Unit 5 - The Establishment and Early Years of Weimar (1918-1924)

The Weimar Constitution

Terms of the Constitution As a democratic republic, the politicians of the Weimar Republic were committed to maintaining law and order, the protection of property, and the establishment of a new Constitution for Germany. Ebert worked within a Constitution which made his task more difficult. It was, for its time, very democratic, as it allowed all adults (men and women) aged over 20 to vote. Crucially, the constitution allowed the different political parties to have a say in the government of the country. The number of seats for each party in the Reichstag, the German Parliament, was based on the total number of votes gained by that party. This system is known as Proportional Representation. The head of the government, the Chancellor, needed to secure the support of a majority in the Reichstag. In addition to the national Parliament, the Weimar Republic permitted the eighteen German states to retain their own state governments and representative assemblies (Landtag). The seventeen Länder German states retained control over some functions of government, notably, the police, education, religion, and social welfare. The new Weimar constitution was signed on 11 April 1919. Its key features are listed below. - All Germans over 20 had the vote - Men and women were deemed equal citizens - There was to be freedom of the press, freedom of speech and freedom to protest - Trade union rights included the freedom to conduct collective bargaining - The state was responsible for providing welfare to women, children and the unemployed - The federal system was maintained but the number of states was reduced from 25 to 18 - For the first time there would be an official national army of Germany rather than separate Länder armies under Prussian control - The Reichstag would be elected by proportional representation - The Chancellor was accountable to the Reichstag - The head of state or President would be elected every seven years The President had the power to dismiss the Chancellor, dissolve the Reichstag and call new elections As head of State, the President served for a maximum of seven years. The President had considerable powers, such as the nomination and dismissal of Chancellors and ministers, supreme command of the armed forces, and the power to dissolve the Reichstag. In emergency situations, he possessed executive and legislative authority, that is, he could rule directly by suspending the Reichstag and making his own laws, backed by the authority of the armed forces. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution stated that: 'In the event that the public order and security are seriously disturbed or endangered, the Reich president may take measures necessary for their restoration, intervening, if necessary, with the aid of the armed forces'. In permitting the President to rule by decree, it was not anticipated that this method of governing would be used on a regular basis. Ironically, Ebert used it on 136 occasions, many times when he simply wanted to override Reichstag opposition. There were no effective safeguards against a President threatening to dissolve the Reichstag and call new elections if it refused a Presidential decree. Despite the broad Presidential powers, it was nevertheless the case that new laws had to originate in the Reichstag and required the approval of a majority therein. In the Reichsrat, the second Chamber of the German Parliament, there were 67 representatives of the 17 separate states of the Länder with each state represented in proportion to its population but no state was to have more than 40% of the representation—to prevent any one state dominating, as Prussia had during the Second Reich. The Reichsrat could provide advice on, and amendment to, laws but could be overridden by the Reichstag. Therefore, in the Weimar Constitution, there were elements of Parliamentary and Presidential government, and the line of demarcation between the respective institutions, interests, and individuals was clearly delineated. Attention had been given to constructing a system in which, hypothetically, there were checks and balances so that power was allocated and dispersed in a democratic way.

Expectations and realities of Versailles

TThe Treaty of Versailles was widely resented in Germany as a fresh act of betrayal by the Weimar politicians. It was not only the terms of the Treaty which caused resentment, but even the way the Treaty was signed which caused anger. German representatives were led into the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, and signed the treaty while the leaders of the victorious powers looked on in silence. The British civil servant Harold Nicolson recounted the scene in the Palace of Versailles: 'There is absolute hush. 'Let the Germans enter', says Clemenceau. Through the door appear six soldiers in single file. And then, on their own, come the two German representatives. The silence is terrifying. They keep their eyes away from the two thousand staring eyes. They are deathly pale. It is all very painful. They are shown to their chairs. Clemenceau breaks the silence, saying 'We are here to sign a Treaty of Peace.' There is tension. The Germans sign. There is relief. We kept our seats while the Germans were led like prisoners from the dock'. The way of conducting the Treaty negotiations led to Germans calling the Treaty a Diktat, that is, a dictated peace, since German representatives had little say in the terms of the treaty, and only minor amendments were accepted by the Allies. Germany was blamed for the war in the so-called 'War Guilt Clause' which laid responsibility for the war firmly at her door. As it was widely assumed that the major European nations had also contributed to the outbreak of the war through the European alliance system, many Germans, not just on the right, considered this provision unfair. By placing the blame for the war on Germany, the Allies could make Germany pay for damage caused during the war. These payments, known as reparations, were set at £6,600,000. Germany also had her armed forces reduced to 10,000 men, an army smaller than the much smaller state of Belgium. Additionally, she was not permitted to possess aircraft, submarines, or tanks, and was allowed only six battleships. As a special measure designed to protect the security of France, German troops were not allowed to be based on the Rhineland, near the border with France. Germany also lost a considerable amount of land to other European countries, largely because the Allies acted on one of the principles of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, the right of each nationality to 'self-determination', that is, governing itself. Many national groups, by the process of centuries of migration, lived closely together. Where this occurred, national boundaries were drawn to the disadvantage of Germany, which lost Alsace and Lorraine to France, part of East Prussia and Silesia to Poland, Eupen and Malmédy to Belgium, Memel to Lithuania, and North Schleswig to Denmark. These losses amounted to the loss of over four million people but this was not all, for German also lost her colonial possessions. Germany was not allowed to join with Austria in a political union, which appeared to contradict the principle of self-determination but was merely another example of the harsh treatment meted out to Germany. Supervision of the terms of the Treaty was entrusted to the newly-created international organization the League of Nations, but Germany was not allowed to join.

Challenges to Weimar, 1919-23: the Spartacists

The Spartacists was the name given to the group which formed the core of the future German communist party, which modelled itself on the Bolshevik party in Russia. For the Spartacists, getting rid of the Kaiser was only the first step towards achieving a communist revolution, akin to that of Russia in 1917. However, the Spartacists were divided on their attitude towards the government. Some wished to wait until dissatisfaction with the government created a groundswell of opinion in favour of revolutionary action. Others, such as Karl Liebknecht, a leading figure in the movement, called for an immediate seizure of power and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The socialists within Ebert's government were driven more to the right by the insurrectionary language of the communists. On 6 December 1918, soldiers in Berlin fired on a Spartacist demonstration, killing sixteen. Resignations of independent politicians from the government destroyed any hope of bridging the gap between the government and the Spartacists. The Left was now polarized into two hostile camps. On 1 January 1919, the Spartacists met at a congress in Berlin, and split from the independent socialists, and formed the German Communist Party (KPD), carrying with them some left-wing independents. The leading figures of the party were Liebknecht, a gifted orator and son of a Social Democratic leader, Wilhelm Liebknecht, and Rosa Luxemburg, a Polish Jewess of immense personal charm and formidable intellectual qualities. Communists denounced Ebert's government as 'the enemy of the working class', and called for government by workers and soldiers councils, and refused to participate in the General Election. Despite the prompting of the Russian Bolsheviks, most German Communists were sincere democrats, aware that Germany was not ripe for a socialist revolution. As we have seen, on 6 January 1919, a Spartacist uprising took place, against the advice of Luxemburg who sensed that communism had not yet won over the mass of the working class, without whom, she believed, the dictatorship of the proletariat was a hollow pretence. Armed Communists occupied newspaper offices and various public buildings. The government response was vigorous, and having turned to the army, learnt that Groener proposed to use irregular bands of volunteers, like those being formed in the Baltic lands and Poland to fight the Russians and defend the frontiers of Germany. These troops were known as the Freikorps (Free Corps), and it was they who crushed the rising. On 10 January, the Freikorps attacked Communist positions in Berlin, and by 13 January the revolt was defeated after savage street-fighting. Over 100 Spartacists were killed, including Liebknecht and Luxemburg who were captured and murdered by the Freikorps. While the crushing of the revolt cleared the way for elections to the Constituent Assembly to take place, the brutality of the Freikorps, and their use by politicians like Ebert, who claimed to be acting in accordance with the constitution, deepened divisions on the Left. The KPD although only enjoying the support of a small minority of the working class and the electorate had strong support on industrial centres in the Ruhr and Saxony, and inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution, saw itself as the German equivalent—they saw themselves as leading the revolution. Failed risings in Berlin and Bavaria, which the Freikorps again played a crucial role in suppressing, did not end the communist agitation. In April 1919, there was a wave of strikes in Germany's industrial heartlands of Halle and the Ruhr valley. The strikers wanted shorter hours, more control over their own industries, and a government based on workers' councils. After workers played a key role in suppressing the Kapp putsch (see below) with a general strike in Berlin. The communists formed an approximately 50,000 strong Red Army and seized control of the Ruhr. The regular army, and again, the Freikorps, crushed the rising, after a long struggle. There were further disturbances in Halle, Dresden, Saxony, and Thuringia, and further afield, and extending into 1923, but these were again successfully combatted. At least 600 Communists were killed in Bavaria, and across Germany, thousands of Spartacists were killed. The government was never seriously challenged by left-wing revolts though they did have an important political impact in the sense that they heightened fears of a 'Red Revolution' among the frightened law-abiding middle-classes, who were well aware of the reports of class-based brutality and murder coming out of Russis. This fear prompted greater support for right-wing parties who argued for a greater emphasis on maintaining law and order.

Chronology of Versailles timetable, 1918-1919

- 11 November 1918: Armistice agreement made to end fighting on the Western Front - 19 January 1919: Peace Conference convened at Palace of Versailles - 7 May 1919: German delegates presented with document containing first draft terms of the treaty - 16 June 1919: Germans given seven days to sign the final Treaty - 20 June 1919: German Coalition Cabinet collapses over divisions in signing the Treaty - 22 June 1919: Reichstag votes to accept the Treaty - 28 June 1919: German delegates sign the Treaty of Versailles

The Munich Putsch

- Origins of the Munich Putsch: The National Socialist movement placed a great emphasis on violence, and actively disrupted the meetings of other political parties, especially Communists. The military associations surrounding the Nazis did not stop at violence but extended to political murders. After the failure of the Kapp Putsch, the Freikorps gathered in Bavaria, where they planned and carried out the murder of Erzberger, the German politician, and Rathenau, the Jewish Foreign Minister of Germany. Bavaria became the centre of right wing politics in Germany, with the first attempted coup by the Nazis in the Munich Beer-Hall Putsch of 1923. Hitler was convinced that a seizure of power was possible. The Weimar government was damaged by French occupation of the Ruhr and the collapse of the mark, and support for the Nazis increased. Disorder and insecurity were necessary conditions for the rise of National Socialism. Hitler's denunciation of the system which had allowed this crisis to occur touched a chord among the misery and despair of many classes in Germany. Hitler was only interested in opposition to occupation of the Ruhr in so far as it could be used as a means for seizing power. He was not interested in a national uprising and war of liberation, since this would only strengthen the government's position. The end of passive resistance in the Ruhr gave Hitler the opportunity to denounce the action as a humiliating surrender. Hitler also had before him the example of Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy in 1922 after the March on Rome. With this example in mind, and rashly believing he could seize power, Hitler decided to act.

The economic impact of the invasion of the Ruhr

- Reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr: By the end of 1922, Germany had fallen behind in paying reparation payments to France in coal. The tough line of the French government resulted in the invasion of the Ruhr district of Germany by 60,000 French and Belgian troops in January 1923. The Ruhr was one of the most important areas of German industry, and was crucial for French and German industry, since Germany exported coal from the Ruhr to France, and imported French iron for German steelworks. The intention of the invasion was to secure the trade in these articles, and for France to collect the reparation payments 'in kind', that is, by taking German coal equal to the value of Germany's reparations payments. The Ruhr was the heavily industrialised area of Western Germany including the towns of Dusseldorf, Essen, and Dortmund; it was the industrial heartland of Germany, accounting for 80% of Germany's steel and iron production and more than 80% of Germany's coal. It also contained many iron and steel works and engineering factories. Troops were sent in to occupy the Ruhr and extract payment by force in compliance with the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The aim was to secure reparation payments in the form of coal, steel, iron, and manufactured goods. In 1923, the occupying forces increased to 100,000, and the forces took control of mines, factories, and steelworks, and, like armies in the Middle Ages, demanded 'tribute' in the form of food from shops. A military operation had turned into a military occupation. Given the demobilisation of German forces, the government of Wilhelm Cuno knew Germany could not fight back against this form of aggression. Nevertheless, he ordered a policy of "passive resistance" of non-cooperation against the occupying forces. German workers were promised by the government that their wages would be paid if they went on strike, while paramilitary troops secretly working within Germany sabotaged and disrupted French activities by destroying railways lines and bridges. Outraged at French actions, Germans responded to the Government's call for passive resistance to such an extent that the dispute was transformed into a state of undeclared war. France responded robustly by setting up military courts and punishing miners, mine owners and civil servants who would not comply with their demands and orders. Eventually, the French brought in their own workers to extract coal from the Ruhr and to operate the railways. Germans were forbidden from leaving or entering the Ruhr without displaying their passports to French troops. As the intensity of the dispute increased, violence became more common, with some 132 Germans shot for refusing to work, and over 150,000 German workers removed from the Ruhr in the eight months of the occupation. Resistance worked to such a degree that by May 1923, deliveries were only one-third of the average monthly deliveries of 1922 and coal output in the Ruhr had fallen to around 20 percent of the pre-occupation output. During the dispute, Britain attempted to mediate between France and Germany. Britain was frustrated by France's reluctance to compromise. The Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, in a note to the French government on 11 August 1923, suggested an 'expert inquiry' into Germany's capacity to pay. Although much resented in France, the 'Curzon note' restored confidence in Germany of a fair settlement. Curzon's advocacy of an 'expert inquiry' led on 30 November 1923 to the Reparations Commission establishing two committees of experts to examine the question of Germany's capacity to pay—the first step on the road to a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

The political impact of the invasion of the Ruhr

- The end of passive resistance: The invasion of the Ruhr, together with the impact of hyperinflation, disillusioned many Germans especially those of the Mittelstand. The Left and the Right both attempted to exploit the crisis but the occupation of the Ruhr and subsequent hyperinflation were the backdrop to the last serious attempt to overthrow the Weimar Republic by force. In 1923, the small Bavarian-based party, known as the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP/Nazi Party) made the attempt. When Gustav Stresmann called off passive resistance to the French occupation of the Ruhr without getting any concessions there was an outcry from right-wing groups. In Bavaria, the right-wing government declared a state of emergency, and appointed Gustav von Kahr as State Commissioner. In Munich, there was growing agitation for a march on Berlin to overthrow the government and establish a dictatorship. These ideas centred upon the Nazi party and its leader Adolf Hitler. The rise to prominence of this previously-marginal party indicated the political instability of Germany in the early 1920s. - Adolf Hitler and the German Workers' Party: It was within the turbulent post-war period that Adolf Hitler had his formative experiences as a political agitator. After a failed attempt to become an artist in Vienna, Hitler served as a corporal during the First World War. Suffering from exposure to gas, he was in hospital when the Armistice was signed. He saw the Armistice as a betrayal and the peace treaty as shameful for Germany. Hitler was clear who he blamed for German's defeat: Communists and Jews had overthrown the German Empire for their own interests. After the war, Hitler became involved in political activities in Bavaria, the centre of right-wing politics in Germany. Hitler's role in Bavaria is uncertain but after the Communists there were overthrown he gave evidence before a Committee of Inquiry established by the Second Infantry Regiment. Hitler then began work in the Press and News Bureau of the Political Department of the Army's VII (Munich) District Command. After training in the 'political instruction' of troops, Hitler was appointed an Instruction Officer with the task of ensuring troops were inoculated against socialist, pacifist, and democratic ideas. This appointment was an important step in Hitler's career, as the first indication that Hitler possessed some political ability. In September 1919 Hitler was instructed by the Head of the Political Department to investigate a small group in Munich, the German Workers' Party, which was of possible interest to right-wing elements in the army. The German Workers' Party was established by Anton Drexler, a Munich locksmith, and Karl Harrer, a journalist, in 1918. Drexler aimed to set up a party which was working class and nationalist but the total membership of the party was no more than forty, and political activity was largely limited to discussions in Munich beer-halls. Drexler as well as Hitler had noticed that middle-class nationalist movements were out of touch with the masses and ineffective against communist influence. On 12 September 1919, Hitler attended the first meeting of the party, attended by approximately 20 people, at a Munich beer-cellar. A speech given by a Bavarian separatist, advocating the separation of Bavaria from the German Reich, brought Hitler to his feet to give a furious riposte. When the meeting was over, Drexler presented Hitler with a copy of his autobiographical pamphlet. A few days later, Hitler received a postcard inviting him to attend a Committee meeting of the party, and he joined the Committee as its seventh member. Hitler gave the party some impetus and organization, and the number of meetings increased. Hitler was prominent in pushing forward the agitation of the party. At the beginning of 1920, Hitler was placed in charge of organizing propaganda, and at a meeting on 24 February 1920, with nearly 2,000 present, he announced the new name of the party: the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers' Party or NSDAP), and its 25-point programme. This change of name marked the emergence of a new force in German party politics, and the Nazi Party, as it soon became known, proved ultimately to be a destabilizing influence in German politics.

Reparations, inflation and hyperinflation

- The political impact of reparations The Versailles Treaty did not fix the actual amount of reparations. A Reparations Committee was established to determine the scale of the damage inflicted by German forces in Allied countries. The Committee Report concluded that Germany should pay 132 billion gold marks with £6.6 billion payable in annual instalments. The Report was presented to Germany in 1921 with an ultimatum to accept it within six days, causing a political crisis. The Fehrenbach Cabinet resigned in protest at the harsh terms, and Joseph Wirth assumed office. There was no alternative to accepting the agreement and the government signed it - albeit unwillingly. Germany made the first payment shortly afterwards. This was the beginning of the policy of "fulfilment" by Germany which moderate Weimar politicians hoped would, by compliance with Allied, terms, lead to an eventual revision of the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The first instalment of reparations payments was made in 1921 but nothing was paid in 1922. By 1922, Germany was in difficulties, and the Reparations Committee granted a postponement of the January and February instalments. In July, the German government asked for a further suspension of payments due that year and in November asked for a loan of 500 million gold marks, and to be released from its obligations for three to four years so Germany could stabilise her currency. In December 1922, the German government argued that hyper-inflation was causing such a major disruption to the economy that Germany could not afford to make the payments in 1923. France thought Germany was exaggerating her economic difficulties, as an excuse to avoid making the payments. She was not alone in coming to this conclusion, for as a British newspaper reported: 'Germany is teeming with wealth. She is humming like a beehive. The comfort and prosperity of her people absolutely astound me. Poverty is practically non-existent. And yet this is a country that is determined that she will not pay her debts. They are a nation of actors. If it wasn't for the fact that the Germans are without a sense of humour, one might imagine the whole nation was carrying out an elaborate practical joke'. Times, 18 April 1922 The French refused to agree to Germany's requests and the scene was set for a major confrontation in 1923 with the invasion of the Ruhr areas by French and Belgian troops, as a means of extracting payment by force.

Chronology of the October-November crisis of 1918

29 September: Ludendorff calls for armistice negotiations 30 September: the Kaiser promises political reform 1 October: Prince Max of Baden forms new government 3 October: Prince Max sends letter to President Wilson asking for an armistice 24 October: Wilson replies, with demands for German demilitarisation 26 October: Ludendorff resigns, and flees to Sweden 28 October: the Kaiser introduces reforms making the Chancellor accountable to the Reichstag 30 October: Naval mutiny at Wilhelmshaven 3 November: Naval mutiny at Kiel 8 November: Revolt in Bavaria and declaration of the Bavarian Socialist Republic 9 November: Declaration of German Republic and abdication of the Kaiser 10 November: Ebert-Groener pact 11 November: Germany signs an armistice with the Allied Powers

The Constituent Assembly

Amidst great political tensions, the Constituent Assembly elections were held in January 1919. The SPD secured the largest share of the vote and the largest number of seats in the Assembly but did not have an overall majority—compromises and agreements with other parties would be necessary to govern the country. Party - No. of seats SPD - 163 USPD - 22 Centre - 91 DDP - 75 DNVP - 44 DVP - 19 The Assembly met in the small town of Weimar rather than Berlin as the political situation in the capital remained unstable after the events of January. Ebert was elected by the Assembly as the first President and the new government was led by Philipp Scheidemann of the SPD, and the coalition consisted of the SPD, the Centre Party and the DDP. Workers' and soldiers' councils handed their powers over to the new Assembly, thus making any revolution like the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia extremely unlikely. Political authority seemed to be channelled towards democratic and parliamentary politics. The Constituent Assembly was tasked with drawing up a new Constitution, and all parties agreed to a clean break from the 1871 autocratic Constitution for the German Empire. The Constitution was designed to guarantee the rights, privileges, and powers of the people while providing security for property and maintaining law and order.

Ebert and the German revolution

Behind the political structures and constitutional formulas was the fundamental role of government in maintaining order. It was a difficult task, for demobilisation of the armed forces followed the Armistice, which led to street demonstrations, strikes, and armed clashes becoming regular occurrences with bands of ex-soldiers roaming the streets. Ebert's efforts to maintain order were threatened by the USPD and the Spartacists. On 22 November 1918, he reached an important agreement between the government and the Berlin workers and soldiers and their councils (soviets) to the effect that the government accepted it only exercised power in the name of the soviets. This was only a temporary agreement meant to re-assure and assuage some of Ebert's colleagues, for many in the USPD (whose leader Hugo Haase was part of Ebert's government), saw the soviets as the true expression of the revolutionary will of the people, and as the way by which the revolution could be extended. They believed that the autocratic system of government would not be finally abolished until aristocratic estates were broken up, the army, civil service, and judiciary were in the hands of the proletariat, and key industries were nationalised under workers' control.

Debt management

By 1919, the German government faced a debt of 1.44 billion marks. As during the war, the German government faced a choice of raising taxes or reducing spending, or a mixture of both. In the Weimar period both courses of action were risky. An increase in taxation would be politically unpopular and risk alienating support, for the anti-Republican parties could claim taxes were being levied and raised to pay for Allied reparation payments. Reducing expenditure was similarly risky for the fragile Republic for many social welfare provisions had been implemented by the Weimar government, and these were potentially jeopardised by cutting expenditure. In the end, the Weimar government did not address the issue directly. Although the National Debt was high, by 1921 unemployment had virtually disappeared and there had been a rapid recovery in economic activity. The German economy appeared to cope well with the transition to peace but at the cost of spiralling inflation. Prices doubled between 1918 and 1919 and quadrupled between 1919 and 1920, reaching a point fourteen times higher than in 1913. There were partly political reasons for this situation, for the 1920 coalition government, dominated by the Centre party, and led by Konstantin Fehrenbach, was supported by many powerful German industrialists who benefitted from inflation by taking short-term loans from Germany's central bank to expand their businesses. By the time the loans were due for repayment, inflation had reduced their real value, and inflation also had the beneficial effect of reducing the government's burden of debt—though reparation payments were not affected as they were paid in gold marks. In many ways, German politicians had a vested interest in allowing inflation to continue unchecked. Inflation was in many ways beneficial, and by 1921, unemployment in Germany was down to 1.8 percent, which compared favourably with the 17% in Britain. High inflation encouraged investment especially from the United States but left unchecked inflation could be dangerous and in Germany it became hyper-inflation which affected the functions and operations of the entire economy.

Why was the establishment of soviets a threat to the political stability of Germany in 1918-1919?

By the establishment of soviets of workers and soldiers there was a danger that Germany follow the same path as the Russian Revolution had, by allowing Communist agitators to seize control of State institutions and would eventually overthrow the government. In Russia in 1917, the Bolsheviks had used the soviets as a way of asserting traditional structures of political authority and had successfully infiltrated them before using them as a vehicle for Bolshevism. The same threat existed in Germany, though the Russian crisis was arguably deeper and more prolonged thus allowing deeper and more influential penetration, but the soviets in Germany could have performed a similar task.

The new regime and the old regime

Constitutional arrangements did not operate a vacuum, and despite the liberal nature of the Constitution, much remained unreformed. Traditional elements in the army, judiciary, and civil service did not fit easily into the new Republic, and these institutions were left largely untouched by the new regime. In the army, the officer corps was determined to retain its independence within the Republic. It largely remained intact from the time of the Second Reich and was therefore hardly politically neutral. The army was used with full force against successive left-wing revolts, and there was a degree of collusion between far right-wing political groups and army officers. General Hans von Seekt, appointed Commander-in-Chief in 1920 believed that the army owed its loyalty not to the Republic but to a 'timeless Reich' which was the true expression of German nationhood. Significantly he also believed that the army could legitimately intervene in politics whenever necessary. Senior civil servants were still drawn overwhelmingly from the aristocracy and could wield enormous power. In the civil service, freedom of opinion and expression was permitted so long as it did not conflict with loyalty to the German state, but it was often that case that the nature of that state was contested. A similar situation existed within the judiciary. Article 54 of the Weimar Constitution guaranteed judicial independence, but many judges from the Second Reich remained in place, most of whom were staunchly monarchist and anti-democratic. Judges were often partial in their interpretation of the law. The penal code of the Republic stipulated that anyone attempting to overthrow the Constitution by force should be sentenced to imprisonment but members of left-wing parties were often punished with great severity while right-wing agitators were more likely to be treated leniently. The causes of political instability in Weimar Germany were not difficult to discern and it only required a certain set of circumstances to occur before social and economic problems and political polarisation in the wider society were reflected within the political system. The Republic's origins left a legacy of distrust and bitterness which did not abate with the passage of time. The trauma of military defeat, the abdication of the Kaiser and social and economic disorder and political turmoil took a toll on the German population. The Republic was the unsatisfactory legacy of war and revolution and Weimar politicians were blamed for those traumatic events. From the beginning, the Weimar Republic was attacked from the Communists on the Left and embryonic Fascists on the Right. For the far Right, the Republic's very existence, and its politicians having betrayed Germany and the German army by making a dishonourable peace, the famed 'stab-in-the-back' theory, tarnished its reputation from the beginning. Moreover, the so-called shameful and treacherous capitulation at Versailles hardened opposition. For the extreme Left, the unreformed institutions of the state meant that conservative and monarchist supporters remained embedded within Germany's political structures where they wielded political authority: a situation that could only be overturned by revolution, not liberalism. In the 1919 election, most support was for parties that were moderate or willing to join coalition governments in the Weimar Republic. Yet, a significant minority supported the extreme left and right, with the Communists securing 5.3 percent, and the right-wing Nationalists (DNVP), 11 percent of the vote. This worrying trend towards extremism being legitimated by the political system was to remain problematic throughout the course of the Weimar Republic.

The Ebert-Groener pact

Ebert was considered a constitutionalist who would stop the descent of Germany into chaos and revolution. His proclamation of 9 November was signed 'Imperial Chancellor', a clever device to emphasize continuity from the previous monarchist regime. This helped to secure the allegiance of the officer corps and the civil service to the government. Ebert declared the government aim as to bring peace to Germany as quickly as possible. After the proclamation of the Republic, Ebert's first task was to ensure the loyalty of the army. On 11 November, an armistice of such severity was signed that Germany was left virtually defenceless. Germany therefore started its immediate post-war history with a new, untried provisional government that was far from in control of events at home and faced the prospect of an imminent dictated peace settlement. When the armistice was signed, Germany was in turmoil, reeling under its losses and the political upheavals. On 12 November 1918, the Cabinet sent a telegram to Hindenburg upholding the power of the command of officers. Ebert and Groener came to an agreement, the Ebert-Groener Pact of November 1918, to work together to preserve Germany as best they could. This didn't mean that army leaders were happy with a republic, any more than Ebert was happy to compromise with the old order in the army. The impact of this pact was exaggerated and denounced by the Left as proof that Ebert had betrayed the revolution. It was hardly a betrayal since Ebert made no secret of his distaste for revolution. Nevertheless, the agreement did seal the fate of any attempts to democratize the army. As time went on, Ebert's relations with the German officer class improved. Groener feared the revolution but recognized that Ebert was a deeply patriotic German who was a constitutional democrat rather than a revolutionary socialist. Groener offered the full support of the army to the government, and expected Ebert to defend Germany from Bolshevism. The army was placed at the government's disposal for this purpose. Ebert assured Groener of his determination to do this, and of his wish to call a Constituent Assembly as soon as possible. In return for the offer of military support, Ebert agreed to curtail the power of the soldiers' councils which threatened military discipline. For both sides the pact was a pragmatic decision to collaborate to preserve Germany from chaos and revolution. The army would be at best a reluctant supporter of the new republic, but the pact meant that it would remain a potent force. The Kaiser had gone, but the largely anti-republican generals remained. In the 1920s the army became almost a state within a state and a haven for many who at heart were opponents of democracy. A similar compromise, this time between trade union leaders and industrial employers, was reached a few days later in the Stinnes-Legien Agreement. The government had been in a precarious position, for its authority was uncertain beyond Berlin and not even accepted in all parts of the capital. In Berlin, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards planned a provisional government through soviets without reference to the Reichstag, and many soldiers, sailors, and workers in towns and cities across Germany set up their own councils to govern themselves, and the prospect of a communist revolution in Germany following that of Russia seemed a distinct possibility. The German revolution of 1918 was bloodless, as the old order offered no resistance but despite events in Bavaria, it was not a socialist revolution. Political and administrative functions were assumed at a local level by patriotic Germans anxious to maintain law and order in a time of national crisis. They had in common a wish to be rid of the Emperor and to establish a democratic form of government in Germany. Owing to the chaos and disturbances in Berlin, the new government met in Weimar, a town in Saxony 150 miles from Berlin. The German Empire no longer existed, the monarchy had abdicated, so the German state was organized along Republican lines — thus was born the period of German history known as the Weimar Republic.

Why did France take the decision to occupy the Ruhr? Was there an alternative policy available?

French troops entered the Ruhr to enforce the extraction of goods to the value of reparation payments set by the Reparations Committee as that owed by Germany. France had always been the most militant of the Allied powers and argued at Versailles for strong measures to be taken against Germany, as a means of keeping Germany as weak as possible. A display of French strength in this way had therefore political and economic dimensions. France could have possibly negotiated further by involving other powers, especially Britain, who were keen to see an end to the crisis, but there was little desire within France or in French political circles to find a non-military solution, and they much preferred to resort to a show of force.

Why did Germany have difficulty paying war reparation payments?

Germany had difficulty meeting its obligations for reparation payments as she claimed they were too high, especially so since Germany had lost much of her productive capacity by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, and there had been very limited economic growth since the end of the war. While there was no shortage of reasons for the poor economic conditions in Germany, historians have questioned whether there was an element of resistance within Germany's governing circles to make the payments, which many Germans had of course criticised as unfair and illegitimate.

Why did Hitler receive lenient punishment for his role in the Munich Putsch, and what does it tell us about the political condition of Germany?

Hitler spoke forcefully at his trial for treason, and used the occasion to advertise his nationalist arguments. Many of these arguments impressed Germans dissatisfied by the treatment given to Germany after 1918, and in right-wing nationalist circles, Hitler emerged as a popular figure. The judges at the trial clearly had right-wing sympathies and passed a lenient sentence accordingly. The Weimar government had left many of the institutions untouched with the result that hostility towards the Republic was entrenched in many areas of German life. Hitler's trial indicated that Germany remained a divided nation and society, and right-wing arguments possessed considerable force and were gaining popularity, as German politics became polarized between extremes of Left and Right.

What were Hitler's main political ideas in the early years of the Nazi party?

Hitler's ideas in his early years were centred on and connected primarily with opposition to the Weimar Republic and to the threat of communism. While paying lip-service to the programme of the German Workers' Party's socialistic content, Hitler's ideas were mostly concerned with restoring Germany to her pre-war glory. National unity based on language and culture was important to Hitler, as was virulent opposition to communists and Jews, whom he saw as the architects of the downfall of the German Reich, and its subsequent humiliation at the Armistice and in signing the Versailles peace treaty.

Aftermath of the Munich Putsch

Hitler, Ludendorff, and Röhm were arrested and placed on trial for treason in February 1924. Hitler's trial lasted from 24 February until 1 April. Along with nine other participants, he was accused of high treason. The trial was conducted in a manner favourable to the accused. Hitler used the courtroom as a propaganda opportunity, and attacked the Weimar Republic. His forceful and assured language skilfully played on the right-wing sympathies of the judges. Remarkably, in a trial for treason, the defendants were conceded to have had honourable motives. German newspapers reported the case, and many Germans were impressed by Hitler's arguments, especially his appeal for greater national sentiment and pride. Hitler and three others received a legal minimum of five years' imprisonment. Ludendorff was acquitted, after his military services as a general during the First World War were taken into consideration. While in prison, Hitler received favourable treatment from guards and a considerable amount of mail from admirers. Hitler had his own room and was allowed as many visitors as he wanted. After approximately one year in the Landsberg Am Lech fortress, Hitler was released on 20 December 1924. He had used his time productively to write Mein Kampf, his political creed, which in due course became effectively the manifesto and political guide of the Nazi party.

Social welfare and the social impact of hyperinflation

Hyperinflation 1923-24: As we have seen, at the end of 1921, Chancellor Joseph Wirth's government announced that reparation payments scheduled for early 1922 could not be met and the economy was in a state of near-collapse. What had been a case of serious inflation ever since 1914, caused in part by paying for the war effort with increasing amounts of paper money, became hyperinflation - sometimes called the 'Great Inflation' - as prices soared and money values fell uncontrollably. The value of the mark fell from 20 to the pound in 1918 to 20 billion to the pound when hyperinflation reached its peak in 1923. The social consequences were dramatic. Savings became worthless almost overnight, businesses went bankrupt, and families faced destitution and starvation. Table 1: Price of a loaf of bread in Berlin, 1918 to November 1923 Date - Marks 1918 - 0.63 1922 - 163 January 1923 - 250 July 1923 - 3,465 September 1923 - 1,512,000 November 1923 - 201,000,000,000 Inflation had always been a problem for the Weimar Republic, and had various causes such as the credit financing of war reparations, the continuing financial burdens of the war, the printing of money, currency speculation, and the flight of capital out of the country. On 1 July 1923, 160,000 marks were worth one dollar; by August this had increased to one million marks. By November, the exchange rate was 4.2 billion Reichmarks marks to the dollar. The collapse of the currency meant the end of trade, plus increased bankruptcies, food shortages, and unemployment, with the result that many Germans suffered great hardship; the crisis touched every member and class of German society. Personal savings were annihilated and the purchasing power of wages was reduced to nothing. Not only did the crisis destroy property and money, but also the faith in the meaning of property and money.

What were some of the effects of hyper-inflation within the German economy?

Hyperinflation had many effects on German society. The most obvious the rise in prices which made the currency virtually worthless and led to great volatility in the economic conditions within the country. Soaring costs impacted businesses workers, and families, those with small businesses, and those on fixed incomes and with savings. Unemployment and high prices imposed great hardship on many people, leading to destitution, sickness, and hunger.

Communist risings

In February 1919, Ebert became the first President of the Weimar Republic. Ebert was a moderate politician, who attempted to guide Germany through this difficult period, and the first Weimar government - consisting of the socialist SPD, the German Democratic Party and the Centre Party - reflected his belief in cooperation and moderation, and the need for all parties which believed in governing through a Parliament and a Constitution to work together. Ebert was hated by the extremists of the Left, the communists, and the many right-wing groups who supported the idea of military rule in Germany. Ebert recognized the possibility of revolution in Germany, with widespread unrest occurring across the country, and was determined to stop any Communist seizure of power. He had already been tested by a Spartacist demonstration on 6 December in Berlin which had been fired on by troops, killing sixteen. On 23-24 December, a naval mutiny was put down by the army, and in protest the three USPD Ministers in the government resigned. These incidents were the prelude to more serious disorder. On 6 January 1919, the newly formed Communist Party (KPD) staged the so-called Spartacist Rising, attempting to emulate Lenin's seizure of power in Russia in 1917. Rosa Luxemburg had realised that workers in Germany were not ready for revolution, and she had also been openly critical of Lenin's repressive measures after the Bolsheviks had seized power but, as workers' risings spread, she sided with the workers and called for closer relations with the Soviet Union, greater power for workers' councils and the nationalisation of industry. Luxemburg was seen by the SPD as a dangerous revolutionary determined to destroy the embryonic democracy of the Weimar Republic. A Revolutionary Committee of 6 January issued a proclamation deposing the Ebert government and announcing the establishment of a new revolutionary government: 'Comrades! Workers! The Ebert-Scheidemann Government has rendered itself impossible. It is hereby declared deposed by the undersigned Revolutionary Committee, the representative of the revolutionary socialist workers and soldiers (Independent Socialist Party and Communist Party)' After a week of heavy fighting in Berlin the uprising was crushed by the army and irregular military groups called Freikorps. Both Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were arrested, tortured and murdered. Over the next few months, the Freikorps continued in the role of suppressor of revolution, most notably in Bavaria, previously a kingdom within the second German Empire but transformed into a Republic at the end of the First World War. Bavaria was, later, the centre of right-wing opposition to the Weimar Republic government but a Communist government was established under Kurt Eisner. After Eisner was murdered by a right-wing fanatic in February 1919, a Soviet Republic was proclaimed in April. Food and clothing were taken from the rich and given to the workers, and a Bavarian Red Army formed. This government lasted throughout 1920-21 until a local coalition following the example of Berlin called in a local Freikorps to crush the revolutionary government. At least six hundred Communists were killed in Bavaria, and across Germany, thousands of Spartacists were killed.

Topic 3 - Political instability and extremism

In many ways, political instability was the keynote of the Weimar Republic between 1919 and 1923. Communist risings in the early years were suppressed partly by irregular troops (such as the ostensibly demobbed Freikorps) whose increasing involvement in far right-wing politics formed the basis of attempted right-wing coups and close involvement in political assassinations and political violence. In the face of pressure from both sides, the Weimar government appeared to be weak, and the loyalty of the army was uncertain, for many officers harboured deep resentment of the Republic's role in ending the war and in making a dishonourable peace treaty. These factors encouraged the development of many extreme right-wing groups throughout the period of the Weimar Republic, not least the nascent National Socialist party, which had emerged from the violent political circles of Bavaria.

From the quote above and from your wider reading, what issues was Kapp most concerned about and why did he attempt to a military coup?

Kapp was concerned with restoring the German monarchy and the Empire (hence the reference to the Reich) but he was also concerned with contemporary economic problems and financial dislocation at the end of the war, with high prices and increasing costs for business. Underpinning the economic catastrophe for Kapp was the existence of the Weimar Republic which had no legitimate authority, was weak, and vulnerable to the threat posed by communism. To avert Germany from further disaster, with the potential collapse of the Republic and the potential communist revolution, Kapp thought he had to act to save Germany.

The Beer Hall Putsch

On 8 November 1923, at a meeting of Bavarian political leaders at the Burgenbräukeller in Munich, Hitler attempted to seize power. The meeting was being addressed by Gustav von Kahr, the head of the government of Bavaria. Kahr himself was an authoritarian right-winger, albeit of an old-fashioned kind, and staunchly opposed to the Weimar government in Berlin. Twenty minutes into the speech, Goering burst into the hall with twenty-five armed Brownshirts, and Hitler leapt onto a chair, shouting 'The National Revolution has begun. This hall is occupied by six hundred heavily armed men'. The SA surrounded the hall, and holding a revolver, Hitler announced that the Reich and Bavarian governments were to be overthrown. Army and police barracks were occupied, and Hitler planned to march on Berlin at the head of his armed forces. Kahr agreed, at gunpoint, to support him. Hitler had up to 3,000 Stormtroopers of the SA and Kampfbund (German Fighting Unit) at his command. On the following morning, Hitler, supported by the wartime leader General Ludendorff (For Ludendorff's important role in the war effort, see Unit 5 - Topic 1 - The Impact of War: Domestic Political Crisis and the Versailles Treaty), marched into Munich. They were met in a narrow street by 100 armed police summoned by Kahr to crush the revolt. After a shot was fired, the police opened fire leading to a gun battle in the streets of Munich. Sixteen Nazis and three policemen were killed. Hitler, suffering from a dislocated shoulder, fled from the scene. The putsch had ended in failure. Despite the failure of the putsch it was a remarkable achievement by Hitler. It was an attempt that was partly bluff, and which displayed the over-confidence of the Nazi party, but it was significant as a statement of intent. The putsch was badly organized, with strategic positions unsecured, and the leadership of military commanders found wanting, especially the lack of clear instructions and command. Hitler had never intended to use force but thought revolution was possible in agreement with the political and military authorities.

Why were post-war German governments partly responsible for rising inflation?

Post-war German governments allowed inflation to increase as it was beneficial for many businessmen to expand their business by taking short-term loans, which were reduced in value by the time the loan was due for repayment. Inflation also helped to reduce the scale of government debt and by prompting further investment helped to reduce unemployment.

The abdication of the Kaiser

Socialists and Communists did not lead the initial revolts. It was rather the case that ordinary Germany who wanted the Kaiser to abdicate and who wanted to establish a democratic republic had taken control of the situation. The Kaiser was viewed as an obstacle to peace and democracy, but he refused to abdicate. With negotiations for an armistice at a vital stage, socialist leaders in the government resigned on 9 November to impress on Prince Max their view that the Kaiser must abdicate. Advised by the new army chief, General Groener, that further military resistance on the Western Front was fast becoming impossible, Prince Max responded by announcing that the Kaiser had abdicated. He had no constituted authority to act in this way, and on the same day, he handed over power, of what was now a republic, to Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the SPD. The Kaiser had not in fact abdicated but had been presented with a fait accompli, and was told later in the day by General Groener that the army would not fight for him, he fled to the neutral Netherlands a dejected and demoralised man. It was left to Philipp Scheidemann, a leading SPD figure, to declare from the steps of the Reichstag that the Kaiser had abdicated. He stated in a speech which was as much a call for order and stability as it was a call of hope for the future: "Everything for the people. Everything by the people. Be united, faithful and conscientious. The old and rotten, the monarchy, has collapsed. The new may live. Long live the German Republic" In 1922, the Kaiser, writing from exile, linked the decision to force him to abdicate with Germany's military defeat: "The decision as to my going or staying, as to my renunciation of the Imperial Crown and retention of the Royal Crown of Prussia, was summarily snatched from me. The army was shaken to its core by the erroneous belief that its King had abandoned it at the most critical moment of all".

The Weimar Constitution Continued

Strengths of the Constitution: The strengths of the Constitution were perhaps, in hindsight, less obvious than its weaknesses. There was a wider right to vote, with even women allowed to vote and become Deputies in the Reichstag and State Parliaments. Proportional representation allowed even smaller parties to win seats in the Reichstag, and there was full representative democracy in this sense at local and national levels. Unlike in the Second Reich, Prussia could not dominate the other German states. The Constitution also set out the rights of the individual in a clear and expansive way, with equality before the law and personal liberty inviolable. The rights of property were guaranteed and there was full religious and economic freedom. Referendums could be called by the President, the Reichstag or at the request of the people if one-tenth of the electorate petitioned for one. Taken together, there were substantial democratic and individual advantages contained within the terms of the Constitution and in broad terms, it represented a significant liberalisation of previous constitutional arrangements. Weaknesses of the Constitution: Many of the problems of the Weimar Republic were a consequence of deficiencies in the Constitution. Owing to proportional representation, and the absence of a minimum vote threshold for Parliamentary representation, political parties in the legislature were numerous. As there was no possibility of banning parties from taking part in elections, this meant that the democratic parties were directly confronted by the anti-democratic parties of the Left and Right. Political instability caused by shifting party allegiances and alliances led to frequent dissolutions and elections to the Reichstag. In the period 1920-32, there were seven elections, and frequent changes of government. We can see the effects of these deficiencies when we consider that between 1919 and January 1933, there were 20 Cabinets with 12 different Chancellors. Under the proportional representation system, no single party was ever to have an overall majority in the Reichstag. Many historians have argued that proportional representation brought fragmentation and instability, just when they would do the most damage to a young republic under considerable stress. Between November 1918 and November 1923, Germany had nine different Chancellors. By the time of the 1928 election there were 28 different political parties. Also contentious was Article 48 of the new constitution, which gave the President emergency powers to rule by decree in times of crisis. If he considered there was an emergency, the President could use Article 48 to suspend the democratic Constitution and rule directly with his own laws and the backing of the armed forces. While Ebert used this power regularly and (largely) to ensure the new Republic's survival, it was a power later exploited much more freely in the early 1930s by President Hindenburg, who was not nearly so keen on democratic procedures as Ebert. The weaknesses of the Weimar Republic were often subtle, for in some cases, they could be taken as strengths if circumstance had been different but given the fragmented condition - economically and politically - of Germany, they were clear weaknesses. As the President had the power to appoint or dismiss the Chancellor as he wished and government instability was very prevalent. Proportional representation meant there were many political parties which made strong government very difficult, especially in times of crisis. Among the many political parties were right-wing and left-wing parties which wanted to destroy democracy and those in certain positions of authority such as judges had sympathy with right-wing extremists and were reluctant to deal severely with those with similar political views.

The Versailles Peace Treaty

Terms of the Versailles Treaty: Germany arrived at the Versailles Peace Conference expecting a peace on agreed principles but German delegates were soon astounded and disillusioned by the severity of the peace terms. Although Germany was on the brink of defeat, the armistice had not been a surrender but had rather been an agreement to withdraw forces from occupied territories pending a full peace settlement. The peace conference had opened on 12 January 1919. The defeated powers were excluded and all the major decisions were taken by the 'Big Three' of David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, and Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France. Vittorio Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister was often considered influential but the main decisions were taken by the US, Britain, and France. The peace settlement known as the Versailles Treaty was signed on 28 June 1919. The terms of the treaty can be classified into three groups: - Territorial: provisions that took land away from Germany - Military: provisions that limited Germany's armed forces - Financial and economic: penalties and sanctions which harmed the German economy The Treaty set out 440 articles detailing Germany's punishment. The following articles were the most important: - The Covenant of the League of Nations was formed but Germany was not allowed to join - The Rhineland was demilitarised, and the German army was prohibited from going there - The Saar, with its rich coalfields, was given to France for 15 years - Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France - Germany was forbidden to unite with Austria - Lands in eastern Germany, the rich farmlands of Posen and the 'Polish Corridor' between Germany and East Prussia, were given to Poland - Danzig was made a free city under League of Nations control. - All Germany's colonies taken were given to France and Britain as 'mandates'. - The German army was restricted to 100,000 men and the navy to six battleships and no submarines. No German air force was permitted - Germany was deemed responsible for all the loss and damage caused by the war. Reparations were eventually set at 132 billion gold marks

On what basis did the Allied Powers impose such exacting terms on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles? Explain the position of France, Britain and the United States in this process.

The Allies imposed harsh terms on Germany because within the Versailles Treaty, Germany was blamed for the war, and this attribution of guilt led to the logical conclusion that Germany must be punished by financial sanctions, territorial losses, and military disarmament and limitations. France's desire for security against another German attack somewhat blinded them to the danger of imposing too harsh terms on Germany, but the US and Britain were alive to this peril and softened some of the proposed French measures. All the Allied countries were under pressure by their own populations to impose penalties on Germany, and while some of the final measures were punitive and harsh, the process of imposing penalties on those defeated after a war was far from new and had been used many times in the past.

The Freikorps

The Freikorps played a very important role in suppression of communist revolts. Who were they? After the war, the deprivation of those who had fought for Germany caused great resentment, especially amongst those who had served in the armed forces. As there were few houses and jobs, many servicemen did not want to be demobilized. There were a multitude of ex-servicemen involved in patriotic and military associations, who formed themselves into unofficial units, with the encouragement of Hindenburg and Groener, and armed and equipped themselves from the surplus of the war. As they were no longer part of the German army, they became known as the Freikorps. The Freikorps were composed of men who were patriotic, nationalist and anti-communist. Most recruits came from demobilised junior army officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) like corporals and sergeants, but the Freikorps also attracted students, adventurers, and drifters with a taste for violence. Less disciplined in action, they gave vent to frustration, aggression, and a desire for revenge which characterised many demobilised soldiers. Their aim, which they shared with right-wing political groups, was the overthrow of the Weimar Republic, the reversal of the decisions made at Versailles in 1918, and the restoration of Germany to her 'rightful' position in Europe. Ebert's use of the Freikorps to defeat the Communist rising in Berlin led to great self-belief and confidence within the Freikorps. They occupied an unofficial place within the military structure and were not part of the official army, despite being under the overall command of General Walter Luttwitz and being supplied with uniforms and weapons from official army stores.

The programme of the German Workers' Party

The German Workers' Party was radical, nationalist, anti-capitalist and anti-Semitic, as had been outlined in their 25-point programme. The radical nature of the programme was apparent in the proposal that large companies must share their profits with workers. There were even liberal democratic proposals, such as the demand that all citizens should have equal rights and duties. Yet, not all those who lived in Germany could become citizens, for the programme stated that no Jew could be a citizen of Germany. For the moment, it was the nationalist measures which provided the focus to draw in support for the Workers' Party. The Versailles Treaty must be overthrown, and Germany united with Austria and all other German speakers. Here was a programme which was seeking to create a 'Greater Germany'. The various proposals of the programme reflected the political differences and shades of political opinion within the Workers' Party. It could be argued that Hitler's own programme was much simpler: power for himself and enhanced power for the nation. For him, the policies of the Twenty-Five Points were merely a means to this end.

What were the respective powers of the President and the Reichstag in the Weimar Constitution?

The President exercised considerable authority in being able to dismiss the Chancellor, dissolve the Reichstag and call new elections. He also exercised control of the armed forces and could exercise legislative and executive authority by suspending the Reichstag and ruling directly. The Reichstag was the supreme law-making body in a political system which aimed at a version of parliamentary democracy. New laws had to originate in the Reichstag and required majority of votes in the Reichstag to pass. As the Reichstag was elected by a broad democratic franchise it was the case that it possessed greater political legitimacy, perhaps bolstered by the allocation of seats via Proportional Representation.

Social welfare and hyperinflation

The Weimar Constitution stipulated that every German citizen should have the right to work or to welfare, leading to a series of reforms to the welfare system and the implementation of enhanced employment rights. In 1919, the maximum eight-hour working day was passed, and in the same year, the Government's health insurance system was extended to include wives, daughters, and the disabled. Aid for war veterans incapable of working because of injury also became the responsibility of the national government, and aid for war widows and orphans was also increased. In 1922, the National Youth Welfare Act required all local authorities to set up youth offices with responsibility for child protection, while also decreeing that all children had a right to an education. The budget for social welfare placed demands on government. The printing of money was largely conducted to pay out for welfare benefits that the Weimar Republic was committed to providing, but unfortunately only succeeded in exacerbating the hyper-inflation crisis. Winners and losers: Inflation is often viewed as damaging to an economy but when there are such rapid fluctuations in value, there are always winners and losers, and post-war Germany was no different in that respect. There were numerous people well-placed to take advantage of the hyper-inflation. Firstly, there were those who could manipulate the unusual situation to their advantage, such as black marketeers selling goods at vastly inflated prices. Then those with debts, mortgages and loans who could pay off what they owed in virtually worthless currency. Speculators who could take out loans and repay them once the currency was further devalued also profited. Among others were those leasing property on long-term fixed rents as the real value of rent decreased, holders of foreign currency (such as foreigners living in Germany), and those in the countryside - who coped better as agricultural produce (food) was more valuable than money. The losers have received more historical attention, for their grievances were more tangible and were exploited by political extremists on both sides. Those with savings, investments, or with fixed incomes or on welfare support, such as students, the retired, and the sick, were badly-affected. Those patriots who loaned the government money in wartime by purchasing fixed-interest rate 'war bonds' lost, as the interest payments decreased in value, as well as landlords reliant on fixed rents who suffered badly from the depreciation in the value of the currency. Unskilled workers were amongst the worst affected as wage rises did not keep pace with rising prices, which also brought an increase in unemployment which impoverished (some of) them further. Among the more important 'classes' affected were the Mittelstand, that is, artisans and small-business owners of the middling ranks. While they constituted a diverse social group, they were generally without a steady and reliable source of income. While their costs increased, the prices they charged could not keep pace with inflation, and they also paid a disproportionate share of taxes. The sick suffered as medical costs as well as food prices increased, leading to higher rates of malnutrition, death rates, and suicides. The incidence of diseases like tuberculosis and rickets indicated dietary deficiencies. The effects of hyperinflation varied considerably between classes and regions but the perception among the middle classes was that they had lost the most, on the basis that their hard-earned savings had been wiped out. In the immediate post-war period, the German economy had to adjust to peacetime conditions. In this respect, it was no different from other combatants but the transition for the defeated power was difficult for the legacy of the war left Germany a serious debt with reparation payments to be made representing an added difficulty. Price inflation, following the printing of more money, spiralled out of control in 1923, bringing chaos to millions of Germans and making them look for more radical solutions to Germany's difficulties. Many Germans turned to extremist political groups for their salvation.

Topic 2 - Economic and social issues of the early years of the Weimar Republic

The Weimar Republic faced great economic difficulties in its early years. The legacy of four years of warfare was, in economic terms, extensive damage to Germany's industrial and agricultural base, economic dislocation, imbalance between the economic sectors, rampant inflation, and high levels of debt. In domestic terms, Weimar governments tried to ease the transition to peacetime by accepting a relatively high rate of inflation which curbed the unemployment rate, which was deemed to be necessary to preserve social stability. The Allied imposition of reparations added difficulties to Germany's positon, and while Germany accepted the terms of the Versailles Treaty, she appeared reluctant to accept the level of reparation payments demanded by the Allies. With France refusing to agree to any modification, civil disorder erupted from the French occupation of the Ruhr but the German government's policy of passive resistance ultimately led to the hyperinflation crisis, the social and economic complications of which fuelled support for the extremist parties and contributed to further political instability and called the existence of the Republic into question.

The problems of coalition government

The Weimar political system Prior to 1914 the wide array of political parties in the Reichstag had not represented a great problem, for they had at that stage no say in the choice of government. Conversely, in Weimar Germany, the fragmentation of parties was of great importance since governments needed to obtain a majority in the Reichstag to legislate. With the electoral system of proportional representation, no one party was likely to command a single-party majority in the Reichstag. Coalition government was therefore the predominant form of government, and as German society became more divided, political fragmentation became more pronounced. In Germany, many extremist parties of Left and Right were devoted to the violent overthrow of the Weimar Republic and the democratic system. The presence of these parties placed a greater burden on the moderate, centrist parties such as the SPD, the Centre Party, and the DDP, to work together for a stable coalition government. Though most of the politicians in these parties understood the need to compromise, the great problems facing Germany meant great divisions existed as to how to resolve the most difficult problems such as reparations and the Ruhr crisis. Another great problem was that support for the moderate parties was diminishing, especially after 1920, as the following Table demonstrates. This narrowing of the base for coalition governments meant there was less room for manoeuvre for coalition parties. At the very time when compromise and negotiation was needed, the basis for achieving such a result were slowly being eroded. Table 1: 1919 and 1920 Reichstag elections Party - Jan. 1919 - June 1920 USPD - 22 - 83 SPD - 163 - 103 DDP - 75 - 39 Centre - 91 - 64 DVP - 19 - 65 DNVP - 44 - 71 KPD - 0 - 4 - Political instability, 1919-23: As the more extreme political parties would not join coalition governments, the task facing the governing parties was made more difficult. The first four years of the Republic was characterised by unstable governments, and shifting coalitions and alliances. After 1920, the SPD, owing to internal divisions, ceased to take the leading role in coalition governments, and most Chancellors were drawn from the Centre Party. Since the SPD were the largest party in the Reichstag this caused further difficulties. Table 2: Weimar Governments, 1919-1923 Date - Chancellor - Party - Coalition parties - Reason for fall -Feb. 1919 - Scheidemann - SPD - SPD/Centre/DDP - Versailles June 1919 - G. Bauer - SPD - SPD/Centre/DDP - Kapp putsch Mar. 1920 - H. Műller - SPD - SPD/Centre/DDP - Election June 1920 - Fehrenbach Centre - DDP/Centre/DVP - Reparations May 1921 - J. Wirth - Centre - SPD/Centre/DDP - Partition of Upper Silesia Oct. 1921 - J. Wirth - Centre - SPD/Centre/DDP Nov. 1922 - W. Cuno - None - DDP/Centre/DVP/BVP - Economic crisis Aug. 1923 - Gustav Stresemann - DVP - SPD/Centre/DDP/DVP/BVP - SPD left coalition Nov. 1923 - Wilhelm Marx - Centre - Centre-right - - There were nine coalition governments between February 1919 and November 1923, and it was impossible to have proper continuity in policy, and more seriously, public confidence in the democratic process was seriously undermined. It was the extremist anti-democratic parties which benefited most from this discontinuity.

Political assassinations

The deep and lasting bitterness of German politics was most apparent in the emergence of political assassinations - a spate of which took place between 1919 and 1923, redolent of the febrile political atmosphere of pre-revolutionary Russia and pre-Civil War Spain. Between 1919 and 1923, there were 376 political assassinations: 22 carried out by left-wing conspirators, and 354 by right-wing groups. Over time, right-wing elements gained considerable strength, as continued resentment at the harsh treatment of Germany in the peace treaty, and as the growing force of the 'Stab in the Back' theory, became apparent. Nationalist groups played on the 'betrayal of Germany' with great effect. Patriotic leagues (Vaterländische Verbände) were often formed out of old Freikorp units, and acted as fiercely anti-republican paramilitary groups. They were potentially very powerful, and some were actively supported by members of the regular German army. Right-wing political assassinations began with the murder of the USPD leader Hugo Haase, shot in front of the Reichstag in October 1919. These were followed by the murders of Matthias Erzberger in August 1921 and Walther Rathenau in June 1922. Erzberger had led the delegation which signed the Armistice and he had also signed the Versailles Treaty, and he was also Germany's representative on the Reparations Committee. Rathenau's crime was to be a Jew and a leading Minister in a Weimar Ministry. He had also signed the Armistice and negotiated with the Allies at Versailles. Assassinations were carried by the Organisation Consul a nationalist paramilitary group formed from ex-Freikorp members, after the Freikorps had been officially disbanded following the Kapp putsch. Rathenau had been popular, over 700,000 protestors lined the streets of Berlin after his murder and the value of the mark fell, and other countries feared repercussions. Political instability could lead to financial stability and the government was moved to act, with the Reichstag passing a law in July 1922 for the protection of the Republic which imposed severe penalties on those involved in conspiracy to murder, while also banning several extremist organisations. The Organisation Consul was forced to disband but the law was not very effective as right-wing judges often did not enforce it. The Bavarian government even refused to implement it—unwittingly allowing the Nazi movement to establish itself in Bavaria. Rathenau's killers and their accomplices received an average sentence of only four years each in prison. While 326 right-wing murders went unpunished and only one murderer was sentenced to severe punishment before 1923, ten left-wing murderers found guilty were sentenced to death. Weimar politicians seemed to exaggerate the threat from the Left and underestimate the threat from the Right, and partly on this basis of de facto immunity, anti-republican right-wing groups established themselves very firmly within Germany.

The state of the Republic by 1924

The early years of the Weimar Republic were characterised by political instability and violence and economic volatility. The difficulties encountered by successive governments owed something to constitutional weaknesses but deeper social divisions also played a part. Differences over how the country should be governed were very deep and bitter. The legacy of the war was fresh in the minds of Germans and distrust of the Weimar politicians was rife on the Right, and it was a critique which was cultivated assiduously by right-wing agitators. On the Left, the political system of the Republic was seen to have failed, for the reassertion of political authority by traditional political elites outside of the legislature had become obvious and examples such as the partial justice meted out by right-wing judges or the uncertainty surrounding the loyalty of the army were creating the basis for further conflict. Somehow the Weimar Republic survived these great strains but the conflict of the post-war years left a legacy of distrust and bitterness which never left the Republic and left it vulnerable to the vicissitudes of further political and economic crisis.

The economic impact of reparations

The economic impact of war had been hugely destructive. Manpower losses and trade disruption proved to be burdens for Weimar Germany from the outset. The Versailles Treaty had taken away colonies, nullified overseas trading concessions and deprived Germany of valuable industries and mines in Alsace, Lorraine, the Saar and Upper Silesia. This cost Germany 75 per cent of its iron ore resources, 25 per cent of its coal resources and 15 per cent of its arable land. In 1919 the national debt of 144,000 million marks was 30 times what it had been in 1914. The war reparation bill, set in April 1921 at £6,600 million in cash payments and over £4000 million in goods, added to Germany's burden. The payment of cash and goods in a devastated economy proved difficult and was often impossible. The burden of reparation payments made the huge government debt ever more difficult to service. Gold reserves were inadequate to deal with the scale of payments that needed to be made in gold. Another part of the payments had to be made in coal but Germany had lost much of its coal reserves by the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Increasing exports might have offset the debt but the Allies had hampered Germany's export trade by confiscating its entire merchant fleet and later imposing high tariffs on imports of German goods. The Allies had forced Germany to pay reparations but at the same time had made it difficult for Germany to find the money to pay. The response of the German government was to print more money, making inflation worse and causing the value of the mark to fall. The economist John Maynard Keynes had argued that £2 billion was a safe maximum to pay, and that the burden of reparations could damage Germany and the Allies. The modern historian Detlev Peukert has argued on the contrary that the figure was quite manageable as it only represented 2 percent of Germany's Gross National Product (GNP). Peukert saw the effects of reparations as exaggerated, and clearly he is correct to see inflationary pressures as condoned and encouraged by German governments in the post-war period, since they could use the rapid decline in the value of Germany's currency to support the case that reparations should be abolished altogether or reduced drastically. The financial burdens of war threatened the existence of the young Republic, especially arising from reparations payments, which contributed after mid-1922 to escalating inflation. The fundamental cause of the problem was the announcement by the Allied powers in 1921 of the reparations bill, which caused panic in Germany, while in October of the same year, the League of Nations overruled the recent plebiscite held in Upper Silesia to give Poland a larger and more valuable share of former German territory. The compliance of the German government with these demands resulted in the murder of Erzberger in 1921 and Walter Rathenau in 1922. The relationship between economic developments and political extremism was already fully understood. In the following years, the full extent of Germany's financial problems came to the fore with great force. The economic chaos was compounded by the Franco-Belgian occupation of the industrial Ruhr district in January 1923, to take reparation payments directly.

Reaction from Germany

The harsh terms led to protests and demonstrations in Germany. Many Germans wanted to continue fighting, especially on the Eastern Front, but the army generals realistically warned that there was no possibility of a German victory. The most vehement resentment came from the nobles and industrialists who had supported the former Imperial government, but more significantly for the future, from ex-servicemen and army officers. In June 1919, German army officers attempted to get their men to demonstrate against the signing of the Treaty, even after the German government had officially accepted the terms. Efforts in this direction came principally from the Army Corps of General von Luttwitz, with Colonel Hahnke, commanding the 30th Regiment, calling on his men to show that they would not submit to dishonourable terms. It was reported that Hahnke promoted insubordination in the ranks: 'He asked those willing to protest against the Peace Terms to fall in on his right, and those in favour of acceptance to fall in on the left. The men all moved to the right, whereupon Colonel Hahnke praised their patriotism, and declared that General von Luttwitz was already in communication with certain politicians, who would form a new Government if the one which had just taken office at Weimar were overthrown'. (The Times, 27 June 1919) Despite this display of insubordination, General Groener telegraphed Ebert to inform him that the army generals would remain faithful to the government, and this assurance went some way towards ensuring that the Treaty was accepted, albeit grudgingly. Behind these protests was general disbelief among Germans that they had been militarily defeated. German propaganda had hidden the truly desperate nature of Germany's military situation in the autumn of 1918. Despite the Allied blockade, support for the war effort had still been strong, and the Kaiser's abdication and the armistice had come as a shock. Resentment among the population seemed to concentrate on the following aspects of the Treaty: - As the self-determination of nations had been widely viewed as a basis for a just peace, why were the rights and wishes of Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland being ignored - The War Guilt clause was viewed as an unjust humiliation, when Germany had to fight in 1914 to avoid being encircled - Reparations were too high and being based on the unjust war guilt clause were illegitimate - The Allied occupation of parts of Western Germany and French control of the Saarland caused great resentment, and in the latter, German nationalists were outraged at the banning of traditional German patriotic songs and festivals in areas under French control - Disarmament and exclusion from the League of Nations seen as unduly harsh How justified were these complaints? Though sympathy existed for Germany in many countries, especially Britain, there were limits to this sympathy, for the public outside of Germany largely blamed it for the outbreak of the war, and the terms of the Treaty had already been in some way known to Germany. Wilson's Fourteen Points and even the armistice terms had stipulated terms such as the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the establishment of a new state of Poland, and disarmament. In some ways, the Treaty was not as severe as it might have been, for the French wanted annexation of the Saarland or the setting up of a new state in the Rhineland but Britain and the US had resisted such a move as it would weaken Germany too much and leave her vulnerable to communism. The Treaty also did not punish Germany in the same way as she had punished Russia in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918. If Germany had won the war, she planned to annexe territory, expand her colonial possessions and impose a severe reparations bill on the Allies—the exact set of terms the Allies imposed on Germany. It could also be argued, as it has been subsequently by some historians, that the reparations bill was much lower than that demanded by the French and was not beyond Germany's capacity to pay. All German political parties agreed that accepting the Versailles terms was incompatible with national honour. It had seemed possible to negotiate or amend some of the terms but the Allies rejected any substantial amendments, and the seven-day ultimatum for acceptance caused a political crisis which resulted in the resignation of Scheidemann and a new coalition government led by Gustav Bauer. On military advice that further resistance was futile, Bauer signed the treaty. The SPD recognised the gravity of taking this decision and requested the DNVP, DDP, and DVP to state publicly that those who voted for the Treaty were not unpatriotic. In the long term, they took the decision to outwardly comply with the terms of the Treaty, while negotiating modifications, a policy known as "fulfilment". The Treaty turned even some of the Republic's former supporters against her, and furthered the association made between Weimar, weakness and failure. In driving a wedge between the constitutionalist politicians and the public, right-wing arguments gained further traction. The peace settlement added a further grievance to the 'stab in the back' theory. In 1919, Hindenburg had clearly indicated where he thought the blame for Germany's defeat lay. At a Commission of Inquiry established by the Weimar government to investigate the causes for Germany's defeat, he stated: 'An English general has said with justice: the German army was stabbed in the back. No blame is to be attached to the sound core of the army. Its performances call like that of the officers' corps for an equal admiration. It is perfectly plain on whom the blame rests'. The military origins of the theory were important to its acceptance and credibility among some sections of the population. One historian has written: 'The stab-in-the-back myth had been born and was accepted without question on the right wing; the army could be exonerated from all blame for Germany's defeat; those responsible were the 'November traitors', the coalition parties—primarily the socialists—who had sabotaged the war effort by their agitation for a peace of reconciliation; had engineered the revolution and had signed the shameful Versailles 'dictate''. William Carr, A History of Germany, 1815-1990 (4th edition, 1991), p. 263 Those politicians of the Weimar Republic who signed the peace treaty were termed the 'November Criminals' by far right-wing groups, including the young political agitator Adolf Hitler, and attracted an element of support from demobilized troops, embittered at their treatment. Ebert, Erzberger, and Scheidemann were targets, for they provided a link between the Republic, the humiliating surrender of November 1918, and the Versailles Treaty.

Explain the importance of the Ebert-Groener pact, and identify the interests which the respective politicians represented.

The importance of the Ebert-Groener pact lay in it establishing a degree of security and order within Germany at the critical period of social, economic and political crisis. The dangers in the immediate post-war period arose from the cleavage which had opened between the military and the civilian politicians over sensitive issues surrounding the Armistice. The pact assured the government that the military recognised its legitimacy while military officers were assured that order and the traditional lines and structures of authority would be maintained with the army. By re-asserting the traditional authority and responsibilities of army and government, the pact meant that the government could confront agitation from Left and Right with some confidence that the danger of revolution had been averted.

Reaction from abroad

The main decisions at Versailles were taken by France, Great Britain, and the United States. The aims and objectives of the three countries varied considerably, largely reflecting their different national interests, and to understand the developments which followed, it is important to consider these differences more closely. As Prime Minister between 1916 and 1918, David Lloyd George had led Britain to victory in the war, with a vigorous prosecution of the war effort. At the end of 1918, as head of a coalition government with the Conservative party, Lloyd George won a convincing victory in the General Election. During the election campaign, the coalition used the slogans 'Hang the Kaiser' and 'Make Germany Pay' as a means of obtaining political support. A hostile press campaign in Britain advocated severe punishment of Germany, but privately Lloyd George did not share this view. He aimed at preserving British naval supremacy, and the interests of the British Empire, but he aimed to achieve these objectives by the means of a moderate peace settlement. Lloyd George feared that if Germany was punished too harshly, the German people would turn to communism, and a communist regime in the centre of Europe, along with Soviet Russia, would be highly dangerous to the Western European capitalist powers of Britain and France. Alternatively, a harsh peace might lead to a nationalist backlash in Germany which would seek to avenge the injustice of harsh peace terms imposed on Germany. Lloyd George also recognized that Britain's dependence on international trade meant that the recovery of the German economy was an important consideration for Britain. In holding these views, Lloyd George represented something of a middle course between the harsh proposals of Clemenceau, and the idealistic moderation of Wilson. While Lloyd George talked tough during election campaigns, he was more realistic when it came to actual policy-making, but he faced the problem of the widespread backlash against Germany in Britain but especially in France: 'The French could not be freed so easily from the German problem. In their eyes, Germany, though defeated, was still dangerous. They would have liked to see Germany break up, and, since this failed to happen, wanted elaborate precautions against her for the future. Lloyd George held that, since Germany existed, she must be conciliated. Once more, he talked 'hard' with the intention of acting 'soft' when men, including himself, came to their senses'. A. J. P Taylor, English History 1914-1945, p. 134 As the United States had only entered the war in 1917, President Wilson did not fully appreciate the strong feelings against Germany which existed in Britain and France. He simplified the problems of national and ethnic rivalries which had existed in Europe for centuries. It also soon became obvious that Wilson's party, the Democrats, were losing support in the USA and that there was a growing public feeling that the United States should have nothing to do (politically) with Europe. Indeed, it was not certain that the United States would even sign the peace treaty. Wilson had originally set out the basis of the Fourteen Points in January 1918 to reassure American public opinion that the war was being fought for a moral cause and to ensure a lasting peace in Europe. As the conference at Versailles proceeded, Wilson began to defer more to the views of Clemenceau, and placed his faith in better international relations in the League of Nations, the establishment of which was the final point of the Fourteen Points. The French delegation, led by Georges Clemenceau, was under great pressure from French public opinion to take revenge on Germany. Most of the war had been fought on French soil, and the industry and agriculture of north-west France was virtually destroyed. The part of France invaded and occupied by Germany had been lost to France during the war, and it was region which contained a highly-productive agricultural sector, especially in wheat and oats production. Moreover, pre-war statistics (1913) indicate that the area produced 80% of France's steel and 55% of her coal. By 1918 France's GDP was perhaps understandably 24% less than it had been in 1913. The French desire for revenge and compensation was understandable but unlikely to lead to either an equitable peace agreement or improve the prospects for peace in the long-term. Clemenceau initially wanted German territory dismembered, with the Rhineland becoming an independent state, the Saarland annexed to France, and Danzig forming an integral part of Poland. The other Allies would not agree to such harsh measures. Clemenceau's main aim was to gain security for France by preventing another attack on its frontiers. This objective involved keeping Germany weak and making it difficult for her to make a full economic recovery. The means to achieve this objective was the disarming of Germany, restoring Alsace and Lorraine to France, and making Germany pay for the cost of the damage France had suffered during the war. On those terms Clemenceau was successful but the final settlement disturbed many people outside Germany as being too harsh. One of the most notable was John Maynard Keynes, the famous economist whose 1919 book The Economic Consequences of the Peace castigated the treaty and predicted a backlash in Germany. The divisions between the Allies led to a peace treaty which - with hindsight - was too harsh in many respects, and which by following the principle of punishing Germany, led to much resentment and bitterness. Perhaps more seriously, the re-drawing of boundaries effectively created new problems surrounding national minorities in existing states (e.g. Germans in the Danzig Corridor, which you will encounter later). Within Germany, the Treaty was viewed by many on the Right as another act of betrayal which made more people question the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic. By compromising Germany's territorial integrity and by humiliating he with the War Guilt clause and reparations, the Versailles Treaty solidified the right-wing critique of the Weimar Republic, and as such provided the opportunity for extremist groups to increase support after 1919.

Economic effects of the occupation

The occupation of the Ruhr and the passive resistance campaign was a disaster for the German economy. Paying wages to striking workers represented a further drain on scarce national resources, and tax revenue was lost from businesses which closed, with unemployed workers a further liability for the government. Germany had to import coal and pay for it from limited foreign currency reserves within the country, and not the least of the problems which emerged in the wake of the crisis was that a shortage of goods pushed up prices further. Production declined to such an extent that the cost to German industry was much greater than the cost of paying an annual reparation bill. The combined cost amounted to twice the annual reparation payments, and fatally the government opted to print yet more money. It was this decision which acted as the hair-trigger for the hyper-inflation crisis which followed. French occupation and the strike by workers gave the final push to the deterioration of the mark. The fall in its value of was astonishing. At the end of 1918, four German marks were worth one dollar; by 1922, this had increased to 400 marks, and by 1923, 7,000 marks. With shortages of materials in Germany, prices rose steeply. The government was forced to print more money to keep up with these changes, but this merely increased price inflation. Larger-denomination notes were printed which reflected the devaluation of the German mark.

The post-war legacy: the social and economic condition of Germany

The peacetime economy: In the aftermath of military defeat, revolution and an imposed peace settlement, Germany experienced severe economic difficulties culminating in the catastrophic hyperinflation crisis of 1923 when the currency became virtually worthless and the country came close to collapse. Europe in the period between 1918 and 1923 was in a restless, disturbed state, with the chaos of post-war reconstruction, political instability and violence, and the emergence of extremism on the left and right. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Germany. At the end of the war, food and coal supplies were scarce and most Germans faced starvation. By 1918, Germany produced just over half of its productive capacity before the war. In the last two years of the war, the Allies blockaded Germany, and stopped supplies, so the German government was unable to import food. Bitterness was one of the main legacies of the war, as many returning soldiers returned to no home or job. During the winter of 1918-19 many Germans suffered badly, and their plight was made worse by the outbreak of Spanish flu, which began in the summer of 1918 and reached a peak in early 1919. An estimated half a million soldiers and civilians died from the epidemic. In these desperate circumstances, it was only natural that extreme parties, offering radical solutions to the crisis in Germany, by obtaining greater support could challenge the existence of the Weimar Republic. The war effort had involved high levels of military spending in all combatant countries. In Great Britain, the government decided to raise taxes and to facilitate an increase in borrowing to meet the expansive military expenditure. In Germany, the government chose to increase borrowing and print more money, with the result that government debt increased and the value of the currency fell. It was a strategy based on a flawed and risky premise that Germany would win the war and recoup any wartime losses by territorial annexation and financial reparations—the very points she complained about as unfair within the Versailles Treaty. Military defeat meant that this war dividend was denied to the German government and instead Germany suffered from the imposition of heavy reparation payments and the loss of valuable industrial areas. During the war, the Reich government pushed up indirect taxation to unparalleled levels to account for ordinary government expenditure, while the military budget was financed separately by means of war bonds. This was more expensive because, unlike taxes, they were fixed to a promise to repay the loans plus interest after a certain time. In effect, they could only be honoured if Germany won the war. Patriotic Germans carried their gold marks to the banks in 1915 and 1916; they were given a promissory note in return, which by 1918 had already lost much of its value because of wartime inflation. After the war the Weimar government was left bankrupt and had no choice but to renege on the promise to bond holders. Many joint stock companies withstood the inflation that resulted, but small businesses and retailers were badly hit and white-collar workers and the working classes saw their living standards decline.

Why were ex-military men prominent in right-wing groups opposed to the Weimar Republic?

The significant number of military men involved in opposition to the Weimar governments was a consequence of the unpopularity in much of the German army for the Armistice, the abdication of the Kaiser, and the punitive features of the Treaty of Versailles. Many officers, feeling betrayed at the outcome of the war, supported the 'Stab in the Back' theory. They had fought for German Empire and considered they had been undermined by the Weimar governments. Additionally, they considered the Weimar government as too weak to resist the threat of Communism. They therefore formed themselves into paramilitary political groups with a political agenda of restoring Germany to her former glory.

The establishment of the Weimar Republic

The struggle for power Ebert was conscious that his government lacked legitimacy, and he was determined to establish a new Constitution as quickly as possible. After agreeing the Armistice with the Allies on 11 November, Ebert turned his attention to organising elections for a Constituent Assembly which would possess the necessary legitimacy to govern the new Republic. The political complexion of Germany remained characterised by fragmentation and division, if anything deepened by the rigours of military defeat and revolution, and by divisions over acceptance of the Weimar Republic. The political parties can be conveniently divided into the socialist parties and the non-socialist parties. The socialist parties consisted of, firstly, the SPD, formed in 1875, which was a Marxist party committed to revolution but by using constitutional means. The membership of the SPD was approximately one million in 1918. The USPD was a breakaway group from the left of the SPD, inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917; its membership was approximately 300,000 in 1918. The group formerly known as the Spartacist League, changed its name to the German Communist party or KPD, in January 1919. Its membership was only 5,000 in 1918 but its revolutionary activities were far more prominent than its total membership suggested. The main non-socialist parties in the new Republic were the Centre Party, formed in 1870 to protect Catholic interests in the mainly Protestant Reich. It enjoyed strong support in the main Catholic areas of Bavaria and the Rhineland, and was supportive of a democratic constitution. The German Democratic Party (DDP) was a left-leaning liberal party, based on the old Progressive party, with most support coming from intellectuals and the middle class. The DDP also supported a democratic constitution. On the other hand, the German National People's Party (DNVP) rejected the new constitutional arrangements. The DNVP was based on the old Conservative party, whose support came from landowners and a section of small businessmen. The German People's Party (DVP) occupied something of a middle course, as a right-leaning liberal party based on the old National Liberal Party, their support came from the upper-middle class and business interests. The DVP was opposed to some aspects of the new Republic but willing to participate in its governments.

Topic 1 - The Impact of War: Domestic Political Crisis and the Versailles Treaty

The years 1918-19 were tumultuous years for Germany. After the controversial Armistice of November 1918, it came as a shock to most of the population to learn that Germany had been defeated in war. The German Reich was then toppled with the forced abdication of the Kaiser, the installation of the Weimar Republic and the creation of a thoroughly liberal democratic Constitution. That was followed by a punitive (to German eyes) peace treaty in 1919, which roused great opposition in Germany. The political crisis and economic collapse which followed the end of the war led to political violence between Left and Right, with the formation of paramilitary bands and revolutionary groups seeking to seize control of the German state. With the disruption of the political system and the threat of revolution a serious one, the political and military elites made an agreement to cooperate to prevent further disorder. Germany was saved from further political convulsions but by signing the Versailles Treaty; the Weimar politicians accepted what was for most Germans, especially those on the political Right, a dishonourable and shameful treaty which they were determined to overturn. The new Republic was thus unpopular from the beginning, for by accepting the harsh peace terms, it was closely associated with weakness, defeat, and subjugation.

The crisis of October and November 1918

The transition from war to peace By the end of September 1918, it was becoming clear to General Ludendorff and the German High Command that Germany was on the brink of defeat. Although the Allies had not yet entered Germany, its armies were retreating all the way along the Western Front. Ludendorff believed that the American President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points might provide the basis for a tolerable, negotiated peace for Germany. In the growing chaos towards the end of the war, the Kaiser enacted measures which ended his autocratic rule. The appointment of the moderate and respected politician, Prince Max of Baden, as Chancellor in October 1918, was intended to assuage fears of the transition from war to peace. Prince Max established a new government based on the party composition of the Reichstag including the socialist SPD. Crucially, the army was placed under the control of the civil government. These reforms represented a major constitutional transformation, designed to save Germany from humiliation and to prevent the Kaiser from being ousted. It was a 'revolution from above' intended to avoid a 'revolution from below'. As the situation for Germany grew increasingly serious both at home and abroad, Prince Max began the process of peace negotiations with the enemy powers. He had written to President Wilson on 3 October asking for an armistice, that is, a formal end to the fighting but Wilson was suspicious of this 'peace note', thinking it was perhaps a stratagem which would allow Germany to buy time before preparing for a new military offensive. Wilson replied that Germany must evacuate from all occupied territories, end submarine warfare, and enact democratic reforms at home. These demands were too much for Ludendorff to accept, and despite rumours of possible last-ditch military effort, he resigned and fled to Sweden. To ease domestic unrest and impress enemy negotiators with Germany's good intentions, Prince Max had obtained the resignations of the war leaders, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and allowed representatives of the SPD to join the government. It was a shattering blow to the German people to discover that Germany was seeking an armistice, for this as taken as an admission of defeat. Civilian discontent exploded at the Kaiser, the political parties, and those in positons of authority even in the army. On 28 October, when the German Navy High Command had ordered ships to attack British ships in the English Channel, the crews of two cruisers had refused to do so. This mutiny was the first indication of a broader revolutionary movement emerging in Germany. Before peace terms could be agreed, civil order had disintegrated. A rebellion of sailors at the Kiel naval base, the main naval base in Germany, on 3 November 1918 signalled the start of civil war against the imperial regime. The revolt spread to other towns and cities, and other risings followed, with the socialist Kurt Eisner and his supporters proclaiming a breakaway Bavarian Republic on 8 November which resulted in the establishment of Soviets (councils of workers, peasants and soldiers) and the creation of the 'Bavarian Democratic and Socialist Republic'. More widely, Soviet-style workers' councils were formed all over Germany as central authority collapsed.

By reference to the German political system between 1919 and 1933, what were the weaknesses of the Weimar Constitution?

The weaknesses of the Weimar Constitution were many and various. Owing to Proportional Representation there were numerous political parties, some democratic, some anti-democratic, within the Reichstag. By 1928, there were 28 different political parties. Shifting alliances and loyalties were common, as governments needed to maintain a majority, but also led to frequent dissolutions and elections, leading to a numerous governments and Chancellors between 1919 and 1933. Article 48 of the Constitution also provided a temptation for Presidents to rule in a dictatorial manner and could be used for anti-democratic purposes.

Who were the winners and losers in German society from the hyperinflation crisis?

The winners and losers from hyperinflation consisted of disparate groups and there was great variation across Germany in the incidence and severity of hyperinflation, and much depended on economic status and function within German society. The winners were those engaged in the 'black market' who sold goods at vastly inflated prices, those who had taken out loans, mortgages, and debts, those on long-term, fixed rents, holders of foreign exchange, and those in the countryside who could cope better as they had better access to regular sources of food. Debtors who had taken out loans could pay the loan back at a fraction of the cost, and larger businesses could cushion losses and obtain smaller businesses at lower prices. The losers were those on fixed incomes, savers, creditors, those on welfare, lenders of wartime loans, unskilled workers under threat of unemployment, and small businessmen and artisans who together were termed the Mittelstand, the middling classes.

Challenges to Weimar, 1919-23: the Kapp putsch

There were many competing far right-wing groups, and they were often divided as to objectives. There were even separatist groups in Bavaria who sought independence from the Weimar Republic. In the main though there was a constant atmosphere of hostility to the Weimar Republic and a feeling of bitterness towards the men who had signed the armistice and the dishonourable, shameful peace treaty at Versailles. Right-wing ideas were strong among the Freikorps and the army, and within German society these views found resonance among traditional bastions of authority and status-conscious conservative occupations, most notably among landowners, the judiciary, and the civil service. A right-wing revolt an attempted seizure of power occurred on 13 March 1920, when Wolfgang Kapp, a Prussian landowner, aimed to overthrow the Weimar Republic and restore the monarchy. Kapp led an army of between 6,000 and 12,000 men including large numbers of Freikorps under General Luttwitz; he seized Berlin and raised the pre-1914 German imperial flag. He then issued a proclamation: "The Reich and nation are in grave danger. With terrible speed we are approaching the complete collapse of the state and of law and order. Prices are rising unchecked. Hardship is growing. The government, lacking in authority and in league with corruption, is incapable of overcoming the danger". Kapp saw the weakness of the government as a great danger as it would be unable to resist Bolshevism—a view shared by most of the political Right. Ebert's government was forced to withdraw to Dresden, and when Ebert and his Chancellor Gustav Bauer called on the regular army to crush the rising, von Seekt famously told Ebert that "Troops do not fire on troops; when Reichswehr fires on Reichswehr, all comradeship with the officer corps has vanished". Nevertheless, the rising failed to gather support across Germany, and when Ebert called on workers to carry out a strike in essential services, Berlin was brought to a standstill and within four days the putsch collapsed. Kapp and Luttwitz were forced to flee, and Ebert's government returned but not quite with the air of triumph that might have been expected. The attempted putsch failed but it had shown that the army could not be trusted to defend the Republic, civil servants could be disloyal, and workers could show their power. Without the support of the army, the Weimar government was weak. Kapp was supported by some important figures, including Ludendorff, and the by now notorious Freikorps, which the Weimar government had been unsuccessfully attempting to disband. The officer corps did not support Kapp but despite the failure of the putsch it was a warning to the Weimar government that their political authority was fragile, a position reinforced by the leniency shown towards those brought to trial in the aftermath of the putsch, and contrasting with the harsh punishment meted out to left-wing agitators.

The Nazi Party and militarism

There were no class limits to membership, and the National Socialist party attracted the aggrieved and excluded of German society. Ambition, resentment, envy, lust for power and wealth, were motive forces. The new party was not organized in the same way as traditional political parties. The most obvious sign of this was the Brownshirts, the Nazi paramilitary organization, fitted out in brown uniforms reminiscent of Mussolini's Blackshirts in Italy. The formal name of the Brownshirts was the Sturmabteilung (SA), and they were recruited from the rougher elements in German society. Founded by Hitler in Munich in 1921, they used methods of violence and intimidation and persecuted Jews, and played an important role in Hitler's rise to power. Hitler's energy in promoting the Workers' Party attracted interest, and he himself looked for support from right-wing elements in Bavaria. Captain Ernst Röhm of the Army District Command in Munich exercised considerable influence in the world of the Freikorps, Defence Leagues, and right-wing political conspiracies. Röhm had joined the German Workers' Party before Hitler, and sought to harness the working class to nationalist and militarist right-wing groups. Rohm inserted ex-Freikorps and ex-servicemen into the German Workers' Party, forming strong-arm squads which proved to be the nucleus of the SA. In 1925, Hitler formed another military section of the party. The Schutzstaffel (protective echelon) was formed as Hitler's personal bodyguard and was trained to be absolute loyal and obedient, whilst displaying ruthlessness towards opponents. It became notoriously known as the SS, and from 1929, was headed by Heinrich Himmler. Eventually, it would become a rival intra-party force to the more conventionally para-military SA. Hitler placed great emphasis on symbolism and display to impress the population. The uniformed ranks of the SA and SS were intended to display the order and patriotism of the movement. No less important were the symbols of the movement. The Nazis adopted the swastika as their symbol, and the Nazi flag, with a black swastika in a white circle against a red background, was striking. The colours were the same as those on the flag of the German Empire under the Kaiser. This was no coincidence, for Hitler saw the Nazis as building a new Reich: 'In red we see the social idea of the movement, in white the nationalist idea, in the swastika the mission of the struggle for the victory of the Aryan man'. For Hitler, the social and racial aspects of German nationalism were closely entwined.

The effects of hyperinflation

Those living on fixed incomes or from savings suffered disproportionately, for the value of their income became almost worthless. Even workers, who were in the position where wages were negotiated, could never keep up with the price rises. Numerous stories relate the, often ridiculous, situations arising from a currency out of control, such as the man who went to a café for a cup of coffee costing 5,000 marks. By the time he paid the bill, the price had risen to 8,000 marks. Some people gained, such as those who had debts or had taken out loans, for they only had to pay back a fraction of the original cost. Many richer businesses were capable of cushioning losses, and could take over smaller businesses which had gone bankrupt. In the long term, it was the middle classes with businesses and savings who suffered the most, and the dramatic fall in the middle-class standard of living, promoted political radicalism and prepared the ground for National Socialist agitation. Parties supporting the Weimar government were increasingly blamed for the economic situation and this made political instability even worse, fuelling general discontent and causing political sympathies to polarise. That the Weimar Republic survived its economic and political problems before 1924 was in large part because of its leadership, with the new Chancellor Gustav Stresemann prominent in providing the population with the necessary reassurance that the crisis could be overcome, and partly from a more sympathetic attitude from other countries over time.

Risings on the Left and Right

Timeline of left and right risings and revolts, 1919-1923 - January 1919: Spartacist rising in Berlin - March 1919: Second Spartacist rising in Berlin - April 1919: Strikes in Halle and the Ruhr - October 1919: Assassination of Huge Haase - March 1920: Kapp putsch - April 1920: Workers revolts in Saxony and Thuringia - March 1921: Communist-led revolt in Saxony, spreads to Hamburg and the Ruhr - August 1921: Assassination of Matthias Erzberger - June 1922: Assassination of Walther Rathenau - October 1923: Communist-led revolt in Saxony - November 1923: Beer Hall putsch in Munich

Why did left and right wing political groups oppose the Weimar Republic?

Weimar governments tried to steer a middle cause, of moderate policies, which avoided the extremes of Right and Left. The opposition of right-wing groups to the Weimar Republic was based on the association of the Republic with the humiliating surrender at the Armistice and the Treaty of Versailles. The Left, encouraged by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, viewed the Weimar Republic as betraying the workers, and upholding elements of the old regime in Germany.