Theorist Concepts

Gates, Robert. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War

"We had to face four key realities: 1) the primary challenge was extremists from all communities; the center was eroding and sectarianism was spiking ( a change from when the Sunni-based insurgency was the primary challenge); 2) political and economic progress in Iraq was unlikely absent a basic level of security; 3) Iraqi leaders were advancing their sectarian agendas as hedging strategies, in pursuit of narrow interests and in recognition of past history; 4) the tolerance of the American people for the effort in Iraq was waning ( a gross understatement, if there ever was on)." P.47-48

Kotter, John, P. Power and Influence

- Most of us work in socially intricate organizations where we need the help not only of subordinates but of colleagues, superiors, and outsiders to accomplish our goals. This often leaves us in a "power gap" because we must depend on people over whom we have little or no explicit control. •One must manage all relevant relationships - subordinates, peers, bosses, those outside one's chain of command, employees in interdependent departments. •---- Effective leadership in a job that includes a complicated set of lateral relationships requires, first, a keen sense of where those relationships are. •----managing the relationship with the boss is a necessary and legitimate part of a job in a modern organization, especially in a difficult leadership job •"Power and influence beyond formal authority" Interdependence- a state in which two or more parties have power over each other, because they are to some degree dependent on each other"

Kahneman: Thinking Fast and Slow

A general limitation of the human mind is its imperfect ability to reconstruct past states of knowledge or beliefs that have changed. Once you adopt a new view of the world (or of any part of it)- you immediately lose much of your ability to recall what you used to believe before your mind changed. (202) When do judgments reflect true expertise? >An environment that is sufficiently regular to be predictable >an opportunity to learn these regularities through prolonged practice (240) The research suggests a surprising conclusion: to maximize predictive accuracy> final decisions should be left to formulas especially in low-validity environments. Heuristics is a nature process we go through to find good enough answers to be able to more on to the next task. System 1 and System 2 really could be labeled intuition and deliberate thought. We quickly work to find good enough answers because they serve us well the majority of the time by allowing us to accomplish a lot more tasks than if we slowed down to deliberating think about everything. Critical tasks such as planning military operations require one to apply critical thought and be aware of instinctual responses as there are many different ways to manipulate the mind to get a response one seeks. Individuals need to be aware of this as they review their own work, and be quick to point it out when working with others. More importantly, one needs to be opening to questioning why they know/think what they do and what evidence that assertion is based on. Everyone likes quick an easy, and further goes to the comment that if everyone else in the room says yes, than you need to say no, and even if you don't fully support the position in which you are not defending it is likely to bring about an overall better solution than if the conversation was not had in the first place. Which draws from the TOA 2 lesson about understanding various schools of thought and the application to politics in shaping society. wo Systems1- Like RAM - Easy/effortless access to information Ø "Operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. (p. 20) Ø One further limitation of System 1 is that it cannot be turned off. (p.25) Ø Detects simple relations and excels at integrating information about one thing, but it does not deal with multiple distinct topics at once, nor is it adept at using purely statistical information. (p. 36) Ø System one more influence on system 2 when it is busy (p. 41) Ø When we are uncomfortable and unhappy, we lose touch with our intuition. (p. 69) Ø The main purpose of system 1 is to maintain and update a model of your personal world, which represents what is normal in it. The model is constructed by associations that link ideas of circumstances, events, actions, and outcomes that co-occur with some regularity, either at the same time or within a relatively short interval. As these links are formed and strengthened, the pattern of associated ideas come to represent the structure of events in your life, and it determines your interpretation of the present as well as your expectations in the future. (p. 71) ○ Generates impressions, feelings, and inclinations; when endorsed by System 2 these become beliefs, attitudes, and intentions. ○ Operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort, and no sense of voluntary control. ○ Distinguishes the surprising from the normal ○ Is biased to believe and conform ○ Matches intensities across scales (size to loudness) ○ Shows diminishing sensitivity to quantity (psychophyics) ○ Responds more strongly to losses than to gains (loss aversion) ○ Frames decisions problems narrowly, in isolation from one another (p. 105) -Two types of system 1 thinking: Heuristics and experiences 2- Requires effort or concentration Ø "Allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. (p. 21) Ø Often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration. Ø Is in charge of self-control to overcome impulses (p. 26) Ø Is the only one that can follow rules, compare objects on several attributes, and make deliberate choices between options. (p. 36) -The test of learning psychology is whether your understanding of situations you encounter has changed, not whether you have learned a new fact. (p.174)

Cohen, Eliot. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

Argues that the idea of Huntington and others "Normal" Civ-Mil relations (similar to 's thoughts) was rarely true and most successful political leaders. The failure of recognition of the nature of the Vietnam war and poor Macro mgmt was the problem, per Cohen, not Micro MGMT of tactics by political leaders.

Biddle, Stephen. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle

Argument: "I argue that a particular nonmaterial variable - force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which forces are actually used in combat - is centrally important, shaping the role of material factors and often predetermining winners and losers. Moreover, I see the critical period of innovation in force employment occurring very early - on the western front from 1917 to 1918 - with technological change since then serving mostly to increase the price of ignoring the lessons taught in the first decades of the twentieth century." (p. 8) Concepts: -"I hold that a particular pattern of force employment - the modern system- has been pivotal in the twentieth century and is likely to remain so. I argue that since at least 1900, the dominate technological fact of the modern battlefield has been increasing lethality." (p. 14) >To perform military missions in the face of this storm of steel requires armies to reduce their exposure, and since 1918 the central means of doing so has been modern system force employment. (p. 14) +The modern system is a tightly interrelated complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration at the operational level of war. (p. 14) -Taken together, these techniques sharply reduce vulnerability to even twenty-first century weapons and sensors. -Where fully implemented, the modern system damps the effects of technological change and insulates its users from the full lethality of their opponents' weapons. (p. 14-15) Implication: The net result has thus has been a growing gap in the real military power of states that can and cannot implement the modern system, but surprisingly little change over time in outcomes between mutually modern-system opponents. (p. 15)

The Cave and the Light

Aristotle decided to focus on time, space, and matter to explain form versus the other way around with Socrates and Plato. Three events shape the world today 1) World Trade Center Attack 2) 2003 Human Genome Project 3) 2008 global financial meltdown Both: -the importance of reason -physical world is shaped by eternal forms that are more real than matter. -both condoned the subordination of woman and slavery -a bias toward progress was built into the American character, along with a love of liberty both political and personal. (515) -it considers religion as the safeguard of morality, and morality as the best security of law, and the surest pledge of the duration of freedom. (515) The idea that the human mind has direct access to truths that the senses cannot reach- that can be traced back to Plato, (521) The Tender-minded (528) -Rationalistic (going by principles) -Intellectualistic -Optimistic -Religious -Freewillist -Monistic -Dogmatical The Tough-Minded (528) -Empiricist (going by facts) -Sensationalistic -Materialistic -Pessimistic -Irreligious -Fatalistic -Pluralistic -Skeptical One Main difference: Plato looks backwards for keys to unlock our future, and Aristotle looks forward to what we could be. A: "The universe and everything in it is developing towards something continually better than what came before," p.52

Warden, John. The Air Campaign, Planning for Combat

Bullseye strategic bombing •Each level of system or "ring" was considered one of the enemy's centers of gravity. The idea behind Warden's five rings was to attack each of the rings to paralyze their forces, an objective also known as physical paralysis. Warden differs from Douhet in assigning leadership the highest priority, where Douhet espoused attacking the morale of populations, making Warden's theory more applicable for attacking non-democratic regimes, while Douhet's theories were based on the largely democratic nations of interwar Europe.

Naveh, Shimon "In the Pursuit of Excellence"

Characteristics of Operational Art: •Cognitive tension between strategic aims and tactical execution •Reflect the cognitive tension •Based upon industrious maneuver •Action should be synergetic •Aim towards disruption of Opponent's system •Reflect a contemplative attitude towardsf the factor of randomness •Non-Linear in Nature •Interaction between maneuver and attrition •Independent Entity •Related to a broad and universal theory

Thucydides "The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War"

Fear, Honor, Interests Realipolitic- Melian Dialogue States act only out of Fear or self-interest (realism) States go to war not the individual Challenges of keeping a democracy at war over long periods of time.

Bonura, Michael "Under the Shadow of Napoleon"

French Combat Method ○ Reinforced the fundamental elements taught through the tactical regulations and introduced primacy of the offensive, the importance of combing the effects of the auxiliary arms to support the main attack, and a linear but noncontiguous understanding of the battlefield.

Jullien, Francois. A Treatise on Efficacy

Chinese generals continues to make the most of the situation as it unfolds (guided simply by whatever profit there is to be gained rather than follow some set up ends. (39) *chose your own adventure Two different modes of efficacy result from these two different logics: on the one hand, the relation of means to ends with which we in the West are the more familiar; on the other, a relation between conditions and consequences, which is favored by the Chinese. (40) Rather than destroy the forces of the enemy, it is better to have them come over to your side. By advancing deep into their territory, separating them from their bases, and cutting off their communications, you force the enemy to surrender of his own accord. Moreover, not only do you capture the enemy country intact, "you also keep your own troops intact. (48) *Current strategy of getting economically involved in everything. Efficacy - "the pursuit of success in a particular field of action" (8), which is enabled by metis, "a kind of cunning intelligence that knows how to adapt to difficulties" (7) "To summarize the difference between Western and Chinese thought: on constructs a model that is then projected onto the situation, which implies that the situation is momentarily 'frozen'. The other relies on the situation as on a disposition that is known to be constantly evolving". (189) In other words, in the western way of war generals try to deliberately impose their will on the operational environment via brute force applied though a plan (based on "the model" of the OE referred to above) , but in the Chinese way "Whoever is skilled in warfare seeks success from the potential of the situation 'instead of demanding it from the men under his command.' His art is 'to rely on the potential' and he 'chooses his men' accordingly. (189)

Worley, Robert. Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System

Exceptionalism, Exemplarism, Vindicationism, and Exemptionalism Exemplarism is the principle that the United States could best serve the spread of liberal democracy by being an enviable example to the world. (31) Ø Find themselves in agreement with Kant's principle of noninterference into the affairs of other nations. Vindicationism- asserts that America can best serve the world by spreading democracy, not merely by example, but by forceful action. (32) Ø Reject territorial sovereignty and the principle of self-determination Exceptionalism- America believes that it was the exception to the rule. Ø Its heart is pure and its intentions benign because it does not seek empire through territorial acquisition. (32) Exemptionalism- the US has been so successful in building international institutions and law through treaty and, on occasion, attempts to exempt itself from treaty provisions. (34) Andrew Jackson preferred to distance America from European struggles (isolationist). (35) Woodrow Wilson believed in spreading democracy to the world but took a far more aggressive stance than Adams. (35) Ø Rejected realist principles in favor of idealism. (36)

Simpson, Emile. War from the Ground Up: Twenty-first-century Combat as Politics

Future wars are less likely to be a zero-sum contest between two rivals and that victory and defeat with not be objective results. War and the use of force will only be judged based on the many different subjective interpretations of the various audiencs. Globalization has proliferated the number of audiences for any conflict making an objective outcome for war more elusive Armed politics versus war Strategic audience is no longer just your country it is all actors within the importance of narrative and interpretation •There is a new paradigm for war (force directly seeks political objective) to replace the traditional paradigm (force used in mil domain for mil objectives). •Asymmetric war means there is a difference in templates of war (what is winning and losing), not that there is an advantage (true of all wars). •Based on the information revolution, which instantly globalizes information, the OE will be fragmented politically by multiple actors (vs polarity, "see-saw") and multiple foci for outcomes •Metaphors: the traditional duel (polarity with unified template of war) is now a street fight (multiplicity of actors and foci for outcomes). •War is now a competition of strategic narratives, which requires a strategic dialogue •Strategy is creating a polarity that work for you more than the enemy. privilege •narrative (requires a vision, confidence in the vision, and rhetoric [appeal to moral foundation, reason, and emotion]).

Schneider, James "Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundations of Operational Art"

Growth of Operational Art through study of American Civil War •Distributed Ops •Distributed Campaign •Continuous Logistics •Instantaneous C2 •Operationally Durable •Operational Vision •Distributed Enemy •Distributed Deployment

Betts, Richard K. "Is Strategy an Illusion?"

Have Nothing

Snyder, Jack. "One World, Rival Theories.

Have Nothing

Lauer, Stephen. "American Discontent: Unhappy Military Outcomes of the Post-Second World War Era."

Have nothing

Luttwak, Edward "The Operational Level of War"

Have nothing

Witt, John Fabian. Lincoln's Code

Have nothing

Citino, Robert "The German Way of War"

I would say the German way of war is: Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms (241) The goal of modern strategy will be to achieve a decision with highly mobile, highly capable forces, before the masses have even begun to move. (243) Ø The mass becomes immobile, it can no longer maneuver, and therefore it cannot win. It can only crush." (243) Ø Once on a wartime footing, its real strength would lie not in its mass but in its mobility. (243) The development of the radio assisted with command and control issues that mechanization brought with it. (255) Once again, as in all of Prussia's wars, we see the crucial role of time constraints. (258) German way of war left many planning issues in the air, allowing them to play out in the course of actual operations. Ø Indeed, the man in the field always took precedence over the staff in German war making. (258) Thanks to armor and rapid motorized units - as well as to a superior Luftwaffe - breakthroughs lead very soon to a catastrophic situation on long segments of the enemy front (266) Ø To the Germans, however, what had happened in Poland was not the creation of something new, but a renaissance. (267) Ø To German officers saw the rebirth of an old tradition. ○ For all the talk of German innovation and the "rise of blitzkrieg" in the interwar period, it seems that the German army had changed hardly at all. (267)

Definitions of Strategy

My Definition of Strategy: The use of End, Ways, Means, with the assessment of risk [Joint Doctrine Note, Clausewitz, Betts] to guide future actions [Mintzberg] in pursuit of continuing advantage [Dolman]. Liddell Hart- art of distributing means to fulfill ends of policy Grand Strategy: DIME -> War Dolman: Seeking to maintain a position of continuing advantage Grand Strategy: enhance welfare of people Gray: there are multiple definitions Ø Direction use mad of means and chosen ways and Clausewitz & Betts: Art of employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war Mintzberg: a plan, direction, guide to the future, pattern overtime, position, Ø Emergent and realized

Luttwak, Edward N. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace

My purpose is to uncover the universal logic that conditions all forms of war as well as the adversarial dealings of nations even in peace. p.xi "It is only in the realm of strategy, which encompasses the conduct and consequences of human relations in the context of actual or possible armed conflict, that we have learned to accept paradoxical propositions as valid." p.2 "The large claim I advance here is that strategy does not merely entail this or that paradoxical proposition, blatantly contradictory and yet through valid, but rather that the entire realm of strategy is pervaded by a paradoxical logic very different from the ordinary "linear" logic by which we live in all other spheres of life." p.2 "Consider an ordinary tactical choice, of the sort frequently made in war. To move toward its objective, an advancing force can choose between two roads, one good and one bad, the first board, direct, and well paved, the second narrow, circuitous, and unpaved. Only in the paradoxical realm of strategy would the choice arise at all, because it is only in war that a bad road can be good precisely because it is bad and may therefore be less strongly defended or even left unguarded by the enemy. Equally, whose use by the advancing force is more likely to be anticipated and opposed. In this case, the paradoxical logic of strategy reaches the extreme of a full reversal: instead of A moving toward its opposite B, as war preparation is supposed to preserve peace, A actually becomes B, and B becomes A." When the attempt is made to reduce anticipated combat risks by any form of paradoxical action, including maneuver, secrecy, and deception, the overall action will tend to become more complicated and more extended, thereby increasing organizational risks." p.8-9 "Once we focus instead on the paradoxical logic of strategy as an objective phenomenon, which determines outcomes whether or not the participants try to exploit it or are even conscious of its workings; and once time is duly introduced to make the process dynamic, we can recognize the logic in its totality as the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites." p.16 "But when it comes to the skills and procedures of war, the balance of possibilities is not even: victory misleads, defeat educates." p.19 "None of this means that victory must inevitably lead to defeat if war continues. But unless it benefits from overpowering reinforcements derived from its ultimate sources of military strength (that is, from factors exogenous to the logic), the victorious army will have to pause and recuperate from its own successful advance to overcome the unfavorable tendencies at work. By restoring its energies of morale and leadership through rest and troop replacements; by bringing forward its entire supply organization; by providing for the security of rear areas if threatened; and by revising those procedures, tactics, and methods that the enemy is learning to anticipate and defeat, the victorious army can restore its capacity for further success, in effect pushing outward and into the future its culminating point of victory." p.21-22 And yet the sequence keeps repeating itself, propelled by the irresistible attraction of defeating costly weapons with cheap ones. p. 35-36 In the realm of strategy, therefore, economic principles collide with the demands of war-effectiveness. Although there is an obvious cost barrier to unlimited variety there is also a vulnerability barrier to the unlimited pursuit of economies of scale by homogeneity- Enthusiasts persuaded of the power of some marvelous new weapon will invariably be surprised by the variety of adversary reactions that will deny the success that seemed so certain. Likewise, however, those who are reacting successfully against the new weapon may easily overlook the danger of overshooting the culminating point of success by sacrificing too much offensive strength what counts is rather the entire geography of the encounter, the length of frontages, the depths of territory of each side, the roads and other transport infrastructures. And it is at the theater level, where there is not only more space but also more time, that supply is decisive: outcome of military actions is determined only at that highest level: even a most successful conquest is only a provisional result that can be overturned by the diplomatic intervention of more powerful states

Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-22, Army Leadership. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012. Chapter 10 and Chapter 11. (18 pages)*What strategic leaders and organizations do.

In this case strategic describes the type of thinking rather than the usage in joint doctrine to describe a level of war, security objectives, or ideas to employ the instruments of national power. In contrast to thinking following traditional problem-solving steps, strategic thinking is not looking to solve a bounded problem but is creating a set or pattern of decisions to achieve future success. While a tactic is a specific prescription of how something will be done, a strategy is a philosophy of what is valued and consists of guidelines or boundaries that shape what actions to take. Activities of Strategic thinking 1) Situational Understanding 2) Questioning 3) Systems thinking 4) Analogical reasoning 5) Self-Awareness Operational Master resources and systems Strategic leadership- the process used to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus. Government, interagency, NGOs, etc. Strategic leaders simultaneously sustain what is necessary in the current environment, envision the future, and convey that vision to a wide audience. They often personally spearhead change. America's complex national security environment requires an in-depth knowledge of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Strategic leaders understand the interrelationships among these instruments and use them to achieve strategic ends. Broadly defined, strategic art is the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to promote and defend the national interest. Masters of the strategic art integrate the three roles performed by the complete strategist: strategic leader, strategic practitioner, and strategic theorist.

Joint Doctrinal Note 1-18: Strategy

In warfare, the critical social transaction is political interaction, adding organized violence to political interaction has powerful and unique effects. Warfare is a product of both politics and policy, which has two implications for strategists. 1) To be viable, strategy must aim to achieve the policy goals set by the political leadership. 2) Must recognize and accept that those policy goals are created within the chaotic and emotional realm of politics. Warfare is, most fundamentally, the use of force to make an enemy to do one's will. Clausewitz saw the nature of warfare as defined by the interplay of passion, chance and creativity, and reason. (15 pdf) At grand strategic level, the ways and means to attain US core national interests are based on the national leadership's strategic vision of America's role in the world. Enduring values and beliefs embodied in the national interests represent the legal, philosophical, and moral basis for continuation of the nation's system.

Hatch, Mary Jo "Organizational Theory"

Introduction to the study of organizations and organizing processes. Several perspectives are considered •Modernists use the organization as an organism model •Symbolic-interpretive use organizations as a culture and interaction as based on shared beliefs •Postmodernists use the collage metaphor bits of knowledge and understanding brought together to form a new perspective that has reference to the past organizations have or are cultures (shared understanding is an illusion) Ontology- defines the nature of knowledge (concerns our assumptions about reality) What is really going on or what you think is happening. Epistemology- Defines how to evaluate knowledge and how it's formed. Organizational Theory- The branch of sociology that deals with the strucuture of organizations and the systems and processes that operate within them. •Culture: The complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by a man as a member of society •Organizational narratives: A story of real events with a plot and characters that, when analyzed, will tell us about the organization's culture and distinctive practices •Culture influences behavior via norms and values than it should be possible to manage the norms and values of the organization in such a way that desired behaviors and other organizational performances are more or less guaranteed •Theory of organizational culture -Assumptions: What a member of a culture believes to be their reality -Norms: Expressions of values --> what are the norms in my unit and how does this affect the way planning is conducted? Establish the sort of behavior that is tolerated....have to be very careful to establish norms that are doctrinally correct when conducting planning ---> only when members of the culture can see some benefit in them, will new values become taken for granted and absorbed into unconscious assumptions -Culture significantly influenced organizational performance when it either helped the organization to anticipate or adapt to environmental change --> when culture and the need for adaption are aligned, cultural strength boosts performance

US Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design

It requires the commander's direct participation in a heavily inductive reasoning process upfront. This process must produce a well-framed problem hypothesis and an associated campaign design—a conceptual approach for the problem. This appreciation of the problem and the design of a solution can then be handed off to a deductive reasoning process executed by the staff under the commander's direction that, in turn, produces executable plans and orders for implementation. The first process is one of formulation, a creative, heuristic, and iterative activity; the second is one of implementation, a practical, logical, and disciplined linear activity. "war amongst the people." These are conflicts in which some or all of the participants are irregulars and military operations cannot deliver a conclusive political result. Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD) describes a process to create a systemic and shared understanding of a complex operational problem and to design a broad approach for its resolution. (pdf 8) Ø Recognizes bottom up refinement and feedback (9) ○ Frame problems themselves and share their understanding with others. (9) Structural complexity- based on the number of parts in the system - more independent parts the greater the complexity. Interactive complexity- based on the behavior of the parts and the resulting interaction between them. Operational Problem- is a discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels military action to resolve it.

Jervis, Robert. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life

Key Concepts: System Effects = crucial effects are delayed or indirect + relations between actors are defined by relations with others + interactions cannot be understood by addition + many outcomes are unintended + regulation is difficult Crucial to a systems approach is the belief that structures are powerful and that the internal characteristics of the elements matter less than their place in the system.(5) We are dealing with a system when - a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts. The result is that systems often display nonlinear relationships, outcomes cannot be understood by adding together the units or their relations, and many of the results of actions are unintended.(6) We Can Never Do Merely One Thing - In a system, the chains of consequences extend over time and many areas. The effects of action are always multiple. (10) Interconnections and emergent properties define systems, whether or not humans are a part of them.(28) Emergent Properties - If we are dealing with a system, the whole is different from, not greater than, the sum of the parts. Reductionism—seeking to understand the system by looking only at the units and their relations with one another—is not appropriate. (12) The system is driven by the purposeful behavior of individual actors who are moved by their own incentives, goals, and calculations. Interconnections - in a system, the fates of the units and their relations with others are strongly influenced by interactions at other places and at earlier periods of time. When the interconnections are dense, it may be difficult to trace the impact of any change even after the fact, let alone predict it ahead of time, making the system complex and hard to control. (17) Interconnections are highlighted when a system is disturbed by the introduction of a new element.(18) Because most systems have either been designed to cope with adversity or have evolved in the face of it, breakage or overload at one point rarely destroys them. Some arrangements of connections will make a system resistant to change and others can facilitate instability. When one element or relation cannot change unless several others do, small and slow adjustments will not be possible; each element has a veto over all the others. In international politics the most important case is that each state might be glad to abandon a preoccupation with power and narrow self-interest if its rivals did.(19) In other cases, one element controls another, which in turn controls a third, thereby producing great indirect influence.(20) Sometimes the interconnections are relatively obvious because the chains are short or the processes involved are familiar. When chains of interconnections are long and intricate, the results are more likely to be surprising. (21) Interconnections and emergent properties define systems, whether or not humans are part of them.(28) Deterrence theory - (credible) reputation, commitments, and others' expectations create interconnections. Our threats are interdependent. Essentially we tell the Soviets that we have to react here because, if we did not, they would not believe us.(23) Indirect & Delayed Effects - the relations between two actors often are determined by each one's relations with others; interactions are central and cannot be understood by additive operations; many outcomes are unintended; regulation is difficult and prone to misfire. Nonlinearities create problems with proceeding incrementally by a slow but well sustained progress where the effect of each step is watched. This prescription ignores several facts: Jumps rather than smooth progressions often characterize operations of systems Some goals can only be reached by quick and drastic changes The direct response to a small alteration in a policy or input may tell us very little about either the delayed effects - when variables interact in a nonlinear manner, changes may not be gradual. Instead, for a prolonged period there may be no apparent deterioration, followed by sudden collapse or transformation. First Interactions - Results Cannot Be Predicted from the Separate Actions. That is, two or more elements produce results that cannot be understood by examine each alone. The effect of one variable frequently depends on the state of another, as we often see in everyday life. There is no such things as "with all else equal," a change to X will produce Y.(40) Second Interactions - Strategies Depend on the Strategies of Others. That is, the fate of an actor's policy or strategy depends on those that are adopted by others. Further complexities are introduced when we look at the interactions that occur between strategies when actors consciously react to others and anticipate what they think others will do.(44) Third Interactions - Behavior Changes the Environment. That is, behavior alters the environment in ways that affect the trajectory of actors, outcomes, and environments. Initial behaviors and outcomes often influence later ones, producing powerful dynamics that explain change over time and that cannot be captured by labeling one set of elements "causes" and other "effects." (48) •Cannot know the consequences of one's actions with certainty •Flexibility and resilience are needed when acting in a complex system to account for unintended consequences. •Must act, wait, and be prepared with additional actions depending on the outcome. •Lijphart Effect: Despite uncertain future, states can take actions to counter or dampen foreseeable effects •Domino Theory: Belief that strong action following crisis will limit adversary's perceptions of weakness after multiple failures •Doing things in Twos: Coupling a positive action with a negative one to balance the anticipated effects

Gray, Colin. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice

Lots of stuff nothing unique imo.

Young Man and Fire

Narrative: This is the account of the 1949 Mann Gulch, MT fire and the crew of 15 smokejumpers who fought it (12 died). Thesis: The cone of probability/uncertainty can be reduced by understanding the environment, phenomenon, variables ie Mitigate cone of probability = (Environment + Factors of Phenomenon + Variables) / Function Theories: The many theories as to why the 12 died included: placing blame on the leader (Dodge) for failing to maintain an exit, starting slowly, and not bringing his subordinates into his plan to do an early burn; the 2nd in command (Helman) who died for not listening to the leader; the fire service for sending them out in high winds. (MacLean was attempting to figure out which theory was correct with his book) Applicability: This book was used throughout the course to explain a theory of the phenomenon (how fire works) and a theory of action (how to fight/escape the fire) Thesis: The man Gulch Fire of 1949 was the result of several critical events 1)Incomplete understanding of the theory of fire 1)Started by lighting 2)Burned at high temp and took O2 3)Back draft when fresh O2 added 4)Dodge ate lunch on DZ while crew fought fire 2)Lack of prep 1)No Class D fire since 1947 2)3x WK TRN for smoke jumper Key ideas 1)Develop all encompassing theory of fire based on eye witness (Sallee + Rumsey, scientific experiments, 2)History 1)Prevent anchoring 2)C2 structure - Hellman (2IC) insubordinate 3)Dodge never went with crew before 4)Dodge not at front of formation 3)Theory foes from general concept to doctrine 4)Parading shift 5)Fires COG analysis -> Wag found the CV to attack

Cohen, Eliot. The Big Stick,

Power is the ability to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do. It implies purposiveness - the ability to make things happen. Much of what is termed soft power is not controllable; that is, it cannot be directed with precision - and indeed, sometimes it cannot be directed at all. This turns out to be true even of sanctions. (16) The largest problem with sanctions as a tool of policy is that it assumes that leaders care deeply about the state of their country's economy, or that they can be touched personally by restrictions imposed on (for example) its banking system. But they may not care and may not be affected. (17) American military power is thus often caught between opposing poles- actual versus deterrence; achieving immediate objectives versus creating order, norms, and rules; and, of course, defending interests and asserting values. (199) Ø The complexity of American strategic purpose in the twenty-first century, and the intrinsic limits of any system of using it, makes the challenges of wielding hard power as daunting, from the intellectual point of view at least, as they have ever been. (199) Ø Few strategic problems are ever completely solved; they may diminish in intensity, but will continue to exist in parallel with old ones. (200) ○ Politics is fluid and continuous; there are no end states in politics § "has no end and permits the mind no rest...The victorious general enjoys the honors of his victory for a long while; but a prime minister has to face the new situation born of that very victory itself. (202) Defeat Nazi Germany and find yourself in a Cold War with your former ally, a standoff that takes place in large measure on the territory of your defeated former enemy, now an ally. (202) Containment, end state, and exit strategy are a kind of strategic pixie dust, the sprinkling of which over the complex problems of contemporary policy problem may seem to make them manageable. In fact, they do not manage them. They oversimply them, and because their intended results are often unattainable, these concepts paralyze the decision-maker rather than inform them. (203) Understanding strategy in the years to come will require walking away from these concepts and devising ones in line with the political and strategic realities of our times. (203) Grand strategy is a soothing concept; yet not merely is illusory, for the most part, but dangerous. (203) Strategy is the art of matching military means to political ends; a single document, produced at irregular intervals, under the auspices of the president in his role as commander in chief, would make much more sense. (206) My thoughts about Cohen reading: the world is uncertain and you need to be prepared to handle a wide range of possibilities. This is why having a larger military specialized in handling various aspects would be more suited to handling the task asked of it. Nothing is long lasting and there is continuous change so grand strategy is an illusion. One needs to be flexible and respond to the circumstances of the moment rather than trying to force the current situation into a historical example.

Grygiel, Jakub. Great Powers and Geopolitical Change.

Purpose: 1) To bring geography back to the study of international relations 2) Examine the importance of foreign policy that reflects the underlying geopolitics. 3) To draw from history lessons for US foreign policy Argument: For the last four decades geography has played an increasing smaller role in international relations theory, resulting in a growing gap between theory and practice. Geography is the geological reality of the earth, composed of mountains, rivers, seas, climate, and so on. Geopolitics is a combination of geological features (e.g., natural resources) with human activity (e.g., production and communication technology) that alters the value of places. Ø While geography does not change (e.g., the location of oil fields is the same now as it was two hundred years ago), the value given to it can fluctuate dramatically with the development of new technologies (e.g., over the course of several decades the diesel engine increased the importance of oil-rich regions from the Caspian Sea to the Middle East). In short, geopolitics is defined by the location of natural and economic resources and the lines of communication linking them. It is a map of sorts, assigning strategic value to places. Finally, geostrategy describes where a state directs its military and diplomatic efforts. Because of limited resources, states, even the most powerful ones, must choose where to project their power and influence, imparting a clear geographic direction to their foreign policy.

Isserson, G.S. "The Evolution of Operational Art"

The operational artist emerges as a synthetic mediator whose campaign concept becomes the fundamental referent for the strategic war designer and the tactical battle planner. (xiii) "Changes in objective reality often required fundamental changes in our subjective thinking if we are to survive in a dynamic and often hostile world. (ix) In much the same way Soviet theorist Isserson re-visualized the nature of modern warfare that began with the overthrow of the classical Napoleonic paradigm. (X) Tactical bias (x) Ø First, the way we structure the world as we see and imagine it. ○ Grounded in the past. ○ Fallacy of genetic composition- a false belief that what is true of our tactical past will hold true of our expanded operational and strategic future. (xi) ○ Soviet theorists realized operational art was a way of thinking designed to overcome the fallacy of genetic composition- the tendency to structure cognitively the whole of warfare from the sum of its individual tactical parts. (xi) Ø Second, way classical generals were educated (xi) ○ Went with transformation of military education Ø Third, leadership in military organizations ○ The emergence of operational art suggested a new emphasis on intellectual leadership, an autonomous style (xii) Ø Fourth, perennial institutional assault on military theory (xii) 1. The Basic Principles of Our Operational Art The key point of departure, the historical significance of revolutionary-class war with its essence based on political categories and relations, determines the character of the combat front and the nature of our future operations. (41) The basic principle of our military preparation, of our operational art, are the principles of the offensive. (42) Ø Offensive strategy of annihilation Under these conditions, the basic mission of our operational art is substantiation and elaboration of the theory of a deep operation for annihilation. (14) 6. The In-Depth Breakthrough and Destruction of the Front Ø A front must be broken by means of a decisive operation. A front must be broken and totally crushed throughout its entire depth. (65) Ø A modern deep breakthrough essentially requires two operational assault echelons: an attack echelon for breachign a front tactically; and a breakthrough echelon for inflicting a depth-to depth blow to shatter and crush enemy resistance through the entire operational depth. (66) Under the contemporary condition of deep strategy victory belongs to the side with the deeper front and the more powerful deep echelons. (66) The fast-moving advance guard echelon of motor-mechanized units and cavalry must be withdrawn early from the combat front because their long-range effects are no longer suited to the situation. (67) Ø There will be insufficient maneuver space, and they will have fulfilled their mission as an army-level advance guard. These units will now move to the flank on the way to redeployment in the rear of the offensive operational formation. They will be replaced by advancing echelons of combined arms infantry formations, the effects of which are more appropriate to combat against a front. (67) Ø Attack echelons with numerous tanks, highly-effective heavy artillery, and short-range combat aviation. Ø Following is the breakthrough echelon of fast moving units tailored in advance as an offensive operational formation. In operational perspective, these actions would become a new grand multi-level battle waged on several tiers within the operational depths. (69) This battle will resurrect "Cannae" on the new basis of deep strategy. ( •Deep operations •Simultaneous containment and suppression of enemy's depth. •Consecutive Operations -Depth, Mass, Mobility, Organization, C2

Drezner, Daniel W. Theories of International Politics and Zombies

The realpolitik of the living dead All realists start with a common assumption - that anarchy is the overarching constraint of world politics - the absence of a centralized, legitimate authority. (33) Ø Every actor must adopted self-help measures to ensure continued existence. Ø Primary actors are those that can guarantee their own survival - states. (33) Ø The only currency that matters is power - the material capability to ward off pressure or coercion while being able to influence others. (33) ○ If one state amasses more and more power, other states will have to balance that state. Ø Skeptical of international institutions to regulate world politics. (34) Ø "Who will gain more?" Ø Focus like a laser beam on the international distribution of power. (35) States would take a passive role in combating the zombies and hope that others would do the dirty work. (40) In some circumstances states would encourage fighting between zombies and other states to weaken them. (45) In the end, realists would caution human governments against expending significant amounts of blood and treasure to engage in far-flung anti-zombie adventures - particularly blood. (45) Regulating the undead in a liberal world order -All liberals nevertheless share a common belief: cooperation is still possible in a world of anarchy. (47) Ø liberals look at world politics as a non-zero-sum game. Ø Mutual cooperation on issues can yield global public goods on a massive scale. Ø These gains are not always distributed evenly, but they do make all actors better off than they would be in the absence of policy coordination. Ø Major actors in world politics therefore have an incentive to realize the benefits that come from long term mutual cooperation and avoid the costs that come with mutual defection. (47) Creates free riders Governments will be less likely to cheat in the short term if they know it means they will lose the benefits from trade in the long term. Ø Multilateral institutions that monitor and disseminate information can ensure that cheating will be detected and punished. (49) Ø Democracies are more likely to cooperate with each other. ○ Liberals posit that democracies are more likely to have similar preferences, making cooperation easier. The liberal paradigm would predict two significant loopholes that could form within the confines of a global counter-zombie regime. Ø First, some countries might fail to provide timely information about zombie outbreaks until the problem had escalated yond local control ○ Authoritarian countries are often reluctant to admit health crises because of the threat such an admission could have on state control over society. Ø Non-democratic regimes are less likely to invest in the public goods necessary to prevent or contain disasters. ○ This is one reason why the loss of life from disasters is greater in authoritarian countries.

Arena, Michael J., and Mary Uhl-Bien. "Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting from Human Capital to Social Capital."

Shift part of the focus to how they can unleash the hidden potential within organizations through a better understanding of social capital. In today's dynamic world, leadership frameworks must also shift- from a predominantly human capital focus, such as the bias toward competency-based models, to a social capital emphasis, focusing on facilitating the movement of ideas across a system through bridging and brokering. (23) Complexity Leadership Theory: Proposes that adaptability, which enhances performance and innovations, occurs in the everyday interactions of individuals acting in response to pressures and opportunities in their local contexts. Ø Problem is that silos can create obstacles to interconnectivity. Operational system - drives formality, standardization, and business performance Entrepreneurial system- strives for innovation, learning and growth. Adaptive Space- occurs in the interface between operational and entrepreneurial systems by embracing, rather than stiffing, the dynamic tension between the two systems. Enabling Adaptive Space = Pressures + Practices + Principles. The primary role of pressures is to move a system out of equilibrium. "loosens up" a system.

Dolman, Everett Carl. "Seeking Strategy"

Strategy and Choice Tactics is about constraining the opponent's choices to one - surrender or die. Tactician seeks to bring events to culmination, whether in victory or in exit strategies or end games. Strategist realm, has no end or culminating point, is the realm of change. Ø It is the purpose of strategist's to manipulate the boundaries and rules of competition, to make them fluid, to change them as readily as needs dictate. ○ Enters into a relationship with the goal of continuing it, on favorable terms, and accepts that every choice made and acted on redefines the rules and boundaries of the interaction. (14) The conditions for victory could change at the moment of triumph, in which case the winner is determined not by skillful play but fortuitous interruption. Ø Vital to the tactician that the rules not change during the course of battle Ø Expecting and adapting to change is the essence of the strategic thinker's planning. ○ Once the terms and decisions to begin the game are agreed upon, strategy is subordinate to tactics (but never over). While there is no best strategy for playing the game, there are infallible tactics within it. Ø The critical competition outside the boundaries of the field of play is what connects the tactician to the strategist. Ø The strategist strives instead to expand options, even for the opponent. ○ Rejects closure, seeking instead to continue. It is the interaction of war, its duel nature, that forces this view: no matter how careful my planning, no matter how comprehensive my plan, the opponent could do something unanticipated. Strategy and Strategists Strategists as agents are products of their times, their cultures, societies, and governments - in short, interactive products of their structures. Ø The study of strategy is therefore incomplete without a study of strategists in their time, a relationship that is a coequal if not dominant influence on the evolution of strategy through history. (18-19) Ø Seek conditions of advantage (23) ○ Tendencies to happen (events, phases, and fields) ○ The notion that a group acts in predictable ways but that an individual does not has far-reaching consequences for the military planner. The pattern is what leads to understanding.

Wass de Czege "Thinking and Acting Like an Early Explorer: Operational Art is not a Level of War"

Strategy is about choosing the "best" way forward - one that usefully exploits the potential of what is known about the terrain, the weather, and the natives. Tactical decisions are about how to optimize such functioning "in this particular case" and thus achieve the concrete "stepping stone" objectives identified in the strategy. Skepticism is a requirement in strategy, the art of plotting the way ahead among great uncertainties. Strategy operates in a system that we must assume to be "open" within the time frame we are exploring. Operational art is not a level of war, or the art of generalship. It is what goes on in the explorer's mind, the mediating and balancing interaction between his strategic and tactical reasoning. In other words, if we create these new realities, then we will not only progress toward our goal, but be in a better position to advance further by gaining a better understand of "the way things appear to be" to avoid misfortune and to reveal new opportunities for continuing progress. "The way things appear to be" is an understanding, at minimum, of what elements of the situation including oneself seem to be key, how they might relate, how the current situation came to be, how the situation might change, and how elements of the situation and the currents of change might be employed, sidestepped, avoided, removed, blocked or manipulated to gain advantage on the way forward.

Svechin, Aleksandr A. "Strategy"

Strategy is the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set by the war for the armed forces. Strategy decides issues associated with the employment of the armed forces and all the resources of a country for achieving ultimate war aims. While operational art must take into account the possibilities presented by the immediate rear (front logistics), the strategist must take into account the entire rear, both his own and the enemy's, represented by the state with all its economic and political capabilities. A strategist will be successful if he correctly evaluates the nature of a war, which depends on different economic, social, geographic, administrative and technical factors. In strategy the center of gravity lies in developing an independent point of view which primarily requires careful homework. Familiarization with strategic topics must begin at the start of military service, and one must study the military historical past from the vantage point of these topics, evaluate the military events one has personally experienced and examine the current evolution of the military profession However, like the tactician and operations specialist, a strategist is not completely independent in his field. Just as tactics is an extension of operational art and operational art is an extension of strategy, strategy is an extension of politics.

Ryan, Alex "What is a systems Approach"

Systems are an idealization Systems have multiple components The components are interdependent Systems are organized; System have emergent properties Systems have a boundary Systems are enduring Systems effect and are affected by their environment Systems exhibit feedback Systems have non-trivial, purposeful behavior

Kalinovsky, Artemy. A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The American side should take him seriously, he said, when he spoke of finding a new way in which regional conflicts could be solved. The US side could be assured that "the hand of Moscow would be a constructive hand." *Does the same need to happen today in regional conflicts? (Syria)

Strachan, Hew "The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective"

Theme/Summary: Strachan uses an idealized idea of civ-mil relations. Some of the ideas seem to lean towards a greater militarism in democratic gov't by increasing the clout of the Mil Leadership. He further advocates that Clausewitz holds relevancy for all aspects of warfare but his 'strategy' must be understood as a lower level than today's vers. Strategy in its Clausewitzian form was the use of battles for the purposes of war. (11) -Soldiers lost control of strategy, and so the discipline which defined and validated the art of the commander, the business of general staffs and the processes of war planning, was no longer theirs. (17) -Nukes (Policy/Military together) and All volunteer army (Less socia)l contributed. -This led to the creation of "Operational Art" in 80s as a politics free zone. -"The Principal purpose of effective civl-military relations is national security: its output is strategy. Democracies tend to forget that. They have come to address civil-military relations not as a means to an end, not as a way of making the state more efficient in its use of military power, but as an end in itself. Instead the principal objective, to which others become secondary, has been the subordination of the armed forces to civil control."

Hurd, Ian. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.

Theme: Analysis of three most important political variable of legitimacy. Thesis: Role of legitimacy as motivation for actor compliance with international norms and institutions negates description of international system as anarchic. Legitimate (government) institutions tolerate opposition to be accountable. Opposition to sovereignty should be expected and potential alternatives should be respected. Key Concepts •Weber: Social control is a function of coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. •Legitimacy- normative belief (perception) by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. •Provides internal reason for compliance generated out of sense of moral obligation. •Suchman: a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some social construction norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. •International System based on sovereignty exists because of legitimacy. •Sovereignty by coercion is an anomaly (i.e. Iran-Iraq War and Bosnia Herzegovina/FRY War) •States generally do not calculate costs and benefit of violation rules of sovereignty •Revisionist states that seek to challenge principle of sovereignty are rare •These factors suggest internalization of sovereignty as broadly accepted norm among actors. •Presence of legitimate institutions implies authority which implies lack of anarchy •International system clearly exhibits order in which patterns repeat, institutions solidify, and practices are stable. Implications & Linkages •Berger, Theory of Social Construction: Legitimacy-compliance based compliance as generated by perception social construction of what is right, good, or moral. What motivates states to follow international norms, rules, and commitments? (1) because the actor fears the punishment of rule enforcers, (2) because the actor sees the rule as in its own self-interest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed •Role of legitimacy as motivation for actor compliance with international norms and institutions negates description of international system as anarchic •Legitimacy- normative belief (perception) by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed •Three currencies of power: coercion (make someone do something, stick), self-interest (more benefit, less loss, utilitarian, carrot), and legitimacy (belief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed, moral) •Anarchy is the absence of legitimate authority, while authority is willing compliance based on perceived •legitimacy of superior How to explore legitimacy -rate of compliance: how often used to comply with rather than break the rules of your study -reasons for compliance: what do decision-makers say is her motivation complying with the wrong question(391)

Parsa, Misagh "States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions"

Theme: Analyze the theories of irregular warfare from the viewpoints of state and non-state actors and the resulting requirements for the application of operational art. Thesis: - The goal is to contribute to a comprehensive theory of social revolution in developing countries and a framework within which to understand and explain other revolutions - a comparative analysis of three states' structures, social classes, and ideologies in large-scale social conflicts. Despite great advances, structural models by themselves cannot explain the complexity of social revolutions in developing countries nor can it explain the eruption, nature, timing and outcome of social conflicts. Because revolutions in the 20th century have occurred only where major social classes succeeded in forming broad coalitions, any theory of revolution must also focus on the state, its nature, and its vulnerability to revolutionary conflicts. States that form exclusive polities and states that intervene highly in capital accumulation tend to be come very vulnerable to challenge and attack. Prolonged exclusion from the polity predisposes the excluded toward radical measures and insurgency. Note - the author focuses on developing states Key Concepts: Revolution - rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures that are carried through class-based revolts from below Exclusive Rule - States that are characterized by exclusive rule tend to become vulnerable to challenge and attack in times of crisis. Such states contract the scope of the polity and block access to the state and the centers of political power. They often tend to eliminate or render irrelevant formal democratic institutions. In extreme cases, highly exclusive states may develop an exceedingly personalistic rule, which excludes virtually the entire population, even the economic elite, from decision making and government resources. Such regimes also tend to minimize or eliminate accountability to the public and rule independently of the underlying population. Furthermore, they do not provide any option for change. When exclusive rule and centralization of power come a bout in the context of large-scale social conflicts, they often have several consequences •First, states may have to continually resort to violence and repression to demobilize or eliminate their opponents or insurgents. The continuous use of repression may reduce social support for the regime and force it to become dependent on both the military and external support to maintain its power. •Second, government repression may weaken or eliminate elite or moderate challenges and consequently polarize the opposition in favor of the hegemony of radical or revolutionary challengers. •TILLY - "Perhaps the largest single factor in the promotion of revolutions and collective violence has been the great centralization of power in national states." Examples - France, Russia, China. State Intervention - the target of social conflicts - the relationship between the state and economy has crucial consequences for social conflicts. State intervention in capital accumulation converts the government into a major economic actor and thus affects the nature of social conflicts by providing a visible, concrete target for challenge and attack when things go wrong in the eyes of the population. There are three types of states relevant to the intervention in capital accumulation: •Regulative - These states intervene minimally in the economy, limiting their activities to enforcing rules and assuring efficient operation of the market, often through fiscal and monetary policies. •Administrative - These states intervene moderately in economic matters. In addition to regulative activities, they initiate planning, pursue corporate type policies, and may provide economic incentives to certain sectors. •Hyperactive - These states intervene extensively in capital allocation and accumulation, thus limiting the scope of the market's operation. In addition to extensive regulating and planning, they often own and control vast economic resources. Thus, at times of economic crisis, the state rather than market forces will be held accountable for failure and mismanagement making the government vulnerable to challenge and attack. Furthermore, their strategies often serve particular interests rather than those of general society. Additionally, the state that employs sizable segments of the workforce inevitably tends to become the target of workers' economic conflicts. Last, the state becomes vulnerable when it pursues economic and financial policies that are dependent on the global market and external sources of capital and technology. Although, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have managed to do so, the fact remains that high state intervention increases the likelihood that social conflicts will become politicized and potentially target the state. Collective Action & Coalition Forming - occurs in high levels of state intervention, economic crisis, when exclusive rule limits options for change given a weakened or repress the moderate opposition, and when there is less class conflict. In contrast, coalition formation is unlikely where ideologically driven challengers become very powerful and threaten the privileges of the upper class. Coalition formation - In highly repressive situations, large-scale insurgencies are initiated only when the balance of power favors the disadvantaged groups and classes. Regressive measures taken by the state can further feed unrest and coalescing of opponents. The further the state is from the accepted societal norm, the more likely moderate to extreme opponents will coalesce against economic or political gripes. Armies manned by conscripts are more sensitive to widespread gripes due to their maintained connectivity to the populace. •Ideology & Social Revolution - Whether large-scale social conflicts will end in political change only or transform the entire social structure depends, at a minimum, upon the challengers that ultimately seize power. If the new leaders are moderate with ties to the upper class, the revolution will result only in changes to the political system accompanied by limited social reforms. On the other hand, if the new leaders are radical revolutionaries, the outcome may be a large-scale social transformation of the class structure. In theory, challengers who possess crucial resources, who are well organized and unconstrained by repression are in a better position to lead the insurgency and seize power. •Moderate Challengers - Have greater potential than revolutionaries to gain power. Greater resources. Mobilized because they are permitted to form occupational or economic organizations to defend interests, which also enhances the capacity for collective action. They are less restricted by repression because they do not advocate fundamental change in the social structure. May have allies with the government. They do not mobilize to bring about social revolutions. At most they advocate the expansion of the democracy. Pragmatism usually trumps idealism. •Radical Challengers - Advocate social revolutions and lack adequate resources, thereby forced to operate underground to avoid repression. Generally do not have allies with the government. If they become powerful and attract allies among the working classes, they may threaten privileged social classes and reduce the likelihood of coalition formation. Many emerge but few succeed. •Revolutionary Challengers - They gain strength under exclusive regimes that repress the moderate opposition. They may be able to seize power if the elite opposition has broken away from the existing regime but has failed to remove the power-holders. The may also succeed if they can forge a coalition with moderate challengers or obtain their implicit support by reducing the intensity of class conflict so that the upper class ins not threatened. Once a broad coalition is formed, success increases if revolutionary challengers simultaneously combine popular uprising disruptive collective action in the form of general strikes, and armed attacks on the coercive apparatus of the regime. Conclusion - States that form exclusive polities and are hyperactive appear to be most vulnerable to challenge and attack. Although structural variables set the state for conflicts, they don determine the occurrence, timing, and the process of conflict. CASE STUDIES - Iran, Nicaragua, Philippines - All three pursued capitalist development strategies that were successful. All three regimes governed by means of authoritarian mechanisms and coercive apparatuses. All three governments had long enjoyed the economic, political, and military support of the US. (3) In short, all three developed similar social structures, experienced massive popular opposition, yet emerged with very different outcomes.(25) •Social revolution exists when there is a breakdown between the people and the state, the outliers are organized, the coalition contains elites (clergy, students, workers, capitalists), the state alienates the moderates, and the state ceases engaging. •Exclusive rule (no other contenders), centralization of power (alienates trust, loyalty of the people), and high level of economic intervention (state owns resources and hyperactive) render states vulnerable to conflict and challenge. •Intervention by foreign states exacerbates the problem by further consolidating resources at the state level.

Nye, Joseph. The Future of Power.

Theme: Analyzes political variable of power Thesis: Traditional elements of national power are insufficient to change or affect behavior. Power is derived from the tangible and intangible resources that underlie power relationships. (p.5, 9) Key Concepts •Relational Power - Three faces (p. 14) •First face (Command Power): ability to change other's behavior against their his/her initial preferences •Uses threats, rewards, or military force. •Second face (Co-optive): Using institutions ideas and values, including military resources, to frame the agenda and make other's preferences irrelevant •Third face (Co-optive): Affecting another's preferences so he/she wants what you want; eliminates need to command change. Success in war can convey competence that generates positive attraction. •A helps to create and shape B's basic beliefs, perceptions and preferences. B is unlikely to be aware of this or to realize the effect of A's power. •Soft Power- Ability to affect others through co-optive means (agenda setting, persuasion, attraction) to obtain preferred outcome. •Increasingly decentralized; power diffuses from state to non-state actors in information age. •Emphasizes public diplomacy to create two-way communication between state and global public •Allows dissent which can generate positive attraction that may facilitate policy objectives Implications & Linkages •Reiterates Clausewitzian idea of war as an extension of policy by other means. Military force still relevant, but not sole instrument of power by which to influence another's will. Military force must be used in support of or in conjunction with co-optive forms of power. Smart Power: The ability to combine hard and soft resources into effective strategy. -Affect others through framing the agenda to shape other beliefs, perceptions, and preferences. -full range of tools

Echevarria, Antulio "American Operational Art 1917-2008"

Theme: Evolution of an American Way of Warfare - another taxonomy to Linn, Echo of Battle Thesis: US Army's OPART saw progression towards first grammar (conventional) WF and disregard second grammar, although indication were their (Vietnam) - contemporary OPART is more than only one but a combination of at least two grammars Key Concepts •There are two grammars of war: -1- high intensity conflict: a battle centric effort meaning to defeat an adversary by annihilation or by attrition -2- low intensity conflict / counter insurgency: seldom battle centric, requires special purpose units/organizations •WW II provided valuable experiences in the application of OPART - fire and movement, arrangements of tactical action; Gen Patton and Eisenhower as operational artists •Korean War: -Applied WW II approaches and failed to adjust to limited objectives of Pres Truman -= habit of thinking in WW II terms of annihilative victories -Fighting INS for SOF only, repeated this experience in Vietnam again -MacArthur's relief was basically the extension of the primary focus of American operational art on the 1st grammar. •1973, Wrighley (traditional belief): apply overwhelming firepower, resources, and numerical superiority •Gulf War 90/91 -US AF COL JOHN WARDEN, developed approach of long-range precision strike technology to target a foe's will to fight while avoiding not only costly ground campaigns but also the extensive destruction associated with strategic bombing. -FM 100-5 brought in 'decisive victory' via deterrence, power projection, Network Centric Warfare, EBO, Information was hailed as the key to lifting the fog of war... •OEF/OIF (2001-2003) •American OPART was never closer to perfecting war's first grammar than during the initial operations. However, failed to prepare enough for other competences would be needed in a 2nd grammar war. Implications & Linkages •Linn (Echo of battle) provides the idea of pacification (= dual nature of fighting and stabilizing) •Are two grammars sufficient/ more appropriate to explain the nature of warfare? Do we need another grammar (Hum Intervention, Peacekeeping?) •Operational Art in the 20th Century has seen progression toward perfection of first grammar. US operational planning and execution focused too much on war's first grammar, which is why the classic definition of operational art is also problematic. It is not enough merely to 'design' and 'link' operations, as the classic definition holds, with only one grammar in mind. Contemporary operational art requires mastering two grammars. •First Grammar is conventional war, which the US Army has nearly perfected •Second Grammar is unconventional war, which has suffered from focus on first grammar.

Gaddis, John Lewis "The Landscape of History"

Theme: Historical consciousness: Art and Science of historical analysis to prepare for the future. Thesis: Gaddis explains historical methods - how historians are not bound by time or space, but must choose what to include and discard and thereby deliberately tell their story about history = each history is designed to fit a purpose and audience, no mono-causal view on every situation Key Concepts •The title is a metaphor as history is like cartography - both create their representation of reality without duplicating it •= written history is selective = often contains a moral agenda/bias with historians as master of the narrative •the past is the landscape and story of the history is the way we represent it •= breath and depth depend on scale of investigation •The art to manipulate time, space and scale up to upheld to standards for verification (science) •Vary between reductionist - holistic/ecological view of interaction •particularization of generalization and vice versa to support the narrative •integration of randomness with regularity •differentiation of causes •Key Terms •Selectivity - "Historians decide which ones we want to write about" = fallacy of blind sites •Simultaneity - The ability to analyze more than a single place or time = offers multiple perspectives •Scale - The ease with which historians can shift the scale of the macroscopic to the microscopic and relate both. •Reductionism vs. Constructivism, and the importance of being able to integrate elements of both when solving complex problems. •Continuities - series of phenomena with patterns across time •Contingencies - different/new phenomena without pattern that emerge, i.e. Black Swans (extreme) Implications & Linkages •Kuhn - Continuities and Contingencies in Science Paradigm shifts •Historians can interpret the past for the purposes of the present with the view of managing the future (theory and doctrine) •not a clear-cut guide for the future, but can inform and inspire about the possible future by analyzing the past. •You cannot be objective about events while you are standing in them •Modeling (Jomini): seeks to show how a system has worked in the past (principles, rules) and how it works in the future •Simulation (Clausewitz): illustrate specific past events, not to replicate = often the case when more variables •Clausewitz: historical examples to explain an support a theory, but cautions about application in other situations •Historians cannot know truth. Tension between particularization and abstraction (rarely claim applicability beyond context but do acknowledge tendencies and patterns) •Historians believe in contingent causation - ID sensitive dependence •Distillation (understand the complexity), conducting simulations (thought experiments), and then representing the past (like a cartographer), are the tools of a historian, who considers the sensitive dependence on initial conditions but takes an ecological view of reality (complexity, interdependence of systems). •History is not guide to future, but can guide and inform the future •Time and Space is defined by Scale, simultaneity, selectivity, •Continuities (patterns over time) and contingencies (phenomenon that cannot be patterned)

Tilly, Charles " Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1992"

Theme: Non-Western state, societal formation Thesis: The state transformation process, which begins with militarization has, as its end result civilianization Key Concepts •State structure appeared chiefly as a by-product of ruler's efforts to acquire the means of war •Relations among states, especially through war and preparation for war, strongly affected the entire process of state formation •There could be alternative histories of state formation based on continuously varying the combinations of concentrated capital, preparation for war, and position within the international system •Coercion, and the wielders of coercive power, create states •Capital: any tangible mobile resources and enforceable claims on such resources; process to produce and accumulate capital produces cities •Stages of warfare and state organization: •Patrimonialism: Tribes, feudal levies; •Brokerage: mercenaries; •Nationalism: levee en mass; •Specialization: professional, standing armies Implications & Linkages •Berger - Generally, at each stage of development (city state, national state, empire), the state and the people (and all the classes of people) developed new relationships with one another and new institutions to govern them •Gaddis - National states did not have to develop the way they did in Europe. The fact that they did owes to the peculiar nature of the competition in Europe, the Roman inheritance, the land, the languages, etc. However, once the competition began, the national state was the best model for Europe. Reinforces a Gaddisesque critique of a mono-causal view on this subject. •Increased concentrated Coercion and Capital propelled the process of state formation in Europe •Even though trajectories (coercion intensive vs capital intense) may differ, states remained if they were able to successfully concentrate both coercion and capital. •Goldstone's response: Only applies to France and Germany. War-making alone counts for state formation in Europe.

Kuhn, Thomas "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions"

Theme: Paradigm of Change/Revolution in Scientific Theory Thesis: Scientific revolutions represent paradigm shifts in the accepted and predominant reality and create new knowledge instead of cumulative knowledge in the realm of the already known. Science evolves through impacts of an anomaly that challenges the existing science, and leads to a crisis, and change towards an emerging paradigm that solves the anomaly and replaces the old theory. Key Concepts •Normal Science - applying current theories within the realm of accepted paradigm to solve by puzzling and applying approved methods •Paradigm - Determination of shared rules/ explanation/ theories •Anomaly - unaccounted phenomena within the paradigm (discovery (novelty of fact) or invention (novelty of theory)) •Crisis - insecurity, essential tension in scientific research, old approach reaches its limits •Learning a Paradigm - theory, methods, and standards, change in the world view •Theories demand large-scale paradigm destruction and major shifts in problems and techniques of normal science •Crisis closure: 1) Normal science works; anomaly not strong enough, return to current paradigm; 2) Anomaly inexplicable with current tools; labeled for future study; resistance for change 3) New candidate for paradigm emerges; battle for acceptance ensues Implications & Linkages •Theories are accepted until they are proven to be inadequate to explain phenomena •Link to Berger about how social constructed reality affect the acceptance of a new paradigm application in real life introduces human interaction, biases/fallacies, and relations in this process •Link to Gaddis and the investigation of history to provide evidence for a certain paradigm •Paradigm Shift: There is a commitment to a paradigm (normal science). Crisis (significant unfixable anomalies - violations of paradigm-induced expectations) forces a revolution from normal science to a new normal science through a dissatisfaction, new theory proposal, dialectic, debate, and validation/agreement. •paradigm is a commonly accepted scientific principle - "A theory in practice" •cannot hold two paradigms, changes the way one views evidence •normal science is research based upon past scientific achievement

Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.

Theme: Relations between global and domestic politics and the usage of a complex systems approach Thesis: Diplomacy and inevitable domestic politics have a reciprocal relation which needs to be reconciled by the decision makers and actors to achieve an aim. Key Concepts fo Two-Level Game •national level (Level II), domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups = example: ratify Level I decisions •international level (Level I), national government seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments •complex since an actor has to incorporate the effects of a decision on two levels = domestic issues might get global reach and vice versa and could be exploited by adversary actors •Win-Set as another source of uncertainty for other actors •All acceptable solutions of an actor = the smaller your win-set, the stronger your position during negotiations •The larger the win-set, the more likely are tentative agreements that can be ratified in Level II •If win-sets overlap, you can achieve an agreement (Kinky win-set: last possible point of agreement) •Possible effects (such as low costs) of non-agreements on the negotiation, but also credibility and future negotiations •Motive of the chief negotiator •Enhancing his standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources or by minimizing potential losses •Shifting the balance of power at Level 2 in favor domestic policies that he prefers for exogenous reason. •To pursue his own (human factor) conception of the national interest in the international context Implications & Linkages •Mack (1975!): counter-/insurgencies (Vietnam) emphasize two fronts of war - the military and the domestic; weaker insurgent utilizes this and refuse to fight on the stronger military's terms to increase domestic war weariness = "affect the will of the enemy" •Links to Kissinger (The guerilla wins if he does not lose) and Lamborn's five power dynamics (# 5, linkages) •Rose compares Johnson's and Nixon's approach to Vietnam and the the pressure of Level II •Nixon/Kissinger created limited win-sets and bargain leverage to enable an honorable extrication •Not an US defeat and maintained credibility •Gates: elaborates on the reciprocal effects and Are there any author •battlespace with Washington and one with Bagdad clock, moving at different speeds •Slow down Washington to allow acceleration in IRQ; Putnam's level II drove the US decisions for IRQ •approach: feed the media, timeline for situation reviews, mitigate Senate/House own agendas •Diplomacy and inevitable domestic politics have a reciprocal relation which needs to be reconciled by the decision makers and actors to achieve an aim. •national level (Level II), domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt •international level (Level I), national government seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures •Win-Set as another source of uncertainty for other actors •All acceptable solutions of an actor = the smaller your win-set, the stronger your position during negotiations •The larger the win-set, the more likely are tentative agreements that can be ratified in Level

Lamborn, Alan. "Theory and the Politics in World Politics."

Theme: Synthesizes understanding of strategic interaction between actors and structures, and explains political dynamics of political relationships. Thesis: Different international and domestic political theories share meta-theoretical principles that can bridge the gap between theory building, practical politics, and policy making, and integrate international and domestic politics. Key Concepts •Central dynamics of world politics reflect central dynamics of politics generally: •Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman: "the world operates as in the constrained model, in which domestic imperatives interact with international structural forces to shape foreign policy outcomes"( 1992:268-9). •Political Dynamic #1- Power and Preference. Strategic importance of preferences determined by relative distribution of power. •Political Dynamic #2- Legitimacy. Actors accept or challenge political procedures or outcomes based on value of legitimate relationships, procedural legitimacy, and legitimacy of relationships •Political Dynamic #3- Politics and Shadow of Future. Actors' compete, make immediate demands, reciprocate, or hedge based on understanding of strategic context and compatibility of future preferences •Political Dynamic #4- Risk taking preferences (RTP) and strategic choice. Actors' risk taking preferences depend on expected value of outcomes and control over policy choice and implementation. •Political Dynamic #5- Linkage Politics. World politics driven by interaction of international, factional, and constituency politics. •Most IR theories examine the effects of power, legitimacy, time, and linkage on actor's choices and behavior. •Realists and idealists start with underlying assumption of strategic interdependency of power and variations in compatibility of actor's preferences (PD#1) •Classical realists still concerned with legitimacy, time horizons, risk, and linkages (PDs#2-5) •Hans Morgenthau: common moral standards, civilization, and interests check limitless desire for power in balance of power system •Rational choice theorists espouse PD#2 in analysis of actor's goals •Constructivist analysis of competitive, individualistic, and cooperative approaches to security depends on compatibility of actors' preferences (PD #1), importance of legitimate communities and perceived legitimacy of process and outcomes (PD#2), actors' time horizons (PD#3), and RTP (PD#4). Implications & Linkages •Putnam's two-game model •Strategic policy and military strategy as a function of or constrained by domestic interests.

Herbst, Jeffery "States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control"

Thesis: - Low population density is a causal factor in explaining the weak state as it creates problems for 'authority and control'. Herbst stresses the geopolitical problem of controlling and maintaining order over vast areas of land with few people; power therefore tends to be concentrated in urban areas and does not extend to the rural. The inability of African leaders to control their territory is a central explanation for the failure of African states to consolidate. Assumption - states are only viable if they are able to maintain control of their own borders. Key Concepts: Due to low population density, lack of interstate conflict, the perverse role of colonialism and the international state system, African states did not develop institutions that could effectively control and police their territories. Herbst is putting forth a new theory of state formation in Africa. He starts with the assumption that Africa is characterized by state failure, and that this can be traced back to the fact that TILLY's pattern of state development did not occur in Africa due to different structural factors: Africa did not suffer from a scarcity of land, rather they suffered from a scarcity of labor. This explains why states did not fight over land, but fought over people. There was no need or incentive to defend a well-defined territory, so bureaucracies, institutions, and infrastructure did not emerge as they did in Europe. Low population density and an absence of external threats mean that elites relied on plunder and resource exploitation to acquire wealth/resources rather than the European route of institution and state building. Bottom Line- the states in the sub-sahara never had to fight for resources or ever employ military power in the way that was conducive to state formation on TILLY's account. •Theory of control: the balance of Benefit (capital: people) and Cost (coercion, infrastructure to project power,loyalty) of control are important in the formation of states characterized by low population density, mobile citizens, and poor ecology/geography. •Problem Africa: project authority over inhospitable territories - low densities of people. •Europeans are territory based view of control while Africa is population based view of control •Herbst argues that leaders confront three sets of issues when building their states: -Costs •Leaders face cost when trying to expand their authority. •Nature of costs that leaders face depends on how far power is being broadcast. •Definition of "territorial control" defines extent of consolidation of rule/power -Boundaries •Boundary Politics- broadly defined as attempts by states to mediate pressures from the international system through the use of buffer mechanisms to maximize their authority over territory. •States can and do lower the costs of controlling a territory by developing a set of boundary institutions that insulate them from possible economic and political threats. -State Systems •Focus on the state systems that successive African leaders constructed in order to further their own efforts at state consolidation.

Ikenberry, G. John "After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars"

Thesis: Interlocking institutions can create order that mutes power asymmetries in IR. Key Concepts •Ch. 1: The Problem of Order - Most important characteristic: New distribution of power suddenly emerges, creating new asymmetries between powerful and weak states. Old order destroyed, new opportunities and incentives for new way - New hegemonic power can dominate (prevail endless conflicts), abandon (go home), transform (durable and favorable advantages by institutionalizing post-war order). Most take third choice... - Realist say eventually problems of anarchy arise: economic rivalry, security dilemmas, institutional decay, and balancing alliances.However, continued stability post-Cold War requires going beyond neorealism. - Neoliberal theories see institutions as agreements or contracts between actors that function to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and solve collective action problems. - Constructivist see institutions as diffuse and socially constructed worldviews that bound and shape the strategic behavior of individuals and states. Overarching patterns of relations that define/reproduce actions/interests. State identities: prevailing norms and ideas about the purposes and orientation of state as entity & wider actor in IS. - Institutions are both constructs and constraints. Institutions are embedded in the wider political order. •Ch. 6: Settlement of 1945 - Did not provide a single comprehensive peace settlement; very fragmented; One US-Soviet, Other NATO-Japan. Soviets most militarized in history, US/NATO most institutionalized in history (Bretton Woods) •Ch. 7: Institution Building After the Cold War - Sharply increased American power & pursued institution-building agenda. NATO, NAFTA, WTO, etc. Implications & Linkages: Dolman, Gaddis, Berger, Jervis, Nye (Smart Power) •Institutional Theory of Order explains strength of post-war order & warns that peeking out from restraints in the institutions would create problems for the USA. Realist miss how institutions relate to power. •The debate about international control is not about realists vs institutionalists...debate is how states develop institutions to restrain power and establish binding commitments •United States transformed the international system by employing institutions as a way to establish political control and order -"...[I]nstitutions are...critical at the beginning of hegemony - or 'after victory' - in establishing order and securing cooperation between unequal states" -Institutions develop because of the asymmetries of power between weak and strong states in the international system. While neoliberal insitutionalism usually speaks of institutions as resolving 'collective action' or 'information' problems, Ikenberry sees institutions as crucial for resolving these power "asymmetries". -institutions create a "constitutional order"; a political order that exists because of agreed upon rules, that allocate rights and restrain power -Institutions create order in three ways. One, institutions have shared, or mutual agreements, over the rules of the game. Two, these rules set limits on the ability to exercise

Walt, Stephen M. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories."

Thesis: No single approach can capture the complexities of modern politics, so we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas. 1)Realism: States are competing for power (remains the most compelling framework) -Dominant theory throughout Cold War -International System is a struggle for power 1a) Classical Realist- Desire to dominate other states. 1b) Neo-Realist: Great powers are trying to survive 1c) Defensive realistsL little interests in military conquest because of the cost outweighs benefits. 2) Liberalism: Economic interdependence discourages states from warfare. 2a) Democratic Peace Theory- Democracies do not go to war with other democracies 2b) Institutional Theory- Institutions cooperate when its in their best interests 3) Constructivism: Impact of individual ideas -Pay close attention to discourse (reflects/shapes norms of society)

Berger and Luckmann's "Social Construction of Reality"

Thesis: Reality is socially constructed or built by how we have been raised (parents, church, school, media, peers) Groups and Individuals interact in a social system and create/form concepts that are institutionalized over time, as a result, what we present to others is a representation of our past experiences. •Reality is both objective and subjective •Internal Process -Externalization : Things happen outside myself -Objectification: Perception -Internalization: Interpretation -Crystallization: What I see matches what outside sees •Group Process -Institutionalization: Everyone agrees -Socialization: Assign values -Legitimatization: Explaining and justifying reality

Bousquet, Antonie "The Scientific Way of Warfare"

Thesis: The practice of warfare can be understood as the attempt to impose order over chaos, to exert control where it most threatens to elude, and to find predictability in the midst of uncertainty. Throughout the modern era, the dominate collection of scientific ideas has been reflected in the contemporary theories and practices of warfare in the Western World. The primary concern is with the manner in which scientific ideas have been systematically recruited to inform thinking about the very nature of combat and the forms of military organization best suited to prevail in it. Key Concepts: TOA 12: Post-Second World War Conceptual Theories of War •Mechanistic Warfare & the Clock - The universe became understood, laws of nature, Newton, the whole is understood by its parts. It is the symbol of order, regularity, and predictability. It resonated with enlightened absolutism, faith in the rational and orderly organization of government, and the position of the monarch as the sole seat of power. Warfare rehearsed synchronized movements. Discipline & obedience to the pre-determined sequence of battle. Geometry in fortifications and ballistics. It attempted to maintain order and ward off chaos through a pre-programmed and centralized routine void of considering the actions of the opposing army. With all initiative removed from the individual soldiers, success required that the commanding officers plan ahead and dictate in advance the series of maneuvers to be carried out. The army of Frederick the Great was the gold standard - soldiers heavily drilled and disciplined to execute pre-ordained maneuvers on the battlefield - marching in step according to rigid tactical deployments and performing synchronized firing and reloading cycles at the highest possible tempo. •Thermodynamic Warfare & the Engine - Science gained an understanding of the energy that drove the mechanisms of motion. The world was full of instability and change beginning with the Napoleonic wars and culminating at the end of World War II. Ideologies shifted to liberal or socialist. The engine was central to industrialization. Warfare flowed with greater energy, propelling vehicles, increasing the destructiveness of weapons, larger economies mobilizing for war, and the moral energy that allowed mass conscription. Tactics became decentralized (march divided and fight united at the DP) while the operational level (logistics) became very centralized given the vast distances that motorization enabled. Commanders recognized that chaos was inherent to warfare - required the ability to adapt rather than attempts to banish. •Cybernetic Warfare & the Computer - Cybernetics examined systems that were viewed as closed - the ultimate objective of the system was homeostasis / stability and therefore linearity and negative feedback dominated the cybernetic outlook. Following WWII, communication (telegraph, telephone) became necessary to achieve the required coordination of increasingly large and intricate military systems - "the science of communications and control" The conception of warfare rested on the notion that information was the paramount factor determining success. There was also the belief that war could be fully managed and controlled scientifically. The science of communications and control promised to manage chaos and disruption through self-regulating mechanisms of information feedback. The computer allowed information processing. The drive from complete predictability and centralized was renewed, particularly in the nuclear age / Cold War. Operations research and systems analysis was applied to from the tactical to the strategic. To avoid perturbation, containment and management of conflict prevented apocalypse. Vast C2 architectures were formed to organize the global projection of armed force. McNamara and the Whiz Kids in Vietnam - informational overload and bottlenecking remains vulnerability of centralized, hierarchical structures for C2. •Chaoplexic Warfare & the Network - The rediscovery of non-linear mathematics, self-organization and emergence led to chaos and complexity theory. The Cold War receded giving way to a globalized world requiring new approaches to security. In CH7 he advocates Boyd's OODA Loop (1990s) as an approach to dealing with the realities of complexity. The fundamental change from Cybernetic to Chaoplexic was moving from trying to control to focusing on exploitation. Exploit what is there - positive and negative feedback - you can use volatility to your advantage - keep the enemy off balance. Technology: Clock - Engine - Computer - Network Forms of Warfare: Close order drill (17-18th Century) - Mass mobilization, industrialization (19-1945) - Command and control, automations (1950-70s) - Swarming, decentralization (1970s-Present)

Boyd, John "Patterns of Conflict"

Thesis: This study aims to develop a comprehensive interpretation of John Boyd's strategic theory. It argues that Boyd's OODA loop concept, as well as his entire work are more comprehensive, deeper and richer than the popular notion of 'rapid OODA looping' Key Concepts •JOHN BOYD - THEORY OF ACTION •The OODA Loop - DESTRUCTION & CREATION - we destroy the enemy's world view (KUHN paradigm shift) creating conditions for him to adapt and us to learn. It applies at all levels of war. Just as you can speed up the enemy's decision cycle, you can also slow it down. The goal is to observe and orient as quick as possible in order to overwhelm. Actions are founded upon a firm understanding which gives way to the probability of success (because it is impossible to predict the future). We live on the edge of chaos - chaos allows creativity and change while stability allows the retention of information = learn, anticipate, adapt. Note, that Orientation (BERGER social construction) - shapes the way that we interact with the environment - observe, decide, and act. (DORNER habits of thought and characteristics that account for failure). The aim is Exploit the Orientation - differences and mismatches - so that we can comprehend, cope with, and shape, as well as be shaped by the world and the novelty / emergence that arises out of it (NELSON, BOUSQUET). (A way to do this is offered by G-MAN - Structure, Function, Process / RAFT model). •Armed forces as complex adaptive systems - Armed forces are like organisms and need to survive. They compete, learn, evolve, survive, or not. The same applies to military strategy and doctrine. "survival of the best informed." Boyd focuses on the factors that can impair an opponent's capability to adapt and those that preserve one's own capacity to do so (STRANGE - CC, CR, CV). Attack multiple COGs, along multiple avenues, in manner in which he is not prepared for - "Strategic Paralysis." Diminish the adversary's freedom of action while improving ours (DOLMAN maintain the advantage). Force change in the opponent's system. Push a system away from its ordered, disciplined state one where several subsystems are forced to self-organize due to lack of higher direction. Randomness is the loss of cohesion and the ability to adapt. When the capability to communicate degrades, units must look after themselves for longer periods of time and through doctrine and training will be able to self-organize for some time. After longer periods the outdated schemas (mental modules / paradigms of the environment and its conditions to guide response/action) will not match reality anymore and the units will fail to react properly. Confusion = collapse. Render the enemy deaf, dumb, and blind. •He understood the influence of complexity and that some systems cannot be reduced for understanding; however, approximate knowledge is better than nothing, truth is not required to impact OODA. Don't need to find the "right" response, just need to have a set of possible responses available. •Ways to account for "chaoplexity:" 1. seek to constrain enemy actions and choices 2. understand the interconnectedness (and resiliency) of the system 3. aim for indirect effects and apply multiple strategies TOA 12: Post-Second World War Conceptual Theories of War •To prevent this from happening to us, Boyd recommends trust, implicit communication, open flow of information, and shared view on the organization purpose. Allow latitude to respond to changes in the environment. Lateral relations among subordinate units encourages self-organization. Commanders should not direct a certain COA, only set the boundaries of behavior, the overall direction, and to develop organizational orientation patterns. This allows the force to continue the fight when disruption enters the decision cycle. (Link to MISSION COMMAND) Tempo and Variety, not speed -Strategic level is slower for effects to occur -doctrine -Tactical level is speed relative to enemy •Interaction and Isolation •Attack enemy's mental, moral, and physical •Themes: -pervasive uncertainty as prime characteristic of life, -the essence of combining analysis with synthesis, marrying induction and deduction, -the importance of novelty, mismatches and creativity, -and the requirement to combine multiple perspectives to form adequate orientation patterns -Observation (data collection), Orientation (Analyze), Decision , Action

Paret, Peter. The Cognitive Challenge of War, Prussia 1906

This book provides a narrative on how Prussian Army transformed from autocratic militaristic to Scharnhorst's reforms. Concepts were not adopted until there was a crisis because resistance because existing social system •Ability to adapt and learn •Inability to identify the changing nature of war •Importance of narrative

Yergin, Daniel and Joseph Stanislaw. The Commanding Heights

Toward the Mixed Economy During the 1920s, the market system had not performed anywhere near adequately in many countries, and during the 1930s, it had failed massively. It could not be counted on not to fail again. Governments, therefore, would take on a much-expanded role in other to deliver full employment, extirpate the "slump" regulate and stabilize economic activity, and ensure that the war was not followed by a depression that would make vain all the promises and idealism and sacrifices of the struggle that had just concluded. (3-4) At the end of the war, in Europe and throughout much of the world, capitalism was discredited in a way that is not easily imagined today. It seemed infirm, inept, and incapable. It could not be counted upon to deliver economic growth and a decent life. Nobody in Europe believes in the American way of life - that is, in private enterprise. (4) Capitalism was considered morally objectionable; it appealed to greed instead of idealism, it promoted inequality, it had failed the people, and - to many - it had been responsible for the war. (4) Keynes (short-term focus in which regulation is good) Hayek (Long-term Focus in which regulation is bad)

George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776

US has taken a distinctive approach toward foreign policy. Assumed ideas and shared values determined ways Americans viewed themselves and others and how they dealt with other peoples and responded to and sought o shape events abroad. •Exceptionalism •Power is not guaranteed security •Unilateralism is not isolationism- we engage the world but we don't become beholden to other powers. •US has had a successful foreign policy. Fall of the Soviet Union brought many changes within the American Political and Military Strategy. The US struggle against the USSR had become the norm and the rapid collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR placed the US as the hyperpower within an unstable and fragmented globalized world. Following the collapse the US half heartedly embraced its position as the head nation in the 1990s with mixed results. Following the attacks of 9/11 this policy radically changed from balancing and stability efforts to pre-emption and preventive conflict under the younger Bush administration. The demonstrated willingness for the US to act unilaterally has had a negtative impact on the US reputation and soft power influence throughout the world and the US has lost some of its prestige as a result.

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations

War is distinguishable from murder and massacre only when restrictions are established on the reach of battle. (42) An interesting read...at times it feels like the author is rambling, and then from time to time says something that makes you stop and think. Seems to discuss war as something that changes and it is because restraints of some kind are applied that make it something more than murder. All the while acknowledging the horror of i

Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy

We can now arrive a shorter definition of strategy as - 'the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy'. (321) Grand strategy - serves to bring out the sense of 'policy of execution'. For the role of grand strategy - higher strategy - is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war - the goal defined by fundamental policy. (322) Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. (322) Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and coordination of the end and the means. (322) The object in war is a better state of peace - even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. (338)

Just War Theory

set of principles outlining conditions when the use of violence would be acceptable•Jus ad bellum (Go to War) -Proper Authority - minimally legitimate sovereign -Last Resort - all diplomatic means exhausted. -Just Cause - Self defense or other defense. -Proper Motives - the just cause is not a cover for profit or revenge -Reasonable chance of Success - -Proportionality - Universal costs < Universal benefits •Jus in bello (Just actions in war) -Discrimination - combatant vs non-combatant -Proportionality - action proportional to the objective. -Military Necessity - Militarily relevant target -DDE (Doctrine of Double Effect) -Legitimate act of war -Acceptable effect -Intent is good, no intent for bad, active intent to minimizw bad by accepting cost to oneself •Jus post bellum (Lasting peace) -Proportionality - peace measured and reasonable -Rights Vindication - Human Rights reestablished -Discrimination - punishment for leaders, and war criminals, not civilians. -Compensation - proportionate and discriminate. -Rehabilitation

Jomini, Henri Antoine "The Art of War"

· "War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in that nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case." (13) Strategy · Strategy embraces the following points - selection of the theater of war, determination of the decisive point, selection and establishment of the fixed base, selection of the objective point, strategic fronts, choice of lines of operations, best strategic line, bases of operations, marches of armies, relation between positions of depots and marches of army, fortresses, entrenched camps, and diversion. (61 - 62) · "Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map." (62) · "There is one great principle underlying all the operations of war... It is embraced in the following maxims: (1) To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own. (2) To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's own forces. (3) On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow. (4) To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy." "Strategy is the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the theater of war or the zone of operations." (294

Lauer, Stephen "Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks: Politics, Policy, and the Military Operational Artists"

· Lauer presents the problem of the operational artist in the limited wars of the 21st Century and the uniquely difficult problem of matching military capabilities to securing uncertain political aims. The model provides a way to describe the necessity for the military operational artist to recognize the political, while never forgetting the responsibility for providing military advice that is both politically aware and does not commit military force to an end that is unsuited to the nature of the military force envisioned.

Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

• Fleet-in-being, navy is a way of achieving objectives along with army •Great issues always decided by armies. Fleets support armies on land, because people live on land. •Corbett -- established the relationship of naval operations to war generally and then advocated a comprehensive "maritime" strategy •Naval power must be synched with diplomatic and military power •Agrees with command of the sea as a proper aim, but not the only aim •Winning battle and command of the sea is too narrow of a scope, opportunity for battle doesn't always exist nor is there always a need to fight

Rosenau "Thinking Theory Thoroughly"

•"Of what is this (phenomenon) an instance?" •Is this a descriptive (OE, problem frames) or prescriptive (solution frame, COA) problem? •"Acquire not a set of skills, but rather a set of pre-dispositions, a cluster of habits, a way of thinking, a mental lifestyle. . ." •Empirical Theory deals with the "is" of international phenomena, with things as they are if and when subjected to observation. •Value Theory deals with the "ought" of international phenomena. •Discover order, sacrifice detailed for broad, ready to be wrongThinking theoretically is more art than science below are 9 pre-conditions to assit in developing and improving the skill: 1.Don't focus on making the appropriate definition of theory. 2.Decide if you're after empirical theory of value theory •Empirical Theory deals with the "is" of international phenomena, with things as they are if and when subjected to observation. •Value Theory deals with the "ought" of international phenomena. 3.Be able to assume that human affairs are founded on an underlying order 4.Must question (every event/situation/observed phenomenon ie what is it an instance of? 5.Be prepared to sacrifice detailed description for broad observations 6.Tolerate ambiguity, pay attention to probabilities, and distrust absolutes 7.Be playful about int'l phenomenon ie toy with the hypotheticals etc within situations 8.Be genuinely puzzled by Int'l phenomenon 9.Be ready to be proven wrong (ie avoid confirmation bias)

Lawson, Bryan. How Designers Think

•'Design' is both a noun (product) & a verb (process), but from Lawson's perspective it is a process, which helps professionals learn to understand problems that other people may find hard to describe and create good solutions for complex, unfamiliar dilemmas. •the process of design problems is a 3-dementional model -x-axis = designer, client, user, legislator; -y-axis = internal and external constraints; and -z-axis = radical, practical, formal, and symbolic constraints. •3 types of drawings: presentation, production, and the design drawing •5 steps of the creative process, 1st insight, 2nd preparation, 3rd incubation, 4th illumination, 5th verification. Talks about design traps (category, puzzle, number, icon, & image) Design Traps •Category Trap = Whilst schools undoubtedly share much in common, they are also all different. Thus to transfer solutions previously y, seen at other schools to a new one may be quite inappropriate. ^ What is worse, is that the designer working in this way may not O even notice the difference or be aware of the parts of the problem which have not been addressed. •Puzzle Trap = design problems are not puzzles. There are no correct or, even, optimal answers to design problems...Designers treating a part of a design problem as a pseudopuzzle can be trapped into thinking that the elements and rules of this pseudo-puzzle are as inviolate as a normal puzzle. •Number Trap = If a problem or any aspect of a problem can judgment in design'. If a problem or any aspect of a problem can be expressed numerically then all the power of mathematics can be brought to bear on it. Any powerful tool is dangerous, and mathematics is no exception. The incorrect use of mathematical techniques on the wrong sort of numerical systems was thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5. However, even if all the rules have been obeyed, one even more tricky aspect of the number trap still remains. The assumption that larger numbers represent things which are bigger, better or more desirable! •Icon Trap = It is all too easy for the designer gradually to become more interested in what the drawing looks like in its own right, rather than what it represents. •Image Trap = The designer invariably has an image of the final design held in his or her mind. However, there can often be a mismatch between intention and realization in design.

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air.

•1) Instead of fighting along the border area with rear safe from any military activity, new technology has changed that equilibrium (air) •2) It is possible to go far behind the fortified lines of defense...it is air power which makes this possible •Strategic Bombing: bomb enemy centers of population, gov, and industry to shatter civilian morale and force them to sue for peace (hit hard, hit first) •1) The guiding principle of bombing actions must be destroyed completely in one attack, making further attack on the same target unnecessary •2) To have command of the air means to be in a position to wield offensive power so great it defies human imagination.

Strange, Joe and Richard Irons. "Center of Gravity What Clausewitz Really Meant"

•Clausewitz understood that there were more than a single COG. Multiple translations have led interpretations that he is only referring to a single COG (hub of all power). Strange believes there are two categories for COGs Moral and Physical (may be COGs at different levels and different times). COGs are mostly apparent when interaction occurs (Clausewitz). •By appealing to the original concept of centers of gravity, one can determine that they are dynamic, positive, active agents (people in formations and groups or individuals), obvious (more for physical than moral centers, depending on the quality of intelligence gathered on an enemy), and powerful and strike effective blows. Physical centers of gravity can be visualized more easily as armies or units, those things that resist an enemy. By contrast, moral centers of gravity are less obvious. Yet it is essential to understand them since they are likely to be more important on the strategic level. •Clausewitzian centers of gravity are not characteristics, capabilities, or locations. They are dynamic and powerful physical and moral agents of action or influence with certain qualities and capabilities that derive their benefit from a given location or terrain.

A.T. Mahan "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History"

•Control of the Sea: Wealth/Greatness comes from overseas commerce, which requires access to markets, which requires navies to protect against other navies, which requires basing and overseas possessions to project the navies from. •Practical principles (Jominian): basing, logistics, interior lines •Elements of sea power: Geographic Position, Physical configuration (Rivers, Pen), Extent of territory (coast line), Population (sea knowledge), Character of the people (Want to make $), Character of the Government (production, support, wiliness)

Schoen, Donald A. Educating the Reflective Practitioner

•Design education derives from reflective practicum •Reflection in action is the process of thinking about the current, ongoing action, especially when the tacit processes are surprised by something not working. It asks "of what is this an instance", and "how should I think about this." •Reflection on action is after (or before) the action, and does not allow for on the spot adjustments. Design is practitioners engaging in conversation with the materials at hand over indeterminate zones of practice. A student learns best by suspending disbelief, and acting through imitation. •Knowledge-in-action is the spontaneous action of an expert that may not be explainable. •Knowledge-on-action is explaining action, describing the implicit knowledge behind what you did.

Senge, Peter, M. The Fifth Discipline

•Disciplines are Personal Mastery, Mental models, building shared vision, team learning and systems thinking •Systems thinking is the integration of the other four disciplines •two distinct types of feedback processes: -Reinforcing (or amplifying) feedback processes are the engines of growth. ..Reinforcing feedback can also generate accelerating decline—a pattern decline where small drops amplify themselves into larger and larger drops, such as the decline in bank assets when there is a financial panic. -Balancing (or stabilizing) feedback operates whenever there is a goal-oriented behavior. If the goal is to be not moving, then balancing feedback will act the way the brakes in a car do. If the goal is to be moving at sixty miles per hour, then balancing feedback will cause you to accelerate to sixty but no faster -In addition, many feedback processes contain "delays,'' interruptions in the flow

Cohen, Elliot and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War.

•Disputes traditional rational for failure: "man in the dock," "The Man on the Couch," Collective Incompetence, Institutional Failure, or culture failure •3 types of failures: -failure to learn -failure to predict -failure to adapt •Model for determining the causation of military failure: five steps -Identify failure -Identify critical tasks not performed -analyze all layers strategic operational and tactical -Identify analytical matrix -determine pathway

Dörner, Dietrich. The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right

•Failure is mapped with multiple decisions and not 1 point of failure. Used games to map decisions. •The modern world is made up of innumerable interrelated subsystems, and we need to think in terms of these interrelations •Complexity, interdependency, analogies, unintended consequences and observations. The effectiveness of a measure depends on the context for which it is pursued. •In very complex and quickly changing situations the most reasonable strategy is to plan only in rough outline and to delegate as many decisions as possible to subordinates. These subordinates will need considerable independence and a thorough understanding of the overall plan. Such strategies require a "redundancy of potential command," that is, many individuals who are all capable of carrying out leadership tasks within the context of the general directives •The logic of failure is the belief that complex systems have simple causal problems Archetype [Limit to Growth - good but unseen building 2ndary effects. Shift the burden -to hard to deal with]. •Best practices include: avoiding the problems (information distraction, can/ought to solve, not reflective), getting experience (supersignals, dynamics, education), setting good goals (efficient diversity), continually scaling in and out, and recognizing the ongoing influences of the system on goal pursuit. •Steps in planning and action (43) -Formulation of goals -Formulation of models and gathering information -Prediction and extrapolation -Planning of actions; decision making and execution of actions -Review of effects of action and revision of strategy (Interactive with all steps) •Make more decisions •Test hypotheses •Have goals—structured, intermediate, tested •Think by analogy •Ask why questions •Freely experiment •Cull unsuccessful techniques •Develop well buffered systems—with stable negative feedback loops •Delegate—don't overcentralize

Moltke the Elder

•General Staff, emphasized education •Combined Arms (Cav, Inf, Arty) •Importance of Attack and counterattack •"Mission Command" (Auftragstaktik): give subordinates greatest possible independence. Orders should contain "only that which the subordinate commander cannot independently determine for the attainment of a certain goal." •"Simple action, consistently executed, will most certainly attain the objective" •Strategy is a system of expedients

Schmitt, Carl "Theory of the Partisan"

•Generally speaking, civil war is military conflict between two or more approximately equal political governments for sovereignty over people and territory native to both, whereas revolution is a change, not necessarily by force or violence, whereby one system of legality is terminated and another is constituted within the same country •Criteria for a partisan: -irregularity -increased mobility of active combat -increased intensity of political engagement -telluric •War before WWI was "bracketed" so that it rarely went beyond the classical European understanding of conventional state-on-state war. Enmity has become a part of the equation for war, removing the classical, European, bracketed system of war, which requires a: •Theory of a partisan (irregular, political, mobile, telluric/defensive) important to understand modern warfare. •The partisan has changed how war should be "bracketed" or explained.

Kenneth Waltz Man, The State, and War

•Image 1: cause of war is in the nature of man •Realist Perspective: Human nature fixed; domestic and inter-national violence are byproducts of human existence, mitigated only by the fear of overwhelming coercive authority •Image 2: cause of war in the nature of the state •External war can produce internal unity •Internal order maintained through arbitration, law, monopoly on force. Domestic features define the character of the state •Image 3: cause of war in the anarchic nature of international politic •War is caused by International Anarchy - no overarching coercive power to prevent war -Waltz concludes that all 3 are the cause for war. Human nature and the state provide the efficient causes (what starts the war), while the international environment provides the permissive causes (not enough deterrence, no penalty, etc.). The International environment is the permissive cause - it limits the effects of the human condition and the state from bursting out of the limit into war. The human condition is located in the state, and affects the state. Both the state and the human condition affect the "limits" of the international environment. (234)

Gharajedaghi, Jamshid. Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for Designing Business Architecture

•Interactive Design is the process of defining problems and designing solutions. You fix a problem by first formulating the mess (define the problem, which represents the system in its context), by searching (snapshot, problems, and dynamics), mapping (representing the new shared image, that which helps us make sense of the present and recreate the future), and story-telling (communicating). •Think holistically—structure, function, process, purpose/context •Think operationally—feedback loops, delayed responses, carrying capacity •Understand self-organization of the system—its propensity, especially toward cultural norms •Be interactive—experiment (wargame), test to see if it is the right problem

Philosophy of Mao Zedong

•Mao- •"War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups" •Laws of War are developmental •"Thus the different laws for directing different wars are determined by the different circumstances of those wars--differences in their time, place and nature." •Shaped the revolution for the circumstances he was in and the army he had Implications & Linkages •Revolutions that follow Mao's model without accounting for local conditions likely fail •Same applies to counterinsurgent's ... •• Looked at war at its current form (revolutionary) in its current context (China) •Balance the objective realities of war (everything outside the mind, conditions and resources) and the subjective realities of war (sense-making, the theories of phenomenon and action, the general's plan). A plan (subjective) that does not account for resources or conditions (objective) is unbalanced. •"Politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed." •Stages of People's War: •1. Organize/Prepare •2. Guerilla war •3. Conventional War

Mintzberg, Henry. Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, and Planners

•Strategy is a plan, a pattern, position, and perspective •Strategy = intended, deliberate, unrealized, emergent, and realized •Umbrella Strategy = Operational Approach •Design School of Strategy Formation •Emergent Strategy is refined by feedback mechanisms to achieve intended results •Planning is a "Formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of decisions" -1. Decomposition: into a series of articulated steps, carried out in sequence -2. Articulation: clear and explicit -3. Rationalization: systematic/intentional vs haphazard. Grounded in analysis, not synthesis p. 7. Formal definitions of planning (per Mintzberg) 1) Planning is future thinking (p. 7) 2) Planning is controlling the future (p. 7-8) Planning is the design of a desired future 3) Planning is decision making (p. 9.) 4) Planning is integrated decision making (p. 11) Plan(ning) refers to an integrative hierarchically organized action in which various kinds of decisions are functionally ordered. 5) Planning is a formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated systems of decisions. (p. 12) "a formalized, integrated process" p. 24. Based on Forms of strategy discussion (and diagram), there are: Intended strategies Deliberate strategies Unrealized strategies Emergent strategies Realized (actual) strategies p. 27. One person's strategy is another's tactics- that what is strategic depend on where you sit (a business, not DoD definition) p. 29. "Our conclusion is that "strategic planning" cannot be synonymous with strategy formation...the implication...is that planning may have less to do with strategy making than is often claimed..."

Ames, Roger "Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare"

•Sun-Tzu •This world view-nonlinear approach •Tao-both what the world is and how it is •Strategic Advantage (Shih)-intangibles such as morale, opportunity, timing, psychology, and logistics •Stragegic positioning (Hsing)-limited to the tangible and determinate shape of physical strength •Foreknowledge (Chih)-understanding the local situation completely entails understanding both sides of all correlative pairs •Leadership is critical. Must select the right commander, and that commander needs specific traits. Parts of Sun Tzu are really leadership lessons. •Importance of study. Each battle/war is unique, and requires study. It is the many lists of attributes and types that support this study - much like METT-TC, ASCOPE, PMESII-PT, etc today. •War is expensive and destructive. Should be avoided when possible. If not possible, only commit resources (men) when victory is assured. •Does recognize the enemy will attempt to do the same things he is suggesting. Need to know about enemy commander. •The only way to understand is to have very good intelligence. For Sun Tzu, this meant HUMINT as that was the only type available to him.

Doleman, Everett "Pure Strategy: Power and Principles in the Space and Information Age"

•The outcome of battles and campaigns are ever-present variables within the strategist's plan, but victory is a concept that has no meaning there. The pure strategist accepts that war is but one aspect of social and political competition, an ongoing interaction that has no finality. Strategy therefore connects the conduct of war with the intent of politics. It shapes and guides military means in anticipation of a panoply of possible coming events. In the process, strategy changes the context within which events will happen. •definition of strategy, a plan for continuing advantage •purpose of military strategy is to link military means to the political aim. The purpose of operational strategy is to contest or gain command of the medium of battle (land, sea, air, space, or information), which allows the tactical and political aims to remain at odds logically but to converge practically Military power is but one of the means by which the political object is pursued. Land, sea, air and space, and information power are sub-domains of military power. •The ability to describe a system by breaking it down into its constitutive parts. And vice versa, is linear reductionism. Where the whole is less or greater than the sum of its parts, we find nonlinear systems.

Clausewitz, Carl "On War"

•Three Kinds of war: - Pure war - logical extreme that cannot exist in the real world -Absolute war - War in which the aim is to overthrow the enemy and render him helpless against your will. Political and military wills combine for total victory (Napoleon) -Real war - All wars that do not reach the level of absolute war all real wars are limited by the political aim -Total war is not of Clausewitz Trinity: People-Passion, Enmity; Military - chance, probability; Government/Policy- Reason