Chapter 15: Partly Developed States

Strategies of Partly developed countries to achieve security:

-The most assertive strategy in the pursuit of security is to build military power. Two partly developed countries, China and Russia, have chosen to build an extensive military capacity in order to achieve the goal of security; they are the second- and third-highest military spenders in the world (behind the United States) (SIPRI 2017). China has had the world's largest military for decades, and it has more than doubled its expenditure in the past 10 years. It is now transforming its military and has become the closest to the United States in terms of the sophistication of its military technology, weapons, and deployment. Its strategic approach is to utilize its military not only for defense of China but also to protect its interests throughout Asia and beyond. -After World War II, the Soviet Union placed exceptionally high importance on security goals and aimed for unchallengeable military power. The Soviet bloc built the world's most powerful military for conventional warfare, and the Soviet Union had near parity with NATO in air power and nuclear capabilities. From the late 1940s until the late 1980s, the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States dominated the bipolar international system and spawned a huge military buildup on each side. For Russia under Putin, the security response to the more multipolar global system has been to strengthen ties with the enemies of its enemies (e.g., Iran, Syria, Venezuela) and to rebuild and modernize its military. Between 2007 and 2016, Russia's military spending almost doubled. And, although diminished from its Cold War strength, Russia's military machine still includes a huge standing army and about the same number of nuclear warheads (7,000) as the United States (6,800) and China (215) combined (SIPRI 2017). In the United States, President Trump has recently indicated that he intends to withdraw from some key arms treaties, which will likely have the effect of increasing the levels of military expenditures in Russia, the United States, China, and other countries around the world. Among other partly developed countries, Brazil is the world's eleventh-highest military spender, and Turkey is fifteenth. However, most of the partly developed countries do not have notably large militaries or defense expenditures. While Brazil primarily utilizes its military for internal stability, Turkey also deploys its military to protect its borders and to respond to the Kurds and the turbulence associated with neighbors such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The shifting nature and instability of the global political system might soon prompt other countries to build up their defense capacity, as Slovenia and Slovakia have already indicated that they will do. In contrast, some partly developed countries are not expanding their military to achieve security. South Africa, for example, has recently begun slightly decreasing its military budget. Mexico has also decreased its defense expenditures in recent years. Many of the partly developed countries rely primarily on multilateral mutual defense treaties such as NATO in Europe and the Rio Pact in Central and South America (although Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela have withdrawn from this pact).

Since the early 1990s, many of the partly developed countries have attempted to achieve prosperity by transitioning to a __________ political economy, which entails __________. (a) market; state ownership (b) market; privatization (c) command; state ownership (d) planned; restructuring

(b) market; privatization

Recent years have witnessed the rise of authoritarian populists in countries such as __________. (a) Germany and Portugal (b) Mexico and the United States (c) Brazil and Hungary (d) Germany and the United States

(c) Brazil and Hungary

Which country has the world's largest economy in terms of power purchasing parity (PPP)? (a) the United States (b) India (c) China (d) Germany

(c) China

In 2018, the Economist Intelligence Unit labeled Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and South Africa as __________. (a) authoritarian states (b) failed states (c) flawed democracies (d) command economies

(c) flawed democracies

Argentina is an outlier country that is characterized by a __________ level of social development and a __________ level of economic development. (a) medium; high (b) high; high (c) high; medium (d)high; low

(c) high; medium

For the most part, the partly developed countries of Central and Eastern Europe remained Communist until the __________. (a) early 2010s (b) late 2000s (c) late 1980s (d) mid-1970s

(c) late 1980s

The partly developed countries tend to have GDPs per capita (PPP) between __________. (a) $35,000 and $40,000 (b) $7,000 and $12,000 (c) $5,000 and $10,000 (d) $12,000 and $35,000

(d) $12,000 and $35,000

Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has strengthened ties with the enemies of its enemies, which includes countries such as __________. (a) Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines (B) Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic (c) India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (d) Iran, Syria, and Venezuela

(d) Iran, Syria, and Venezuela

While there has been some reduction in nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, which state has the largest number of nuclear warheads? (a) the United States (b) China (C) North Korea (d) Russia

(d) Russia

The delivery of improvements in education, health, and quality of life to most citizens is contingent on __________. (a) the extent of democracy (b) the extent of economic development (c) the extent of social development (d) a political system's capabilities

(d) a political system's capabilities

Some partly developed countries __________ and rely on multilateral defense treaties such as NATO or the Rio Pact. (a) are expanding their militaries to combat internal threats (b) are expanding their militaries (c) develop weapons of mass destruction (d) are not expanding their militaries

(d) are not expanding their militaries

A country that is urbanized and has quality education and healthcare systems, developed infrastructure, and high life expectancy, but low GDP per capita, would measure __________ on social development and __________ on economic development. (a) low; high (b) poorly; well (c) medium; high (d) high; low

(d) high; low

Partly developed countries have taken two distinct paths in their pursuit of stability: higher levels of democratic freedoms or __________. (a) social democracy (b) planned economies (c) command economies (d) more authoritarian restrictions

(d) more authoritarian restrictions

Challenges to achieve political stability of partly developed countries:

Currently, many of the partly developed countries face a number of issues that challenge their political stability. In general, these challenges are similar to those in countries in the Global North and Global South. Many have multiple identity groups that may disagree and even come into conflict over the distribution of power and the values most important to each group. Most partly developed countries are concerned about their sovereignty and their borders, as they are unable to prevent in-migration of groups that do not share their nation-based identity. As the previous section indicated, many have economies that are generating some growth but do not produce sufficient resources to satisfy all their population with respect to public services, jobs, and material well-being. All are concerned with maintaining public order in the face of various forms of social disorder. While the challenges to stability are not unique, there are several notable features of the contexts and responses in partly developed countries. For some partly developed countries, the approach to stability has been directly associated with repressive rule. Countries such as Albania, China, and Cuba are examples of this absence of any recent experience with democracy. In such regimes, the challenge is to sustain the repressive political order in the face of emerging dissatisfaction among groups and individuals who desire greater freedom. Can the regime allow some liberalization of the rules regarding freedom of expression, criticism of the government, and access to global social media without opening the floodgates of protest and instability? Moreover, modest opening of the economic system to private enterprise in many of these countries fosters a sense of freedom that will be difficult to control. For example, as the Chinese population is more integrated into the global economy and the global information network, interest in greater personal and political freedom increases. And the growing economic inequality in China is producing increased dissatisfaction among those left behind; fully 73 percent of Chinese believe that corruption among the political and economic elites is widespread and is getting worse (Transparency International 2017). While economic growth might seem a valuable corollary to promoting democracy, an examination of the data in Figure 15.2 and Table 15.2 makes clear that there is no necessary relationship between these two factors among the partly developed countries. The Debate in 15 explores the potential for democratization in China, among the lowest on the democracy indices. Some of the partly developed countries with a history of nondemocratic regimes emerged from the Communist bloc, where several generations were socialized to accept minimal political freedom in exchange for stability. This has also been the approach to order maintenance in countries with a tradition of "strong man" leadership, such as partly developed countries in Latin America and East Asia. Now, as more democratic norms of governance are introduced, the risks of instability could increase. If the economy in one of these new democracies struggles or there is disorder in the society, democratic values might be called into question. This is a major challenge if the political system lacks strong political institutionalization. The population might withdraw support for the political leadership and look for leaders and parties that promise stern measures to improve conditions. This situation seems to be evident in countries such as Turkey, where President Erdogan has steadily reduced democratic freedoms and shifted away from the secular principles that had existed since Atatürk (recall the Focus in 10). It has also occurred in Venezuela, as conflicts between groups on the right and left have compounded an economy in free fall and led to widespread rioting and harsh repression by the leftist political leadership. It is also clear in the steady return to more heavy-handed authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin in Russia after a brief post-Soviet experiment in democracy. In many of the flawed democracies, frustration with democracy can increase rapidly. For those who believed that the transition to democratic processes would generate both stability and prosperity, the results of their "freedom" have often been disappointing. And blame for these results is focused on those controlling the government at that moment. As Chapter 10 described, when there are low levels of political institutionalization, because the people lack confidence in the value and capabilities of the political structures and the political actors, the probability of political instability and political decay rise. This can lead to the rise of authoritarian populists such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. There can be sudden and dramatic shifts in the political parties that control government, as recently occurred in Mexico and Malaysia. Top leaders cannot only be voted out of power but also convicted of corruption by their rivals, as in Brazil, where both former Presidents Lula and Rousseff have been convicted (see the Focus in 15), and Malaysia, where the president was voted out in 2018 while his family was embroiled in a billion-dollar corruption scandal. The Peruvian president also resigned abruptly in 2018 due to allegations of corruption. For all these reasons, it is not uncommon for a substantial proportion of the population in flawed democracies to lack confidence in their national government; for example, in Poland, this is the case for 80 percent of the people. In Mexico, 72 percent have no confidence in the central order maintainer, the police (World Values Survey 2018). While these dynamics put such countries at risk for political turbulence and civil disorder, the widespread belief in the virtues of democracy and the implementation of its various components of political freedoms and civil rights does offer a positive possibility. There are partly developed countries that have relatively high scores on the two democracy indices in Table 15.2, including Botswana, Panama, and Latvia. These are encouraging examples of countries that have established and sustained strong democracy and have delivered stability and social order to their population.

Goals of BRICs countries: Security

Each BRICS country faces different security challenges. All rank very low on the Global Peace Index (recall Compare in 12). Only Brazil enjoys few security risks from the other countries in its region. In South Africa, there is a persistent risk that regional sectarian violence across sub-Saharan Africa will lead to an influx of refugees that South Africa cannot manage. Racial, ethnic, and tribal identities within South Africa and across its borders add to the potential risks. India, China, and Russia are all nuclear powers. India has ongoing conflict with another nuclear power, Pakistan, is in a volatile region drenched with violence, and could find itself fighting again with current BRICS buddy China. China is a major military power and has expansionist aspirations that could place it in conflict with many countries on its borders, as well as with the United States. And Russia has rebuilt its massive military machine and engages in an aggressive foreign policy because it perceives hostile countries along many of its lengthy borders and especially with the United States. Watch Mandela's Homeland: A Microcosm of South Africa One of the BRICS countries, South Africa, is dominated by the legacy of its first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela. Imprisoned as a political prisoner for twenty seven years, Mandela helped transition the country out of race-based authoritarianism to a pluralistic democracy. Source: Courtesy of boclips/AFPTV/Getty Images The futures of the BRICS countries might be intertwined. The BRICS countries might constitute an emerging power center that rivals the economic and military might of the United States and the EU in a way that could alter political and economic relationships around the world. However, if any of the BRICS states is significantly weakened because of economic mismanagement or political instability, the coalition might not survive. Similarly, if the BRICS countries cannot maintain their alliance in the face of a major global crisis, if their incentives to cooperate are swamped by their individual national interests, or if the BRICS New Development Bank fails, the notion of their shared future could dissipate. Yet even if the grouping does not survive, the BRICS countries will be a global force to reckon with for decades to come. Some of the particular challenges facing Brazil are explored in the Focus in 15.

Brazil

Focus in 15 Order and Progress in Brazil: Sometimes The motto on the Brazilian flag is "Order and Progress." The vision of order and progress has guided much of Brazilian policy since the founding of the republic in 1889, but recent history has cast doubt on its ability to sustain this vision. Brazil is the fifth-largest country (in area) in the world, it is sixth largest in population (207 million), and it has vast natural resources. In many ways, Brazil reflects the promise of development in the twenty-first century—but it also epitomizes the troubles associated with that quest. Progress From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the state took the lead in guiding Brazil's industrialization, emphasizing import substitution and promoting exports. The involvement of international capital and foreign corporations was encouraged. The results were impressive. Brazil's economic development was praised worldwide as a "miracle," with yearly growth averaging 10 percent. Brazil's economy is now larger than that of all the rest of South America and is the eighth largest in the world. It is a BRICS country due to its increasing impact on the global economy. It is a leader among the developing countries in the production of many goods, including agricultural exports such as coffee, sugar, and cocoa; minerals such as tin, gold, iron ore, and bauxite; and industrial goods such as textiles, cement, automobiles, weapons, and machinery. Since 1970, life expectancy has increased 14 years (to age 74), infant mortality has dropped to one-third its former level, and adult literacy has risen to 93 percent. Brazil successfully hosted the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. Order Politically, Brazil is a constitutional democracy. The government is a federal republic, with an elected president who has dominant power over the bicameral National Congress. It has a multiparty system, universal and compulsory voting, an independent judiciary, and a partly free press. Its Freedom House rating is "free," and its citizens enjoy relatively high levels of political rights and civil liberties. There have been two decades of competitive and fair elections, including the smooth transition to the presidency of Dilma Rousseff in 2011 after 79 percent voter turnout. Even when Rousseff was impeached in 2016, the country peacefully transitioned power to her vice president, Michel Temer. The large state bureaucracy has maintained social and political order, with minimal class-based conflict, and Brazil is often cited as one of the world's most successful multiracial societies. A strong military ensures Brazil's security and sovereignty. Progress? The economic miracle in the 1970s was built on a weak base of economic statism. It was fueled by debt-led growth and deeply dependent on external support for finance capital, technology, and markets. Much of the growth was in the 600 state-owned companies, many of which were extremely inefficient and eventually went bankrupt. The emphasis on industrial development has had many negative consequences, including a decline of the agricultural sector that resulted in 2 million peasants becoming landless and the need to import basic foods. After years of miraculous growth, the economy came close to collapse in the early 1980s and again in the mid-1990s. The average annual growth rate is erratic, with the past five years being 0.5, -3.5, -3.5, 1.0, and 1.4 percent. During the 1990s, hyperinflation was also a problem (reaching a staggering high of 2864 percent in 1990). Brazil's foreign debt is the second largest outside of the Global North—more than $652 billion. Despite government aid programs, one in five Brazilians lives in poverty. Brazil has the world's sixteenth-most-unequal distribution of income, as wealth is heavily concentrated in the urban upper- and upper-middle classes. Order? Since 1930, the military has deposed six top political leaders. The military, supported by the middle class, seized power most recently in a 1964 coup against an elected government that was judged too sympathetic to the needs of the many rural and urban poor. The military government was repressive and ruthless, crushing leftist opposition, censoring the press, and compiling one of South America's worst records of human rights abuses. An elected president took office in 1985, after 21 years of authoritarian military rule, and a new constitution was implemented in 1988. Since that time, recurrent economic problems have provoked a huge rise in social disorder. Crime rates are extremely high; urban riots are frequent, especially in the huge favelas located in the cosmopolitan cities; and there is violence between peasants and landholders, who are disputing the government's announced but unfulfilled promises of land reform. President Collor de Mello was forced to resign due to a massive corruption scandal. When the next president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was elected in 1995, the citizens reflected their disgust with government: One in three Brazilians abstained from voting in the presidential election, and blank (protest) votes outnumbered votes cast for any senate candidate in 22 of the 26 states. In 2016, President Rousseff was impeached for engaging in pedaladas (a manipulation of government accounts). Two years later, her popular presidential predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was sent to prison for his involvement in a widespread bribery and kickback scheme involving top politicians. Not surprisingly, Brazil scores only 40 on a 100-point corruption scale (where 100 is very clean). In late 2018, a deeply divided electorate selected Jair Bolsonaro, an intemperate, far-right populist, as president. He has authorized extreme measures to deal with disorder. Meanwhile, policymaking is stymied by a fractious legislature composed of more than a dozen major political parties, many of whose members actually change parties between elections and are primarily loyal to their regional political bosses. The Brazilian flag's proud announcement of "Order and Progress" flaps ironically over the building where these politicians attempt to govern.

Which of the BRICS countries has been most aggressive in suppressing political freedoms? (a) China (b) South Africa (c) Russia (d) India

(a) China

In the coming years, if Global North countries struggle to continue having significantly greater per capita GDPs than other countries, it would suggest that globalization is __________. (a) a great equalizer (b) a limiter of prosperity (c) a promoter of inequality (d) the cause of war

(a) a great equalizer

If a country does not neatly fit into one of the three categories of development, we may deem it to be __________. (a) an outlier country (b) a fragile state (c) underdeveloped (d) a failed state

(a) an outlier country

Social capital and community are created through __________ as much as through government policy. (a) culture and tradition (b) economic activity (c) the action of elites (d) foreign direct investment

(a) culture and tradition

Brazil has no serious __________ on its continent. (a) military enemies (b) political allies (c) diplomatic engagement (d) trade partners

(a) military enemies

Imagine a country that is immense in size, has extensive resources, and is positioned in a geostrategic location of great importance. At some point in the future, it may very well be asked to join which group of countries? (a) NATO (b) BRICS (c) PCDCs (d0 NICs

(b) BRICS

High Social Development/Mid-level economic development: Argentina

Argentina has a long history of relatively high social development. Thus today, literacy and life expectancy are very high, while infant mortality and rates of disease (e.g., HIV, malaria, tuberculosis) are low. Fully 71 percent of the population has access to the Internet, and the country is largely urban (91 percent) and cosmopolitan. However, in recent decades, the Argentinian economy has suffered a dramatic up-and-down pattern. After a period of severe negative growth and unemployment, Argentina was in deep economic crisis in 2002. It defaulted on $130 billion in bonds and devalued its currency. By 2010, the economy was strong, driven by manufacturing and food exports, with about 9 percent growth. In recent years, the economy is struggling again, with very low or negative growth, capital flight, and high inflation (about 25 percent) (World Bank 2018b). Argentina remains one of the largest economies in Latin America, but due to the economic fluctuations, inflation, and high unemployment, its economic development has not matched its social development level.

Challenges for partly developed countries to achieve security

As mentioned earlier, Russia's military resurgence, its assertive foreign policy, its reconquest of part of Ukraine, and its nuclear arsenal are viewed with alarm by most of its geopolitical neighbors, many of whom are also partly developed countries (Aslund and Kuchins 2009; McFaul et al. 2010). Similarly, China's military assertiveness has many surrounding countries, including partly developed countries such as Thailand and Malaysia, extremely worried about China's aggressive policies and strong military. Thus, the biggest security challenge for many Asian and Eastern European partly developed countries is the threat of another partly developed country—one that is heavily militarized. In the Western Hemisphere, partly developed countries like Cuba and Mexico are similarly challenged, given the very large military budget of their regional neighbor, the United States. The security challenges are more immediate and severe in some of the other partly developed countries. For example, Libya, Thailand, and Venezuela are all facing extraordinary internal security challenges. In Libya, the post-Gaddafi period (2011-present) has been one of intermittent civil war, militia-based violence, and Islamic State terrorism. In Thailand, a 2014 military coup (the twelfth successful coup in Thailand since 1932) has left the country ruled by an oppressive military junta that has barred gatherings of more than four people and has sent people to army-run "attitude adjustment camps" for engaging in government opposition. And in Venezuela, violent protests and demonstrations have been commonplace since 2014, with the government's harsh crackdowns resulting in hundreds of deaths. For the protesters who survive, fear of persecution has led many to join the Venezuelan economic refugees in fleeing to neighboring Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and other Latin American countries. These cases of extreme internal insecurity are also examples of instability, as these countries' lack of order maintenance, political development, and democracy are closely tied to their insecurity. Further, these internal security problems create external security problems, as these countries lose influence and prestige, and they risk being seen as vulnerable by other countries.

Partly developed countries that are flawed democracies

Brazil, Hugnary, Poland, South Africa. The reasons for the flawed nature of their democracy vary, ranging from high levels of inequality, poverty, and violence (South Africa) to persistent corruption (Brazil) to increasingly authoritarian tactics used by government leaders (Hungary).

BRICs

Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

Chila Will Democratize... and Should

China's many years of strong economic growth, driven by economic privatization that started at the end of the 1970s, have shown that significant economic development can occur without a democratic form of government (see the Debate in 10). Indeed, for the past two decades, the Chinese economy has outperformed every country in the world that has a democratic form of government. Political stability and decisive policy leadership are critical components in sustaining high growth in a developing economy. Democratic political systems, especially in less developed and partly developed countries, are often unable to sustain these components because democracies are prone to policy disagreement, fragmented leadership, decision stalemate, and group conflict. China's model of government aligns with its political culture, history, values, and goals. Confucian culture values strong and stable structures, loyalty to authority, and faith in a virtuous ruler who is concerned with the people's needs. Similarly, Marxist-Leninist ideology prioritizes the needs of the common people and advocates centralized control that can effectively deliver on this promise. The Chinese people seem to agree: In one survey of Chinese citizens, 59 percent said that political stability is the most important condition in the country's progress and that democratization would only lead to chaos (Tang 2005). Fewer than one in four people disagreed with this belief. In another survey, more than 90 percent of the respondents said that an "orderly society" is preferable to a free society that could result in disruption (Chen 2004). In response to claims that China is undemocratic, Chinese leaders point to undemocratic practices by some of the more developed democracies, such as persistent poverty, racial discrimination, gun violence, and harmful interference in the affairs of other countries (Tang 2005). Because China's goal is to sustain its economic growth and to raise per capita GDP substantially, the country must prioritize an alternative view of human rights which focuses on improving its people's socioeconomic conditions. Until the country further develops its economy, it cannot (and should not) be distracted by calls to prioritize civil liberties and political rights.

China will not democratize... and does not need to argument

China's many years of strong economic growth, driven by economic privatization that started at the end of the 1970s, have shown that significant economic development can occur without a democratic form of government (see the Debate in 10). Indeed, for the past two decades, the Chinese economy has outperformed every country in the world that has a democratic form of government. Political stability and decisive policy leadership are critical components in sustaining high growth in a developing economy. Democratic political systems, especially in less developed and partly developed countries, are often unable to sustain these components because democracies are prone to policy disagreement, fragmented leadership, decision stalemate, and group conflict. China's model of government aligns with its political culture, history, values, and goals. Confucian culture values strong and stable structures, loyalty to authority, and faith in a virtuous ruler who is concerned with the people's needs. Similarly, Marxist-Leninist ideology prioritizes the needs of the common people and advocates centralized control that can effectively deliver on this promise. The Chinese people seem to agree: In one survey of Chinese citizens, 59 percent said that political stability is the most important condition in the country's progress and that democratization would only lead to chaos (Tang 2005). Fewer than one in four people disagreed with this belief. In another survey, more than 90 percent of the respondents said that an "orderly society" is preferable to a free society that could result in disruption (Chen 2004). In response to claims that China is undemocratic, Chinese leaders point to undemocratic practices by some of the more developed democracies, such as persistent poverty, racial discrimination, gun violence, and harmful interference in the affairs of other countries (Tang 2005). Because China's goal is to sustain its economic growth and to raise per capita GDP substantially, the country must prioritize an alternative view of human rights which focuses on improving its people's socioeconomic conditions. Until the country further develops its economy, it cannot (and should not) be distracted by calls to prioritize civil liberties and political rights.

Outlier Countries

In looking at Figure 10.1, you'll notice that some countries do not neatly fit into one of the three categories of development. In our taxonomy in Figure 10.1, we deem these countries "outliers." For instance, these countries might have a medium level of economic development and a high level of social development (e.g., Argentina, Costa Rica) or a low level of social development and a high level of economic development (e.g., Algeria, Indonesia) or mid-level social development and a low level of economic development (e.g., Ukraine, Georgia). Any combination that mixes different levels on the two dimensions of development of the taxonomy results in our classification of a country in this outlier category. Some outlier countries will soon transition into one of the three categories. For instance, some are rising toward most developed country status (e.g., Estonia). Some have dropped toward less developed country status (e.g., Georgia) and others are advancing toward partly developed status (e.g., Algeria). In this section, we briefly describe the real-world dynamics in four outlier countries.

Strategies for Partly Developed Coutnries to Achieve Stability

In the cases where the partly developed countries have chosen democracy, elections are fair, open, and very competitive; multiple parties hold seats in the legislature; and there are smooth leadership turnovers. The citizens' political rights and civil liberties are extensive. There is a vigorous political discourse and a press that is free to report honestly and impartially on the government and political elites. There is a participatory political culture that encourages an engaged civil society. Finally, there are alternative sources of information that provide a variety of perspectives on political events and issues. As Table 15.2 indicates, many of the partly developed countries have at least some of these characteristics of democratic regimes. Although the Economist Intelligence Unit's (2018) Democracy Index does not rate any partly developed country as a "full democracy," a number of the partly developed countries, including Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and South Africa, are classified as "flawed democracies." The reasons for the flawed nature of their democracy vary, ranging from high levels of inequality, poverty, and violence (South Africa) to persistent corruption (Brazil) to increasingly authoritarian tactics used by government leaders (Hungary). Finally, while each of the countries listed in Table 15.2 is classified as "free" according to Freedom House's (2018) Aggregate Freedom Score, not all of the flawed democracies are "free" (e.g., Malaysia is only "partly free").

Low Social Development/Mid-Level Eocnomic Development: Indonesia

Indonesia is a country that measures low on our social development index. It struggles with its quality of life on health and education outcomes. More than one-third of the population under age five suffers from moderate to severe malnutrition, and fewer than half of the schools have access to the Internet (UNDP 2017). Only one-quarter of the adults are Internet users (UNDP 2017). Almost half of the population lives in rural areas, although urbanization in the country has increased dramatically in the past few decades, as Indonesia's cities have grown faster than any other cities in Asia (Mulyana 2014; World Bank 2018b). This rapid urbanization and integration into the global economy have helped propel the country into higher rates of economic growth (averaging about 5 percent annually) and GDP/capita/PPP of $12,284 (Lewis 2013). However, to further its overall development, the country will need greater investment in technology and in public infrastructure (e.g., housing, roads, public transportation) to accommodate the growing economy and the ballooning urban population. Something as simple as severe traffic congestion can hinder economic efficiency. For instance, a 25-mile drive from a suburb to downtown Jakarta typically takes about two hours, a lengthy commute that diminishes the economic productivity of Indonesia's workforce.

Partly developed countries GDP

One characteristic of a partly developed country is that its GDP per capita (PPP) is between $12,000 and $35,000

Mid-Level Social Development/High Economic Development: Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is a very wealthy country that remains at a mid-level of social development. Its economic development has been driven by its oil wealth. The country is the world's largest exporter of petroleum, and the money earned from these sales accounts for 85 percent of its government revenue (Heritage Foundation 2018). Fluctuations in oil prices can disrupt the country's economy, but overall GDP per capita (PPP) remains very high, at $53,845. Despite this wealth, the country is somewhat mixed in terms measures of social development. On the one hand, it is very urbanized, about three-quarters of the population are Internet users, and favorable health statistics have reached a high level in the last thirty years. On the other hand, due to the country's social conservatism, gender inequality remains extremely high and the mean number of school years is low (8.8 for girls and 9.9 for boys). Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in only his early 30s, has promised to modernize the country. For instance, he has extended to women the right to drive (under certain conditions) and women were finally allowed to vote in 2015. But he is also associated with the country's strong-arm approach to government dissenters and aggressive foreign policy interventions, as in Yemen. Due to the reduced global emphasis on human rights and democratic politics associated with the rise of the Beijing Consensus, the Saudis might continue to limit aspects of their overall improvements in liberalization and social development even as the country's strategic use of its oil wealth sustains its very substantial level of prosperity. One interesting question is whether the country can diversify its economy before the oil runs low. Another question is whether reforming members of the ruling family will overcome the resistance of the socially conservative elite that dominates the culture.

Strategies of Partly developed countries for prosperity:

Since the early 1990s, some of the partly developed countries have attempted to achieve a rapid transition to a market political economy. Turkey illustrates this quick shift, as the country abruptly announced on January 24, 1980, that, with strong support from the IMF and World Bank, it would be implementing neoliberal economic reforms, including reduced or eliminated subsidies for certain key sectors (such as agriculture), an end to import substitution policies, and a focus on export promotion and free markets. Such rapid transitions to market-based neoliberalism are most pronounced in the formerly Communist systems, such as Albania, Poland, and Russia. For Communist regimes, the principal strategy for achieving the goal of the equal distribution of abundant goods and material welfare to the entire population was the command political economy, as detailed in Chapter 8. The state and the Communist Party, guided by a comprehensive plan, attempted to control nearly all of society's valued resources. As a result, the quality of life was decent, but economic performance was disappointing. Now, central planning has been abandoned, and most state-owned enterprises have been sold to private actors (privatized) or shut down. Private firms produce goods for profit, and the prices of most goods are determined by supply and demand. Most other partly developed countries have not transitioned their political economies as rapidly as Turkey and the post-Communist countries. For these countries, the strategy to achieve prosperity was to move their economies slowly in the direction of neoliberal economic policies. Malaysia illustrates this longer journey, as it embraced the developmental state approach in the 1970s and 1980s, with government investment in education and technology development, growth of public-sector employment, and entrepreneurial training—all meant to grow the middle class (Tan 2009). Since the late 1990s, Malaysia has shifted more fully to neoliberalism, focusing on market economy principles and government deregulation. Since 1991, the country has been working toward its "Vision 2020" plan (recently updated to the more realistic "Vision 2025") of becoming a high-income, industrialized country. Chile is another example of a partly developed country that slowly altered its economy—in this case, from statism to neoliberalism. As this new approach was embraced in Chile, state enterprises were sold off, privatization of government services was extensive, and foreign investment was encouraged. Finally, although China remains a severely restrictive one-party system (under the Communist Party), in 1978, President Deng Xiaoping introduced market-based reforms that steadily shifted the economic structure in a capitalist direction. His successors have continued this trend. The Chinese economy today empowers the private sector, supports private property rights, encourages free market competition, and encourages profit-making business ventures. Although many partly developed countries have, in general, transitioned to market-based economies, many have recently introduced more state capitalist policies as well (Kurlantzick 2016). Brazil, China, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand are examples of partly developed countries where the government has reasserted itself in the economy, often in ways that benefit the country's public officials and elites. Thus, while neoliberalism remains the dominant strategy for most partly developed countries to achieve prosperity, state capitalism is growing in influence and has a more prominent role in many of these emerging economies.

Goal of Brics Countries: Prosperity

The BRICS countries have embraced a market- and trade-based economic strategy that enables them to compete globally with the Global North. Trade with other countries is a crucial part of their economic development strategies. In China, this has been particularly driven by the export of manufactured goods at prices that are highly competitive in the global marketplace. Brazil and Russia have taken full advantage of exporting their abundant natural resources as well as goods from an expanded manufacturing base. South Africa and India have grown their knowledge sectors to serve clients both inside and outside their countries. As in the earlier developmental state strategy (recall Chapter 10), the government in each of the BRICS has been an active partner with the firms that have been most effective in the production of goods and services. Public policies have favored certain actors and sectors in the attempt to facilitate export-oriented growth. Brazil is the only BRICS country that has been very supportive of production for domestic consumption, although the domestic market is becoming more important in all of the BRICS, especially China. Each state's economic policies have facilitated the emergence of an elite class that is extraordinarily wealthy. China and India have enjoyed sustained and consistent economic growth during the past decade, while growth in the other three countries has been up and down. One interesting aspect of the BRICS' cooperation is the formation of the BRICS New Development Bank in 2013. This bank funds development projects in the five member states to enhance infrastructure (especially renewable energy) and to promote the expansion of targeted manufacturing and service sectors. It also pools the currencies of the BRICS states to fend off any future currency or financial crisis. This bank is envisioned as a means to provide the countries with greater independence regarding monetary policy and the flow of investment and thus to limit the constraints and dependency imposed on the BRICS countries' economies by Global North financial institutions, especially the World Bank and the IMF. The Chinese approach to development is a market-authoritarian model of political economy that embraces capitalism as the "lifeblood of global commerce" but is not tied to classical liberal models of democratic governance (Halper 2010: 47). This alternative to Global North capitalism has gained interest and support from countries around the world and is sometimes termed the "Beijing Consensus." It has been embraced by some less developed countries in particular because it seems more efficient at managing the economy than are democratic systems. And China also gains favor as it invests in these countries' development without requiring that the countries implement liberal, democratic institutions and protect human rights (Halper 2010).

Mid-Level Social Development/Low Economic Development: Georgia

The East European country of Georgia was part of the Soviet Union until 1989. During the Soviet period, its population (of 3.7 million) benefitted from the Communist commitment to providing extensive education, health care, and other social benefits to all citizens. Georgia had a basic economy, and the Soviet system did not focus much on economic development for the region. Despite its relatively low GDP per capita (PPP) of $10,699, Georgia has sustained its social development levels since gaining independence. For example, the mean education level is high (12.8 years), and the child mortality rate is low (10.7 per 1000). Between 2000 and 2014, critical years of transition for this postCommunist country, its Human Development Index value, measuring quality of life, increased by more than 12 percent (UNDP 2017). As Georgia has shifted to a market economy, economic growth has improved, with average annual GDP growth of 5.4 percent in the past two decades. One industry that has the potential to drive the economy to a higher level is tourism: The number of tourists traveling to Georgia has almost tripled in just the past five years, as visitors flock there for the wine, food, ancient churches, and ecotourism offerings. Given its social development, if Georgia can sustain economic growth, it could reach the partly developed country category soon.

Goal of BRICs countries: Stability

The different approaches to maintaining stability in the BRICS countries were described in this chapter and Chapter 14. China has been most aggressive in suppressing political freedoms, controlling the media and Internet, and limiting antisocial behavior through its system of surveillance, security forces, and prisons. Russia has pursued similar strategies, although at a less intensive level. While China has prevented almost any cracks in its one-party government system, Russia has allowed multiple parties, although it has grown increasingly authoritarian in recent years. In contrast, India, Brazil, and South Africa operate "free" constitutional democracies, with multiparty elections, limited mandates, and relatively high levels of political, media, and personal freedoms. However, all three face serious destabilizing forces due to internal conflict stemming from identity politics (of ethnicity, caste, religion) and substantial inequality. Corruption is pervasive among both public-sector and private-sector actors in all five countries, draining productive resources and undermining social and economic relations. Moreover, all BRICS countries have high levels of wealth inequality that are rising as prosperity increases. Along with a mix of ethnic, religious, and caste-based inequalities in each of the BRICS countries, this might be a central cause of the high levels of crime and social unrest. All these factors result in low levels of support for public officials and political institutions and are potential sources of the kinds of political decay and internal political violence described in Chapters 10 and 12. The ultimate success of each of the BRICS countries might depend on the extent to which it can limit or mitigate these destabilizing tendencies.

BRICs countries

The discussion of the partly developed countries earlier in this chapter devoted some attention to Brazil, China, South Africa, and Russia. Along with India, these five countries are part of a grouping that does not cluster in Figure 10.1. They do not have the same major political institutional arrangements, similar political economies, a common culture, or a shared region. However, they are now widely referred to as the BRICS, a group that has received attention in discussions of the global economy. Whence came the BRICS? In the first few years of the twenty-first century, senior analysts at Goldman Sachs, a global investment firm, attempted to predict the worldwide distribution of power in 2050. They posited that a small set of countries outside the Global North would have a huge impact on the global system. They termed these countries the BRIC countries, with BRIC standing for Brazil, Russia, India, and China. In 2006, diplomats from each of the BRIC countries gathered in New York for the first official BRIC meeting. And by 2010, the four BRICs became the five BRICS, when they invited South Africa to join the group. The premise underlying the BRICS analysis is simple: If the BRICS countries, with more than 3.1 billion people (about 40 percent of the world's population), embrace the modernizing economic principles associated with global trade and globalization, their economies will become very large and could substantially shape the global economy by 2050, given their size, extensive resources, geostrategic locations, and the changing conditions in Global North countries. In 2003, the combined GNP of the BRICs countries was only 15 percent of that of the Global North. By 2019, their combined GDP (PPP) has grown to one-third of the world's economic output (Elsenhans and Babones 2017; Wilson and Purushothaman 2003). Earlier chapters in this book should alert you to the huge differences among the BRICS countries. Recall, for example, the Compare in 1 that highlighted many differences between India and China. Brazil is mostly tropical, while vast areas of Russia are covered by permafrost. India and China each have 25 times more people than South Africa. India is a parliamentary democracy, and Russia is an authoritarian nondemocracy. China is a one-party state, and Brazil has more than a dozen parties competing for seats in the legislature. Brazil has no serious military enemies on its continent, while India borders on two major nuclear powers with which it has fought. Indeed, it might be argued that the main commonality among the BRICS countries is the goal of a future global system that is not dominated by the Global North countries, especially the United States, Japan, and the EU. What development strategies do the BRICS countries employ to achieve this shared goal?