Being and Knowing Exam #2 (section 2.2 (second half of it)->2.5 and 3.1)

MAKES CAUSAL DETERMINISM FALSE: -Causal Indeterminism: Theory of Causality:

Quantum mechanics: some events are purely random and uncaused. They just happen for no reason whatssoever. For example: a random event is a radioactive decay of atoms.

-Thought Experiment: Taylor's Unpredictable Arm: refutes indeterminism

Suppose that my right arm is free, according to this conception; that is, that its motions are uncaused. It moves this way and that from time to time, but nothing causes these motions. You have nothing to do with them at all; they just happen, and neither I nor anyone else can ever tell what this arm will be doing next. -Actions, as opposed to reflexes, are intentional. Taylor's arm movements are NOT actions because he did NOT intend them to happen. But if they are not actions, they are not free actions either. So Indeterminism does NOT provide a satisfactory account of free will.

Suppose that a man commits a crime as a result of an "irresistible impulse" such as some form of psychopathology. Can he be held responsible for what he did? Why or why not?

The Hard Determinist Argument can be used, that because "couldn't control his urge", he can't be responsible for committing the crime. He has no free actions.

Peter Van Inwagen- The Consequence Argument

events have consequences, and those consequences are determined by the laws of nature. Among those consequences are the actions we perform. But because those actions are the consequences of things over which we have no control, our actions aren't free.

Causal Determinsm: Theory of Causation

every event is the consequence of past events +the laws of nature If the past determines the future and the furure has to unfold only one way, then there is no free will because we have no say in the matter...

-Causal Determinism

every event is the consequence of past events plus the laws of nature. Everything that will happen in the future is the consequence of what has happened in the past plus the laws of nature. But you can't change the past (because you can't travel back in time) and you can't change the laws of nature...

The Determinism Offense:

everything that we do is the product of our environment and our genes, and we can't control any of that, so we can't be held responsible for what we do.

How does Eliminative Materialism differ from reductive materialism

former doesn't identify the mind with anything physical. Both logical behaviorism and the identity theory contend that to talk about mental states is to talk about physical states of some sort. Eliminative materialism states that, to talk about mental states is to talk about nothing, the mind is a myth, all mental states can be eliminated from our explanations of behavior.

Explain the implications of Searle's brain replacement thought experiment.

funcitoning like an actual chinese speaker but not actually know chinese at all. It is simulating a person who speaks chinese but doesn't actually know how to speak or understand chinese. So, Searle concludes, passing the Turing Test is not a sure sign of intelligence. Searle's Chinese Room, shows that theres more to being intelligent than just producing a certain output relative to a given input.

Functionalism differs from behaviorism:

functionalism allows mental states to serve as both the input and the output of other mental states. For example, functionalism recognizes that coming to believe that your lover is cheating on you can cause you to become jealous. According to functionalism, then, mental states not only can cause behavior, but they can also cause other mental states.

Thought Experiment: Searle's Brain Replacement

go blind. As a last resort of treatment, doctors put in silicon chips to your visual cortex, and it works. Now imagine that they keep putting silicon chips in but it doesn't seem to work, and in the end, your brain is entirely made up on silicon chips. One logical possibility is, you continue to have all of the sorts of thoughts, experiences, memories etc, that you had previously; the sequence of your mental life remains unaffected, meaning, you don't need a brain to have a mind (counterexample for identity theory). Second possibility is, as the silicon chips progressively get implanted into your brain, your area of your conscious experience is shrinking, but this shows no effect on your external behavior, meaning, there is more to having a mind than having the right behavioral dispositions (counterexample for behaviorism). Third possibility is, imagine that the implantation of the silicon chips produces no change in your mental life, but you are progressively more and more unable to put your thoughts, feelings, and intentions into action. Your thoughts, feelings, intentions remain intact, but your observable external behavior slowly reduces until your are paralyzed, meaning, you don't need to have any behavioral dispositions or a brain to have a mind (counterexample for logical behaviorism AND identity theory).

-both Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativists believe that mental states...

have no affect on body, however, Epiphenomenalists believe there are mental states (but that what goes on in the mind doesn't occur to the body), while Eliminativists simply DO NOT believe in mental states at all.

Why is it the case that if we deliberate (Done consciously and intentionally), we must assume that some of our actions are free?

if something is done intentionally and consciously, then we assume that we intended to do that and so our actions are free.

Identity and Indiscernibility

if two things are identical-that is, if two terms refer to one and the same thing- then whatever is true of one must be true of the other. So, if mental states are identical to brain states, whatever is true of mental states must be true of brain states.

-The problem with responsibility and free will: SKINNER:

if we have no free will and so our decisions and actions are predisposed, then we cannot hold anybody responsible/accountable for their actions. So.... fire all lawyers, turn all jails into behavioral reconditioning programs (reprogram people to do what society thinks they should do)

Mental Properties: cannot be explained....

in terms of anything else or more basic, they are primitive.

Identity Theory proved to be an inadequate theory of the mind because...

it failed to recognize that things without brains could have minds. Because Functionalism allows minds to be caused by and realized in things, other than brains, it doesn't suffer from that failing either.

Logical behaviorism proved to be an inadequate theory of the mind because...

it failed to recognize the causal role of mental states.

Multiple Realizability

minds are "multiply realizable".

Genetic Determinism

most social behavior (the way we interact with other people) encoded in our genes -if you wanted to clear out the jails and have re-programming centers, they would be "re-programming" your genes (crispr)

Transhumanism

movement that seeks to transcend the limits of human biology by utilizing technology to enhance our physical and mental capabilities.

Nietzsche (similar to hitler's belief)

similar to Hitler's belief: believed in the "ubermensch", they are the leaders, they shouldn't be bound by traditional rules by society that the "common man" is bound to, they are separate and better than the "common man". Because ubermensch are superior could do whatever they want

What argument can be offered to show that we can understand the world without assuming that every event has a cause?

sometimes there are just random events (quantum mechanics, particles...)

Conscious Experience

states that whereas brain states are knowable by empirical investigation, mental states are not. So, mental states can't be identical with brain states.

What do Lewis and Putnam's thought experiments show?

that minds can be realized in things other than brains. In other words, minds are "multiply realizable".

theory of mind-functionalism

the doctrine that mental states are functional states. Unlike the identity theory, which claims that the mind is the brain, functionalism claims that the mind is what the brain does. -Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part.

Property Dualism

the doctrine that mental states have both physical and nonphysical properties -physical objects have two types of properties (1. physical (mass, charge) 2. Mental properties (qualia, intentionality). Physical properties have mental properties but mental properties CANNOT be reduced to physical properties. -mental properties are primitive (they can't be reduced to something more basic). -Basic physical properties (mass, charge, momentum- they cannot be reduced/broken down any further). To understand these basic properties, you try to understand their formulas. To understand consciousness, we have to try and understand consciousness as its "own thing", at its' basic property, and not reduce it, it is a primitive fundamental aspect in of itself. (said by David Chalmbers). -property dualists are NOT substance dualists:

The Double Aspect Theory

the doctrine that the mind and the body are two aspects of a single underlying substance

demon theory and eliminativists

the mind is to the body as demons are to disease. Eliminativists say that, since we know that demons aren't real (so they don't cause disease), just as demons don't cause disease, mental states aren't real so they don't cause behavior. -Eliminativists believe that mental states (what goes on in the mind related to behavior) will soon be taken out of textbooks because mental states don't exist.

Epiphenomenalism

the mind is to the brain as smoke is to fire. The smoke itself has no effect on the fire.

-Block's Chinese Nation presents a version of what is known as Absent Qualia Objection- refutes functionalism

the objection to functionalism based on the belief that functional states could have all the functional properties of a mental state without having any of its qualitative content...because it purports to show that it's possible for something to be functionally equivalent to a human being and yet have no conscious experience.

Empiricism

the only source of knowledge is sense experience: british empiricists (John Locke, Hume, Berkeley) they believed that not only is this a theory of knowledge but a theory of meaning.

Incompatibilism vs. Compatibilism

the view that Causal Determinism is incompatible with free will. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism

Panpsychism

the view that everything has mental properties. That's not to say that everything has a mind, but it is to say that everything has features of the sort we associate with minds, like perceiving, desiring, remembering, and so on

-Causal Indeterminism:

the view that some events are not the consequence of past events plus the laws of nature. The future is NOT fixed, the future can unfold in a number of different ways, all of which are consistent with what has gone before.

Explain why indeterminism is not an adequate theory of free action.

the view that some events are not the consequence of past events plus the laws of nature. The future is NOT fixed, the future can unfold in a number of different ways, all of which are consistent with what has gone before. -Thought Experiment: Taylor's Unpredictable Arm: -Actions, as opposed to reflexes, are intentional. Taylor's arm movements are NOT actions because he did NOT intend them to happen. But if they are not actions, they are not free actions either. So Indeterminism does NOT provide a satisfactory account of free will.

If there is real foreknowledge...

then there is no free will. (if somebody can know what your gonna do before you do it) then you have to do it. If your future is fixed, there is no free will.

-if God knows the future, then...

then there isn't free will because the future is fixed. -so if you take the oracle and prophecy seriously, then technically you don't have free will.

Identity Theory

theory that mental states are brain states. Superior to behaviorism because it can explain mental causation.

Hard Determinsim: Theory of Free Will:

there are no free actions, there is NO free will, because everything is determined by what went on before, so you have no control. Having free choices is just an illusion, your choices are being affected and determined by factors that we cannot change.

-According to Hard Determinism:

there is only one possible future. The universe must unfold in the way dictated by the laws of nature. This doesn't deny that it seems that we have free will, it denies that the way things seem is the way they are. Free will is an illusion caused by our ignorance of the true causes of our actions.

Speciesists

those who believe that only things with brains like ours can have minds

Hard Determinism

those who believe we have no free will-that there are no free actions-are known as Hard Determinist

Open-Theism:

view that god knows the past but he doesn't know the future because the future is open.

Downward Causation

was introduced by sociologist Donald Campbell to explain the effects of the environment on biological evolution. mental events acting to cause physical events

-According to Holbach,

we are natural objects bound by the same laws that govern everything else in the natural world. Since those laws are not under our control-since we cannot change those laws at will-our lives are not under our control. We can no more change the future than we can change the past

Primitive Property

a property that cannot be reduced to or analyzed in terms of any more basic property

Is folk psychology an inadequate psychological theory? Why or why not?

-Eliminative materialism (also called eliminativism) is the claim that people's common-sense understanding of the mind (or folk psychology) is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist. It is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind.

-Thought Experiment: Laplace's Superbeing

-Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it-an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis- it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes.

Thought Experiment: Gardner's Random Bombardier

-Imagine a plane flying at supersonic speed over a continent. It carries a hydrogen bomb that is dropped by a mechanism triggered by the click of a Geiger counter. If quantum mechanics is correct, the timing of this click is purely random. Hence, absolute chance determines where the bomb falls, and thereby decides between many alternative, equally possible courses of history. -By detecting the presence of subatomic particles, Geiger counters effectively "couple" the microworld to the macroworld. Thus, any indeterminism that exists in the microworld can be reflected in the macroworld. In Gardner's scenario, the click of a Geiger counter triggers the dropping of a hydrogen bomb. Because the clicking of the Geiger counter is indeterminate, the dropping of the hydrogen bomb is also indeterminate. --Causal Indeterminism: the view that some events are not the consequence of past events plus the laws of nature. The future is NOT fixed, the future can unfold in a number of different ways, all of which are consistent with what has gone before.

Explain why intentionality creates a problem for functionalism.

-Intentionality: when we think, we think about something. --The intentionality of mental states must not be confused with the intentionality of persons. -We often speak of persons doing things intentionally, or on purpose. To say that a mental state has intentionality, however, is not to say that it does anything on purpose. Rather, it is to say that it represents or refers to something. Functionalism: what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. Problem for functionalism: -The essential feature of those mental states is their intentionality- they are directed on or about something. BUT, functionalism can't account for intentionality because one can know how to manipulate symbols without knowing what they mean, as Searle's Chinese room thought experiment demonstrates.

Intentionality

-Intentionality: when we think, we think about something. For example, the hope that the Yankees will win the pennant is about the Yankees, the pennant, and the proposition that the Yankees will win the pennant. The "aboutness" of thought is known as Intentionality. -the word "Intentionality" comes from the latin verb "intendo", which means, "to point or aim at something." So something that possesses intentionality points or aims at something. The things it points or aims at are known as its intended objects. -The intentionality of mental states must not be confused with the intentionality of persons. -We often speak of persons doing things intentionally, or on purpose. To say that a mental state has intentionality, however, is not to say that it does anything on purpose. Rather, it is to say that it represents or refers to something.

Thought Experiment: Putnam's Inverted Spectrum- refutes functionalism

-Inverted spectrum problem: seems possible for something to be functionally equivalent to us and have the wrong kind of conscious experience. --the problem for accounting for the fact that people's color experiences could be very different even though they are functionally equivalent. -the problem that this proposes for functionalism is: the two people with inverted spectra or the one person before and after the inversion are in the same functional state. They would both produce the same output from the same input. For example, if you asked them, 'What color are stop signs?", they would both say "Red". If you asked them, "are ripe tomatoes the same color as stop signs?", they would both say yes. But, even though they are in the same functional state, they are not in the same mental state, for the qualitative content of their visual experiences is vastly different- one experiences redness when looking at red objects, whereas the other experiences blueness. So there must be more to being in a mental state than being in a functional state. -imagine your spectrum becomes inverted at a particular time in your life and you remember what it is like before that. There is no epistemological problem about "verification". You wake up one morning and the sky looks red, and your red sweater appears to have turned blue, and all the faces are an awful color, as on a color negative. Now perhaps you could learn to change your way of talking, and to call things that look red to you "blue", and perhaps you could get good enough so that if someone asked you what color someone's sweater was you would give the "normal" answer. But at night, let us imagine you would moan, "Oh, I wish the colors looked the way they did when I was a child. The colors just don't look the way they used to, Putnam's Argument: If Functionalism were true, it would be impossible for people with the same functional organization to be in different mental states. But, as Putnam's Inverted Spectrum shows, it's not impossible for people with the same functionalism organization to be in different mental states. So Functionalism is false; having a certain functional organization is not a sufficient condition for being in a certain mental state.

Explain the inverted spectrum problem.

-Inverted spectrum problem: seems possible for something to be functionally equivalent to us and have the wrong kind of conscious experience. --the problem for accounting for the fact that people's color experiences could be very different even though they are functionally equivalent. -as Putnam's Inverted Spectrum shows, it's not impossible for people with the same functionalism organization to be in different mental states. So Functionalism is false; having a certain functional organization is not a sufficient condition for being in a certain mental state.

2 aspects of mental states that any good theory should account for

-Qualia: subjective feeling of being in a mental state -Intentionality: about-ness, mental states are about things. To understand a sentence is to know what it is about. -functionalists do intentionality well: they claim that if we get the right program, we'll know "about-ness"

Sensations have.... emotions have... beliefs have...

-Sensations- have Qualia -Emotions-have Qulia -Beliefs- have intentionality

Thought Experiment: Jacquette's Intentionality Test

-This experiment suggests that what our thoughts are about is not determined by any feature of them other than their intentionality. We don't think about objects by means of anything else. We simply think about them. That's what makes intentionality a primitive property.

Thought Experiment: Rorty's Demons

-a certain primitive tribe holds view that illnesses are caused by demons- a different demon for each sort of illness. If no one has every been in pain, however, it follows that no one has ever done anything because he or she is in pain. If there are no mental states, there are no mental causes. So, like Epiphenomenalism, elimiative materialsm denies that mental states affect behavior. But unlike epiphenomenalism, eliminative materialism completely denies that mental states exist.

Thought Experiment: Searl's Chinese Room and Turing's argument

-consider a language you don't understand. In my case, you don't understand chinese. To me, chinese writing looks like squiggles. Now suppose i am placed in a room containing baskets full of chinese symbols. Suppose also that I am given a rule book in English for matching chinese symbols with other chinese symbols. The rules identify the symbols entirely by their shapes and do not require that I understand any of them. The rules might say things like, "take a squiggle sign from basket number one and put it next to squoggle sign from basket number two". Imagine if people outside of the room who understand Chinese hand in small bunches of symbols and that in response I manipulate the symbols. Now, the rule book is a "computer program". The people who wrote it are "programmers", and I am the "computer". The baskets full of symbols are the "data base," the small bunches that are handed in to me are "questions" and the bunches I then hand out are "answers". -inside the room, Searle is doing what a computer does when it processes information; that is, he is manipulating formal symbols in accordance with a set of rules. -To those outside of the room, it appears that he understands what the symbols mean, for the string of symbols he produces in response to the string of symbols he receives mariis like the one a native chinese speaker would produce. But he doesn't understand what the symbols mean. So, Searle concludes, passing the Turing Test is not a sure sign of intelligence. Turing's Argument 1. If a computer could understand a language solely in virtue of running a program, then the man in the room would understand Chinese (because he's doing the same thing that a computer does-namely, manipulating symbols in accordance with a set of rules). 2. But the man in the room doesn't understand chinese 3. So computers can't understand a language solely in virtue of running a program.

Searle's chinese room: refutes the Turing Test and Strong AI, and Functionalism

-funcitoning like an actual chinese speaker but not actually know chinese at all. It is simulating a person who speaks chinese but doesn't actually know how to speak or understand chinese. So, Searle concludes, passing the Turing Test is not a sure sign of intelligence. Strong AI is false: computer produces meaning-less symbols and syntax, while minds doesn't just produce symbols, it has meaning (intentionality) to the symbols and syntax. JUST running the right program is not sufficient (refuting functionalism)

Problems of Functionalism

-inverted spectrum problem:seems possible for something to be functionally equivalent to us and have the wrong kind of conscious experience. -absent qualia problem: if functionalism is true, then it should be impossible for something to be in a functional state and have no consciousness -philosophical zombie: something that is behaviorally indistinguishable from us but has no conscious mental state. -Ned Block Chinese Nation: Block's Argument: If Functionalism were true, then anything that had the right sort of functional organization would have a mind But as Block's Chinese nation shows, it is not the case that anything that had the right sort of functional organization would have a mind. So Functionalism is false; having the right sort of functional organization is not a sufficient condition for having a mind.

Eliminative Materialism

-materialism: all there is is matter in motion, if you know all the physical facts about something, you know all there is to know (connected to mary's room). -this theory (eliminative materialism) explains why Reductive Theories which try to explain consciousness in terms of something else, try to reduce consciousness to something else, like functionalism tries to reduce consciousness to functional states-(dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, and functionalism) fail. They fail because there is no such thing as a mind, there are no mental states, we can't explain mental states because they DO NOT exist.

Chalmers the Hard and Easy Problem of consciousness

-the Hard Problem of consciousness: "Why is the processing in the brain accompanied by consciousness?" -the Easy Problem: "How does the brain perform various functions?" -people could have gone about their life not accompanied by consciousness (chalmers)

The Turing Test Thought Experiment: The Imitation Game

-the new form of the problem (can machines think?) can be described in terms of a game which we call the "imitation game." 3 people play. (a)- a man, (b)- a woman, ©- who may be of either sex. - Turing contends that if a machine could play this game as well as a normal man-that is, if it could convince an interrogator that it was a man as often as a normal man could-then the machine would be intelligent. For Turing, there is nothing more to being intelligent than being able to use language as we do.

Mary's room thought experiment

-version of Nagel's Bat (to refute the identity theory- that mental states are just brain states). Law of Identicals (A=B, so A and B are identitcal, whatever is true of A is true of B). Suppose you got somebody that knows everything about Bat's brain, woudl that mean that he would know what it means and feels like to have a bat's sonar. Nagal says no, meaning you can't identify mind with brain. We can know everything there is to know about the bat's brain, without knowing what it is like to be a bat or what bat consciousness is like. --Mary's room: Mary knows everything there is to know about human vision, she's only experienced black and white and so she doesn't know what the conscious experience of seeing colors are like (example that goes against Physicalism). If Mary was watching tv and there was an error, and the apple on her screen turns to color, so she experiences seeing color. Is she learning anything new? -The knowledge argument: if she had knowledge that an apple is red, then if she saw an apple, she would know it was red. But if she didn't know that before, then she wouldn't know what color it was. -Inverted Spectrum Problem: if it is possible for two people to be functionally identical, and yet have different conscious experiences, then we can't identify mental states with functional states. Functionally they are the same, but consciously (their experiences) are different.

Chamer's two "crazy" ideas

1. Consciousness is fundamental 2. Consciousness might be universal, every system might have some degree of consciousness (Panpsychism)-integrate consciousness into the physical world

-The Consequence Argument:

1. Every event (including our actions because our actions are events) is the consequence of past events + laws of nature. Every event is the consequence of past laws, 2. but we can't change events and we can't change laws of nature or the past. 3. If that is true, then that means we don't have free will.

Consequence Argument:

1. If Causal Determinism is true, every event is the consequence of past events + laws of nature. 2. The problem is, we can't change the past (because thats logically impossible) and we can't change the laws of nature (because thats physically impossible). 3. So, if we can't change the past or laws of nature, we don't have any control over our lives. 4. So, if Causal Determinism is true, we have no free will. Problem is, if we have no free will and no control over our lives, then we can't be held responsible for things that we do. -Our social and law systems are based on the fact that we do have control of our lives, that we do have free will, so we can be held responsible for things that we do. If we weren't held responsible, the social and law systems will have to change.

If Causal Determinism is true argument...

1. If Causal Determinism is true, then every event is the consequence of past events plus the laws of nature 2. We are powerless to change past events, laws of nature, or their consequences, which include our actions 3. If we are powerless to change our actions-if we can't do otherwise-then we can't act freely 4. Therefore, if Causal Determinism is true, we can't act freely.

The Hard Determinist Argument for believing that Causal Determinism rules our moral responsibility

1. If Causal Determinism is true, we can't act freely 2. If we can't act freely, we can't be held responsible for our actions 3. Therefore, if Causal Determinism is true, we can't be held responsible for our actions

-Necessary Condition for Free Will:

1. Our actions are undetermined at the moment of choice, and when you are at that moment of making a choice, there should be more than one path to take 2. The choice should be determined by you.

-Reasons for believing that every event is the consequence of past events plus the laws of nature

1. Science shows that Causal Determinism is true, and 2. Reflective common sense shows that Causal Determinism is true.

according to Psychology, there are 2 determinants of human behavior

1. Why do we do the things that we do (the experiences we have growing up determines how we act when we grow up-Nurture), and 2. Nature (genetics determine how we act). These 2 agree that we are programmed but don't agree on which one is more prevalant.

According to traditional compatibilism, why isn't Locke's trapped conversationalist (depicted in his thought experiment) performing a free action by staying in the room?

A person is trapped in a room with a person he wants to talk to. He wants to stay in the room but doesn't have the choice to leave. Therefore staying is a voluntary action but not a free one according to traditional compatibilism.

Locke's Trapped Conversationalist

A person is trapped in a room with a person he wants to talk to. He wants to stay in the room but doesn't have the choice to leave. Therefore staying is a voluntary action but not a free one according to traditional compatibilism.

What does Searle's thought experiment about Chevrolet station wagons show?

A thought experiment that ridicules eliminative materialism, by showing that if we accept the claim that there are no mental states, we must also accept the claim that there are no Chevrolet station wagons.

Traditional Compatibilism.

A type of soft determinism that says actions are free if they are caused by the will of the person without being forced.

What does it mean to say that intentionality is a primitive property?

According to Thought Experiment: Jacquette's Intentionality Test, This experiment suggests that what our thoughts are about is not determined by any feature of them other than their intentionality. We don't think about objects by means of anything else. We simply think about them. That's what makes intentionality a primitive property.

Explain the difference between actions and reflexes.

Actions, as opposed to reflexes, are intentional. Taylor's arm movements are NOT actions because he did NOT intend them to happen. But if they are not actions, they are not free actions either. So Indeterminism does NOT provide a satisfactory account of free will.

Explain the significance of the fact that brain states are knowable by empirical investigation but mental states are not

Although brain states are knowable by empirical investigation, mental states are not. So, using the "Identical Theory", brain states and mental states therefore cannot be identical to each other.

Thought Experiment: Putnam's Conscious Computer

Assume that we are, as wholes, just material systems obeying physical laws. Then, our mental states cannot be identical with any physical or chemical states. It is clear that whatever program of the brain may be, it must be physically possible, though not necessarily feasible, to produce something with that same program but different physical and chemical constitution. Then, to identify the state in question with its physical and chemical realization would be absurd. Lewis and Putnam's arguments 1. If the Identity Theory were true, then it would be impossible for anything without a brain to have a mind 2. But, as Lewis pained Martian and Putnam's conscious computer showed, things without brains can have minds 3. So, the Identity Theory is not true, having a brain is not a necessary condition for having a mind.

Thought Experiment: Nagel's Bat

Assume we all believe bats have experience. Most bats perceive the external world primarily through sonar, detecting reflections, but bat sonar, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine. The mind-body problem connection to Nagel's bat: if the facts of experience (what it is like for the experiencing organism) are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism. Nagel's argument: 1. If mental states are identical to brain states, then it is possible to know everything about the mind by knowing everything there is to know about the brain. 2. But, as the example of the bat shows, its not possible to know everything about the mind by knowing everything about the brain 3. Therefore, mental states are NOT brain states. According to Nagel, identity theory leaves out (which any adequate theory of mind should account for), is the subjective character of conscious experience. What something feels like can only be known from the "inside" (first-person point of view). The physical properties can be known from the "outside" (third person point of view). Because a complete knowledge of physical properties does not yield a knowledge of mental properties, the mind cannot be identified with the brain. -Nagel's bat experiment also suggests that we are not the only creatures that are conscious

Thought Experiment: Block's Conversational Jukebox

Block's conversational jukebox, like Searle's Chinese Room, shows that theres more to being intelligent than just producing a certain output relative to a given input. How that output is produced is also important. If it's produced in a way that doesn't require any intelligence, then even if it can pass the Turing test, it isn't intelligent.

-The Consequence Argument: Hard Determinist believes that...

Causal Determinism is incompatible with free will. In their view, if Causal Determinism is true, it is impossible for us to have free will. Since they accept the principle of Causal Determinism, they maintain that we have no free will.

-the argument for Hard Determinism rests on the assumption that...

Causal Determinism is true

Thought Experiment: Chalmer's Zombies

Consider the logical possibility of a zombie. They are physiologically and behaviorily identical to us. They are made out of the same stuff we are made out of, and they act the same way we do. The only difference is that they have no conscious experience. There is nothing that it is like to be a zombie becuase they have no sensations or emotions. -This shows that, consciousness is non-physical. He is trying to show that mental states are not reducible to or explainable in terms of physical properties.

Indeterminism: Theory of Free Will

Free actions (weren't caused by what went on before) are uncaused -if it wasn't caused by you, then you cannot be held responsible -if free actions are uncaused, they weren't caused by us, so we cannot be held responsible Thought Experiment: Taylor's Unpredictable Arm

Why does Searle's view of mental and physical properties seem to be a form of epiphenomenalism?

Epiphenomenalism: believe the mind is to the body as smoke is to fire (smoke is just bi-product of fire). They don't deny mental states, but they say that mental states don't have an effect on behavior. What goes on in the body can cause us to have certain mental states (kick in the shin, pain), but it doesn't go the other way around (what goes on in the mind doesn't occur in the body), it is just one direction. Searle's view is, (Searle's Chinese Room), shows that theres more to being intelligent than just producing a certain output relative to a given input. Mental states cannot be reducible and explained solely by physical states. Epiphenomenalism states that mental states and behavior are related, that one is a bi-product of the other, that what goes on in the body can cause us to have a certain mental state (but not the other way around).

Artificial Intelligence: Functionalism

Functionalism is the theory of mind that underlies the field of Artificial Intelligence. The goal of AI research is to create a computer that can think for itself. Such a computer could have a mind of its own. -According to Functionalism, to have a mind is to have the ability to perform certain functions. -"Strong AI": there's nothing more to having a mind than running the right kind of program. In this view, the mind is to the brain as the software of a computer is to its hardware. In other words, your mind is the program that's running on your brain.

Explain why the existence of uncaused events on the subatomic level is a problem for hard determinism.

Hard Determinism: those who believe we have no free will-that there are no free actions. -the existence of uncaused events shows that there are random and uncaused events, but hard determinism states that there isn't any uncaused events.

Explain how Nagel's bat thought experiment attempts to undermine identity theory.

Identity Theory is the theory that mental states are brain states. Nagal bat: you can't identify mind with brain. We can know everything there is to know about the bat's brain, without knowing what it is like to be a bat or what bat consciousness is like.

Does Taylor's thought experiment about drug addiction demonstrate that traditional compatibilism is an inadequate theory of free action? Why or why not?

If a person becomes a victim of drugs without their knowledge or consent, they become a victim of a desire and act on it. They freely choose to do drugs but are hardly free because the drugs inflict the desire upon them. -does this demonstrate that traditional compatibilism is an inadequate theory of free action? Traditional Compatiblism is a type of soft determinism that says actions are free if they are caused by the will of the person without being forced. Sort of. It supports it because the person freely chooses to do drugs, but it doesn't support it because they become victims of a desire and are hardly free because the drugs inflict the desire.

Thought Experiment: Block's Chinese Nation (shows that functional state is not sufficient for being in a mental state)

In this thought experiment, the people in China are functioning like neurons in a brain. They are sending and receiving signals to and from one another. If Functionalism were true, then once the billion people in China started running the program, there would be a billion people and one people in China; the billion people with walkie-talkies and the "person" whose program they are running. If the project were carried out properly, it should even be possible to talk to that "person". Block's point, however, is that such a "person" could not possibly have any conscious experience and thus could not be considered to have a mind. So there must be more to having a mind than having the right sort of functional organization. Block's Argument: 1. If Functionalism were true, then anything that had the right sort of functional organization would have a mind 2. But as Block's Chinese nation shows, it is not the case that anything that had the right sort of functional organization would have a mind. 3. So Functionalism is false; having the right sort of functional organization is not a sufficient condition for having a mind. -Functionalism claims that a mind can be made out of anything, as long as something has the right sort of functional organization,- as long as produces the right sort of output given the input it receives it can be considered to have a mind.

idea that according to Tradtional Materialism, the universe is like a giant billard ball game.

Just as the path of every billard ball is determined by the forces acting on it, so is the path of every elementary particle. Someone who knew all the laws of physics, all the properties of all the physical objects of the universe, and all of the forces acting on them would be able to predict the entire future of the universe, including everything we will ever do. But if it's possible to predict all of our actions, then what we do is not up to us. If, as Traditional Materialism suggests, all of our actions are determined by forces beyond our control, we have no free will. --According to Traditional Materialism,then, the universe is a great, intricate mechanism ticking and turning ceaselessly in fixed ways. Every brain state follows necessarily from preceding brain states so that every thought and action is entirely necessitated, as the motions of any mechanisms known as human beings.

Thought Experiment: Lewis Pained Madman- refutes functionalism

Lewis's madman is in pain, but his pain has a very different function that ours. Instead of distracting him and making him groan and writhe, it turns his mind to math and makes him ross his legs and snap his fingers. Such a person is odd, but not inconceivable. The poor fellow may simply be wired wrong. If there can be such a person, however, Functionalism is mistaken because being in a mental system doesn't depend on being in a particular functional state. The causes and effects of the madman's pain are totally different from ours. Yet he may nevertheless experience pain in the same way we do. Lewis's argument (shows that functional state is not necessary for being in a mental state): 1. If Functionalism is true, it would be impossible for someone to be in pain and function differently than we do when we are in pain. 2. But, as Lewis's pained madman shows, it is not impossible for someone to be in pain and function differently than we do. 3. So Functionalism is false; being in a certain functional state is not a necessary condition for being in a mental state. -To be in pain, you do not have to be in any particular functional state. What makes something a pain is what it feels like, not what it makes you do. Because Functionalism suggests otherwise, it is mistaken. HAVING A BRAIN IS NOT NECESSARY FOR HAVING A MIND!

What is the point of Jackson's thought experiment about the color-challenged scientist?

Lives in a black and white room and knows everything here is to know about color vision then is let out of room for the first time and experiences red, she learns something new. She new had all the physical information, yet she could still learn something new, therefore physicalism is fake.

Is it possible to provide a complete account of the world in purely physical terms? Why or why not?

No, because according to Jackson's thought experiment about color, she knew all the physical information about the colors but she could still learn something new through experience, so Physicalism is fake.

-KEY DIFFERENCE between Neo and Agents

Neo could change the law of the Matrix, so he does have free will, but the Agents cannot change the law of the Matrix.

What does Searle's Chinese room thought experiment show?

Searle concludes, passing the Turing Test is not a sure sign of intelligence. -the computers don't understand the meaning of the symbols.

Explain the concept of downward causation and why it implies that human behavior cannot be explained in purely materialist terms.

The concept is that, mental events acting to cause physical events. - a causal relationship from higher levels of a system to lower-level parts of that system Implies human behavior cannot be explained in purely materialist terms: mental states act to cause physical (material) events.

Explain the absent qualia objection.

The objection to functionalism based on the belief that functional states could have all the functional properties of a mental state without having any of its qualitative content...because it purports to show that it's possible for something to be functionally equivalent to a human being and yet have no conscious experience.

Chalmer's zombies thought experiment

The philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception that imagines a being that, if it could conceivably exist, logically disproves the idea that physical substance is all that is required to explain consciousness.

Modern Physics, however, supports Causal Indeterminism:

The view that some events are NOT the consequence of past events plus the laws of nature. So, the future does NOT appear to be determined.

William James argues that free will...

argues that free will is possible only if human choices are not part of some causal chain but are the results of chance. Because of the element of chance, there exist multiple possibilities for humans, as opposed to the one and only locked-in future of determinism. This view is attractive, but is seriously flawed-for if an action is the result of uncaused chance events, it is random. And a random action cannot be a free action because it is not produced by an act of will

-Epiphenomentalism (form of Dualism)

believe the mind is to the body as smoke is to fire (smoke is just bi-product of fire). They don't deny mental states, but they say that mental states don't have an effect on behavior. What goes on in the body can cause us have certain mental states (kick in the shin, pain), but it doesn't go the other way around (what goes on in the mind doesn't occur in the body), it is just one direction.

Emergentism

claims that mental properties are emergent properties. As emergent property is one that is had by a whole but not by any of its parts. Life, for example, is an emergent property. The basic constituents of a living organism-the atoms and molecules out of which are made- are not alive. But the organism itself is alive because its parts interact with one another in the right sorts of ways. -an Emergent Property, then, is one that emerges or comes into being when things that lack that property become related in the appropriate ways. -According to Emergentists, consciousness is an emergent property. The individual neurons that make up or brains are not conscious, but once they become related to one another in the right sort of ways, consciousness emerges.

-Watson:

clearly thought that how we behaved as adults was determined by how we were brought up as children-that is, by how we were nurtured. Our genetic makeup might be was irrelevant.

Folk Psychology

commonsense theory of mind that explains people's behavior in terms of beliefs and desires

Behaviorism

defined mental states in terms of their causal role, but the only inputs it recognized were physical stimuli, and the only outputs it recognized were bodily movements.

Integrated Information Thoery: Giulio Tononi

each consciousness has a mathematical formula, allows you to analyze any structure of a system, there is a mathematical formula for consciousness -suggests Panpsychism (everything has some sort of mentality to it, everything is conscious to some degree based on its' physical structure) might be true - it is possible to have a qualia scope: shows what level consciousness and what kind of consciousness