebounding - then discourse provides the mechanism that accomplishes this. Design consciously identifies tensions through its awareness of narratives in discourse in an effort to both enhance understanding and opportunities for learning, and to identify asymmetries that can be exploited. Designers themselves practice discourse to consciously expose their own preconceptions as they engage over fact and meaning in context through constructing and reconstructing narrative explanation. The emergent explanation of the environment then becomes the underlying logic of the approach taken, and a frame of reference for further learning as the systems exhibits difference when action generates change. Design uses discourse as the vehicle, or medium, for learning and understanding. Discourse requires discipline, suspension of disbelief, and the ability to listen. P77-78. While "Narrating the Self" (Ochs and Capps) is was the reading for Narrative, and The Fifth Discipline (Senge) covered Discourse, the Art of Design Text has the best information on both and includes relationships of Narrative and Discourse to other Design concepts as well as other references including FM 5-0.

15. (ANP) Evaluate some traditions of American foreign policy. How do those traditions inform military strategy and operational art?

Note that all "Foreign Policy Traditions" in the ANP syllabus center on McDougall's Promised Land, Crusader State - The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 McDougall's compelling thesis is that there is a fundamental dichotomy in US Foreign Policy, with two competing doctrines each influenced by four different themes. There is the Promised Land (or Old Testament) impulse, which is based on four key traditions: 1. Exceptionalism (focus on liberty at home, avoiding entangling alliances) 2. Unilateralism (as opposed to isolationism) 3. The American System (Monroe Doctrine) 4. Expansionism (Manifest Destiny) This was the prevailing approach to foreign policy—designed to protect America's liberty and independence from the outside world—until 1898 and the Spanish American War, at which point a New Testament (Crusader State) gained ascendancy, likewise guided by four traditions: 1. Progressive Imperialism 2. Liberal Internationalism (Wilsonianism) 3. Containment 4. Global Meliorism (reforming other nation's internal problems) Conclusions: "The United States went off the rails, in terms of its honored traditions, when it went to war with Spain in the first place (118)." "Our first four foreign policy traditions—the Old Testament of American diplomacy—reflected that balance of reason and faith (203)." From: http://brothersjudd.com -review: "...we should return to the Old Testament—taking care of our own internal problems; being prepared to act unilaterally, if at all; remaining strong enough to deter challenges; and thereby, continuing to fulfill our unique destiny." Also... "...Americans have developed eight discrete traditions in their attitudes and policies toward the outer world...none of the traditions has ever really died: to this day, all command a certain amount of loyalty among a portion of the American people, while several of them coexist uneasily within individual breasts (xi)." And... Foreign policy is not just about who is in office at the time. McDougall challenges the concept—or myth—that foreign policy changes when the President changes. Synthesis: How do those traditions inform military strategy and operational art? This question almost seems to be a ruse to drag the SAMster into a lengthy discussion regarding the terms "strategy" and "operational art" and therefore spend a vast amount of time attempting to define those terms. However, based on McDougall's Promised Land, Crusader State, one could argue that any strategic or operational planning must be able to support any of the eight foreign policy traditions that McDougall identifies. McDougall asserts that all eight of these traditions to some extent, exist in our current form of government and within the hearts of policy makers and may not change as America's leadership changes. Additional information on the "isms": Exceptionalism - "colonial rebels who founded the United States believed that their country was destined to be different and presumably better than others on earth (16)." -also: "...the essence of Exceptionalism was Liberty at home (40)." "..the essence of Unilateralism was to be at Liberty to make foreign policy independent of the "toils of European ambition." Unilateralism never meant that the United States should, or for that matter could, sequester itself or pursue an ostrich-like policy toward all foreign countries. It simply meant, as Hamilton and Jefferson both underscored, that the self-evident course for the United States was to avoid permanent, entangling alliances and to remain neutral in Europe's wars except when our Liberty—the first hallowed tradition—was at risk (40)." "The American System we associate with Monroe was composed of three principles: no new colonization, no transfer of existing colonies, and no re-imposition of colonial rule (71)." "He (Monroe) did not mean to promise that the United States would intervene to secure Latin American independence (71)." "Expansion was a logical corollary of the first three U.S. foreign policy traditions. For if the United States was to remain free and independent—the first tradition—then it must pursue a unilateral foreign policy—the second tradition. If Unilateralism was to survive, then it must promote an American System of states—the third tradition. But it was not enough that the United States remain aloof from Europe. It must preempt European bids for influence over the vast unsettled lands that remained in North America—hence the fourth tradition (78)." Two schools of Manifest Destiny (82): 1) Peaceful, automatic, gradual, and governed by self-determination - led by John O'Sullivan. 2. Belligerent, insatiable, and impatient - led by journalists and politicians from Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois. "In light of Unilateralism, the American System, and Expansionism, therefore, the imperialism of 1898-1917 was no aberration, but the sum of initiatives deemed necessary to defend America's traditional posture. And that may explain why the United States seemed to turn away from imperialism after the short burst. Once the navy had the bases it needed and foreigners were prevented from grabbing the bases they wanted, American interest required no more (118)." Wilson's rationale for war: make the world safe for democracy. Wilson believes in the "perfect-ability" of man versus the Founding Fathers who believed we are imperfect people but we are going to do the best with what we have. -this relates back to his book—"Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics"—which critiques the Founding Fathers. The critique of Wilsonianism is that we act militarily out of moral reasons when in fact we are acting out of interests; therefore, there really is no double-standard per se when we do not act militarily in parts of the world where human rights violations and the like occur. The hypocrisy occurs when one says we are moral people and we stand behind our values for example yet, America does not act in places of the world which are not in our interests. Containment was a strategy to limit and prevent Soviet expansionism. NSC-68 - Communist ideology ultimately calls for a world revolution and therefore is a threat to the American System. "Global Meliorism is simply the socio-economic and politico-cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better place. It is based on the assumption that the United States can, should, and must reach out to help other nations share in the American dream (173)." President Kennedy = Global Meliorist. Vietnam War = Global Meliorist war (184). McDougall's argument is that Kennedy crossed the line to Meliorism when the U.S. abandoned the authoritarian Vietnamese leader Diem in favor of someone more democratic (187). Reference Freedman's ¬Deterrence: "Deterrence then will not be the driver of foreign policy but the benign consequences of its underlying consistency and coherence (130)." Deterrence is a component of strategy or containment. Deterrence is not, in and of itself, a policy.

When you start......

Questions will not be ones that have "right" answers. Write the question down, think about the answer, and then answer it. Don't just jump into the answer. Draw a sketch when asked to. Will usually get follow up question after 1st question. Don't be surprised. This is not an indicator of failure. Once you know who you have: ID courses taught, introduce self to committee and provide copy of monograph ("is there anything in particular I should focus on in preparing for the exams").

30. (TCC) Describe the concept of operations that your group devised. What implications does this have for future force structure and acquisitions?

SUBJECT: Central Command (CENTCOM) Scenario: "Riyad Rumble". 1. Purpose: Provide an overview of a potential scenario within CENTOM's area of operations within the next twenty years (2031) that would require U.S. military intervention. 2. Scenario: In this scenario, the disparity between the wealthy and the poor within Saudi Arabia has widened to such a degree that the society is at a tipping point. As a result, a Sunni insurgent group emerges in Saudi Arabia seeking government economic reform. This group wants greater wealth sharing of the profits from national oil revenue between the government and the people. The insurgent strategy is to bring world pressure to bear on the Government of Saudi Arabia to institute change. Their tactic is to disrupt the flow of oil to the world by targeting oil infrastructure. 4. Enemy Most Likely Course of Action (EMLCOA): The insurgent group establishes sanctuary areas in northern Yemen and conducts attacks against the oil pipelines in southern Saudi Arabia. They also conduct terrorist attacks and information operations in the cities. Information operations are conducted to influence the world's governments to pressure the Government of Saudi Arabia to reform. 5. Friendly concept of operations: CENTCOM assists the Government of Saudi Arabia through increased security force assistance (SFA)/foreign internal defense (FID), intelligence support and limited direct action by special operations forces (SOF). SFA/FID will enhance the Government of Saudi Arabia's ability to cope with the insurgency. Intelligence support provides enhanced targeting capability to the Government of Saudi Arabia. SOF conducts limited direct action against high value targets in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 6. Implications for force capabilities and strategy over the next 20-25 years: a. Maintain/increase Arabic linguist capability b. Increase HUMINT capabilities in the region c. Maintain capability to perform SFA/FID d. Conduct detailed joint intelligence preparation of the battlefield in anticipation of conflict e. Re-evaluate current security cooperation with Saudi Arabia to ensure resources are provided to enable the Government of Saudi Arabia to maintain order

18. (ANP) Relate American foreign policy traditions to the American conduct of small wars.

Since the War of 1812, American foreign policy tradition centers on guaranteeing its security. America's conduct of small wars was military action deemed necessary to ensure its security in the form of preemption and expansionism. In Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, John Gaddis asserts that unlike its Asian and Europe counterparts, America's maintains a foreign policy based off the Monroe Doctrine that expands its hegemony outwards, not inwards, following a traumatic security experience from a foreign threat. The following are examples: Westward expansion/Frontier wars. This was un-colonized territory. From the U.S. perspective, if the U.S. didn't seize control, then European colonial powers would first. As a result, the Indian wars occurred in the West. The Spanish-American War resulted in U.S. re-asserting its hegemony in the Western hemisphere against European powers, and also resulted in U.S. gaining control of previously held Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. U.S. counterinsurgency operations (another small war) in the Philippines that followed was the U.S. retaining control of its "sphere of security" since it now had control of those colonies and Hawaii as a U.S. territory. After World War I (Wilson), U.S. policy transitioned towards global meliorism a.k.a. Wilsonianism. The U.S. experience in Vietnam was another small war where military force was deployed to buy time for the civil programs to build South Vietnam into a viable non-Communist state. Operation Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, Gaddis, argues, were small wars consistent with historical American policy traditions and it wouldn't have mattered if it was Gore or Bush as President; after 9/11, the U.S. would have invaded Afghanistan and eventually Iraq as part of its tradition of expanding outward to guarantee its security. References: Surprise, Security, and the American Experience by John Gaddis Promised Land, Crusader State by Walter A. McDougall (Chapter 8)

Step2: 1st Question generally a long one.

Step2: 1st Question generally a long one. Some professors will explicitly require you to use the board or butcher paper. "Pick your favorite campaign and give me your analysis of the campaign. Use a Butcher board to draw a graphic to help you answer the question." (AKA Dr. Shifferle) Make sure you listen to the question and they may direct your answer such as Command or Events. So What: Have a campaign laid out, drawing in mind, and use elements of Operational Design to answer. Have Vicksburg and another Campaign in mind in case you have to redirect. (~10-15 min prep and required time to answer)

31. (TCC) Describe the difference between war and warfare. What are the implications of this distinction for US military operations in the 21st century?

Theory: Hoffman's Inside Terrorism attempting to define terrorism as a separate grand strategy or a warfare tactic. Any tactic that is political, non-state, psychological, and against innocents is a type of warfare, but only part of a greater use of war to achieve political goals. Cronen: on how to end terrorism or to end war: 6 methods of decapitation, negotiations, success, failure, repression, and reorientation. Qiao Liang's Unrestricted Warfare: International norms when asymmetric warfare is the only way to defeat the US. Will this lead to urban battles? Clausewitz: War is a continuation of politics (pp 86-87). War is an act of force, a pure theory of war (Page 75-80) Delbruck's war are a form of confrontation or competition. Warfare are methods to choose from. Strachan p44. "Strategy was appropriated by politicians and diplomats, by academics and think-tank pundits, and it became increasingly distant from the use of the engagement for the purposes of the war", A401. Doctrine: No definition of war, but there are "War Plans" that are only focused on military aspects. University of Michigan's Correlates of War (COW) definition of war: Sustained combat involving substantial fatalities: "We must define war in terms of violence. Not only is war impossible without violence (except of course in the metaphorical sense), but we consider the taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic of war Practice: War is the art and science of warfare, a state of hostility, a struggle or competition between opposing forces for a particular end. Warfare is the how, the activity or military operation. Libyans operation approved by an international community and not through a national congress. Will all future wars require UN legitimacy? One method is deterrence and prevention options, contradicting Clausewitz's sole purpose as the destruction of the enemy. (Dr. Zenko's DMO brief - discrete military options with limited goals)

16 (ANP) Using a historical example, examine the relationships between the application of military force and the use of diplomacy.

strategy — A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0) It all begins with National Strategy. Before discussing the application of the instruments of national power and their relationship it is key to understand under what context those elements are being applied. That is to say, what is the overall strategy and then we can better understand how those elements are applied. In the West, and particularly for the US, defining a strategy has been somewhat difficult. As compared to the consistency one experiences in an autocratic government, term limits in the US lead to changes in strategy. As David Lai stated in his article Learning from the Stones: A GO Approach... we see the difference between the US and China. Lai argues that the Chinese put heavy emphasis on strategy while the US relies on overwhelming force and advanced capability. In Seminar 4 we were lucky enough to see this first hand through our Seminar Leader Col Valledor who was put in the position of employing military power without an understanding / unable to get an understanding of what was the overarching strategy. But that is not the example, I want to use, I want to look at what Sadat was able to do in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and illustrate how he used the diplomatic and military instruments of power. First, it begins with a strategy. Sadat had a clear strategy. He wanted to change the way the Israeli's saw themselves and change American policies towards the region (improve them with the US). How was he going to achieve this strategy. He needed to conduct a cross-canal attack into Israel and hold that ground. He knew the Israeli's were better equipped, but when his new surface to air capabilities and anti-tank weapons if he could gain that territory and hold it under that protective umbrella he could force the Israeli's to attack his strong defenses inflicting many casualites on the Israelis. But, as Gawrych writes, Sadat using astute diplomacy was going to turn these small military gains into political victory. Diplomatically, he engaged the Syrians to get them to open another front against the Israelis. This would prevent the Israelis from massing against the Egyptians. Furthermore, through diplomacy the Egyptians acquired the Soviet SAMs and anti-tank missiles that would be critical in the fight. Sadat also looked to shore up his relations with other Arab states such as Saudi Arabia to get funding and to place economic strain on the US to wake them up to the situation. Establishing a clear strategy and effectively using the diplomatic and military instruments of power in support of that strategy resulted in Sadat and Egypt achieving strategic success. Other Authors • Mintzberg o Strategy as a plan, pattern, position, perspective o Intended, Deliberate, Emergent, Realized, Unrealized • Dohlman o Position of continuous advantage • Strachan o grand strategy was to coordinate and direct all the resources of the nation towards the attainment of the political object of the war--the goal defined by national policy o Strategy is designed to make war useable by the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfill its political objectives. o Strategy is iterative, a dialogue where ends also relfect means, and where the result--also called strategy--is a compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to implement it.

11. (AoD) Define adaptive work and describe how one leads this type of effort.

(See D322 from 20 Oct 10, Leadership Without Easy Answers by Ronald A. Heifetz. References below.) Adaptive work is defined as an adaptive challenge when a gap exists between values and circumstances and that gap cannot be closed by application of current technology, know-how, or routine behavior. "Adaptive work consists of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs, or behavior. The exposure and orchestration of conflict - internal contradictions - within individuals and constituencies provide the leverage for mobilizing people to learn new ways." P. 22 The example studied for class was the 1983 case between the Environmental Protection Agency and the American Smelting and Refining Company copper plant near Tacoma, WA (p. 88). The processing of copper ore involved the use of arsenic, which had been determined to cause cancer. William Ruckleshaus was the head of the EPA who was responsible for protecting the public health. His involvement required that he: - Identified an adaptive challenge - Regulated level of distress - Focused attention on relevant issues - Devised strategy that shifted responsibility for the problem to the primary stakeholders Other terms introduced include: Adaptive vs. Technical Work (pp. 73-76) Routine - technical work Non-routine - technical to adaptive work Non-routine/requiring learning - adaptive work Holding Environment (pp. 110-113) The holding environment contains the stresses of the adaptive efforts (relationship) and holds attention to facilitate adaptation. Ruckleshaus established an environment of trust and respect between the EPA and the stakeholders in Tacoma. Additionally, he had the authority of the federal government to take legal action against the company should it be necessary. Ruckleshaus, therefore, was able to establish an environment that convinced every stakeholder that they needed to participate in the process in order to achieve some semblance of their individual interests. Directing Attention (pp. 113-114) Ruckleshaus was able to direct people's attention to the issues requiring adaptive change and away from emotional issues by: Reality testing Managing info/framing issues Orchestrating conflicting perspectives Choosing the decision-making process The following references include my journal notes and a couple of book reviews/summaries. 20 Oct 10 - D322 Third reading: Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1994. 13-27, 30-35, 57-66, 73-76, 88-103, 110-124 [66 pages] CARL SAMS Books 303.34 H465L Enabler: You will see terms borrowed from Heifetz's explanation of leadership scattered throughout the design literature. Heifetz outlines leadership in terms of adaptive work. Read the section on adaptive work, then delve into his description of leading from a position of authority in Part II. You will find examples sprinkled liberally throughout. The specifics of the Tacoma crisis illustration are of lesser importance than getting to the conclusions Heifetz makes about the nature of adaptive leadership. Of interest to future staff officers, Heifetz has two chapters in Part III on how one leads when he/she does not occupy a formal position of authority. We do not read these for this lesson, but you may find them worth your time for later personal development. 2. Ronald A. Heifetz is the King Hussein bin Talal Senior Lecturer in Public Leadership, co-founder of the Center for Public Leadership at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and co-founder of Cambridge Leadership Associates. Known for his seminal work during the past two decades on the practice and teaching of leadership, his research focuses on how to build adaptive capacity in societies, businesses, and nonprofits. His book Leadership Without Easy Answers (Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1994) has been translated into many languages and is currently in its 13th printing. 4. Heifetz' thesis is that leadership is organized around two key distinctions: technical versus adaptive problem solving and leadership versus authority. P. 8 5. Leadership cannot be value-free if we desire more of it. Leadership is a social contract mobilizing people to tackle tough problems. P. 15 Theories Situationalists - conditions at the time make the leader/hero Trait Approach - personal traits make the leader Contingency Theory - combines personal traits and situation Transactional - leaders and followers exchange needs for value Towards a definition of leadership 1. Resembles current cultural assumptions, one's normal understanding of what it means to lead applies 2. Practical 3. Socially useful activities 4. Broad definition of social usefulness Adaptive work Adaptive challenge when a gap exists between values and circumstances and gap cannot be closed by application of current technology, know-how, or routine behavior Leadership - action to clarify values Dominance - coercion/habitual deference Authority - conferred power to perform a service, voluntary (A Bug's Life) Authority culture - USSR, Iraq - social habit Responsibility of Authority - direct, protect, orient, resolve conflict, establish norms (founding father) In times of stress - charismatic authority may bring revolutionary change Adaptive vs. Technical Work Routine - technical Non-routine - technical to adaptive Non-routine/requiring learning - adaptive "If we think (the people) not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion." Thomas Jefferson p. 91 EPA Tacoma, WA case study with EPA dir. Ruckleshaus - Identified an adaptive challenge - Regulated level of distress - Focused attn on relevant issues - Devised strategy that shifted responsibility for problem to primary stakeholders Authority - formal, informal Holding Environment - contains stresses of the adaptive efforts (relationship), holds attn to facilitate adaptation Directing attention - getting people to pay attn to the issues requiring adaptive change Reality testing Managing info/framing issues Orchestrating conflicting perspectives Choosing the decision-making process 7. A manager must be able to differentiate between technical problems and adaptation problems. Only then can he step in and take the correct actions to manage the situation. Who knows, it might even be termed "leadership" by someone when it is all over.

3. (SDM) Choose one of the applicatory readings from SDM (Parsa, Brinton, Kalyvas, or Herbst), and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem.

2. Reading chosen: Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (SDM 114). 3. Paul Reynolds' defines theory as, "abstract statements that are considered part of scientific knowledge in either the set-of laws, the axiomatic, or the causal process forms." (Reynolds 1971, 11). Key in our examination was Reynolds' idea that "explaining why one event is associated with another, or what causes an event, is the basic purpose of a theory." (Reynolds 1971, 17). 4. Did the author present a theory? a. Yes. Herbst provides a social scientific explanation that integrates these observations into a coherent picture. Herbst put forth a state consolidation model (See diagram). The ability to broadcast power over a state is impacted by these 3 methods of consolidating 'power over space/distance.' b. Why do states seem so ineffective in Africa? Why are they unable to do what states are supposed to do? Why do bad policy and corruption characterizes most institutions? Herbst persuasively argues that the key to this situation is to be found in the historical evolution of African state institutions. Due to low population density, lack of interstate conflict, and the perverse role of colonialism and the international state system, African states did not develop institutions that could effectively control and police their territories. They did not develop institutions to mobilize resources or mobilize people. Out of this flows a lack of democracy, corruption, and bad economic policies. 5. How did the reading illustrate the utility of theory? a. Social science theories aim to provide simple ways of classifying and understanding an endlessly complex reality. With a few simple notions, however, Herbst provides an explanation of state failure in Africa. It seems highly plausible that this institutional failure is the key source of misery in the lives of millions of people. Portions of theory may apply to governance difficulties in the 'hinterlands' of Pakistan and Afghanistan. b. One criticism is that some think the model is not applicable everywhere (e.g. USA and Australia formed functioning institutions with comparatively low population densities). In some ways, Africa may be viewed as unique combination of factors. BLUF: Herbst proposal, while argued by the author as a theory, is necessarily plausible or generally accepted by the majority of social scientist. Even though the cost of expanding, nature of boundaries, and the design of the state ruling system have an impact on a number of African nations, this are not unique conditions/ circumstances to Africa. These same conditions can be argued for other geographical locations; for example: The pre- and post-colonial eras in the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan region can also be argued to have been impacted by the fact that the British (Russian in Afghanistan circa 1780-1893s) did not have the financial capability (cost) to properly expand the hinterlands, the nature of the national boundaries and the way the colonial powers drew them (especially the Durand Line in 1893; Afghanistan/Pakistan border), and the state ruling systems (pseudo democracy in Pakistan and a Kingdom-turned-failed state in Afghanistan) had many of the same effects on the Asian sub-continent that Herbst argues makes Africa, in accordance with his theory, unique.

36. (EX) Both JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 identify a thorough mission analysis as crucial to planning. Explain the primary purpose of mission analysis and describe how JOPP differs from MDMP during the mission analysis phase. What are the command and control implications of these differences? Would a brief to your division commander using MDMP be different than a brief to the SECDEF or CJCS using JOPP?

37. According to FM 5-0, the purpose of Mission Analysis is "to better understand the situation and problem, and identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and most importantly why." JP 5-0 states that the primary purpose of Mission Analysis is "to understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process." 38. JP 5-0 Mission Analysis Steps (15, really 14 if you take out "Develop Mission Analysis Brief") FM 5-0 Mission Analysis Steps (18) The most obvious difference in the two MA processes is that JOPP directs the identification of friendly and enemy centers of gravity (COGs). There are operational and strategic centers of gravity. However, at the tactical level, these are called decisive points. In addition, at the tactical level, FM 5-0 directs IPB, ISR synch, and ISR planning. These steps do not exist in JOPP. Lastly, JOPP considers the national strategic endstate that drives the CDR's military endstate his objectives, and the initial effects. In MDMP, however, tasks and purposes are nested to ensure that tactical endstates are linked to operational objectives. 40. What are the command and control implications of these differences? In JOPP or an the joint strategic/operational-level, we must ensure that assigned mission, end state and objectives of the next higher commander can be accomplished either in a single operations or in a campaign (due to the complexity and likely duration or intensity of the operation. Additionally, we must ensure that assigned command and control relationship are mutually supportive in a manner that facilitates an accomplishment of assigned objectives.

20. (EOA) Given an element of operational art, explain it by use of a historical example.

A: Definition of Elements of Op Design (FM 3-0, Ch 6, 2008) Ch 6, para. 6-26. In applying operational art, commanders consider the elements of operational design. These are tools to help clarify and refine their concept of operations by providing a framework to describe its execution. They help commanders understand, visualize, and describe complex combinations of combat power and help them formulate their intent and guidance. The elements of operational design may be used selectively in any operation. However, their application is broadest in the context of campaigns and major operations. Elements of OP DESIGN: (from Crayton's list out of FM 1-02). Short Historical Examples in italics. 1. Endstate: set of conditions which define achievement of the commander's objective (or policy objective at Strat level). Vicksburg campaign: fall of Vicksburg in the Vicksburg campaign. When Vicksburg was surrounded and Johnston was unable to mount a successful breakthrough and rescue of besieged forces, and J. Davis was unwilling/unable to reallocate forces from other Departments. 2. Conditions: based on STRAT ENDSTATE, the conditions which define the supporting MIL ENDSTATE. See Vicksburg above: lack of capability for reinforcement, breakthrough and allocation of forces. 3. COG: capabilities and characteristics that provide base from which enemy draws power and freedom of action, physical strength, or will. COG: Napoleon's Grand Armee: capabilities: His mobilized population. Characteristics: His Corps de Armee and staff system 4. Operational Approach (Direct vs Indirect): Direct: Attack enemy COG or principle strength by application of combat power against it. Any Napoleonic Campaign in which he mustered, marshaled, marched and fought the enemy's main field army. Indirect: Attack enemy COG by applying combat power against multiple decisive points while avoiding main enemy strength (attacking CCs and CVs?) Napoleon's Continental System in his fight to defeat England. He could not match their main source of strength (Royal Navy), and so he pursued their trading partners to cut off their trade revenue. 5. Decisive Points: Place, event, system, or function which allows commander to achieve marked advantage over enemy and influence outcome of an operation. Prussian 2nd Army's arrival through the mountain passes and attack on Austrian right flank at Konigraatz. This action broke up the Austrian frontal attack and disintegrated their forces such that they could not continue the action. This gave the Prussian Commander a decisive (and final) advantage in the campaign. 6. LOO/LOEs: LOO: directional orientation of forces in time/space in relation to the enemy and links force to its base of operations and objectives. Napoleon's march on Prussia resulting in the battle of Jena-Auerstadt. He fortified the road to the final attack positions and once they crossed the LD at Hof, he marched his 6 Corps in 3 columns of 2 Corps each through the Franconian Forest, with intention of invading NE through Saxony and closing on the Elbe River where he would fight the decisive battle prior to crossing the Elbe and marching on Berlin. (it obviously went down differently, but this was his line of operation from the base (Hof) to the OBJ (Berlin) LOE: linking multiple tasks and mission thru logic of purpose to focus efforts toward establishing conditions for success Iraq/Afghan COIN LOEs: Governance, Building security force capacity, development, literacy, etc. all different tasks and missions linked by purpose of generating a stable and self-reliant host nation partner. 7. Operational Reach: distance and duration across which unit can successfully employ capabilities. Egyptians in 1973: El-Shazly knew that his successful gap crossing and attack on Israel would falter if he left his SAM umbrella, and he was right. Under political pressure from Sadat (and Syria), his forces attacked out of under SAM coverage and were defeated. 8. Tempo: relative speed of operations over time with respect to enemy. Rate of military action. Egyptians again on the Suez. The gap crossing exceeded everyone's expectations in how fast the Egyptians crossed and the volume of forces they flowed against the Bar-Lev line and beyond. 9. Simultaneity and Depth: Simultaneity: simultaneous use of offense/defense/stability tasks to overwhelm enemy and set conditions for success Iraq/Afghan COIN efforts: simultaneous targeting and kinetic operations combined with FOB/COP/JSS security and civilian population protection pretty much meets criteria for simultaneity. Depth: the extension of operations in time/space/resources OP Bagration (depth): Soviet Deep Operations Theory of Operational Shock: 48 Soviet Corps attacking across eastern Europe. They struck so deep and fast (time/space) and with such overwhelming forces (resources), that they were overrunning entire Nazi Army Groups 10. Phasing and Transitions: Phasing: shift in the execution of an operation linked to time/distance/terrain/event. Only used when a force lacks capacity to accomplish mission in a single action. Operation Overlord into OP Cobra: the Cotentin Peninsula breakout 1944: Allies had to seize beachheads, expand lodgements, built combat power, and then break out of the peninsula before Hitler could mass forces to prevent the breakout. This required extensive phasing of operations Transitions: shift in focus between phases or between an operation and its branches/sequels, or a shift in main effort. Breakout from Cotentin Peninsula: shift from Montgomery's forces to Bradley's forces in the breakout. Montgomery could not/would not break out towards Caen, thus the transition to a southward attack out of the peninsula by Bradley. 11. Culmination: point in time/space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue operations. Usually represents a decisive shift in relative combat power. 79th DIV in the Meuse Argonne offensive. The 79th had the OBJ of Mounfacon, but never got there due to heavy German resistance, poor C2, and few avenues of maneuver on the terrain. This prevented them from securing the OBJ. 12. Risk: Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards (risk to mission or force) Egyptians on the Suez: El-Shazly knew the risk associated with leaving the SAM umbrella, as did Sadat. He underwrote risk that would prove to be fatal to his campaign. Termination: "Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is key to achieving the national strategic end state." (JP 5-0) After the Battle of Koniggratz, Bismarck prevented the Prussian Army from pursuing the defeated Austrian Army to Vienna. Instead, the Prussians and Austrians signed an armistice three weeks later that achieved Prussia's strategic goal of a Prussianized Germany without Austria. End State and Objectives: (Koniggratz) The strategic objective of the Prussians was to unite Germany under Prussian control without Austria. The operational aim for Bismarck was to conduct a campaign to defeat eh Austrian Army in less than six months, but not destroy it. The tactical objective was to conduct a movement to contact to find the Austrian Army, then maneuver to defeat it. The three objectives were aligned. The decisive victory at Koniggratz achieved the objective at all three levels. (Class notes) Effects: (Desert Storm) The use of a sustained air campaign was to achieve the effect attriting 50% of the Iraqi ground forces prior to the commencement of the ground war. While it was difficult to assess the damage during the air campaign, the 100 hour ground war confirmed that the air campaign did achieve the effect of breaking the will of Iraqi ground forces. (Interview, CENTCOM Planning Cell) Center of Gravity: Desert Storm) "A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act." (JP 5-0) The Iraqi COG was adjudged to be the Republican Guard, three heavy and five motorized divisions equipped to be the highest Iraqi standards. (Brown, "Maturation of Op Art, " p. 462) Decisive Points: (Vicksburg) "A geographical place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success." (JP 5-0) The victory at Vicksburg gave the Union control of the Mississippi River, split the Confederacy, and opened the way for more Union victories and conquests. Direct versus indirect: (Desert Storm- Indirect) VII Corps, the main attack, enveloped the Iraqi line at its far west end, then turned east to annihilate the Republican Guard. (Brown, Lines of Operations: (Overland Campaign) The design and execution of Grant's plan of campaign for 1864 is the birth of operational art because he set forth "to work all points of the army together, and towards a common center." (Schneider, "Loose Marble," p. 92) Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman would attack Atlanta and Georgia, while the Army of the Potomac, led by Maj. Gen. George Meade with Grant in camp, would attack Robert E. Lee's Army of Virginia. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler was to attack and advance towards Richmond, going up the James River. Depending on Lee's actions, Grant would join forces with Butler's armies and be fed supplies from the James River. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel was to capture the railroad line at Lynchburg, move east, and attack from the Blue Ridge Mountains. (Alfapedia) Operational Reach: "The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. It is linked to culmination." (JP 5-0) The Japanese were at their limit of operational reach at the Battle of Midway. The Germans were at their limit of operational reach at the Battle of Stalingrad. Simultaneity and Depth: (IDF, 1973) Simultaneity refers to the "concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels." (JP 5-0) The concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the area of operations, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources and contributing to the enemy's defeat." The Egyptians and Syrians had seized the initiative at the outset of hostilities on 6 Oct 73. The IDF were then able to repel, counterattack, and seize the initiative against the Syrians on the Golan front, thus forcing Assad to plea to Sadat for help. Sadat ordered a Sinai offensive that the Israelis were able to defend, counterattack, and seize the initiative against the Egyptians too. (Gawrych, 1973 Arab-Israeli War, pp. 55-56) Timing and Tempo: (IDF, 1973) Tempo and proper timing allow the friendly commander to "dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and inhibit the enemy." The Israeli air force diverted north from the Sinai to meet the crisis on the Golan front where Israeli armor was outnumbered six to one. It halted the Syrian advance and allowed the IDF to reinforce with a second division on 7 Oct and a third division on 8 Oct. The IDF also reinforced the Sinai with armor, TOW missiles, and air force to repel the 13 Oct Egyptian offensive. (Citino, 176-179) Forces and Functions: (Desert Storm) "Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both adversary forces and functions concurrently to create the greatest possible friction between friendly and adversary forces and capabilities." (JP 5-0) Over time a campaign plan emerged that accommodated allied preferences and borrowed heavily from each of the basic operational options available. Fighting would begin with a multi-phased air campaign to establish preconditions for ground assault. Allied air forces would successively smash Iraqi air defenses, secure air supremacy, suppress Iraqi command and control, isolate the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, and attrit enemy ground forces in the path of the proposed offensive. (Brown, pp. 453-454) Leverage: (Desert Storm) "In joint operations, leverage is the relative advantage in combat power and/or other circumstances against the adversary across one or more domains (air, land, sea, and space) and/or the information environment sufficient to exploit that advantage." (JP 5-0) The U.S. and its Coalition had decisive air and information superiority during Operation Desert Storm. (Brown, pp. 453-454) No army in history has had as precise and accurate a picture of how its adversary laid out on the ground as did the American Third Army on 24 February 1991. (Brown, p. 454) Balance: (Desert Storm) "The appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as to the nature and timing of operations." Over time a campaign plan emerged that accommodated allied preferences and borrowed heavily from each of the basic operational options available. Fighting would begin with a multi-phased air campaign to establish preconditions for ground assault. Allied air forces would successively smash Iraqi air defenses, secure air supremacy, suppress Iraqi command and control, isolate the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, and attrit enemy ground forces in the path of the proposed offensive. (Brown, pp. 453-454) Anticipation: The Six-Day War, also known as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, was fought between June 5 and June 10, 1967, by Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The war began with a large-scale surprise air strike by Israel on Egypt. The outcome was a swift and decisive Israeli victory. Israel took effective control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Opinions are divided on whether Israel's attack was an act of aggression or a preemptive strike of a defensive nature. (Wikipedia) Synergy: (Desert Storm or IDF, 1973) "Synergy is the employment of a nation's resources across the range of military operations in a synchronized and integrated fashion, resulting in greater combat power and operational effectiveness through synergistic action." Israel was a small country of just over 3 million people in 1973. Israel was attacked by two Egyptian armies across the Suez Canal and at the same time along the Golan front by the Syrians. While the IDF initially relied too heavily on armor, the IDF was able to synchronize operations on two fronts against two numerically superior adversaries using combined arms maneuver. (Gawrych, p. 68) At the time of the 25 Oct ceasefire, the IDF had encircled Suez City and the Egyptian Third Army, and on the Golan front the IDF had penetrated 20 km into Syria to reach within 40 km of Damascus. (Gawrych, p. 74) Culmination: (Gettysburg) The Gettysburg campaign wore down Lee's offensive capability. He could no longer strike effectively at the political center of gravity of the war (the vicinity of the Potomac), and hence this battle was a decisive turning point in the Civil War. (Reid, America's Civil War: The Operational Battlefield, p. 304) Arranging Operations: (Desert Storm) "Arranging operations is an element of operational design, and phasing is a key aspect of this element." Over time a campaign plan emerged that accommodated allied preferences and borrowed heavily from each of the basic operational options available. Fighting would begin with a multi-phased air campaign to establish preconditions for ground assault. Allied air forces would successively smash Iraqi air defenses, secure air supremacy, suppress Iraqi command and control, isolate the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, and attrit enemy ground forces in the path of the proposed offensive. (Brown, pp. 453-454)

12. (AoD) How do you build organizational learning to facilitate integrated planning? Using theory, history, and doctrine, describe how this might this contribute to the organization's ability to reframe during execution?

A: (one way to do it) construct your organization along two lines of effort to create an agile, learning organization prepared to deal with complex problems. LOE 1: Organizational Structure (Hatch): Despite the military's inherently hierarchical structure (mechanistic), there is precedent for military organizations modifying traditional top-down structures into flatter, more collaborative structures (organic) which enables better synthesis of information (ex. Cross-Functional Teams, Fusion Cells). The structure of the organization depends on the complexity of the problem facing the team, and the desired flexibility to be achieved. Ultimately, it is about achieving the right balance of differentiation (specialization) and integration (collaboration). LOE 2: Organizational Culture (Checkland/Poulter): Once an organization is structured to facilitate the bringing together of different 'views' (different WFFs or interagency SMEs?), then learning models such as the Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland/Poulter: Learning for action) can facilitate the synthesizing of different views of the problem into a richer understanding for all (or the commander). Checkland refers to this as "learning your way through the problem". Though SSM is very 'communal' in arriving at a solution, it can be modified to military organizations in that the accommodation to be reached is between the commander and his subordinates, rather than among peer stakeholders. This implies a commander willing to empower subordinates to such an extent that SSM would work. Army planning doctrine clearly outlines the need for integrated (detailed and conceptual) planning (FM 5-0, Ch 3). We have already discussed how even a hierarchical institution like the military can re-structure to optimize learning (cross-functional teams, fusion cells). The call for a 'learning culture' is embodied in the Army's design doctrine as well. Conceptual planning clearly outlines the need to initially frame the problem by developing a deep understanding the environment. Further, doctrine clarifies the central role of the commander in this process of framing (learning/understanding). With an optimized organizational structure and culture, the two elements of planning (conceptual-detailed) linked by robust feedback mechanisms, can generate well thought out plans which, based on a deep understanding of the environment and the problem, will anticipate changes in the OE as the plan unfolds (branches/sequels). The Iraq coalition's 'reframing' under GEN Petraeus in 2007 is a good example of the military reorganizing (Fusion Centers, COICs, Interagency Integration with AMB Crocker) to leverage a wider range of views, and rapidly implementing new understanding into a multi-faceted strategy to seize the initiative from the insurgents by splitting the Anbar tribes from the greater insurgent movement.

4. (SDM) Compare and contrast Jomini and Clausewitz. Consider their backgrounds, the intellectual and cultural influences on their theoretical efforts, the similarities and differences in the purpose and content of their published work, and their relevance to present-day military doctrine and theory.

Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869), born into a middle-class Swiss family, rose through the ranks of the French army to become a chief of staff. He wrote frequently during and after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The Summary of the Art of War represents Jomini's mature thinking on the subject of war and the influence of the Enlightenment and earlier writers like Bulow and Lloyd. He believed that there was a rational way to explain war, especially strategy. There was an underlying fundamental principle of war—at the strategic level, military power should be applied in mass against an enemy in theater, and then maneuvered to encounter the enemy army. At the tactical level the friendly army masses on the decisive point (that place or object the capture or destruction of which will defeat the enemy) at the proper time and with the proper force. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), son of a retired Prussian lieutenant, first served during the Wars of the First Coalition against France and throughout the Napoleonic Wars. He was a Kriegsakademie graduate and later director of the Berlin War Academy who was driven by Prussian setbacks to advocate reform in the Prussian army. Although Jomini's contemporary, Clausewitz was influenced by the German Romantic Movement and Kant and Hegel who advocated the improvement of knowledge and questioning of accepted concepts. On War proposed a theory of war and placed it in dialogue with the reality of war. Absolute war is the theoretical extreme but politics limit wars. War is fundamentally an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will; battle is the means. War is composed of a paradoxical trinity—primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; the play of chance and probability; and the element of subordination as an instrument of policy (related somewhat to the people, the commander/army, and the government). The best commanders possess genius comprised of coup d'oeil and determination. Jomini is more prescriptive and explanatory, Clausewitz less prescriptive and more contemplative. Jomini eventually became convinced that the outcome of battles and wars was subject to the genius of the commander as well as friction; this is the only context in which he seems to agree in part with Clausewitz. Jomini did not believe like Clausewitz did that battle was the only means to decide war. Jomini picked historical examples from the Napoleonic age and worked his way backward to find support for his theories (sometimes erroneous), while Clausewitz sampled across history and saw both change and continuity. Both regarded each other as respectively too formulaic and too abstract. In a sense the two emphasize opposite sides of the same coin (the theory of war as more science or more art). Both for example recognized the importance of concentrating military force against a specific enemy place or entity to cause defeat (Jomini—decisive point; Clausewitz—COG) but explained the concept differently, often from a tactical versus strategic perspective. Relevance for today: Jomini's concepts of mass, maneuver, lines of operation, and objective all survive in today's US Army doctrine and these concepts provide a necessary foundation upon which to design campaigns and practice operational art. Clausewitz's point about war being the extension of politics by other means is widely accepted and his discussions of chance and friction force modern commanders and staffs to plan for contingencies and build in flexibility. Sometimes the US military adopts concepts with Jominian certainty (Network-Centric Warfare) while forgetting the permanence of Clausewitzian friction. Sources: Jomini, Baron Antoine Henri. The Art of War. Translated by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862/London: Greenhill Books, 1996; von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought From the Enlightenment to the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 108-137, 170-256.

13. (ANP) What is the relationship between strategy and operational art? What factors should be considered in examining the strategic context for operational art?

B.L.U.F. - Strategy informs the application of operational art (provides the military practitioner with the ends to be accomplished); and operational art enables strategy (translates strategic concepts into a logical plan of action). Doctrine - When examining the strategic context for operational art doctrine (JP 5-0, IV-1) states that commanders must consider: (1) What conditions are required to achieve the objectives? (Ends) (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways) (3) What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means) (4) What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions? Historical Anecdote - Germany WWII • Geographic position in the middle of Europe necessitated short, decisive victory • Result was Plan Yellow (a modified Schlieffen Plan incorporating Blitzkrieg) which sought to o "defeat of as much as possible of the French Army and Allies," and seizure of "as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France to serve as a base of operation for the air and sea war against England." - Hitler's Directive #6, October 9, 1939. Theory - • Everett Dolman, Pure Strategy o "Strategy is a plan for attaining continuing advantage" (pg 6) o "The strategist must concentrate less on determining specific actions to be taken and far more on manipulating the structure within which all actions are determined." (pg4) or Strategy is intended to provide the political aims to be reached through employment of the instruments of national power. Operational art applies conceptual planning to develop an approach that links the political aim to series of campaigns designed to achieve concrete tactical objectives. Using operational art, commanders frame their concept by answering several fundamental questions: What is the force trying to accomplish (ends)? What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)? How will the force achieve the end state (ways)? What sequence of actions is most likely to attain these conditions (ways)? What resources are required, and how can they be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)? What risks are associated with that sequence of actions, and how can they be mitigated (risk)? Understanding the strategic context is an essential consideration for developing an operational approach because the strategic context provides boundaries for feasible, suitable, acceptable, desirable, Some of the factors include history of the region, the political aims, previous policy and other mistakes. Theory: Doleman: The strategist seeks favorable continuation of events. It represents the link between political and military action. Strategy is a plan for attaining continuing advantage. CvC: the use of engagements for the object of the war Liddell Hart: Differentiates between Military and Grand Strategy. Doctrine: Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war (JP 3-0). Applying the elements of operational art helps. Strategy is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives (JP 3-0). The President translates national interests and policy into a national strategic end state. History: Moltke and Bismarck era of the Prussian Army recognized the importance of maintaining contact with the requirement to maintain. Grant understood the political objective while planning the 1864 campaign.

29. (TCC) What is the utility of scenario planning for anticipating future conflicts? What did you learn about operational art in using this process?

BLUF: You could use Scenario Planning to analyze what are the kind of situations in the future in which military forces will be used, and how they will be used (with partners and with what capacities). Both Scenario planning and Operational art are creative processes. Background: • Scenario building is just a tool, trying to structure how we think about the future • Scenario planning, developed by Peter Schwartz, is perhaps the most widely-used method among futurists for avoiding such inconvenient surprises • Important: focus your efforts on what it does mean for your actions NOW, or tomorrow. Which decisions do I have to take? • NOT a prediction (or forecasting trends): an attempt to provide range of options to deal with future • Scenario's help sort through complexity by indentifying patterns of changes, enabling use to act more explicitly and holistically. • Scenario planning process is perhaps comparable to a OODA-loop • Scenario planning best for 5 to 10 years out: you can use the trends we are familiar with today • Both: ordering of perceptions. • Example: you need scenario's to take decisions on building aircraft carriers • Steps in Scenarioplanning: 1. Identify Focal issue or decision 2. Key forces in the local environment 3. Driving Forces 4. Rank by importance and uncertainty 5. Selecting Scenario Logics 6. Fleshing out the scenario's 7. Implications 8. Selection of leading indicators

23. (EOA) Discuss the relationship between operational command in conventional and counter-insurgent war. How are they the same and how are they different?

COIN - need to integrate with JIIM, protect people, etc. Need unity of effort between agencies. Need subordinate leaders to truly understand intent and adapt. Cost of harm to population is much more damaging. • Seizing the initiative may take longer since the host nation government was probably slow to recognize and address the insurgency. (3-24, ix) • Learn and adapt is a key methodology. Learning during conflict may meet with resistance. (ibid) • COIN practices will need to be developed and applied locally (3-24, x). • Requires knowledge of foreign policy, cultural, social, and other unfamiliar situations. (ibid). • Close coordination required with governmental and nongovernmental agencies at all levels (ibid). • Requires openness to suggestions and inputs from superior and subordinate levels. (ibid) • Requires the constant shift between offense, defense and stability ops (3-24, p1-19). • Unity of effort is a goal and unity of command is unlikely. (ibid). • Ethics and leadership must be permeate at all levels in order to avoid turning the population against U.S. forces (3-24, 7-5). Conventional - • Lines of operation will be primarily be physical. • Primary task is the massing of combat power at the decisive time and place. • Coordination with non-military agencies is less of a focus during combat operations. • The operational environment will change less during operations, than it might during protracted COIN. • Commanders may face both conventional war and coincident insurgencies, or have to deal with transitions. • Commanders may begin with initiative or capture with decisive kinetic action. • Maneuver and lethal firepower are likely to be the key tools. Mission Command/Battle Command - mission orders, Aufstragtaktik

28. (TCC) Choose one form of warfare discussed in TCC 505 through 511. How do you see this form of warfare developing in the next 20-25 years, and how will it interact with other forms of future warfare in the conduct of military operations?

COIN/IW will be the dominant type of warfare for the next 20-25 years Being a complex and systemic type of war it is likely to evolve into a more sophisticated form of warfare As we learn and change our way of fighting COIN, so does the enemy The "other" has the initiative in driving our doctrine and we will likely remain reactive All forms of future warfare, cyber, limited contact etc will be tailored to fit the paradigm of COIN/IW.

19. (EOA) Explain the main stages in the development of operational art from the 18th to the 21st century. Identify the major theories, doctrines, technological advances, and other contributors to this evolution.

Classical Warfare 1. American Revolution - Operational Art: Maybe - Greene's Southern Campaign 2. Napoleon at Jena - Operational Art: Yes, but unknowingly. He was unaware of what was happening at Austerlitz, no orders supported the corps' action, and no he provided no C2 over that operation. Formation and use of the Corps; also, remember the "commander on the hill" example. 3. The 1863 Campaign--‐Gettysburg - Operational Art: Yes? He was employing his forces along different LOOs and they were separated by time and space. (The comment from Dr. Stentiford is that Grant is the only person in the Civil War applying operational art). 4. Koniggratz 1866 (Moltke's Bohemia campaign) - Operational Art: No, unless distributed movement of forces constitutes operational art. 5. Classical Era Emergent Theory Industrial Warfare 6. Meuse Argonne 1918 - Many of the shortcomings in the Meuse-Argonne campaign can be attributed to exactly the types of concerns which are the responsibility of the operational planner: specific intelligence on the enemy, synchronization of assets, fires, logistics, commander's intent and communications as well as combined arms operations. 7. France 1940 8. Operation Overlord 9. Operation Bagration 10. Operation Musketeer 11. Industrial Era Emergent Theory Limited Warfare 12. Korea (October 1950--‐March 1951) 13. Vietnam: Initial Commitment (1965) 14. 1973 Arab--‐Israeli War 15. Limited War Era Emergent Theory Modern Warfare 16. Soviet Intervention: Afghanistan 17. Operation Desert Storm 18. Operation Enduring Freedom 19. Modern War Era Emergent Theory From FM 3-0, Change 1: 7-1. Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war (JP 3-0). 7-2. Operational art reflects a holistic understanding of the operational environment and the problem. This understanding enables commanders to develop end state conditions and an operational approach to guide the force in establishing those conditions for lasting success. James J. Schneider - The Loose Marble - and the Origins of Operational Art: "All planning and execution ended with the decisive battle. The idea of simultaneous and successive operations was therefore alien to the Napoleonic style of warfare and to its predecessors. These two particular characteristics—simultaneous and successive operations—are in fact the heart of operational art (87)." Shimon Naveh - In Pursuit of Military Excellence: "Here lies the essence of operational logic. Tactical excellence can never be a substitute for operational cognition, and not only because it is unaware of system operating principles. The principle mechanisms which contribute to the formation of tactical excellence, such as aggressiveness, initiative, adhering to missions, and the possession of the technical aspects of warfare, if they are not balanced by a cognitive tension and operational judgment, must eventually lead to the system's disintegration and not to the creation of operational excellence. Accumulating tactical successes, as great as they may be, if not backed by professional operational direction expressed by means of rational and coherent objectives, may end up in a fiasco (146)." -the author uses the North-African campaign and Rommel as an example. "German operational art in World War II emphasized maneuver, whereas, US operational art, with some notable exceptions, tended to emphasize the application of firepower to achieve the attrition of the enemy forces (108)." But true operational art is about firepower and maneuver. Operational art versus tactical superiority -can you tell the difference?

2. (SDM) John Lewis Gaddis, in The Landscape of History, discusses the concepts of continuity and contingency. How does he define these terms and what usefulness do the concepts have not just to historians, but to both academics in other fields and military practitioners?

Continuities are patterns that extend across time. These are not laws, like gravity or entropy; they are not even theories, like relativity or natural selection. They are simply phenomena that recur with sufficient regularity to make themselves apparent to us. Without such patterns, we'd have no basis for generalizing about human experience: we'd know, for example, that birth rates tend to decline as economic development advances, or that empires tend to expand beyond their means, or that democracies tend not to go to war with one another. But because these patterns show up so frequently in the past, we can reasonably expect them to continue to do so in the future. Trends that have held up over several hundred years are not apt to reverse themselves within the next several weeks. Contingencies are phenomena that do not form patterns. These may include the actions individuals take for reasons known only to themselves: a Hitler on a grandiose scale, for example, or a Lee Harvey Oswald on a very particular one. They can involve what the chaos theorists call "sensitive dependence on initial conditions," situations where an imperceptible shift at the beginning of a process can produce enormous changes at the end of it. They may result from the intersection of two or more continuities: students of accidents know that when predictable processes come together in unprecedented ways, unpredictable consequences can follow. What all of these phenomena have in common is that they don't fall within the realm of repeated and therefore familiar experience: we generally learn about them only after they've happened. The future is a zone within which contingencies and continuities coexist independently of one another; the past as the place where their relationship is inextricably fixed; and the present as the singularity that brings the two together, so that continuities intersect contingencies, contingencies encounter continuities, and through this process history is made. For military practitioners continuities are facts and patterns upon which we plan. We then account for contingencies by identifying branches in war gaming and preparing for them through branch planning

8. (AoD) FM 6-22, Army Leadership, discusses informal leadership. Define the concept and give an example of a situation that required you to use informal leadership during a practicum or exercise. How does information, effective communication, and influence play a role in informal leadership?

Doctrine: FM 6-22, para 3-51: Informal leadership can be found throughout organizations, and while it can play an important role in mission accomplishment, it should never undermine legitimate authority. All members of the Army could find themselves in a position to serve as a leader at any time. Informal leadership is not based on any particular rank or position in the organizational hierarchy. It can arise from the knowledge gained from experience and sometimes requires initiative on the part of the individual to assume responsibility not designated to his position. Therefore, even the most junior member may be able to influence the decision of the highest organizational authority. Theory: Lawson, Bryan, How Designers Think. Boston: Architectural Press, an imprint of Elsevier, 2006. Pg 289 Lawson states that designers (read operational planners) often collaborate in teams, capitalizing on the strengths that everyone brings to the table. The informal leader needs to be able to support the commander by not only contributing in this collaboration but also synthesizing the strengths of their teammates. Pg 299 Initiating reflection on action is a way that an informal leader can do this. Czarniawska, Barbara. "The „Narrative Turn‟ in Social Studies." Narratives in Social Science Research (Sage Publications, 2004). Pg 3: The narrative is a rich source of insight given from a specific perspective. Pg 5: there is a positioning that takes place when creating a narrative. Additionally, there is a power in creating narrative because the author decides what is important and what is not. This can be tied to information, effective communication, and influence. Lawson's model page 106 lends some insight on effective communication in terms of the message and influence. Petraus used a matrix similar in idea to this when crafting his strategic communication and IO plans. Both internally to the US and for friendly and enemy audiences. History:Wedermeyer provides an example of informal leadership, effective communication, and influence as can be seen by his 13 page victory plan that he shaped with the following 4 keys to engaging in decisive combat operations outside the US. 1. Must possess a powerful navy and merchant fleet. 2. Must take advantage of air power, overwhelming air supporiourity. strategic aerial bombardment. 3. Forward basing to create proximity to the enemy is key. 4. Concentration of forces. Practical application: (insert personal example here) As a planner your leadership role will be both formal based on your position and informal based on your experience, education, and credibility. Information, effective communication, and influence are all related. Information is useless if it cannot be effectively communicated either verbally or written. The narrative is a very effective manner of written communication to impart information on the recipient. A narrative is an enduring document readily converted into power point, point papers, white papers, 5 paragraph op orders, cc intent, concept of operations etc. and written well it leaves little to personal interpretation. Influence is also closely tied to effective communication and can be leveraged by the informal leader in a manner that is positive and in keeping with being a cohesive teammate.

24. (EOA) Is operational art only relevant for major combat operations? Does operational art have utility in COIN or small wars? Why or why not?

References: FM 3.0 Change 1 CH.7 and JP 3-0, Chapter II, para 2c & JP 3-0, Chapter III, para 5) Short Answer: Operational art is relevant throughout the spectrum of conflict and isn't limited by operational themes or size of conflict. Long Answer: Operational art is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. All of these requirements are present in any type of conflict throughout the spectrum of conflict. Operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. In joint operations, operational art focuses in particular on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, cyber, and special operations forces. Operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions: 1. What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends) 2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways) 3. How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means) 4. What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk) More more more Operational Art: Operational Art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by the skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational Art integrates ends ways and means across the levels of war. It is a thought process. (JP 3.0) Major Combat Operations: major operation - (DOD) A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. (FM 1-02 Operational Terms and Graphics) Full Spectrum Operations: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an independent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve desired results. They employ synchronized action- lethal and nonlethal- proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. (FM 5.0, 1-11) COIN: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02) Small Wars: Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation. (Small Wars Manual) What? Operational art is relevant across the spectrum of operations and has utility in COIN and small wars. Operational art spans a continuum- from comprehensive strategic direction to concrete tactical actions. Bridging this continuum requires creative vision coupled with broad experience and knowledge. Operational art provides a means for commanders to derive the essence of an operation. Through operational art, commanders translate their concept of operations into an operational design and ultimately into tactical tasks. They do this by engaging ends, ways, and means and by envisioning dynamic combinations of the elements of full spectrum operations across the levels of war. They then apply operational art to array forces and maneuver them to achieve the desired end state. (FM 3.0 6-17) So What? Operational art requires three continuous, cyclic activities. These activities define military and nonmilitary actions across the spectrum of conflict: framing (and reframing) the problem; formulating design; refining the design. (FM 3.0, 6-29) Therefore? Individually, these activities further refine the nature of the operation, determine force structure, focus operations, and prioritize resources. Together, they help operational commanders translate broad political guidance into tangible tactical actions. The elements of operational design help commanders develop planning guidance into tangible tactical actions. The elements of operational design help commanders develop planning guidance and communicate their intent. These actions are the first steps in setting the conditions for operational and tactical success. (FM 3.0, 6-29) Which Means? Applying operational art in full spectrum operations involves knowing when and how to apply offense, defense, and stability operations. Every operation does not require offensive tasks; stability or civil support may be the only elements executed. Nonetheless, commanders and staffs always consider each element of full spectrum operations and its relevance to the situation. An element may be unnecessary, but it is the commander who determines that. However, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks at lower echelons is common in irregular warfare and peace operations. (FM 3.0, 3-122) Example of elements of operational design used in MCO or COIN • MCO: o Napoleon at Jenna o Moltke at Koniggratz o Meade at Gettysburg • COIN/Small Wars/ etc o T.E. Lawrence in Arabia o Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam

25. (EOA) Given what you have learned in EOA, what is your personal definition of operational art? How would you change the current definition of operational art in FM 3-0?

Operational Art (McKenzie) - is the unique arrangement of military operations in time and space to achieve a desired state. Theory - • Robert Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare: o "Operational CDRs must do more than simply assemble divisions, corps, and armies...they must have an end result in mind @ the start of the operation, one that involves the destruction of a considerable portion of the enemy's fighting power." (pg 8) • Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory: o "operational cognition" or "cognitive tension" (pg 39) describes the relationship between the tactical and strategic levels of war and suggests that operational art facilitates negotiation between these two levels. • Robert M. Epstein, "Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War": o defines operational art as a "process of actions and thought performed at the operational level." (pg 8) o Additionally, summed operational art as "...thinking in terms of campaigns..." • James Schneider, "The Loose Marble - and the Origins of Operational Art": o "Hallmark of operational art is the integration of temporally and spatially distributed operations into one coherent whole." (pg 87) o "Vulcan's Anvil" • Bruce Menning, "Operational Art's Origins": Operational Art requires (pg 9) - 1. Identification of strategic objectives within a theater 2. Visualize a theater in 3x dimensions 3. Determine sequence of military actions - preparation, organization, support, battles, CMD arrangement Operational Art (FM 3-0, CHG1) - is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war (JP 3-0).

14. (ANP) What is deterrence? What is the military's role in deterrence?

Part 1: Deterrence -Deterrence - (DoD) The prevention from action by fear of consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. See FM 1. (FM 1-02) -Deterrence is a coercive strategy. A coercive strategy involves the purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic choices. (Freedman, p. 26) - Deterrence is concerned with discouraging others from acting in ways that advantage them but harm you. Strategies geared to coercing others to act in ways they might consider harmful but advantage you have been described as compellence or coercive diplomacy. The first term comes from the "second-wave" theorist, Tom Schelling, and the second from a team led by "third wave" Alexander George and William Simon. (Freedman, p. 109) - During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the U.S. was warning the Soviet Union at the same time to stop constructing missile sites in Cuba (compellence) and not to pass ships carrying more missiles through the American blockade (deterrence). The Soviet Union warned of consequences if the threats were implemented. Thus, it was a process of coercion and counter-coercion with deterrence and compellence under way on both sides at the same time. (Freedman, p. 110) -Deterrence can be a technique, a doctrine, and a state of mind. In all cases it is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with the crossing of those boundaries. (Freedman, p. 116) -Deterrence can be a technique, a doctrine, and a state of mind. In all cases it is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with the crossing of those boundaries. (Freedman, p. 116) Part 2: Role of the military in deterrence -The military has a role to deter and to compel adversaries. The military uses the threat or use of force to influence the actions of adversaries. -Phase I is typically "deter." -Compel: To use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. (FM 3-0) Synthesis: -Clausewitz: "War is thus an act to compel our enemy to do our will." (Book 1, Ch.1, p. 75) -"War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means." (p. 605) The military is the "addition of other means." -In Book 8, Chapters 7 & 8, Clausewitz discusses the limited aims of offensive and defensive war. "A major victory can only be obtained by positive measures aimed at a decision, never simply by waiting on events." History: Desert Shield: The purpose was to deter the Iraqis from invading Saudi Arabia. Desert Storm: The purpose was to compel the Iraqis to leave Kuwait.

Step1: Review the Monograph

Step1: Review the Monograph (~10 min) Methodically in the same organization as your Monograph Introduction Inform and Influence Activities, Social Media, and Definitions Soldiers and Role in Inform and Influence Activities Social Milieu of the Soldier Habits and Hazards Regulations and Operations Security Essential Training Elements Now that the Department of Defense has permitted the use of social media for both private and official purposes, the question becomes, can the military, the Army in particular, obtain the benefits sought from social media use without seriously compromising individual and operations security? Answering this question required an initial assessment of Army goals and objectives to determine why the Army risked the use of social media, which revealed two reasons immediately. First, the Army needed social media to communicate its inform and influence activities more effectively. Second, social media was the primary means by which soldiers maintained contact with their friends and family and, consequently, became a significant element in maintaining soldier morale. If the Army did not need social media to distribute its inform message, it might have avoided the difficulties created by the personal use of social media by soldiers. Thus, the security risk posed by the use of social media cannot be reduced to a simple enforcement of operations security rules. Nevertheless, soldiers who are not trained to avoid the disclosure of classified or sensitive information will, through their ingrained habits, present a significant security risk. To understand the situation and to derive the needed training requires an initial examination of social media as a means of inform activities. This discussion is made more intelligible if, while discussing social media in the inform and influence context, important definitions of social media and its components are also addressed. The discussion of personal soldier use supports the Army inform and influence activity requirements, but introduces the risk of casual use of social media. In other words, soldiers have habits, which create vulnerabilities that enemies of the United States can easily exploit. An examination of casual social media use reveals common practices that stand contrary to sound operations security. Comparing social media habits with regulatory requirements reveals the key elements of required training. The reality is evolutionary information changes will continue without the military's consent. Bottom line, all military personnel require training on appropriate use of social media now. The Army can institute training that raises awareness to these dangers for all service members. Ideally, social media becomes a manageable medium to communicate the right messages and maintain good order and discipline within the Armed Forces.

7. (AoD) Using theory, history, and doctrine explain the relationship between design and battle (mission) command.

The Army Design Methodology (ADM) and battle command are closely intertwined. As LTG Caldwell wrote, "design is the next step on a path to maturing our battle command model for the complexities of operations in an era of persistent conflict." (foreword to Jack Kem, Design: Tools of the Trade). Many of the topics studied throughout AMSP, not just in the design block of instruction, support LTG Caldwell's statement. Theory of design, doctrinal descriptions of the ADM and battle command, and historical operational design illuminate the close relationship between design and battle command. The theoretical basis for the Army Design Methodology lies in several authors, to include Yaneer Bar-Yam, Donald Schön, Bryan Lawson. ADM supports battle command as team effort to support the commander, which is supported by each of these theorists. Bar-Yam states that no individual, commander or otherwise, is as complex as a group of people (Making Things Work, 259). An adaptive organization forms a design team of complexity appropriate for the identified problem in order to provide solutions of commensurate complexity. The ADM as described in doctrine supports battle command, which according to FM 3-0 is the "art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing forces to impose the commander's will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership to translate decisions into actions—by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose—to accomplish missions." (FM 3-0, 5-2). Design underpins the exercise of battle command, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing. As these iterations occur, the design concept—the tangible link to detailed planning—is forged (FM 5-0, 3-1). Thus, design enhances the "understand" and "visualize" components of battle command, and provides the links to the "describe" and "direct" elements of battle command. The continual assessment, a fundamental part of battle command, is also served by problem re-framing in the ADM. The historical example of design studied most prominently in AMSP was Grant's actions against Vicksburg in 1863. Although Grant's advisors and subordinate commanders did not use the same terminology as found in current doctrine, they nonetheless adapted their organization to meet the very complex problem of seizing Vicksburg within the strategic context of the Civil War. Grant arranged the efforts of his organic units and supporting naval forces on the Mississippi to present the defending Confederates under Pemberton with an insurmountable dilemma. Design is the underpinning of battle command, especially in the complex environment of modern operations.

17 (ANP) Explain how economic theory can influence military operations.

The application of economic theory can have a significant impact on military operations, affecting the strategy and conduct of war. For example, global meliorism is the socio-economic and politico-cultural expression of an American mission of make the world a better place, a policy that directly influenced the conduct of military operations. In Promised Land, Crusader State, historian Walter A. McDougall asserts that U.S. military's involvement in Vietnam was the first time the U.S. military deployed its military not to win through attrition warfare or battlefield victory, but to buy time for the war to be won through civilian social and economic programs (i.e. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support a.k.a. CORDS), which was the application of political, social, and economic theory into practice for the South Vietnamese government. McDougall argues that General Westmoreland's limited military strategy that didn't allow military operations into Laos and limited attacks into North Vietnam was a direct result of a global meliorist policy that put priority on the economic theories implemented through the CORDS (i.e. more capitalist oriented, property rights reform) program. Economic theory can also be applied in planning contingencies for the second order effects of military operations. Specifically, economic theory can be applied as part of a plan to deal with war profiteering and black market activities during post-conflict occupation operations and/or stabilization operations. A large second order effect of UN peacekeeping operations was the emergence of the black market economy that sustained Sarajevo between the besieged Bosniacs, the besieging Serbs, and the UN peacekeeping forces involved. In the case of Sarajevo, these activities prolonged the siege into a three-year battle. A new social elite emerged from an illicit economy that negatively impacted postwar reconstruction and hindered the legitimacy of the Bosnian government. Taking the concept of global meliorism a step further, Dr. Daniel Cox asserts that the military will most likely be employed in the future for the purpose of economic development support. Theorist Carl Schramm proposes expeditionary economic to spur economic growth for post-conflict operations, requiring the application of economic theory into military campaign planning. However, there is no consensus of what expeditionary economic looks like and what kind of military forces would be involved. Regardless, economic theory influence military operations into a form of militarized neo-liberalism. References: The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy by Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw Promised Land, Crusader State by Walter A. McDougall (Chapter 8) Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo by Peter Andreas

32. (TCC) What trends will influence the future operating environment? How will these trends affect operations in the next 20-25 years?

Theory: Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century: (concept of continuity and change): pg 7 War has persisting and universal contexts, political, social-cultural, economic, technological, military strategic, geographical/geopolitical/geostrategic, historical and trends can be discussed in terms of these. (continuity, trends)Pg 11 in general the human, political, and strategic plots remain similar. Additionally, belligerents that are materially challenged will find themselves looking for asymmetrical advantage in grand and military strategies. (change, trends) pg 11 1.Future wars will harbor integral cyber warfare and space warfare. 2. information will continue to play an important part of perception with near real-time audit of belligerent behavior on a global scale where transparency and truth will compete for audience. 3.Contemporary kinetic air power is so precise and its preemptive capabilities are such that it decreases the potential for a regular heavy ground force campaign. That said, regular and irregular styles of warfare are still likely. Bart Schuurman "Clausewitz and the New War Scholars": Pg 92, (continuity) terrorist, guerrillas and similar actors have aimed at an opponents will to fight rather than his means; (change) the difference now is they enjoy enhanced access to that will. Doctrine: JOE: pg 4: (continuity) Conflict will not disappear. War has been the principal driver of change over the course of history, and there is no reason to believe that the future will change. War will remain primarily a human endeavor. (change) strategic landscape will change, employment of technologies, adaptation of adversaries will alter the character of joint operations. Practical application: JOE: Impact on operations is that the US needs to continue to be ready for combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction (full spectrum). We will always operate in a joint manner, most likely with a coalition of the willing. An inherent challenge addressing this question is the discussion on normative vs. emperical discussion. A normative discussion on this topic, which is what this is likely to turn into involves projecting current trends based on current assumptions into the future with a dearth of evidence to support them. An emperical discussion involves facts and is based more on evidence. The problem with discussing trends for the future is that the further out to project the less empirical the discussion becomes.

34. (EX) Field grade officers are critical to the way the Army and other services work. Explain your future role as a staff officer on a general staff.

Using the characteristics of a SAMS graduate as highlighted by program director, COL. Wayne Grigsby, SAMS planners are to be leaders who are operational planners grounded in doctrine and team players. General Caslen states (25 August 2011) that a Division Commander requires staff officers to be: • MDMP Experts • Superior briefing skills • Ability to find simplicity out of complexity • Ability to write • Delivering a quality product on time • Ability to assist commander to "think out loud" • Ability to provide sound and timely advice Being a team player isn't necessarily about putting forth your own individual work load but also through the development and continued education of the members of your team. As a field grade officer on an Army staff it is likely that there will be senior officers who are responsible for the actions of the staff itself. However, SAMS graduates must be prepared to work with the other staff members, to include senior ranking officers, to train, teach and educate all members of the staff in the proper use of doctrine and the operations process. Making the team requires four fundamentals of building a relationship with your staff members, holding each other accountable, building capacity in the organization and executing the mission within the time prescribed. Finally, it is the responsibility of every field grade officer, not only SAMS graduates, to understand that there is a greater result of the work that is done at the higher headquarters. This result is conducted by the Soldiers on the battlefield and it is executed relentlessly and with confidence that senior military planners are correctly analyzing the situation and placing the Soldier, and members of that unit, in a situation that bring everyone home and accomplish the mission. The greatest power we hold as officers on the staff is the power of the pen. We put the lives of our Soldiers in danger every day and we must realize, regardless of how far extracted we are from the actual combat, that a Soldier executes the orders we produce and we must ensure that we have enabled him or her to do their job effectively. General Caslen stated in a speech to SAMS students on 25 August 2010 that the responsibility of senior staff members was dedicated to, "clearly defining and solving complex problems in complex situations." It is as Von Schlieffen stated, "Work relentlessly, accomplish much, remain in the background, and be more than you seem."