CivPro

Tony has a low opinion of federal courts. Could he file his case in state court instead? (A) No. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal questions. (B) No. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal questions based on constitutional rights. (C) Yes. State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over most federal questions, including this one. (D) Yes, but only if Tony also joins a state law claim for battery.

Answer (C) is correct. In most cases, the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal question cases. In a few situations, federal statutes make federal jurisdiction exclusive over particular claims. In most situations, including a civil rights claim such as this one, the plaintiff can choose to file the case either in state or federal court. (Under certain circumstances, the defendant may choose to remove a case filed in state court to federal court. (See Topic 31.) Answers (A) and (B) are incorrect. Federal jurisdiction is not exclusive over federal questions generally or federal questions based on constitutional rights. Answer (D) is incorrect. Tony need not have a state law based claim to authorize state court jurisdiction.

A used car dealer in State A is profiled in an article in a newspaper with national circulation. The article states that the dealer never sells a car without rolling the odometer back at least 25,000 miles. In fact, the dealer is an honest businessperson who never changes odometers, so he sued the newspaper for libel in State A state court. The newspaper's entire operation is conducted from its offices in State B, but it sells 5,000 copies in State A on an average day. In its initial pleading, the newspaper argues for dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction over the newspaper because of insufficient contacts. What is the likely ruling of the court on this issue? A: Deny the motion because the newspaper's contacts with State A were sufficient so it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in State A. B: Deny the motion, unless State A lacks a "doing business" jurisdictional provision. C: Grant the motion, because selling 5,000 copies of a newspaper per day is not significant business. Grant the motion, unless State D: A has a long arm statute covering the newspaper's conduct.

A: The court is likely to rule that the newspaper is subject to personal jurisdiction for a libel action in State A because it has sufficient minimum contacts with the state. The publisher should reasonably anticipate causing injury wherever the newspaper is sold, and so should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in each state. [Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)] (B) and (D) are incorrect. The exercise of jurisdiction over a particular defendant must be both authorized by statute and constitutional. These are separate requirements. The newspaper's claim of insufficient contacts goes to the constitutionality of the exercise of jurisdiction. Whether State A has a "doing business" statute or a long arm statute is irrelevant to this determination. (C) is factually incorrect; selling 5,000 newspapers per day would probably be considered sufficient contact, especially since the cause of action arose from that conduct.

A wholesaler sued a retailer in a federal court in State A. The retailer timely filed and served a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied this motion. Thereafter, the retailer filed and served his answer. Ten days after serving his answer, the retailer filed an amended answer, raising, for the first time, the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, which was available when the motion mentioned above was filed. Should the court consider the personal jurisdiction objection? A: No, because that defense has been waived B: No, because objections to personal jurisdiction may only be made by making a motion to dismiss before filing an answer. C: Yes, because the retailer may serve an amended answer as of right within 21 days after serving his original answer. D: Yes, because the amendment relates back to the original answer, thus preserving his right to raise the objection.

A: The court should not consider the retailer's objection because the retailer has waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. A defendant may object to personal jurisdiction in two ways: (i) by raising it in a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b); or (ii) if he has not moved under Rule 12(b), by raising the defense in his answer. Thus, the retailer has waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by making a pre-answer motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) and failing to raise in that motion the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. (B) is incorrect because a defendant may preserve the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in his answer, provided he has not made a Rule 12(b) motion. (C) is also incorrect. If a defendant does not make a Rule 12(b) motion, he may preserve the defense by raising it in his answer or in any amendment as of right. However, the retailer has made a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss; therefore, he has not preserved by putting it in his amended answer. (D) is incorrect because, as previously discussed, the retailer waived the defense by making a Rule 12(b) motion. Moreover, the concept of "relation back" is irrelevant here. It is used to determine when a claim asserted in an amended pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading for statute of limitations purposes.

On the defendant UPF's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the federal district court should: (a) Grant the defendant's motion to dismiss because as a local Indiana company it had insufficient contacts with Ohio to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction; (b) Grant the defendant's motion to dismiss because its contract with NFI was an insufficient basis to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction over UPF; (c) Deny the defendant's motion to dismiss because by failing to raise the personal jurisdiction challenge earlier in the litigation, UPF waived its ability to contest personal jurisdiction after three years into the litigation; (d) Deny the defendant's motion to dismiss because Ohio clearly can assert personal jurisdiction over UPF based on its contractual relationship with NFI; (e) Deny the defendant's motion to dismiss because Ohio's assertion of personal jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

ANSWERS (A) and (B) are incorrect because the court never considers whether UPF had sufficient contacts with Ohio—or whether the contract was insufficient to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction, because the defendant waived its ability to bring this challenge. ANSWER (D) is incorrect for similar reasons; the court does not deny the motion based on a finding that the contract alone supports and assertion of personal jurisdiction. Again, ANSWER (E) is incorrect because the court does not conduct a due process analysis; it simply determines that it must deny the defendant's motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction because this motion—three years into the litigation in which the defendant made a general appearance—is untimely and waived.

Naomi, from North Dakota, sues Sherry, from South Dakota, for breach of a $15,000 contract. Naomi is extremely annoyed by the breach, which she thinks was spiteful, and so she also includes a claim for $100,000 in punitive damages. Under the applicable state law, punitive damages cannot be recovered in cases based on contract. Is the amount in controversy requirement satisfied? (A) No. Damage claims that are invalid on their face cannot be included in computing the amount in controversy, leaving only the $15,000 claim. (B) No. It is extremely unlikely that a jury would award Naomi punitive damages of that size, leaving the total probable damages less than $75,000. (C) Yes. Damages based on contract and tort theories against a single defendant should be combined in computing the amount in controversy. (D) Yes. Because the $100,000 claim is sufficient by itself, it does not matter whether you can also add the $15,000.

Answer (A) is correct. The court generally looks at the face of the plaintiff's complaint to determine the amount in controversy. However, if the plaintiff has requested damages that are legally unavailable, they will not be counted because they cannot be recovered whatever the facts of the case might turn out to be. Here, under the applicable law, the punitive damages are unavailable, so they may not be counted in computing the amount in controversy. The only remaining claim is for $15,000, well short of the required $75,000. Answer (B) is incorrect. Courts will not try to predict whether the plaintiffs will really recover as much money as they have prayed for in computing the amount in controversy. Unless it appears to a legal certainty that the amount requested cannot be recovered, the plaintiff's complaint will determine the amount. This answer is therefore wrong because it indicates that it is the jury's probable reaction rather than the legal unavailability of the punitive damage claim that would defeat jurisdiction. Answer (C) is incorrect. It is true that damages based on contract and tort theories can be aggregated (if they are different damages). That does not rescue the punitive damages in this case. Answer (D) is incorrect. The problem is not whether Naomi's two types of damages can be added together, but that the $100,000 claim is legally invalid.

DeFarge, Inc. sells knitting needles in every state in the United States. It has sold 5,000 pairs of needles to customers in California over the past three years. At least one pair was defective, and it broke and injured Lucie Manette while she was knitting. Lucie, a resident of California, would like to sue DeFarge there, even though its headquarters is in Paris, Texas. Can California constitutionally assert jurisdiction over DeFarge? (A)Yes. DeFarge has purposefully done business in California and should have anticipated being haled into court there. (B)Yes. By selling its products in California, DeFarge has consented to jurisdiction there. ( (C)No. DeFarge does not have continuous and systematic contacts with California. (D)No. If the customers initiated the orders, the mere sale of goods in the forum state will not be sufficient to make the assertion of jurisdiction constitutional.

Answer (A) is probably correct. This situation has the kind of contacts that Carton's case lacked. Here DeFarge regularly and purposefully made a large volume of direct sales to the forum state. Lucie's claim arises out of DeFarge's contacts with California: it sold knitting needles there, and her claim is that one of those needles was defective and injured her. This defendant has benefited from the California market, and it is fair to require it to defend itself in a California court in a suit involving the products voluntarily sold there. Answer (B) is incorrect. DeFarge has done a sufficient volume of voluntary business with California to provide sufficient contacts for the state to constitutionally assert jurisdiction over it. That does not, however, mean that it has actually consented to jurisdiction. Although Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro , 180 L. Ed. 2d 765 (2011), says that a defendant's contacts with a forum means that it "submits to the judicial power" of the forum, his reasoning is joined only by three other Justices, and even Justice Kennedy distinguishes this concept of "submission" from actual consent. Answer (C) is incorrect. Continuous and systematic contacts are not required for specific jurisdiction, and Lucie's cause of action (defective knitting needle) arises out of DeFarge's contacts with California (selling knitting needles). Answer (D) is probably incorrect. An isolated sale of goods initiated by a consumer might not be sufficient to justify jurisdiction. However, a large volume of voluntary sales over some period of time will be sufficient for jurisdiction, even if the contracts are structured so that the "offers" come from the customers. Be aware, however, that some courts defer to defendants' attempts to structure their businesses to avoid jurisdiction, and so if DeFarge did nothing to solicit the business of California consumers and all of DeFarge's contacts with California were initiated by the customers, many courts might find that California lacked jurisdiction over DeFarge on Lucie's claim, especially if the quantity of sales was small or sporadic.

Kent makes his home in Kansas, but he and his family have for years spent two weeks of each summer in a cabin in Estes Park, Colorado. Kent purchased gardening supplies for his Kansas home from A Thousand Acres, a mail order company headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona. Kent has refused to pay the bill, and the company has sued him in Colorado, as that is far more convenient. Knowing that Kent would be in Colorado on vacation, the company had its process server hand the lawsuit papers to Kent at the summer cabin. Does Colorado have personal jurisdiction over Kent in this case? (A)Yes. Coming to Colorado every summer creates sufficientcontacts to justify jurisdiction. (B)Yes. Service within the state under these facts makes jurisdiction proper. (C)No. Kent's contacts with Colorado are not related to the company's claim. (D)No. Transient jurisdiction is no longer constitutional

Answer (B) is correct. This question highlights what is known as "transient jurisdiction" or "tag" jurisdiction. Dating back to the time when a court's jurisdiction was based on asserting power over a person within the state's boundaries, transient jurisdiction is based on service of process on the defendant within the state. Serving Kent with process in Colorado, even though Colorado is not his home, meets the requirements of transient jurisdiction. In Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld transient jurisdiction in a very split opinion. Some Justices believe that transient jurisdiction, because it was traditionally accepted, is per se constitutional. Others believe that it must be subjected to a due process test, but nevertheless approved the service in Burnham based on service on a defendant who was in California on business and to visit his children. This opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor found no due process problem when the defendant served in the state had even briefly taken advantage of "significant benefits provided by the State." It left open the possibility of a different result when the defendant's presence in the state is "involuntary or unknowing." Kent's regular visits to Colorado and the service of process on him there should meet the requirements for transient jurisdiction. Answer (A) is incorrect. While coming to Colorado every summer, coupled with service in Colorado, met the requirements for transient jurisdiction, coming to Colorado every summer is not sufficient alone. The cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in this case is not related to Kent's activities in Colorado, and so for this cause of action the repeated summer contacts are insufficient. The result would be different if the cause of action arose out of a tort Kent committed while in Colorado that injured Colorado residents. Answer (C) is incorrect. Transient jurisdiction includes jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the reasons the defendant was present in the state when served. Answer (D) is incorrect. Transient jurisdiction, under most circumstances, remains constitutional, as noted above. In the international arena, however, a judgment based only on transient jurisdiction is generally considered to be improper. It could be difficult to enforce such a judgment abroad if the defendant does not have non-exempt assets in the U.S.

Goneril and Regan enter into a contract to purchase a year's supply of heating oil from Lear Energy. The contract provides, in paragraph 25: "Any suit to collect overdue payments under this contract may be filed in any state or federal court in the State of New York." Goneril and Regan reside in Michigan, and Lear is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York, but it does business in a number of states and negotiated the contract with Goneril and Regan and delivered their oil from Lear's Michigan office. Goneril and Regan, who are not particularly honest, take the oil but fail to pay. Lear wants to sue them in New York. Are Goneril and Regan subject to personal jurisdiction on this claim in a New York court? (A)No. Goneril and Regan are not domiciled in New York. (B)Yes. This suit is about the "status" of the contract, and so jurisdiction over Lear is sufficient. (C) Yes. Goneril and Regan have consented to jurisdiction in New York, which has some connection to the underlying dispute. (D) No. Goneril and Regan lack sufficient contacts with New York to be sued there.

Answer (C) is correct. Defendants can consent to a court's personal jurisdiction before suit. If in a valid and enforceable contract a party agrees that suit may be filed in a given court, that contractual provision will be enforced. Sometimes the court will declare the provision to be unenforceable under applicable contract law, but absent such a finding the federal courts have tended to enforce such clauses, even when they purport to bar litigation in any other courts, and even when they are part of a contract of adhesion. For examples, see Nat'l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (Michigan defendants agreed to be sued in New York), and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing choice of forum clause found on back of the plaintiffs' cruise tickets). Answer (A) is incorrect. Defendants can be sued in states other than their domiciles if the requirements of due process are otherwise met. Answer (B) is incorrect. The cases that allow suit to determine a person's status, even in the absence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, concern issues such as the termination of a family relationship. The "status" exception does not permit the court to establish parties' rights under a contract under the guise of adjudicating their status under the contract. The status exception is extremely limited. For example, in a divorce case the court could assume jurisdiction to grant the divorce itself but could not divide marital property or order support payments in the absence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Answer (D) is incorrect. Even assuming Goneril and Regan lack sufficient purposeful contacts with the state of New York, the contractual clause consenting to jurisdiction allows the New York courts to assert jurisdiction over them.

DeFarge also sells another product, the Super Chopper. This is a large, expensive machine used in manufacturing plants. It advertised the Super Chopper in the January issue of a nationally-circulated trade publication. After a DeFarge-employed salesman made a persuasive presentation on a swing through Maine, DeFarge sold one Super Chopper to a customer there. Because of a flaw in the chopper's safety system, it cut off the hand of Jarvis Lorry, an employee of the customer. Lorry wants to sue DeFarge in Maine for his personal injuries. Can a Maine court constitutionally assert jurisdiction over Lorry's claim against DeFarge? (A)No. This isolated transaction is not enough to be the basis for personal jurisdiction. (B)Yes. DeFarge reached out to Maine because national advertising is sent there. (C)No. DeFarge's customer could sue in Maine, but Lorry cannot. (D)Yes. Lorry's cause of action arises directly out of DeFarge's contacts with Maine, which were purposeful and from which DeFarge earned profits.

Answer (D) is probably correct. DeFarge has deliberately marketed its product in the state of Maine. This was done partly through a national publication that is available in Maine. Note, though, that in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro , Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion treated a foreign corporation's marketing to the entire United States as not targeting any particular state. Untargeted national media, therefore, may not "count" even for domestic defendants. But the fact that DeFargesent an employee to Maine to sell the Super Chopper is the kind of "purposeful availment" that was missing in Nicastro. Further, this is a large, expensive machine, so that a single sale is more significant than the sale of a single pair of knitting needles. (That argument, though, was more persuasive to Nicastro's dissenters than to the plurality, which still treated that sale of one large machine as a single, isolated transaction.) That same machine is now said to have injured the plaintiff in Maine. That combination of facts may be sufficient to support a conclusion that DeFargehas sought to serve the Maine market, and that its contacts are sufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Although there is only a single sale, it was purposeful, it was initiated by the defendant's seeking to sell in Maine, and it is precisely this contact that is alleged to have caused damage to the plaintiff. Answer (A) is probably incorrect, but it might be held to be correct by some courts. The "stream of commerce" metaphor is so beguiling that it can be overused. Cases involving purposeful direct sales to the forum can show more "purposeful availment" and the kind of desire to serve the market that is absent in cases in which a product reaches the forum state through a less direct means. The stream of commerce cases involve situations in which the defendant did not make a sale directly into the forum state (e.g., component part manufacturers as in Asahi; sales through independent distributors, as in Nicastro; consumers bringing products to the forum as in World-Wide Volkswagen). There is nevertheless a tendency in some courts to use "isolated sales" to label both types of cases, and to deny jurisdiction. The concurring Justices in Nicastro (Justices Breyer and Alito) also remarked that "[n]one of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient" (citing World-Wide Volkswagen and Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi).

Nick, from North Carolina, wants to sue Carol, from Connecticut. Nick has two claims against Carol. One claim, for $50,000, is for breach of a contract to buy Duke basketball souvenirs. The other, for $30,000, is for breach of a separate contract to buy University of Connecticut women's basketball t-shirts. Carol took delivery of the items but has failed to pay for them. If Nick filed his suit in federal court, what would be the amount in controversy? (A) $50,000 (B) $30,000 (C) $80,000 (D) $80,000 plus interest

Answer (C) is correct. In order for diversity jurisdiction to be proper, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs (28 U.S.C. § 1332). There are various rules regarding the circumstances under which multiple claims can be aggregated (added together) to reach the $75,000 threshold. All claims asserted by one plaintiff against the same defendant may be aggregated (although the same damages may not be counted twice). Here, Nick can add the two distinct claims to reach a total of $80,000. Answers (A) and (B) are incorrect. The claims will be added, as noted above. Answer (D) is incorrect. Even if Nick is due interest on this breach of contract claim, interest is not counted in computing the amount in controversy.

Sydney Carton traveled to Paris, Texas, on vacation. While shopping at a local department store there (a "mom and pop" establishment that has never advertised outside of Texas), he was wrongfully detained and searched. Back home in Virginia, Carton filed suit against the store. Can a Virginia court constitutionally assert jurisdiction over Carton's claim against the Texas store? (A)Yes. The store intentionally injured a resident of Virginia. (B)Yes. Plaintiffs can always file suit in their home states. (C)No. The store's contacts with Virginia are insufficient to permit the assertion of jurisdiction. (D)Yes. The store profited from selling its products to a Virginian.

Answer (C) is correct. The Texas store may have wronged Carton, but it did so at its home in Texas. It does not have sufficient contacts with Virginia to be sued there. Nor did the store take any purposeful act aimed at Virginia or seek to serve the Virginia market. The fact that a Virginian was allowed to enter the store does not provide the kind of contact with Virginia that the courts look for to establish personal jurisdiction. The facts do not even indicate that the store was aware that Carton was from Virginia during its encounter with him. Answer (A) is incorrect. The tort of wrongful imprisonment is an intentional one. But it was not committed in Virginia or directed toward injuring a Virginia citizen in Virginia. The intentional nature of the tort does not change the result under these facts. Answer (B) is incorrect. While it will often be true that plaintiffs can sue at home, that is not invariably true. The jurisdictional analysis is based on the defendant's relationship with the forum, not the plaintiff's relationship with it. Answer (D) is incorrect. The defendant did not initiate its contacts with Carton; Carton came to it. The constitutional test requires that the defendant take some purposeful act directed at the forum state, and selling a small item to a customer who has come to the defendant's home base is not sufficient to provide jurisdiction in the customer's home state over the customer's wrongful imprisonment claim.

Martin, from Michigan, sued his employer, Blue Hat Computers, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oregon, for wrongful discharge. He filed suit in state court in Detroit, Michigan, asking for damages of $85,000. He had his lawyer draw up the lawsuit papers on May 1, but he continued to negotiate with Blue Hat. Negotiations finally broke down on July 1. As a last ditch effort at settlement, Martin's lawyer faxed a copy of Martin's potential complaint to Blue Hat on July 2. After receiving no response, Martin had his lawyer file the case and serve Blue Hat with the summons and complaint on July 15. Blue Hat would like to remove the case to federal court. When is/was its deadline for removal? (A) May 31. (B) August 1. (C) August 14. (D) This is a trick question. There is no deadline for removal.

Answer (C) is correct. The removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1446) provides that the notice of removal shall be filed "within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading ... or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter." For a while, some courts interpreted this statute so that the receipt of a courtesy copy of a complaint, even if before the lawsuit was filed, started the running of the 30 days. The Supreme Court has held that this interpretation is incorrect. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. , 526 U.S. 344 (1999). The time limit is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, "through service or otherwise," after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service of the summons. Applying this rule, it is service of the summons and complaint on July 15 that starts the clock running; the summons functions as the sina qua non directing a defendant to participate in a civil action. Thus, if the summons and complaint are served together, the 30-day period for removal runs from the date of service. Second, if the defendant is served with the summons but the complaint is furnished to the defendant sometime later, the period for removal runs from the defendant's receipt of the complaint. Third, if the defendant is served with the summons and the complaint is filed in court, but under local rules, service of the complaint is not required, the removal period runs from the date the complaint is made available through filing. Finally, if the complaint is filed in court prior to any service, the removal period runs from the service of the summons. Answer (A) is incorrect. The deadline does not run from the drafting of the complaint. Answer (B) is incorrect. As explained above, the pre-filing courtesy copy does not start the running of the 30 days. Answer (D) is incorrect. There is indeed a deadline for removal.

Carton (from previous question) learned that the store, on several occasions in the past, sold copies of some book about the French Revolution and shipped them to residents of Virginia who had called the store and ordered the books. Now can a Virginia court constitutionally assert jurisdiction over the store in Carton's case? (A)Yes. The store intentionally injured a resident of Virginia. (B)Yes. The store now has sufficient contacts with Virginia to permit the assertion of jurisdiction. (C)No. The store's contacts with Virginia are unrelated to Carton's claim. (D)Yes. The store profited from selling its products to a Virginian

Answer (C) is correct. The store's contacts with Virginia are still insufficient. And Virginia's claim to personal jurisdiction is still weak. This is still a fairly low level of activity, and it was initiated by the Virginians. First, the sale of books is unrelated to Carton's cause of action and therefore cannot be used to support jurisdiction over the store on his wrongful imprisonment claim. Second, the Virginians initiated the purchase transaction. Answer (A) is incorrect. As was true in the previous question, the fact that the cause of action is an intentional tort does not improve the jurisdictional claim when neither the tortious act nor its consequences took place in the forum state. Answer (B) is incorrect. These minimal contacts certainly would not justify the exercise of general jurisdiction. Therefore, because they are not related to Carton's cause of action, they do not "count" when assessing the store's amenability to Carton's cause of action. Some commentators argue that courts should be allowed to consider both related and unrelated contacts in determining the appropriateness of jurisdiction in a kind of "hybrid" jurisdictional analysis, but the Supreme Court continues to discuss them as two separate types of jurisdiction, including in the two 2011 cases, Nicastro and Goodyear, and the two 2014 cases, Daimler and Walden. Answer (D) is incorrect. The mere existence of some amount of profits generated by sales to residents of the forum state does not guarantee the existence of personal jurisdiction, particularly when the cause of action is unrelated to those profits

When Officer Krupke arrested Tony, a scuffle ensued. Tony believes that Krupke used excessive force in making the arrest. He wants to sue Krupke for violating his federal constitutional rights, but his injuries amount to only about $2,000 worth of medical bills and a sore jaw. Both Tony and Krupkeare citizens of New York. Can Tony file his case in federal court? (A)No. The amount in controversy is insufficient. (B)No. There is no diversity of citizenship. (C)No. The suit lacks both diversity and a sufficient amount in controversy. (D)Yes. The suit would be proper under federal question jurisdiction

Answer (D) is correct. Tony's claim that excessive force used during his arrest violated his constitutional rights states a claim for relief under a cause of action created by federal law. It, therefore, can form the basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Where federal question jurisdiction exists, the parties' citizenship and the amount in controversy are not relevant. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Answers (A), (B), and (C) are incorrect. When a federal question exists, there is no minimum amount in controversy requirement, nor do the parties need to be from different states.

Wendy's husband, Peter, was killed in the crash of a private plane in Iowa. The plane was manufactured by Pepper Corp., which is headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, where the planes are manufactured (E.D. Mo.). Wendy (who lives in southern Minnesota), as Peter's surviving spouse, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Pepper in federal court in Iowa. Pepper knows that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in Iowa, but it would rather defend at home in Missouri. What motion could Pepper file to achieve this objective, and what law will be applied if Pepper's motion is granted? (A) Pepper should file a motion to dismiss the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 because venue is not proper in Iowa. (B) Pepper should file a motion to transfer the case to Missouri for the convenience of witnesses and parties; if granted, the federal court in Missouri will apply Missouri law, including Missouri's choice of law rules. (C) Pepper should file a motion to transfer the case to Missouri for the convenience of witnesses and parties; if granted, the federal court in Missouri will apply the law that would have been applied by the federal court in Iowa if the case had not been transferred, including Iowa's choice of law rules. (D) Pepper should file an alternative motion to dismiss the case or to transfer the case to Missouri for the convenience of witnesses and parties; if the case is transferred to Missouri, the federal court in Missouri will have the discretion to apply Missouri law or Iowa law.

Answer (C) is the correct answer. Section 1404(a) of Title 28, authorizes a convenience transfer to Missouri "in the interest of justice" and for "the convenience of parties and witnesses." 28 U.S.C. § 1404. The case could be transferred to any district or division where it might have been brought, which would include the Eastern District of Missouri. In ruling on a motion under § 1404, the court will consider whether party and forum convenience override the plaintiff's choice of forum, which is given considerable weight. Party considerations include relative ease of access to witnesses and evidence, the cost of obtaining the attendance of witnesses, the ability to compel the attendance of key witnesses and, where applicable, the jury's ability to view the scene of the accident. Forum considerations include the effect on the courts' dockets, the burden of jury duty on the possible fora, local interest in the case, and the substantive law that will apply to the issues in the case. Under the rule of VanDusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1961), if the case is transferred, the transferee court must follow the law that would be applied by the transferor court; to avoid gamesmanship, the transfer should result in the change of courtrooms, not a change in the governing law. Answer A is incorrect. Venue is proper in Iowa because the plane crash occurred in Iowa. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) ("a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred").

Pam was born and grew up in Pennsylvania. She went away to college in Massachusetts (her parents paid her tuition), but she always returned home to work in the summers. During her senior year, her parents moved to Virginia, and she lived there between college and law school. She is now a law student at a law school in Texas. She really likes it there and has decided to take the Texas bar exam and look for a job there after graduation. Where is Pam domiciled? (A)Pennsylvania. This is her domicile of origin and she keeps it until she is no longer a student. (B)Massachusetts. She changed her domicile when she went to live there to attend college. (C)Virginia. Her domicile changed when her parents moved there and she went to join them. (D)Texas. By being present there and having the intention to stay indefinitely, she has made the state her domicile.

Answer (D) is correct. A person when born acquires a domicile of origin (the parents' domicile). In order to change to a new domicile (a domicile of choice) one must intend to make the new place home for an indefinite period of time and must be physically present there at least briefly. Here, Pam has changed her domicile to Texas because she is a resident there and intends to make it her home. The fact that she has not yet secured a permanent job does not prevent Texas from being her domicile. Answer (A) is incorrect. Pennsylvania is her domicile of origin. It is also true that students, especially undergraduates, often have not changed domicile by going off to school. They tend to lack the necessary intent to make the location of the school a permanent home. Pam's return during the summers to her parents' home reinforces this belief here. But it is not true that students can never acquire a new domicile of choice. Answer (B) is incorrect. Under different circumstances, Pam might have changed her domicile to Massachusetts. She was physically present there. But her practice of returning home to Pennsylvania during the summers, her continuing financial dependence on her parents, and her apparent intention to leave Massachusetts upon graduation are indications that she did not change her domicile. Answer (C) is incorrect. It is not clear whether Pam's domicile changed briefly to Virginia. If she considered it to be home, and had no intention of leaving at a fixed time, that might be true. It seems more likely, though, that Pam had already planned to leave Virginia to move to Texas to attend law school. In either case, her subsequent move to Texas with intent to stay there means that Virginia is not her domicile at this time.

Cordelia, disinherited by her family, has moved to Iowa and bought a farm. She is very happy in her new home. Unfortunately, she has a difficult former business partner, Edmund, who believes that Cordelia owes him money from a failed venture in Dover, Delaware. Edmund has sued Cordelia in Iowa. At the time, Cordelia was out of state attempting a family reconciliation back in Michigan, and so Edmund arranged for Cordelia to be served with process while she was there. Assuming this is permitted under Iowa's long-arm statute, may Iowa constitutionally assert jurisdiction over Cordelia? (A)No. Defendants must be served with process in the forum state to be subject to personal jurisdiction. (B)No. The transaction that is the subject of Edmund's suit has nothing to do with Iowa. (C)Yes. Cordelia has enough contacts with Iowa to allow specific jurisdiction. (D)Yes. Courts of human defendants' home states traditionally have personal jurisdiction over them in all cases.

Answer (D) is correct. Courts of a defendant's home state traditionally have personal jurisdiction over her whether or not the claim is otherwise tied to that state. The Supreme Court has long held that "domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). The benefits of citizenship are said to justify reciprocal duties. As a practical matter, it is efficient for plaintiffs to know there is one place where a defendant is certainly amenable to jurisdiction, and those defendants will not usually be unduly inconvenienced by being sued at home. Answer (A) is incorrect. Service of process out of state (generally permitted by virtue of a state "long-arm statute") is constitutional if the defendant has the required contacts with the forum state. Answer (B) is incorrect. When a human defendant is sued in her domicile, the cause of action need not have arisen out of contacts with the forum state. Answer (C) is incorrect. Although Cordelia does have enough contacts with Iowa to justify specific personal jurisdiction over some claims, that is not the reason that jurisdiction would be correct in this case. That lower level of contacts, if that were all that existed, would not justify jurisdiction over Cordelia in Iowa with regard to a cause of action that arose in Delaware.

Woolf, who resides in the Northern District of Texas (N.D. Tex.), wants to sue Austen, who resides in the Western District of Louisiana (W.D. La.), for negligence resulting in an automobile accident. The accident occurred in Oklahoma (E.D. Okla.). Where would venue be proper? (A) N.D. Tex. (B) W.D. La. (C) E.D. Okla. (D) W.D. La. or E.D. Okla.

Answer (D) is correct. Proper venue for Woolf's suit against Austen is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Section (b)(1) provides that venue is proper in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state. As there is only one defendant, the judicial district of her residence, W.D. La., is proper. Section 1391(b)(2) also provides that venue is proper in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. In this case, the negligence and its consequences occurred in E.D. Okla., making venue proper there as well. Because both Sections 1 and 2 make U.S. venue available, Section 3 does not apply. Answer (A) is incorrect. The plaintiff's residence is not for that reason a district of proper venue. Answers (B) and (C) are incorrect because they are incomplete. The various venue options listed in § 1391 are all available, and the plaintiff may choose among the districts in which venue is proper.

Paulette has filed a complaint in federal court in Houston, Texas alleging that her employer, National Development Company (NDC) discriminated against her on account of her race. Paulette served NDC, a foreign corporation, with its principal place of business in Arkansas, by having the registered agent served by delivery of the summons and complaint to the registered agent in person by an Arkansas Sheriff who prepared a return of service and sent the return, which showed the person served, the manner of service, and the date of service, back to the clerk of the trial court. If NDC moves to dismiss the action because of insufficient service of process, what result? (A)The action should be dismissed because the Arkansas Sheriff was not authorized to serve the summons and complaint by federal law. (B)The motion to dismiss should be denied because the case is pending in a federal court in Texas as long as Texas law allows service of process in Arkansas by an Arkansas sheriff. (C)The motion to dismiss should be denied if Arkansas law authorizes service of process by an Arkansas sheriff on a domestic corporation's registered agent. (D)(B) and (C) are both correct.

Answer (D) is correct. Rule 4 allows for service of process (summons and complaint) to be conducted pursuant to the law of the state where service is sought to be effected or pursuant to the law of the forum state where the action will be adjudicated. Thus, both answers (B) and (C) are correct. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1); see also Deininger v. Deininger, 677 F. Supp. 48, 490 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (jurisdiction proper over defendant when served pursuant to Texas long-arm statute). Further, "dismissal of a complaint is inappropriate when there exists a reasonable prospect that service may yet be obtained. In such instances, the district court should at most, quash service, leaving the plaintiff free to effect proper service." Umbenhauer v. Woog , 969 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir. 1992).

Tom, from Texas, wants to sue Mark, from Mississippi, and Acme Corp., an Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in Texas, for $100,000 alleging breach of contract. Can Tom properly file his suit in federal court? (A)Yes. There is diversity of citizenship because Tom and Mark are citizens of different states. (B)Yes. There is diversity of citizenship because Mark and Acme are citizens of different states. (C)Yes. There is diversity of citizenship because Tom is a citizen of a different state from Mark and Acme. (D)No. Tom and Acme are both citizens of Texas and the diversity statute requires that no plaintiff be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.

Answer (D) is correct. The statute creating jurisdiction in cases involving citizens of different states (28 U.S.C. § 1332) has been interpreted to require complete diversity. In other words, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any defendant. In this case, the plaintiff is a citizen of Texas. One defendant, Mark, is a citizen of Mississippi, creating minimal diversity. However, defendant Acme is a corporation, and corporations are citizens both of their state of incorporation and of their principal place of business. Acme is therefore a citizen both of Alabama and of Texas. Therefore, both Tom and Acme are Texas citizens, destroying complete diversity. Answer (A) is incorrect. Diversity does exist between Tom and Mark, but this is not sufficient for federal court jurisdiction. Answer (B) is incorrect. It is the citizenship of plaintiffs vs. defendants that matters for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, not the citizenship of co-defendants. In fact, if the plaintiffs were from Texas and both defendants were from Mississippi, diversity jurisdiction would exist. Answer (C) is incorrect. As explained above, Tom and Acme are citizens of the same state because of the way corporate citizenship is determined.

Assume the same facts as in the question above, except that Martin files suit in state court in Oregon. Is the case removable? (A) Yes, it can be removed at any time. (B) Yes, it can be removed because the diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy make it a case that could have been brought in federal court. (C) Yes, if Blue Hat files the proper papers by the removal deadline. (D) No. This case is not removable.

Answer (D) is correct. This case meets the requirement for diversity jurisdiction. Martin is a citizen of Michigan, and Blue Hat is a citizen of Delaware and Oregon. The amount in controversy is sufficient. Martin could have filed his suit in federal court. However, under these facts (filing in state court in Oregon), Blue Hat may not remove. The removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)) does not allow a defendant sued in its home state to remove a case based on diversity jurisdiction. The fear of local court prejudice against a non-resident defendant does not apply when the defendant is a citizen of the forum state. Blue Hat is a citizen of Oregon and the case was filed there. Answers (A) and (C) are incorrect. It is not true that cases can be removed at any time, and timing aside, this one cannot be removed at all. Answer (B) is incorrect. Although Martin could have filed the case in federal court, because he chose state court, Blue Hat cannot remove it.

Woolf (N.D. Tex.) wants to sue Austen (W.D. La.) and Bronte (E.D. La.) for theft of trade secrets. The alleged theft arose out of a series of events: (1) Austen approached Woolf in New York City (S.D.N.Y.) while Woolf was there to see a Broadway play and got access to the secret; and (2) Bronte wrongfully used the secret in her business in Hartford (D. Conn.). Aside from Louisiana, where would venue be proper? (A) D. Conn. (B) S.D.N.Y. (C) N.D. Tex. (D) D. Conn. or S.D.N.Y.

Answer (D) is correct. This question examines the problem of what constitutes a "substantial part" of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim. The legislative history makes clear that more than one district can qualify — the statute does not require the identification of a single district that has the most events or omissions. In this case, it is likely that a district in which trade secrets were stolen and a district in which they were wrongfully used would both qualify as places where a "substantial part" of the events or omissions occurred. Again, Section 3 is not applicable. Answers (A) and (B) are incorrect because they omit districts in which venue would be correct for the reasons set forth above. Answer (C) is incorrect. The statute does not make the district of the plaintiff's residence a place of proper venue.

When Officer Krupke arrested Tony, a scuffle ensued. Tony believes that Krupke used excessive force in making the arrest. He wants to sue Krupkefor violating his federal constitutional rights, but his injuries amount to only about $2,000 worth of medical bills and a sore jaw. Both Tony and Krupke are citizens of New York. Can Tony file his case in federal court? (A) No. The amount in controversy is insufficient. (B) No. There is no diversity of citizenship. (C) No. The suit lacks both diversity and a sufficient amount in controversy. (D) Yes. The suit would be proper under federal question jurisdiction.

Answer (D) is correct. Tony's claim that excessive force used during his arrest violated his constitutional rights states a claim for relief under a cause of action created by federal law. It, therefore, can form the basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Where federal question jurisdiction exists, the parties' citizenship and the amount in controversy are not relevant. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Answers (A), (B), and (C) are incorrect. When a federal question exists, there is no minimum amount in controversy requirement, nor do the parties need to be from different states.

Massive Mining Corporation (MMC) was located in West Virginia and did all of its business there. Unfortunately, after a major mine collapse, MMC had to suspend its mining operations. Due to local hostility, the company's management decided to move the company headquarters to Vermont. The CFO opened a bank account in Vermont and paid all the bills there. Dan Blankenboat, the CEO, bought a house in the mountains of Vermont, and any board meetings and management team conferences that happened after the collapse occurred there. It is unknown at this time when MMC will be able to re-open the mine and move back to West Virginia. Morgan, a miner who worked for MMC, was killed when the mine collapsed. His widow has moved to New Hampshire, so the possibility of suing MMC in Vermont is very appealing. Could Vermont constitutionally assert jurisdiction over MMC for a claim arising out of the collapse of the mine? (A) Yes. MMC has a level of contacts with Vermont that would satisfy the Supreme Court's test for specific personal jurisdiction. (B) Yes. MMC is now essentially at home in Vermont. (C) No. MMC's contacts with Vermont do not involve mining. (D) No. Morgan's injuries did not arise out of MMC's contacts with Vermont.

B is correct but the reasoning was too long so I didn't put it in here. Answer (A) is incorrect. Because Mrs. Morgan's claim does not arise out of MMC's Vermont activities, a level of contacts that would suffice for specific jurisdiction would not be sufficient to support jurisdiction. Answers (C) and (D) are incorrect. Because MMC's level of involvement in Vermont is continuous and systematic, it can be sued there on causes of action arising elsewhere, whether they involve mining or not. Commentators disagree about the extent to which the Court's opinion in Perkins can be extended beyond its facts. The situation described in this question, however, would meet even the stricter interpretation of Perkins.

A citizen of State A purchased life insurance by mail from a State B insurance company. The policy was the only one that the company had ever sold in State A. The purchaser mailed premiums from State A to State B for five years, and then died. The insurance company refused to pay the policy benefits. The purchaser's administrator sued the company in State A state court. The state has a long arm statute that grants a state court in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who "contract[s] to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of the contracting." The insurance company argued that its only contact with State A since it began its business was the purchaser's insurance policy, and that this single contact does not meet the minimum required for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction under International Shoe. How should the court rule on the minimum contacts issue? A: For the purchaser's administrator, because the State A statute authorizes jurisdiction B: For the purchaser's administrator, because of the close connection between the contact and the case. C: For the insurance company, bc exercise of jurisdiction would not be constitutional. D: For the insurance company, because suit must be brought in State B

B- The court should rule for the purchaser's administrator on the minimum contacts issue and exercise in personamjurisdiction over the insurance company. Generally, fewer contacts will suffice for in personam jurisdiction if those contacts are directly related to the cause of action. Here, even though the sale of the insurance policy constituted only a single contact, it is the contact at issue in the case. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction would be constitutional. (A) is incorrect because the exercise of jurisdiction, in addition to being authorized by statute, must also be constitutional. (C) is incorrect because a single contact is sufficient if the case is based on that contact, as discussed above. (This is called "specific jurisdiction.") (D) is incorrect, because a suit in State A would be permissible if it is authorized by statute and constitutional, which it is here

As a result of his injuries, the Bolings filed suit against the gas can manufacturer, Blitz USA. During the course of their litigation against Blitz USA, the Bolings entered into a series of non-recourse loans with Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC and Cambridge Management Group, LLC, two out-ofstate limited liability corporations, to obtain advances on his potential personal injury recovery. The Bolings received $30,000 plus fees through these loans. In entering into the loan agreements, Prospect and CMG obtained an interest in the Bolings' potential personal injury recovery the pending lawsuit against Blitz USA. By their terms, these loans accrued interest at a rate of 4.9% per month and at the time of the suit, the total amount owed to Prospect was $340, 405.00. Boling filed a lawsuit against Prospect in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky seeking a declaratory judgment that the loan agreements were to be interpreted by and deemed unenforceable under Kentucky law. His wife was not made a party to this lawsuit. Subsequently, Prospect filed suit against the Bolings in the Superior Court of New Jersey, and Boling removed that action to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Kentucky has a long-arm statute that provides: courts "may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's ... transacting any business in this Commonwealth...." In a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), defendant Prospect moved to dismiss the case from the Kentucky federal district court for a lack of personal jurisdiction. (19) On defendant Prospect's motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction, the Kentucky federal court should: (a) Grant the motion to dismiss because Prospect was not a citizen of Kentucky, had only very limited contact with the state through the loans to the Bolings; and assertion of personal jurisdiction would offend due process; (b) Grant the motion to dismiss because Prospect had a parallel lawsuit pending in federal court in New Jersey on the same issues; (c) Deny the motion to dismiss because Prospect was conducting business in the state of Kentucky and availing itself of the benefits and protections of Kentucky law; (d) Deny the motion to dismiss because as a loan provider, Prospect had contacts with all fifty states; (e) Deny the motion to dismiss courts generally give deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum.

C: ANSWER (A) is incorrect because the court, on the facts, found to the contrary; that prospects contacts with Kentucky through the loans to the Bolings was sufficient to confer jurisdiction pursuant to Kentucky's long-arm statute and did not offend due process. ANSWER (B) is incorrect because the existence of a parallel lawsuit in New Jersey has no bearing on the Kentucky court's analysis whether it has good personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant Prospect. ANSWER (D) is incorrect because there is no indication in the facts that Prospect has nationwide contacts, and so this is irrelevant to an analysis of personal jurisdiction in this problem. ANSWER (E) is incorrect because, while a general statement of law, the plaintiff's choice of forum must give way to defendant's due process rights if the grounds for asserting personal jurisdiction are not present. The court denies the defendant's motion not because of deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum, but because the defendant has sufficientcontacts with the state under Kentucky's long-arm statute and cases construing that statute.Exam Pro on Civil Procedure

The plaintiff, a citizen and resident of the District of State A, is planning to sue the defendant, a citizen and resident of Germany who was visiting relatives in the District of State A, for personal injuries the plaintiff suffered when the defendant pushed him off a ski lift in State B. State B also has only one federal court district. In which district or districts may the defendant be sued? A: In any federal judicial district in the United States B: The District of State A or District of State B only.. C: The District of State A only D: The District of State B only..

D: The defendant may be sued in the District of State B only. For a federal court to validly assert power over a case, (1) subject matter jurisdiction must be proper, (2) the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and (3) venue must be proper (although venue may be waived). Personal jurisdiction is based on contacts. Very generally, a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction (that is, personal jurisdiction for all causes of action) in the state in which the defendant is domiciled. The defendant is subject to specific jurisdiction (that is, jurisdiction over the instant cause of action only) in states in which the defendant has minimum contacts. A defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in a state in which the defendant commits a tort. Venue is proper in the district in which the defendant resides or in the district in which the events giving rise to the claim occurred. Here, State B is the only state which has both personal jurisdiction and proper venue. (Subject matter jurisdiction exists as well based on alienage jurisdiction.) (A) is incorrect because, although the venue statute makes venue over a non-citizen, non-domiciliary proper in any district, the court still must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, as explained above. (B) and (C) are incorrect because, although the German resident is visiting State A, he is not domiciled therein, and venue based on the residency of the plaintiff is not applicable here.

A motorist was involved in a car accident with the vice president of a large corporation while on vacation in another state. Upon return to his home state, the motorist decided to sue the vice president. The vice president has had absolutely no personal contacts with the motorist's home state, although the company for which she works does extensive business in the state. The motorist read in a newspaper that the vice president was served with a subpoena to testify at a grand jury proceeding in the state regarding some of her company's activities in that state, so he arranged for process to be served on the vice president when she attended the hearing. Does the state court have jurisdiction over the vice president? A: Yes, because she was served with process while in the state B: : Yes, because she is doing substantial and continuous business in the state. C: No, because she was in the state solely to testify at the grand jury proceeding, and she lacks minimum contacts with the state. D: D: No, because in-state service of process is never a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction.

States have limited power to assert in personamjurisdiction over defendants who are in the state as parties or witnesses in another judicial proceeding. In effect, a civil defendant is given a "free pass" into the state while she is testifying in a different proceeding. Thus, because the vice president is essentially immunized from service of process while in the motorist's state while she is testifying in another proceeding, in-state service of process cannot form the basis for personal jurisdiction over her. As a result, (A) is incorrect. Furthermore, it is her company that is "doing business" in the state, not herself. The facts state that she has no contacts with the state. Thus, (B) is incorrect. (D) is incorrect because in-state service of process may form the basis for a state court to assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.

A town planned to build a new street through a parcel of vacant land on the edge of town. The land records show a deed dated October 5, 1947, to the current property owner, for whom an address is given in the capital city of the state. The town instituted an in rem condemnation action in state court, with notice to all interested parties published in the town newspaper. The property owner, who still resides at the address in the capital city, does not see the notice. The court allows the condemnation to proceed as requested by the town. Is the condemnation valid as to the property owner? A: Yes, because a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. B: Yes, because notice by publication was sufficient. C: No, because the property owner was required to be served by summons. D: No, because the property owner should have been mailed notice of the proceeding.

The condemnation is not valid because the property owner should have been mailed notice of the proceeding. In an in rem action, persons whose interests are known to be affected and whose addresses are known must be notified at least by ordinary mail. The town should at least have sent notice to the property owner at the address it had for him, even if it seemed unlikely that he would still be there. (B) is thus incorrect. (A) is incorrect because, although the statement is true, it does not address the notice requirement. (C) is incorrect. It is well established that service by mail meets the due process requirement of notice in certain cases (i.e., a summons is not always required).

Clara and Carl, from California, want to sue Ida and Irene, both of whom are citizens of Illinois, for a $500,000 personal injury claim. Can they properly file their suit in federal court?

Yes. Multiple parties on the same side of the lawsuit may be citizens of the same state, as long as all plaintiffs are diverse in citizenship from all defendants. Therefore, the fact that Clara and Carl are both from California, and that Ida and Irene are both from Illinois, does not destroy diversity.