ALL CON LAW CASES

Roe v. Wade (1973) RULE OF LAW: The constitutional right to privacy protects a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. FACTS: Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code restricts legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Roe (plaintiff), a pregnant single woman, brought suit against Wade (defendant), a Texas state official, on the grounds that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on her right to obtain an abortion. The federal district court considering the case issued declaratory, though not injunctive, relief stating that the Texas statute was void for its overbreadth, vagueness, and infringement on Roe's Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Roe appealed the denial of injunctive relief to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does the constitutional right to privacy protect a woman's right to choose to have an abortion?

(Blackmun, J.) ⇨ Yes. The constitutional right to privacy protects a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. However, abortions may be regulated by a state after the first trimester of pregnancy and may be completely prohibited after the point of "viability" of a fetus unless necessary to preserve the health of the mother. Historically, women have had a greater right to terminate their pregnancies than they currently enjoy. There are three reasons for the gradual increase in strictness in anti-abortion laws. Firstly, decreasing the availability of abortion is seen as a way to decrease illicit sexual activity. Secondly, concerns over the safety of abortion procedures prompted a decrease in its prevalence to protect the health of women. Finally, states increasingly note their own interest or duty in protecting prenatal life. The Court must analyze the right of women to obtain abortions against the backdrop of these countervailing state interests. The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to personal privacy, but such a right is implied from various aspects of the Bill of Rights. The "zone of privacy" implied in the Constitution is broad enough to encompass a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. However, this holding is qualified by noting that the right is not unlimited and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. Regulation limiting a "fundamental right" of privacy must be justified by a compelling state interest, and legislative enactments must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. Applying this test to the abortion issue, a woman's privacy interest outweighs any countervailing state interests during the first part of her pregnancy when abortion is deemed relatively safe and when the fetus is very early in its development. However, at some point in the pregnancy, the potential dangers to the mother of a later abortion and the increased development of the fetus as a potential person outweigh the right of the mother to privacy. Thus, state interests grow in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a certain point during pregnancy, became compelling enough to override her general right to privacy. With respect to the state's interest in protecting the health of the mother, the interest becomes compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester (first three months of pregnancy), when performance of an abortion becomes increasingly risky. A state's interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling at viability, or whenever the fetus is capable of a meaningful life outside the mother's womb. A state can prohibit abortion after viability, except when it is necessary to protect the life of the mother. Measured against these standards, Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code overly restricts abortions in allowing them only when necessary to save the life of the mother. The statute is unconstitutional, and the district court's decision is reversed. Concurrence (Burger, C.J.) ⇨ The Texas abortion statute impermissibly restricts abortions for the purpose of preserving the health of pregnant women. Concurrence (Stewart, J.) ⇨ The Griswold majority attempted to rely on other bases for its judgment than the "liberty" interests protected by substantive due process. In the same way, the liberty interest at stake in the present case—the right of a woman to choose an abortion—is best supported by substantive due process provisions, rather than a vague right to privacy such as that outlined in Griswold. Concurrence (Douglas, J.) ⇨ The case is governed by the holding in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), recognizing a constitutional right to privacy. The right to an abortion is included in the basic rights governing marriage and family decisions protected by Griswold and is derived from various amendments in the Bill of Rights. The right of privacy is ultimately subject to a balancing test including compelling state interests. The majority is correct that the right exists for women and is not outweighed by such interests in the present case. Dissent (White, J.) ⇨ Nothing in the language or history of the Constitution supports the majority's judgment. The majority simply creates a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers, investing it with sufficient constitutional authority to override many existing state anti-abortion statutes. The majority completely overrides the political process and denies voters across the nation the ability to weigh in with their beliefs on this important issue. Dissent (Rehnquist, J.) ⇨ The constitutional right of privacy is not implicated in the present case. The Texas statute bars a licensed physician from performing a medical procedure on a woman. Such a transaction is not "private" in the traditional sense of the word. As such, the Texas regulation of abortion should be treated similar to other economic and social regulations and upheld if it has a rational relation to a valid state objective. Even under this test, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would limit any state statute that seeks to prohibit all abortions, even when the life of the mother is in jeopardy. Such an absolute statute likely would not be found rationally related to a legitimate state objective, as states have a strong interest in preserving the health of women. In the same vein, however, the majority's sweeping invalidation of any restrictions on abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy ignores any state interest in the potential life of the fetus and is impossible to justify under a rational basis standard. In addition, the entire trimester system itself, as defined by the majority, is reflective more of a legislative than a judicial judgment. The majority creates a right that does not exist in the Fourteenth Amendment. All regulation powers over abortion should be left entirely to state legislatures.

Stanley v. Illinois (1972) RULE OF LAW: All parents are entitled to a hearing to determine their fitness before the state deprives them of custody of their children. FACTS: Peter Stanley (defendant) and Joan Stanley never married but lived together on and off and had three children over an 18-year period. When Joan Stanley died, the state of Illinois (plaintiff) instituted a dependency proceeding. Under Illinois law, an unmarried father was presumed to be an unfit parent. Upon the state's showing of the father's unwed status, the children were taken from his custody and declared wards of the state. An unwed father was not entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent. In contrast, all married parents, divorced parents, and unwed mothers were entitled to a hearing before the state removed their children from custody. As a result of the dependency proceeding, Stanley's children were taken from his custody and declared wards of the state. He appealed, contending that the process violated his rights to equal protection and due process. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May the state deprive an unmarried father of custody of his children solely on the basis of his children's illegitimacy?

(White, J.) ⇨ No. When it comes to removing children from the custody of their parents, Illinois law treats unmarried fathers differently from all married parents, divorced parents, and unwed mothers. Whereas the state provides the latter groups with a right to be heard before determining their fitness to parent, the state presumes that unmarried fathers are unfit. That distinction violates both due process and equal protection. Whether due process requires a hearing or not depends on a weighing of the private and government interests at stake. A father's interest in retaining custody of his children, regardless of his marital status, is great. While Illinois's interest in protecting children from unfit parents is legitimate, its means of achieving that interest with respect to unmarried fathers is not. If the state were truly devoted to ensuring that children have fit parents, it would not automatically presume the unfitness of an unwed father. There is no evidence that all unwed fathers are unfit to parent. Some are certainly capable, as is Stanley in the case at bar. Nor does Illinois's interest in efficiency and expediency outweigh the interests of a parent. Presumptions always make procedures more convenient, but convenience does not outweigh a father's interest in his children. In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court holds that Illinois's dependency proceedings, which presume that unwed fathers are unfit to have custody of their children, violate the due process rights of such fathers. As extended to the entire class of unwed fathers, the procedure also violates equal protection. Like other categories of parents, unmarried fathers are entitled to a hearing on their fitness to parent prior to losing custody of their children.

Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) RULE OF LAW: Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not outlaw distribution of contraception to unmarried persons. FACTS: Under a Massachusetts statute, it is a crime to give away "any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of conception," with the exception of a registered physician providing such items to married couples for the purpose of preventing pregnancy. William Baird (defendant) was convicted of violating the statute after he exhibited contraceptive articles in the course of delivering a lecture on contraception to a group of students at Boston University, and after he gave a young woman a package of Emko vaginal foam at the close of his address. Baird challenged his convictions in Massachusetts state court against Eisenstadt (plaintiff), a Massachusetts sheriff responsible for enforcing the statute. The trial court partially overturned Baird's conviction. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. Eisenstadt appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May a state statute permit the giving of contraceptives to married persons and not to unmarried persons without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Brennan, J.) ⇨ No. The practical effect of the Massachusetts statute is that only married persons seeking contraception from a registered physician for the purpose of preventing pregnancy can actually obtain contraception. Single people cannot obtain contraception at all, and married people cannot obtain it for the purpose of preventing the spread of disease. The argument that the primary purpose of the law is the prevention of premarital sex and the spread of disease is rejected. It is unlikely that the Massachusetts legislature actually intended to withhold contraception from unmarried fornicators and punish them with unwanted pregnancy and possible disease. Additionally, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1966), establishes a right of privacy in marriage that permits married couples to use contraception. Hence, Massachusetts cannot ban all contraception in general. Moreover, Massachusetts cannot grant married and unmarried persons unequal access to contraception. The consequences resulting from a denial of contraception to unmarried persons creates a suspect class that violates the Equal Protection Clause. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Concurrence (Douglas, J.) ⇨ This case can be decided solely on First Amendment grounds relating to freedom of speech. Massachusetts may not limit Baird's ability to lecture on Planned Parenthood issues or contraception. Baird distributed contraception in order to aid his communication. If Baird had not distributed contraception, there would be no question as to whether his speech is protected by the First Amendment. Dissent (Burger, C.J.) ⇨ There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment or any other part of the Constitution which suggests that medicinal forms of contraceptives are required to be made available in the open market. The present case is distinguishable from Griswold because the Court in that case was tasked with determining the constitutionality of a statute that flatly prohibits the use of contraception. Here, the Court is faced with a statute that merely regulates the use of contraception among different groups of people.

Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) RULE OF LAW: A law with the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and is thus unconstitutional. FACTS: The State of Texas passed two laws governing abortions. The first required that a doctor performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital no more than 30 miles from where the abortion was being performed (the admitting-privileges requirement). This provision was adopted to ensure that women had easy access to a hospital in the event that complications from the abortion arose. The second provision required that the standards for each abortion facility meet the minimum standards for ambulatory surgical centers (the surgical-center requirement). Whole Woman's Health (plaintiff) sued John Hellerstedt (defendant), commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services, claiming that the laws were unconstitutional. The district court determined that the laws would reduce the number of abortion facilities in Texas from 40 to seven or eight. The district court found that this reduction in facilities would make it difficult to serve all the women who wanted abortions in Texas, particularly in rural areas. In addition, the district court found that abortion was an adequately safe practice in Texas prior to the adoption of the laws. Finally, the district court found that abortions performed at ambulatory surgical centers were not appreciably safer than abortions performed at other types of abortion facilities. For these and other reasons, the district court found the laws to be unconstitutional. The court of appeals reversed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Is a law with the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion unconstitutional because it imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion?

(Breyer, J.) ⇨ Yes. A law with the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and is unconstitutional. Under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), states can impose limited restrictions on abortions that ensure the safety of the patient, but these restrictions cannot unduly burden the patient's right to have an abortion. In this case, the district court did not err by finding that the two Texas abortion laws are unconstitutional. Each law is an unnecessary safety regulation with the purpose of creating a substantial obstacle to seeking an abortion. The admitting-privileges requirement does not provide any real health benefit to women. Even without the requirement, abortion is already a safe procedure in Texas. The law does, however, place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, because the law will result in the closure of the majority of abortion facilities in Texas. The surgical-center requirement similarly makes it more difficult to obtain an abortion without any evidence that the law is necessary to the health of women. In sum, the laws impose an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion. Both requirements are thus unconstitutional. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence (Ginsburg, J.) ⇨ Complications from abortions are rare and even when they do occur, they often are not dangerous. In fact, abortions are safer than childbirth, and yet there are no admitting-privileges requirements or surgical-center requirements for childbirth in Texas. The challenged laws will not actually protect the health of women. Instead, the law will simply decrease access to abortion services. Dissent (Alito, J.) ⇨ The Court should not have heard this case, according to the doctrine of res judicata. Dissent (Thomas, J.) ⇨ While the entirety of this Court's abortion jurisprudence is troubling, the Court's opinion today rewrites the undue-burden test in Casey. The Court's adoption of exceptions and balancing tests is "a regrettable concession of defeat—an acknowledgement that we have passed the point where 'law,' properly speaking, has any further application."

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) RULE OF LAW: An implied "right of privacy" exists within the Bill of Rights that prohibits a state from preventing married couples from using contraception. FACTS: Griswold (defendant) was Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Buxton was a licensed physician and professor at Yale Medical School who served as Director for the League at its Center in New Haven. The Center was open and operated from November 1 to November 10, 1961, when Griswold and Buxton were arrested for giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons for preventing conception. Buxton and Griswold were arrested and convicted as "accessories" pursuant to Connecticut statutes that prevented using contraception or assisting someone else in using contraception. Griswold and Buxton challenged the convictions and brought suit against Connecticut, (plaintiff), alleging that the statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed their convictions, and the Supreme Court of Errors affirmed. Griswold and Buxton appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does the Bill of Rights contain an implied right of privacy that permits the use of contraceptives by married persons?

(Douglas, J.) ⇨ Yes. A "right of privacy" protecting the intimate relations of married couples is implied in the Bill of Rights. For example, the First Amendment protects the right to association. The Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers in a person's house without their consent. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination. The Ninth Amendment provides that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The protected activities in each of these Amendments are "penumbras" that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, but instead represent various "zones of privacy" into which the government cannot intrude. The marital relationship is located within a "zone of privacy" impliedly created by these various fundamental constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights. The Connecticut law seeks to prohibit the use of contraceptives in the marital relationship and in doing so violates this area of protected freedoms. The right of privacy in marriage is a concept older than the Bill of Rights that should necessarily be kept sacred and free from intrusion by the state. The Connecticut law is unconstitutional and Griswold's conviction is reversed. Concurrence (Harlan, J.) ⇨ Rather than relying on an implied right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, the right to use contraception in marriage is supported by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In looking beyond established law such as the Due Process Clause and inferring a new right of privacy from the Constitution, the majority is engaging in inappropriate judicial activism. Concurrence (White, J.) ⇨ The Connecticut law as applied to married couples deprives them of liberty without due process of law, as used in the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the ban on the use of contraceptives by married couples does not in any way reinforce the state's ban on illicit sexual relationships. Connecticut does not disagree with the use of contraceptives as a whole, but rather with their use in adultery and fornication. However, the prevention of these relationships is the stated purpose of the Connecticut statute, making the statute sweepingly broad and over-inclusive as to be rendered unconstitutional. Concurrence (Goldberg, J.) ⇨ Connecticut's birth control law unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right to marital privacy. Even though the right of marital privacy is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it is supported by numerous decisions of the Court, as well as specifically by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment provides that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Relying on Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137 (1803) every clause in the Constitution is meant to be given effect. If the Court denies the existence of a marital right of privacy simply because it is not enumerated in the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights, it is essentially denying all meaning in the Ninth Amendment. Additionally, the right of privacy in marriage is rooted in the "traditions and collective conscience" of people and is therefore a fundamental right. Connecticut offers a legitimate purpose as justification for its statute (i.e. preventing adulterous relationships), but fails to consider less-intrusive means for accomplishing this purpose. Dissent (Black, J.) ⇨ The Connecticut law is unwise and based on unsound policy. There is no basis in the Constitution for the "right of privacy" concept as defined by the majority. The closest provision to a right of privacy is the protection against unreasonable searches and seizure in the Fourth Amendment. However, the Fourth Amendment does not establish a general right of privacy. Additionally, the Ninth Amendment and Due Process Clause should not be used by the Court as authority to strike down all state legislation that the Court believes violates "fundamental principles of liberty and justice," or is contrary to the "traditions and collective conscience" of the American people. Dissent (Stewart, J.) ⇨ The Connecticut law is silly, unenforceable, and unwise. However, it is not unconstitutional. It is not the duty of the Court to strike down legislation with which it simply disagrees. If the people of Connecticut disagree with a state law, their best recourse is to use their actual Ninth and Tenth Amendment rights and convince their elected officials to change the law.

Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) RULE OF LAW: A state law requiring forced sterilization of criminals convicted of crimes of moral turpitude unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental rights of marriage and procreation and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. FACTS: An Oklahoma statute, the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, allows the forced sterilization of any "habitual criminal" within the state. The statute defines a "habitual criminal" as a person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude" either in Oklahoma court or in a court of any other state, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and sentenced to prison within Oklahoma. Skinner (defendant) was convicted in 1926 of stealing chickens and sentenced to prison in Oklahoma. In 1929, Skinner was convicted of robbery with firearms and sentenced to prison. In 1934, he was convicted again of robbery with firearms and again incarcerated in Oklahoma. He was confined there in 1935 when the Sterilization Act was passed, and in 1936, the Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, (plaintiff) instituted proceedings against him. Skinner challenged the act as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. At his jury trial in Oklahoma state court, the court instructed the jury to consider only whether a vasectomy would be detrimental to Skinner's health. The jury answered in the negative. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed a judgment directing that a vasectomy be performed on Skinner. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does a statute that allows for the forced sterilization of persons deemed to be "habitual criminals" violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Douglas, J.)⇨ Yes. The state legislation deals with some of the most basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation, both rights impacted by forced sterilization, are fundamental to the very survival of the human race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, can have far-reaching and potentially devastating effects not only on Skinner as an individual, but on the future of the human race if exercised imprudently. The Oklahoma law infringes upon these fundamental rights, so it is best examined with strict scrutiny. The sterilization statute only applies to criminals convicted three times of crimes of moral turpitude. It does not apply to criminals convicted three times of other crimes, such as embezzlement. Oklahoma offers no compelling justification for treating certain classes of criminals differently. Its forced sterilization statute is arbitrary and amounts to invidious discrimination against Skinner. Criminals convicted of crimes of moral turpitude in the state are singled out as a suspect class for no legitimate state purpose. The sterilization law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed. Concurrence (Stone, C.J.)⇨ The result should not have been supported by the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the interference of the State of Oklahoma through forced sterilization in such a personal liberty interest should have been invalidated based on the Due Process Clause.

Buck v. Bell (1927) RULE OF LAW: The right to reproduce is not a fundamental liberty. FACTS: A Virginia law provided that a person with a mental illness could be sterilized for the benefit of the person and society. Sterilization decisions were made by the mental hospital in which the person resided. Carrie Buck (plaintiff) had a mental illness and was a patient at a mental hospital. After several months of observing Buck, the mental hospital and state superintendent (defendant) ordered her to be sterilized. Buck brought suit, claiming the law violated her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Buck also argued the law violated her equal protection rights in that the sterilization law was not applicable to people outside of mental institutions. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Is the right to reproduce a fundamental liberty?

(Holmes, J.) ⇨ No. The right to reproduce is not a fundamental liberty. Substantive due process affords fundamental rights not explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. However, any such unenumerated rights must be fundamental liberties to be protected under a claim of substantive due process. In this case, the right to reproduce as a mentally ill person is not a fundamental liberty. Accordingly, Virginia's state law permitting involuntary sterilization of a mentally ill person does not violate the person's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, the law does not violate Buck's equal protection rights. Although the law is not applicable to individuals outside of a mental institution, the law is sufficiently tailored to meet its policy goals.

Gonzalez v. Carhart (2007) RULE OF LAW: Congress may ban a specific type of partial-birth abortion provided its restrictions on the practice are narrow and clear and the ban does not constitute an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion. FACTS: In November 2003, President Bush signed into law the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (PBABA). The PBABA prohibited "intact dilation and evacuation" (Intact D&E), a particular manner of ending fetal life in the second trimester whereby a surgeon killed the fetus by dilating the mother's cervix, piercing the fetus's skull with scissors, and using suction to extract the fetus from the uterus. When Congress passed the PBABA in 2003, more than thirty states had laws prohibiting the procedure. Dr. Leroy Carhart (plaintiff), a physician that performed Intact D&E, brought suit in federal district court against Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (defendant) seeking to enjoin the PBABA from taking effect. Carhart argued that the PBABA was unconstitutionally overbroad and lacked a health exception for partial-birth abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The district court ruled for Carhart and held the PBABA unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed, and the US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May Congress ban a specific type of partial-birth abortion provided its restrictions on the practice are narrow and clear and the ban does not constitute an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Yes. Before viability, a state cannot prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy. Additionally, a state cannot impose upon this right an undue burden. An undue burden exists if the purpose or effect of a regulation is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. However, a regulation that merely creates a structural mechanism by which the state, or the parent or guardian of a minor, can express profound respect for the life of the unborn is permitted if the regulation is not a substantial obstacle to a woman's right to choose. Carhart argues that the PBABA is void for vagueness on account of its scope being indefinite. This argument is rejected. The PBABA prohibits only narrow, specific types of partial-birth abortion. Moreover, the PBABA defines the criminal offense involving performance of an unlawful partial-birth abortion with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Carhart also argues that the PBABA imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion because its restrictions on second-trimester abortions are overly broad. This argument is likewise rejected. The PBABA prohibits "Intact D&E" only and contains no proscription of D&E procedures that involve the removal of a fetus in parts. Additionally, the PBABA does not prohibit "Intact D&E" that is accidentally performed. Congress's purposes for passing the PBABA is founded on a profound respect for human life and a desire to ensure women make an informed decision in aborting a fetus. These purposes were upheld as permissible state objectives in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The PBABA is constitutional, and the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ The Court's abortion jurisprudence, including its decisions in Casey and Roe have no basis in the Constitution. The majority should not have considered the issue of whether the PBABA constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Neither the parties nor the lower courts raised the issue. Dissent (Ginsburg, J.) ⇨ The majority's decision constitutes a misapplication of the precedents outlined in Casey and other abortion jurisprudence. Moreover, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology asserts that the banned procedure is necessary and proper in certain cases. Additionally, the majority's decision unwisely blurs the line between pre-viability and post-viability abortions. The point of viability has previously been upheld as defining when a woman's interest in obtaining an abortion is outweighed by a state's interest in preserving life. Blurring this point negates a sufficient body of jurisprudence defining the right to an abortion according to the point of viability. Most troubling is the majority's decision to uphold a regulation of a woman's right to an abortion that contains no exception for safeguarding a woman's health. This lack of a health exception constitutes an undue burden on the right of a woman to seek an abortion under Casey.

US v. Windsor (2013) RULE OF LAW: (1) A reviewing court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal even if the appellant is not seeking redress from an adverse judgment, provided the party retains a sufficient stake in the case to satisfy Article III of the Constitution. (2) A federal statute excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage for purposes of federal benefits is unconstitutional. FACTS: In 2007, two women, Edith Windsor (plaintiff) and Thea Spyer, were legally married in Ontario, Canada. Windsor and Spyer returned to New York, which recognized the marriage. Two years later, Spyer died, leaving her estate to Windsor. Windsor claimed the federal estate-tax exemption for surviving spouses but was denied under the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7. The provision amends the definition of marriage to a "union between one man and one woman" and defines spouse as an opposite-sex husband or wife. Windsor paid the taxes and sued in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of the restriction. The Attorney General issued a letter notifying Congress that the Department of Justice (DoJ) would not defend DOMA's constitutionality anymore, though it would continue to enforce the provision. The House of Representatives authorized the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) to defend DOMA on its behalf. BLAG was granted permissive intervention. The district court held that the provision was unconstitutional and Windsor was entitled to a refund. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis of heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation. The government and BLAG petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted. ISSUE: (1) Does a reviewing court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal if the appellant is not seeking redress from an adverse judgment? (2) Is a federal statute excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage for purposes of federal benefits constitutional?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ (1) YES. Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only cases or controversies. Standing under Article III requires a plaintiff to have an actual, redressable injury caused by the defendant. Courts have imposed "prudential limits" on the exercise of jurisdiction for political issues best addressed by democratic branches when individual rights are not at stake. Being forced to pay an unconstitutional tax is a redressable injury sufficient to confer standing. In this case, therefore, Windsor had standing to sue. The question is whether the DoJ's agreement that the provision was unconstitutional rendered the appeal nonjusticiable. The amicus briefs argue that the parties were no longer adverse, because the federal government does not seek to avoid the judgment. This ignores the difference between Article III requirements and prudential limits on jurisdiction. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court concluded that standing was proper even though the executive had concluded the statute at issue was unconstitutional. The Immigration and Naturalization Service continued to enforce the statute, and this was enough to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement. There may be adequate controversy even if "the Government largely agree[s] with the opposing party." The rule prohibiting appeal by a party not seeking redress from an adverse judgment is a matter of prudence, not an Article III requirement. Here, there was still a controversy, because the government continued to enforce the law and refused to refund Windsor's payment. BLAG's participation ensured the proceedings were truly adversarial. There is no need to decide whether BLAG alone had standing. Adjudicating this case will provide guidance for pending and prospective litigation. Although this unusual case presents a dilemma, this Court has the "primary role in determining the constitutionality of a law." Refusing to hear Windsor's claim would cede that role to the president, which is inconsistent with separation of powers. The matter was justiciable. (2) NO. The provision in DOMA defining marriage as excluding same-sex couples is a deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause includes a right to equal protection. Congress enacted DOMA, which governs the definition of marriage in over 1000 federal statutes, in 1996 in response to efforts to legalize same-sex marriage. DOMA treats marriages of same-sex couples as "second-class" without any legitimate interest justifying discrimination. Though Congress may enact laws that impact marriage, regulation of marriage is within states' exclusive power over domestic relations, subject to constitutional limits. Marriage was historically understood as a union between opposite-sex couples, but many now see this limitation as unjust. DOMA "departs from th[e] . . . tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage." The federal government denies equal treatment to a group New York deems equal in status to opposite-sex married couples. This violates equal protection and due process. Those guarantees require that Congress not discriminate merely to hurt a "politically unpopular group." As the legislative history makes clear, DOMA's purpose and effect are to disadvantage married same-sex couples. "DOMA writes inequality into the entire US code" and ensures the disparate treatment of legally married couples living within the same state. The moral and sexual choices of homosexuals are protected by the Constitution. DOMA degrades those couples and harms their children. DOMA is invalid under the Fifth Amendment; the judgment is affirmed. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The Court aggrandizes its own power at the expense of the people. The majority paints the Court as the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality above the democratically elected branches, but the Framers intended to create co-equal branches. The judiciary does not have "primary" authority to decide the constitutionality of laws. Courts may only decide cases or controversies. The power to "say what the law is" is "incidental." Windsor won at trial. On appeal, Windsor and the federal government advocated the same outcome. The case should have been dismissed. The majority cites Chadha to support its position, but the parties there contested the position of the government and the lower court. Congress intervened, and the case was only justiciable because the House and Senate were adverse parties. Jurisdiction requires controversy as well as standing. Moreover, even if jurisdiction were proper, the majority is wrong. The government may or may not constitutionally regulate sexual norms and, thus, same-sex marriage. There are legitimate justifications for DOMA. DOMA settled choice-of-law questions and preserved federal benefits for opposite-sex married couples as they were when enacted. The majority's claim that DOMA's only purpose was to dehumanize same-sex married couples is untrue. The majority demeans Congress in making this accusation based on preservation of what until very recently was the universal definition of marriage. In any event, a constitutional law should not be invalidated due to allegedly improper motives. The disclaimer that this opinion will not impede states' ability to define marriage is illusory. The majority has provided ammunition to attack state same-sex marriage bans by asserting there is no legitimate purpose justifying such laws. This question should have been left to the democratic process. Dissent (Alito, J.) ⇨ Windsor's constitutional rights were not violated. The federal government's position was not adverse to Windsor's, which would render the majority opinion advisory. BLAG had standing on behalf of the House of Representatives, which suffered a redressable injury. In Chadha, Congress had standing, because the ruling impacted its power to legislate. The Court there said that Congress had standing to defend a law when the agency charged with enforcement declined to do so. The idea that only the president may defend a law's constitutionality is contrary to Chadha. Same-sex marriage is an issue of public policy; the Constitution is silent. Substantive due process protects "fundamental rights . . . deeply rooted in this Nation's history." Same-sex marriage has no historical roots. Windsor seeks recognition of a new right. Windsor argues that DOMA violates equal protection, classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to heightened scrutiny, and DOMA cannot survive that scrutiny. However, the scrutiny structure for equal-protection claims is not well suited for marriage laws. Historical understandings of marriage were related to child rearing; the modern, "consent-based" view is related to mutual commitment. Which view is correct is a question for the political branches. The majority correctly says this should be decided by the states. DOMA does not impede states' ability to define marriage; it only clarifies the category of people entitled to the benefits under federal law. DOMA is valid. Dissent (Roberts, C.J.) ⇨ Regulation of marriage has historically been left to the states, but variations have generally involved minor matters. The federal government acted to preserve the fundamental definition of marriage, which was the traditional understanding throughout history and in the rest of the world. The majority goes too far in deciding that Congress's only motive was "a bare desire to harm." It is important to note that this decision does not impact states' ability to maintain the traditional definition of marriage. The majority makes this disclaimer explicit, which is necessary in light of the federalism concerns underpinning its ruling. This opinion has no impact on states' definitions of marriage.

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) RULE OF LAW: Under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, states must issue marriage licenses and recognize lawful out-of-state marriages for same-sex couples. FACTS: In response to some states legalizing same-sex marriage, various states enacted laws and constitutional amendments defining marriage as between one man and one woman. When James Obergefell's (plaintiff) partner, John Arthur, became terminally ill, the pair decided to marry. The couple wed in Maryland, where same-sex marriage was legal. After Arthur died, however, the couple's home state of Ohio refused to list Obergefell as Arthur's surviving spouse on the death certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse (plaintiffs), a same-sex couple living in Michigan, adopted three children. Because of a state ban on adoptions by same-sex couples, DeBoer and Rowse could not both be legal parents to their children. Ipje DeKoe and Thomas Kostura (plaintiffs) got married in New York before DeKoe was deployed to Afghanistan with the army reserve. They later moved to Tennessee, which refuses to recognize the union. These and similarly situated plaintiffs separately sued state officials (defendants) charged with enforcing state marriage laws in federal courts in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, alleging violations of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district courts found for the plaintiffs in each instance, but the state officials appealed to US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court of appeals consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that states were under no constitutional duty to license or recognize same-sex marriages. The plaintiffs petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted. ISSUE: Must states issue marriage licenses and recognize lawful out-of-state marriages for same-sex couples?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Yes. Same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Marriage is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. For example, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court struck down anti-miscegenation laws that interfered with the right to marry. Similarly, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), the Court invalidated state laws limiting the ability of individuals with unpaid child support to marry. Ultimately, the four principles underpinning the protection of the right to marry apply equally to opposite and same-sex couples: (1) the right to choose whether and whom to marry is "inherent in the concept of individual autonomy"; (2) the right serves relationships that are equal in importance to all who enter them; (3) assuring the right to marry protects children and families, which implicates the myriad of rights related to procreation and childrearing; and (4) lastly, marriage is the very "keystone of our social order" and foundation of the family unit. Though marriage has historically been viewed as between opposite-sex couples, the institution has changed over time, including through the changing legal status of women. Similarly, while same-sex relationships were once forbidden, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court held that same-sex couples had an equal right to intimate associations. Refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry denies them a myriad of legal rights, including those related to taxation, insurance benefits, intestate succession, spousal evidentiary privileges, child custody and support, etc. In this instance, the liberty interest protected by due process intersects with the right to equal protection, and same-sex marriage bans violate both. Therefore, states must issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Further, states must recognize lawful out-of-state marriages between same-sex couples. All contrary laws are struck down. The court of appeals is reversed. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ An unelected committee of nine lawyers has stopped the debate and the democratic process on this issue. There is no question that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment could not possibly have intended for it to eliminate the traditional and, at least at that time, universal understanding of marriage. The justices are selected for their skill as lawyers, not policymakers, and in are in no way representative of the rest of the country. Dissent (Roberts, C.J.) ⇨ Although there are strong arguments for the inherent fairness in recognizing same-sex marriages, this should be left to individual states to decide. The Constitution does not define marriage, and states should be free to define it as they will, including maintaining the traditional definition of marriage recognized throughout history. The Court has usurped the right of the people to make such a decision through the democratic process and denied same-sex marriage the legitimacy that comes with that. Marriage developed as a means of ensuring children were cared for by two parents. The Court has warned of the dangers of finding new, implied fundamental rights as a matter of substantive due process, as the Court fatefully did in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857) and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court is acting as a super-legislature and substituting its own judgment for the law. Further, if same-sex marriage is valid, there is no good argument why plural marriage should not be. Finally, the Court fails to conduct the traditional Equal Protection Clause analysis before declaring the clause to be violated.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) RULE OF LAW: A state abortion regulation places an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion and is invalid if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. FACTS: Planned Parenthood (plaintiff) brought suit against Casey (defendant), the Governor of Pennsylvania, in federal district court for the purpose of challenging five restrictions on abortion under Pennsylvania law. Most significantly, the Pennsylvania statute required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period for all women prior to undergoing the procedure. All minors seeking an abortion were required to obtain the informed consent of at least one parent, while a married woman had to show that she notified her husband of her intent to abort the fetus. The district court issued judgment for Planned Parenthood, but the court of appeals upheld all Pennsylvania provisions except the requirement of spousal notification. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether a state restriction on abortion that requires informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period is unconstitutional.

(O'Connor, J.) ⇨ No. The holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is reaffirmed. In Roe the Court held: (1) a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the state; (2) a state may restrict abortions after fetal viability as long as it passes a law that exempts pregnancies that endanger the woman's life or health; and (3) a state has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus. Stare decisis operates as a governing principle in nearly all of the Court's decisions. Precedent holdings should be overturned only if changing circumstances render the established rules unworkable. Although Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no sense proven unworkable in its limitations of state restrictions on abortion. Although medical advances have moved the moment of viability for a fetus to an earlier date, the central holding of Roe remains relevant. However, some changes to the contours of Roe's application are necessary. Hence the trimester framework established in Roe is overruled. This structure creates overly rigid rules for defining states' and women's interests in the abortion debate. It is improper to completely prohibit a state from regulating abortion before the end of the first trimester. Before the first trimester ends, a state can constitutionally issue reasonable regulations for abortion to help ensure that women are properly informed about their decision to abort. Based on this principle, some of Pennsylvania's restrictions in the present case can be upheld as constitutional regulations on abortion designed to help women make informed and rational choices. Instead of adhering to the trimester framework for judging the constitutionality of such regulations, a new undue burden test is hereby created for determining whether a regulation impermissibly interferes with a woman's right to an abortion. An undue burden exists if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. Applying this new standard to the Pennsylvania statute, the spousal notification requirement constitutes an undue burden, according too much power to a husband over his wife, and is therefore invalid. However, the informed consent, parental notification, and 24-hour waiting period restrictions do not constitute an undue burden and are upheld. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Concurrence/Dissent (Stevens, J.) ⇨ The doctrine of stare decisis applies in this case. The plurality's holding in Roe has been successfully applied for two decades and is a part of the national framework and dialogue on the issue of abortion. States have a right to regulate abortion after viability, but the plurality is incorrect to overrule the trimester framework established in Roe. Both the states' interest in protecting the life of the unborn fetus, as well as a woman's interest in having a right to an abortion can be served without overruling the trimester framework. Concurrence/Dissent (Blackmun, J.) ⇨ State restrictions on abortion violate a woman's right to privacy by (1) requiring her to carry a fetus in spite of severe physical intrusion and risk of bodily harm and (2) depriving her of the right to make her own decision about reproduction and family planning. State restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality in that states can essentially force women to endure childbirth and embrace motherhood against their will. Strict scrutiny should be applied to state restrictions on abortion. The right to an abortion should be established as a fundamental right incapable of being overturned by future decisions or voter initiatives at the ballot box. Concurrence/Dissent (Rehnquist, C.J.) ⇨ The historical traditions of the American people do not justify holding the right to an abortion as a fundamental right protected by strict scrutiny review. Instead, a "rational relationship" test should be adopted as the sole criterion for determining the constitutionality of any state restrictions on abortion. Concurrence/Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The permissibility of abortion and the limitations placed upon it should be resolved by citizens voting in the political process rather than by courts. The decision of whether to permit abortion is left to the states, as there is no federal right to an abortion in the Constitution. The Constitution is silent about such a right, and the longstanding traditions of American society permit abortion to be prohibited by states.

Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) RULE OF LAW: The right to marry is a fundamental right, and any legislative attempts by a state to limit that right are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly-tailored to the accomplishment of an important governmental purpose. FACTS: A Wisconsin statute prevented members of a certain class of residents from marrying without first obtaining a court order granting them permission to marry. This class was defined by the statute to include any Wisconsin resident required by court order or judgment to pay child support to a minor that was not in his custody. A court order granting permission to marry could be obtained if a member of this class submitted proof of compliance with his or her support obligation and, in addition, demonstrated that the children covered by the support order were not then or not likely to later become public charges. Redhail (plaintiff), a Wisconsin resident, fathered a child out of wedlock in high school. A paternity action was instituted against him in 1972. Redhail appeared in court and admitted to fathering a baby girl. The court entered an order requiring him to pay monthly child support until the girl reached age eighteen. For the next two years, Redhail was unemployed and indigent and was unable to make any child support payments. In 1974, he filed an application for a marriage license with Zablocki (defendant), the County Clerk of Milwaukee County. Redhail's application was denied on the grounds that he had not obtained a court order granting him permission to marry. It was stipulated that even if he had applied for such a court order, it would have been denied because Redhail was unable to make child support payments and his daughter was already considered a public charge. Redhail brought suit against Zablocki in federal district court on the grounds that the Wisconsin statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled for Redhail, and Zablocki appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether a statute that prevents certain residents from marrying without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Marshall, J.) ⇨ Yes. The right to marry is a fundamental right and strict scrutiny is appropriate for evaluating the constitutionality of any state statutes limiting the right to marry. The right to marry among interracial couples was first discussed in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), but subsequent Court decisions extended the right to marry to all persons as part of their fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Additionally, marriage is part of the fundamental "right of privacy" implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The right of marriage is legally on the same level of importance as other decisions involving procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. Reasonable regulations that do not actually interfere with the ability of a person to marry are not subject to strict scrutiny and can be legitimately imposed. The Wisconsin law clearly and absolutely interferes with Redhail's right to marry on the grounds that he can likely never attain the financial means to fulfill his child support obligations and thus receive a court order granting him permission to marry. Applying strict scrutiny, the Wisconsin statute can be upheld only if it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and closely tailored to accomplish those interests exclusively. Despite the fact that Wisconsin offered important state interests as justification for the statute (i.e. counseling Redhail about his support obligations and ensuring out-of-custody children are financially supported), the statute itself is not closely tailored to accomplishing these interests and is unconstitutional. Numerous, less discriminatory means exist by which the Court may compel delinquent persons to fulfill child support obligations. The Wisconsin statute is unconstitutional and the decision of the district court is affirmed. Concurrence (Stewart, J.) ⇨ The majority improperly determines that the Wisconsin statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The application of the Equal Protection Clause is improper because that Clause deals with the prevention of invidious discrimination and not the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. The Wisconsin statute exceeds the bounds of permissible state regulation of marriage and invades liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, a federal "right to marry" exists in the Constitution. The regulation of marriage is left to the states, subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause. Wisconsin's law particularly burdens the liberty interests of the indigent, as it completely eliminates their ability to marry for financial reasons. The statute is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. Concurrence (Powell, J.) ⇨ Wisconsin's restrictions on the right to marry are unconstitutional. However, the majority's holding is overbroad in that it seeks to subject to strict scrutiny every classification that "directly and substantially" relates to the right to marry. Reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter the marital bond can be legitimately imposed; it is problematic that the majority provides no guidelines for determining when a regulation falls into this category. Concurrence (Stevens, J.) ⇨ Lingering tension exists between the Court's holding in the present case and its prior decision in Califano v. Jobst , 434 U.S. 47 (1977), which stands for the principle that a law is not subjected to strict scrutiny simply because the law burdens an individual's ability to enter into a marital relationship in some way. In Califano, the challenged program involved Social Security benefits assigned based on marital status. In contrast, the Wisconsin program seeks to restrict what persons can enter into the bond of marriage. A significant constitutional difference exists between a program that allocates benefits and burdens according to marital status, and one that solely burdens the ability to marry. Under the Wisconsin statute, individuals are completely foreclosed from marrying if they cannot afford to pay child support. Thus, instead of regulating based on marital status like the statute in Califano, the Wisconsin statute unduly burdens the right to marry of impoverished persons. The statute burdens low-income persons in particular and violates the Equal Protection Clause. Dissent (Rehnquist, J.) ⇨ Marriage is not a "fundamental right" triggering the application of strict scrutiny. Rational basis review should be applied. Under rational basis review, the statute is a permissible exercise of a state's power to regulate family life and to assure the support of minor children.

Meyers v. Nebraska (1923) RULE OF LAW: A state may not prohibit the teaching of foreign languages to a young child in school when such teaching has been requested by the child's parent because this interferes with the fundamental liberty interest of a parent to control his or her child's education. FACTS: Under Nebraska law, it was a crime for any individual or teacher in any private, parochial, or public school to teach any subject to any person in any language other than English. Foreign languages could be taught as languages to students only after completion of the eighth grade. Meyer (defendant), a teacher in a parochial school in the State of Nebraska (plaintiff), was convicted of violating the Nebraska statute by teaching German to Raymond Parpart, a ten-year-old child. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court of the US granted certiorari. ISSUE: May a state law forbid the teaching of any subject in a non-English language in local schools without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(McReynolds, J.) ⇨ No. The scope of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause does not only include the freedom from bodily restraint. Rather, recognized liberty interests include the freedom to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and raise children, to practice religious faith, and to generally pursue common law notions of happiness. These liberty interests cannot be interfered with by arbitrary or unreasonable legislation that does not further a legitimate state purpose. Applying these principles to the present case, the right to teach German in schools to children at the request of their parents relates to the fundamental right recognized for parents to control and educate their children. Thus, parents' desire to educate their children in German, as well as Meyer's right to teach German, are liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nebraska enacted its prohibition on teaching German for the legitimate purpose of fostering nationalism after World War I between the US and Germany. However, while this is a legitimate purpose, the means adopted (the total prohibition of teaching German in schools before the eighth grade) is overbroad and not closely related to the achievement of this purpose. Nebraska exceeded the scope of its constitutional powers, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska is reversed.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) RULE OF LAW: Requiring children to be educated only by public instruction violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. FACTS: The state of Oregon (State) (defendant) enacted the Compulsory Education Act (Act), which mandated that children between the ages of eight and 16 attend public school in their district of residence. The Society of Sisters (Society) (plaintiff) and Hill Military Academy (Academy) (plaintiff), both providers of private education for youths, sued the State to enjoin the Act. Plaintiffs prevailed in the lower court. The State appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does requiring children to be educated only by public instruction violate the US Constitution?

(McReynolds, J.) ⇨ Yes. While states may require that children attend school and reasonably regulate such schools, states do not have the authority to require public education only. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty of parents and guardians to direct their children's education. Children are not owned by the state. Unless a state can show a reasonable relation between legislation and a legitimate state objective, the state may not curtail its citizens' constitutional rights. No reasonable relationship is shown in this case. There is no evidence that private education is harmful. Thus, the Act unreasonably interferes with a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The injunction is affirmed.

Troxel v. Granville (2000) RULE OF LAW: Under the Due Process Clause, a state court may not grant visitation rights to a person, even when doing so would be in a child's best interest, if those visitation rights are opposed by the child's parent because doing so interferes with the parent's fundamental liberty interest in rearing his or her child. FACTS: A Washington statute permitted any person to petition a superior court in the state for visitation rights at any time and authorized the court to grant such visitation rights whenever visitation might serve the best interest of the child. Jenifer and Gary Troxel (plaintiffs) petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their paternal grandchildren after their son, the children's father, committed suicide. Tommie Granville (defendant), the mother of these children, opposed the petition. The Washington Superior Court granted visitation rights to the Troxels, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and held that the Washington statute unconstitutionally interfered with the fundamental rights of parents to rear their children. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether a Washington statute that permits any person to petition a superior court for visitation rights at any time, and permits the court to grant such visitation if it is in the best interest of the child, violates the Due Process Clause protections of a parent's right to rear his or her child.

(O'Connor, J.) ⇨ Yes. There is difficulty in attempting to define the concept of the "average" American family because the composition of families varies tremendously across the nation. Many states have passed similar non-parental visitation statutes to that in Washington because they recognize the reality that grandparents and other relatives often play significant roles in the rearing of children. The extension of visitation rights to a non-parent third party is often accompanied by certain "costs" and can sometimes put significant strain on a parent/child relationship. The liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is one of the oldest interests recognized by the Court as absolutely protected by the Due Process Clause. Applying these principles to the present case, the Washington statute, as applied to Granville and her family unconstitutionally infringes on that fundamental parental right. The statute is overly broad in that it does not require any deference to a parent's decision that visitation by a third party will not be in his or her child's best interest. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the statute for no reason other than a disagreement over visitation existed between Granville and the Troxels. This decision is not based on any showing by the Troxels that Granville is an unfit parent, or that she seeks to cut off visitation completely between her children and their grandparents. On the contrary, Granville merely seeks to limit visitation with her deceased husband's parents after his death because she believes it is in the best interest of her own children. The statute is unconstitutional, and the decision of the Washington Supreme Court is affirmed. Concurrence (Souter, J.) ⇨ The Washington court acted in accordance with the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence involving Due Process Clause issues. The majority need not have considered whether an actual harm exists in granting visitation rights to the Troxels, nor attempted to define the scope of a parent's right or its necessary protections. The Washington statute could have been invalidated on its face simply because it is vastly overbroad. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ Neither party argued that the Court's substantive due process cases were wrongly decided, or that the Court's original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of rights not enumerated under the Due Process Clause. The plurality's recognition of a fundamental right of parents to rear children is enough to fully decide the issues before the Court. However, the plurality fails to articulate a standard of review for such cases. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The right of parents to rear their children is fundamental and should be protected to the exclusion of other rights, but no such right is enumerated in either the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence. The plurality should have declined to invalidate the Washington state law on the grounds that it infringed upon a right not enumerated in the Constitution. Dissent (Stevens, J.) ⇨ The Washington Supreme Court merely requires its state legislature to draft a better version of the current statute; instead the Court should have completely denied certiorari. However, because the Court addressed the merits, it would have been wiser to recognize that the Washington Supreme Court rendered a federal constitutional judgment holding a state law invalid on its face. In light of that judgment, the Court should have confronted the federal questions raised by the case directly. Dissent (Kennedy, J.) ⇨ The state supreme court held that the statute is flawed because it awards visitation to a non-parent without a finding that harm to the child would result if visitation were withheld. In effect, the state supreme court appears to hold that a "best interest of the child" (BIC) standard is never applicable in third-party visitation cases. Although there might be visitation cases in which the BIC standard will not adequately protect a parent's right to raise his or her child, a requirement that a harm to the child standard be used in every instance is too broad. The case should be remanded with instructions to reconsider the case under the BIC standard.

Pavan v. Smith (2017) RULE OF LAW: The Constitution entitles same-sex couples to civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. FACTS: Terrah Pavan and Marisa Pavan (plaintiffs) were married and conceived a child through anonymous sperm donation. Terrah was the birth mother of the child. In filling out the child's birth certificate, the Pavans listed both spouses as parents. The Arkansas Department of Health issued a birth certificate with only Terrah's name as the parent. An Arkansas state law required that, subject to certain exceptions, when a woman is married at the time of conception or birth, the woman's husband's name must be listed as the father on the child's birth certificate. The Pavans brought suit against the state (defendant), claiming that the state's implementation of the law violated the Constitution under the holding of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), which granted same-sex couples the right to marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the law. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does the Constitution entitle same-sex couples to civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples?

(Per curiam) ⇨ Yes. The Constitution entitles same-sex couples to civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. The state bases the law in this case purportedly on the desire to keep an accurate record of children's biological parents. However, the law requires a birth mother's husband's name on a birth certificate even in the case of anonymous artificial insemination, wherein the husband is clearly not the biological father. The law is thus about more than genetics-based recordkeeping; it is about giving married parents a legal recognition of parenthood, a recognition that under the law is not available to unmarried parents. Having given this special legal recognition to married opposite-sex couples, the state cannot prohibit such recognition for married same-sex couples. The law in this case prohibits such recognition for same-sex couples like the Pavans and is therefore unconstitutional. The judgment is reversed. Dissent (Gorsuch, J.) ⇨ The state law in this case is designed to ensure that the names of biological parents are on birth certificates. Such an approach does not violate the Constitution.

Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977) RULE OF LAW: The right of related family members to live together is fundamental and protected by the Due Process Clause, and necessarily encompasses a broader definition of "family" than just members of the nuclear family. FACTS: The City of East Cleveland (CEC) (plaintiff) enacted a housing ordinance that limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance narrowly defined the term "family" as encompassing only a few categories of related individuals. Inez Moore (defendant) lived in East Cleveland in a home with her son and two grandsons. Under the housing ordinance, this arrangement was outside the legal definition of "family." Moore received a notice of violation of the ordinance from the CEC and when she refused to modify her living arrangement, Moore was charged with criminal penalties. Moore was convicted and sentenced to a fine and five days in jail. Moore appealed to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which sustained her conviction. Moore then appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does a housing ordinance that limits the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family, and narrowly defines the term "family" to include only a few categories of related individuals, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Powell, J.) ⇨ Yes. The CEC argued that its housing ordinance should be sustained based on the Court's previous decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), where a housing ordinance limiting occupancy in single residences was sustained because it bore a rational relationship to permissible state objectives. However, the present case is distinguishable from Belle Terre because the Belle Terre ordinance expressly allowed all who were related by "blood, adoption, or marriage" to live together. It prevented only unrelated individuals from living together, while the CEC ordinance limits blood relatives from living together. When a city attempts such an intrusive regulation of family as that present in the CEC ordinance, the court must carefully examine the importance of the government's objective and the extent to which the objective is advanced by the ordinance. CEC seeks to justify its ordinance as a means of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden on the CEC's public school system. Although these are all legitimate public purposes, the housing ordinance serves them only marginally and is not necessary to their accomplishment. The right of family members to live together is fundamental and protected by the Constitution. The CEC's argument that this right extends only to nuclear family members is rejected. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has strong historical roots and is worthy of constitutional recognition. The CEC's housing ordinance improperly limits this right, is therefore unconstitutional, and the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence (Brennan, J.) ⇨ The Constitution has the power under the Due Process Clause to prevent the CEC from passing such a restrictive housing ordinance that completely disregards modern family relationships. Municipalities can pass zoning ordinances to alleviate noise or to eliminate traffic congestion as these are reasonable land use restrictions in furtherance of the legitimate objectives the CEC claims as justification for its ordinance. However, the CEC enacted a senseless and arbitrary restriction that cuts deeply into an area of protected private family life. The CEC cannot constitutionally attempt to define "families" as only encompassing nuclear family members as this completely ignores the reality of many modern family situations. The concept of "family" differs between both Caucasian and African American families, as well as between urban and suburban dwellers. The CEC's attempt to pass a housing ordinance that uniformly limits the types of permissible living arrangements for families is unconstitutional. Concurrence (Stevens, J.) ⇨ Under the standard of review announced in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), a housing ordinance may be declared unconstitutional only if it is shown to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable as having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The CEC fails to show that its housing ordinance furthers in any way the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The statute violates Moore's liberty interests under the Due Process Clause and is unconstitutional. Dissent (Burger, C.J.) ⇨ It is unnecessary for the Court to have even considered the difficult constitutional issue raised by the case. Rather, the CEC has provided an administrative remedy to Moore to challenge her criminal penalties under the housing ordinance; a remedy of which she has not taken advantage. The case could have been decided at the local level, and the Court should have dismissed Moore's claims and declined to consider the merits. Dissent (Stewart, J.) ⇨ Moore did not assert a claim to a liberty interest that is as highly valued as other liberty interests recently recognized by the Court as protected under the Due Process Clause. For example, Moore's desire to share a single-dwelling unit with her son and grandsons is not as valuable as her right to bear or not bear children, or her right to nurture and rear her children in a manner of her choosing. The Court runs the risk of overly extending the concept of fundamental rights. Moreover, it is impossible to require the CEC to draft a housing ordinance that anticipates and provides for every possible combination of private family lifestyles. The ordinance should be upheld as a constitutional restriction on a non-fundamental right. Dissent (White, J.) ⇨ The case invoked both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The scope of the Due Process Clause is based on a guarantee of fair "process" and should not be construed as a license by courts to strike down arbitrary legislation. Here, the Court's primary task is to determine whether the procedures used by the CEC are fair. Additionally the plurality concludes incorrectly that the CEC violated Moore's fundamental liberty interests in ruling that she could not live with her son and grandsons. The ordinance does not completely foreclose the possibility of this family living arrangement, as it still permits her to live with her grandchildren in other parts of the Cleveland metropolitan area. Finally, Moore's claims cannot be sustained on equal protection grounds. The housing ordinance does not implicate a fundamental right and should be analyzed under rational basis review. The ordinance furthers legitimate objectives and the CEC acted rationally in passing it. The statute should be upheld as constitutional and the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.

Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) RULE OF LAW: The right of a potential natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man is not traditionally recognized in historical jurisprudence and is not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. FACTS: Gerald D. (defendant) and Carole D. were married in 1976 in Las Vegas and resided together in California. In 1978, Carole became involved in an adulterous affair with a neighbor, Michael H. (plaintiff). In 1980, she conceived a child, Victoria. Soon after delivery, Carole informed Gerald that Michael might actually be the father of Victoria, at which point Michael and Carole each took DNA tests showing that there was a 98.7% chance that Michael was Victoria's father. Soon after, Gerald and Carole separated, and Carole took up residence with a third man and rebuffed Michael's attempts to visit Victoria, who he strongly believed to be his daughter. Although Michael filed an action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity and grant him visitation rights, the case was withdrawn after Carole started seeing Michael again and signed an agreement stipulating that Victoria was their daughter. Carole later reconciled with Gerald and went to live with him again with Victoria. In 1984, however, Michael and Victoria, through her guardian ad litem brought another action to establish paternity and visitation rights for Michael. Gerald intervened and moved for summary judgment on the ground that under California law, there were no triable issues of fact regarding Victoria's paternity as California law provided that "the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." Later in 1985, the California Superior Court granted Gerald's motion for summary judgment and rejected Michael and Victoria's motions for continued visitation. Michael claimed that the law at issue denied him an opportunity to establish his paternity and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. A California court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of the California law, and Michael appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether a statute that prevents a possible biological father from establishing his paternity of a child violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Scalia, J.) ⇨ No. Due Process Clause jurisprudence governing "liberty" interests requires such interests to be both "fundamental" as well as traditionally protected by society. An asserted liberty interest of certain parental rights must be rooted in history and tradition. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment traditionally protects only relationships developed within the unitary family. Here, Michael's paternity interests should be upheld only if the relationship between people in a similar situation as Michael and Victoria has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of society. No such historical protections exist, but history is more inclined to protect relationships among traditional family units (i.e. Gerald, Carole, and Victoria). In a traditional family unit, a strong presumption exists that any child born into a family is born of the husband and wife, unless the husband is incapable of procreation or has no access to his wife during the relevant period. No historical precedent exists that addresses specifically the power of the natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man. This right does not exist traditionally. As a result Michael is not deprived of a fundamental right. Michael's challenge is rejected and the constitutionality of the California law is upheld. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Concurrence (O'Connor, J.) ⇨ The majority reaches the correct result but improperly uses a mode of historical analysis for identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause. Concurrence (Stevens, J.) ⇨ California courts are not obligated to provide a judicial determination that Michael is Victoria's father. However, a court is obligated to give Michael and Victoria a reasonable opportunity to determine whether the assertion of Michael's paternity is in Victoria's best interest. Michael's relationship with Victoria is sufficiently strong to permit an opportunity to show that visitation rights would benefit Victoria. The California law, as written, provides Michael with that opportunity. Dissent (Brennan, J.) ⇨ The plurality is wrong to foreclose the possibility that a natural father might have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and cohabitating with, another man at the time of the child's conception and birth. The plurality is uncomfortable with an unlimited notion of liberty interests under the Due Process Clause, and hastily issues its opinion that all liberty interests must be based on "tradition" simply because it wants to define the scope of due process protections. However relying on "tradition" is itself problematic because the concept is almost as difficult to define as "liberty." Additionally, nothing in the Court's precedent requires constitutional principles to be entirely based on traditional common law concepts. Several liberty interests recently recognized by the Court that are not based on tradition include: the right to use contraception; the freedom from corporal punishment in schools; the freedom from arbitrary transfer from a prison to a psychiatric institution; and the right to raise one's natural but illegitimate children. The plurality's decision to rely solely on "tradition" for defining family relationships is misguided because modern technology such as DNA can confirm with near certainty the existence of a paternal link. The Constitution is not a stagnant document, but it is designed to adapt with changes in both technology and society. Dissent (White, J.) ⇨The majority's decision improperly upholds as constitutional the California statute governing paternity rights. California law deems it "irrelevant" for paternity purposes whether a child conceived during, and born into, an existing marriage is conceived by someone other than the husband. The fact that Michael is Victoria's father is highly relevant in determining whether he has rights to visit her or participate in any aspect of child-rearing. Michael's paternity of Victoria is a liberty interest that is denied without due process of law by the California statute.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (2013) RULE OF LAW: The Indian Child Welfare Act does not protect the rights of a parent who has never had custody of the child. FACTS: A baby girl (defendant) was born to a Hispanic mother and a father who was Cherokee. The mother and father were unwed at the time of the birth, which occurred off reservation. While the mother was pregnant, the father relinquished parental rights to the child by text message to the mother. The baby was born and the mother placed the baby for adoption. The adoptive parents (plaintiffs), non-Indians, notified the father of the pending adoption. The father did not contest the adoption, but later sought custody in the adoption proceedings held before the family court in South Carolina. The court denied the adoption under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. Specifically, the court held that the father's parental rights could not be involuntarily terminated under ICWA because the adoptive parents did not show that serious harm would come to the child by granting custody to the father. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does the Indian Child Welfare Act protect the rights of a parent who has never had custody of the child?

(Alito, J.) ⇨ No. The Indian Child Welfare Act does not protect the rights of a parent who has never had custody of the child. The ICWA was enacted to halt state child-welfare and private agencies from moving Indian children off the reservation—without justification—and placing those children far from families and culture, to live with non-Indian families. Thus, to protect the rights of parents living on the reservation, the ICWA prohibits the involuntary termination of an Indian's parental rights unless that parent's continued custody—those are the words used in the statute, continued custody—will harm the child and remedial efforts to keep the Indian family intact have failed. Continuing custody means what it says: the parent must have custody of the child before adoption is attempted. In this case, the mother—a non-Indian and the sole custodial parent—voluntarily initiated adoption proceedings. The father never had custody over the child and thus, cannot have had continuing custody of the child as required by the statute. Thus, the father's parental rights can be involuntarily terminated without the protection of the ICWA. Remedial efforts to keep a family intact cannot prevent the breakup of a family that never was. The decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for the adoption to proceed. Concurrence (Breyer, J.) ⇨ The majority should limit the decision to the specific circumstances before the court, i.e., to a father who has abandoned the child, relinquished parental rights, and consented to adoption. A noncustodial father who is paying child support and who has visitation rights should not be denied protection under the ICWA. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ Congress is not constitutionally authorized to supersede state domestic relations law merely because an Indian is involved in the dispute. The ICWA should not apply to the circumstances of this case. Dissent (Sotomayor, J.) ⇨ The Court today denies noncustodial, biological parents the protections of the ICWA. Not just bad or neglectful parents—but all parents without custody, whether involved in the child's life or not. This holding will stand uniform federal standards for Indian child custody proceedings on its head. Continued custody, as used in the ICWA, does not mean that a parent must have had custody of a child in the past, but rather that a continued parent-child relationship exists. The ICWA clearly states that any biological parent is a parent and that a parent-child relationship can be more than a custodial arrangement. The ICWA protects more than custodial relationships. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ Continued custody refers only to future custody of the child.

McDonald v. Chicago (2010) RULE OF LAW: A Bill of Rights guarantee applies to the states if it is fundamental to the nation's scheme of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. FACTS: Petitioners challenged a law enacted by the City of Chicago (respondent) that prohibited Chicago residents from possessing handguns, claiming that the law violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. ISSUE: Does the Second Amendment apply to the states, thereby invalidating a local law prohibiting residents from possessing handguns?

(Alito, J.) ⇨ Yes. The Second Amendment applies to the states, thereby invalidating Chicago's law prohibiting residents from possessing handguns. Under the process of selective incorporation, a particular Bill of Rights guarantee will apply to the states if it is fundamental to the nation's scheme of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570 (2008), this Court found that individual self defense is a basic right, which forms the central component of the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms, and which is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. Following the Civil War, in response to the efforts of some states to disarm returning black soldiers and other black people, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which protected the right of all citizens to keep and bear arms. When this was met with southern resistance and presidential vetoes, Congress responded by adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby providing a constitutional basis for the rights included in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Concurrence (Alito, J.) ⇨ The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The City argues that gun ownership is not a fundamental right because other countries have limited gun ownership. However, the standard to be applied in incorporation cases is not whether there is any civilized legal system that does not recognize a particular right, but whether a particular right is fundamental to this nation's justice system. In addition, the Second Amendment does not differ from other rights simply because a right to a deadly instrument raises issues of public safety, as rights that restrict law enforcement activities and criminal prosecutions also implicate public safety. Finally, it is important to note that Heller does not invalidate laws that prohibit the possession of firearms by felons or the mentally ill or within government buildings and schools, or which place conditions on the sale of firearms. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the states, and is both fundamental to the nation's scheme of ordered liberty and deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. However, the Second Amendment is enforceable against the states, not through the Due Process Clause, but rather through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, because the right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed as a privilege of being an American citizen. The Due Process Clause only guarantees process before a deprivation of a right, and cannot define the substance of rights not expressly included in the Constitution. The doctrine of substantive due process is inconsistent with the understanding of the Due Process Clause at the time it was ratified. Concurrence (Scalia, J.) ⇨ Justice Stevens argues that the right to keep and bear arms is not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment despite being deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. In addition, Justice Stevens would have the Court defer to the democratic process when states are already giving close consideration to a right. However, under this approach, a right that has traditionally been recognized and regulated by the states would deserve less protection than a right that the political branches have traditionally withheld. Further, Justice Stevens' assertion that firearms have an ambivalent relationship to liberty because they can injure others seems to require that to be incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment a right must have no harmful effect on anyone, a requirement that no right can meet. Justice Stevens' assertion that the right to bear arms is different from other fundamental rights because it is not critical to leading a life of autonomy, dignity, or political equality is an inappropriate political and moral judgment. Finally, Justice Stevens argues that even if there is a constitutional basis for incorporating the right to bear arms, the Court should not do so for prudential reasons. The Court does not have the authority to withhold rights protected under the Constitution, and Justice Stevens' argument that states have a right to experiment with solutions to gun violence because the solution to the problem is unclear is equally applicable to any serious social problem. While the historical approach may not be the perfect means for limiting judicial lawmaking, it is the best and most objective means available. Dissent (Breyer, J.) ⇨ Nothing in this country's history supports Heller's finding that a private right of self defense is incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. Incorporating a private right of self defense against the states will not protect discrete and insular minorities from state regulation, help ensure equal respect for individuals, promote a necessary part of the democratic process, or protect individuals at risk of unfair treatment by a majority. In addition, the fact-intensive questions raised in analyzing state gun laws are better left to legislatures, not the courts. Dissent (Stevens, J.) ⇨ In undertaking a substantive due process analysis, the Court must show respect for the democratic process. Judicial intervention may be improper where a liberty interest is already the subject of close consideration by the states. In addition, while some fundamental aspects of personhood and dignity require protection, in deciding to recognize a new liberty the Court must be sensitive to both intrinsic ideas of liberty and to the practical realities of contemporary society. Firearms can both assist in self defense and contribute to the murder of innocent people. The right to possess a particular type of firearm is also different from liberty interests previously identified under the Due Process Clause, because it is not necessary in order to live a life of autonomy, dignity, and political equality, and because of its risk to other people's security. Moreover, state regulation on gun possession is just as deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition as the individual interest in possessing a firearm. Because conditions vary greatly from one locality to another, courts should allow state and local governments the right to experiment in finding solutions to gun problems. In addition, opponents of gun control are a powerful group not at risk of unfair treatment by the majority. Finally, when determining whether a right is fundamental, it makes little sense to treat history as dispositive, as Justice Scalia does. Historical views can be unclear and uninformative, and are sometimes wrong, and the historical approach gives judges unprecedented powers in an area in which they have no special qualifications.

Murphy v. NCAA (2018) RULE OF LAW: Congress may not issue direct orders to state legislatures. FACTS: The federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) largely prohibited states from permitting gambling on sports. PASPA also prohibited private gambling on sports. PASPA did not make gambling a federal crime but permitted sports leagues to bring lawsuits for injunctions. New Jersey (defendant) passed a law permitting sports gambling. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) (plaintiff) sued to enjoin the law based on PASPA. New Jersey argued that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering principles in the U.S. Constitution. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May Congress issue direct orders to state legislatures?

(Alito, J.): NO. Congress may not issue direct orders to state legislatures. Under the U.S. Constitution, states retain individual sovereign rights. This division of power is valuable for three reasons: (1) it lessens the risk of the federal government gaining too much power; (2) it easily allows for political accountability in that it is clear to citizens which government entity is responsible for the laws to which they are subject; and (3) it avoids a situation in which Congress does not have to account for the financial implications of its actions. In this case, the Court determines that PASPA violates the anticommandeering doctrine. The statute directs state legislatures not to pass laws that would permit sports gambling. This is a direct violation of states' sovereignty and is unconstitutional. The Court declines to sever PASPA's prohibition on states permitting sports gambling from PASPA's prohibition on private sports gambling, because absent the prohibition on state action, Congress would not have passed the law at all. The statute is not severable and is unconstitutional in full. CONCURRENCE (Thomas, J.): The Court needs to reconsider its severability precedents, which improperly make courts redraft statutes. DISSENT (Ginsburg, J.): PASPA's prohibition on states permitting sports gambling is severable from PASPA's prohibition on private sports gambling. The Court erred by failing to sever these statutory provisions.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) RULE OF LAW: The President of the US may not engage in lawmaking activity absent an express authorization from Congress or the text of the Constitution. FACTS: In late 1951, steel mill owners and their employees had disagreements over the terms of collective bargaining agreements. Unable to reach an agreement, the steel mill employees' representative gave notice of intent to strike after the expiration of their current agreement. The federal government unsuccessfully entered the negotiations, and on April 4, 1952, the steel mill employees' union gave notice of its intent to strike on April 9, 1952. The importance of steel as a component in weapons and war materials led President Truman to believe that a reduction in steel production from a nationwide strike would jeopardize the nation's security. The President issued Executive Order 10340 directing Sawyer (defendant), the Secretary of Commerce, to take control of and continue operating most of the nation's steel mills. Sawyer carried out the order, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (plaintiff), along with other steel mill operators, brought suit in district court alleging that the President's order amounted to an exercise of lawmaking, a legislative function reserved expressly for Congress. Therefore, the President's exercise of lawmaking was unconstitutional. The district court granted an injunction in favor of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., on the grounds that the President acted unconstitutionally, but the court of appeals stayed the injunction. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May the President of the US, under his constitutional executive powers, issue a lawmaking order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the nation's steel mills?

(Black, J.) ⇨ No. The President's power to issue executive orders must come from either an act of Congress or the Constitution. Congress expressly rejected the use of seizure to solve labor disputes as unconstitutional when it considered the drafting of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Here, the President does not rely on any statutory authority to seize real property. Since Congress has not acted to grant seizure powers to the President in labor disputes, the President's authority must come from the Constitution. Sawyer admitted that there is no express authority in the Constitution that justifies the President's actions, but argues that the President's power to do so should still be implied from powers granted to the President in Article II of the Constitution. This argument is not constitutionally supported since the link between the power to make war decisions and the power to seize private property for the resolution of labor disputes is attenuated. Additionally, the President's actions cannot be supported by his general executive powers, as the Constitution charges the Executive with "faithfully executing the laws," not making the laws themselves. The decision of the district court is affirmed. Concurrence (Burton, J.) ⇨ The Constitution vests authority to deal with this type of national emergency in Congress. Congress therefore properly outlined the procedures available to the President to prevent a large-scale strike that could harm the country in the Taft-Hartley Act. Congress chose not to authorize the President to seize an industry, retaining that power for itself. The President decided to use an unauthorized method to deal with the steel mill labor crisis, but he lacked the inherent power to make the seizure on his own accord. There was no "imminent invasion or threatened attack" here, and thus, there is no need to determine what the President's constitutional authority would be in that case. The order cannot be justified as a military command either. Ultimately, the President usurped Congress's authority and violated the separation of powers when he issued the order, and the order is unconstitutional. Concurrence (Jackson, J.) ⇨ The President and Congress have distinct powers, but the Constitution allows for some overlap of authority in different scenarios. The President may act pursuant to executive powers, congressionally-granted powers, or a combination of both. When the President acts under an express or implied grant of power, he can rely on both his own powers and Congress's. When the President acts without an express grant or denial of Congress's powers, he acts under the aggregate of his own independent powers. When the President acts in a way that is incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, he may rely only on the powers expressly granted to him by the Constitution. Since Congress denied power to the President in the present case under the Taft-Hartley Act, the third scenario is implicated. The President may be deemed to have acted constitutionally only if he is acting based on an express grant of power from the Constitution. The Constitution does not grant the President such powers, and the President's power to "faithfully execute the laws" does not cross into the function of lawmaking. The President is checked by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The President has clearly deprived steel mill owners of their property without due process. Concurrence (Douglas, J.) ⇨ Congress is the only branch of government that can appropriate money to pay for a program involving a nationwide seizure of property. Hence, Congress is the only branch that may authorize such actions. It is important to keep this power within Congress to avoid the possibility of a future President abusing the power. Concurrence (Frankfurter, J.) ⇨ The President has been given powers to seize production, transportation, communication, or storage facilities on sixteen separate occasions since 1916. However, the difference between these occurrences and the present case was that, in all prior instances, Congress granted temporary powers to the President to act in times of war or national crisis. Additionally, the powers were only granted for a specific, limited time frame. In the present case, the President was acting to remedy only an industrial problem that was not connected with wartime or a national emergency. Additionally, Congress specifically withheld this type of power from the President, in labor relations settings, when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. The President acted unconstitutionally because the facts surrounding the present case are different than prior instances of presidential grants of power and because Congress could have given the President power but chose instead to withhold it. Concurrence (Clark, J.) ⇨ This case is controlled by the holding in Little v. Barreme (1804), which held that when Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in responding to that crisis. However, in the absence of such procedures from Congress, the President's independent power to act depends on the gravity of the situation confronting the nation. The President's actions are unconstitutional because Congress already prescribed procedures for use in this particular situation, and the situation is not so grave as to warrant his acting without a grant of power from Congress. Dissent (Vinson, C.J.) ⇨ The President acted in a necessary way to prevent a crisis of national defense that could result from a lack of steel production. The Constitution delegates to the President the duty to execute legislative programs. The implementation of a steel seizure program designed to preserve production and promote the national defense qualifies as a legislative program. The President is uniquely qualified to step in and implement this program, as no other branch of government has the ability to act so quickly by releasing an Executive Order. The President's actions are fully within the actions given to the executive branch by the Constitution, as the Framers necessarily made the executive branch a robust one so it could serve as an actual check and balance to the other branches of government. The majority's decision is improperly aimed at "straw men" as it seeks to prevent the evils of potential future presidents. This scenario is not at issue. The President is both authorized and uniquely qualified to perform this function.

Palmer v. Thompson (1971) RULE OF LAW: A state regulation based on racial classifications is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause if the plaintiff proves both a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory impact of the regulation. FACTS: In 1962, the City of Jackson, Mississippi operated five public parks, swimming pools, and other public facilities on a racially segregated basis. Four of the swimming pools were designated for use by Caucasians only. The fifth pool was designated for use by African Americans only. Several African American plaintiffs challenged the segregation, alleging that it violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution. The district court hearing the case held the segregation unconstitutional, but refused to issue an injunction to stop the practice. The court of appeals affirmed, and the US Supreme Court denied certiorari. The City then proceeded to desegregate these public facilities, but declined to operate its swimming pools on a desegregated basis. The City closed four of its pools. Palmer (plaintiff), an African American resident of Jackson, and several other African American residents brought suit against Thompson (defendant), a City of Jackson official, in federal district court challenging the closing of the pools and seeking to convince the city to reopen them on a non-segregated basis. The district court denied this request, and the court of appeals affirmed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether plaintiffs challenging a state action based on racial classifications must show not only a discriminatory purpose, but also a discriminatory impact.

(Black, J.) ⇨ Yes. Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any act of Congress places an affirmative duty on states to operate swimming pools. Additionally, this case does not present a situation where Caucasians are permitted to use swimming pool facilities while African Americans are denied access. The City closed all of its pools. Palmer argues the pool closings were motivated by the City legislature's intent on separating races. However, none of the Court's precedents invalidate legislative judgments solely on the basis of discriminatory intent. Discriminatory intent is difficult to prove because of the many viewpoints and compromises factored into a legislative decision. Regardless of the City's possible discriminatory motives in closing the pools, Palmer fails to prove that the pool closing has a discriminatory impact on African American residents as a group. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed because both a discriminatory impact and discriminatory purpose are required to invalidate a state action challenged on equal protection grounds. Concurrence (Burger, C.J.) ⇨ Budgetary reasons frequently force municipalities to close public recreational facilities such as pools. Such closures would invariably affect some groups of people more than others, but it is imprudent for these actions to be challenged on every occasion as violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Concurrence (Blackmun, J.) ⇨ The City of Jackson's position is justified by the district court's factual findings that the operation of pools is a luxury and not a necessary public service (unlike public education), and that the continued operation of the pools constitutes a financial deficit for the city. So, the City acted rationally in closing a non-essential public service such as pools in order to preserve financial resources. To hold that the city cannot constitutionally close public services that cost it significant funds would essentially force the City to continuously fund burdensome projects. Although compelling reasons exist for keeping the pools open, the balance of hardships and benefits tip in favor of the City's interests in closing the pools. Dissent (Douglas, J.) ⇨ The majority's holding that a state can constitutionally cease providing a public service to avoid integration of races is completely inapplicable to future cases. Such a situation is not constitutionally permissible, and there is no real difference between that hypothetical situation and the factual situation in the present case. Additionally, a state closing of pools impacts the poor more than the rich and specifically impacts poor African Americans more than poor Caucasians as the former is proven to be the primary user of public pools. Dissent (White, J.) ⇨ States may not constitutionally adopt a practice of taking an official stance against desegregating public facilities to the point of preferring to close those facilities rather than enact desegregation measures under the Fourteenth Amendment. By allowing the City to maintain this stance of abandoning its public pool facilities, the majority is ignoring the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dissent (Marshall, J.) ⇨ The majority should not rely on the apparent facial neutrality of the City's decision to close the pools in finding that it did not unfairly discriminate against African Americans. Precedent suggests that the equal application of a discriminatory law to all racial groups does not constitute a safeguard against the denial of equal protection of the laws to African Americans. Additionally, since the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education , 347 U.S. 483 (1954), all public facilities such as public schools and public pools are treated equally as being protected from the influence of racially discriminatory measures under the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority's current exemption of public pools from the Fourteenth Amendment's protections is contrary to seventeen years of precedent denouncing segregation in public facilities.

Korematsu v. US (1944) RULE OF LAW: State laws restricting the rights of persons based on race are subject to strict scrutiny and will only be upheld if they further a "pressing public necessity." FACTS: On May 9, 1942 under Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, based on Executive Order 9066, Japanese-Americans were ordered to move to relocation camps in light of the US' involvement in World War II. Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 specifically excluded Japanese Americans from remaining in San Leandro, California, a region designated as a "Military Area." Korematsu (defendant) was an American citizen of Japanese descent who was convicted by the US Government (plaintiff), in federal district court for violating Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34. No questions were raised as to Korematsu's loyalty to the US. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, an Executive Order requiring Japanese Americans to relocate to internment camps during World War II, was constitutional.

(Black, J.)⇨ Yes. Although all legal restrictions which restrict the civil rights of a single racial group are automatically suspect, it does not follow that all such restrictions are automatically unconstitutional. Such restrictions are subject to rigid scrutiny by the courts, and will only be upheld in instances of a "pressing public necessity." A comparison is made of the present case to a prior decision in Hirabayashi v. US, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), that upheld a conviction for the violation of a curfew order by a Japanese American during World War II. It was determined in Hirabayashi that the order was designed as a "protection against espionage and against sabotage." Applying Hirabayashi to the present case, it is within the power of Congress and the executive branch to exclude Japanese Americans from the West Coast war area during World War II when the US is in conflict with Japan. Like the curfew order, the same concerns over preventing espionage and sabotage constitute a sufficient "pressing public necessity" to justify excluding Japanese Americans from their homes in particular areas during the war effort. It does not matter that many Japanese Americans remain loyal to the US because the military has determined that many others retain loyalties to the Japanese government. The US Government does not have the resources to make individualized determinations of loyalty during the war effort, therefore exclusion of Korematsu from the West Coast, regardless of his personal loyalties, is justified because of the existence of a "pressing public necessity." The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Concurrence (Frankfurter, J.) ⇨ Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 clearly makes it a crime for Korematsu to remain in the Military Area during World War II. Both Congress and the executive act constitutionally in passing the Order based on the powers given to the government under the Constitution to "wage war successfully." The constitutionality of the particular Civilian Exclusion Order should be judged within the context of the war in which it is enacted. The power to enact exclusionary measures such are justified if the circumstances of war necessitate it, as they are in this case. Dissent (Roberts, J.) ⇨ The undisputed facts exhibit a clear violation of Korematsu's constitutional rights. The total exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast for the duration of the war is a far more significant violation of their rights than the curfew provision at issue in Hirabayashi. In the present case, Korematsu was convicted because he refused to submit to imprisonment in an internment camp by the government despite a lack of inquiry into his loyalty to the US. Additional Executive Orders were issued that severely restricted the travel of Japanese Americans, and thus Korematsu found himself in a predicament where he was faced with violating the travel restrictions or being imprisoned because he unlawfully remained in his home in violation of the Civilian Exclusion Order. The existence of two laws with which equal compliance is impossible effectively deprives Korematsu of his due process rights under the Constitution because it makes him a criminal regardless of what action he chooses. The Civilian Exclusion Order should have been found unconstitutional. Dissent (Murphy, J.) ⇨ Congress and the executive exercised unconstitutional authority, and the Civilian Exclusion Order itself is motivated by racism. The military is justified in making these types of decisions, but power to do so is limited by the judicial process which determines the reasonableness of its actions when they conflict with other important liberty interests. The majority should have only looked to whether the exclusion of Japanese Americans from their homes "reasonably related" to the US' interest in preventing espionage and sabotage. Applying this standard, the exclusion of all Japanese people as a whole from their homes on the West Coast is not reasonably related to preventing these dangers. To conclude that the exclusionary provision is related to espionage and sabotage is to justify the Civilian Exclusion Order on racist grounds and assert that Japanese Americans as a class are more likely to commit these crimes than other racial groups. Even if some Japanese Americans are more likely to commit such acts, this is not a sufficient reason to adopt a racist exclusionary measure which affects all Japanese Americans as a group. Dissent (Jackson, J.) ⇨ The authority of the military to enact provisions like the Civilian Exclusion Order is not unlimited. Whenever the military decides to act in this way to protect its security interests in a war area, the need for protection based on the situation on the ground is likely very grave. However, even in light of these pressing circumstances, the military's actions are constrained by the Constitution. The judiciary is ill-equipped to evaluate the reasonableness of military decisions, however, it should not acquiesce to the decisions of military superiors when these decisions are clearly unconstitutional. The Civilian Exclusion Order in the present case is clearly unconstitutional.

Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana (1978) RULE OF LAW: A state may lawfully discriminate by imposing different regulations on residents and nonresidents of the state as long as those regulations do not impact the "privileges" and "immunities" of noncitizens that bear upon the validity of the nation as a single entity. FACTS: The State of Montana operated a hunting licensing scheme that permitted Montana residents to purchase single-animal hunting licenses for very low fees, but required out-of-state residents to purchase combination licenses for significantly more money, regardless of what animals they wished to hunt in the state. Lester Baldwin (plaintiff) was a Montana resident who operated a hunting-guide business. He and several of his Minnesota clients, all previous hunters in Montana, brought suit against the Fish & Game Commission of Montana (defendant) in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the Montana statute violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. A three-judge panel of the district court denied relief to all plaintiffs, and they appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does a state statute that prices hunting licenses differently for residents and nonresidents discriminate against a basic right of noncitizens in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution?

(Blackmun, J.) ⇨ No. The Privileges and Immunities Clause was enacted to encourage national unity among the several states by protecting the basic rights of noncitizens crossing over other states' borders. However, this finding is limited with respect to those "privileges" and "immunities" bearing upon the vitality of the nation as a single entity. The state must treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally. In the present case, hunting big game by nonresidents in Montana is not a basic right of these nonresidents and does not impact their livelihoods. Rather, it is done purely for sport and recreation, and Montana is not completely foreclosing the possibility of this recreation to nonresidents by simply charging higher fees. Thus, Montana did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause by creating the state licensing scheme. The decision of the district court is affirmed. Concurrence (Burger, C.J.) ⇨ Montana has a special interest in its elk population, and there are limits in this holding. A state has a special interest in regulating and preserving wildlife for the benefit of its citizens, and it may constitutionally pass regulations which favor its own citizens in enjoying that wildlife. However, the majority is correct in limiting the activities to which a state can apply discriminatory regulations based on those which do not bear upon the validity of the nation as a single entity. Dissent (Brennan, J.) ⇨ The fundamental rights of noncitizens bear upon the validity of the nation as a single entity and should not be regulated through "Montana's irrational, wanton and invidious discrimination." The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not go so far as to permit states to pass whatever regulations they wish as long as those regulations do not impact the nation's unity. The enjoyment of natural resources has traditionally been upheld as a "natural right" in precedent cases, and thus the Montana statute exceeds its police powers to regulate its wildlife and unconstitutionally discriminates against important interests of noncitizens.

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) RULE OF LAW: Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate the wages and hours of state employees under the Commerce Clause. FACTS: Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938, but ruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), that the FLSA did not grant authority to Congress to regulate the wages, overtime pay, and hours of state government employees. The San Antonio Metro Transit Authority (SAMTA) (defendant) had previously paid its state employees according to the federal standards established in the FLSA, but ceased doing so after the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities. In 1979, the Wage and Hour Administration of the US Department of Labor ruled that SAMTA could be regulated by the FLSA because its actions were not a traditional government function reserved for the states under National League of Cities. SAMTA then filed suit against the US Department of Labor in the US District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking a declaratory judgment that its actions were not subject to congressional regulation. Garcia (plaintiff) and other employees of SAMTA also filed suit at the same time against SAMTA claiming overtime back-pay. The district court allowed Garcia to intervene as a defendant in SAMTA's suit against the US Department of Labor. The district court ruled for SAMTA. Garcia and the Department of Labor appealed directly to the US Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court remanded the case, and the district court again ruled for SAMTA. On appeal the second time, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does Congress have the constitutional authority to regulate the wages and hours of state employees under the Commerce Clause?

(Blackmun, J.): YES. Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate the wages and hours of state employees under the Commerce Clause. The lower courts have had difficulty applying National League of Cities because of that holding's lack of clarity as to what state activities constitute traditional government functions and are thus protected from congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. National League of Cities is overruled on the grounds that its holding is unnecessary to protect state sovereignty as required by the Tenth Amendment. It is important, under true principles of state sovereignty, that states be free to engage in any activities its citizens deem appropriate, not just those approved on the grounds that they constitute "traditional government functions." Additionally, systems to protect state sovereignty are already built into the structure of the federal government itself. States play a significant role in electing representatives to the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. Elected representatives then continue to represent the interests of their states while in office. States are also vested with indirect control over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by virtue of their control of electoral qualifications. Moreover, the fact that states have been able to channel federal funding into their respective treasuries to finance public works programs indicates that the political process is adequately functioning to provide for their needs. The decision of the district court is reversed. DISSENT (O'Connor, J.): The Court's actions survey the battlefield of federalism and call for a retreat. National League of Cities was an attempt to define the limits of federal regulation on the states and overruling it leads to a decisive victory for Congress's ever-growing Commerce Clause powers. DISSENT (Powell, J.): The Court's decision substantially alters the federal system designed by the framers and embodied in the Constitution to protect states' rights. The majority completely ignores principles of stare decisis in overruling National League of Cities and greatly weakens the power of the Tenth Amendment to stand as an important safeguard of state sovereignty. The Court does not adequately explain how states' role in the electoral process protects them against exercises of the Commerce Clause power infringing their sovereignty. While members of Congress are elected from various states, once in office they are members of the federal government; and although states participate in the Electoral College, the President is not a representative of states' interests against federal encroachment. Indeed, the Court's decision makes federal political officials the sole judges of their own power. DISSENT (Rehnquist, J.): Both Justice Powell's and Justice O'Connor's dissents outline a more prudent way of deciding the case that one day will be recognized by a majority of the Court.

The Civil Rights Cases (1883) RULE OF LAW: Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may only prohibit discrimination by state actors, not private individuals. FACTS: Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1875. Part of the first sections of the Act prohibit discrimination against individuals in establishments including restaurants, hotels, and stores on the basis of race. This case is a consolidation of five different cases from various lower courts heard by the US Supreme Court. In each case, plaintiffs alleged defendants violated some aspect of the Civil Rights Act. Specifically, in US v. Stanley, plaintiffs were several African-Americans that brought suit against Stanley and Nichols (defendants), hotel owners, for denying them admittance to their hotels. ISSUE: May Congress pass an act such as the Civil Rights Act that prohibits discrimination by individuals?

(Bradley, J.) ⇨ No. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment functions as a restraint on abuses by state actors of the rights and freedoms of US citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment also gives Congress the power to pass whatever legislation is necessary to enforce those restrictions on state actors. Thus, had the businesses implicated in the present cases been state or local governments, Congress would have acted constitutionally. However, because all defendants in the cases are private individuals accused of discriminating against African American patrons in privately-owned businesses, Congress acted outside the scope of its Fourteenth Amendment powers. The Civil Rights Act is therefore unconstitutional. Dissent (Harlan, J.) ⇨ The majority focuses too much on the distinction between state actors and private individuals. In doing so, this decision ignores the spirit of the Civil Rights Act itself and the intent of Congress in passing a statute that seeks to prevent discrimination against African Americans. More weight should have been given to Congressional intent before striking down the Act as unconstitutional.

Plyler v. Doe (1982) RULE OF LAW: States may not deny free public education to children not legally admitted into the US. FACTS: Texas amended its education laws to withhold state funds for the education of children not legally admitted into the country. It also authorized school districts to refuse to enroll children not legally admitted into the country. Doe and other aliens affected by this amendment (plaintiffs) sued the state of Texas, alleging that the amended statutes were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the plaintiffs' appeal. ISSUE: May states deny free public education to children not legally admitted into the US?

(Brennan, J.) ⇨ No. A state may not deny free public education to children not legally admitted into the US without violating the Equal Protection Clause. While the judiciary must respect the political decisions of Congress, especially in the area of immigration, states have no similar authority in regard to the classification or discrimination of aliens. However, states do have the authority to take action in regards to undocumented aliens if it complies with federal goals as well as furthers a legitimate state goal. There is no evidence of any federal policy that supports the denial of education to the children of undocumented aliens. A heightened level of judicial review should be applied in cases dealing with the children of undocumented immigrants. Children of immigrants did not choose to enter the country unlawfully, and depriving them of an education will contribute to a large disenfranchised underclass of undocumented aliens. Therefore, the law will only be held constitutional if it furthers a substantial goal of the state. There are three possible state goals, yet none of them are substantial enough to validate the state's discrimination. There is no evidence that denying public education to undocumented aliens will help stop undocumented immigrants from moving to Texas. There is also no evidence that denying these children an education will increase the quality of public education in the state because the children of aliens require a disproportionate amount of educational resources. Finally, the argument that children of undocumented aliens are less likely to remain in the state is without merit. Many undocumented children will become lawful residents or citizens, and the state never has assurances that the beneficiaries of its public education system will stay in the state. Therefore, Texas is not furthering a substantial goal of the state by denying a public education to children not legally admitted into the country. Concurrence (Marshall, J.) ⇨ The majority should have stressed that every child in the country has a fundamental right to a public education. Concurrence (Blackmun, J.) ⇨ Denying an entire class of aliens a public education creates a permanent class of second-class citizens. The Texas statute in question is overinclusive because it is impossible for the state to determine which aliens will eventually be deported. Concurrence (Powell, J.) ⇨ The majority properly uses a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. While the states are understandably frustrated with the amount of illegal aliens within their borders, creating a subclass of uneducated people harms both the states and the nation as a whole. Dissent (Burger, C.J.) ⇨ The court is attempting to make up for Congress' inaction in the area of illegal immigration. However, that decision not to act is a political one, and the judiciary has no right to make political decisions. Heightened judicial scrutiny is only warranted when the classification affects a suspect class or a fundamental right. Illegal aliens are not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right, as the majority appears to acknowledge. Therefore, rational basis review should be applied. The state has a legitimate state purpose in conserving its resources, and the classification in question is rationally related to that goal. This is similar to the federal government's constitutional denial of public benefits to illegal aliens.

Craig v. Boren (1976) RULE OF LAW: A governmental regulation involving gender discrimination is constitutional if it is substantially related to the achievement of an important government purpose. FACTS: An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of "non-intoxicating" 3.2 percent alcoholic beer to males under the age of twenty-one, but permitted the sale of such beer to females over the age of eighteen. Craig (plaintiff), a liquor vendor in Oklahoma, brought suit against Boren (defendant), an Oklahoma state official, in federal district court on the grounds that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court upheld the statute, holding that statistical evidence regarding young men's drunk-driving arrests and traffic injuries demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was substantially related to the achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads. Craig appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether a statute that denies the sale of alcohol to individuals of the same age based solely on gender violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Brennan, J.) ⇨ Yes. The appropriate standard of review for governmental gender-based classifications is intermediate scrutiny. The classification must be substantially related to the achievement of an important government purpose. Applying this standard, Boren offers statistical evidence to show that the state regulations were related to traffic safety. Even if the statistics are taken as accurate in showing the propensity of both sexes to drive under the influence of alcohol, the statistics show that 0.18 percent of females between ages eighteen and twenty were arrested for that offense, while 2 percent of males in that age group were arrested for the same offense. While the difference is statistically significant, it is not enough to justify a broad categorical rule prohibiting the sale of alcohol to males, and not females, in this age group. Additionally, no statistics are offered regarding the use and relative dangerousness of 3.2 percent alcoholic beer as compared to alcohol in general. No justification exists for enacting a gender-based law governing the sale of this particular beer and not alcohol in general to males and females between ages eighteen and twenty. The gender-based discrimination contained in Oklahoma's law constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws to males between eighteen and twenty. The judgment of the district court is reversed. Concurrence (Powell, J.) ⇨ Gender-based classifications are subject to strict, not intermediate scrutiny, as outlined in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Oklahoma did not meet its burden of proof to withstand strict scrutiny. Concurrence (Stevens, J.) ⇨ There is a need for a third standard of review beyond strict scrutiny and rational basis review. On the merits, the statistics presented do not automatically point to the conclusion that males are more likely to drive under the influence of alcohol than females. Dissent (Burger, C.J.) ⇨ Gender classifications should be analyzed under rational basis review. Even though the majority does not agree with the means used by the Oklahoma legislature in passing its statute (i.e. relying on statistical evidence), the majority cannot say that the legislature acted irrationally in reaching its conclusion. Dissent (Rehnquist, J.) ⇨ The majority is wrong to apply any more stringent scrutiny than rational basis for gender classifications. The language of requiring sex-discriminating regulations to be "substantially related to an important government purpose" is not supported by the Equal Protection Clause, case precedent, or any other constitutional provision. Any form of strict scrutiny itself is not appropriate as state legislatures are entitled to great deference in their judgments. The statute should be upheld and the judgment of the district court affirmed.

Katzenbach v. Morgan & Morgan (1966) RULE OF LAW: Congress may pass legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even when the legislation conflicts with state law. FACTS: In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Section 4(e) of the Act provided that no person that successfully completed the sixth grade in a public or private school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, where the language of education was something other than English, could be denied the right to vote in an election because of his inability to read or write English. The election laws of the State of New York, however, required all voters to have the ability to read and write English as a requisite to voting. Morgan and other registered voters in New York City (plaintiffs) brought suit against Katzenbach (defendant), the US government official tasked with enforcing §4(e). The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of §4(e) in federal district court on the grounds that it prohibited enforcement of New York's election laws requiring an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. A three-judge panel of the district court held that §4(e) was unconstitutional, and Katzenbach appealed directly to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Congress pass legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even when the legislation conflicts with state law?

(Brennan, J.) ⇨ Yes. The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment included §5 to grant Congress with broad power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, Congress may pass legislation under its powers in §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided that the legislation is (1) an enactment to enforce a provision of the Equal Protection Clause; (2) plainly adapted to that end; and (3) consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Under this analysis, §4(e) can be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Congress specifically stated that the reason it enacted the provision was to prevent unequal treatment under the law of the Puerto Rican community in New York. Additionally, §4(e) was plainly adapted for that purpose: the practical effect of §4(e) is to ensure that Puerto Rican voters who did not speak English in New York are not disenfranchised in the voting process. This effect is within the letter and spirit of the Constitution as the Constitution highly values civil rights and equal treatment under the laws. Finally, Congress exercised its prerogative to weigh these concerns when enacting such legislation and found §4(e) to be an appropriate measure to promote the Equal Protection Clause. Deference is given to Congress's judgment as §4(e) is an appropriate exercise of Congress's power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court's judgment is reversed. Dissent (Harlan, J.) ⇨ Congress's enactment of Section 4(e) violates the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches and violates the federal and state boundaries of political authority. Franchise is a matter of state concern subject only to the overriding requirements of various federal constitutional provisions dealing with franchise. Hence, New York has constitutional authority to regulate its franchise requirements. Moreover, in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state literary qualification. Finally, Congress may take remedial measures to redress and prevent state violations of federal constitutional standards. However, it is for the Court to decide—not Congress—whether the condition with which Congress has sought to deal is truly an infringement of the Constitution. If it were otherwise, Congress would be able to qualify the Court's constitutional decisions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as other constitutional provisions, by resorting to the Necessary and Proper Clause.

US Dept of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) RULE OF LAW: A state regulation that arbitrarily creates two classes of persons and deprives one class of government benefits violates the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it is based on a mere legislative preference for one class that is not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. FACTS: In 1964, Congress passed the Food Stamp Act to govern and reform its food stamp program. Section 3(e) of the Act excluded from participation in the food stamp program any household containing an individual who was unrelated to any other member of the household. Moreno (plaintiff) lived with Sanchez, a person to whom she was not related, and Sanchez's three children. Moreno met all income and other requirements for receiving food stamps, however, her benefits were denied under § 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act. Sanchez's benefits were also denied despite otherwise qualifying. Moreno brought suit against the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) (defendant) in federal district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the act. The district court held that § 3(e) violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The USDA appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does a law that terminates food stamp benefits for a class of persons comprised of unrelated people living in the same households violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

(Brennan, J.) ⇨ Yes. The practical effect of § 3(e) is to create two distinct classes of people: those living in households in which all members are related to each other; and those living in households where at least some members are unrelated. For this legislative classification of individuals to be upheld, it would have to be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. In the present case, Congress stated that the purpose of the Act was to stimulate the agricultural economy by encouraging people to purchase farm surpluses. The governing of relationships within private homes bears no rational relation to this stated purpose. However, because legislative enactments do not necessarily have to be sustained by the "actual" purpose of Congress, an analysis is undertaken to see if other purposes exist that can constitutionally sustain the statute. In examining the legislative history surrounding the Act, Congress primarily sought to exclude "hippies" and "hippie communes" from participating in the food stamp program. However, this purpose is unconstitutional because the Equal Protection Clause prevents Congress from passing legislation targeting a particular, unpopular group. The USDA argues that the legislature could have reasonably found that households composed of unrelated members are more likely to abuse the program, and thus could have passed legislation that is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of preventing fraud. The Act in question is not targeted at people identified as likely to "abuse the program," but rather discriminates against an entire class of persons that are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements to retain program eligibility. The Act's classification of this group of people as ineligible for assistance lacks any rational basis. The decision of the district court is affirmed. Concurrence (Douglas, J.) ⇨ Strict scrutiny should have been applied in analyzing the challenged statute because § 3(e) interferes with people's fundamental right of freedom of association. Under strict scrutiny, § 3(e) would have only been upheld if it furthers a compelling government interest. The stated purpose of preventing fraud in the food stamp program is not a compelling government interest.Section 3(e) constitutes invidious discrimination against a class of persons for no reason other than the fact that they live with other people to whom they are not related and are too needy to change this arrangement. The challenged legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Dissent (Rehnquist, J.) ⇨ The majority's opinion is inappropriate given the fact that Congress has already considered the benefits and disadvantages of § 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act and enacted the provision because it sees a need for it. Questions about the need for legislative classifications are for Congress, not the judiciary, to decide. Congress could have reasonably believed that the challenged legislative provision would help prevent households organized solely for the purpose of abusing the Food Stamp program from receiving benefits. Thus, § 3(e) would have been rationally related to furthering this purpose.

US v. Comstock (2010) RULE OF LAW: Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the authority to enact a law that allows civil commitment of mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal inmates beyond the end of the prisoners' criminal sentences. FACTS: A federal law allows a district court to civilly detain a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the end of her sentence upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the inmate (1) "'engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation," (2) currently "suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder," and (3) is "sexually dangerous to others" as a result of the illness. 18 U.S.C. § 4248. The statute guarantees the inmate an attorney, a hearing, and other procedural protections. The federal government must turn the inmate over to the state where she was tried or domiciled if the state will accept her. In 2006, civil commitment proceedings were instituted against Grayson Comstock, Jr. and four other federal inmates (plaintiffs). The inmates had pleaded guilty to crimes involving child pornography and sexual abuse of a minor. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed on the grounds that (1) commitment required proof beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) Congress had exceeded its authority. The government appealed. The court of appeals affirmed based on the lack of congressional authority. The government petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari to review the limited question of Congress's authority to enact the statute under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution, which was granted. ISSUE: Does Congress have the authority to enact a law that allows civil commitment of mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal inmates beyond the end of their sentences?

(Breyer, J.) ⇨ Yes. Congress has authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact a statute permitting civil commitment of sexually dangerous federal inmates. First, the Necessary and Proper Clause confers expansive power on Congress to enact legislation that is convenient or useful. Though Congress's powers are limited and enumerated, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the ability to enact any law that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The Court has eschewed narrow interpretations of this clause. The Constitution does not expressly provide that Congress may criminalize behavior or control prisons. Such acts are proper under Congress's sweeping authority to carry into execution the powers vested by the Constitution. Second, Congress has authorized civil commitment of federal detainees and prisoners since the 1850s. This statute is only a small extension of the existing mental health framework for federal prisoners. Third, it was reasonable for Congress to provide for civil commitment of sexually dangerous inmates. Congress is the custodian of federal prisoners and may therefore constitutionally take steps to protect the public from those inmates. Fourth, the statute does not violate the Tenth Amendment by usurping powers reserved to the states. In fact, the statute specifically provides that inmates must be handed over if states assert their authority. Finally, the statute is sufficiently related to enumerated Article I powers and does not give Congress general police powers. In light of these considerations, the statute is a "necessary and proper" means of exercising Congress's enumerated powers. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence (Alito, J.) ⇨ The language used by the majority is overbroad, and the standard applied ambiguous, but the statute is constitutional. This statute supports the criminal laws under which the federal inmates were convicted, and therefore, it is necessary and proper for carrying out the enumerated powers underpinning those federal criminal statutes. Congress ought to "protect the public from dangers created by the federal criminal justice and prison systems," and states should not be forced to carry the heavy burdens, financial and otherwise, for caring for dangerous federal prisoners. There is a "substantial link" between the statute and Congress's powers. Thus, Congress had the necessary authority to pass § 4248. Dissent (Thomas, J.) ⇨ The majority wrongly concludes that Congress possesses the constitutional authority to enact 18 U.S.C. § 4248. While the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress broad authority, it only authorizes actions aimed at the legitimate end of carrying out some other enumerated power. There is no enumerated power authorizing Congress to allow civil commitment of sexually dangerous federal prisoners. Therefore, § 4248 is only constitutional if it is "necessary and proper" for the execution of some other federal power enumerated in the Constitution, but the government does not indicate what enumerated power this law is meant to execute. Providing for the mentally ill and handling civil commitments falls within the states' police powers. Because § 4248 does not execute any of Congress's enumerated powers, it is unconstitutional.

US v. Lara (2004) RULE OF LAW: Congress's decision to extend tribal criminal jurisdiction to Indian nonmembers was a constitutionally permissible extension of inherent tribal sovereignty. FACTS: After the US Supreme Court's holding in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), Congress passed legislation to allow Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, even those who were not members of their tribe. Lara (defendant), a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, was prosecuted by the Spirit Lake Tribe under this legislation. After Lara's tribal conviction, Lara was also charged in the US District Court for the District of North Dakota with a federal crime for the same conduct. Lara contested the charges by arguing that a second conviction would violate the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. In response, the US took the position that the US and Spirit Lake Tribe were separate sovereigns and that the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar convictions by both sovereigns. Lara contended that the congressional amendment delegated federal authority, thus rendering the Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to the federal prosecution, while the US argued that the amendment merely extended the Spirit Lake Tribe's inherent tribal authority. The trial court agreed with the government, as did a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. However, on en banc review, the Eighth Circuit reversed and determined that Congress's extension of tribal criminal jurisdiction was derived from federal authority rather than tribal authority and, therefore, a second conviction would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Is Congress's decision to extend tribal criminal jurisdiction to Indian nonmembers a constitutionally permissible extension of inherent tribal sovereignty?

(Breyer, J.) ⇨ Yes. Congress's extension of tribal criminal jurisdiction derives from inherent tribal sovereignty and not delegated federal power, and this is acceptable under the US Constitution. It is clear from the language of the statute that Congress intended to affirm and extend inherent tribal powers to prosecute Indian nonmembers in tribal courts. The legislative history also supports this interpretation. Moreover, six different factors support the conclusion that the Constitution permits Congress to do so. First, the Constitution gives Congress significant authority to pass legislation on tribal issues. Second, this authority includes both the authority to restrict and to relax restrictions on Indian tribal sovereignty. Third, Congress has historically had the power to modify the sovereignty of different dependent entities, including Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Fourth, nothing in the Constitution suggests that Congress does not have that authority. Fifth, the relevant extension of tribal sovereignty granted by Congress is limited to a tribe's ability to deal with criminal acts that occur on its reservation and does not interfere with states. Sixth, Supreme Court case law has consistently recognized that Congress and the political branches, not the Constitution, determine the authority held by Indian tribes. Although prior cases such as Duro suggest that Congress can delegate power to tribes, they do not prevent Congress from simply extending the inherent tribal sovereignty of Indians. Here, because Congress's decision to allow Indian tribes to prosecute the criminal acts of Indian nonmembers derives from tribal sovereignty rather than a delegation of federal power, Lara's indictments by the Spirit Lake tribal court and the federal court are by two separate sovereigns and do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Eighth Circuit is reversed. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ Although the majority's conclusion is acceptable under current federal case law concerning Indians, the body of law on Indian rights is full of inherent contradictions. Courts have attempted to hold that tribes can be regulated by Congress, while also holding that tribes are sovereign entities, which is logically inconsistent. To resolve questions of whether the Constitution gives Congress the ability to restrict or extend Indian tribal sovereignty, courts must first address this tension and determine whether tribes are, in fact, sovereigns in the first place. Concurrence (Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Congress's amendment to allow Indian tribes to prosecute Indian nonmembers is an extension of Indian tribes' inherent sovereignty and not a delegation of federal authority. That resolves this case, and there is no need to address whether the amendment is authorized by the Constitution. Concurrence (Stevens, J.) ⇨ Because Congress can authorize states to exercise their inherent authority, it should also be able to allow Indian tribes to exercise their inherent authority as well. Dissent (Souter, J.) ⇨ This court has consistently held that Indian tribes lost their inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians when they became dependent sovereigns, and that authority can only be restored by delegation from Congress. This authority is not inherent, as the majority suggests, but can only be authorized by Congress. The only way for inherent sovereignty and jurisdiction to be restored is for Congress to grant Indians independence, as it has done with nations such as the Philippines, or to repudiate the idea of dependent sovereignty. These are the only two ways the Indian tribes and the federal government could truly be dual sovereigns. Otherwise, the ability of Indian tribes to regulate criminal acts by nonmembers is merely a delegation of federal authority. Because these two options are not practical, the best way to proceed is to follow prior decisions and hold that the grant of an extension of criminal jurisdiction to Indian tribes is a delegation of federal authority.

Downes v. Bidwell (1901) RULE OF LAW: US territories are not a part of the US for purposes of the Constitution's revenue clauses. FACTS: Downes (plaintiff) paid a tax, under protest, on goods shipped to him from Puerto Rico. The tax was imposed under the federal Foraker Act, which created a civil government for Puerto Rico. Downes brought suit against the tax collector in New York (defendant), arguing that when the US signed the treaty with Spain to end the Spanish-American War, Puerto Rico became a part of the US. Accordingly, Downes claimed, the tax violated Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which required that congressional taxes be uniform throughout the country. The lower court held that this constitutional provision did not apply to Puerto Rico. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Are US territories a part of the US for purposes of the Constitution's revenue clauses?

(Brown, J.) ⇨ No. US territories are not a part of the US for purposes of the Constitution's revenue clauses. The Constitution discusses states, the people of states, and the representatives of states. Nowhere is there room for an inference regarding territories. Indeed, the Thirteenth Amendment references "the US, or in any place subject to their jurisdiction." The drafters thus acknowledged that there are US territories that are not "states" within the term "US." Puerto Rico is one such territory. Further, Congress has consistently asserted its authority over property in US territories. These assertions of power would be unconstitutional if attempted over property in the states. Although the Court does not in this case decide the question, it likely cannot be said that residents of US territories have no rights and yet can still be subject to congressional authority. The residents likely do have certain fundamental rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property. However, it does not follow that all provisions of the Constitution apply to such residents. The Court holds only that US territories are not subject to the unconstrained will of Congress. In this case, Puerto Rico, a US territory, is not a part of the US for purposes of the Constitution's revenue clauses, including the requirement that congressional taxes be uniform throughout the US. Accordingly, the tax applied to Downes's shipments from Puerto Rico is valid even though it is unique to Puerto Rico. The judgment upholding the tax is affirmed. Concurrence (White, J.) ⇨ The US acquired Puerto Rico as a territory via a treaty. Generally, the president's treaty-making power does not extend to incorporating territories without Congress's approval. Specifically, the treaty in this case states that Puerto Rico's status shall be determined by Congress. Thus, any determination on the application of laws to Puerto Rico must be made by Congress. Given the terms of the Foraker Act, which imposed the tax at issue, it is clear that Congress did not intend to make Puerto Rico part of the US for constitutional purposes. Dissent (Harlan, J.) ⇨ The people of the US have deemed the Constitution the supreme law of the land. Congress does not have the power to forbear from the Constitution in handpicked situations of crisis or novelty. Thus, when the country acquires a territory, the Constitution automatically applies to that territory. Puerto Rico now has a civil government that the US established. It is incongruous to say that the federal laws of the US do not apply. Dissent (Fuller, C.J.) ⇨ In the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Supreme Court held that the US includes the District of Columbia and all US territories. This includes Puerto Rico. The Constitution was created by the people and is carried out by representatives of the people. The powers that the people delegated to their representatives through the Constitution do not expand merely because the US has grown larger. The portion of the Thirteenth Amendment cited by the Court was included out of an abundance of caution due to the state of the Union at that time, as the country was in the midst of a civil war.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) RULE OF LAW: Public accommodations that are segregated according to racial classifications do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as long as such accommodations are "separate but equal." FACTS: In 1890, the State of Louisiana passed a law that provided for separate railway cars for Caucasian and African American persons. Plessy (defendant) was seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African American, but was considered African American under Louisiana law. He challenged the law by taking a seat in a Caucasian railway car and was asked to move to the African American car by the conductor. When he refused, he was forcibly ejected and imprisoned. The Committee of Citizens originally brought suit on behalf of Plessy in Louisiana state court challenging his arrest and conviction. The presiding judge, Ferguson (plaintiff), held that Louisiana had a right to enact such legislation to regulate railway companies as long as those companies operated within the state's borders. Plessy then sought a writ of prohibition against Ferguson. The Committee of Citizens appealed on Plessy's behalf to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which upheld Judge Ferguson's ruling. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May a state enact a law providing for separate railway cars for Caucasian and African American persons without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Brown, J.) ⇨ Yes. While the object of the Fourteenth Amendment is to promote the equality of all races before the law, it cannot have been intended to abolish all distinctions based on color, or to enforce social (as opposed to political) equality when African Americans and Caucasians do not actually want to be commingled. Laws permitting or requiring the separation of the two races are supported by precedent and do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other. If the African American race feels inferior because of the laws, that inferiority construction is placed upon the race by itself. Legislative judgments forcing commingling cannot be used to improve race relations, and if the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it has to be the result of an organic process. The Louisiana law is upheld on the grounds that if the civil and political rights of both races are separate but still equal, one cannot be considered inferior to the other either socially or politically. The distinction does not imply racial inferiority or violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the railway cars of the two races in the present case are separate but equal. The decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court is affirmed. Dissent (Harlan, J.) ⇨ A legislative body or judicial tribunal should not consider the race of citizens when making legislative decisions about civil rights of those citizens. In this case, the consideration of race violates both concepts of equal rights and personal liberty interests. The Louisiana law is condemnable in creating separate cars for African Americans because the obvious underlying reason for the law is a belief by the legislature that African Americans are an inferior race. The Constitution itself is color-blind, and the Louisiana law and the majority's decision both misinterpret the civil rights protections embodied in the Constitution. The majority's decision will eventually be overturned and condemned as being just as pernicious as the previous decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Louisiana's law should have been invalidated as unconstitutional.

US v. Nixon (1974) RULE OF LAW: A presidential claim of privilege asserting only a generalized interest in confidentiality is not sufficient to overcome the judicial interest in producing all relevant evidence in a criminal case. FACTS: President Nixon (defendant) was named as a co-conspirator in various charges including conspiracy to defraud the US. The US District Court for the District of Columbia subpoenaed various tapes and documents relating to specific meetings in which Nixon was a participant. Nixon filed a formal claim of privilege and a motion to quash the subpoenas. The US District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May the President of the US assert an absolute claim of privilege over all confidential communications?

(Burger, C.J.) ⇨ No. Although there is a presumptive presidential privilege for his confidential communications, when the communications do not concern military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, that presumption may be rebutted due to the constitutional need to produce all relevant evidence in a criminal case. Thus there is no absolute, unqualified presidential privilege. Separate powers were not meant to operate with absolute independence. A generalized claim of presidential privilege based on a claim of public interest in confidentiality does not overcome the interest in producing all relevant evidence consistent with the fair administration of justice. President Nixon does not base his claim of privilege on military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets. The President's claim is of a generalized presidential privilege of confidentiality. Such a claim cannot be upheld in a criminal proceeding as the interests of justice outweigh Nixon's general need for confidentiality. As a result, the order of the US District Court for the District of Columbia denying Nixon's motion to quash the subpoena is affirmed.

Reed v. Reed (1971) RULE OF LAW: When state law imposes differential treatment among different classes of individuals, the classification must bear a substantial relation to the purpose of the legislation. FACTS: A law of the state of Idaho imposed a mandatory preference for the selection of males over females in the appointment of an administrator of an intestate estate. Reed (plaintiff) was not selected to serve as the administrator of an estate because of her gender. Reed appealed the court's appointment of a male administrator. The state supreme court upheld the gender-based appointment. Reed petitioned the US Supreme Court for review. ISSUE: When state law imposes differential treatment among different classes of individuals, must the classification bear a substantial relation to the purpose of the legislation?

(Burger, J.) ⇨ Yes. When state law imposes differential treatment among different classes of individuals, the classification must bear a substantial relation to the purpose of the legislation. The Idaho law at issue provides that when several individuals compete for appointment as administrator of an intestate estate, the court must afford preference to male applicants. The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit states from implementing legislation that affords differential treatment to different classes of individuals, but it does prohibit classifications unrelated to the goals of the legislation. Any such classification must not be arbitrary, and must be founded on a reasonable basis that furthers the objective of the legislation. The state supreme court concluded that the law at issue promoted the efficient administration of intestate estates by eliminating one point of potential controversy. In that context, the state court concluded that eliminating a class of applicants on the basis of gender was not an arbitrary or irrational distinction. While the goal of promoting efficient probate administration may be legitimate, eliminating a class of participants exclusively on the basis of gender is inconsistent with the mandates of the Equal Protection Clause. The state supreme court decision is reversed.

Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) RULE OF LAW: In exercising its constitutional spending power, Congress may not enact a law that coerces the states contrary to the autonomy guaranteed to them under the Tenth Amendment. FACTS: Under the Social Security Act's unemployment compensation program, employers are required to pay a federal tax, but receive a 90 percent credit on the tax if they contribute to a state unemployment compensation fund that meets federal requirements. ISSUE: Does a federal law that taxes employers but grants a credit to employers who contribute to state unemployment funds impermissibly coerce states contrary to the Tenth Amendment?

(Cardozo, J.): NO. A federal law that taxes employers to fund national welfare assistance, but grants a credit toward that same tax to employers who help fund state welfare assistance programs, does not impermissibly coerce the states. In exercising its constitutional spending power, Congress may not enact a law that coerces the states and impairs their autonomy guaranteed under the Tenth Amendment. In the context of the cyclical depression and unprecedented levels of unemployment that this country suffered between 1929 and 1936, the use of federal funds to provide relief for the unemployed served the purpose of promoting the general welfare. Many states resisted enacting their own unemployment compensation laws out of fear that they would be at an economic disadvantage to neighboring states. As a result, states were not free to contribute their fair share toward a national problem, which in turn led to a disproportionate fiscal burden on federal resources. The Social Security Act (SSA) is an attempt to provide a system under which states and the federal government can work together to meet a common goal. The funds collected from the federal tax imposed under the SSA will alleviate the fiscal burden on federal resources if states continue not to act, while the tax credit provided to employers will lead to increased funding for state welfare assistance programs that will alleviate the burden on federal resources. Every tax rebate that requires certain conduct is a temptation, but this is not the same as coercion. Under this system, a state is not unduly influenced or coerced when it chooses to administer unemployment relief under its own laws and through state agents as opposed to federal laws and officers. In addition, in providing this tax credit Congress acted within the scope of its function, as the purpose of the tax credit is to protect the federal treasury and to put states on an equal footing. In this case, the tax and the tax credit are also approximate equivalents, both serving to satisfy a fiscal need. Further, the objections to the tax at issue in US v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), are inapplicable here: the funds collected from the tax are not earmarked for a special group; a state unemployment compensation law, once enacted, will necessarily have the approval of that state; the condition placed on receiving the tax credit is not irrevocable, as a state may repeal its unemployment compensation law; and the condition placed on receiving the tax credit is aimed at achieving a lawful end, namely unemployment relief through cooperation between the states and the federal government. Finally, the standards set out under the SSA for state unemployment compensation laws do not impair state autonomy, as they are necessary to ensure that the state programs are indeed what they claim to be before awarding the tax credit to them. The tax and tax credit provided under the SSA do not coerce the states contrary to the Tenth Amendment.

US v. Klein (1871) RULE OF LAW: Based on the principle of separation of powers in the US Constitution, the legislative branch may not impair or direct the exclusive powers of the judicial or executive branches. FACTS: In 1863, Congress adopted a statute providing that individuals whose property had been seized during the Civil War could recover their property or just compensation for it if they proved they had not assisted the Confederate army during the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln then issued a proclamation offering a pardon to anyone who had fought for or supported the Confederate army, provided that person take an oath of allegiance to the Union. Following Congress's act and the President's proclamation, the US Supreme Court held that a presidential pardon was sufficient proof that an individual had not assisted the Confederate army and was enough to justify a restoration of that person's property rights. Based on the 1863 statute and the president's proclamation, V.F. Wilson (D) took the oath of allegiance and was pardoned. After D's death in 1865, the administrator of his estate, Klein (D*), applied to the Court of Claims to recover compensation for property seized from D during the Civil War. While D*'s case was pending, Congress repealed its 1863 statute in 1867. The Court of Claims then decided in 1869 that D's estate was entitled to compensation for seized property based on his oath and presidential pardon. However, in 1870, Congress passed a new law that prohibited the use of a presidential pardon as proof that an individual was entitled to property rights or compensation. The law also said that acceptance of a presidential pardon, without a specific disclaimer of guilt, was conclusive evidence that the person did provide support to the Confederacy and thus made that person ineligible to recover property or compensation. Congress stated that if a person was ultimately found to support the Confederacy, the US Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over an appeal of his or her denial of property rights from the Court of Claims. Based on this new law, the US government (P) brought suit in the US Supreme Court challenging the property rights given to D* on the grounds that since D accepted a presidential pardon, his estate was not entitled to property or sale proceeds. ISSUE: May Congress constitutionally pass legislation that specifically directs or impairs the actions of the judicial or executive branches of government?

(Chase, C.J.): NO. Under the Constitution's grant of power to Congress to make "such exceptions to appellate jurisdiction" as it deems appropriate, Congress could permissibly limit the ability of the Supreme Court to hear certain cases on appeal. However, in this case, Congress's 1870 law did more than just make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction. It went beyond that to actually require the Court to determine it was without jurisdiction if it found that a plaintiff was entitled to property rights based on a presidential pardon. This effectively required the Supreme Court to reach a certain result; it prescribed the rule of decision in a particular case. This is an impermissible extension of Congress's power and is thus unconstitutional. Additionally, Congress also exceeds its powers by limiting the effect of a presidential pardon—a distinctively executive act. The judgment for D* is affirmed because Congress overstepped its bounds and violated the principle of separation of powers in the US Constitution. DISSENT (Miller, J.): Individuals who aided or supported the Confederacy and had their property seized should not be entitled to the return of or compensation for that property. Thus, Congress acted appropriately when determining that a presidential pardon would not stand as conclusive evidence of proof that property should be returned.

Ex Parte McCardle (1868) RULE OF LAW: Although the US Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is derived from Article III of the Constitution, it is conferred subject to whatever exceptions and regulations Congress chooses to make. FACTS: William McCardle (D), a newspaper editor in Vicksburg, Mississippi, was arrested by federal government officials after he wrote a series of newspaper articles that were highly critical of the post-Civil War Reconstruction and resulting military rule of the South. The federal government justified D's arrest on the ground that he violated several provisions of the Reconstruction Acts. D sought a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court in Mississippi, but was ultimately unsuccessful in challenging his arrest. D then sought appellate review of his habeas corpus petition in the US Supreme Court, relying on an 1867 congressional statute that permitted the Supreme Court to have appellate jurisdiction over such matters. However, while the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Congress passed a new law repealing the part of the 1867 statute that permitted Supreme Court appellate review of writs of habeas corpus. President Andrew Johnson vetoed this legislation, but Congress immediately overrode his veto and reinstated its repeal of the 1867 statute. ISSUE: May Congress withdraw jurisdiction from the US Supreme Court after jurisdiction has been given?

(Chase, C.J.): YES. Although the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is derived from Article III of the Constitution, it is ultimately conferred "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make" as outlined in the Exceptions Clause of Article III, Section 2. Here, Congress had previously affirmed the Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions in its 1867 Act, but repealed that provision of the act in 1868. By doing so, Congress exercised its constitutional right to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction. Thus, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to consider D's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Katzenbach v. McClung (1964) RULE OF LAW: Congress may regulate the discriminatory policies of restaurants through Title II of the Civil Rights Act if those policies have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. FACTS: In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Title II of the CRA forbids racial discrimination by places of public accommodation such as hotels and restaurants. The McClungs (plaintiffs) owned and operated Ollie's Barbecue in Birmingham, Alabama and refused to serve African American customers in their dining area. Approximately half of the food served by the restaurant moved in interstate commerce. The McClungs sued Katzenbach (defendant), the US government actor responsible for enforcing the CRA, to enjoin the CRA's enforcement against the McClungs. The action was brought in federal district court. A three-judge panel of the district court issued an injunction preventing enforcement of the CRA against the McClungs. The US government appealed the injunction directly to the US Supreme Court. The Court decided this case along with Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. US, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). ISSUE: May Congress regulate the discriminatory policies of restaurants through Title II of the Civil Rights Act if those policies have a substantial effect on interstate commerce?

(Clark, J.): YES. Congress may regulate the discriminatory policies of restaurants through Title II of the Civil Rights Act if those policies have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Extensive testimony given before Congress in the adoption of Title II of the CRA suggests that established restaurants in areas known for discriminating against African Americans sell fewer interstate goods because of the discrimination, that interstate travel is obstructed directly by it, that business in general suffers, and that many new businesses avoid the location as a result. When legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, the judicial inquiry ends. In this case, in light of the testimony before the legislature, Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce. This, combined with the lower court's finding that a significant portion of the food served at Ollie's Barbecue traveled in interstate commerce, permits Congress to regulate the McClung's actions pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed. CONCURRENCE (Goldberg, J.): Congress's power to enact Title II of the CRA stems from both the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Title II was not passed for economic reasons; rather, it was passed to protect human dignity against the shame and humiliation that may arise from being subjected to discriminatory conduct. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives all Americans the right to be treated as equal members of society with respect to public accommodations, and both § 5 and the Commerce Clause give Congress the authority to enforce that right. CONCURRENCE (Douglas, J.): Although the Commerce Clause provides Congress with the authority to enact Title II of the CRA, the preferable basis of Congress's authority is § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The right of people to be free from discriminatory state action should be more protected under the Constitution than the movement of goods across state lines. Deciding this issue under the Fourteenth Amendment would produce a more definitive result, as this would end discriminatory practices in all specified places of public accommodation, regardless of the effects on interstate commerce. CONCURRENCE (Black, J.): The Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause give Congress the authority to regulate local entities that burden the flow of interstate commerce. Congress has determined that restaurants purchasing a substantial amount of goods from other states could burden and disrupt the flow of interstate commerce if the restaurants were allowed to engage in discriminatory conduct. Ollie's Barbecue purchases 46 percent of the goods it sells in the restaurant from other states, which is a substantial portion. Accordingly, Congress had the power to prevent Ollie's Barbecue from engaging in racial discrimination.

Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc v. US (1964) RULE OF LAW: Congress may enact regulations that prevent racially discriminatory policies in hotel accommodations because of the negative effects of those policies on interstate commerce. FACTS: In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Title II of the CRA forbids racial discrimination by places of public accommodation such as hotels and restaurants. The Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. (plaintiff) in Atlanta, Georgia advertises to and hosts primarily out-of-state guests. The motel practices a policy of refusing to rent rooms to African Americans and brought this suit against the US government (defendant) in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to challenge the CRA as an unconstitutional extension of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. The district court upheld the CRA as constitutional. The court of appeals affirmed. Heart of Atlanta appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Congress enact the Civil Rights Act as a measure to regulate interstate commerce?

(Clark, J.): YES. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to remove obstructions and restraints to interstate commerce. The unavailability to African Americans of adequate accommodations interferes significantly with interstate travel. Moreover, evidence shows that racial discrimination has a disruptive effect on commercial intercourse. Passage of the CRA is a constitutional use of Congress's plenary power to regulate interstate commerce. The decision of the district court upholding the CRA is affirmed. CONCURRENCE (Black, J.): Congress has the power to regulate the motel's activities because of the potential for its discriminatory policies to have a substantial effect on African American travel and thus interstate commerce. Heart of Atlanta operated a very large establishment. Its continual discrimination would ultimately have a large impact on interstate commerce. Additionally, Heart of Atlanta's argument that the Civil Rights Act violated its due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is rejected. The purpose of provisions such as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is largely to protect marginalized groups from discrimination. African Americans have been exposed traditionally to significant discrimination, which was largely the reason Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence it would be highly inappropriate and ironic to permit Heart of Atlanta to use the guarantee of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to strip Congress of its power to protect African Americans from further discrimination. CONCURRENCE (Douglas, J.): The majority should have rested its decision on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which protects the right of all persons to move freely from state to state. This reasoning is sounder than resting the Court's decision on the Commerce Clause which has traditionally been interpreted to allow Congress to pass regulations promoting the free movement of goods and commodities. CONCURRENCE (Goldberg, J.): Congress had a responsibility to pass the Civil Rights Act in order to uphold human dignity. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to pass anti-discrimination legislation. The majority's decision should rest on both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.

Railway Expressway v. New York (1949) RULE OF LAW: A state law that is substantially underinclusive does not necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause because a state may rationally decide to address a public problem in phases. FACTS: A statute promulgated by the State of New York (plaintiff) prohibited vehicles devoted solely to displaying advertisements, but permitted business vehicles to display signs related to their business as long as the business vehicles were not solely used for advertising. Railway Express Agency, Inc. (defendant) was engaged in a nationwide express business and operated about 1,900 trucks in New York City. It sold the space on the exterior sides of its trucks for advertising that was primarily unrelated to its business. Railway was convicted of violating the New York statute in the magistrate's court and fined. The conviction was sustained by the Court of Special Sessions, and the court of appeals affirmed. Railway Express Agency, Inc. appealed to the US Supreme Court on the grounds that the regulation did not bear a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose and was thus unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. ISSUE: Whether New York's regulation of advertising on business vehicles violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

(Douglas, J.) ⇨ No. In passing the law in question, the New York legislature stated that it was seeking to address a traffic congestion problem. Railway argued, however, that to be rationally related to this legitimate public purpose, the law should have regulated the trucks operating in New York—not the content of the advertising on those trucks. Railway's argument is rejected on the grounds that it could not infer that the New York legislature, in making such a regulation, has no rational basis for concluding that the type of advertising used to promote a business owner's own wares is different and less burdensome on traffic congestion than the type of advertising used to promote the wares of another. It does not matter that the regulation seems under-inclusive, as the legislature could have rationally decided that it is most pressing to regulate just one type of advertising at that present time. The regulation passes rational basis review and thus does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Concurrence (Jackson, J.) ⇨ Statutes are rarely struck down based on the Equal Protection Clause, but frequently regulations based on the Due Process Clause are invalidated. The burden should be much higher on the party that seeks to use the Due Process Clause to strike down a substantive law or ordinance. This is because invalidating a statute on the grounds that it impairs a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause runs the risk of leaving unchecked conduct which many people find objectionable. On the other hand, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent any governmental body from dealing with any questionable conduct. Rather, it merely requires that the regulations are applied even-handedly and do not discriminate against a suspect class. This is a better way to deal with objectionable conduct because it does not disable the government, and the Equal Protection Clause should be invoked much more frequently to challenge state regulations. Concurrence (Rutledge, J.) ⇨ The New York Police Commissioner has the authority to issue traffic regulations such as the one at issue in the present case. However, in making such regulations, the Police Commissioner is required to consider public safety interests at all times.

Williamson v. Lee Optical (1955) RULE OF LAW: A state may regulate a business if its legislature determines there is a particular health and safety problem at hand and that the regulation in question is a rational way to correct the problem. FACTS: An Oklahoma state law made it unlawful for any person not licensed as an optometrist or ophthalmologist in the state to fit lenses to a face or fashion existing lenses into a frame unless given a prescription by a state-licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist. Lee Optical (plaintiff) of Oklahoma brought suit in district court against Williamson (defendant), the official charged with enforcing the Oklahoma state law, on the grounds that it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court upheld the aspects of the law that prevented an unlicensed person to provide eye examinations as constitutional, but held unconstitutional the requirement of a prescription for an optician to simply place old lenses into new frames. The district court reasoned that an optician's performance of this task did not pose a significant health and safety risk to the public, and thus the Oklahoma's regulation of this activity was not reasonably and rationally related to a health and safety interest. Williamson appealed the decision to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May a state law prohibit the fitting of lenses by an optician without prescriptive authority from a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist without violating the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Douglas, J.) ⇨ Yes. Although the Oklahoma law might be arbitrary and wasteful in many cases, it is absolutely necessary in other cases where directions from a prescription are required for fitting glasses. Regardless, it is a decision for the state legislature, not the judiciary, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the prescription requirement. In conducting this balancing, the legislature could have reasonably concluded that prescriptions are needed often enough to justify requiring them in every case where lenses are brought to an optician. Prescriptions might not be required in every case, but this is not the test under the Constitution for upholding the law. Rather, it is sufficient that there is a particular health and safety evil at hand for correction and that the particular legislative measure is a rational way to correct it. The legislature made a rational determination that the law is needed in the present case, and the judgment of the district court is reversed.

Woods v. Miller (1948) RULE OF LAW: The war power of Congress activated by armed conflict may extend beyond the cessation of hostilities to permit Congress to address the negative effects of war. FACTS: Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 permitted Congress to regulate rents pursuant to its war powers which were activated by the start of World War II. Cloyd W. Miller Co. (plaintiff) challenged the act against Woods (defendant) in federal district court on the ground that Congress' ability to regulate rents based on its war power ended with the Presidential Proclamation terminating hostilities on December 31, 1946. This proclamation brought about "peace-in-fact" despite not actually terminating the war itself. The district court agreed and held Title II unconstitutional. Additionally, it concluded that even if the war power did not end with the Presidential Proclamation, Congress did not act under it because it did not say so. Woods appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the war power of Congress activated by armed conflict extend beyond the cessation of hostilities to permit Congress to address the negative effects of war.

(Douglas, J.) ⇨ Yes. Congress may constitutionally control rents even after the cessation of World War II hostilities because doing so is necessary to remedy the ongoing housing crisis caused by the war. The war power of Congress activated by armed conflict may extend beyond the cessation of hostilities to permit Congress to address the negative effects of war. This war power may not extend indefinitely, but may continue as long as a significant need exists because of the war that is capable of being addressed by congressional action. World War II caused a significant deficit in housing due to the heavy demobilization of veterans and the cessation or reduction of residential construction during the period of hostilities for the purpose of conserving building materials for the war effort. Congress passed Title II of the Housing and Rent Act to directly respond to this housing shortage. When doing so, it acted pursuant to its Constitutional war powers, as well as the Necessary and Proper Clause (permits Congress to pass whatever laws it deems "necessary and proper" to carry out its other enumerated constitutional powers). Nowhere in the legislative history of Title II did Congress suggest it intended to extend its wartime rent control powers anywhere beyond the specific housing crisis which was greatly intensified by World War II hostilities. While there is always a chance that Congress may abuse its war powers by extending them well beyond the cessation of hostilities, there is no indication that Congress has acted in such a way here. Title II is an appropriate exercise of Congressional power after the conclusion of hostilities because controlling rent is still necessary to remedy the ongoing housing crisis caused by the war. The decision of the district court is reversed. Concurrence (Jackson, J.) ⇨ It is dangerous to justify the result reached by the majority solely by invoking Congress' vague "war power." The war power is generally always hastily invoked and not always executed with careful consideration of the consequences. However, while it is true that war powers should not be permitted to extend for the full amount of time that the effects and consequences of war are present, there is no indication that this was Congress' intent in enacting Title II. While formal hostilities have ceased, the US is still technically in a state of war. There is very much a need for Congressional action to address the ongoing housing crisis, and Title II should be upheld as constitutional.

Chae Chan Ping v. US (1889) RULE OF LAW: Congress may exclude whole classes of people from entering or reentering the US. FACTS: Congress passed legislation in 1888 that prohibited Chinese immigrants from reentering the US. This was a violation of the Burlingame treaty of 1868, and its amendment in 1880, between the US and China. Chinese laborers who attempted to return to the US were denied and sued for entrance. Lower courts affirmed the validity of the legislation and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Can Congress pass legislation that prevents foreign nationals from reentering the US, even when those nationals previously obtained licenses to do so?

(Field, J) ⇨ Yes. Congress has broad powers to deal with foreign affairs, including immigration, as delegated by the Constitution. Any treaties the US has signed with China does not have any effect on subsequent legislation passed by Congress, as both acts of Congress and treaties are the supreme law of the land. No foreign treaty can limit Congress' power to act in the sphere of foreign affairs, only the Constitution itself can do so. The Constitution provides no such limits on excluding certain classes of people from immigrating to the country. It is the duty of every sovereign nation to defend itself from foreign aggression. As such, Congress has the authority to determine when allowing certain groups of people into the country would constitute a risk to the country's security, even if war is not occurring or even likely to occur. Excluding Chinese is no different from excluding criminals, the diseased, or any other class of people Congress deems necessary to exclude for the security of the country. Therefore, Congress is well within its right to deny entry to Chinese persons, even though they had previously obtained licenses for entry. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Sessions v. Morales-Santana (2017) RULE OF LAW: A law that discriminates based on biological sex is unconstitutional if it is not substantially related to the accomplishment of an important governmental purpose. FACTS: A federal law stated that a child born out of wedlock in a foreign country to an American father could become a US citizen if, among other things, the father had lived continuously in the US for 10 years prior to the child's birth, at least five of which were after the father had turned 14. In contrast, the law provided that a child born out of wedlock in a foreign country to an American mother could become a US citizen if, among other things, the mother had lived continuously in the US for just one year prior to the child's birth. Jose Morales lived in the US until he moved to the Dominican Republic when he was 18. Morales thus did not live in the US for five years after he turned 14. While living in the Dominican Republic, Morales had a son, Luis Ramon Morales-Santana (defendant). Morales-Santana moved to the US when he was 13. Morales-Santana was convicted of several crimes, and the US government (plaintiff) commenced deportation proceedings. Morales-Santana claimed that the citizenship law was unconstitutional because it unlawfully discriminated against men. The court of appeals found the statute to be unconstitutional. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Is a law that discriminates based on biological sex constitutional if it is not substantially related to the accomplishment of an important governmental purpose?

(Ginsburg, J.) ⇨ No. A law that discriminates based on biological sex is unconstitutional if it is not substantially related to the accomplishment of an important governmental purpose. In this case, the statute requiring a citizen father to live in the US for longer than a citizen mother to confer citizenship on a child is unconstitutional. In so holding, the Court distinguishes Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), which upheld a distinction between mothers and fathers based on the governmental interest in ensuring a connection between the parent and the child. Here, the governmental purpose in adopting the statute is to ensure a connection between the child and American ideals and principles. There is no basis for a claim that it takes longer for a father to assimilate his child to American culture than a mother. Accordingly, the law's sex discrepancy is not substantially related to the government's interest and is thus unconstitutional. However, in addressing the discrepancy to ensure equal protection, the Court must choose, based on congressional intent, whether to extend the benefit at issue to the disfavored class or eliminate the benefit to the favored class. Here, Congress's intent was to ensure a meaningful connection between the child and American values. As a result, the Court modifies the residency requirement for mothers and holds that to confer citizenship on the child, citizen mothers, like citizen fathers, must live continuously in the US for 10 years prior to the child's birth, at least five of which are after the parent turns 14. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ As Morales-Santana is not entitled to relief even if the law is unconstitutional, the Court should not have reached the constitutionality question.

US v. Virginia (1996) RULE OF LAW: All governmental gender classifications must be substantially related to an important government purpose that can be demonstrated by the government if it offers an exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification. FACTS: The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was the only single-sex public higher education institution in the State of Virginia. It functioned to train men for leadership in civilian life and military service using an "adversative" method. VMI refused to admit women. After an adverse court ruling that this policy of excluding women violated the Equal Protection Clause, VMI created an alternative program for women known as the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL). VWIL differed from VMI in its academic offerings, methods of education, and financial resources. ISSUE: Whether VMI's policy of excluding women from admission denies women equal protection of the laws, and, if so, whether the creation of an alternative school for women is the proper remedy for this denial.

(Ginsburg, J.) ⇨ Yes and no. The standard of review for any governmental gender classification is intermediate scrutiny. This standard requires the government to provide an exceedingly persuasive justification for policies that discriminate against women. Inherent differences exist between men and women, but these differences can be used only for purposes such as remedying the history of sex discrimination against women, or promoting equal employment opportunities, not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity. Virginia has not shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding all women from VMI's leadership training. Virginia argues that the existence of a single-sex school furthers the important state purpose of maintaining a diversity of public education institutions. This argument is rejected. VMI has never existed for the purpose of promoting diversity, evidenced by its policy of excluding women. Virginia also argues that its adversative method of training students provides educational benefits that cannot be made available, unmodified, to women. There is no reason that Virginia's stated goal of training competent future leaders cannot be extended to include women. Without further proof, Virginia falls short of establishing the "exceedingly persuasive justification" required for a sustainable gender-based classification. In addition, the VWIL is different and substandard when compared to VMI on many levels. The creation of this school does not provide a meaningful educational alternative for women seeking to attend VMI. Thus Virginia's policy of excluding women from VMI is unconstitutional. Concurrence (Rehnquist, C.J.) ⇨ The majority's addition of the requirement that the government offer an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for gender-based classifications injects an element of uncertainty into the Court's long-standing intermediate scrutiny test requiring governmental gender classifications to be substantially related to an important government purpose. As new educational opportunities opened up for women, Virginia had notice that the constitutionality of VMI's exclusion policy would one day be challenged. However, VMI responded appropriately by commissioning an independent study that ultimately concluded VMI should not admit women, as this would threaten the school's integrity and processes. However, VWIL is not an appropriate remedy because of its lack of equal opportunities for women. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The majority's opinion effectively shuts down a long-standing and valuable public education institution. The majority ignores precedent, history, and tradition in holding that VMI must admit women. The majority completely ignores evidentiary findings that inherent physical differences exist in men and women that justify requiring them to attend separate schools.

Fong Yue Ting v. US (1883) RULE OF LAW: While aliens in the US are protected by the Constitution in certain respects, Congress has the right to deport them as it sees fit. FACTS: In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act. In 1892, Congress added a requirement that Chinese people in the U.S. had to possess certificates of residence or be summarily deported. Fong Yue Ting (defendant) came to the US from China in or before 1879, intending to make the U.S. his permanent home. Fong hadn't yet applied for a certificate of residence when a marshal arrested him in 1893. Wong Quan's (defendant) story was similar. After he was arrested, the marshal took him before the district judge in the southern district of New York. The judge didn't conduct a hearing. He ordered the marshal to hold Wong in custody and then deport him. Lee Joe (defendant) had actually applied for a certificate of residence on April 11th, 1893, bringing along Chinese witnesses to testify that he'd been in the country legally in 1892. The collector of internal revenue refused to grant Lee a certificate on the ground that he hadn't produced at least one credible white witness as required by the statute. The marshal arrested him, and the judge ordered him deported. All three men petitioned for writs of habeas corpus. They alleged that they had been arrested and detained without due process of law, and their detentions were thus unconstitutional and void. The US circuit court dismissed each writ of habeas corpus but allowed each man to appeal to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Congress deport foreign nationals for not obtaining a certificate of residence requiring confirmation of a white witness?

(Gray, J) ⇨ Yes. Congress has an absolute right to deport non-naturalized foreigners, just as it has an absolute right to deny them entrance into the country. The Constitution grants Congress broad powers to deal with all aspects of foreign affairs, including regulating international commerce, declaring war, and establish naturalization rules. The right to deport aliens is an inherent right of every sovereign nation. Congress, as the legislative body of our sovereign nation which is granted such foreign affairs powers, has such a right. This right can only be limited by the Constitution. While the Constitution protects resident aliens' personal and property rights, they still remain subject to the right of Congress to deport them. As Congress determines the rules and procedures of evidence, it is within its right to require a non-Chinese person to act as witness for a certificate of residence. A similar provision in long standing naturalization laws requires residency to be proven by affirmation of U.S. citizens. Because Fong Yue Ting could not produce a white witness at his hearing before the judge, he is in violation of the Constitutional standards set forth by Congress for remaining in the country legally. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Dissent (Brewer, J) ⇨ Greater protection should be given to those lawfully residing in the country for many years. The Constitution does not support a power to arbitrarily banish anyone, even aliens, from the country. The absolute power to exclude aliens from entering the country should not be extended to those aliens living in the country legally under the protection of the Constitution. The act deprives resident aliens of life, liberty and property without the due process of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The idea that deportation is not a punishment is absurd, and such a punishment requires a system of due process not established by the act. Dissent (Field, J) ⇨ There is a large difference between legislation excluding Chinese persons and legislation deporting those residing in the country lawfully. While the object of the law, determining who is entitled to remain in the country, is constitutional, the process by which it is accomplished is not. It is an exercise of harsh and arbitrary power that is not warranted simply because those affected are aliens. Dissent (Fuller, CJ) ⇨ While exclusion is a political question, Congress cannot arbitrarily deport resident aliens because limitations exist on rights that have been lawfully acquired. In doing so, it is directing the judiciary to inflict punishment without a proper trial. Such an arbitrary power is inconsistent with the principles of justice and the framework of the Constitution.

Giles v. Harris (1903) RULE OF LAW: The federal judiciary has no authority over local conspiracies to systematically disenfranchise black individuals by preventing them from exercising their right to vote. FACTS: Jackson Giles (plaintiff) was president of the Colored Men's Suffrage Association. Giles voted in Alabama from 1871 to 1901. Giles, however, brought suit in federal court against the State of Alabama (defendant), alleging that the state systematically denied black individuals the right to vote through a variety of means, including failing to allow them to register, in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Giles sought an injunction, enjoining the claimed disenfranchisement. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does the federal judiciary have authority over local conspiracies to systematically disenfranchise black individuals by preventing them from exercising their right to vote?

(Holmes, J.) ⇨ No. The federal judiciary has no authority over local conspiracies to systematically disenfranchise black individuals by preventing them from exercising their right to vote. The Court is powerless to enforce laws. Rather, matters such as the enforcement of law and how such laws are enforced are left to the individual states or Congress. In this case, assuming Giles's claims are true, the Court has no authority to rectify the claimed wrongs. The best that the Court could do would be to order the State of Alabama to register black individuals to vote. However, if Alabama intends to disenfranchise black individuals as Giles claims, this mandated registration would not be sufficient to address the situation. The relief that Giles seeks must come from the State of Alabama itself or Congress. Giles's request for an injunction is denied.

Missouri v. Holland (1920) RULE OF LAW: A treaty which infringes the rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution may nevertheless be considered valid if it is made under the authority of the US and is thus the supreme law of the land. FACTS: On December 8, 1916, the President of the US entered into a treaty with Great Britain which provided greater protection for migratory birds. Both the US and Great Britain agreed that their legislatures would pass laws enforcing the treaty. In response, the US passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918 which prohibited the killing, capturing, or selling of any of the migratory birds protected by the treaty, except as permitted by additional regulations passed by the Secretary of Agriculture. Missouri (plaintiff) brought a bill in equity to prevent Holland (defendant), a US game warden from enforcing the act. Missouri alleged primarily that the statute was an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution. The district court dismissed the bill on the ground that the statute was constitutional, and Missouri appealed. ISSUE: Whether a treaty which infringes the rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution may be considered valid, when an Act of Congress performing the same function would be invalid.

(Holmes, J.) ⇨ Yes. The migratory bird treaty and subsequent Migratory Bird Treaty Act are valid exercises of US government power. A treaty which infringes the rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution may nevertheless be considered valid if it is made under the authority of the US and is thus the supreme law of the land. The Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution reserves to the states all powers not delegated to the federal government of the US. Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly delegates the power to make treaties to the federal government, and under Article 6, all treaties made under the authority of the US, along with the Constitution and laws of the US made in pursuance thereof, are declared to be the supreme law of the land. Thus, if a treaty is valid, any statute made to implement it is also necessarily valid under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which permits all legislative acts that are necessary and proper to execute the powers of the federal government (including the treaty power). The migratory bird treaty made by the President with Great Britain is valid, as it was made under the authority of the US. It does not matter that the treaty regulated migratory birds which were located briefly within the borders of Missouri. The federal government routinely carries out its express powers under the Constitution by Acts of Congress regulating activities and functions which happen to fall within the borders of a State, and which would be regulated by the State itself in the absence of the relevant express federal power. There is no reason to treat international treaties differently. An international treaty may regulate activities falling within a State's borders if it is made under the authority of the US and is thus valid. Similarly, if a treaty is valid, it follows that a statute made to implement the treaty is also valid. The migratory bird treaty is valid, and thus the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, passed to enforce the treaty, is also valid. The decision of the lower courts to dismiss the case is affirmed.

ALA Schechter Poultry Corp v. US (1935) RULE OF LAW: (1) Congress may not delegate legislative power to the executive without outlining strict standards for how the executive is to exercise that power. (2) Congress does not have the authority to regulate wholly intrastate activities that have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce. FACTS: A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. (defendant) operated wholesale poultry slaughterhouse markets in Brooklyn, New York. Ordinarily, Schechter bought live poultry in New York City or occasionally in Philadelphia for slaughter and resale. When the poultry reached Schechter's Brooklyn markets, it was slaughtered and locally sold to poultry retailers and butchers who dealt directly with consumers. Schechter did not sell poultry in interstate commerce. Schechter was convicted of 18 counts of violating the Live Poultry Code (LPC) regulations passed by Congress and with one count of conspiracy to violate the LPC. The LPC was promulgated under Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which authorized the President of the US to approve "codes of fair competition" for a trade or industry. Schechter's violations of the LPC included issues relating to its employees' hours and wages and the quality of its poultry products sold to local New York retailers. Schechter appealed its convictions in the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, alleging that Congress exceeded its power to regulate interstate commerce by passing regulations over Schechter's in-state activities. Additionally, Schechter argued that the president engaged in impermissible lawmaking by having full discretion to approve or disapprove the LPC provisions. The appellate court sustained the convictions on 16 counts but reversed the conspiracy charge and two convictions pertaining to Schechter's improper labor standards. The circuit court ruled that the regulations were beyond Congress's power to regulate and that the president engaged in impermissible lawmaking functions. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: (1) May Congress delegate lawmaking functions to the executive branch without outlining strict standards for how the executive is to exercise that power? (2) Does Congress have the authority to regulate wholly intrastate activities that have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce?

(Hughes, C.J.) ⇨ (1) No. Congress may not delegate legislative power to the executive branch to exercise unlimited lawmaking discretion to promote trade or industry. For a delegation of legislative power to the president to be appropriate, Congress must also prescribe specific standards for how the president must exercise that power. The standards and restrictions outlined by Congress in the National Industrial Recovery Act do not offer substantive direction for the president to formulate policy. Congress does not prescribe rules of conduct, but instead permits the president complete discretion to make codes and create rules of conduct. This type of unfettered legislative power given to the executive is unprecedented and an unconstitutional grant of power to the executive by Congress. (2) No. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the authority to regulate activities that directly affect interstate commerce. Purely intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce only indirectly are outside the scope of Congress's authority and remain under the control of the states. Allowing Congress to regulate intrastate activities with only indirect effects on interstate commerce would lead to virtually unlimited federal power and effectively a wholly centralized government. The line between activities that directly affect interstate commerce and activities that indirectly affect interstate commerce is determined as cases arise. Here, Schechter's transactions with the poultry were not in interstate commerce. By the time the poultry reached Schechter's slaughterhouses in Brooklyn, any interstate transactions regarding the poultry were complete, and the remaining transactions concerned the slaughter and sale of the poultry to local butchers and retailers. Furthermore, the LPC provisions at issue primarily relate to the wages and hours of Schechter's workers. These issues do not directly affect interstate commerce; rather, they concern the management of Schechter's local, intrastate business and affect interstate commerce only indirectly. Similarly, the violations of the LPC provisions concerning poultry selection and quality relate only to local sales. To the extent this affects interstate commerce at all, any effect is only indirect. Accordingly, the LPC provisions are invalid, and the judgment of conviction is reversed. Concurrence (Cardozo, J.) ⇨ Congress acted appropriately in allowing the executive branch to regulate poultry trade activities. However, the regulations were still an improper exercise of federal power over purely local activities.

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) RULE OF LAW: Congress may not delegate legislative power to the executive branch without providing clear standards for how the executive must exercise that power. FACTS: A provision of the National Recovery Act (NRA) authorized the President to prohibit interstate and foreign transportation of petroleum produced in excess of limits set by states. In 1933, the President issued Executive Order No. 6199 which acted on this authority and prohibited petroleum transportation in accordance with the NRA. Panama Refining Co. (plaintiff) challenged the executive order by suing Ryan (defendant), the Secretary of the Interior, on the grounds that the NRA represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President by Congress. The district court held the executive order was unconstitutional, but the court of appeals reversed. Panama Refining Co. appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Congress grant power to the President to prohibit transportation of petroleum under the National Recovery Act?

(Hughes, C.J.) ⇨ No. The power granted by the NRA to the President to issue orders prohibiting the transportation of petroleum did not contain any guidance as to the circumstances or conditions in which the transportation of petroleum should be prohibited. The Constitution does not permit delegation of Congress's essential legislative functions, but it does permit Congress to transfer some of its powers to the executive, subject to constitutional limits. These limits require Congress to articulate standards for how the executive is to exercise the legislative powers it receives from Congress. The NRA does not contain standards governing the prohibition of petroleum transportation and therefore is unconstitutional. The decision of the district court is affirmed. Dissent (Cardozo, J.) ⇨ The NRA does contain clear standards for exercising executive authority to prohibit petroleum transportation when read in full context. The President had to conform to Congress's guidance as to what commodity the President could regulate (petroleum), and when it could be regulated (when produced in excess of limits set by states.) These terms limit the President's discretion in terms of what the President may regulate. Implied in the grant of power to the President by Congress is the expectation that he exercise that power in line with the stated purpose of the congressional act, which is the promotion of the petroleum trade. The President has discretion to interpret the facts surrounding one standard or another for prohibiting transportation, but the President is still confined by the policy goals prescribed by Congress. Since the NRA regulates a certain commodity, at a certain time, for a certain purpose, the NRA provides the President with sufficient standards.

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) RULE OF LAW: A state may regulate the minimum wage paid to female employees when that regulation is for the purpose of promoting employees' health, safety and general welfare. FACTS: The State of Washington passed a law which regulated the minimum wages paid to female and minor employees. Elsie Parrish (plaintiff) was employed as a maid at a hotel owned by the West Coast Hotel Co. (defendant). Together with her husband, Parrish brought suit in Washington state court to recover the difference between the wages she was paid by West Coast Hotel Co. and the minimum wage fixed under Washington state law. West Coast defended the suit on the grounds that the state law violated its Due Process right to freely contract under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Washington trial court held for the hotel, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed. West Coast Hotel Co. appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May a state regulate the minimum wage paid to female employees?

(Hughes, C.J.) ⇨ Yes. The previous decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), makes it unconstitutional for states to set minimum wage laws. However, changing social and economic circumstances since that decision warrant a fresh consideration of the issue. The liberty interest asserted by West Coast is that of freedom to contract, but this freedom is not expressly found in the Constitution. Rather, the Constitution, through its Fourteenth Amendment, clearly outlines the liberty interest of freedom from actions which attack an individual's health, safety, or general welfare. Thus, all asserted liberty interests are ultimately restrained by the health, safety, and general welfare interests that comprise due process. Applying this principle, the prior decision in Adkins is an improper application of the constitutional due process provisions that govern states' regulation of the relationship between employers and employees. States pass minimum wage laws designed to promote the health and safety of female employees, and this regulation thus embodies principles of due process. To hold that states cannot regulate in this way would be to deny due process constraints on a state's freedom to contract, and to deny protections for the health and safety of women. Additionally, changing economic times mean that workers who are not paid a living wage would have to rely on taxpayers for the care of their various needs. This is an unprecedented problem because the US is currently in the middle of the "Great Depression." Thus, more workers than ever are seeking community assistance, which leads to an impermissible burden on taxpayers. Washington's minimum wage law is upheld because it promotes the health and safety of women, and because requiring employers to pay a living wage alleviates the burden on taxpayers of having to care for underpaid employees. The decision of the Washington Supreme Court is affirmed. Dissent (Sutherland, J.) ⇨ The majority allows itself to be too swayed by changing current events. The US Constitution is not designed to be changed according to shifting trends in the country's economic climate. The majority is rash in overruling its long-established jurisprudence in response to the economic climate because the "Great Depression" in the US is a temporary change in economic conditions. The majority improperly rejects the precedent that freedom to contract is a firm rule under the Due Process Clause with few exceptions. Additionally, the majority's social welfare justification for its holding is rejected because it is unfair to shift the entire burden of providing for the poor onto employers. The minimum wage legislation should be invalidated on this basis.

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (1937) RULE OF LAW: Congress may regulate labor relations under its Commerce Clause power because labor relations have such a close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce that their control is essential to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions. FACTS: In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (defendant) to enforce federal fair labor practice standards, including the right of employees to unionize. After Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (JLSC) (plaintiff) fired ten employees that attempted to unionize at one of its Pennsylvania plants, the NLRB sanctioned the company for engaging in discriminatory employment practices in violation of federal standards. JLSC brought suit alleging that the NLRA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's interstate commerce power, and the lower courts agreed. The NLRB appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Congress regulate labor relations under its Commerce Clause power to regulate interstate commerce?

(Hughes, C.J.): YES. The power to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and is vested solely in Congress. The power to regulate commerce includes the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection or advancement; to adopt measures to promote its growth and insure its safety; and to foster, protect, control, and restrain interstate commercial activities. The activity in question involved the ability of employees to unionize without facing discriminatory measures. While JLSC argues that this activity deals purely with the production of commercial products and is thus local in nature, JLSC needs to consider the overall effect on interstate commerce of the labor practice involved. The stoppage of operations due to industrial strife between employers and employees could have a significant detrimental impact on interstate commerce. Thus, because of the potential for harm to the stream of interstate commerce stemming from unfair labor practices and disgruntled employees, it is within Congress's plenary power under the Commerce Clause to regulate labor relations. The decision of the lower courts is reversed. DISSENT (McReynolds, J.): The majority departs from settled principles established in precedent cases such as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. US, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). In each case, the Court held that Congress did not have the power to regulate employment issues because labor matters only affect production of goods and thus have no bearing on interstate commerce. Congress may regulate interstate commerce only. In departing from these precedents, the Court risks empowering Congress to regulate even the smallest businesses in the smallest of industries. The majority should have followed precedent and affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.

Wickard v. Filburn (1942) RULE OF LAW: Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. FACTS: During the Great Depression of the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic-controlled Congress passed many "New Deal" programs designed to improve the poor economic climate in the US. One such program was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which limited the area that farmers could devote to wheat production in an effort to stabilize the national price of wheat. Filburn (plaintiff), a small farmer, was penalized pursuant to the Act for producing wheat in excess of the Act's quotas. Filburn filed suit against Secretary of Agriculture Wickard (defendant), seeking to enjoin enforcement against himself of the penalties. Filburn argued that because the excess wheat was produced for his own private consumption and never entered the stream of commerce, his activities could not be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. The district court agreed with Filburn that Congress's regulations were unconstitutional, and the circuit court affirmed. Wickard appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Congress regulate, under the Commerce Clause, the production of wheat designed wholly for individual consumption and not for sale in commerce, interstate or otherwise?

(Jackson, J.): YES. Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. By growing his own wheat, Filburn decreases the amount of wheat purchased in the market and negatively impacts the price of wheat grown for interstate commerce. It does not matter that Filburn himself only exerts a small impact on the wheat market. When taken together with all the other farmers similarly situated, Filburn's activity has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. On account of the aggregate effect of homegrown wheat on the commercial wheat market, Congress may regulate Filburn's activities. The decision of the circuit court is reversed.

Gundy v. US (2019) RULE OF LAW: Authorizing the attorney general to enforce the national Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act against pre-act offenders does not violate the nondelegation doctrine under the current intelligible-principle standard. FACTS: Herman Gundy (defendant) pled guilty to sexually assaulting a child in 2005. The next year, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), imposing a uniform national registration system for all sex offenders, including those convicted before SORNA's passage. Congress delegated "the authority to specify the applicability" of the registration requirements to pre-act offenders to the US attorney general (AG). After his release from prison, Gundy lived in New York without registering there as a sex offender and was convicted for failing to register a few years later. Gundy appealed on multiple grounds, including an argument that Congress could not constitutionally delegate authority to the AG to decide SORNA's applicability to pre-act offenders. The Supreme Court granted review of the issue. ISSUE: Does authorizing the attorney general to enforce the national Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act against pre-act offenders violate the nondelegation doctrine under the current intelligible-principle standard?

(Kagan, J.) ⇨ No. Authorizing the attorney general to enforce the national Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act against pre-act offenders does not violate the nondelegation doctrine under the current intelligible-principle standard. Article I of the Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress and prohibits delegating it to other governmental branches. Supreme Court cases explain that Congress cannot delegate exclusively legislative powers but must have some flexibility to confer discretion to enforce laws on executive agencies to fulfill its job. The Court has repeatedly upheld statutory delegations as constitutional if Congress provided intelligible guidance directing how the delegee must perform. Nondelegation inquiries begin with interpreting the statute to see if Congress provided an intelligible guiding principle. If so, the inquiry ends there. The Supreme Court decided in Reynolds v. US, 565 U.S. 432 (2012), that SORNA's registration requirements apply to pre-act offenders only after the AG determines that instantaneous registration would not be feasible. SORNA posed practical problems by requiring large numbers of offenders who never previously registered to register, and reregistration of those who previously satisfied state-law requirements. SORNA does not give the AG unchecked or unguided discretion. Instead, SORNA's text, context, purpose, and history clarify that the AG holds discretion only over feasibility issues, not over who must register. The text plainly states that SORNA's purpose is to establish a comprehensive sex offender registration system that includes those who committed offenses before SORNA's passage. That purpose and the legislative history establish clear congressional intent for SORNA to apply to pre-act offenders. The AG must order their registration as quickly as feasible, with discretion to delay only as necessary to address transitional problems. Less than a year after SORNA's enactment, the AG determined that it would apply to pre-act offenders immediately. The solicitor general's office agreed that only feasibility issues excused those offenders from registering. A long line of Supreme Court cases uphold even broad congressional delegations of authority if Congress provided an intelligible guiding principle. Examples include authorizing agencies to set equitable prices, reasonable rates, or standards necessary to protect public health. Only two cases found delegation excessive, both when Congress failed to supply any guidance whatsoever. All eleven circuit courts found SORNA's delegation constitutional. The guiding policy is that pre-act offenders must register as soon as feasible in light of administrative and transitional issues. If SORNA's delegation violated the Constitution, so would most of the government. Therefore, SORNA's delegation passes constitutional muster. Gundy's conviction is affirmed. Concurrence (Alito, J.) ⇨ For the past 84 years, the Supreme Court has upheld congressional delegations of agency authority, even when guided by overly capacious standards. The majority of current justices are not willing to reconsider that approach. It makes no sense to treat the delegation here any differently. Dissent (Gorsuch, J.) ⇨ SORNA gives the AG discretion to write criminal laws affecting more than a half-million citizens convicted before its passage. The act grants authority to both "specify the applicability" of the registration requirements to pre-act offenders and "to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders." No deadline limits that vast authority. The AG may choose to require some but not all pre-act offenders to register or apply only some but not all of its requirements. Different attorneys general have enforced different rules. Transferring legislative authority to other branches undermines the separation of powers, which is fundamental to the constitutional system. The framers made lawmaking difficult in order to curtail the federal government from enacting excessive laws that restrict people's liberty and to ensure thorough deliberation beforehand. The Court originally intended the intelligible-principle standard to allow Congress to delegate fact-finding tasks to the executive only as necessary to apply laws. But the test has become so expansive that it now permits excessive delegations of congressional authority. SORNA provides no directives on how to handle pre-act offenders because Congress failed to reach consensus and handed the job off to the executive branch. Congress could have provided directives based on offender's risk of recidivism or number of offenses. Instead it allows the AG to make those policy decisions, an essentially legislative function. Allowing the AG to write criminal laws ends meaningful separation of powers and the procedural protection of individual liberty it ensures. "Feasibility" is too vague to provide guidance. The Reynolds dissent warned that a broad reading of SORNA would lead to separation-of-powers challenges. A future case, before a full panel of nine justices, should curb Congress's delegation of power to the chief federal prosecutor to write criminal laws.

Nguyen v. INS (2001) RULE OF LAW: A federal law establishing different requirements for derivative citizenship of an illegitimate child born abroad based on the citizen parent's gender does not violate equal protection. FACTS: A federal law stated that a child born out of wedlock in a foreign country to an American mother was automatically a US citizen. However, the law stated that a child born out of wedlock in a foreign country to an American father was not automatically a US citizen. Under the latter situation, the law provided that the child could become a citizen if the father established paternity before the child turned 18. Tuan Anh Nguyen (defendant) was born in Vietnam to a Vietnamese mother and an American father, Joseph Boulais. Nguyen became a permanent resident of the US when he was six years old. At 22, Nguyen pled guilty to sexual assault on a minor. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (plaintiff) commenced deportation proceedings. Boulais did not establish that he was Nguyen's father until Nguyen was 28. Nguyen and Boulais claimed that the federal citizenship law was unconstitutional because it denied fathers the equal protection of the laws. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does a federal statute establishing the requirements for derivative citizenship for an illegitimate child born abroad violate equal protection by establishing different requirements based on the citizen parent's gender?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ No. A federal law establishing different requirements for derivative citizenship of an illegitimate child born abroad based on the citizen parent's gender does not violate equal protection. The statutory citizenship requirements represent a governmental gender classification. The statute must be evaluated under an intermediate-scrutiny standard to determine if the requirements are substantially related to accomplishing an important government interest. The statute requires one of three affirmative steps to be taken by a child seeking American citizenship when the child's citizen parent is the father, but not if the citizen parent is the mother: legitimation; a declaration of paternity under oath by the father; or a court order of paternity. Congress rationally chose to impose these requirements on unmarried men and not unmarried women due to the significant biological differences existing between men and women and the resulting differences between mothers' and fathers' respective relationships to potential citizens at birth. Specifically, the imposition of strict proof requirements for a paternal relationship and not a maternal one is justified by two important government interests at stake: (1) the interest in assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists; and (2) the assurance that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a legal relationship but a significant, actual bond. The first interest is satisfied by the statutory scheme, which does not require significant proof of parentage for mothers. A court can infer with such certainty that a biological parent-child relationship exists simply by the act of the mother giving birth. Additionally, in the case of the second interest, the mere act of giving birth constitutes an opportunity for a mother and child to develop a meaningful bond. However, this opportunity frequently does not exist for unmarried fathers who are not always aware that a child had been conceived. This is historically a problem with children born overseas and out of wedlock, as many young men on duty with the armed forces overseas conceive illegitimate children with non-citizen women. Additionally, the increasing ease of travel suggests that more children might possibly be born overseas out of wedlock with fathers who are unaware of their existence. Principles of equal protection do not require the Court to ignore this reality surrounding parentage. The second governmental interest at stake cannot be fully established by a mere DNA test, as a DNA test does nothing to confirm the existence of an actual bond between a father and child. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Concurrence (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The Court cannot circumscribe Congress to confer US citizenship. Dissent (O'Connor, J.) ⇨ The majority's decision rests on sex-based stereotypes. A mother present at birth has no better opportunity to care for and establish a relationship with the child than a father present at birth. The decision continues the stereotype that mothers are inherently more responsible and must be responsible for children, while fathers need not be.

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co (1991) RULE OF LAW: A private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race because the exercise or peremptory challenges invokes state action. FACTS: Thaddeus Edmonson (plaintiff) was a construction worker injured on the job while working for Leesville Concrete Co. (defendant). Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Co. for negligence in federal district court. Edmonson invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. During voir dire, Leesville used two of its three statutorily-permitted peremptory challenges to remove African American persons from the prospective jury. Edmonson, an African American, requested that the court require Leesville to articulate a race-neutral reason for its peremptory challenges. The court denied the request on the grounds that the case was a civil proceeding. The result was a jury composed of eleven Caucasian people and one African American person. The jury rendered a verdict for Edmonson for $90,000, but reduced it to $18,000 because it found Edmonson eighty percent at fault. Edmonson appealed, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May a private litigant in a civil case use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ No. Leesville's actions can be overturned based on the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of race-based discrimination if there is a finding of state action. The Lugar v. Edmonson Oil, 457 U.S. 922 (1982), two-step analysis shows that Leesville acted pursuant to state authority. Firstly, the act of exercising peremptory challenges has its source in state authority. A peremptory challenge means nothing outside of a court of law, which in this case is provided for by the state. Additionally, peremptory challenges are only exercised based on statutory authority provided by the government. Secondly, Leesville can be deemed to be a government actor in this situation. According to precedent, state action has been found when private parties make "extensive use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials." In the present case, a private party cannot exercise peremptory challenges without the overt, significant assistance of the court. The judge in the case, who is clearly a state actor, enforced Leesville's discriminatory peremptory challenges and effected the final and practical denial of the excluded jurors' opportunity to serve on the jury. Thus, Leesville acted pursuant to state authority, and the discriminatory peremptory challenges are thus prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Dissent (O'Connor, J.) ⇨ The majority's conclusion that the actions of Leesville, a private litigant, are transformed into state action simply because they occurred in a courtroom setting is disputed. The state provides the forum, but this does not constitutionally oblige the state to become responsible for all discriminatory acts that occur within the forum. Regardless of the majority's desire to eradicate racial discrimination in the courtroom, the Constitution's protections do not sweep that broadly. A peremptory challenge by a private litigant is fundamentally a matter of private choice and not state action. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The majority's decision, while seeking to help assure racial diversity, can actually work to harm minority defendants by preventing them from using race-based peremptory challenges to keep minorities on the jury. The majority's decision will increase the workload of the already-burdened state and federal courts, and the focus on preventing constitutional wrongs in peremptory challenges will ultimately detract from the merits of the underlying litigation. The majority's decision is more problematic than helpful.

Romer v. Evans (1996) RULE OF LAW: A law prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. FACTS: Several Colorado municipalities passed ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health and welfare services, and other transactions and activities. In response to these ordinances, Colorado voters passed Amendment 2, which prohibited all governmental intervention designed to protect the status of persons based on their sexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships. Evans (plaintiff) represented a class of aggrieved homosexual persons and municipalities in Colorado and brought suit in Colorado state court against Roy Romer (defendant), the Governor of Colorado, on the grounds that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional. The trial court enjoined enforcement of Amendment 2. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, and the US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does a law prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Yes. A law prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no person may be denied the equal protection of the laws. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the law will pass constitutional muster under the Fourteenth Amendment so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. In this case, the State of Colorado argues that Amendment 2 is not unconstitutional because it put gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in the same position as all other persons. However, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the effect of Amendment 2 repeals existing statutes, regulations, and policies that bar discrimination based on sexual orientation. Additionally, Amendment 2 functions to ensure that no similar laws protecting gay, lesbian, and bisexual people are ever enacted. Thus, the Amendment does treat homosexual persons differently from the population as a whole because it withdraws from them, but no other persons, specific legal protection from discrimination, and it forbids the reinstatement of laws and policies that would protect their interests. The effects of the Amendment are far-reaching and prevent the enactment of policies in both the public and private sectors that would protect gay, lesbian, and bisexual people from discriminatory treatment in accessing basic services, which is a basic freedom taken for granted by most other people. Given the understanding of the true effect of Amendment 2, the law fails constitutional scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. Amendment 2 selects an entire group of people based on a single trait (i.e., sexual orientation) and discriminates against them across the board. As a result, a whole class of people is unable to seek the protection of the laws. Such a targeted and injurious denial of basic rights can bear no rational relation to a legitimate state interest even under this lenient standard of judicial review. Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court's decision is affirmed. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The majority mischaracterizes Amendment 2 as showing much more animosity toward gays and lesbians than it actually does. Amendment 2 is not a targeted attack on the rights of homosexuals, but rather an attempt by voters to preserve traditional and long-held sexual mores. The majority attempts to overturn its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and puts the Court's weight behind the idea that opposing homosexuality is as offensive as exhibiting racial or religious bias. The Equal Protection Clause, which has previously been used to uphold the civil rights of racial and religious groups, should not be used in the present case to uphold the rights of homosexuals as a class. The majority actually declines to consider the issue of whether Amendment 2 bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose, because the majority is focused on asserting its view that discrimination against homosexuals is evil. This holding is unsupported by precedent and misguided in its conclusions.

Zivatofsky v. Kerry (2015) RULE OF LAW: Article II of the Constitution grants the U.S. president the exclusive authority to formally recognize a foreign sovereign through executive power that Congress may not contradict via statute. FACTS: Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky (plaintiff) was born to US citizens living in Jerusalem. Zivotofsky's mother requested a passport and report of birth abroad for her son, listing his place of birth as Jerusalem, Israel. The request was denied pursuant to a State Department policy put forth by the U.S. president, which provided that a passport could only list Jerusalem as the place of birth. Zivotofsky filed suit in federal district court against Secretary of State John Kerry (defendant), claiming that § 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Act), 116 Stat. 1350, permitted citizens born in Jerusalem to list their place of birth as Israel. The district court dismissed the action, reasoning that the action presented a nonjusticiable political question and that Zivotofsky lacked standing. Zivotofsky appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the political-question determination, but reversed on the standing issue. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to review, vacated the judgment, and remanded the matter to the court of appeals to determine whether Zivotofsky's interpretation of § 214(d) was correct and whether the statute was constitutional, rather than whether Jerusalem was in fact part of Israel. On remand, the court of appeals held that the statute was unconstitutional, concluding that the president exclusively held the power to recognize a foreign sovereign and that § 214(d) directly contradicted this constitutional authority. The Court again granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does Article II of the Constitution grant the U.S. president the exclusive authority to formally recognize a foreign sovereign through executive power that Congress may not contradict via statute?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Yes. Article II of the Constitution grants the U.S. president the exclusive authority to formally recognize a foreign sovereign, which is an executive power that Congress may not contradict via statute. A recognition is a formal acknowledgment that a particular entity possesses the qualifications for statehood or that a particular foreign regime is the government of a state. Status as a recognized sovereign confers many benefits. Recognized sovereigns may sue in federal court and benefit from sovereign immunity when they are sued. However, the term "recognition" appears nowhere in the Constitution. In this case, Secretary Kerry argues that the president may exercise this recognition power based on the Reception Clause, Art. II, § 3, which directs that the President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers." Pursuant to this authority, Congress has historically deferred to the president in matters such as making treaties with foreign entities, entering into diplomatic relations with a foreign sovereign, and sending ambassadors abroad. The Constitution thus assigns the president the authority to effect recognition on his own initiative. Congress, by contrast, has no similar constitutional power that would enable it to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign nation. Congress is not without constitutional authority with respect to foreign nations, as Congress may regulate commerce, establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and declare war. However, Congress may not contradict the president's exclusive authority to recognize the legitimacy of foreign states and governments, including their territorial boundaries. Thus, Congress cannot require the president, via § 214(d), to contradict his own statement regarding a determination in an official document issued by the secretary of state. Therefore, Zivotofsky may only list Jerusalem as his place of birth. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ Section 214(d) does not require the secretary of state to make a formal declaration about Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem. Making a notation with respect to a citizen's place of birth in a passport does not encumber the US with any international obligations. Instead, the statute merely requires passports to list Israel as the place of birth when requested by an individual. Dissent (Roberts, C.J.) ⇨ Section 214(d) does not contradict the president's recognition authority. Rather, the statute simply gives an American citizen born in Jerusalem the option to designate his or her place of birth as Israel for purposes of a passport.

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) RULE OF LAW: In exercising its remedial and preventive power to enforce a constitutional right under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may enact only legislation that utilizes congruent and proportional means for to achieving that legislative purpose. FACTS: In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in an express attempt to overturn the US Supreme Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, Oregon's prohibition on peyote use in Native American religious practice was upheld because the Oregon state law was one of general applicability. The RFRA prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person's free exercise of religion, even if the burden is derived from a law of general applicability. A person's free exercise of religion can only be substantially burdened if the government can show that its actions were necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and were the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Archbishop Flores (plaintiff) brought suit against the City of Boerne (defendant) under the RFRA after the City of Boerne denied his church's application for a building permit to make necessary expansions to its current building. The city denied the church's permit pursuant to a city ordinance that prevented expansions and alterations of structures designated as historic landmarks or existing within historic districts. The church's permit was denied because the City's Historic Landmark Commission determined the church was located in a historic district. Archbishop Flores sought relief under the RFRA in the District Court for the Western District of Texas. The district court held that the RFRA was unconstitutional, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: In exercising its remedial and preventive power to enforce a constitutional right under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, may Congress enact only legislation that utilizes congruent and proportional means for achieving that legislative purpose?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Yes. Congress has broad, but not unlimited, enforcement powers. Specifically, Congress's powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment are strictly remedial and not plenary. Accordingly, Congress has the power to enforce laws to prevent the violation of a constitutional right, but it does not have the power to define the substance of that constitutional right. There must be congruence and proportionality between the means Congress uses and the preventive or remedial ends it hopes to achieve. Without this congruence and proportionality, Congress's actions may cross the line into unacceptable substantive legislation. This interpretation of Congress's powers is supported by the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the RFRA is outside the scope of Congress's remedial enforcement powers, because it is overly broad in its scope and reach in relation to the desired ends of promoting religious freedom. The RFRA would impose a much more significant burden on states in terms of litigation costs and difficulty of proof than was appropriate in relation to the proposed federal interest. Relying on prior jurisprudence, the RFRA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence (Stevens, J.) ⇨ The RFRA is a "law respecting the establishment of religion" as prohibited by the First Amendment to the Constitution. If the historical building had been owned by an atheist, that person would not have been able to challenge the denial of a building permit based on the RFRA. Thus, the RFRA unconstitutionally promoted the establishment of religion and should be struck down. Concurrence (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The dissent's argument that historical materials suggest that Smith should be overturned as an improper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is incorrect. Not all zoning laws such as those in this case need to be struck down as improper restraints on the free exercise of religion as suggested by the dissent. The dissent does not properly support its position with sufficient historical evidence. Dissent (O'Connor, J.) Smith was wrongly decided. Instead of deciding the present case, the parties should reexamine Smith, which improperly restricts the free exercise of religion. Only after achieving a new understanding of the Free Exercise Clause can the Court properly analyze the constitutionality of the RFRA. Dissent (Souter, J.) ⇨ Smith has little value as precedent and should not be followed in the present case. The case should be set for reargument where a plenary reexamination can be conducted of the Free Exercise Clause issue. Until this occurs, a proper decision regarding the constitutionality of the RFRA cannot be made.

Arizona v. US (2012) RULE OF LAW: A state law that addresses immigration and alien registration is preempted where Congress has completely occupied the entire field. FACTS: The Arizona Legislature passed S.B. 1070, a law designed to deter the unlawful entry and presence of illegal aliens in the state. The federal government (plaintiff) filed suit against the State of Arizona (defendant) in district court and sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the implementation of four specific provisions of the statute. The district court granted the injunction which prohibited the state law from taking effect. Arizona appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review. ISSUE: Is a state law that addresses immigration and alien registration preempted where Congress has completely occupied the entire field?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Yes. Congress possesses vast authority to enact laws and govern over immigration issues and the regulation of aliens. Immigration policy can affect federal and international trade, tourism, diplomatic relations, and other vital interests of the US. The federal government argues that four provisions of Arizona's law are preempted by federal law covering the field of immigration. Section 3 of the statute penalizes an individual for failing to carry an alien registration document on his person. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), the Court found that Congress intended to completely occupy the immigration field with one all-embracing system. There, the Court held that the States lacked the authority to complement or to enforce additional regulations related to alien registration. Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards. Thus, Section 3's requirement that an individual possess an alien registration document is preempted by federal law. Section 5(C) of the statute makes it a state misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for or solicit work in a public place. The federal government argues that § 5 upsets the balance struck by Congress' passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) and therefore must also be preempted. Congress enacted the IRCA as a measure to combat the employment of illegal aliens. Although the federal law does not impose criminal penalties, some civil fines may be assessed. It is well settled that state law will be preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress. Here, § 5 clearly conflicts with the objectives of the IRCA and is therefore preempted. Section 6 provides that a state police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe that the person may have committed any offense that makes him removable from the US. The federal government argues that § 6 creates an obstruction to the alien removal process created by Congress. Under Arizona's law, a police officer may arrest someone if he has probable cause to believe the person has committed any public offense that makes him removable from the US. However, under the federal immigration system, the illegal status of an alien alone is no basis for an arrest. Instead, an administrative process kicks in with the filing of specific documentation to conduct a hearing. If it is determined after such a hearing that the alien is removable, the Attorney General issues a warrant to arrest the alien which is executed by trained immigration officers. Section 6 attempts to circumvent the federal process by allowing Arizona police officers to arrest suspected illegal aliens. This would allow the state to have its own immigration policy in place of the federal immigration system and is thus preempted by federal law. Finally, Section 2(B) requires Arizona police officers to make a reasonable attempt to discern the immigration status of any person they stop, detain, or arrest if there is a suspicion that the person is an illegal alien. The section further provides that any person who is arrested will have his or her immigration status determined prior to being released. Through its comprehensive immigration regulatory scheme, Congress has obligated Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to respond to any request made by state officials for verification of a person's immigration status. The federal scheme leaves some room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter. However, there is no definitive interpretation from the lower courts of Section 2(B) to determine whether it can be construed in a manner that conflicts with federal law. Therefore, §§ 3, 5(C), and 6 of S.B. 1070 are preempted by federal law. It was improper, however, to enjoin § 2(B) until such time as it may be shown that the provision in fact conflicts with federal law. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Concurrence/Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The majority's decision deprives Arizona, and any other State, from furthering its sovereign right and power to exclude people who have no right to be in the state. Moreover, the mere existence of federal action in the immigration field does not mean that a State is powerless to also act in that field. The Arizona laws being challenged do not extend, alter, or revise federal immigration restrictions, but merely enforce current federal restrictions more effectively.

Boumediene v. Bush (2008) RULE OF LAW: Courts must provide detainees held as unlawful alien enemy combatants a writ of habeas corpus to challenge their detention, or, if a writ of habeas corpus is not available, provide an adequate substitute process to detainees that includes the same procedural protections and opportunities that would be provided in a writ of habeas corpus. FACTS: In 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) to provide certain procedures for Guantanamo Bay detainees to challenge their classification as unlawful alien enemy combatants. In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA). Section 7(a) of the MCA prevented detainees classified as unlawful alien enemy combatants from challenging the conditions of their confinement and detentions through a writ of habeas corpus. Boumediene (plaintiff) and several detainees classified as unlawful alien enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay brought actions against the US government (defendant) to challenge their detentions through writs of habeas corpus. The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the MCA. The detainees petitioned for certiorari to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May non-citizen detainees captured abroad and held at the Guantanamo Bay military facility challenge their detention through a writ of habeas corpus?

(Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Yes. The Suspension Clause states that the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended only in cases of rebellion or invasion when public safety requires it. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the Court denied the writ to enemy aliens, captured outside U.S. territory, who were tried and convicted by a military tribunal for offenses committed outside the US and who were at all times imprisoned outside the US. In light of Eisentrager, three factors are relevant in determining the scope of the Suspension Clause with respect to detainees: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process that determines the status; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ. As to the first factor, Boumediene and the other detainees, like the Eisentrager petitioners, are not American citizens. However, unlike the Eisentrager petitioners, the detainees in this case dispute that they are "enemy combatants" and no trial has been conducted to determine laws of war violations. As to the second factor, the Guantanamo Bay military base is under the complete and total control of the US, which, combined with the relatively low burden on the military to hold them there, justifies fully extending the writ of habeas corpus to the detainees. As to the third factor, the Eisentrager petitioners were provided counsel, allowed to introduce their own evidence, and permitted to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses. In contrast, Boumediene and the other detainees were provided with inadequate procedural protections in their Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearings. For example, in a CSRT hearing, the government's evidence is presumed to be valid. No official counsel is provided to the detainee, and the detainee is permitted to present only "reasonably available" evidence. The lack of access to counsel and the inability to introduce evidence fall short of the adversarial mechanisms needed to eliminate the need for habeas corpus review. Therefore, MCA §7 is unconstitutional; however this holding does not affect the DTA and CSRT process. The President is entitled to a reasonable period of time to determine a detainee's status before a court may entertain that detainee's habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence (Souter, J.) ⇨ In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), the Court held that statutory claims of habeas corpus jurisdiction extend to foreign nationals imprisoned by the US at Guantanamo Bay. Later, Congress eliminated the statutory right to bring a writ of habeas corpus. Although the writ is no longer allowed by statute, the Court is not required to disallow the right of foreign nationals to bring a writ of habeas corpus under the Constitution. Many detainees have been held without formal charges for up to six years. The detainees deserve a procedure to challenge their confinement in light of the relatively long length of their detentions. Dissent (Roberts, C.J.) ⇨ Invalidating §7 of the MCA eliminates the most generous set of procedural protections ever afforded to foreign citizens. Additionally, the set of vague procedures in place of the MCA provides little direction to federal courts tasked with adjudicating the claims of detainees. The CSRT hearings afforded to detainees are not part of the initial process used to classify detainees as unlawful alien enemy combatants, but are instead procedures for detainees to challenge their classification. CSRT hearings provide the same procedural protections as a writ of habeas corpus. Thus a writ of habeas corpus for detainees is unnecessary. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The writ of habeas corpus has never been applied to foreign persons detained outside the jurisdiction of the US. Thus, the Suspension Clause of the Constitution does not apply to Guantanamo Bay detainees and the detainees are not entitled to the same legal protections afforded to US citizens. The security of the US will be ultimately weakened by the increase of releases of detainees to their home countries, where many historically have returned to terrorist activities. The legislative and executive branches have unequivocally stated their opposition to extending the writ of habeas corpus to detainees. The judiciary oversteps its bounds in making a ruling that goes against the will of the other branches of government and exposes the US to a security threat.

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) RULE OF LAW: Indian tribes are not foreign nations subject to original jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. FACTS: The State of Georgia (D) attempted to implement laws meant to take land from the Cherokee Nation, despite federal treaties that gave the Cherokees rights to the land. In order to stop this from happening, the Cherokee Nation (P) filed a motion for injunction directly with the US Supreme Court. P argued that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to hear their motion under Article III of the Constitution because the Cherokee Nation was a foreign nation. The Supreme Court heard the case to consider whether it had jurisdiction. ISSUE: Are Indian tribes foreign nations subject to original jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution?

(Marshall, C.J.) NO. The Indian tribes are not foreign nations within the meaning of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction over Indian tribes. Article III provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes between a state and a foreign nation. Indian tribes are not foreign nations within the meaning of the Constitution for two reasons. 1st, the Indian tribes are not entirely separated from the US and cannot be considered truly foreign. Although the tribes have an independent right to land and their own forms of government, these tribes are also a part of the US, physically, economically and politically. The Indian tribes are contained within the US's boundaries, treated as a part of the US for purposes of trade, and reliant on the US government for their protection and for many of their needs. For these reasons, Indian tribes are better described as dependent nations than as foreign nations. 2nd, other sections of the Constitution treat foreign states and Indian tribes as two different things. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution addresses Congress's ability to structure commercial exchanges with various third parties, such as states. This section treats foreign nations and Indian tribes as two different types of third parties that may participate in these exchanges. If the Constitution had intended for Indian tribes to be considered foreign nations, Indian tribes and foreign nations would not have been listed as two separate categories in Section 8. Because terms in the Constitution must be interpreted consistently, foreign nations must be understood to be different from Indian tribes, not only in Section 8, but also throughout the rest of the Constitution. Therefore, an Indian tribe is not a foreign nation under Article III. As a result, the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to hear disputes between states and Indian tribes. The Cherokee Nation's (P's) injunction is denied. CONCURRENCE (Baldwin, J.): The Cherokee Nation cannot be a foreign nation, because it granted full control over the trade and management of its affairs to the US. The government has never recognized a foreign nation of this type of character, and the judiciary cannot do so. The federal government has recognized Georgia's control over its own territory, and the authority of the legislative and executive branches would be directly contradicted if the courts recognized a foreign nation within Georgia. CONCURRENCE (Johnson, J.): Indian tribes do not rise to the organizational level of foreign states and do not have the independence necessary to constitute a foreign state. The treaties that Indian tribes have signed with the US reject any notion of Indian tribes being separate foreign states, because the treaties give the US the power to set conditions on the Indian tribes, limit their boundaries of movement, and submit the Indian tribes to the management and protection of the US. DISSENT (Thompson, J.): A body is a foreign nation if it is governed by its own authority and laws. Foreign states such as Indian tribes may seek allegiances with larger states for protection, but this does not prevent Indian tribes from still being considered foreign states. If the US considered the Indian tribes to be enough of a nation to contract with them through treaties, the US should also recognize the right of the Indian tribes to enforce these contracts through the Supreme Court.

Marbury v. Madison (1803) RULE OF LAW: The Supreme Court of the US has the authority to review laws and legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the US Constitution. FACTS: U.S. President John Adams appointed several individuals to the judiciary in the final days of his presidency. The group of appointees was duly approved by Congress, and Adams had signed their commissions. However, finalizing the appointments required delivering the commissions to the appointees, and that step had not been completed by the time Adams's term expired. The next president, Thomas Jefferson, refused to fully finalize Adams's judicial appointments and directed his Secretary of State, James Madison (D) not to deliver the commissions. William Marbury (P), who had been appointed a Justice of the Peace of the District of Columbia by Adams, brought an action against D in the US Supreme Court. P sought a writ of mandamus to compel D to deliver the commission and finalize P's appointment. Congress had authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, so P brought his action under the Court's original jurisdiction. ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court of the US have the authority to review laws and legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the US Constitution?

(Marshall, C.J.) YES. The Supreme Court of the US has the authority to review laws and legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the US Constitution. The Constitution clearly limits the powers that may be exercised by each branch of government. The legislative branch must operate within these Constitutionally defined limits in passing laws. The role of the judicial branch is to identify, interpret, and apply the law to decide cases. If there is a conflict between a law passed by Congress and the Constitution, then the Constitution must control, and the offending law will be void. Here, P has a right to his commission as Justice of the Peace because he was lawfully appointed to that position by the president's act of signing his commission, further enforced by his confirmation in the Senate. D's refusal to finalize P's appointment interferes with P's legal title, and P is entitled to a remedy under federal law. However, even though a writ of mandamus would have been an appropriate remedy, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the US Supreme Court to give such a remedy, is unconstitutional*. The Act allows the Supreme Court to have original jurisdiction over actions for writs of mandamus. However, this provision directly conflicts with Article III of the Constitution, which greatly limits the cases in which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction and provides it with appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The Act is unconstitutional because it seeks to expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and therefore, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over P's claim.

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) RULE OF LAW: The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, and to make such other laws as it deems necessary and proper to carry out this enumerated power. Additionally, federal laws are supreme and states may not make laws that interfere with the federal government's exercise of its constitutional powers. FACTS: In 1816, Congress passed an act that incorporated the Bank of the US. In 1817, the Bank opened up a branch in the state of Maryland (plaintiff). In 1818, the Maryland state legislature passed an act to impose a tax on all out-of-state banks operating in the state of Maryland. Although the act was general in nature, the Bank of the US was the only such bank in Maryland at that time and was thus the only establishment affected by the tax. James McCulloch (defendant), head of the Maryland branch of the Bank of the US (Bank), refused to pay the tax. This lawsuit ensued and the case was appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The court of appeals upheld Maryland's argument that because the Constitution was specifically silent on the subject of whether the US government could charter a bank, the Bank of the US was unconstitutional. The case was then appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: (1) Does Congress have implied constitutional power to create a bank? (2) If so, may individual states tax a federally created bank?

(Marshall, C.J.): (1) YES. Congress has the constitutional power to charter the Bank of the US. This power is ultimately derived from the Constitution's grant to Congress of the general power to "tax and spend" for the general welfare. However, in addition to its enumerated powers, Congress is also given general powers under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, which states that Congress may create laws it deems necessary and proper to help carry out its enumerated powers. The Necessary and Proper Clause functions to expand, not limit, Congress's enumerated powers. Congress decided that chartering the Bank of the US was a necessary and proper method of raising revenue to carry out its overall taxing and spending powers. (2) NO. The Bank was created by federal statute. Maryland may not tax the Bank as a federal institution because federal laws are supreme to state laws. A federally created institution may not be inhibited by a state law. The Bank of the US functions to serve the entire nation. It is thus inappropriate for it to be controlled by one part of the nation (i.e. Maryland) through a tax. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) RULE OF LAW: If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, the federal law governs pursuant to Congress's constitutional grant of power to regulate interstate commerce. FACTS: Ogden (plaintiff) received a license under New York state law that purported to give him the exclusive right to operate steamboats in New York waters. Gibbons (defendant) sought and obtained a similar license from the federal government, which Gibbons used to compete with Ogden in the same water route that Ogden was using. To protect his monopoly license, Ogden filed suit in the New York Court of Chancery to enjoin Gibbons from operating his boats in New York waters. Gibbons argued that he was operating his boats pursuant to an order of Congress, and that Congress has exclusive power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce. The New York Court of Chancery found in favor of Ogden and issued an injunction to restrict Gibbons from operating his boats. Gibbons appealed the case to the Court of Errors of New York, which affirmed the decision. Gibbons appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, does the state law govern?

(Marshall, C.J.): NO. Congress is granted the power to regulate interstate commerce in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The word "commerce" includes traffic, intercourse, and navigation, as well as commodities associated with interstate commerce. Congress may regulate all commercial activities occurring between states but not activities occurring solely within one state's borders. If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, the federal law governs pursuant to Congress's constitutional grant of power to regulate interstate commerce. In this case, Congress has the power to regulate the interstate commercial activity of steamboats on navigable waters within the state of New York. Because Congress has the power to regulate this activity, and New York passed conflicting regulations of the same activity, federal supremacy principles dictate that the federal regulation trumps the state regulation. Thus, the New York regulatory law is deemed unconstitutional. The decision of the Court of Errors prohibiting Gibbons from operating steamboats in New York is reversed. CONCURRENCE (Johnson, J.): The only issue that ultimately needs to be determined is the intent of the framers in construing Congressional powers. The grant of power by the framers to Congress to regulate interstate commerce is absolute. Additionally, when the framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, they gave it the power to regulate all subsidiary activities that accompany it, such as shipbuilding, carrying trade, and the propagation of seamen. Gibbons' power to run his boats is derived from the framers' intent to accord Congress the power to regulate all areas of interstate commerce, not the states.

Worcester v. Georgia (1832) RULE OF LAW: In the US, states do not have the right to impose laws on Indian nations. FACTS: Samuel Worcester (D), a white individual, was living on the land of the Cherokee Nation in the State of Georgia (P). Under the requirements of Georgia law at the time, all white individuals living on Cherokee land were required to obtain a permit or license from the state. The individuals were also required to take an oath of allegiance to Georgia. Under Georgia law, individuals who violated these requirements could be arrested and brought to court. D failed to obtain a permit or take an oath as required under the law and, as a result, was charged and convicted with four years of hard labor in Georgia's jails. Alternatively, Georgia offered to pardon D's sentence if he would agree to leave the Cherokee Nation immediately. D refused to accept the deal and instead appealed to the US Supreme Court for assistance, arguing that Georgia had no right to exert authority over individuals in the Cherokee Nation because (1) the Cherokee Nation was its own state and (2) the enforcement of Georgia's law would deprive the Cherokee Nation of its autonomy. ISSUE: In the US, do states have the right to impose laws on Indian nations?

(Marshall, C.J.): NO. Indian nations such as the Cherokee Nation are independent entities, and states such as Georgia have no authority to pass laws regarding these entities. Historically, the European and US governments have always treated the Indians as sovereign bodies capable of self-governance and have contracted with them accordingly. When Europeans arrived on North American soil, they understood that while they had an opportunity to buy or trade land with Indians, this opportunity did not supersede the Indians' right to the land itself. The Europeans treated the Indians as sovereign nations with their own rights and privileges. Later, when the US government began to contract with the Indians through treaties, a similar approach was taken. The treaties offered the Indians protection in exchange for land and different needs, but still respected the integrity of the Indian nations. The language of the Hopewell treaty with the Cherokee Nation clarifies that while the US offered protection and management for affairs such as trade, the US did not intend to deny the Cherokee Nation the rights to its own land, nor its right to self-government. The later Holston Treaty echoed these same ideas. In exchange for peace and an agreement to work with the US the Cherokee Nation received protection but not occupation. The US's laws and treaties recognize that the Cherokee Nation is independent and that only the federal government has the authority to contract with sovereign nations. States may not impose their laws or will upon sovereign nations. Here, because the Cherokee Nation is a sovereign nation, Georgia does not have the right to impose requirements upon white individuals living on Cherokee Nation land. Therefore, D should not have been seized and charged under Georgia law. The judgment against D is reversed and annulled. CONCURRENCE (McLean, J.): The Indian tribes have the power of self-government as enshrined in our treaties and laws. Only the federal government has the power and authority to interact with the Indian tribes. However, this self-government should be temporary, and the Indian nations should eventually be assimilated into the states. Moreover, if something happens that renders the Indians incapable of self-government, the states should have the ability to take over.

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp (1977) RULE OF LAW: A state-sponsored racial classification will not be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless a plaintiff shows that the law is motivated by a discriminatory purpose and has a discriminatory impact. FACTS: The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) (plaintiff) applied for a permit from the Village of Arlington Heights (Village) (defendant) to rezone a fifteen-acre parcel of land from its zoning classification as a single-family use to a multiple-family use classification. MHDC planned to build a racially-integrated complex featuring nearly two hundred townhouse units marketed to low and moderate income tenants. The Village denied the permit request, and MHDC brought suit in federal district court alleging the denial of the permit was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Fair Housing Act of 1968. The district court upheld the permit denial, but the court of appeals reversed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the Village's denial of a zoning reclassification permit for a racially-integrated multi-family dwelling violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Powell, J.) ⇨ No. For its constitutional challenge to be upheld, MHDC must demonstrate both that the law is motivated by a discriminatory purpose and has a discriminatory impact. In determining the existence of a discriminatory purpose, several factors must be considered: (1) the historical background predating the decision; (2) the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged classification; (3) departures by the state actor from normal procedures; (4) substantive departures, particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly point to a decision contrary to the one reached; and (5) the legislative or administrative history surrounding the adoption of the legislative classification. Nothing in the factual record indicates that the sequence of events leading up to the denial of the permit sparks suspicion. The property in question has been zoned exclusively for single-family use for decades. The vast majority of the Village is committed to single-family homes as its dominant residential land use. Additionally, the rezoning request was treated according to usual procedures, with the Village scheduling two additional hearings beyond what was common to reconsider the permit denial. Based on these facts, MHDC did not meet its required burden to show that the denial of its permit was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed as the permit denial is constitutional. Concurrence/Dissent (Marshall, J.) ⇨ The entire case should be remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration of the denial of the permit in light of the new standard outlined by the majority. The court of appeals is better situated to determine whether further district court proceedings are required to develop a more extensive factual record. Dissent (White, J.) ⇨ Remand is necessary because the court of appeals never actually considered MHDC's Fair Housing Act claim. Moreover, it is unnecessary for the majority to articulate such a lengthy standard for determining whether a discriminatory purpose exists. Both the district court and the court of appeals found that the permit denial furthered a legitimate state interest in preserving surrounding property values. The existence of this nondiscriminatory purpose itself justifies the permit denial. The judgment of the court of appeals should be vacated solely on the Fair Housing Act claim.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) RULE OF LAW: A facially neutral law that is applied in a discriminatory manner on the basis of race or nationality violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. FACTS: In 1880, San Francisco passed an ordinance that required operators of laundries in buildings not made of brick or stone to apply for a permit to continue operation. At the time, 320 of the laundries in San Francisco were constructed of wood. Yick Wo and Wo Lee (defendants) were laundry operators of Chinese descent. They and over 200 other laundry operators of Chinese descent sought permits to continue their operations. All but one of their requests were denied. However, 80 of 81 similarly situated laundry operators who were not of Chinese descent were granted permits. Yick Wo and Wo Lee were fined and imprisoned after they continued to operate their laundries without permits. Yick Wo appealed to the California Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction. Wo Lee filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, but the court denied relief. Yick Wo and Wo Lee appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does a facially neutral law that is applied in a discriminatory manner on the basis of race or nationality violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Matthews, J.) ⇨ Yes. A facially neutral law that is applied in a discriminatory manner on the basis of race or nationality violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the equal protection of the laws to all people within the US. The Equal Protection Clause applies not only to racial discrimination, but also to discrimination based on a person's nationality or alienage. Equal protection is denied when a facially neutral law is applied unequally among similarly situated people. Here, the San Francisco ordinance appears to be neutral and fair on its face. However, the ordinance has been applied unequally to similarly situated people. Notwithstanding the fact that Yick Wo and Wo Lee have complied with all requirements of the ordinance, the administrators denied their petitions and the petitions of all but one of the other laundry operators of Chinese descent, while granting permits to 80 of 81 applicants who were not of Chinese descent. These facts demonstrate that the permits were denied for no reason other than hostility against their Chinese nationality. Thus, the application of this ordinance has denied Yick Wo and Wo Lee the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, their imprisonment is illegal, and they must be discharged from custody.

The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) RULE OF LAW: The Thirteenth Amendment solely prohibits slavery as experienced by Africans in the US before the Civil War, and the Fourteenth Amendment (which is largely geared towards the protections of emancipated slaves and African Americans) only protects rights guaranteed by the US and not individual states. FACTS: The City of New Orleans faced severe outbreaks of disease after its water supply was contaminated with the refuse from slaughterhouses located about a mile upstream on the Mississippi River. The Louisiana state legislature sought to remedy this problem by centralizing the location of all slaughtering away from the water supply. It did this by creating the Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughter-house Co. (defendant) and gave the company a monopoly over the entire slaughtering business in and around New Orleans. The legislature required all butchers to rent out space from the company and conduct all butchering activities on the premises. The Butchers' Benevolent Assn. of New Orleans (plaintiff) brought several suits against the company alleging that the Louisiana law was an unconstitutional violation of the servitude prohibition in the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The case was submitted on writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, which held for the company. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the Louisiana statute creating a slaughterhouse monopoly violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution.

(Miller, J.) ⇨ No. The Thirteenth Amendment was passed to specifically prohibit the evils of slavery as it existed during the pre-Civil War enslavement of Africans in the US. "Servitude" is a broader concept than "slavery," but the inclusion of this term in the Thirteenth Amendment was solely for the purpose of forbidding any and all forms of African slavery in the future. The Amendment was passed during the post-Civil War era when states enacted harsh and discriminatory legislation limiting the rights of newly-freed slaves. So, although the Thirteenth Amendment does not specifically mention emancipated African slaves, it applies mostly for the protections of this group of people. Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to protect plaintiffs in the present case. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only protects the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the US and not by the individual states. The rights guaranteed by the US are very limited and historically do not include civil rights. Thus, the clause does not apply to protect the Butchers' Benevolent Assn. from the monopoly in the present case. No precedent supports finding that the Louisiana restraint on butchers constitutes a deprivation of their property without due process of law. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to remedy the harsh and discriminatory laws passed against newly-freed slaves after the Civil War. It is doubtful that any state action not specifically directed at emancipated slaves as a class or at the African or African-American race could ever fall within the restrictions of the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause does not apply to plaintiffs in the present case because the Louisiana statute does not involve emancipated slaves or race issues. Thus, the Louisiana statute does not violate the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, and the decision of the lower courts is affirmed. Dissent (Field, J.) ⇨ The majority's overly-narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment virtually guts the Amendment of its protections. Firstly, the Constitution does not contain any separate nationally-sanctioned privileges and immunities. Instead, all privileges and immunities protected by the amendment are derived from those protected by the states. Thus, it is incorrect for the majority to have held that the Fourteenth Amendment only guarantees national, and not state, protections. The majority's conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process provisions only operates to protect the rights of freed African-American slaves is too narrow an interpretation. It requires a broader reading and it encompasses the common law presumption in favor of a general individual right to pursue a legitimate occupation. Dissent (Bradley, J.) ⇨ It is within the rights and privileges guaranteed to every American to pursue whatever civil employment he or she chooses, subject to reasonable regulations by the legislature. The majority's conclusion that the granting of a monopoly over the slaughterhouse business in a large market to one company is not a "reasonable regulation," especially since a butcher's keeping of a slaughterhouse is a fundamental aspect of practicing his trade. To require butchers to conduct their work in a slaughterhouse owned by another company and to require them to pay a fee to that company constitutes an impermissible restriction on their constitutional right to pursue whatever civil employment they choose. Thus, the Louisiana statute is an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dissent (Swayne, J.) ⇨ While the first eleven Amendments to the Constitution were enacted as limitations on federal government power, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments constitute limitations on powers traditionally exercised by states. Thus, it is improper to narrowly construe the Fourteenth Amendment as only providing for rights guaranteed by the national government and not individual state governments, as the Amendment itself clearly deals with state powers. The Fourteenth Amendment contains ample protections to offer relief to plaintiffs from the state-created monopoly.

Richmond v. JA Croson (1989) RULE OF LAW: Without evidence of past particular race-based discrimination, a city may not enact a plan to provide a race-based set-aside to exclusively promote minority business enterprises, as this does not constitute narrowly tailored means geared towards accomplishing a compelling state purpose. FACTS: In 1983, the City of Richmond, Virginia (defendant) adopted the Minority Business Utilization Plan (MBUP) that required primary contractors to whom the City awarded construction contracts to subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar value of the contract to one or more Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs). The 30 percent set-aside did not apply to primary contractors that were themselves controlled by minority groups. The City adopted the plan after studies suggested that very few contracts were awarded to MBEs despite the city's large minority population. No direct evidence existed, however, of any discrimination against MBEs by the City or its prime contractors. The J.A. Croson Co. (plaintiff), a primary contractor, lost its contract with the city after failing to designate 30 percent of the value of its contract to MBEs. Croson sued the City of Richmond in federal district court, which upheld the constitutionality of the MBUP. The court of appeals affirmed, but the US Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration under a strict-scrutiny standard of review. On remand, the court of appeals held the MBUP did not pass strict scrutiny, and Richmond appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May a city constitutionally use a set-aside plan requiring prime contractors to give 30 percent of their business to minority-controlled subcontractors?

(O'Connor, J.) ⇨ No. A state or local subdivision of government has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction, as long as it identifies such discrimination with sufficient particularity so as not to run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to judge the constitutionality of the City's actions in attempting to remedy past discrimination. To pass strict scrutiny, the City must demonstrate that it used narrowly tailored means to accomplish a compelling state interest. The City provides no evidence to identify with particularity instances of past discrimination, but rather justifies its actions based on a general assertion that discrimination in business contracts has historically targeted African Americans. However, the City does not assert that particular MBEs that might benefit from the MBUP were once targets of discrimination. Thus, the MBUP's stated objectives do not constitute a compelling state interest. Next, the City does not use narrowly tailored means to accomplish its stated objectives. The MBUP is designed to promote business for many different minority groups. No evidence exists of particularized discrimination against African Americans or other minority groups. Additionally, the City does not consider other race-neutral alternatives by which it might accomplish the same purposes. The MBUP does not pass strict scrutiny and is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. However, if the city has more concrete evidence of discrimination, its actions in the MBUP might be justified. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. Concurrence (Stevens, J.) ⇨ The goal of the Fourteenth Amendment is to further the national goal of equal opportunity for all US citizens. However, in seeking to achieve this goal, policy makers must enact equality-promoting policies only after careful consideration of their potential future effects. The majority incorrectly assumes that a governmental decision resting upon a racial classification is never permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong. Concurrence (Kennedy, J.) ⇨ The majority reaches the correct result, but it is not necessary for the majority to hold that a state or local subdivision of government has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction. However, governmental race-based classifications may never be upheld unless enacted to remedy a specific instance of past discrimination. Concurrence (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The majority opinion correctly applies strict scrutiny to all governmental classifications by race. However, the majority wrongly suggests that state and local governments may discriminate on the basis of race in order to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination. States may properly act in this way only when needed to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification. However, absent these circumstances, states may never use discriminatory racial classifications to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination. Dissent (Marshall, J.) ⇨ The Court acted improperly in second-guessing Richmond's judgment about the need for the set-aside on the grounds that it is not supported by sufficient evidence. Richmond, the former capital of the Confederacy, has a strong and highly chronicled history of discrimination against racial minorities. Additionally, applying strict scrutiny to remedial measures targeted at racial discrimination is a sharp step backward from the Court's prior affirmative-action jurisprudence. For instance, the MBUP closely mimics the federal set-aside plan previously upheld by the Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) RULE OF LAW: Due process guarantees that US citizens held in the US as enemy combatants must be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-maker. FACTS: In 2001, in response to attacks against the US by the al Qaeda terrorist network on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), authorizing the President to use all appropriate and necessary force against persons suspected of engaging in terrorist activity against the US. The President shortly thereafter ordered US military forces into Afghanistan. This case arises out of the detention of Yaser Hamdi (defendant), a U.S. citizen, who was seized in Afghanistan on suspicion that he was actively working with the Taliban regime. He was turned over to the US military. The US interrogated Hamdi in Afghanistan before transferring him to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in 2002. After learning he was an American citizen, authorities transferred him to Norfolk, Virginia, and then Charleston, South Carolina. The Government contended that because Hamdi was an "enemy combatant" it could hold him indefinitely in the US without formal charges or proceedings until it determined that access to counsel or further process was warranted. Hamdi's father filed a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that Hamdi's detainment violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and demanding that Hamdi be appointed counsel and given a fair hearing. The government (plaintiff) filed a motion to dismiss, which included an outline of the evidence against Hamdi, called the Mobbs Report. The district court found that the Mobbs Report did not contain enough evidence to hold Hamdi without trial. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the US acted constitutionally in detaining Hamdi, and Hamdi petitioned for certiorari to the US Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: When a U.S. citizen is labeled as an enemy combatant, is he entitled to the constitutional protections of due process?

(O'Connor, J.) ⇨ Yes. A U.S. citizen accused of being an enemy combatant must be afforded an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision maker. The government must provide basic procedures for the citizen-detainee to challenge his detention. In passing the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution, Congress authorized the President to exercise the "necessary and proper force" to combat terrorist activity. Hamdi was seized by the US while engaged in terrorist activity in Afghanistan. Thus, Congress authorized Hamdi's detention and his seizure is appropriate. However, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees the right to due process under the law. Furthermore, absent suspension, all persons detained in the US have the right to habeas corpus. This means that an individual accused of criminal activity cannot be detained indefinitely, with no trial, no counsel, and no ability to petition for freedom if he is wrongfully imprisoned. Both parties concede that Hamdi is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus as a US citizen, and that Congress has not suspended the writ. The government argues that Hamdi's writ of habeas corpus should be denied because the facts surrounding his seizure are still in dispute. In order to determine the due process issues in this case, the private interest affected by the official action must be weighed against the government's asserted interest, including the function involved and the burdens the government would face in providing greater process. Hence, Hamdi's interest in being free from involuntary detention must be weighed against the government's interest in ensuring that those who have fought with the enemy in armed conflict do not return. These interests must be carefully balanced. The constitutional guarantees of liberty are best served if a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant receives notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker. However, this holding is qualified. As long as the government provides these core elements, it can tailor other aspects of proceedings to help reduce the burden on the executive of conducting enemy combatant proceedings during times of military conflict. Under these criteria, Hamdi has been denied due process, and therefore is entitled to a hearing that contains the protections of the Constitution. The government is required to provide Hamdi with basic proceedings to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant. The ruling of the court of appeals is vacated and remanded. Concurrence/Dissent (Souter, J.) ⇨ The AUMF does not authorize detention of classified enemy combatants in light of the Non-Detention Act, which strictly prohibits the detention of a US citizen without an explicit act of Congress. Congress has not explicitly acted to permit the detention of Hamdi, but has instead granted general war powers to the President. The power to make determinations affecting citizen-detainees' liberty interests is inappropriate for the President, since the President is entrusted with protecting national security interests. Liberty and security interests are necessarily at odds with each other, creating a conflict of interest. Since Hamdi's detention is unlawful, the question of what procedure is due to challenge a classification as an enemy combatant is unnecessary. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The due process protections available to citizens are distinguishable from those available to non-citizens. Non-citizens accused of aiding the enemy and captured during times of war can be held until the end of the conflict. In contrast, citizens accused of aiding the enemy, like Hamdi, were regarded as traitors and processed through the criminal justice system. The plurality has ignored this tradition and formulated a new system for citizen enemy combatants to be processed. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to a fair hearing, absent invocation of the Suspension Clause; the Constitution does not afford a third option. The executive branch cannot unilaterally relax constitutional due process protections unless Congress suspends those protections. Only Congress may suspend this criminal process for citizens, and the executive can only bring about this result by asking Congress to act. Because both parties agree that the Suspension Clause was not invoked here, Hamdi should be afforded his due process right to a fair hearing in front of a judge, like any other criminal citizen. Dissent (Thomas, J.) ⇨ It is not the role of the courts to define the federal government's war powers. Congress, not the courts, should have considered this issue. The plurality does not properly consider the Government's compelling interests at stake and the judiciary's limited role in balancing this and private interests. Forcing the government to gather additional evidence to prove that an enemy combatant is lawfully detained will be costly, time intensive, and may compromise confidential intelligence, which a detainee could then use against the US. The interest of the government of protecting the country overrides Hamdi's individual liberty interest, and therefore the judgment of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper (1985) RULE OF LAW: States may discriminate against rights of out-of-state residents as long as there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment, and the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the state's objective. FACTS: The Rules of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire (defendant) limit bar admission to state residents. Kathryn Piper (plaintiff) took and passed the February 1980 New Hampshire bar exam. She passed all requirements to be admitted to the New Hampshire bar and filed an application for admission along with a form illustrating her intent to become a New Hampshire resident. She was denied admission to the bar on the grounds that she would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire prior to being sworn in. Piper filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the restrictions on her bar admission, and the district court agreed and granted the injunction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May a state enact restrictions on admission to the bar for out-of-state residents?

(Powell, J.) ⇨ No. The purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to create a national economic union where citizens of state A have the same rights to do business in state B as citizens of state B. The practice of law should be treated just like any business among the several states, as the practice of law is a "privilege" and is necessary for the provisions of justice. However, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not absolute, and states may discriminate against rights of out-of-state residents as long as there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment, and the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the state's objective. In considering the presence of a substantial relationship, it is appropriate to consider the availability of less restrictive means. In the present case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire offered several justifications for its refusal to admit nonresidents to the bar. Nonresidents are less likely to become and remain familiar with the state's local rules, to behave ethically, to be available for court proceedings, and to do pro bono and other work for the state. However, after considering these reasons, none of them pass the test of "substantiality," and the means chosen do not bear the necessary relationship to the state's objectives to satisfy the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire offers little concrete evidence that its fears about the conduct of nonresident lawyers are actually valid. States have the right to regulate their bars, but without more evidence, New Hampshire is discriminating against nonresident lawyers without a substantial reason for doing so, and is using overly-restrictive means. The decision of the lower courts is affirmed. Concurrence (White, J.) ⇨ Based on the facts surrounding Piper's situation, there is no reason to treat her differently than New Hampshire lawyers in terms of granting bar admission. Since she lives only 400 yards away from the New Hampshire border, has taken and passed the New Hampshire bar exam, and plans to practice law exclusively in New Hampshire, there is no substantive reason for her denial of admission. Granting bar admission to Piper would not implicate any of the concerns given by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as justifications for denying bar membership for nonresidents. Dissent (Rehnquist, J.) ⇨ The practice of law is fundamentally different than other interstate businesses in that it essentially requires a local presence within the state to be practiced effectively. The difficulties of complying with local rules and the need for lawyers and legislators that are committed to addressing unique state interests provides enough justification for a state to limit the admission of nonresident lawyers to its bar. Additionally, the issue of having counsel available on short notice for trials and emergency matters is a real issue that can only be solved by requiring lawyers to have in-state addresses, or requiring clients to retain both out-of-state and local counsel. The second option is too expensive to be considered a valid choice, and thus New Hampshire was confined to regulating bar admission because there are really no other valid, less-restrictive alternatives. The decision of the lower courts should be reversed and the New Hampshire regulations upheld.

Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association (1992) RULE OF LAW: A state law that directly regulates occupational health and safety, even though it also serves the state's interest in promoting public safety, is pre-empted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act. FACTS: National Solid Wastes Management Association (plaintiff) filed suit in federal court to challenge an Illinois law that imposed training, examination, experience and licensing requirements upon employees at hazardous waste facilities and operators of hazardous waste management equipment. The Association asserted that the state statutes were pre-empted by federal Occupational Safety and Health Act standards and violated the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution. The district court found that the Illinois laws were not pre-empted by OSHA regulations because they served the purpose of protecting public safety in addition to the OSHA purpose of promoting workplace safety. The district court invalidated a portion of the laws that required mandatory training to take place in Illinois on grounds that it did not promote the purpose of protecting public safety. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the state of Illinois (defendant) petitioned the US Supreme Court for review. ISSUE: Is a state law that directly regulates occupational health and safety, even though it also serves the state's interest in promoting public safety, pre-empted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act?

(O'Connor, J.) ⇨ Yes. A state law that directly regulates occupational health and safety, even though it also serves the state's interest in promoting public safety, is pre-empted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act. The analysis of whether federal law pre-empts state law turns on an inquiry into Congress' intent in passing the federal law. The express language of the Occupational Safety and Health Act pre-empts any state law that regulates activities for which OSHA has already implemented regulation unless the state submits a plan for pre-approval by the agency. Illinois has not submitted such a plan. When state regulation is not explicitly pre-empted by the language of federal law, we recognize two types of implied pre-emption. The first type is field pre-emption, in which federal law so extensively regulates an activity as to support the inference that Congress intended to leave no room for additional state regulation. The second type is conflict pre-emption, which arises when compliance with both state and federal regulation would be impossible or when state law impermissibly obstructs the goals of federal regulation. We conclude that Congress intended OSHA to limit the regulation of occupational safety to only one set of standards. State regulation of this field is pre-empted unless a state plan receives agency approval. The state asserts that Congress intended only to require approval when state regulation would completely supplant OSHA provisions, and not when state regulation would merely supplement the federal regulations. The language of OSHA mandates submission of a plan that will completely supplant the federal regulations. It affords that opportunity only to states willing to assume the full responsibility of regulating workplace safety. That conclusion finds support in the federal statute's exception to pre-emption of any state law regulating conduct for which no federal standard has been established. Additional provisions of the act, which safeguard interstate commerce interests and deprive a state of all jurisdiction over workplace safety when a state regulatory plan is disapproved, convince us that Congress intended to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction over activities regulated under the act. The fact that state law may advance the same ultimate goal as federal regulation does not save it from standing as an obstacle to the implementation of federal law. State law is pre-empted if it interferes with federally prescribed methods for achieving the regulatory goal. If Illinois wishes to implement laws regulating activities already covered by OSHA, it must do so by obtaining agency approval of its proposed regulations. Illinois further asserts that its stated goal of promoting public safety, in addition to regulating workplace safety, spares its laws from pre-emption by OSHA. Although the purpose of a law forms part of the pre-emption analysis, we also look to the actual effect of the law. The critical inquiry goes to the point at which state law so interferes with the implementation of federal regulation as to be subject to pre-emption. Any state law that directly regulates activities regulated by OSHA is pre-empted, irrespective of the fact that it may serve an additional legitimate purpose. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution demands that any state law interfering with federal law, although its regulatory matter may otherwise be well within the scope of sovereign state authority, must yield to federal rule. Concurrence (Kennedy, J.) ⇨ I believe the state law is expressly pre-empted by the terms of the federal act and the plurality opinion unnecessarily expands the jurisprudence of implied pre-emption. The plurality relies on conflict pre-emption, whereas our precedent sets a high bar of direct conflict with Congressional intent as the standard for a finding of conflict pre-emption. If not for OSHA's state plan pre-approval requirements, I would not find the state's supplementary regulations in direct conflict with the purposes of OSHA. Our pre-emption jurisprudence recognizes that the sovereign authority of the states is not to be constrained absent a clear directive of Congress. Nonetheless, I agree that the pre-approval requirements, even though they fail to expressly state pre-emptive intent, support the inference of Congressional intent to impose exclusive federal jurisdiction. The dissent advocates a position that would allow dual jurisdiction by affording states the ability to implement supplemental legislation. That position would undercut the authority of OSHA and create situations in which compliance with both federal and state law would not be impossible but the concurrency of jurisdiction would frustrate federal enforcement. I agree with the plurality's opinion that OSHA pre-empts any state laws that directly regulate occupational safety and health. Dissent (Souter, J.) ⇨ The critical pre-emption inquiry goes to congressional intent, and the language of OSHA does not support a finding of clear congressional intent to supersede state sovereign authority. The act expressly declines to foreclose state jurisdiction over any matter not subject to a federal regulatory standard. That language can be read to preclude field pre-emption and demand deference to federal regulation only in cases of actual conflict pre-emption. That interpretation would leave a state free to regulate workplace safety in any fashion that would not be irreconcilable with OSHA provisions. The act's plan approval requirements specifically reference the development of state plans to pre-empt federal standards. Nothing in that provision prohibits the state from supplementing federal standards in the absence of complete state pre-emption. Any state regulation that unduly burdens interstate commerce may be addressed by Commerce Clause scrutiny. Thus, the act's limitation against the agency's authority to approve a plan that burdens interstate commerce does not lead to the conclusion that it was the intent of Congress to impose exclusive federal jurisdiction. Each provision of the act is consistent with the permission of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction. In my opinion, the Supremacy Clause does not prohibit the state from implementing any laws that do not conflict or interfere with the enforcement of OSHA regulations.

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) RULE OF LAW: Consideration of race as a factor in admissions by a state law school does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because supporting student body diversity is a compelling state interest; however, the school must demonstrate it previously made a serious, good faith consideration of workable, race-neutral alternatives to achieve the sought-after racial diversity. FACTS: The University of Michigan Law School followed an unofficial policy that sought to achieve student body diversity by giving substantial weight to the race of each applicant in making admissions decisions, in addition to its consideration of other academic and non-academic variables. Barbara Grutter (plaintiff) was a Caucasian Michigan resident who applied to the Law School with a 3.8 grade point average and 161 LSAT score. The Law School rejected her application, and she filed suit in federal district court against Bollinger, the university president, and other university officials (defendants) alleging her denial of admission was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the Law School's use of race in its admissions policy was unlawful, but the court of appeals reversed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May a school use race as a factor in student admissions without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(O'Connor, J.) ⇨ Yes. The Court previously addressed the use of race as a consideration in higher education admissions in its decision in University Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 235 (1978). In Bakke, the Court was unable to reach a majority on the question of whether it was unconstitutional to consider race as an important factor in admissions for the purpose of remedying past discrimination against minorities. Student body diversity is a compelling state interest that justifies the use of race in university admissions. The proper standard for reviewing this issue is strict scrutiny. In determining that the Law School's policy passed strict scrutiny, a certain amount of deference is given to the Law School's admissions department in their determination that diversity is essential to its educational mission. The Law School cites significant benefits as reasons for its policy, including the promotion of cross-racial understanding, the breaking down of racial stereotypes, and the enabling of students to better understand persons of different races. Any one of these benefits constitutes a compelling state interest for strict scrutiny. Additionally, the Law School uses narrowly-tailored means to accomplish its purpose because it does not employ a quota system as outlawed in Bakke to achieve diversity. The Law School provides an individual, holistic review of each of its applicants and reasons that alternative methods of achieving the Law School's purpose risk sacrificing both academic excellence and other types of diversity in the school. However, the Law School should cease racial consideration in its admissions policies after instances of past discrimination have been sufficiently remedied. The admissions policy does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Concurrence (Ginsburg, J.) ⇨ The majority's conclusion is correct, but the majority should have required the Law School to adopt sunset provisions, which would require the race considerations in the Law School's admissions policy to be phased out as racial discrimination ceases to be a problem in the admission of minorities to higher education institutions. Concurrence/Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The educational benefits touted by the Law School's admissions department provide insufficient constitutional justification for their actions. The promotion of these benefits merely constitutes a life lesson for students in good citizenship. The effect of the majority's holding would be to uphold any type of program that purports to teach such values, even if it is discriminatory in some way and does not further a compelling state interest. It is the correct result given the specific facts at issue. The holding might be overly fact-specific and difficult to apply to future cases. Concurrence/Dissent (Thomas, J.) ⇨ Frederick Douglass said that the government should leave African Americans alone and that African Americans should be provided only with justice and the opportunity to succeed, and they would do so. The Law School's admissions policy is inherently elitist and not effective in remedying the past effects of discrimination of minorities. Additionally, the majority determines incorrectly that the admissions policy is necessary for furthering a compelling state interest. There is no pressing public necessity to maintain a public law school. Michigan is already served by several private law schools, and some states operate without even one public law school within their borders. The Law School enacted the policy to serve its own elitist goals. The Law School's policy should be invalidated, and the judgment of the court of appeals affirmed. Dissent (Rehnquist, C.J.) ⇨The admissions policy is a glorified system of employing racial balancing or racial quotas in higher education. Minorities are admitted in relatively precise ratios, suggesting that the Law School's admissions department makes deliberate balancing efforts to create a certain racial composition within the student body. This constitutes the exact type of behavior outlawed by the Court in Bakke. Dissent (Kennedy, J.) ⇨ The majority did not properly apply strict scrutiny. The majority should not have been so quick to accept the Law School's statement that its policy furthers important educational benefits, but should have instead conducted a more sweeping inquiry into the constitutionality of the policy's actual effects. The majority did not sufficiently inquire into whether the Law School actually conducted an individual, holistic review of each applicant for admission.

New York v. US (1992) RULE OF LAW: Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. FACTS: In 1985, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (the Act) to help address issues of low-level radioactive waste disposal among the states. The Act encouraged states to adopt programs to dispose of their own waste by creating three incentives: a monetary incentive to encourage states to open waste sites, an access incentive to allow states without sites to be denied access to other states' sites, and a take-title provision which required a state, upon request of a waste-generator within its borders, to take title to the waste and pay damages to the generator for any harm caused by the state's failure to take title. The State of New York (plaintiff) brought suit against the US government (defendant), alleging that the three provisions of the Act were unconstitutional under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Due Process Clause, and the Guarantee Clause. The federal district court dismissed the complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed. The USSupreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May Congress compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program?

(O'Connor, J.): NO. Congress may not pass regulations that have the effect of "commandeering" states' legislative processes. There are two ways Congress may urge a state to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests: (1) as part of its spending powers, Congress may attach conditions on states' receipt of federal funds, or (2) where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, Congress may offer states the choice of regulating that same activity according to federal regulations or having state law preempted by federal regulations. These options allow states to decline compliance with federal regulatory standards if state citizens decide a federal policy is contrary to local interests. However, the take title provision deprives states of such a choice by requiring them to adopt federal regulations or take title to their waste. Hence, the take title provision does not present states with any option other than implementing the Act. Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress could preempt state radioactive waste regulation. However, Congress violates the Tenth Amendment where it directs states to regulate in that field. CONCURRENCE/DISSENT (White, J.): The Act is a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. The Act does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it represents a compromise worked out between and among the states with Congress as a referee. In invalidating the Act, there is a lack of respect for the lengthy negotiation process among the states. Additionally, the take title provision merely requires New York to be held liable for its own waste, as imposing liability would most likely encourage New York to reduce its waste production and lessen the burden of waste on other states. The majority's current decision, as well as precedent, leaves open the possibility for Congress to enact a similar provision according to the Court's new standards for constitutional regulatory schemes. CONCURRENCE/DISSENT (Stevens, J.): The Act is a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. The federal government already regulates state actions in the administration of various environmental programs, public services, military drafts, and a host of other state functions. No distinction exists between Congress's ability to regulate these programs according to federal standards and its ability to enforce federal standards for the disposition of low-level radioactive waste.

Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) RULE OF LAW: The freedoms protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment include economic freedoms and prohibit a state from preventing its citizens from contracting with foreign insurance companies to insure property located within the state. FACTS: In 1894, Allgeyer (defendant), a New Orleans-based company, sent a letter to the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company in New York requesting insurance for an international shipment of cotton. Later that year, the State of Louisiana (plaintiff) filed a petition in Louisiana state court alleging that Allgeyer violated a Louisiana statute that conditionally prohibited foreign corporations from doing business within the State of Louisiana. The trial court held for Allgeyer, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and charged Allgeyer a $1,000 fine. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May a state enact a law that effectively prohibits contracting between its citizens and foreign corporations without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Peckham, J.) ⇨ No. Although Louisiana would have been able to constitutionally prohibit foreign corporations from doing business within its borders, the act in question of sending written correspondence to a foreign insurance corporation is permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects economic freedoms including the freedom to contract with out-of-state parties. Thus, Louisiana's attempt to inhibit such contracting, even though it was regarding property located within the state, deprived Allgeyer of its economic liberties without due process of law. Since Allgeyer had a constitutional right to choose a New York company to insure its property, the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court is reversed.

Lochner v. New York (1905) RULE OF LAW: A state may not regulate the working hours mutually agreed upon by employers and employees as this violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to contract freely under the Due Process Clause. FACTS: In 1896, the New York legislature enacted the Bakershop Act which limited the hours bakers were permitted to work to no more than ten per day. Joseph Lochner (defendant) owned a bakery in New York (plaintiff) and was fined twice under the law for overworking an employee. His conviction was upheld in the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, and was affirmed in the New York Court of Appeals. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May a state regulate the working hours of certain classes of workers without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Peckham, J.) ⇨ No. The general right of an employer to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this Amendment, unless there are circumstances that exclude the right. States may impose reasonable conditions on the right to contract that further the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens. Pursuant to their constitutional police powers, states may prohibit contracts which violate either a federal or state statute, or contracts to use one's personal property for immoral or illegal purposes. Additionally, precedent decisions permit states to regulate certain types of employment when the nature of the work or the character of the employees warrants it. Specifically, states have previously been permitted to regulate the hours of employees in the smelting and mining fields. However, state police power is not absolute and must be balanced against individual liberty concerns protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the present case, the baking profession does not present any of the concerns justifying the states' regulation of hours in some other professions. The regulation in question was not a health law, but was an arbitrary interference into the individual right of employers and employees to contract. The law is thus invalid and the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Dissent (Holmes, J.) ⇨ The majority decided this case based on an economic theory that is largely unsupported by the popular will of the US. It is settled by various precedent decisions and state constitutions that state laws can regulate the lives of individuals in many ways that are not supported by the national legislature. However, the purpose of the US Constitution is not to require states to exercise their police powers uniformly, but to instead give them the power to make their own judgments about what laws are best for their individual citizens. The "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment should not function to prevent the exercise of a dominant opinion among states, that opinion being, in this case, that states can constitutionally regulate the work hours of employees within their borders. The majority ignores the reality of state regulations across the country. Dissent (Harlan, J.) ⇨ It is well settled that states have police powers under the Constitution to regulate activities for the promotion of the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens. The right to contract is necessarily limited by this police power, and limiting employees' work hours bears a direct relationship to promoting their health, safety, and general welfare. Specifically, the air breathed by workers in bakeries is not as clean or healthful as that breathed by workers in other professions, and this condition justifies the New York legislature's regulation. Additionally, it is well documented by other commentators that bakers as a class are more frail and die earlier than other workers, a fact largely attributed to their hard work and long hours. In light of these facts, it is wrong for the majority to assume that the New York legislature acted in bad faith or without deliberation. The majority should have deferred to the legislature's judgment, and this would have upheld the New York law.

Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) RULE OF LAW: The President of the US is entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages based on actions taken in his official capacity. FACTS: A. Ernest Fitzgerald (plaintiff) was a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force. In January 1970, he lost his job when it was eliminated through a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. Previously, in November 1968, Fitzgerald testified before Congress about inflated costs and technical difficulties surrounding the Air Force's new aircraft. His testimony reflected negatively on the Air Force and was met with a negative reaction by Fitzgerald's supervisors, which he alleged was the reason behind his dismissal. Following his dismissal, President Nixon (defendant) publicly claimed personal responsibility for deciding to fire Fitzgerald, but the White House later retracted this statement. Fitzgerald brought suit in district court against President Nixon on the grounds that he was improperly dismissed because of his negative comments about the Air Force. Fitzgerald sought civil damages and President Nixon argued that he was absolutely immune from suit for actions taken in his official capacity. The district and circuit courts rejected the President's claim of immunity, and the US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does the President of the US have absolute immunity from suits for damages when acting in his official capacity?

(Powell, J.) ⇨ Yes. The role of the President does not exist at common law and must be guided by constitutional principles. Fitzgerald's argument that the Constitution places the President on the same level as other executive officers such as governors and cabinet members is incorrect. The President's office is more like that of prosecutors or judges, which are granted absolute immunity from suit when acting in their official capacity. Extending absolute immunity to the President is necessary because participating in lawsuits would severely detract time better spent performing presidential duties and serving the American people. Additionally granting absolute immunity to the President would not completely remove him from checks and balances on his behavior. For example, the President is still highly scrutinized by the press and subject to the threat of impeachment by Congress for misconduct. Finally, the President has incentives to avoid misconduct, such as seeking reelection, maintaining the prestige and influence of his office, and traditional concerns for his historical stature. Thus, the President is not "above the law" but merely immune from private remedies for misconduct. The decision of the lower courts is reversed. Concurrence (Burger, C.J.) ⇨ Absolute presidential immunity is necessarily derived from separation of powers principles. The President is not immune from all claims, but merely immune from liability from civil damages. Failure to grant the President absolute immunity from civil damages suits would subject him to undue judicial scrutiny and harassment. By granting the President absolute immunity from civil damages suits, the integrity and coequal power of the office of the President is preserved. This preservation is required by separation of powers. Dissent (White, J.) ⇨ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137 (1803), stands for the proposition that whether an act is subject to examination in court depends entirely on the nature of that act, not the identity of the person performing that act. Indeed, the majority makes no effort to distinguish categories of Presidential conduct that should qualify for absolute immunity and categories of conduct that should not qualify for immunity. Granting the President absolute immunity places him "above the law," an important problem the Framers sought to avoid when drafting the Constitution.

US v. Morrison (2000) (Pt2) RULE OF LAW: (1) Congress does not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate violence against women because it is not an economic activity. (2) Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may only regulate the discriminatory conduct of state officials, not private actors. FACTS: In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which contained a provision for a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence, even when victims did not file criminal charges. That same year, Christy Brzonkala, a female student at Virginia Tech University, was allegedly assaulted and raped by Antonio Morrison (defendant) and James Crawford. Morrison was temporarily suspended from school, but a state grand jury did not find enough evidence to indict him. Brzonkala and the US government (plaintiffs) brought suit against Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech under the VAWA in federal district court. Morrison challenged the VAWA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. The district court held that Congress lacked authority to enact the VAWA, but a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Fourth Circuit then reheard the case and upheld the district court's decision that Congress lacked authority. Brzonkala and the US appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: (1) May Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, create civil remedies for victims of gender-based violence to sue their attackers in civil court? (2) May Congress regulate the discriminatory conduct of private actors under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Rehnquist, C.J.) ⇨ (1) NO. In US v. Lopez (1995), the Court held that Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activities: the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate commerce; and activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce. The US argues that Congress may regulate gender-based violence because it is an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. However, a key consideration in Lopez was the criminal, non-economic nature of the conduct at issue. Similarly, gender-based violence is a non-economic activity. No legislative history or other findings indicate that gender-based violence has an effect on interstate commerce. Any link between the two is attenuated. The US argues violence against women affects the travelling, engaging of business, and employment in interstate commerce of women as a group. This argument is rejected as Congress cannot regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The decision of the district court is affirmed. (2) NO. The Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. For example, it is a well-settled principle from the precedent decisions in US v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits discriminatory state action, not private action. The US government argues that this principle should be overturned and applied to private action of the type prohibited in the VAWA. However, this argument is dismissed on the grounds that the principle of stare decisis does not justify overturning those decisions and thereby greatly expanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. The VAWA attempts to provide a remedy against private individuals accused of gender-based violence and not state officials. Thus it is an unconstitutional exercise of both Congress's Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause powers. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ The majority correctly applied its reasoning in Lopez to the present case. Any kind of "substantial effects" test that would allow non-economic activity to be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with early Commerce Clause jurisprudence and thus should not be permitted. Dissent (Souter, J.) ⇨ The majority's decision departs from settled Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Congress has the power to regulate activity that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The right to determine what has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce belongs to Congress and not the courts. The present case differs from Lopez because in this case, Congress passed the VAWA after hearing substantial testimony about the negative effects of gender-based violence on women's ability to maintain employment and be productive members of society engaged in interstate commerce. Thus, Congress made a well-informed decision in deciding to regulate an activity that it believed had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority should have honored that decision. Dissent (Breyer, J.) ⇨ The majority's opinion is flawed in that it does nothing to help create a workable standard for Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Firstly, the distinction between economic and non-economic activity is very difficult to define. The majority does nothing to clarify this distinction. Secondly, the majority disregards principles of federalism in overruling Congress's determination, supported by legislative history, that violence against women has a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Finally, the majority's holding fails to set a standard for determining the constitutional limits of Congress's regulatory activity.

Morrison v. Olson (1988) RULE OF LAW: A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer (an independent counsel) and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing the officer without good cause does not violate separation-of-powers principles. FACTS: Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (the Act). Title VI of the Act permitted a court called the Special Division to appoint an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute certain high-ranking government officials for violations of federal criminal laws upon request by the Attorney General. The independent counsel could terminate the position when the investigation and/or prosecution was complete. Additionally, the Act gave the Attorney General sole removal power of an independent counsel "for good cause." Independent Counsel Alexia Morrison (plaintiff) was appointed to investigate possible obstruction of congressional investigations by Department of Justice officials (defendants), including allegations of misconduct and providing false or misleading testimony to a congressional subcommittee by Solicitor General Ted Olson (defendant). When Morrison requested that the federal court issue subpoenas requiring production of withheld Environmental Protection Agency documents, Olson moved to quash, claiming the Act's independent-counsel provision was unconstitutional. Olson argued that the Act violated separation-of-powers principles. The district court denied the motion to quash, declared the Act constitutional, and held Olson in contempt for not complying with the subpoenas. A divided court of appeals reversed, holding that an independent counsel is a principal officer, rather than inferior officer, and thus the Act violated the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution. Morrison appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does a law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer (an independent counsel) and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing the officer without good cause violate separation-of-powers principles?

(Rehnquist, C.J.) ⇨ No. A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer (an independent counsel) and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing the officer without good cause does not violate separation-of-powers principles. The Constitution divides federal officers into "principal" and "inferior" officers. The Appointments Clause requires principal officers to be appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, but allows inferior officers to be appointed by the President, department heads, or the judiciary. There is not a precise line separating principal and inferior officers, but some factors affecting an officer's characterization include whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher department official and whether the scope of the officer's duties and jurisdiction is limited. In this case, the independent counsel is an inferior officer. First, the independent counsel is subject to removal by a higher executive officer, the Attorney General. Second, the independent counsel's powers are limited to investigation and prosecution, which do not impact executive policy. In addition, the independent counsel has limited jurisdiction and tenure. Thus, Congress may authorize the interbranch appointment of independent counsels by the judiciary, as permitted by the Excepting Clause of the Constitution. The functions of the Special Division authorized by the Act are permissible under Article III, though the Division has exceeded these functions in the past. Next, the Act is consistent with separation-of-powers principles. Congress vested appointment power in the judiciary and removal authority in the Attorney General; thus, Congress did not usurp executive authority for itself. Further, limiting presidential authority to remove officials without cause has been upheld in the past. Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The good-cause requirement is not a burden on the president's ability, through the Attorney General, to execute his constitutional authority. This is because the president's need to fully control these types of inferior officers is not central to the functioning of the executive branch. The branches of government are separate but interdependent, and the Act does not violate the separation of powers by usurping executive authority or upsetting the balance of power between the branches. Accordingly, the act is constitutional, and the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ Article II of the Constitution specifically states that "all" (not some) executive powers of the US shall be vested in the president, just as "all" legislative power is vested in Congress, and "all" judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court. The Court impermissibly replaces this bright line rule with an imprecise balancing test for determining the appropriate distribution of power within the executive. The principle of a unified executive is essential in preserving the concept of separation of powers. The Act divests the president of substantial control over the prosecutorial functions of the independent counsel and upsets the balance of power among the branches of government. Further, the characterization of the independent counsel as an inferior officer is wrong; the term "inferior" at the time of the Constitutional Convention meant subordinate, and the independent counsel is subordinate to no one. Accordingly, the Act's delegation of appointment power to the judiciary violates the Appointments Clause.

US v. Morrison (2000) RULE OF LAW: (1) Congress does not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate violence against women because it is not an economic activity. (2) Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may only regulate the discriminatory conduct of state officials, not private actors. FACTS: In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which contained a provision for a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence, even when victims did not file criminal charges. That same year, Christy Brzonkala, a female student at Virginia Tech University, was allegedly assaulted and raped by Antonio Morrison (defendant) and James Crawford. Morrison was temporarily suspended from school, but a state grand jury did not find enough evidence to indict him. Brzonkala and the US government (plaintiffs) brought suit against Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech under the VAWA in federal district court. Morrison challenged the VAWA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. The district court held that Congress lacked authority to enact the VAWA, but a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Fourth Circuit then reheard the case and upheld the district court's decision that Congress lacked authority. Brzonkala and the US appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: (1) May Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, create civil remedies for victims of gender-based violence to sue their attackers in civil court? (2) May Congress regulate the discriminatory conduct of private actors under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Rehnquist, C.J.): (1) NO. In US v. Lopez (1995), the Court held that Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activities: the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate commerce; and activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce. The US argues that Congress may regulate gender-based violence because it is an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. However, a key consideration in Lopez was the criminal, non-economic nature of the conduct at issue. Similarly, gender-based violence is a non-economic activity. No legislative history or other findings indicate that gender-based violence has an effect on interstate commerce. Any link between the two is attenuated. The US argues violence against women affects the traveling, engaging of business, and employment in interstate commerce of women as a group. This argument is rejected as Congress cannot regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The decision of the district court is affirmed. (2) NO. The Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. For example, it is a well-settled principle from the precedent decisions in US v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits discriminatory state action, not private action. The US government argues that this principle should be overturned and applied to private action of the type prohibited in the VAWA. However, this argument is dismissed on the grounds that the principle of stare decisis does not justify overturning those decisions and thereby greatly expanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. The VAWA attempts to provide a remedy against private individuals accused of gender-based violence and not state officials. Thus it is an unconstitutional exercise of both Congress's Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause powers. CONCURRENCE (Thomas, J.): The majority correctly applied its reasoning in Lopez to the present case. Any kind of "substantial effects" test that would allow non-economic activity to be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with early Commerce Clause jurisprudence and thus should not be permitted. DISSENT (Souter, J.): The majority's decision departs from settled Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Congress has the power to regulate activity that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The right to determine what has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce belongs to Congress and not the courts. The present case differs from Lopez because in this case, Congress passed the VAWA after hearing substantial testimony about the negative effects of gender-based violence on women's ability to maintain employment and be productive members of society engaged in interstate commerce. Thus, Congress made a well-informed decision in deciding to regulate an activity that it believed had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority should have honored that decision. DISSENT (Breyer, J.): The majority's opinion is flawed in that it does nothing to help create a workable standard for Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Firstly, the distinction between economic and non-economic activity is very difficult to define. The majority does nothing to clarify this distinction. Secondly, the majority disregards principles of federalism in overruling Congress's determination, supported by legislative history, that violence against women has a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Finally, the majority's holding fails to set a standard for determining the constitutional limits of Congress's regulatory activity.

US v. Lopez (1995) RULE OF LAW: Congress may not, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, pass a law that prohibits the possession of a gun near a school. FACTS: In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA), making it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm in a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Lopez (defendant), a student who brought a gun to his high school, was confronted by school authorities, arrested, and charged with violating the GFSZA. Lopez was tried and convicted. In his appeal, he brought suit against the US government (plaintiff), challenging the constitutionality of the GFSZA as a regulation based on Congress's Commerce Clause power. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with Lopez and reversed his conviction. The US petitioned for certiorari to the US Supreme Court, which granted the petition. ISSUE: May Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, pass a law that prohibits the possession of a gun near a school?

(Rehnquist, C.J.): NO. While Congress has broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, this power does not extend so far as to authorize the regulation of the carrying of handguns, particularly when doing so has no clear effect on the economy overall. Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activities: the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate commerce; and activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce. Here, the GFSZA does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Therefore the analysis must focus on the third category: whether the activity at issue substantially affects interstate commerce. The mere carrying of handguns (not the buying or selling) in a school zone in no way affects commerce, either substantially or otherwise. The GFSZA is a criminal statute having nothing to do with "commerce" or any economic enterprise. The US argues that the presence of guns in school zones affects commerce because crime in schools affects education, which in turn affects job prospects and productivity. If this argument were accepted, Congress could regulate virtually any activity. The court of appeals' decision is affirmed. CONCURRENCE (Kennedy, J.): The GFSZA upsets the balance of power between the federal and state governments. Education is a traditional concern of the states. It is for states to determine whether harsh criminal sanctions are necessary to deter students from carrying guns on school premises. The GFSZA prevents states from exercising their own judgment and experimenting with their own gun prevention programs. CONCURRENCE (Thomas, J.): The new "substantial effects" test is problematic because it makes the Commerce clause "surplusage." Congress is not meant to regulate commercial activity to the full extent suggested by the majority's holding. The majority's three-part definition of commerce is misguided. Instead the word "commerce" should be limited only to encompass the buying and selling, and possibly the transportation of goods. The Court's expansion of the term in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), was wrong. A narrow construction of the term should be applied. DISSENT (Stevens, J.): Congress should have the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the carrying of guns near schools. Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to restrain commerce. Indeed, guns cannot be possessed at all without some sort of commercial activity. Congress should be able to regulate the possession of guns at any location because guns relate to commercial activity and have such a potentially harmful use. DISSENT (Souter, J.): Congressional regulations promulgated under the Commerce Clause are reviewed under a rational basis standard. A deferential view of congressional actions is important to preserving the separation of powers. However, the majority's decision harkens back to a time when the judiciary gave less respect to Congress. The majority's invalidation of a congressional act unwisely goes against important principles of judicial restraint. DISSENT (Breyer, J.): Firstly, Congress's power to regulate commerce among the several states encompasses the power to regulate local activities insofar as they significantly affect interstate commerce. Secondly, the Court must consider not the effect of an individual act, but rather the cumulative effect of all similar instances when determining whether an activity affects interstate commerce. Thirdly, the Constitution requires the judiciary to give a very deferential review of Congress's determination that a regulation relates to its requirement of furthering and protecting interstate commerce. Based on these principles, the proper inquiry should have been whether Congress rationally could have found that violent crime in school zones, through its effect on the quality of education, substantially affects interstate commerce. When all practical realities surrounding the problems of guns near schools are considered, the answer could not be anything other than in the affirmative. A significant logical connection exists between gun regulations and promoting interstate commerce.

South Dakota v. Dole (1987) RULE OF LAW: The receipt of federal funds may be conditional if the exercise of the spending power is for the general welfare, the conditions are unambiguous, the conditions are related to a federal interest in a particular national project or program, and the conditions do not violate any other constitutional provisions such as the Tenth Amendment. FACTS: A South Dakota law permitted persons age nineteen or older to buy beer containing up to 3.2% alcohol. In 1984, Congress passed 23 U.S.C. §158, which directed the Secretary of Transportation, Dole (defendant), to withhold up to five percent of federal highway funds otherwise available to states in which state laws permitted persons under the age of twenty-one to purchase alcohol. South Dakota (plaintiff) sued Dole and the US government in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 158 violated constitutional limits on Congress's spending power and the Twenty-First Amendment of the US Constitution. The district court ruled that Congress acted constitutionally, and the court of appeals affirmed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May Congress withhold federal funds to states that do not comply with federally imposed conditions?

(Rehnquist, C.J.): YES. Congress has specific constitutional power to tax and spend for the general welfare of the US. In exercising this spending power, Congress may condition the receipt of federal funds by states subject to the following four limitations: the exercise of the spending power must be for the "general welfare;" the conditions on the receipt of funds must be unambiguous; conditions must be related to a federal interest in a particular national project or program; and conditions must not violate any other constitutional provisions such as the Tenth Amendment. Section 158 clearly meets the first three limitations on Congress's exercise of spending power as it is designed to promote the general welfare, an unambiguous condition, and related to the significant federal interest in promoting safe transportation on federal highways. While the Tenth Amendment operates to limit Congress's imposition of conditions on states' receipt of federal funds, when the effect of those conditions are coercive, that is not the case in Section 158. Noncompliance only results in a loss of five percent of what states would otherwise receive. The potential loss is not so great as to force states to comply with federal standards. Thus, Section 158 is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. DISSENT (O'Connor, J.): Section 158 is not a condition on Congress's spending power that is reasonably related to an expenditure of federal funds. Instead, Section 158 is an attempt by Congress to regulate the sale of liquor, and is thus a power reserved expressly to the states by Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment of the Constitution. Setting the drinking age at twenty-one is not reasonably related to the identified purpose of safe highway construction. DISSENT (Brennan, J.): The ability to regulate the minimum age to purchase alcohol falls completely within the powers reserved to the states by the Twenty-First Amendment of the Constitution. Congress improperly attempted to regulate a power that the Constitution reserved to the states and the states constitutionally exercised.

Reno v. Condon (2000) RULE OF LAW: Congress may regulate states' activities, using its Commerce Clause powers, provided that the regulation does not require the state to enact any laws or regulations and does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals. FACTS: In 1994, Congress passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) to regulate the disclosure of personal information retained by state Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs). Congress passed this legislation because states routinely obtained significant personal information from individuals in connection with those individuals obtaining driver's licenses and then sold that information to private entities at a profit for the state. The private entities could also further resell this information. The DPPA was designed to prohibit the selling or reselling of individuals' personal information by DMVs or private entities without obtaining the individual's consent. South Carolina and its Attorney General, Condon (plaintiff), brought suit against the US government and its Attorney General, Reno (defendant), in the US District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments of the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for Condon, and the court of appeals affirmed. Reno appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Congress use its Commerce Clause powers to regulate a state's use of its citizens' personal information?

(Rehnquist, C.J.): YES. Personal information collected from individuals by DMVs is an article of commerce. The information is sold interstate to various private entities both within and outside South Carolina. Thus, Congress may regulate the information because of its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce. However, to be constitutional, Congress's regulations must not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment as demonstrated by the Court's decisions in New York v. US, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. US, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). The present case is controlled more by its decision in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), than New York or Printz, as Congress was merely seeking to regulate state activity and not the states' regulations of private actors or the actions of state officials. Congress has the power under the Constitution to regulate state activity. This case does not present the same concerns about Congress commandeering states' legislative processes or state officials' actions as in New York or Printz. Finally, South Carolina's argument that Congress cannot regulate state activity without making general regulations applicable to private entities is rejected. The DPPA is generally applicable to both states and private entities, making resolution of that issue unnecessary. The DPPA is constitutional because Congress attempts to regulate state activity through a generally applicable measure, and the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co (1974) RULE OF LAW: For purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, an action of a private entity will only be treated as state action if there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the private entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself. FACTS: Metropolitan Edison Co. (Edison) (defendant) was a privately owned and operated electricity company that was authorized by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission to deliver electricity to York, Pennsylvania and surrounding areas. It was subject to extensive regulation by the Commission and was granted approval by the Commission to discontinue service to any customer on reasonable nonpayment of bills. Catherine Jackson (plaintiff) was a resident of York and customer of Edison. She defaulted on her bill payments and had her service disconnected, but convinced Edison to reinstate it under the name of James Dodson, another resident in her home. However, when Dodson moved out of the home and Jackson continued to default on the payments, Edison visited the premises and attempted to collect payment. Jackson requested that the service be reinstated under another name which Edison later discovered was that of her twelve-year-old son. Edison disconnected Jackson's service four days later with no other notice. Jackson brought suit in district court alleging that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, she could not be deprived of electricity service without adequate notice and a hearing before an impartial body. The district court dismissed the case because it found no state action present, and the court of appeals affirmed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the actions of a privately-owned electricity company.

(Rehnquist, J.) ⇨ No. The law is clear on the fact that state actions are subject to constitutional regulations and private actions are not, but it is often difficult to determine which actions are truly "state" and which are "private." The fact that Pennsylvania granted a monopoly to Metropolitan Edison over its service area is not enough to show that the private company was acting as the state. Additionally, it is overbroad to hold that every action of a state-regulated business provides an essential public service, or serves the public interest in some way that is somehow converted into state action. An action of a private entity would only be treated as state action if there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the private entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself. In the present case, the State of Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with Metropolitan Edison's action in terminating Jackson's service so as to make the action fairly attributable to Pennsylvania. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Dissent (Douglas, J.) ⇨ The majority should have considered the aggregate of factors present in the relationship between Metropolitan Edison and Pennsylvania—not single factual circumstances—in determining whether their actions were public or private. Additionally, Jackson should have brought this suit under a Section 1983 which specifically permits a private individual to sue a state that either, directly or indirectly, allows a private entity to perpetuate a wrong that infringeson an individual's Constitutional rights. Dissent (Brennan, J.) ⇨ No actual live controversy exists between Jackson and Edison. Under its regulations from the State of Pennsylvania, Metropolitan Edison is required to provide electricity to "customers," which are defined in the regulations as "any persons lawfully receiving service from the company." Jackson ceased to lawfully receive service when she stopped paying her bills, and thus Metropolitan Edison owed her no legal obligation. This case should have been dismissed on that basis. Dissent (Marshall, J.) ⇨ A variety of factors exist that make the actions of Metropolitan Edison sufficiently close to Pennsylvania so they could be fairly attributed to Pennsylvania itself. Firstly, Edison provides an essential, public service to people in York, and it is the only entity authorized to do so in that area. Additionally, Edison is subject to significant state regulations and has a long history of cooperation with Pennsylvania. Most importantly, Pennsylvania has actually granted its approval to Edison's particular method of service termination—the action at issue in the present case. The lower court's decision should be overturned as precedent suggests that approval from a state is sufficient to transform private conduct into state conduct.

Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981) RULE OF LAW: The President of the US has authority to settle judicial claims through an executive order if the settlement of claims is necessary for the resolution of a major foreign-policy dispute with another country and if Congress acquiesces in the president's action. FACTS: On November 4, 1979, the Iranian hostage crisis began when the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran was seized. In response, President Carter, acting pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), declared a national emergency and issued an executive order that froze all Iranian assets in the US. Carter's administration also ordered that lawsuits against Iranian interests in U.S. courts could not proceed without the administration's approval. The administration granted a license for lawsuits against Iranian interests, which allowed prejudgment attachment of property but not final judgments. Pursuant to that license, Dames & Moore (plaintiff) sued Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) for failing to pay Dames & Moore for work it had done on an Iranian nuclear-power plant. On January 20, 1981, the American hostages in Iran were released pursuant to an agreement reached between the US and Iran. The agreement stated that the U.S. government would seek to end all pending litigation against Iran by referring cases to an Iran-US claims tribunal that was established to facilitate settlements. President Reagan subsequently issued an executive order requiring the transfer of all pending cases to the tribunal and ordering the transfer of Iranian assets to the Federal Reserve Bank to be controlled by the U.S. Treasury for settlement purposes. After the issuance of the executive order, the district court stayed a final judgment in Dames & Moore's favor in its action against the AEO. On April 28, 1981, Dames & Moore sued U.S. Government officials including the Secretary of the Treasury (defendant), seeking to prevent enforcement of the president's executive order and Treasury Department regulations implementing the new agreement with Iran. The district court dismissed the action, and the US Supreme Court granted Dames & Moore's petition to review the case. ISSUE: Does the President of the US have the authority to settle judicial claims through an executive order as part of a resolution of a major foreign-policy dispute with another country?

(Rehnquist, J.) ⇨ Yes. The US, along with other countries, has historically exercised its right to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign governments for the purpose of keeping peace with those governments. Although international treaties often accomplish these actions, the president historically used executive orders, without the consent of the Senate, to settle claims. For example, since 1952, the president has entered into at least 10 binding settlement agreements with foreign nations. Congress has implicitly approved this practice through its history of acquiescence and its enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (ICSA). The ICSA provides for a tribunal to handle settlements between US citizens and the government of Yugoslavia. Congress has frequently amended the ICSA to address particular problems stemming from settlement agreements with other nations, evidencing Congress's continued approval of the president's claim-settlement authority. This holding is narrow and does not mean that the president has plenary power to settle all claims. The president has authority to settle such claims if, as here, settlement is necessary to resolve a major foreign-policy dispute and Congress acquiesces in the president's action. The district court's judgment is affirmed.

NFIB v. Sebellius (2012) RULE OF LAW: (1) The individual mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is a valid use of Congress's power to tax. (2) The Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is an unconstitutional use of Congress's spending powers. FACTS: In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Shortly afterward, multiple parties, including business organizations, individuals, and 26 states, filed suit in district courts across the country to challenge the Act's constitutionality. The results were fractured: some courts upheld some or all of the ACA, others declared part or all unconstitutional, some concluded offending provisions could be severed, and others argued that the Act couldn't be challenged until someone was forced to pay the penalty. The National Federation of Independent Business, the State of Florida, and others (plaintiffs) sued in Florida federal court Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (defendant). The litigation challenged two key provisions of the legislation: (1) the individual mandate, which requires individuals to purchase health insurance or pay a "penalty" and (2) the Medicaid expansion provision, which conditioned continued receipt of federal Medicaid funds on states expanding their eligibility requirements for the program. The district court held that Congress had exceeded its authority in passing the individual mandate. The court concluded that the individual mandate was not severable and struck down the Act as a whole. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that the individual mandate was unconstitutional. However, the court of appeals determined that the individual mandate was severable; so, the rest of the Act remained intact. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split between the circuits. ISSUE: (1) Is the individual mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 a valid use of Congress's power to tax? (2) Is the Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 a constitutional use of Congress's spending powers?

(Roberts, C.J.) ⇨ (1) YES. The individual mandate contained in the Act is a valid use of Congress's power to tax. The individual mandate cannot be justified as a valid exercise of commerce power, because the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to compel individuals to engage in commercial activity. Further, the possibility that people could participate in the healthcare market at some point in the future is not enough. This is a slippery slope that could open the door to congressional regulation of all sorts of activity or inactivity not contemplated by the Framers. For example, obesity is more responsible for increased healthcare costs than uninsured people, but under the government's theory, the federal government could mandate that people buy vegetables. Next, the Necessary and Proper Clause only gives Congress the power to do things that are incidental to the valid exercise of some enumerated power, and therefore the individual mandate cannot be justified on this ground either. However, the individual mandate's penalty provision operates more like a tax imposed on those opting against purchasing coverage. Because the tax is assessed just like other taxes, based on income, and collected by the IRS, the fact that Congress calls it a penalty is irrelevant. The Court interprets legislation as constitutional if possible, and the individual mandate can be saved by interpreting the penalty provision as a valid exercise of Congress's power to tax. (2) NO. The Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is an unconstitutional use of Congress's spending powers. With respect to the Medicaid extension, the federal government cannot withhold existing Medicaid funding from states that choose not to participate. Congress can offer grants to states and condition the funds on compliance with certain requirements, as happens frequently with highway and infrastructure funding. However, the Act does not offer the states a genuine choice, because they need to accept a basic change in the nature of Medicaid or risk losing all Medicaid funding. Accordingly, the Medicaid provision is unconstitutional. This provision is severable from the remainder of the Act, which is left intact. Concurrence/Dissent (Ginsburg, J.) ⇨ The individual mandate should be upheld under the Commerce Clause because there was a rational basis for Congress to believe the large uninsured population substantially affected interstate commerce and the mandate bore a reasonable connection to addressing the problem. The majority is incorrect in holding that the Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional. States have no "existing" rights to federal funds, and Congress may decide whether federal funds should be given to the states, and under what conditions. Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ The entire Act should be struck down as unconstitutional. Neither the Commerce Clause nor the power to tax and spend grants Congress the authority to require the individual mandate. The Act's "threats" to terminate states' Medicaid funding absent compliance with the Medicaid expansion are impermissibly coercive.

Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No 1 (2007) RULE OF LAW: Public schools may not assign students to schools solely on the basis of race for the purpose of achieving racial integration, although the use of narrowly-tailored, race-conscious objectives to achieve general diversity in schools is permissible. FACTS: Seattle School District No. 1 and Jefferson County School District (defendants) voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that relied on race to determine which public schools certain children could attend. In each case, the schools used this system to ensure that the racial balance in any given public school fell within a predetermined range based on the racial composition of the school district as a whole. Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) (plaintiff) were parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans solely because of their race. PICS brought suit in district court, claiming that the school districts' actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The district court dismissed the case and upheld the constitutionality of the racial assignment policy, and the court of appeals affirmed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May public school districts, that have never operated legally segregated schools, assign students to particular schools solely on the basis of race in order to achieve racial integration?

(Roberts, C.J.) ⇨ No. School assignments relying on racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. The school districts' use of racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. There are two government interests that qualify as compelling: the interest of remedying the effects of past discrimination; and the interest of promoting student body diversity in the context of higher education upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The racial assignment programs at issue are not related to either of these previously recognized interests. Firstly, the programs are not used to remedy the effects of past racial discrimination because such discrimination has never before occurred in PICS districts. Additionally in Grutter, the diversity interest was not focused on promoting racial diversity alone, but rather encompassed all factors contributing to the diversity of the student body. The main factor that distinguishes Grutter from the present case is that the admissions staff in Grutter analyzed each applicant as an individual, not simply as a member of a racial group. Here, race is upheld as the sole factor in making admissions decision. The school districts cite studies showing that students tend to gain intangible benefits from being educated in a racially diverse environment. This argument is rejected. The school districts provide no evidence that the amount of racial diversity necessary to achieve these intangible benefits coincides with the amount of racial diversity achieved by their racial assignment policies. Without clear evidence that the school districts implemented their policies for the purpose of working toward a specific diversity goal that would benefit their students, the race-based policies are unconstitutional. The certain costs of permitting the school districts to continue their race-based assignment policies far outweighs the potential benefits. Limiting where students may or may not attend school based on race alone makes the school districts' actions no different than those prohibited by the Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The judgment of the lower courts is reversed. Concurrence (Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Race-conscious mechanisms used by schools to promote the goal of diversity in higher education constitute a legitimate state interest. States have a compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation that justifies enacting policies such as those used by the school districts to achieve this goal. However, the school districts' did not meet their burden required under strict scrutiny of showing that their racial assignment policies are narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state purpose of diversity in higher education. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ The plurality's result is correct, but the plurality argues incorrectly that racially diverse classrooms promote better educational experiences. Numerous social and political science studies prove that African American students can succeed in historically black colleges. The implication that African American students cannot learn as well in school unless seated in classrooms next to Caucasian students is sharply rejected. Dissent (Stevens, J.) ⇨ The plurality misused and misapplied the precedent decisions on the issue, including its decision in Brown. The plurality decision constitutes a stark departure from the previous interpretation of that case. Dissent (Breyer, J.) ⇨ The plurality's opinion strongly deviates from its precedent decisions and strips from communities a powerful tool by which they can bring about desegregation in their school districts. The school districts' efforts to date in using such policies to eradicate desegregation should be applauded. Indeed, the policies already have been largely successful in reducing the amount of children attending single-race schools. The goal of creating "unitary" schools is a compelling state interest. The school districts' policies are narrowly-tailored means for achieving that interest. Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause permits school districts to use race-conscious criteria for the purpose of achieving positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel such actions. Precedent suggests that school authorities are charged with enacting policies to bring about Constitutional goals, and the school authorities in the present case should have the authority to enact whatever policies they deem fit to bring about the racial desegregation requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Additionally, the policies used constitute narrowly-tailored means to achieve the legitimate state interest of racial desegregation. Judges are not as competent as school administrators to determine what policies are most prudent and efficient for achieving these goals. Ultimately, this decision will have significant consequences for racial equality in the future and greatly restrict the force of Brown as applied to public school districts.

Brown v. Board of Education (1954) (Brown I) ** RULE OF LAW: Separate educational facilities based on racial classifications are inherently unequal and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. FACTS: The present case represented a consolidation of cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. In each state, African American minors sought the aid of their state courts in gaining admission to public schools on a non-segregated basis. In all instances, Brown and other minor African American children (plaintiffs) had been denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. They alleged that this segregation deprived them of Equal Protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1951, Brown first filed suit against the Board of Education for Topeka, Kansas (defendant) in federal district court. The district court ruled in favor of the Board of Education, citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 507 (1896), as guidance. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other tangible factors are equal, deprives the children of the minority group of educational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Warren, C.J.) ⇨ Yes. In deciding the issue it is not possible to rely on the original intent surrounding adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment because prior cases and the legislative history involved in its enactment are inconclusive as to the true extent of its meaning. Additionally, it is not helpful to look at the status of public education at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, as most Caucasian children were then educated by private schools, and most African American children were not educated at all. Very few public schools existed at the time, which adds to the difficulty in determining the historical intentions surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment's effect on public education. An examination of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself is utilized to determine the intent behind the Amendment's application to public education. The basic language of the Amendment suggests that it was passed to prohibit all forms of discriminatory legislation against African Americans. In the present case, all basic attributes of the Caucasian and African American schools are essentially the same. To determine whether the segregated schools violate the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted, it is necessary to examine the actual effect of this segregation on the institution of public education as a whole. Public education has, over the years, become one of the most valued and important public services performed by state and local governments. Children can hardly be expected to succeed in life if they are not educated. Thus, when an opportunity for education exists and the state has undertaken to provide it, that opportunity must then be made available to all students on equal terms. In the present case, the opportunity for education is not equally provided to minority students, as the existence of segregation has a profound and detrimental effect on their hearts and minds. Modern studies confirm that the children experiencing segregation feel inferior, become less motivated, and perform at a lower standard than children that do not experience segregation. To the extent to which Plessy held to the contrary regarding the psychological effects of segregation, it is hereby overturned. The African American students are deprived of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment because of the segregation in their public education. The decision of the district court is reversed.

Trump v. Hawaii (2018)* (2019v in class) RULE OF LAW: A presidential proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nationals of particular countries is sufficiently justified by national-security concerns to survive rational basis review. FACTS: President Donald Trump (defendant) signed an executive order suspending the entry of foreign nationals from seven countries for 90 days. Each country had been previously identified by Congress or prior administrations as posing heightened terrorism risks. A federal district court entered a temporary restraining order blocking the restrictions. In response, the President signed a similar executive order, which was also challenged in court. Several district courts issued preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of the entry suspension. The appeals courts upheld the injunctions. The Supreme Court granted cert. The temporary restrictions expired before the Court could act, so the Court vacated the lower decisions as moot. President Trump then ordered federal agencies to conduct comprehensive evaluation of every country's compliance with the US's risk-assessment baseline. Based on this evaluation, the President issued a proclamation seeking to improve vetting procedures by identifying deficiencies in the information needed to assess whether nations from particular countries presented public safety threats. The proclamation placed entry restrictions on the nationals of eight foreign countries. The countries were selected by the President because their systems for managing and sharing information about their nationals were deemed inadequate. The state of Hawaii (plaintiff) brought suit, arguing that the proclamation violated provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act (the act). Hawaii also argued that the proclamation violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it was motivated by animus toward Islam. The trial court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the entry restrictions. The appeals court affirmed the decision. The case was then brought before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Is a presidential proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nationals of particular countries sufficiently justified by national security concerns to survive rational basis review?

(Roberts, C.J.) ⇨ Yes. A presidential proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nationals of particular countries is sufficiently justified by national-security concerns to survive rational basis review. Section 212(f) of the act permits the President to suspend the entry of foreign nationals if the President deems such entry to be detrimental to the interests of the US The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from discriminating based on religion. If the President exercises his constitutional power on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, courts will not look behind the exercise of that discretion. Courts also will not test the President's discretion by balancing its justification against the asserted constitutional interests of U.S. citizens. Here, the President fulfilled the requirement of § 212(f) that his proclamation be based on a finding that entry would be detrimental to the interests of the US. The President's proclamation was based on several agencies' review of every country. The evaluations underlying the President's chosen restrictions are more detailed than any prior order a President has issued under § 212(f). The act is highly deferential to the President, and whether his chosen method of addressing a risk is justified from a policy perspective is irrelevant. Although § 202(a)(1)(A) prevents discrimination regarding visa applications, that section does not act as a constraint on § 212. The proclamation serves a legitimate state interest in preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted. The text of the proclamation makes no mention of religion, and other facts do not support an inference of religious hostility. Thus, the lower court's ruling is reversed and the case is remanded. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ Universal injunctions imposed by district courts are growing in popularity, but appear to be inconsistent with the Constitution. Concurrence (Kennedy, J.) ⇨ There are numerous situations in which the statements and actions of government officials are not subject to judicial intervention. However, all officials are still required to adhere to the Constitution at all times. The world must know that the US government remains committed to liberty. Dissent (Sotomayor, J.) ⇨ Cases involving the Establishment Clause receive a heightened standard of review, but even under rational-basis review, the proclamation is unconstitutional. Based on the evidence, a reasonable observer would conclude that the proclamation was motivated by religious bias. President Trump previously called for a complete shutdown of Muslims entering the country, among numerous other statements indicating religious animus. The proclamation targets majority-Muslim countries. The majority has offered insufficient support for its view that the proclamation is grounded in legitimate national-security concerns. The government offers no evidence that the existing vetting scheme is insufficient for achieving the proclamation's national-security objectives. Dissent (Breyer, J.) ⇨ Evidence supports the possibility that the government is not enforcing the proclamation as written. Instead, it appears that the government may be discriminating against individuals seeking entry based on religion. There is enough evidence that, on balance, creates a sufficient basis to set the proclamation aside.

Nebbia v. New York (1934) RULE OF LAW: Without the presence of other constitutional prohibitions, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent states from enacting economic policies such as price regulations to further the public good as long as those policies are not unreasonable or arbitrary. FACTS: In 1933, the State of New York (plaintiff) established a Milk Control Board which had the power to fix the prices of milk sold by New York stores. Nebbia (defendant) owned a grocery store in Rochester, New York and was convicted of selling milk at a price below the fixed price. The County Court of Appeals for Monroe County affirmed the conviction, and Nebbia appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May a state fix the price of goods sold within its borders without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Roberts, J.) ⇨ Yes. During the Great Depression, the price farmers received for milk was far below the cost of milk production. This discouraged farmers from producing milk, an essential item of a healthful diet. The legislature thus determined, for the public good, it must set the price of milk to ensure farmers received a fair price for their product and continued to promote healthy diets by producing milk. This interest in encouraging milk production was balanced against the individual interest in freedom from governmental interference in the making of contracts. However, the freedom to contract is not absolute. States inherently possess the power to pass regulations that promote the public good. In the present case, the milk industry in New York was severely impacted by price-cutting by retailers. To combat this problem, the New York legislature established the Milk Control Board to fix prices. This decision was not arbitrary, but instead promoted the public good by protecting the milk industry. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent states from enacting economic policies to promote the public good, as long as those policies are not unreasonable or arbitrary. The policies in the present case were not unreasonable or arbitrary, so Nebbia's conviction in the court of appeals is affirmed. Dissent (McReynolds, J.) ⇨ The Milk Control Board is an improper exercise of legislative power. The Due Process Clause had been correctly applied in past decisions to directly prevent the evils associated with doing business in difficult economic times. However, legislative action is inappropriate in the present case because the Milk Control Board sought to indirectly regulate milk production to prevent the evils of business by fixing the price at which retail stores could sell milk in the hopes of indirectly boosting the profits realized by the actual producers of milk. This practice is not supported by precedent applications of the Due Process Clause and is an improper extension of legislative power. In creating this policy, the legislature is instead, seeking to manage, control, and dictate the operations of the milk industry. The Milk Control Board's price fixing scheme should have been invalidated because the New York legislature exceeded the scope of its powers.

US v. Butler (1936) RULE OF LAW: Congress may not use its taxing and spending powers to obtain an unconstitutional result, such as invading the reserved rights of the states under the Tenth Amendment. FACTS: In 1933, Congress enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) to allow the Secretary of Agriculture to set limits on the production of certain crops and tax farmers that produced in excess of those limits. The AAA also provided grants to farmers to control their production of crops and thus regulate prices. Butler (plaintiff), a processor of crops, brought suit against the US government (defendant) in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the AAA. The district court ruled that Butler was required to pay taxes under the AAA, but the court of appeals reversed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Is the tax imposed on farmers by the Agricultural Adjustment Act a constitutional exercise of Congress's taxing and spending power?

(Roberts, J.): NO. Article I, § 8 vests in Congress the power to levy and collect taxes for the general welfare. The framers held differing views on the scope of this power. Madison believed the clause merely gives Congress the ability to tax and spend to carry out its other enumerated powers, whereas Hamilton believed the clause gives Congress a wholly separate enumerated power to tax and spend as long as it is in furtherance of the general welfare. Hamilton's view is the correct one: Congress's power to tax and spend is a separate power not confined by Congress's other enumerated powers. However, this power is not without limits. Any congressional power to tax and spend is limited by Tenth Amendment state sovereignty concerns. The AAA violates state sovereignty by seeking to invade states' rights to regulate and control their own agricultural production. Since Congress has no power to regulate and control agricultural production, it follows that Congress may not indirectly accomplish that end through its taxing and spending powers. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. DISSENT (Stone, J.) ⇨ The present case should be guided by four principles that, when considered, justify upholding the AAA as constitutional. Firstly, courts are limited in their inquiry into the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions and may only determine whether those branches have the authority to enact statutes or executive orders. It is not the place of the judiciary to question the wisdom of these statutes if they were constitutionally enacted. Secondly, Congress unquestionably possesses the power to levy an excise tax on the production of agricultural materials. Thirdly, because national agricultural production is in a depressed condition, there is no question that any tax enacted by Congress to improve production is in furtherance of the general welfare. Finally, no questions of an unauthorized delegation of legislative power are raised in this case.

Whitman v. American Trucking (2001) RULE OF LAW: (1) When Congress confers decision making authority to agencies, it must set forth in a legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform; and (2) Under § 109 of the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator may not consider implementation costs in setting national ambient air quality standards. FACTS: Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (defendant) to promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for certain air pollutants. Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA directs the EPA to set ambient air quality standards, the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator are necessary to protect the public health. In July 1997, the Administrator revised the NAAQS for particulate matter and ozone. The American Trucking Associations, Inc. and others (plaintiffs) challenged the new standard in federal court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that § 109(b)(1) of the CAA delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of Article I, § 1 of the US Constitution because the EPA had interpreted the CAA to provide no "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The appellate court further held that Whitman is prohibited from considering the costs of implementation in setting NAAQS under the CAA. The appellate court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The case then came before the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: (1) Does § 109(b)(1) of the CAA delegate legislative power to the Administrator of the EPA? and (2) Under § 109 of the Clean Air Act, may the EPA Administrator consider implementation costs in setting national ambient air quality standards?

(Scalia, J.) ⇨ (1) No. In a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency. When Congress confers decision making authority to agencies, it must set forth in a legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform. An agency may not cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting a limited construction of the statute because doing so is itself an exercise of unlawful legislative authority. The degree of agency discretion that is acceptable depends upon the scope of the power that Congress has conferred. Here, the text of § 109(b)(1) of the CAA places limits on the EPA's discretion that are similar to those that this Court has approved in earlier cases. Additionally, the scope of discretion that this statutory provision allows for falls within the outer limits of this Court's nondelegation cases. Accordingly, the lower court's decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for reinterpretation that would avoid a supposed delegation of legislative power. (2) No. Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA instructs the EPA to set primary ambient air quality standards, NAAQS, "the attainment and maintenance of which are requisite to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety." However, the appellate court in Lead Industries Assn., Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C.Cir.1980), held that economic considerations may play no role in the promulgation of NAAQS under the CAA. Instead, the EPA identifies the maximum airborne concentration of a pollutant that the public health can tolerate, decrease that concentration to provide an "adequate" margin of safety, and then set the standard at that level. Plaintiffs contend that economic costs of implementing stringent NAAQS can cause detrimental effects on the public health. Although plaintiffs' claims may have some validity, the plain and unambiguous text of § 109(b)(1) make clear that cost considerations do not enter the decision-making process for establishment of NAAQS. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed on that point. Concurrence (Breyer, J.) ⇨ The CAA does not permit the EPA to consider economic costs of implementation when the agency creates regulations. The text of the Clean Air Act and precedent decisions justify the conclusion that §109(b)(1) of the CAA is a constitutional delegation of rulemaking authority to the EPA. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ Under Art. I, §1 of the Constitution, all legislative power is reserved to Congress. The text in the Constitution may prohibit the delegation of any legislative power from Congress to the executive, regardless of the presence of "intelligible principles." Concurrence (Stevens, J.) ⇨ Agency rulemaking authority is "legislative power." There is nothing inherently unconstitutional about a valid delegation of rulemaking authority as long as the delegation provides a sufficiently intelligible principle. By enacting § 109 of the CAA, Congress effected a constitutional delegation of legislative power to the EPA.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) RULE OF LAW: Under Article III of the Constitution, a party does not have standing to litigate a generalized grievance against the government in federal court if she suffered no personal injury other than the harm suffered by all citizens. FACTS: Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), as amended 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., requires federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce before undertaking actions that might jeopardize endangered or threatened species. The ESA provides that any person may initiate a civil suit on her own behalf to enjoin anyone, including governmental entities, from violating the ESA. In 1978, the Secretaries promulgated a joint regulation stating that the ESA consultation requirement extended to federal actions taken in foreign nations. A new joint regulation limiting the geographic scope to the US and the high seas was proposed in 1983 and adopted in 1986. Organizations dedicated to the protection of wildlife (P) sued the Secretary of the Interior, Lujan (Secretary) (D), seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation's interpretation was wrong and an injunction requiring D to restore the initial interpretation of the geographic scope of the statute. The Ps argued they were injured because a lack of consultation for governmental activities abroad increases the rate of extinction of endangered species. D moved to dismiss based on the P's lack of standing. The district court granted the motion, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded. The district court then granted the P's summary judgment motion and issued the injunction. The appellate court affirmed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does a party have standing to litigate a generalized grievance against the government in federal court if she suffered no personal injury other than the harm suffered by all citizens?

(Scalia, J.): NO. A plaintiff may not litigate a generalized complaint against the government based on harm suffered equally by all citizens. Standing under Article III of the Constitution contains three elements. (1)st, a plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury. An injury in fact is "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized...and (b) actual or imminent." (2)nd, the plaintiff must show a causal link between the harm and the conduct at issue. This means that the injury is "fairly traceable to the challenged action...and not the result of the independent action of some third party." (3)rd, it must be probable that a favorable verdict will redress the harm. The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate these elements. Allowing citizens to sue over an abstract "right" to have the Executive Branch follow statutory procedures implicates the separation of powers doctrine. Here, the Ps failed to show that threats to endangered species cause them imminent injury. Their theories regarding an ecosystem, animal, or vocational nexus justifying standing for individuals who want to study, see, or work with such animals are too speculative. The Ps also failed to show how a favorable outcome would redress their alleged injury. Conjecture regarding redressability is insufficient to support standing. Additionally, the Ps have not suffered a "procedural injury" that justifies standing under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA. The Ps are suing over a generally available complaint about the government, not seeking to enforce a procedural requirement that protects a separate, concrete interest. Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. CONCURRENCE (Kennedy, J.): Although the Ps have not made a sufficient showing to establish standing based on one of their nexus theories, a similar theory might support standing under different circumstances. Additionally, "Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before." Congress has not done this with citizen-suit provision of the ESA, as the provision does not specifically "identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to sue." CONCURRENCE (Stevens, J.): The Court's finding that the Ps failed to show an imminent and redressable injury is flawed. Nonetheless, reversal of the decision of the court of appeals is warranted because it is not clear that Congress meant for the consultation requirement of the ESA to apply to federal government activities in foreign nations. DISSENT (Blackmun, J.): D was not entitled to summary judgment, because the Ps raised genuine issues of fact as to injury and redressability. Additionally, the Court's general rejection of standing for plaintiffs with "procedural" injuries is too broad and may interfere with or limit the constitutional authority of Congress to allow citizen-suits in federal court. Congress could have simply issued a mandate barring executive actions that harm endangered species. Instead, Congress legitimately gave the Executive Branch a measure of discretion in implementing the law, subject to review for procedural violations by courts. Such review is one reason Congress has generally been given the benefit of the doubt when delegating tasks to the Executive Branch.

Gonzalez v. Raich (2005) RULE OF LAW: Congress may regulate the use and production of home-grown marijuana as this activity, taken in the aggregate, could rationally be seen as having a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. FACTS: In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act to combat illegal drug use in the US. Shortly after, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) which categorized illegal drugs into different "schedules" and prevented their sale, purchase, and possession in the US. In 1996, California enacted the Compassionate Use Act that allowed the use of medical marijuana within the state by persons needing it for legitimate medical purposes. Angel Raich and Diane Monson (plaintiffs) were California residents who both legally used marijuana to treat legitimate medical issues. Despite receiving approval from California state officials, federal agents seized and destroyed Raich's marijuana plants. Raich brought this suit against Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the US (defendant), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the federal CSA. The court of appeals ruled that the CSA was an invalid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power, and Gonzales appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Congress regulate the use and production of homegrown marijuana?

(Stevens, J.): YES. The Court held in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), that Congress has the power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic "class of activities" that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In this case, Raich's activity of growing marijuana for home use can be seen rationally as having a substantial effect on interstate commerce because there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market for marijuana. The present case is comparable to the homegrown wheat in Wickard. In Wickard, Congress sought to regulate the national market for wheat by controlling homegrown commodities. Likewise, in the present case, Congress sought to regulate and eliminate the national market for illegal drugs by eliminating home-grown varieties. Just as the addition of homegrown wheat to the overall market frustrated Congress's attempts to regulate the entire market in Wickard, Raich's addition of homegrown marijuana to the national scheme, when taken in the aggregate with others similarly situated, has a significant effect on Congress's ability to eliminate the national illegal marijuana market. Therefore, the CSA is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power because Congress acted rationally in determining growing marijuana was an economic activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. CONCURRENCE (Scalia, J.): Congress's power to regulate activities having a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce is derived not only from the Commerce Clause, but primarily from the Necessary and Proper Clause, which allows Congress to do whatever it deems necessary to accomplish its regulatory objectives. In deference to this constitutional provision, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not substantially affect interstate commerce. Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause is far-reaching. DISSENT (Thomas, J.): Raich's activities in growing marijuana for home use is not properly categorized as "commerce." The marijuana in question was never bought or sold; never crossed state lines; and had no demonstrable effect on the national marijuana market. Congress has broad authority to regulate local activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but this provision, even when amplified by the Necessary and Proper Clause, has limits. Congress did not demonstrate that regulation of medical marijuana is necessary to combat the interstate drug trade. Accordingly, Congress's actions violate the Tenth Amendment. DISSENT (O'Connor, J.): The majority's decision essentially trumps states' rights and federalism concerns, and it violates the previous decisions in Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The majority's decision risks opening the door for Congress to improperly regulate any intrastate activity deemed "essential" to interstate commerce.

Printz v. US (1997) RULE OF LAW: Congress may not compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs. FACTS: Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) in 1993 as an amendment to its Gun Control Act of 1968. The Brady Act was a federal gun-control provision that required the US attorney general to implement a nationwide handgun background check system. While moving towards a national system, in the interim, state and local officials were required to conduct background checks of prospective firearm purchasers. Under the Brady Act, sellers of firearms would report sales to their county Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs). The CLEOs would then conduct background checks and confirm the lawfulness of the sales. Printz and Mack (plaintiffs) were CLEOs in Montana and Arizona, respectively. Printz brought suit in federal district court against the US government alleging that the Brady Act was an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power because it compelled state officers to participate in federal service. The district court held that the provision of the Brady Act requiring CLEOs to perform background checks was unconstitutional, but held that this provision could be separated from the rest of the act, leaving a constitutional, voluntary background check system in place. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions were constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May Congress compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs?

(Scalia, J.): NO. Congress may not compel state CLEOs to administer federal programs. Firstly, no clear evidence exists that historical Congresses believed they had the power to compel state executives into federal service. Secondly, the Constitution creates a system of dual sovereignty whereby the states and the federal government are independent entities with different governmental functions. Thus, the Constitution's structure suggests that it is inappropriate for the federal government to violate states' status as separate entities by compelling their officials to perform federal roles. Additionally, the Constitution clearly states the execution of the laws is the responsibility of the President. The Brady Act transfers this responsibility to thousands of CLEOs, who are not subject to Presidential control or oversight. Hence, empowering each CLEO to make background check decisions would reduce the power of the executive branch and strain the constitutional separation of powers. Finally, the present case is governed by New York v. US, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which held Congress may not require states to legislate according to federal standards because doing so constitutes a commandeering of traditional state policy making functions. Thus the provision of the Brady Act allowing the federal government to directly control state officers conflicts with the New York decision and is unconstitutional. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. CONCURRENCE (O'Connor, J.): The provisions in the Brady Act compelling state officials to carry out federal objectives are unconstitutional. However, state and local officials might choose to volunteer under the Brady Act to carry out its provisions in an effort to improve gun control. Additionally, the background check provisions in the Brady Act are only required in the interim until the attorney general successfully implements a nationwide, federally-administered system. This could encourage state and local officials to voluntarily comply with the Brady Act, despite this decision. CONCURRENCE (Thomas, J.): Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power only to regulate commerce among the several states, a power that does not extend to regulating wholly intrastate, point-of-sale transactions. Under US v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Congress does not have the authority to regulate the intrastate transfer of firearms. Congress lacks both the underlying power to make firearm regulations under the Second Amendment, as well as the ability to compel state officers to enforce such regulations under the Tenth Amendment. DISSENT (Stevens, J.): When Congress exercises powers delegated to it by the Constitution, it may impose obligations to act on state and local officials, and even ordinary citizens. There are no constitutional restrictions in this area explicitly placed on Congress's ability to regulate firearms. Nothing in the Tenth Amendment grants the ability to state and local officials to ignore a command from Congress given pursuant to its Article I, Section 8 enumerated powers. Additionally, the framers envisioned a system in which the national government has the power to make demands on local officials and individual citizens. The framers' goal of empowering the national government does not mean that states must surrender their sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment; the national government is simply authorized to act for the benefit of the union as a whole. Finally, the New York decision is not controlling in the present case. New York dealt with the issue of whether state legislators—as opposed to state executive officials—may be enlisted to implement federal policy. DISSENT (Souter, J.): The text of Federalist No. 27, written by Alexander Hamilton states that, because the new Constitution would authorize the national government to bind individuals directly through national law, it could "employ the ordinary magistry of each [state] in execution of its laws." The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and state officer oath requirements of the Constitution combine to stand for the proposition that state governments are incorporated into the national government, and that state officials, because of their oath, are also incorporated into national government service. This and other provisions from the Federalist Papers suggest that Congress, when acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, may require state government or state officials to act in furtherance of those constitutional powers. DISSENT (Breyer, J.): Other nations have successfully implemented a system whereby local authorities are commissioned to carry out regulations created by a national, federal body. The success of other nations with this model could be instructive in upholding the constitutionality of a similar model in the US.

District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) RULE OF LAW: Subject to certain safety limitations, the 2nd Amendment to the US Constitution creates an individual right to keep and bear arms apart from any military purpose. FACTS: Dick Heller (plaintiff), a Washington, D.C. special police officer, applied for a registration certificate from the city of Washington, D.C. for a handgun he wished to keep at home. A Washington, D.C. statute prohibited possessing a handgun in the home without a license, and it also required any lawful handgun kept in the home to be rendered inoperable through use of a trigger-lock. The District of Columbia (defendant) denied Heller's application for a registration certificate based on its law. Heller then filed a lawsuit in federal district court for the District of Columbia arguing that the city's bar on the registration of handguns, its prohibition on guns in the home without a license, and its requirement of trigger-locks for lawful guns in the home all violated the Second Amendment. The district court dismissed Heller's complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed on the grounds that the Second Amendment grants an individual the right to bear arms. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does a law prohibiting the possession of usable handguns in the home violate the 2nd Amendment to the US Constitution?

(Scalia, J.): YES. Although the Second Amendment appears to have been created for the purpose of ensuring the creation of a future militia, this purpose ultimately does not change the fact that the Second Amendment was designed to create an individual right to keep and bear arms. Nothing suggests that the individual right to keep and bear arms is conditional on being for a strictly military purpose. However, states must be free to regulate who can possess firearms based on certain safety concerns (for example, states are free to deny handgun registration and possession to felons and the mentally ill). However, provided Heller does not fall within the categories of people prohibited from owning handguns due to safety concerns, the District of Columbia's prohibition on handgun possession in the home, as well as its requirement that lawful handguns in the home be rendered inoperable for self-defense, is unconstitutional. DISSENT (Breyer, J.): The District of Columbia's law does not violate Heller's Second Amendment rights. The Second Amendment's protection of the right to bear arms is not absolute. The District's law should only be overturned if it is an unreasonable or inappropriate regulation of Heller's Second Amendment rights. Even if the Second Amendment could be interpreted as protecting a self-defense (and not militia-based) purpose for owning a handgun, the District of Columbia law does not unreasonably interfere with the right of self-defense because its purpose is to combat the presence of handguns in high-crime urban areas. In examining future similar laws designed to combat health and safety risks by limiting Second Amendment rights, courts should adopt a unique level of scrutiny. A better approach would be an "interest-balancing inquiry" whereby the court would seek to determine whether a particular statute burdens an interest protected by the Second Amendment in a way that is disproportionate to the statute's effects on other important governmental interests. In applying this new level of scrutiny to the District of Columbia's law, the law is a permissible, proportional legislative response to the serious problem of handguns and urban crime, and thus it furthers an important government interest in health and safety. DISSENT (Stevens, J.): The majority does not adequately describe the scope of the individual right to keep and bear arms. The text of the Amendment itself, its history, and the Supreme Court's prior decision in US v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), provide an ample discussion of the bounds of the right that differ from the majority's conclusion. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that it was unlawful for two men to possess a sawed-off shotgun because their reasons for doing so bore no relationship to the purpose of preserving a well-regulated militia. The Miller holding, as well as the historical context and debate surrounding the adoption of the Second Amendment, means that the individual right to keep and bear arms was designed to be solely for the purpose of preserving a well-regulated militia. Heller seeks to own a handgun for self-defense and not a militia-related purpose, therefore, the majority's holding that his right to do so is constitutionally protected is incorrect.

Sabri v. US (2004) RULE OF LAW: Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare and may enact, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, any provision rationally related to carrying out its spending powers for the promotion of the general welfare. FACTS: Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(2) to provide federal criminal penalties for the giving and receiving of bribes for the benefit of state, local, and tribal officials of entities that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds. Sabri (defendant), a real estate developer, bribed a Minneapolis city official on three separate occasions in an effort to obtain permission to circumvent local licensing and zoning laws. The city official headed a Minneapolis public community development organization, which received approximately $23 million annually in federal funds. The US government (plaintiff) prosecuted Sabri in district court under 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(2) but Sabri moved to dismiss the indictment. Sabri argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not require proof of a connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe in establishing criminal liability. The district court held for Sabri and dismissed the indictment, but the court of appeals reversed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: May Congress prohibit bribing of federal officials under its spending powers without requiring proof of a logical nexus between federal funds and the alleged bribe?

(Souter, J.): YES. Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal monies to promote the general welfare. Congress has corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to ensure that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power are actually spent for the general welfare. The Constitution does not mandate that Congress require proof of a logical connection between the elements of a regulated offense and federal monies for the valid exercise of Congress's Article I powers. Sabri's argument that a logical nexus between an alleged bribe and federal money is required for Congress to regulate bribes is dismissed. Corruption committed by state and local government officials presents a sufficient threat to the general welfare to justify congressional regulation of this activity. It is irrelevant that Congress's regulation would limit some corruption that did not directly impact federal money. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad spending powers that may be exercised to promote the general welfare in any way Congress believes is rationally related to achieving that goal. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) ⇨ Congress must show more than a rational relationship between a statute and the exercise of an enumerated power for it to be upheld. It is unnecessary to decide what Congress must additionally show since the same holding can be reached under the Commerce Clause.

NYC Transit Authority v. Beazer (1979) RULE OF LAW: A state regulation that is over-inclusive because it regulates a general class of persons based on the conduct of particular members within that class does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution if it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. FACTS: The New York City Transit Authority (defendant) promulgated a policy that it would not hire or employ persons currently participating in one of New York City's several methadone maintenance programs. About 40,000 persons received methadone treatments in New York, and treatments were primarily administered to treat the physical withdrawal symptoms of heroin addicts. Beazer (plaintiff) and three other persons brought suit in federal district court against the New York City Transit Authority in a class action on behalf of all persons who had been, or would in the future be, subject to discharge or rejection as employees of the Transit Authority because they participated in a methadone maintenance program. The district court ruled in favor of Beazer and found the employment policy unconstitutional. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the New York City Transit Authority's refusal to employ or hire persons participating in a methadone maintenance program amounted to unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

(Stevens, J.) ⇨ No. Beazer's primary argument was not that the transit Authority should not be permitted to enact a special rule governing the employment of all narcotics users. Rather, Beazer argued that users of methadone should not be included in the general class of "narcotics users." However, the district court found that substantial differences exist between users of methadone and persons that used no drugs at all. Additionally, a substantial number of persons enrolled in methadone maintenance programs cannot be expected to complete them, and thus there is a great risk of recidivism among employees and potential hires in this class of persons. The Transit Authority can attempt to distinguish among methadone users and determine which people are most likely to present continuing drug use risks, yet such a rule would be imprecise and almost impossible to apply in practice. The Transit Authority has a legitimate interest in not employing narcotics users. Given the risks of recidivism or lingering effects of narcotics use among persons enrolled in methadone maintenance programs, it is reasonable for the Transit Authority to enact a policy of total exclusion from its payroll persons who are currently enrolled in methadone programs. Beazer argues that the Transit Authority's rule was unconstitutional because it was overbroad and potentially excluded from employment methadone users that are not recidivists and would successfully complete their programs. However, the general rule employed by the Transit Authority serves general objectives of safety and efficiency. The rule does not enact additional discriminatory provisions against a more defined suspect class of persons, rather, the rule discriminates against a general class of persons. Under these circumstances, it is of no constitutional significance that the degree of rationality for the Transit Authority's regulation is not as great for some methadone users as for others. The regulation of employment for an entire class is rationally related to legitimate safety and efficiency interests, and thus the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence/Dissent (Powell, J.) ⇨ It is not unconstitutional to discriminate in employment decisions against persons currently receiving methadone treatments. However, the Transit Authority's policy discriminates against persons that have successfully graduated from their methadone programs and are now living drug and alcohol-free lives. The policy itself states that it would still exclude from employment persons who have successfully completed their methadone programs and lived drug and alcohol-free for less than five years. The majority does not extend its holding to cover persons living drug free for less than five years, rather, its holding only expressly applies to persons currently enrolled in methadone programs. The case should have been remanded for further consideration because the majority only partially decided the issues. Dissent (Brennan, J.) ⇨ Justice Brennan dissented because he would have affirmed the case based on reasons stated in Part I of Justice White's dissenting opinion. Dissent (White, J.) ⇨ The district court made undisputed findings of fact that persons having been on methadone maintenance programs for over a year or having successfully graduated from such programs are both easily identifiable by the Transit Authority's normal screening procedures and are as easy to hire as people that have never used narcotics. Thus, the question at bar should have been the rationality of placing successfully maintained or recently cured persons in the same category as those just attempting to escape heroin addiction, rather than with the general population. There is no reason that successfully rehabilitated persons are any less "employable" than members of the general public as a whole. The policy of not hiring methadone maintenance program participants is not rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of furthering employability.

Clinton v. NY (1998) RULE OF LAW: There is no provision in the US Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes. FACTS: The Line Item Veto Act (Act) gave the President the power to "cancel in whole" three types of provisions signed into law. Specifically, the Act allowed for the cancellation of (1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit. The effect of the cancellation was the prevention of the item from having any legal force or effect. President Clinton (defendant) invoked the Act to cancel a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that would have allowed New York to avoid repaying funds received under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. Individuals who would have benefitted under those provisions of the Social Security Act (plaintiffs) challenged the cancellation. The district court found that the Act was unconstitutional. The case came before the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Is the Line Item Veto Act constitutional?

(Stevens, J.) ⇨ No. There is no provision in the US Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes. Instead, Article I, § 7 of the Constitution requires that legislation originate in Congress and only be presented to the President upon passage in both the House and the Senate. The Constitution further provides that if the President does not approve the bill, he shall return it to the house where it originated. This "return," which is also known as a "veto", is subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote in each house of Congress. Here, the President's cancellation power under the Act differs significantly from his power to "return" a bill under the Constitution. For example, the statutory cancellation takes place after the bill becomes law, while the constitutional return of the bill takes place before the bill becomes law. Additionally, the statutory cancellation only applies to part of the bill, while the constitutional return applies to the entire bill. The Act authorizes the President to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without regard for the procedures set forth in Article I, § 7 of the Constitution. This unilateral power to change the text of a duly enacted statute is unconstitutional. If Congress seeks to create a new procedure for creating laws, it must amend the Constitution. Accordingly, the Act is unconstitutional and the district court is affirmed. Concurrence (Kennedy, J.) ⇨ Separation of powers is central to ensuring that each branch of government is able to vigorously assert its proper authority. The Act increases the power of the President beyond what the Framers envisioned, thereby compromising the political liberty of American citizens. Concurrence/Dissent (Scalia, J.) ⇨ This case presents an issue under the separation of powers doctrine, not the Presentment Clause. The question at the core of the case is whether the Act transferred to the President a degree of political, lawmaking power that is traditionally retained by the Legislative Branch. There is no difference between Congress authorizing the President to cancel a spending item and Congress authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President's discretion. Congress has been engaging in the latter behavior since the founding of this country. Dissent (Breyer, J.) ⇨ The Act does not violate any specific textual constitutional command. It also does not violate any implicit separations of powers principle. The Constitution authorizes Congress and the President to experiment with novel methods to improve government, such as the one contained in the Act.

Clinton v. Jones (1997) RULE OF LAW: The US Constitution does not grant the President of the US immunity while in office from suit for actions allegedly occurring prior to his assuming the presidential office. FACTS: Paula Jones (plaintiff) alleged that before President Bill Clinton (defendant) was elected to the office of President of the US, he made "abhorrent" sexual advances toward her which she "vehemently" rejected. After this time, Jones, a state of Arkansas employee, said she was treated rudely by coworkers. After Clinton was elected President, Jones stated he defamed her personally to a reporter and called her a "liar." Jones brought state law claims against Clinton for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In bringing these claims, Jones noted that none of the conduct at issue occurred during Clinton's time in office as President of the US. The lower court held that Clinton was not immune from suit while in office for actions allegedly occurring before he assumed the presidential office. The district court granted a stay of the proceedings, and Jones appealed. The appellate court reversed, and the US Supreme Court considered the case. ISSUE: Whether the US Constitution permits the President of the US to be sued while in office for actions occurring prior to assuming office.

(Stevens, J.) ⇨ YES. Clinton is not immune while in office from suits for alleged acts occurring before his time in office. The US Constitution does not grant the President of the US immunity while in office from suit for actions allegedly occurring prior to his assuming the presidential office. The policy basis for providing immunity for public officials acting in their "official" capacities is to permit them to perform the full range of their official duties without being hindered by the threat of or actual litigation. However, the policy reasons behind providing immunity for "official" acts do not transfer to justifying immunity from suit for "unofficial" conduct. As Jones' allegations against Clinton stem from acts allegedly occurring before his time in office, they cannot be considered official acts. Thus, based on policy justifications for official immunity, Clinton should not be granted immunity from suit for these acts. Clinton is not arguing, however, that he should receive absolute immunity for his official acts. Rather, he is requesting the courts stay the judicial proceedings against him until after the end of his time in office. Clinton argues a stay of the proceedings is necessary so he can devote his undivided time and attention to his public duties. Additionally, he argues that the doctrine of separation of powers would be violated if the Judiciary interfered with the operations of the Executive Branch by permitting these proceedings to go forward. Clinton argues that this practice could create a "slippery slope" of permitting endless litigation to occupy the time of presidents. However, this argument is incorrect on several levels. First, it has no basis in history. In the entire existence of the US, only three presidents have been sued while in office. Thus, it is unlikely that permitting Jones' suit against Clinton will be the catalyst by which a flood of litigation is opened up involving presidents. Second, the doctrine of separation of powers would not be violated as it is unlikely that the Judiciary's grant of permission for Jones' lawsuit to go forward rises to the constitutionally-prohibited level of interference by the Judiciary in the functions of the Executive Branch. Finally, if the federal district court manages the case properly, it is unlikely the litigation will consume an overly-burdensome amount of Clinton's time. While stays of litigation proceedings may sometimes be appropriate due to reasons having nothing to do with issues of official immunity, this is not the case here. The district court's decision to grant the stay of proceedings against Clinton does not take into account Jones' constitutional right to a speedy trial. Additionally, it could jeopardize the availability of evidence and witnesses. The decision of the district court to grant the stay was premature. Clinton is not entitled to a stay of judicial proceedings based on his unofficial acts until he leaves office. The decision of the appellate court overturning the stay granted by the district court is affirmed.

Personal Admin of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979) RULE OF LAW: To prove that a state actor violates the Equal Protection Clause by enacting legislation with a discriminatory purpose, a plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. FACTS: The State of Massachusetts enacted a veteran preference statute providing that all veterans qualified for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying non-veterans. Feeney (plaintiff) was a female non-veteran applicant for the civil service that scored very highly on a number of competitive civil service exams. However, she was passed over for employment opportunities by males with lower scores who were veterans. Feeney challenged the veteran preference statute in federal district court against the Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts (defendant), alleging that the statute disadvantaged women and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found that the preference operated overwhelmingly to the advantage of males. Although the district court believed the statute's stated goals were noble and that the statute was not enacted to specifically disadvantage women, the district court held the statute unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Personnel Administrator appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does a state veteran preference law that discriminates against women violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Stewart, J.) ⇨ No. The Massachusetts veteran preference law was enacted to reward veterans for their service, to ease their transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and disciplined people to the civil service. Despite the attempts of Massachusetts to include as many women as possible in the scope of the law, a disproportionate amount of men are included largely because gender-based restrictions were enacted by the military itself. The dispositive question is whether Feeney demonstrates that a gender-based discriminatory purpose has shaped the Massachusetts veteran preference legislation. The crux of Feeney's argument is the established criminal and civil legal principle that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his or her voluntary actions. The Massachusetts legislature is aware that many more men than women serve in the military. In according preference to veterans in the civil service, Massachusetts must intend that more men than women be employed in the civil service. The disparity in civil service hiring decisions in favor of men is therefore intentional. However, to prove a discriminatory purpose as required for an Equal Protection Clause challenge, Feeney must prove that the Massachusetts legislature adopted the veteran preference law because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon women. Nothing in the record indicates the legislature enacted the law to discriminate against women. Feeney fails to meet her burden of proof. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Dissent (Marshall, J.) ⇨ The Massachusetts veteran preference law should be held unconstitutional because of its extreme discriminatory impact on women as a group. The impact of the statute on women is undisputed. Less than two percent of women in the state are veterans, rendering desirable civil service employment positions open almost exclusively to men. The reality of the absolute preference for veterans means that more men occupy traditionally higher-paying positions in the civil service that encompass more responsibility, while more women occupy lower-paying clerical positions, if any. When the foreseeable impact of a facially neutral policy is so disproportionate, the burden should shift from the individual plaintiff to the state to establish that gender-based considerations play no role in the legislature's enactment of the particular legislative scheme in question. The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed unless Massachusetts demonstrates that no gender-based considerations influenced its decision to adopt the veteran preference statute.

Geduldig v. Aeillo (1974) RULE OF LAW: Discrimination based on pregnancy in a state disability insurance program is subject to rational basis review. FACTS: The State of California administered a disability insurance system that paid benefits to persons in private employment who were temporarily unable to work because of a disability not covered by workman's compensation. The program received no state funding but was instead funded entirely by contributions of one percent of the wages of participating employees. Aiello (plaintiff) and other women suffered disabilities resulting from pregnancies. Aiello brought suit in federal district court against Geduldig, a director of the California Department of Human Resources Development, and the State of California (defendants) to challenge the constitutionality of the disability insurance program. Aiello argued the program violated the Equal Protection Clause because, in defining disability, the program excluded from coverage certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy. The district court held that the insurance program was unconstitutional. Geduldig appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Is discrimination based on pregnancy in a state disability insurance program subject to rational basis review?

(Stewart, J.) ⇨ Yes. Discrimination based on pregnancy in a state disability insurance program is subject to rational basis review. Such discrimination does not violate the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on gender discrimination. One of the main benefits of the California program is the fact that it is completely self-sustainable and does not rely on state funding. However, if California extends its coverage to all temporary disabilities accompanying pregnancy and delivery, the disability insurance program could not continue to run on employee contributions alone. California chose to include most employment-related disabilities in its insurance program, but not all. However, this under-inclusiveness does not make the program unconstitutional. Precedent suggests that a state can take individual steps towards accomplishing a public purpose. The California disability insurance program is ultimately a social welfare program. Hence, the Court should apply rational basis review. The state legislature could have reasonably found that the exclusion of pregnancy disabilities from the program is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in maintaining the program's self-sustainability. The program does not discriminate against all women, but merely divides people into pregnant persons who are not covered and non-pregnant persons who are covered. The latter group includes both men and women. The California disability insurance program is constitutional under this standard. The decision of the district court is reversed. Dissent (Brennan, J.) ⇨ The disabilities associated with pregnancy are very serious and expensive. There is no distinguishable difference between the effects of these disabilities and other non-pregnancy disabilities on lost wages and employment opportunities. By singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar to women, California is essentially creating a gender-based double-standard for disability insurance coverage. California imposes a limitation upon the disabilities for which women workers can receive benefits, while men receive full compensation for all disabilities suffered, including those unique to their gender. Such dissimilar treatment of men and women constitutes gender discrimination.

US v. Carolene Products (1938) RULE OF LAW: Congressional legislation of common commercial products will be scrutinized under a rational-basis test. FACTS: In 1923, Congress passed the Filled Milk Act (FMA), which criminalized the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk or cream. Carolene Products Co. (defendant) owned a milk processing plant. The US government (plaintiff) indicted Carolene Products in district court for violating the FMA. Carolene was accused of shipping a product called "Milnut" that consisted of a compound of skim milk and coconut oil. Carolene argued that the FMA was unconstitutional. The district court granted Carolene's motion to dismiss, and the US government appealed directly to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Is the rational-basis test the appropriate judicial review for congressional legislation of common commercial products?

(Stone, J.) ⇨ Yes. Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919), held that state legislatures possessed authority to regulate widely used articles of food for the benefit of the public's welfare. There is no meaningful reason to depart from that holding in the present case simply because the law at issue was passed by Congress and not a state. Additionally, Congress, in passing the FMA, relied on extensive evidence that consuming inferior milk products posed a significant danger to the health and safety of the general public. Judicial review is improper unless it is clear there is no rational basis for Congress's judgment. It is footnoted, however, that although rational-basis review is applied to this case, other types of cases exist in which a stricter review of legislative judgments is required. Specifically, the application of heightened scrutiny may be appropriate in cases in which legislation violates the Constitution on its face, attempts to distort or rig the political process, or discriminates against discrete or insular minorities. However, because none of these issues are a factor, rational-basis review of the legislature's judgment is sufficient. The FMA is rationally related to the public's health and safety interests in consuming nutritious milk, and the judgment of the lower courts is reversed.

US v. Darby (1941) RULE OF LAW: Congress may regulate the labor standards involved in the manufacture of goods for interstate commerce and may exclude from interstate commerce any goods produced under substandard labor conditions. FACTS: Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to prevent the introduction and shipment of goods produced under labor conditions that failed to meet federal standards from entering the stream of interstate commerce. The US government (plaintiff) brought suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia against Darby Lumber Company (defendant) alleging that the company engaged in labor practices that fell short of the FLSA's standards with the intent of manufacturing goods to be sold in interstate commerce. The district court quashed the indictment of Darby, and the court of appeals affirmed. The US government appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Congress prohibit the shipment of goods in interstate commerce made by workers in unfair employment conditions and the employment of such workers in manufacturing goods for interstate commerce?

(Stone, J.): YES. While manufacturing is not itself interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods between states falls within the definition of commerce and is thus capable of regulation by Congress under its plenary Commerce Clause powers. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), holding that Congress may regulate only articles of commerce themselves and not the conditions under which they are produced, is overruled. The power of Congress over interstate commerce is absolute and is subject only to limitations prescribed by the Constitution. The present holding has no effect on the Tenth Amendment's assertion that all powers not given to the federal government are reserved to the states. In passing the FLSA, Congress merely exercised powers accorded to it under the Constitution and did not usurp power from the states. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.

Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) RULE OF LAW: The US Constitution grants exclusive authority to the federal government for making laws regulating the capture and return of fugitive slaves. FACTS: In 1837, Edward Prigg (defendant) captured Margaret Morgan and her children in Pennsylvania. Prigg claimed that Morgan was a fugitive slave. Pennsylvania was a non-slave-holding state and was a common refuge for fugitive slaves. The federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 authorized the owner of a fugitive slave to seize the slave and bring the slave before a federal judge or state magistrate to obtain a certificate after proving that the slave was actually a fugitive slave. Prigg did not prove that Morgan was a slave before any federal judge or state magistrate in Pennsylvania. Instead, Prigg forcibly removed Morgan and her children to Maryland, where a county judge adjudged them to be slaves. Prigg was charged and convicted under a Pennsylvania law designed to prevent self-help in the return of fugitive slaves. Prigg challenged this law as unconstitutional. ISSUE: Does the US Constitution grant exclusive authority to the federal government for making laws regulating the capture and return of fugitive slaves?

(Story, J.): YES. The US Constitution grants exclusive authority to the federal government for making laws regulating the capture and return of fugitive slaves. The Constitution states, "No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." This provision of the Constitution was a necessary element to combine the slave-holding and non-slave-holding states into the Union. The purpose of the clause was to prevent non-slave-holding states from intermeddling with or obstructing the rights of owners of slaves in the slave-holding states. The clause vests the exclusive authority of regulating the capture and return of fugitive slaves to the federal government. The clause is found in the U.S. Constitution and does not point out any state action to carry out its effect. Additionally, the federal Fugitive Slave Act carries out the full purpose of the clause, and all state legislation on the issue has been preempted. Therefore, the Pennsylvania statute that was the basis of Prigg's conviction is unconstitutional. CONCURRENCE (Taney, C.J.): The Constitution only prohibits states from enacting legislation that interferes with the rights of slave owners regarding fugitive slaves. States are free to enact laws that enforce these rights, because the Constitution does not prohibit those laws. DISSENT (McLean, J.): No law authorizes a person to seize a fugitive by force and take the fugitive to another state. The Constitution does not authorize this act, and the federal Fugitive Slave Act does not authorize this act. The Fugitive Slave Act requires that a master seek a certificate from a federal judge or state magistrate in the state where the fugitive is seized. This appropriately protects the rights of the master and the rights of the various states.

Loving v. Virginia (1967) RULE OF LAW: A state may not restrict marriages between persons solely on the basis of race under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. FACTS: In June 1958, Mildred Jeter, an African American woman, and Richard Loving, a Caucasian man (defendants), were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. They later moved to Virginia (plaintiff) and resided in Caroline County. The laws of Virginia, however, banned interracial marriages within the state. In October 1958, the Lovings were indicted for violating the Virginia law. They plead guilty and were sentenced to one year in jail, but the trial court suspended the sentence for twenty-five years on the condition that the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return to the state together for twenty-five years. The Lovings then moved to the District of Columbia, but filed suit in state trial court to vacate the judgment against them on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of the Virginia statutes and upheld the convictions. The Lovings appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May a state enact a statute that prevents marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classification without violating the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(Warren, C.J.) ⇨ No. State bans on interracial marriages were passed as a reaction to slavery and have been present since the colonial period. Such bans were affirmed by the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during a period of extreme nativism following World War I. However, in the fifteen years preceding the Lovings' case, fourteen states had repealed their own similar bans on interracial marriage. In the present case, the Commonwealth of Virginia seeks to uphold its interracial marriage ban on the grounds that it furthers a legitimate state purpose of preserving racial integrity and preserving racial pride. Virginia also argues that the regulation of marriage has traditionally been left to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Finally, Virginia argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause suggested that it is only obligated to apply its laws equally among different groups of people. Thus, it argues that it is complying with its obligation by preventing interracial marriage for all people, not just Caucasians. The argument that the mere equal application of a law is enough to overcome the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on invidious racial discrimination is rejected. Virginia's statute is motivated solely to restrict marriage based on race, and by precedent, such laws have been found to be a threat to equality. At the very least such race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and cannot be upheld unless they are shown to accomplish a permissible state objective independent of the racial discrimination. In the present case, there is no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination that justifies Virginia's classification. The Virginia statutes violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence (Stewart, J.) ⇨ As expressed in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), and restated here, "it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend on the race of the actor."

US v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp (1936) RULE OF LAW: An otherwise unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive may nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive goal is to provide relief in a foreign conflict. FACTS: Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to stop the sale of arms to countries involved in the Chaco border dispute. That same day, President Roosevelt issued an executive order prohibiting munitions sales to warring countries involved in the Chaco border dispute. In 1936, an indictment was issued alleging that Curtiss-Wright Export Co. (defendant) illegally sold arms to Bolivia, a country engaged in the Chaco border dispute. The transaction was in violation of the congressional resolution and the President's executive order. The district court issuing the indictment held for Curtiss-Wright, ruling that the indictment was not supported by sufficient information to charge Curtiss-Wright. The US government (plaintiff) appealed directly to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive may nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive goal is to provide relief in a foreign conflict.

(Sutherland, J.) ⇨ Yes. There are significant differences in the federal government's power to regulate internal versus foreign affairs. All powers given to the federal government over internal affairs are carved out by enumerated provisions in the Constitution from the powers generally reserved to the states. In contrast, any powers given to the federal government over foreign affairs are not carved out from state power because the states never possessed powers over foreign affairs. The grant of power over foreign affairs vested in the federal government after it usurped power from the British Crown. The President is the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations. Any exercise of power by the President must be exercised within the constitutional parameters granted to him, but the scope of the President's powers in international affairs is broad. In order to effectively maintain international relations, congressional legislation concerning foreign affairs must accord the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction that would not be admissible if domestic affairs alone were involved. The President's executive order is constitutional and the decision of the district court is reversed.

Carter v. Carter Coal (1936) RULE OF LAW: Congress may not regulate a purely local act under its Commerce Clause powers. FACTS: Congress passed the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act (BCCA) to create a national commission of coal miners, coal producers, and private citizens to help regulate the coal mining industry by establishing standards for fair competition, production, wages, hours, and labor relations. The BCCA delegated to the commission the power to fix the minimum and maximum prices of coal at every mine in the US. Additionally, the labor relations provisions of the BCCA gave coal mine employees the right to organize and enter into collective bargaining agreements in all states. Although compliance with the BCCA was purely voluntary, Congress encouraged compliance by rewarding participating coal mines with a tax rebate for abiding by the BCCA's provisions. Carter (plaintiff) sued his own company, Carter Coal Co. (defendant) to enjoin it from paying the required tax for noncompliance under the BCCA. ISSUE: May Congress regulate a purely local act under its Commerce Clause powers?

(Sutherland, J.): NO. In the Constitution, commerce is defined as "intercourse for the purposes of trade" between and among the several states. Commerce includes all aspects of trade relating to the sale and transportation of commodities. However, commerce has not been defined to include the manufacturing and production of commodities as it occurs within an individual state. In this case, the manufacturing of coal at local mines and issues pertaining to the wages, hours, and organizing of local employees are local issues, affecting only the particular state in which these activities take place. Thus, the BCCA is an unconstitutional extension of Congress's Commerce Clause power because it accords to a national commission the ability to regulate purely local issues relating to the production of coal. The fact that the coal eventually will be introduced into the stream of interstate commerce is immaterial. Congress may not attempt to regulate the coal before that act occurs. CONCURRENCE/DISSENT (Hughes, J.): The wage and labor provisions of the BCCA are invalid because they are improperly drafted, and Congress may not use its Commerce Clause power to regulate industry within a state. But the BCCA also regulates prices of coal in interstate commerce and prohibits unfair interstate competition. This is permissible under the Commerce Clause. The Court is incorrect to find the entire BCCA invalid because of its labor provisions. DISSENT (Cardozo, J.): The prices for intrastate coal sales are sufficiently related to the prices for interstate sales to justify an overall system of regulation. Setting prices within states could affect interstate sales. The central government thus has the power to enforce the BCCA under the Commerce Clause.

Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) RULE OF LAW: People of African descent brought to the US and held as slaves, as well as their descendants (either slave or free), are not considered citizens of the US and are not entitled to the protections and rights of the Constitution. FACTS: Dred Scott (P) was an African American man born a slave in Virginia in the late 1700s. In 1830, P was taken by his owners to Missouri and purchased by Army Major John Emerson (X) in 1832. X took P with him on various assignments in Illinois and Wisconsin Territory, areas that outlawed slavery based on Congress's enactment of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Missouri Compromise of 1820. While in Wisconsin, X allowed P to marry and later left P and his wife in Wisconsin when he was reassigned to Louisiana. While in Louisiana, X married Eliza Irene Sandford. X then sent for P and his wife, who traveled to Louisiana to serve X and his wife. After X's death in 1843, his widow inherited his estate, including P. P attempted to purchase his freedom from X's widow, but she refused. In 1846, P sued X's widow for the freedom of himself and his family, but the Missouri Supreme Court upheld their slavery. P brought suit again in 1853 in federal district court against John Sandford (D), executor of X's estate. The federal court relied on Missouri law to find that P was still a slave, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. P petitioned for certiorari in the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether Scott, a person of African descent who was born a slave but later taken by his owner to live in free states with the intent of becoming a permanent resident, was considered a citizen of the US and entitled to all the rights and privileges of the US Constitution.

(Taney, C.J.): NO. In deciding that P and other persons of African descent, whether currently slaves or free, are not citizens of the US and thus not entitled to Constitutional protections, an analysis is made starting with the characterization of persons in this category by the Framers of the Constitution. The inquiry is necessarily limited to a class of persons that include only those whose ancestors are of the African race, imported into the US, and sold as slaves. At the time the Framers drafted the Constitution, the prevailing view in the US was that people of African descent imported into the country as slaves were an inferior race and therefore not entitled to basic Constitutional protections, rights, and freedoms. Regardless of its own disagreement with this classification, the judiciary's role is not to judge the wisdom of the policy, but rather to interpret the application of the Constitution as it was written. It does not necessarily follow that a person is entitled to all the protections afforded to a citizen of the US because someone is a citizen of a particular state. The history and plight of African Americans is very different from that of Native Americans, as the latter have always been considered free and independent residents of the US. While there is no difficulty extending constitutional protections to Native Americans, African Americans, brought as slaves to the US have never been afforded the same status and consideration. Applying these principles to the present case, although the Framers' language in the Declaration of Independence stated that "all men are created equal," the prevailing negative view of African Americans at the time of the Declaration's drafting meant that the Framers could not have intended those words to apply to African Americans. People of African descent were brought to the US as property and were always considered as such in subsequent years. The factual record suggests that P is still considered property and a citizen of Missouri, where he resides. The Circuit Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to consider his claim because he does not have citizenship rights which include the right to sue in state or federal courts. Finally, the Congressional Acts that abolished slavery in the northern States of Illinois and Wisconsin where Scott had lived are themselves unconstitutional. Thus, neither P nor his family is made free by being carried into these states by their owner with the intention of becoming a permanent resident. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. CONCURRENCE (Wayne, J.): It is unnecessary to add to or qualify any of the majority's holdings on any point. The majority properly decided both P's individual issue and the issue of whether the Missouri Compromise legislation was constitutional. CONCURRENCE (Campbell, J.): The majority's conclusion that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to hear P's case is in error, but the resolution of the jurisdictional question has no bearing on the merits of the case. Rather, the outcome reached by the majority in the case could have ultimately been supported by its characterization of the effect of the time P spent with his master outside of Missouri. Without actual emancipation procedures, P's absence from Missouri and brief residence in free states does not make him a free man upon returning to Missouri. CONCURRENCE (Catron, J.): Under Illinois law, slaves owned by a master become free once that master becomes a permanent resident of Illinois. However, in the present case, X never became a permanent resident of Illinois, and P and his family were not formally freed before they returned to Missouri. The Missouri Compromise is a valid exercise of Congressional power and should be upheld. Applied to the facts of the present case, Congress validly excepted Missouri from its prohibition on slavery in the Missouri Compromise, however, when P reentered Missouri after having not been formally emancipated in Illinois, he was still a slave in a state which permitted slavery. In sum, P is still a slave and not entitled to Constitutional protections. CONCURRENCE (Daniel, J.): On the facts as they stand, the circuit court should have never exercised jurisdiction to hear the case because P is not actually a citizen of Missouri. Facts giving rise to a court's jurisdiction must be stated from the record, and such facts do not exist on the record in the present case. The nature and position of slaves, as they have been recognized since ancient societies, denies the right of such persons to participate in the political process and have access to court systems provided for free citizens. P's enslaved status denies him the opportunity to even bring his plea in abatement in the court system. Jurisdiction over P's case does not exist in any court. CONCURRENCE (Nelson, J.): States have the constitutional right to pass whatever laws they deem fit to govern property ownership within their borders. As slaves are considered property, states have a constitutional right to pass laws governing the ownership of slaves, subject only to limitations from the Constitution and the sovereignty of other states in passing their own laws on the subject. Missouri constitutionally permits the ownership of slaves within its borders. This is unlimited by any federal provisions. However, Illinois also constitutionally outlawed slavery within its borders and outlined the process by which slaves could become free if their masters became permanent residents of Illinois. If X, P's owner, had actually become a permanent resident of Illinois, P's status as a slave would likely have been impacted upon his return to Missouri. However, this is not the factual situation as it exists in the present case. P was never formally emancipated because X did not become a permanent resident of Illinois. Therefore, Illinois law posed no limit on Missouri state sovereignty in holding that P was still a slave upon reentry within its borders. CONCURRENCE (Grier, J.): The majority's conclusion that the Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional is enough to decide the issue of P's status as a slave. It is unnecessary to consider jurisdictional questions in light of this holding. DISSENT (McLean, J.): The original plea in abatement is actually a trespass action brought by P for assault and wrongful imprisonment of the P family by Sandford. The characterization of P as a person of African descent whose ancestors were brought to the US as slaves does not mean that P now lacks the right to sue in circuit court. It is clear that the citizenship requirements to bring suit are not the same as the requirements to vote or participate in other aspects of civil society because women and children are permitted to sue in federal court. Thus, P has jurisdiction to challenge his wrongful imprisonment as a slave by Sandford. On the merits, decisions governing the existence of slavery are left solely to the power of states under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. Congress does not have the authority to influence the institution of slavery through its passage of the Missouri Compromise and other legislation. Missouri and Illinois have the right to adopt differing laws on slavery within their own borders. However, Congress has the constitutional authority to establish and regulate the internal affairs of a territory such as the Wisconsin territory in which P resided with his master for some time. Congress, in establishing the Wisconsin territory, expressly abolished slavery within its borders. Thus, when P entered this territory with the consent of his master, he was made a free person based on the federal law which governed his place of residence. This fact is supported by X's actions in traveling to Illinois and the Wisconsin territory with the desire to become a permanent resident of those places, allowing P to marry, and leaving the Ps in Illinois once X left. When P and his family returned to Missouri, they were free. The majority is in error to have decided this case solely on the application of Missouri law, and it should have considered congressional and state limitations on the right to own slaves. DISSENT (Curtis, J.): The Circuit Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the case. The pleadings sufficiently show that P was a citizen of Missouri and Sandford was a citizen of New York, and federal court jurisdiction is appropriate based on diversity of citizenship. The majority should have treated the issue of whether P was a slave at the time of bringing the suit differently than whether his parents were at one point enslaved. The enslavement of his parents has no bearing on his right to sue because P was already freed under Illinois law when he brought suit. Precedent decisions support the conclusion that all citizens born or naturalized into an individual state simultaneously gain the privileges of national citizenship. Thus, if P is properly a citizen of Missouri, he should also be entitled to the protection of the federal Constitution as he is also a citizen of the US. P is entitled to national citizenship which includes the right to sue regardless of P's status as being a person of African descent. Congress constitutionally abolished slavery in the Wisconsin territory. The State of Missouri is obligated to recognize the change in P's status after having lived in Wisconsin before returning to Missouri. It is an error for the majority to conclude that P was still a slave upon reentering Missouri because Missouri does not give proper weight to the laws of other states and the federal government establishing P's freedom.

Toomer v. Witsell (1948) RULE OF LAW: The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution prevents states from discriminating against citizens of other states unless valid independent reasons exist for the discrimination, and the degree of discrimination bears a close relationship to those reasons. FACTS: A South Carolina statute designated certain maritime waters off the coast of that state as "a common for the people of the state for the taking of fish." However, the statute also required payment of a license fee of $25 for each shrimp boat in the area owned by a South Carolina resident, and $2,500 for each boat owned by a non-resident. Toomer (plaintiff) was an individual fisherman from Georgia, who instituted this action along with four other Georgia fishermen in district court against Witsell (defendant), the South Carolina official responsible for enforcing the statute and fees. Toomer sought to enjoin enforcement of the South Carolina statute on the grounds that it violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court denied the injunction and dismissed the case, and Toomer appealed directly to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: May a state impose different fees for similar practices depending on the individual's residence?

(Vinson, C.J.) ⇨ No. The Privileges and Immunities Clause was enacted to help promote national unity by ensuring that citizens from State A that venture into State B enjoy the same privileges that the citizens of State B enjoy. The Privileges and Immunities Clause bars discrimination against citizens of other states where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the fact that they are non-residents. However, this protection is not absolute. The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not prevent disparate treatment when there are valid independent reasons for it. Not all means chosen by states validly comply with the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The effect of South Carolina's fee structure for fishing boats actually excludes out-of-state fishermen from its waters. South Carolina does not offer any independent reasons why out-of-state fishermen constitute a peculiar source of evil such that the prohibitory statute is necessary. Thus, South Carolina's regulations are unconstitutional. The decision of the district court is reversed. Concurrence (Rutledge, J.) ⇨ The statute burdens interstate commerce. The state's requirement that out-of-state fishermen unload, pack, and stamp their catch (for tax purposes) before leaving the state is unnecessarily burdensome to the point of excluding these fishermen from commerce within the state. Concurrence (Frankfurter, J.) ⇨ The majority misapplies the Privileges and Immunities Clause and should have instead invalidated South Carolina's actions based on the Commerce Clause. The Tenth Amendment reserves significant regulatory powers to the states, and tthis necessarily includes the power to regulate fisheries and favor its own citizens in certain aspects. Thus, South Carolina did not exceed its constitutional powers in charging higher fees to out-of-state citizens to fish in its waters simply on the grounds that they were out-of-state citizens. Instead, this action should have been invalidated on the grounds that the disproportionately high fees charged by South Carolina to out-of-state residents excessively burdened interstate commerce and is thus a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.

US v. Cruikshank (1875) RULE OF LAW: (1) The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to actions by private individuals. (2) A criminal indictment must allege, positively and specifically, the ways in which the defendant violated the law under which the defendant is charged. FACTS: The US (plaintiff) successfully prosecuted William Cruikshank and others (defendants) under an 1870 federal statute for conspiring to murder two African Americans, thereby denying the victims all their rights under the US Constitution and federal law, including the rights to (1) assemble peacefully under the First Amendment, (2) bear arms under the Second Amendment, (3) life and liberty, and (4) vote. Cruikshank moved for an arrest of judgment, challenging the legal sufficiency of the indictments. The US Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana split on the challenge and certified it for consideration by the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment apply to actions by private individuals? (2) Must a criminal indictment allege, positively and specifically, the ways in which the defendant violated the law under which the defendant is charged?

(Waite, C.J.) ⇨ (1) NO. The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to actions by private individuals. Instead, it prevents states from infringing individuals' fundamental rights. In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment does not give one citizen an enforceable right against another citizen. In this case, the indictments against the defendants must be vacated. The indictments for conspiracy to violate the victims' rights to assemble and bear arms fail because those rights are protected against only the federal government; the rights do not apply against a state or private citizen. In addition, the indictments for conspiracy to violate the victims' rights to life and liberty and to vote fail because those rights are to be protected by the states, not the federal government. (2) YES. A criminal indictment must allege, positively and specifically, the ways in which the defendant violated the law under which the defendant is charged. Under the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution, a defendant is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Thus, an indictment must set forth every element of the defendant's alleged offense in positive terms, with clarity and accuracy. If the law the defendant allegedly violated includes generic terms, it is not enough for the indictment to simply recite those terms. Instead, the indictment must state the specific ways in which the defendant allegedly met or departed from those terms. Not only is this necessary if the defendant is to receive a fair trial, but it also protects the defendant from future indictments based on the same alleged offense. In this case, the government drafted the indictments in sweeping terms and without describing how Cruikshank and the others violated each of the victims' constitutional rights. This deprived Cruikshank and the others of the information they needed to rebut the government's allegations, and it deprived the trier of fact of the information needed to determine if each element of the crimes had been satisfied. The indictments were too vague and general to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, and therefore the appellate court's arrest of the judgments is affirmed. Concurrence/Dissent (Clifford, J.) ⇨ The indictments were not expressed clearly enough for Cruikshank and the others to understand exactly what they were accused of having done, and they were not clear enough to allow the defendants to plead judgments based on those indictments in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same alleged offenses.

Cooper v. Aaron (1958) RULE OF LAW: State officials and state legislatures are bound by orders of the US Supreme Court based on its interpretation of the US Constitution. FACTS: In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the US Supreme Court held that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional and ordered the desegregation of public schools in the southern US. An Arkansas federal district court, relying on Brown, ordered the desegregation of schools in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Little Rock school board was unable to comply with that decree after the Governor of Arkansas blocked African American students from attending a segregated school by calling in the National Guard. The district court issued an injunction against the Governor, and African American students were eventually permitted to attend desegregated schools with the protection of federal troops. The Little Rock school board, represented by Cooper (P), brought suit in federal district court seeking a postponement of the desegregation plan in the state due to the uneasy circumstances present. The suit was challenged by Aaron (D), representing African American children in Arkansas. The district court granted relief, but the court of appeals reversed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether state officials are bound by federal court orders based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the US Constitution.

(Warren, C.J.): YES. The Arkansas Governor and state legislature are bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, and Brown is reaffirmed. State officials and state legislatures must comply with orders of the US Supreme Court based on its interpretation of the US Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "supreme Law of the Land." In Marbury v. Madison (1803), the Court held that the federal judiciary, and particularly the US Supreme Court, has final authority in interpreting the Constitution, or saying "what the law is." Thus, it follows that the decisions of the Supreme Court, in interpreting the Constitution, become the "supreme Law of the Land" and are binding on state officials and legislatures. Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer swears an oath to "support the Constitution," and thus must abide by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution. In Brown, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution as prohibiting racial discrimination in public schools. This interpretation is thus binding on the Arkansas state officials and legislature. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) RULE OF LAW: Racial segregation of public schools in the District of Columbia violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. FACTS: Bolling (plaintiff) was one of a group of African-Americans who filed suit in the federal court for the District of Columbia to challenge the constitutionality of racial segregation in the district's public schools. The district court dismissed the complaint and Bolling appealed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari prior to an appellate court decision. ISSUE: Does racial segregation of public schools in the District of Columbia violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

(Warren, J.) ⇨ Yes. Racial segregation of public schools in the District of Columbia violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We have held that the states are prohibited from racial discrimination in public schools by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The difficulty in this case arises from the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states and not to the District of Columbia. The Fifth Amendment does apply to the District of Columbia, but it does not contain an equal protection clause like the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, the concepts of equal protection and due process are closely related. Equal protection affords a somewhat higher level of protection against impermissible discrimination than due process guarantees, but invidious discrimination may rise to the level of a due process violation. The term "liberty" encompasses more than mere restrictions against bodily freedoms and applies to every endeavor that an individual is free to pursue. Liberty may not be restricted except to serve a legitimate government interest. Public school segregation serves no legitimate government interest. Differential treatment of African-American children deprives them of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. Having already concluded that the Constitution prohibits the states from discriminating in public education, we cannot rationally exempt the federal government from the same prohibition. The case is remanded for consideration of issues not addressed in this opinion.

City of Cleburne, TX v. Cleburne Living Center Inc (1985) RULE OF LAW: The mentally disabled are not a quasi-suspect class and thus any legislative regulations affecting their rights are subject to rational basis review and not intermediate scrutiny. FACTS: In 1980, the Cleburne Living Center (Center) (plaintiff) filed an application for a special use permit with the City of Cleburne, Texas (City) (defendant). The Center sought a permit to build a residential facility for mentally disabled men and women. The facility would house up to thirteen persons, who would be supervised at all times. The City denied the permit application, and the Center brought suit in federal district court challenging the denial. The district court upheld the denial. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the mentally disabled were a quasi-suspect class of persons and thus intermediate scrutiny should be applied to the City's denial of the permit application. It invalidated the denial as not furthering an important government purpose. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether a city's denial of a permit for a group home for mentally disabled persons violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether the review of such a denial required intermediate scrutiny.

(White, J.) ⇨ Yes and no. The court of appeals erred in applying heightened scrutiny to the denial of the permit application. The mentally disabled are not a quasi-suspect class, and thus rational basis review of the City's decision is appropriate. Firstly, it is undeniable that mentally disabled persons require special care for functioning in the everyday world, so legislative judgments are likely to be rational and should not be scrutinized more closely. Secondly, on a national scale, federal lawmakers have shown great appreciation for the plight of the mentally disabled and enacted significant legislation prohibiting discrimination against them. Applying heightened scrutiny and requiring the legislature to show that these efforts are substantially related to an important governmental purpose might actually discourage the legislature from continuing to act to protect the mentally disabled. Thirdly, the existence of so many regulations make it clear that the mentally disabled are not politically powerless, but have already been able to attract the attention of lawmakers to provide for their rights. Fourthly, finding the mentally disabled a quasi-suspect class would pose problems in the future for classifying other groups as such that possibly share some but not all characteristics with mentally disabled persons as a group. For these reasons, rational basis review is appropriate for any legislative determinations affecting mentally disabled persons. The City does not require a special use permit for apartment buildings, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the elderly, private clubs, and fraternal orders. In contrast, the City requires a special use permit for a group home for mentally disabled persons. This difference in treatment is irrelevant because the Center's proposed home would not threaten legitimate interests of the City in a way that other permitted uses would not. The City's arguments that the home would create negative attitudes about the mentally disabled in the community, or that it would elicit harassment of residents from children in a nearby school, are rejected as this concern is speculative and thus irrelevant. The City's concern that the home is located on a floodplain is not sufficient for denying the permit for the home because other similar buildings are located there. Finally, the City's concerns about the size of the home and the amount of residents are also rejected because if the residents were not mentally disabled, the city would have no objections. Thus, there is no rational basis for the City to conclude the group home would impact its legitimate interests, and therefore the denial of the special use permit violates the Equal Protection Clause. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence (Stevens, J.) ⇨ Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence more accurately reflects a continuum of judicial responses ranging from strict scrutiny to rational basis review, rather than a system of three clearly-defined standards. The complicated facts of individual cases do not fit neatly into the existing standards, and a "rational basis" for review is preferential. The rational basis test, when properly and thoughtfully applied, is adequate for deciding all cases implicating the rights of various classes of persons. Heightened scrutiny is unnecessary. Concurrence/Dissent (Marshall, J.) ⇨ Mental retardation should not be used as a proxy for invalidating the rights of an entire group of persons. Mental disabilities affect different people in different ways, and it is unfair for governments to make regulations which discriminate against all mentally disabled individuals. The majority is correct in saying that the Equal Protection Clause requires attention to the capacities and needs of mentally disabled persons as individuals. However, the majority's determination that the case can be sufficiently decided with rational basis review, and denying that any action by the city requires heightened scrutiny, is incorrect. Heightened scrutiny should have been applied to the case, and there should have been a better job in investigating and articulating the facts of the city's actions to justify this result. The majority erred in applying rational basis review in light of the present facts which suggest the need for heightened scrutiny.