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Adultery

"Voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's spouse." In Reynolds v. Reynolds, the court of appeals upheld a chancellor's grant of a divorce on the ground of adultery where testimony established that the defendant appeared infatuated with a woman and that he spent all night at her house several times.

Fault grounds for divorce

(1) Natural impotency, (2) adultery, (3) being sentenced to a penitentiary and not being pardoned before being sent there, (4) willful, continued, obstinate desertion for the space of one year; (5) habitual drunkenness; (6) Habitual and excessive use of opium, morphine, or like drug; (7) habitual, cruel, and inhuman treatment; (8) mental illness or intellectual disability on the date of the marriage, if the complainant was without knowledge of the illness or disability; (9) marriage to some other person at the time of the purported marriage; (10) pregnancy of the wife by another at the time of the marriage, without the husband's knowledge; (11) relation within the prohibited degrees of kindred; and (12) incurable mental illness.

Defenses to fault-based divorce

(1) Recrimination (if both spouses are guilty of bad faith, neither is entitled to a divorce) (2) Condonation (forgiveness of the marital fault by the wronged spouse, with the understanding that the conduct is not to recur) (3) Connivance (one spouse's consent to the wrongful conduct of the other) (4) Collusion (the parties agree to frustrate the divorce procedure in some way, usually by creating grounds or by agreeing not to defend a case) (5) Provocation (the complainant provoked the conduct of the wrongdoing spouse through conduct of such a grave and serious nature as to justify the defendant's actions.

Bozman v. Bozman

32-year marriage ended in divorce. Husband claims wife committed adultery. Before the divorce was finalized, the husband filed a complaint against his wife for malicious prosecution alleging the wife had falsely filed a number of criminal charges against William. Wife pursued stalking, harassment charges. The issue was whether married persons should be able to sue one another since traditionally they are treated as one person. A spouse can sue their spouse because they are two separate people. The Interspousal Tort Immunity rule is abolished in tort cases involving personal injury to a spouse resulting from negligence of the other spouse.

Habitual, cruel, and inhuman treatment

Conduct which endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of danger thereto, thereby rendering the continuance of the marital relation unsafe for the unoffending spouse, or such unnatural and infamous conduct as would make the marital relation revolting to the unoffending spouse and render it impossible to him or her, as the case may be, to discharge the duties thereof. Cruelty required by statute must be so gross, unfeeling and brutal as to render further cohabitation impossible.

Cladd v. State

Husband and wife are separated for approximately six months. He broke into her apartment with a crowbar, strikes her and attempts to throw her off the second-floor stair railing. The next morning, he attempted to break in again, but left when the police arrived. The issue was whether a husband who is physically separated, but not legally separated can be guilty of burglary when he enters premises, possessed only by the wife, without the wife's consent and the intent to commit and offense therein. The apartment was the separate property of the wife and she could bar him from entering even though they were married at the time. A spouse could establish a separate place from the other spouse.

Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections

Mary Emily Stuart married Austell, and both parties agreed after the marriage that she would continue to use her birth name. She registered to vote using her birth name, but the registrar notified her by mail that she would have to change to her husband's surname or her registration would be forfeited. She then sued. Plaintiff was not utilizing her maiden name for fraudulent purposes. Court held that if a married woman may lawfully adopt an assumed name without legal proceedings, then we may think Maryland manifestly permits a married woman to retain her birth given name by the same procedure of consistent non fraudulent use following her marriage.

Palermo v. Palermo

Mr. Palermo (the husband) (defendant) and Mrs. Palermo (the wife) (plaintiff) were married. The wife filed a petition for divorce under a New York state law that permitted a court to grant no-fault divorce upon a sworn statement that the marriage had irretrievably broken down for a period of at least six months. The husband argued that he was entitled to a trial to determine whether the marriage was irretrievably broken down. The court recognized that the legislature moved to make it easier for one of the parties to end the marriage upon a sworn declaration that the marriage has irretrievably broken for more than six months.

Irreconcilable differences

No-fault divorce falls within the gambit of irretrievable breakdown. There are several grounds for an irreconcilable difference: divorce, including incompatibility, separation for a specific time period, etc. Mississippi is the last state that requires an agreement between the parties to get a divorce.

Proxy marriage

Occurs when one or both of the parties cannot be present for the wedding and an agent acts on their behalf

Henne v. Wright

One of the plaintiffs wished to give her daughter the surname of the child's biological father, even though the mother and father were not married at the time of birth. The mother was married to another man, who made no claim to the child and did not object to the name suggestion. The other plaintiff wished to give her child the surname of her other two children, which was not connected to them in any way. The Nebraska Department of Health did not allow the mothers to name the children as they wished. The right to give a child a surname with which the child has no legally established parental connection is not fundamental. The state only needed a rational reason for law, which was met: (1) promotes welfare and support of children, (2) helps make certain that the names of citizens are not used for improper purposes, (3) promotes inexpensive and efficient record keeping

Wolfe v. U.S.

Spousal privilege is "regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice"

Vigil v. Haber

The defendant sued his ex-fiancée for the return of the engagement ring. The court held that an engagement ring is a conditional gift dependent upon the parties' marriage and should be returned if marriage doesn't occur. The court held it would be impossible and contrary to public policy to attempt to determine fault in these emotionally charged situations. This is the minority rule. The majority approach is to determine fault.

Desertion

The ground of desertion is proven by evidence that one spouse intentionally and willfully abandoned the other for the period of one year (one-year period computed from first date of refusal to reconcile). If the deserting spouse makes a good faith offer of reconciliation, the abandoned spouse's unjustified refusal to reconcile, if cont. for a year, may constitute desertion. Criswell v. Criswell. Constructive desertion was found in Griffin v. Griffin where a husband refused to work, leaving his family destitute, without food, and dependent on neighbors.

Warren v. State

The issue was whether a man can claim marital rape exception for raping and sodomizing wife? No, the husband can be prosecuted of rape. There are some states that still recognize the marital rape exception.

Williams v. Williams

The parties entered a ceremonial marriage and cohabitation with their children for 27 years. But the wife, unknown to her, was still married to her first husband. The new husband filed for annulment. The putative spouse doctrine has two elements: (1) a proper marriage ceremony was performed, and (2) one or both of the parties had a good-faith belief that there was no impediment to the marriage and the marriage was valid and proper. Putative spouses are entitled to equitable distribution of property not generally no spousal support unless the state statute provides so or there is a finding of bad faith on the opposing party

Singh v. Singh

The parties realized after marrying that they were half-uncle and half-niece, but later sought to set aside the judgment of annulment arguing that the law did not apply to them since it did not apply to marriages of half-blood. The court, using rational basis, held that the marriage was void. If the parties had stayed together, this union could have been collaterally attacked at any time. Marriage invalid in Connecticut due to parties being related. Went against strong state public policy.

Edmunds v. Edwards

The parties were married and husband was mildly retarded but functional. After the marriage, the guardian of his estate brought an action to annul the marriage. A marriage contract will not be declared void for mental incapacity to enter it unless there existed at the time of marriage such a want of understanding as to render the party incapable of assenting thereto. A marriage is presumed valid, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking annulment. Factual elements needed for form a valid marriage: (1) there was an understanding that marriage was for life, (2) there are financial obligations, and (3) there is a sexual component to marriage.

Crosson v. Crosson

The parties were married and later divorced. Afterward, the husband asked the wife to come home and she agreed. The parties began cohabitating the next day. Unknown to the wife, the husband later married another woman. When she found out, she filed for divorce. Elements of a common law marriage: (1) Capacity. (No impediment to marriage); (2) Present, mutual agreement to permanently enter the marriage relationship to the exclusion of all other relationships; and (3) Public recognition the the relationship is a marriage and (4) public assumption of marital duties and cohabitation.

In re Dube

The parties were married, bought a home, and had a son. The husband engaged in one incident of infidelity, and when the wife found out, she threatened to kill the husband's family and destroy the marital home. The husband filed for divorce, claiming irreconcilable differences. He later amended the petition and added an alternative ground that the wife had so treated him as seriously to injure health or endanger reason. At the divorce hearing, the husband asked the court to consider the wife's conviction. The trial court granted the fault-based divorce on the grounds of the conviction and ordered an unequal division of marital property, custody to the father, and no alimony to the mother. Supreme Court: cannot be fault-based divorce because they were both guilty. The party asking for fault-based divorce must be innocent and the husband here had committed adultery. Condonation was not a defense because the record does not show the wife forgave husband, clearly.

Trammel v. U.S.

The petitioner was indicted for importing heroin into the United States. The government's case rested principally on the testimony of the petitioner's wife, who testified as to his involvement in the scheme. The issue was whether an accused could invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony so as to exclude the voluntary testimony of his wife. The Hawkins v. U.S. rule states that testimony of one spouse against another is excluded unless both spouses consent. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the rule from Hawkins was modified so that the witness-spouse may testify against her defendant-spouse if she chooses to do so. A witness may not be compelled to testify. Information disclosed privately between a husband and wife is still privileged under a separate rule protecting confidential marital communication. Could testify as to any acts witnessed during the marriage and to any communication made in the presence of the third person.

Brady v. Brady

The plaintiff filed for divorce, alleging cruel and inhuman treatment and constructive abandonment (refusal to have sex with the spouse). The trial court rejected most of the plaintiff's claims but still granted divorce. Courts have required a high degree of proof of cruel and inhuman treatment where there is a marriage of long duration; an isolated act of mistreatment will rarely suffice. Court uses the totality of the circumstances here.

Carabetta v. Carabetta

The plaintiff filed for divorce, but the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the parties had never been married. The parties had a wedding ceremony, performed by a priest in a church. But they had never secured a marriage license as required by law. The court held that such a marriage is dissoluble (voidable) rather than void. There are (1) substantive requirements and (2) formalities for marriage. Void marriage is not a marriage and never was (failing substantive requirement). If marriage fails on formality, it is voidable rather than void. The legislature determines this distinction

McGuire v. McGuire

The plaintiff married and lived with her husband for 30 years. He was stingy with money but there was no evidence to suggest that the wife was mistreated or that she was otherwise uncared for. She sued for maintenance. The court held that a spouse may not sue the other for support as long as the house is maintained, and the parties are living as husband and wife. Public policy requires that the standards of a family are a matter of concern for the household and not for the courts to determine. Wife had a healthy bank account and could have used the rent money from her ex-husband's land. The parties were not separated or living apart at any time.

Moe v. Dinkins

The plaintiffs were minors who bore a child and cohabitated, but state law forbade their marriage without parental consent. They challenged law on due process grounds. The court applied the rational basis test and held that the law is constitutional. Minimum age requirements vary from state to state, but most have an age at which a potential spouse is considered competent to marry and an age at which parental consent is required. A child's constitutional rights are different from an adults. The rationale for this is: (1) vulnerability of children (state has the responsibility to protect them); (2) inability to make critical decisions in an informed and matured way (state has the responsibility to regulate them); (3) the role of parent in raising the child (under the 14th Amendment state cannot take away those rights)

Annulment

To declare the invalidity of a union from its inception. No marriage ever existed.

State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh

Wife filed petition for a temporary restraining order against Husband; on numerous occasions he beat her causing serious physical injuries and she was hospitalized. Denise filed a petition for an ex parte order of protection under Missouri's Adult Abuse Act (the Act). Under the Act, an adult who was abused by a former adult member of the household could petition the court for relief, namely by seeking either an ex parte order or a protective order that could be issued after notice and a hearing. The court holds that the Act is constitutional and warranted under strict scrutiny test (child custody is a fundamental right). The court uses the Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test: The interests and procedures considered, these ex parte order provisions comply with due process requirements because they are: (1) a reasonable means to achieve the state's legitimate goal of preventing domestic violence, and (2) afford adequate procedural safeguards, prior to and after any deprivation occurs.