COMM LAW EXAM 2

Cape Pub. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 8 Med.L.Rptr. 2535 (1982)

"Although publication of the photograph, which won industry awards, could be considered by some to be in bad taste, the law in Florida seems settled that where one becomes an actor in an occurrence of public interest, it is not an invasion of her right to privacy to publish her photograph with an account of such occurrence."

Randall "Tex" Cobb v. Time, 278 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2002)

"Cobb's argument that SI should have interviewed the referee and the ringside officials tends to show that SI might not have acted as a prudent reporter would have acted. But the actual malice standard requires more than just proof of negligence."

Cain v. Hearst 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994)

-"Cain (a member of the Dixie Mafia) is believed to have killed as many as 8 people. Cain killed one of his lawyers in 1973 and married the lawyer's widow a few months later; Cain killed a 67-year old man in 1977. In 1983 he 'bought' a prostitute from a friend to finance his activities; Cain persuaded the prostitute to marry a trailer park owner named Anderson, so that Cain could kill Anderson and share the prostitute's inheritance from Anderson; when the prostitute balked, Cain threatened to kill her 5-year old daughter and 'deliver her daughter's head in a wastepaper basket'; the prostitute married Anderson three days later, and on Jan. 5, 1985 Cain killed Anderson." No false light in Texas But remember Turner v. Dolcefino Argued before the Texas Supreme Court by William Ogden of Houston

New Times Inc. V. Issacks

Watch Video

Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, ___ U.S. ___ (2015)

Facts of the case: In August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the organization's logo, and one faintly making up the background of the plate. The TDMV had a policy stating that it "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any member of the public." The board in charge of approving new specialty plates received multiple negative comments from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application. Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license plates are a form of government speech; therefore, they were within their rights to choose which messages and views they wanted to express on the plates. The district court disagreed and held that the plates were private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech in a non-public forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that "discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and Southern heritage." Question: 1. Do specialty license plates constitute government speech that is immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality? 2. Does preventing the confederate flag from appearing on license plates constitute viewpoint discrimination? Conclusion: Yes, no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government choosing the content of its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because that expression is the product of the democratic electoral process. Based on the analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texas's specialty license plate is an example of such government speech (as opposed to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and other states have long used license plates to convey messages. Moreover, the public associates license plates with the State. Finally, Texas maintains direct control over the messages on its specialty plates from design to final approval. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote a dissent in which he argued that, with over 350 varieties of specialty plates, an observer would think that the plates were the expression of the individual drivers, not Texas. Because the specialty license plates are a limited public forum for private expression, Texas rejecting the confederate flag design because it might be offensive is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.

Briscoe v. Reader's Digest, 4 C.3d 529, 1971 Cal. LEXIS 338 (1971)

Briscoe was a former criminal who had been entirely rehabilitated for some time and who lived in relative obscurity, far removed from his earlier criminal enterprises. A jury might well find that a continuing threat that the rehabilitated offender's old identity will be resurrected by the media is counter-productive to the goals of this correctional process. Essentially overturned by Cox v. Cohn and Gates v. Discovery Communication (2004)

Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts

Facts of the case In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "Bear" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case. Question: In light of the Court's ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, were the allegations made against Butts and Walker libelous? Conclusion: In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court noted significant differences between the circumstances of these cases and those of New York Times. In particular, criticism of Butts or Walker, unlike a government official, could not be conflated with criticism of public policy. Thus, the Court reasoned that public figures who are not public officials may recover damages for libel stemming from false reports based on "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." The Court concluded that Curtis' investigation of its allegations against Butts failed to meet this standard. The company printed a questionably reliable source's allegations without any attempt to verify his claims, and the story in question was not a pressing event or immediately newsworthy. The Court thus affirmed the lower courts' denial of a retrial. The situation in Butts contrasted with Walker, where the AP relied on a correspondent on the scene of an event that was immediately newsworthy. The Court thus denied Walker's claims to damages.

Hustler and Larry C. Flynt v. Jerry Falwell, 485 U.S 46 (1988)

Facts of the case: A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed. Question: Does the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection extend to the making of patently offensive statements about public figures, resulting perhaps in their suffering emotional distress? Conclusion: Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject.

Masson v. New Yorker, 501 U.S. 496 (1991)

Facts of the case: After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself "the greatest analyst who ever lived." However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure. Question: Does the First Amendment give the New Yorker a right to publish fabricated quotations attributed to a public figure? Conclusion: No. In a 9-0 vote, the Court ruled that the First Amendment s free expression clause could not protect the distortions in Malcolm s article. Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion also explained when a direct quotation can be considered false, and therefore potentially libelous. The First Amendment limits libel suits by public figures. A report about a public figure cannot be considered "false" unless it is a gross distortion of the truth. Justice Kennedy's opinion explained that a direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said. Malcolm_s fabrication qualified as a "gross distortion," and the Court granted Masson standing to sue.

Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974)

Facts of the case: An Albany, Georgia theater manager was convicted under a Georgia obscenity law when he showed the critically acclaimed film "Carnal Knowledge." The film explored social conceptions of sexuality and starred Jack Nicholson and Ann Margaret. Question: Did the manager's conviction violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: A unanimous Court held that the Georgia Supreme Court misapplied the obscenity test announced in Miller v. California (1973). Justice Rehnquist argued that Miller did not give juries "unbridled discretion" to determine what is patently offensive. Only material that displays "hard core sexual conduct" is prohibited. Since "Carnal Knowledge" did not contain scenes of that nature it merited constitutional protection.

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)

Facts of the case: An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between the chief union negotiator and the union president (the petitioners) during collective-bargaining negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local school board. After a teacher-favorable proposal was accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the intercepted conversation. Petitioners filed suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an unknown person using an electronic device had surreptitiously intercepted their telephone conversation. Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the District Court concluded, in part, that the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability containing "no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech." Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid because they deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake. Question: Does the First Amendment provide protection to speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted communication? Conclusion: Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications by parties who did not participate in the illegal interception. "In this case, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance," wrote Justice Stevens. "[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern." Noting that the negotiations were a matter of public interest, Justice Stevens wrote that the "debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that inspired Justice Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v. California, but it is no less worthy of constitutional protection."

Elonis v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___ (2015)

Facts of the case: Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a "true threat," which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that "true threats" require a subjective intent to threaten. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence which the "true threat" exception was created to prevent. Question: Does a conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. §875(c) require proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten? Conclusion: Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the prosecution needed to show that Elonis intended the posts to be threats, and therefore that there was a subjective intent to threaten . An objective reasonable person standard does not go far enough to separate innocent, accidental conduct from purposeful, wrongful acts. The Court held that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an innocent actor because the crucial element that makes this behavior criminal is the threat, not merely the posting. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed that the prosecution only needed to prove negligence, but he argued that the majority opinion should have addressed what the proper instruction should be. By leaving out what the prosecution did need to show, attorneys and judges are left to guess whether knowledge or recklessness is the appropriate standard. Justice Alito also argued that recklessness should be the standard because a higher standard would effectively change the law rather than clarify it. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that nine of the eleven circuit courts of appeals had already addressed this issue and resolved it with a general intent standard. The majority opinion not only overturns their rulings but also leaves the courts uncertain as to whether an intent to threaten is required or whether recklessness will suffice. Justice Thomas also argued that knowledge of posting the relevant threats is enough to establish the intent element because knowledge of those facts is required to make the actions illegal; ignorance of those actions being illegal should not provide shelter from the law.

Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)

Facts of the case: Anthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the "actual malice" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the editorial decisions that were made during the production of the program. Question: In an accusation of libel, do the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect members of the press from inquiries into their thoughts, opinions, and conclusions that go into the editorial process? Conclusion: The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the privilege not to answer editorial inquiries is not absolute. Justice White argued that shielding editorial decision-making from inquiry would "substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice," a burden which was already substantial in the Court's view. White was confident that investigations into this process for falsehood or libelous reporting would not lead to self-censorship of stories that are documented and true; "only reckless error will be discouraged," which would not threaten the constitutionally protected freedom of the press.

Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)

Facts of the case: At a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which "substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser was suspended from school for two days. Question: Does the First Amendment prevent a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a high school assembly? Conclusion: No. The Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the "fundamental values of public school education."

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)

Facts of the case: At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful. Question: 1) Does the First Amendment allow public schools to prohibit students from displaying messages promoting the use of illegal drugs at school-supervised events? 2) Does a school official have qualified immunity from a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when, in accordance with school policy, she disciplines a student for displaying a banner with a drug reference at a school-supervised event? Conclusion: Yes and not reached. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by a 5-4 vote, ruling that school officials can prohibit students from displaying messages that promote illegal drug use. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that although students do have some right to political speech even while in school, this right does not extend to pro-drug messages that may undermine the school's important mission to discourage drug use. The majority held that Frederick's message, though "cryptic," was reasonably interpreted as promoting marijuana use - equivalent to "[Take] bong hits" or "bong hits [are a good thing]." In ruling for Morse, the Court affirmed that the speech rights of public school students are not as extensive as those adults normally enjoy, and that the highly protective standard set by Tinker would not always be applied. In concurring opinions, Justice Thomas expressed his view that the right to free speech does not apply to students and his wish to see Tinker overturned altogether, while Justice Alito stressed that the decision applied only to pro-drug messages and not to broader political speech. The dissent conceded that the principal should have had immunity from the lawsuit, but argued that the majority opinion was "[...] deaf to the constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high-school students [...]."

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)*

Facts of the case: Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony "for any person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place," and specifies that "any such burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group." At trial, Black objected on First Amendment grounds to a jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required "intent to intimidate" could be inferred. He was found guilty. O'Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. In Elliott's trial, the judge did not give an instruction on the statute's prima facie evidence provision. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court held, among other things, that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional on its face and that the prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because the probability of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected speech. Question: Does the Commonwealth of Virginia's cross-burning statute, which prohibits the burning of a cross with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, violate the First Amendment? Conclusion: Yes, but in a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, in which four other justices joined, the provision in the Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute unconstitutional in its current form, in which three other justices joined. Justice Antonin Scalia left the latter portion of the Court's conclusion to argue that the Court should vacate and remand the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court with respect to Elliott and O'Mara, so that that court could have an opportunity to construe the cross-burning statute's prima-facie-evidence provision. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concluded that the Virginia statute is unconstitutional and therefore concurred in the Court's judgment insofar as it affirmed the invalidation of Black's conviction. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

U. S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)*

Facts of the case: David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime. Question: Was the law an unconstitutional infringement of O'Brien's freedom of speech? Conclusion: No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest. "[W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."

Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1971)

Facts of the case: Donald Tanner was a Vietnam War protestor who was distributing anti-war handbills inside Lloyd Center Mall in Portland, Oregon. The handbills were unrelated to the operations of Lloyd Center. Lloyd Center was privately owned by Lloyd Corporation, which prohibited the distribution of handbills inside the mall. While distributing handbills, Tanner and other protestors were informed by mall security that they should stop their distribution or be subject to arrest. The protestors ended their distribution, left the mall, and filed suit against Lloyd Corporation in United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging their First Amendment right to free speech had been violated. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Question: Were Tanner and the other protestors' First Amendment right to free speech violated by Lloyd's refusal to allow them to distribute handbills on mall property? Conclusion: No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Tanner was not entitled to distribute handbills within Lloyd Center. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell contrasted this case with Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, which allowed protestors to picket a shopping center when their picketing was "directly related" to the shopping center and no "reasonable opportunities to convey their message...were available." Here, Tanner's were unrelated to the operations of the mall, and the protestors had an alternative on the sidewalks immediately outside the mall, which were owned by the City of Portland. Powell characterized equating public property with private property intended for public use - such as the mall - as "reach[ing] too far." Therefore, Tanner and the protestors did not have a First Amendment right to distribute their handbills within the mall.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254 (1964)

Facts of the case: During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law. When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed. Question: Did Alabama's libel law unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? Conclusion: To sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled for the Times. When a statement concerns a public figure, the Court held, it is not enough to show that it is false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the term "actual malice" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a malicious purpose. In libel law, "malice" had meant knowledge or gross recklessness rather than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly disseminate false information without a bad intent.

Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966)

Facts of the case: Frank Baer sued Alfred Rosenblatt for libel based on allegedly defamatory statements Rosenblatt made in his editorial for the Laconia Evening Citizen regarding Baer's performance as Supervisor of the Belknap County Recreation Area. The article questioned the ways that Baer, and the County Commissioners to whom he reported, failed to develop the Area to its full potential. A jury in New Hampshire Superior Court awarded Baer damages. In the time between the outcome of the trial and Rosenblatt's appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, where it held that a state cannot award damages to a public official for a defamatory falsehood unless the official proves that there was actual malice—knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. The New Hampshire Supreme affirmed the award and found that New York Times v. Sullivan had no impact. Question: Does a government official have to prove that defamatory statements were made in actual malice to succeed in a libel action? Conclusion: Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that there must be evidence that the libelous statements are directed specifically at the public official in question, and not the governmental body in general. Since the trial judge permitted the jury to award damages based on the finding that Baer was one member of a governmental organization that was libeled, the Court held that the jury instructions were erroneous, and the judgment should be overturned. The Court also held that the public official must establish the statements were made with actual malice, according to the definition set out in New York Times v. Sullivan. Justice Tom C. Clark concurred in the decision. Justice William O. Douglas concurred and argued that the term "public official" is not one that appears in the Constitution and therefore does not need to be as narrowly defined as the Court makes it. He also argued that the First Amendment should bar Congress from enacting any federal libel laws, so the discussion should be surrounding public issues rather than public officials. In his concurrence, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the Constitution prevents state defamation laws from being converted into laws against seditious libel. He argued that the ruling protects a private individual's reputation while upholding a high standard of proof for a public official's defamation suit. Justice Black concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that the First Amendment protects speech that is critical of the government and argued that the majority's opinion in both New York Times v. Sullivan and this case did not go far enough in protecting that right. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John M. Harlan argued that the majority opinion's rule that the jury cannot convert "impersonal" libel to "personal" libel misconstrues tort law. Under conventional tort law, there may be recovery if the group is specific enough to be understood to apply to a specific individual. Justice Abe Fortas wrote a jurisdictional dissent and argued that certiorari was improvidently granted. He wrote that, because the original trial and decision occurred before the Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, that ruling should have no effect on this case.

Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)

Facts of the case: Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling. Question: Does the First Amendment allow a newspaper or broadcaster to assert defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure? Conclusion: The Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that Gertz's rights had been violated and ordering a new trial. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. First, the recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard of fault less then recklessness limits private persons to actual injury. Justice Harry A. Blackmun write a concurring opinion signing on to the reasoning and outcome of the majority. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and William O. Douglas dissenting, arguing that the failure to apply the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to private persons involved in public matters would stifle "free and robust debate." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined the majority in reversing the Court of Appeals ruling but would have simply reinstated the jury verdict and damage award. They disagreed with the majority's refashioning of state liable laws involving private individuals and the news media.

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)*

Facts of the case: Grace Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, attempted to distribute religious literature on the sidewalk near a post office in Chickasaw, Alabama. The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned Chickasaw, Alabama in its entirety as a company town. Marsh was convicted of criminal trespass. Appealing her conviction, Marsh argued that the state law violated the First Amendment. Question: Did Alabama violate Marsh's rights under the First and Fourteenth amendments by refusing to allow her to distribute religious material in the privately owned town of Chickasaw? Conclusion: In an opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black, the majority ruled in Marsh's favor. The Court reasoned that a company town does not have the same rights as a private homeowner in preventing unwanted religious expression. While the town was owned by a private entity, it was open for use by the public, who are entitled to the freedoms of speech and religion. The Court employed a balancing test, weighing Chickasaw's private property rights against Marsh's right to free speech. The Court stressed that conflicts between property rights and constitutional rights should typically be resolved in favor of the latter. Justice Frankfurter concurred. Justices Reed, Burton, and Stone dissented.

Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S 374 (1967)

Facts of the case: In 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine ("Life") printed an article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages against Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on Life. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted Life's owner, Time Inc. ("Time") certiorari. Question: Is a publication, containing misrepresentations about the subject of its coverage, protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees? Conclusion: Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court set aside the Appellate ruling against Time because the lower court failed to instruct the jury that Time's liability was contingent upon a showing that it knowingly and recklessly published false statements about the Hill family. The Court explained that absent a finding of such malicious intent on the part of a publisher, press statements are protected under the First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or inaccurate. The Court remanded for retrial under the new jury instruction.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)

Facts of the case: In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court. Question: Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment? Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. ___ (2014)

Facts of the case: In 2007, the Massachusetts state legislature created a 35-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics. The petitioners, individuals who routinely engage in "pro-life counseling" outside of state abortion clinics, sued in federal district court and argued that the law violated the First Amendment protection of free speech. The district court held that, although the law placed a restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech, the law was constitutional because it was content-neutral and still left adequate, if not perfect, alternative means of communications. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed and held that the Supreme Court, in Hill v. Colorado had already affirmed a similar statute in Colorado that prohibited certain activities within 100 feet of abortion clinics. Question: 1. Did the First Circuit err in upholding the Massachusetts law under the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? 2. If the Supreme Court's ruling in Hill v. Colorado applies, should that ruling be limited or overruled? Conclusion: Yes, unanswered. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Massachusetts law was content-neutral on its face because a violation depends not on the speech itself but on the location of the speech, and therefore does not need to be analyzed under strict scrutiny. However, the Court also held that the law is still not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest because it places too great a burden on the petitioners' First Amendment Rights. By denying the petitioners the ability to engage in conversation and leafleting on public streets and sidewalks, the law prevents the petitioners from engaging in exactly the transmission of ideas the First Amendment is meant to protect. The Court also held that, in enacting the law, Massachusetts overlooked other options that could serve the same interests without placing an undue burden on historical avenues of speech and debate. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the law is content-based and therefore must be examined under strict scrutiny. A blanket prohibition of speech in areas where only one type of politically charged speech is likely to occur cannot be content-neutral. Justice Scalia also pointed out that the majority opinion did not address the question of whether Hill v. Colorado should be limited or overruled. Because Justice Scalia argued that the law was content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, he wrote that Hill should be overruled because it contradicts First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that the law's exemption for clinic employees and volunteers constitutes viewpoint discrimination because it silences abortion opponents while allowing clinic workers and supporters to express their views.

Tinker v. Des Moines ICSD, 393 U.S. 503 (1968)

Facts of the case: In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest. Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion. Question: Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the students' freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference. In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that children are not necessarily guaranteed the full extent of First Amendment rights. Justice Byron R. White wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that the majority's opinion relies on a distinction between communication through words and communication through action. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment does not provide the right to express any opinion at any time. Because the appearance of the armbands distracted students from their work, they detracted from the ability of the school officials to perform their duties, so the school district was well within its rights to discipline the students. In his separate dissent, Justice John M. Harlan argued that school officials should be afforded wide authority to maintain order unless their actions can be proven to stem from a motivation other than a legitimate school interest.

Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing, 419 U.S. 245 (1974)

Facts of the case: In December 1967, the Silver Bridge at Point Pleasant, West Virginia, collapsed and killed 43 people, including Melvin Cantrell. Joseph Eszterhas, a reporter for the local newspaper the Plain Dealer, was assigned to cover the story. He decided to focus on the Melvin Cantrell's funeral and the impact of his death on his family. Five months later, he returned to do a follow-up piece and spoke to the Cantrell children when their mother, Margaret Cantrell, was not present. The article appeared on August 4, 1968 and contained a number of admitted inaccuracies concerning the family and the status of their home. Margaret Cantrell and her children sued under the "false light" theory of invasion of privacy. After the jury heard plaintiff's case, the judge removed the demand for punitive damages because Cantrell had failed to present evidence that the falsehoods stemmed from actual malice. The defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the judge denied. The jury found the defendants guilty and awarded compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the district judge should have granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Question: Should the district judge have directed a verdict for Forest City Publishing Co.? Conclusion: No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the district judge adequately instructed the jury that liability could only be imposed if the jury determined that the false statements were made knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth. Because no one objected to the instructions, the Court held that it did not have to consider whether this was an acceptable standard for "false light" cases. The Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in overturning the case. The Court of Appeals based its analysis on the concept of "actual malice" as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan, while the district judge based his analysis on the common law standard of malice. The Court held that the district judge should not have directed a verdict for Forest City Publishing Co. because there was sufficient evidence in the case to prove Forest City Publishing Co. was aware of the falsehoods. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the imposition of legal analysis differentiating common law malice from actual malice infringes on the freedom of the press by making that freedom contingent upon a jury's opinion. He argued that such a stance could result in a more timid press that would not report stories accurately for fear of facing a libel suit.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)

Facts of the case: Law enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials. Question: Did the Georgia statute infringe upon the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment? Conclusion: The Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited making private possession of obscene materials a crime. In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall noted that the rights to receive information and to personal privacy were fundamental to a free society. Marshall then found that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." The Court distinguished between the mere private possession of obscene materials and the production and distribution of such materials. The latter, the Court held, could be regulated by the states.

Packingham v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___ (2017)

Facts of the case: Lester Packingham was convicted of taking "indecent liberties" with a minor in 2002, as a 21-year-old college student. Per North Carolina law, he was sentenced to a standard 10-12 month imprisonment, followed by a 24-month supervised release. Aside from being told to "remain away from" the minor, his conviction entailed no special stipulations. Packingham was arrested in 2010 after authorities came across a post on his Facebook profile, thanking God for having a parking ticket dismissed. He was arrested for violating North Carolina's laws regarding convicted sex offenders, which barred the offender's access to social media websites. In his defense, Packingham argued that the law violated his First Amendment rights. He was convicted in trial court, which found that the state had a weighty interest in keeping sexual predators off of social media websites for the "protection of minors." The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and held that the social media website provision of the law was unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that the law was constitutional by finding that the law was a "limitation on conduct" and not a restriction of free speech. The court found that the state had a sufficient interest in "forestalling the illicit lurking and contact" of registered sex offenders and their potential future victims. Question: Does a North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing various websites, where minors are known to be active and have accounts, regardless of whether or not the sex offender directly interacted with a minor, violate the First Amendment? Conclusion: The North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing various websites, where minors are known to be active and have accounts, regardless of whether or not the sex offender directly interacted with a minor violates the First Amendment. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, in order to be valid under the First Amendment, a content-neutral regulation of speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. In other words, the law cannot burden substantially more speech than necessary to advance the government's legitimate interest. In this case, although the government has a legitimate interest in protecting children from abuse, this law too broadly restricted access to all sorts of websites. Even if it were limited only to social media websites, the law would still unconstitutionally restrict speech because of the vast number of functions that social media websites perform in the modern world. First Amendment jurisprudence has never allowed for such a broad regulation of speech, and similarly broad restrictions have been struck down. However, a state could accomplish the same goal by enacting a more narrowly written statute. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the majority opinion erred in equating the entire internet with a traditionally public forum instead of recognizing the importance of allowing states to regulate certain types of websites. The government certainly has a compelling interest in protecting children from potential sexual predation, and the internet is a place that allows sexual offenders to contact children in ways that they might not otherwise be able, so the government should be able to regulate sex offenders' use of the internet to an extent. However, the North Carolina law at issue here went too far because it encompassed websites that were unlikely to facilitate a sex crime against a child. Because the North Carolina law prohibited more speech than necessary to further the government's significant interest, it violated the First Amendment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.

Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)

Facts of the case: Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims. Question: Did the Georgia law violate the freedom of the press as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: The Court held that the Georgia statute violated the Constitution. Justice White recognized the primacy of issues of privacy and press freedom, but he also identified compelling reasons why the press should not be restricted in this case. First, the news media is an important resource for citizens which allows them to scrutinize government proceedings. The commissions and adjudication of crimes are issues relevant to the public interest. Second, in the development of the privacy right, the Court has held that the interests of privacy "fade" in cases where controversial "information already appears on the public record." Restricting the media as the Georgia law did was a dangerous encroachment on press freedom, argued White, as it "would invite timidity and self-censorship."

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1 (1990)

Facts of the case: Michael Milkovich, Maple Heights High School's wrestling coach, testified at a hearing concerning a physical altercation at a recent wrestling meet. After the hearing, Theodore Daidium published an article in the local newspaper saying that anyone at the wrestling meet "knows in their heart" that Milkovich lied at the hearing. Milkovich sued Daidium and the paper for defamation, alleging that the article accused him of perjury, damaged his occupation, and constituted libel. The court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that Milkovich failed to show the article was published with actual malice. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that the article was a constitutionally-protected opinion. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded, holding that Milkovich was not a public figure and the defamatory statements were factual assertions, not constitutionally-protected opinions. Question: Are the statements in the newspaper article constitutionally protected opinions? Conclusion: No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that there is no special constitutional privilege for opinions. The statements in the newspaper were sufficiently factual to be proved true or false. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing that the statements could not reasonably be interpreted as defamatory. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)

Facts of the case: Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings. Question: Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee? Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision.

Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 585 US _ (2018)

Facts of the case: Minnesota Statute § 211B.II prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel at or around polling places on primary or election days. The text of the statute did not define "political", so Minnesota election officials distributed policy materials to help identify which items fell within the scope of the law. Election officials received instructions to request that anyone wearing apparel which violated the guidelines laid out in the policy materials remove or cover it up. While officials were instructed to allow the person to vote regardless of their compliance, misdemeanor prosecution was a possible outcome, should an individual refuse the removal or cover-up request. This case arose when Andrew Cilek, executive director for Minnesota Voters Alliance, was temporarily prevented from voting at his local polling place in November 2010 because he was wearing a t-shirt with a Tea Party logo and a button that advocated for the requirement of a photo ID to vote. Minnesota Majority, Minnesota Voters Alliance, and Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots, along with their association Election Integrity Watch (EIW), filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and various county election officials to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The parties claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, and was selectively enforced, which also violated their Equal Protection rights. Initially, the district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the claims regarding Equal Protection and facial First Amendment violations. It reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment against EIW, et al., on the as-applied First Amendment claim. Reviewing de novo the grant of summary judgment against EIW, the Eighth Circuit considered EIW's claim that the Minnesota statute was not reasonable, as applied to Tea Party apparel, because the Tea Party is not a political party in Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded and held that the district court was correct in its ruling, since EIW had failed to present specific facts that showed banning Tea Party apparel was not reasonable, given the Minnesota statute's purpose. The Eighth Circuit held that EIW's argument that voters in Tea Party apparel were affected by selective enforcement had also failed, as it offered nothing more than speculation that voters wearing other forms of political apparel avoided enforcement of the statute. EIW, et al., then petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower courts' ruling was correct. EIW indicates in their petition for a writ of certiorari that there is a circuit split on the issues presented, where the Eighth Circuit's ruling aligns with the D.C. and Fifth Circuit, which both have held that the government has authority to ban forms of political speech near polling places. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held, by contrast, that a complete ban on all political speech, absent any limiting principle, is unconstitutional, regardless of the location in which such speech has been banned. Question: Is Minnesota Statute § 211B.II facially overbroad, thus infringing upon the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by banning all political apparel at a polling place, effectively imposing a "speech-free zone"? Conclusion: The Minnesota statute prohibiting individuals from wearing political apparel at a polling place violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court reasoned that a polling place is a nonpublic forum under its precedents, which means that the state may place reasonable limits on speech therein. Content-based restrictions on speech must be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression" based on the speaker's viewpoint. The text of the Minnesota statute made no distinction based on the speaker's political persuasion, so it would be permissible so long as it is "reasonable." One component of reasonableness is the presence of "objective, workable standards" guiding enforcement of the law. Because the statute in question does not define the term "political" nor any other key terms describing the types of apparel subject to the prohibition, the law affords too much discretion in enforcing the ban and is thus unreasonable. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. The dissent would not have reversed and remanded the court of appeals below, as the Court did, but instead would have certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court to give the state courts "a reasonable opportunity to pass upon and construe the statute."

U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. ___ (2012)

Facts of the case: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces. The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal. Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision. Question: Does 18 U.S.C. 704(b), the Stolen Valor Act, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the Court of Appeals. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny and are almost always invalid, except in rare and extreme circumstances. While categories of speech, such as defamation and true threats, present a grave and imminent threat, false statements alone do not present such a threat. Congress drafted the Stolen Valor Act too broadly, attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm. Criminal punishment for such speech is improper. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred, concluding that false statements of fact should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. However, as drafted, the Stolen Valor Act violates intermediate scrutiny because it applies to situations that are unlikely to cause harm. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented. Congress could not draft the Stolen Valor Act more narrowly, while still preventing the substantial harm caused by false statements concerning military decoration. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.

Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)*

Facts of the case: On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. Question: Did the increase in Mitchell's sentence based on his bigoted motives violate his First Amendment rights? Conclusion: No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the Wisconsin statute paralleled antidiscrimination laws which had been found to comply with the First Amendment. It also determined that the consequences for the victim and the community tended to be more severe, when the victim of a crime was chosen on account of his or her race. Thus, when the Wisconsin statute increased the sentence for such crimes, it was not punishing the defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements, but rather the predicted ramifications of his or her crime. Finally, the Court concluded that the Wisconsin statute did not violate the right to free speech because the occasion in which an average person's racist comments would be used against him or her in a court of law would arise so rarely that he or she would not feel forced to suppress them.

Ginzburg v. U.S., 383 U.S. 463 (1966)

Facts of the case: Ralph Ginzburg and several of his associates were charged with violating a federal obscenity statute for mailing circulars about how and where three different obscene publications could be obtained. Ginzburg challenged his conviction as unconstitutional since the circulars themselves were not obscene. On appeal from an adverse ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding an unfavorable lower court finding, the Supreme Court granted Ginzburg certiorari. Question: Does conviction under the federal obscenity statute, for pandering advertisements for sexually explicit publications, violate of the First Amendment's free speech protections if the advertisements are not themselves obscene? Conclusion: Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that although circulars themselves may not be obscene, their public mailing offends the federal obscenity statute if they advertise obscene materials. The Court reasoned that where the sole emphasis of an advertisement is the commercial exploitation of erotica for prurient appeal, it shall be deemed "pornographic" communication that lies beyond the scope of First Amendment speech protections. The Court cautioned, however, that the distribution of materials containing sexuality in the context of art, literature, or science is not per se prohibited under the obscenity statute if it can be shown to advance human knowledge or understanding.

U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)

Facts of the case: Robert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for "knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain." His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest. Question: Is 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that depictions of animal cruelty are not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court further reasoned that because a "substantial number" of § 48's applications are unconstitutional, the law is overbroad and, thus, invalid. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented. He disagreed with the majority opinion arguing that § 48 was not intended to suppress speech, but rather to "prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty." He was concerned that the majority holding will practically legalize the sale of such videos and spur the resumption of their production.

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)

Facts of the case: Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated "Sam's Stationary and Luncheonette" in Bellmore on Long Island in New York. They had a lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-called "girlie" magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the store and purchased copies of "Sir" and "Mr. Annual"; the purchase was instigated by the boy's parents to lay the grounds for Ginsberg's prosecution. On October 26, 1965, Ginsberg sold the same minor copies of "Man to Man" and "Escapade" at the instigation of a police officer. All of the magazines in question contained pictures of nudes, and "Escapade" and "Mr. Annual" contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual conduct. Section 484-h of New York's Penal Law prohibited the sale to persons under seventeen years of age of 1) pictures of nudity or sexual conduct or 2) literature containing narrative accounts or sexual excitement, if these materials were "harmful to minors." It defined "harmful to minors" as that quality of any description or representation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse that 1) predominantly appealed to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, 2) was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what was suitable material for minors, and 3) was utterly without redeeming social importance for minors. Ginsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on two counts of violating Section 484-h. The Appellate Term, Second Department of the New York Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Question: 1. Did Section 484-h of New York's Penal Law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments on its face because it restrained expression? 2. Was Section 484-h of the Penal Law unconstitutionally vague and uncertain on its face, in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: No and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that Section 484-h did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a restriction on expression. Justice Brennan wrote that obscenity was not within the area of protected speech or press. He acknowledged that the magazines were not obscene for adults, but emphasized that Section 484-h did not prohibit Ginsberg from selling the magazines in question to persons seventeen years of age or older. Justice Brennan focused on Ginsberg's argument that the scope of the constitutional freedom to read material concerned with sex did not depend upon whether that person was an adult or a minor. He rejected Ginsberg's contention that Section 484-h was a violation of minors' constitutionally protected freedoms, characterizing Section 484-h as New York's attempt to adjust the assessment of obscenity in terms of the sexual interests of minors. Justice Brennan wrote that New York had an interest in the well-being of its children, and that this subject was within New York's constitutional power of regulation. Justice Brennan also held that Section 484-h was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. He rejected Ginsberg's argument that Section 484-h failed to give adequate notice of what was prohibited. The New York Court of Appeals previously read Section 484-h to prohibit knowingly selling obscene material to minors, and the Court also read a knowledge requirement into other similar state statutes. Justice Brennan also rejected Ginsberg's argument that the statute was impermissibly vague, as Section 484-h expressly stated that a defendant must be acquitted if he proved that he made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor in question. Justice Potter Stewart concurred. He argued that while the First Amendment protected men's freedom to decide what they will read and listen to, government regulation could extend to settings where a person lacked the capacity to make a choice. New York was free to determine that children were not possessed of a full capacity for individual choice. Justice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Hugo Black. He acknowledged that the act was not a violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but disagreed that obscene material was excluded from First Amendment protection. Justice Abraham Fortas dissented, arguing that the majority avoided the essence of the case's problem by failing to define obscenity for the purposes of the censorship of material sold to minors.

R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)*

Facts of the case: Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Question: Is the ordinance overly broad and impermissibly content-based in violation of the First Amendment free speech clause? Conclusion: Yes. In a 9-to-0 vote, the justices held the ordinance invalid on its face because "it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." The First Amendment prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-semites are bastards but not that all Jews are bastards. Government has no authority "to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules."

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 US ___ (2018)

Facts of the case: The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates and two other religiously-affiliated pro-life entities engaged in providing pregnancy-related services in the state of California (collectively "NIFLA") sought to enjoin the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the "Act"). The law's stated purpose is to ensure access to reproductive health services for all California women, regardless of income. NIFLA argued that the Act's requirements that (1) licensed clinics provide information to patients about free and low-cost publicly funded family planning services, including contraception and abortion, and that (2) unlicensed clinics inform patients of their unlicensed status violated their free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied NIFLA's motion for preliminary injunction, concluding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), as to either their free speech or free exercise claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court had not abused its discretion by denying the injunction. The Court rejected NIFLA's argument that strict scrutiny should apply to the Act, because while the law compelled content-based speech by requiring NIFLA to disseminate information about low-cost family planning services, it did not discriminate based on viewpoint. Relying on its own precedent in the face of a circuit split regarding the level of scrutiny to apply in the abortion-related disclosure context, the Court reasoned that the type of speech at issue in this case was professional speech. It was therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny, which the family planning information disclosure requirement survived. The Court also affirmed that the requirement that unlicensed facilities disclose their unlicensed status survived any level of scrutiny. Finally, the Court agreed with the decision below that NIFLA was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on free exercise grounds, finding that the Act to be a facially neutral law of general applicability that survived rational basis review. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari did not include this issue. Question: Do disclosures required by a California reproductive rights law violate protections arising from the free speech clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment? Conclusion: In a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the pro-life pregnancy center petitioners were likely to succeed on their claim that the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the "FACT Act" or the "Act") violated the First Amendment. In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court began its discussion by explaining that the licensed notice was a content-based regulation that likely violated the First Amendment. The court rejected the Ninth Circuit's characterization of the licensed notice as regulating professional speech, stating that the Court had never recognized "professional speech" as a separate category of speech that was subject to different free speech rules. The Court explained that it had only granted lesser protection to professional speech in two situations--where professionals were required to disclose "factual, noncontroversial information in their 'commercial speech,''' and where states regulated professional conduct that incidentally implicated speech--and that neither of those lines of authority were applicable in the instant case. The Court further stated that it had a long history of protecting the First Amendment rights of professionals outside of those two contexts, emphasizing that imposing content-based regulations on professional speech created a risk of the government seeking to suppress unpopular ideas rather than advance legitimate regulatory objectives. The Court also concluded that the licensed notice did not survive even intermediate scrutiny, as it was "wildly underinclusive" in light of the Act's stated purpose of providing low income women with information about the state-sponsored health services at issue. The Court also held that the unlicensed notice unduly burdened protected speech. Assuming without deciding that rules requiring professionals to disclose "factual, noncontroversial information in their 'commercial speech'" applied here, the Court stated that California was required to show that such disclosures were only justified if they addressed a potentially real and not simply hypothetical harm, and that here, the state had only presented hypothetical risks. And even if the state had overcome this requirement, the Court ruled that the unlicensed notice was still unduly burdensome because it "impose[d] a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that [wa]s wholly disconnected from the State's informational interest," possibly leaving unburdened speakers whose messages aligned with the state's views. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. The dissent argued that both notice requirements were likely to pass constitutional scrutiny. Regarding the licensed notice, Breyer highlighted the Court's precedent permitting state notice requirements as to abortion alternatives, such as adoption, and asked why a state law couldn't require healthcare provider to provide information about abortion and childbirth services in this case. Breyer also rejected the majority's assertion that the unlicensed notice was supported by only a "hypothetical" interest, as well as the conclusion that this particular requirement should be deemed facially unconstitutional due to the fact that it could create an undue burden in some situations.

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 484 U.S 260 (1988)

Facts of the case: The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court. Question: Did the principal's deletion of the articles violate the students' rights under the First Amendment? Conclusion: No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.

Watchtower Society v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)

Facts of the case: The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation. Question: Does a municipal ordinance that requires a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which contains one's name, violate the First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse? Conclusion: Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. The Court reasoned that the village's interest in preventing fraud could not support the ordinance's application to the religious organizations, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the Court decision deprived Stratton residents of the degree of accountability and safety that the permit requirement provides.

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Facts of the case: The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words." Question: Does the First Amendment protect protesters at a funeral from liability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the family of the deceased? Conclusion: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, "I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point." Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case."

Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)

Facts of the case: The village of Skokie, Illinois had a population of approximately 70,000 persons, of whom approximately 40,500 were Jewish. Included within this population were thousands who survived detention in Nazi concentration camps. On March 20, 1977, Frank Collin, the leader of the National Socialist ("Nazi") Party of America, informed Skokie's police chief that the National Socialists intended to march on the village's sidewalk on May 1. As a result of media attention and a number of phone calls allegedly made by Nazi Party members to residents with "Jewish names", this planned demonstration became common knowledge among Skokie's Jewish community. Collin wrote a letter to Skokie officials stating that the purpose of the demonstration was to protest the Skokie Park District's ordinance requiring a bond of $350,000 to be posted prior to the issuance of a park permit. He also stated that the demonstration would consist of 30-50 demonstrators marching in single file in front of the Skokie Village Hall. The demonstrators intended to wear uniforms similar to those traditionally worn by Nazis, including swastika armbands. Collin also said that the demonstrators would not make derogatory public statements and would cooperate with reasonable police instructions. The district court of Cook County conducted a hearing on a motion by the Village of Skokie for a preliminary injunction. The court considered Collin's letter as an affidavit and took the testimony of a number of Skokie residents. One resident testified that a number of Jewish organizations planned a counterdemonstration for the same day with an expected attendance of 12,000 to 15,000 persons, and that the appearance of Nazi demonstrators could well lead to violence. The mayor of Skokie also testified that the demonstration could lead to uncontrollable violence. The court entered an order enjoining defendants from marching, walking, or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or off their person on May 1, 1977. The Nazi Party applied to the Illinois appellate court for a stay of the district court's injunction; the appellate court denied their application. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court also denied the petition for a stay. The Nazi Party then filed an application for a stay with Justice John Paul Stevens, who referred the matter to the Court. Question: Did the Illinois Supreme Court improperly deny the National Socialist Party's request for a stay of the district court's injunction? Conclusion: Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Illinois must provide strict procedural safeguards, including appellate review, to deny a stay for an injunction depriving the Nazi Party of protected First Amendment rights. The Court treated the Illinois Supreme Court's denial of a stay as a final judgment for the purposes of Supreme Court jurisdiction because it involved a right separable from and collateral to the merits of the Nazi Party's case. Hence, the Court also treated the Nazi Party's application for a stay as a petition for certiorari. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Potter Stewart, dissented. He disagreed that the refusal of the Illinois Supreme Court to stay an injunction could be described as a final judgment or decree by the highest court of a state. He noted that no Illinois appellate court had heard or decided the merits of the Nazi Party's federal claim.

Madsen et al. v. Woman's Health Center Inc. et al, 512 U.S. 753 (1994)

Facts of the case: Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer-zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order. Question 1) Is the prohibition of all protesting within the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic an infringement of the First Amendment right to free speech? 2) Is the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the clinic a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 3) Do the limitations imposed on noise-making constitute a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 4) Do the restrictions placed on the use of images violate the First Amendment right to free speech? 5) Is it a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech to bar protesters from approaching potential patients when they are within a 300-foot radius of the clinic? 6) Is it a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech to prohibit all protesting in a 300-foot radius of clinic staff residences? Conclusion: No, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)

Facts: A City ordinance of Griffin, Georgia, provided that distributing literature of any kind within the city limits of Griffin, without first permission from the City Manager, shall be deemed a nuisance and punishable as an offense. The Appellant distributed in Griffin, without permission, a pamphlet setting forth the gospel of the "Kingdom of Jehovah" and was therefore convicted. Question: Did the Griffin ordinance requiring permission to distribute literature violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Conclusion: Yes. The lower court is reversed.Chief Justice Charles Hughes (J. Hughes) stated the ordinance prohibits the distribution of materials of any kind, at any time, at any place, in any manner, without a permit from the City. The prohibitions of the ordinance are not limited to ways, which might be regarded as disruptive to the public order, or obscene. Thus, we think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. The right of freedom of the press was directed against the power of the licensor.

Sidis v. FR Publishing, 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940)

Facts: The Plaintiff was the unwilling subject of a brief biographical sketch and cartoon printed in The New Yorker weekly magazine, which was published by the Defendant. The Plaintiff was a famous child prodigy. His name and prowess were well known to newspaper readers of the period. When he was sixteen, he graduated from Harvard College, amid considerable public attention. Since then, his name has appeared in the press only sporadically and he has sought to live as unobtrusively as possible. The article on the Plaintiff described his early accomplishments in mathematics and the widespread attention he received, then recounts his general breakdown and the revulsion which the Plaintiff thereafter felt for his former life of fame and study. It is not contended that any of the matter printed is untrue. Nor is the manner of the author unfriendly. The work possesses great reader interest, for it is both amusing and instructive. But it may be fairly described as a ruthless exposure of a once public character, who has since sought and has not been deprived of the seclusion of private life. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for intrusion on his right to privacy. The Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. The Plaintiff appealed. Question: Is an invasion of privacy actionable if the Plaintiff was a public figure and the statements printed were of interest to the public? Conclusion: No. Judgment affirmed.* The right to privacy must stem from the famous article by Warren and Brandeis on The Right of [to] Privacy in 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193. Warren and Brandeis realized that the interest of the individual in privacy must inevitably conflict with the interest of the public news. Certain public figures, they conceded, such as holders of public office, must sacrifice their privacy and expose at least part of their lives to public scrutiny as the price of the power they attain.* The Plaintiff was once a public figure. As a child prodigy, he excited both admiration and curiosity. Of him great deeds were expected. The article in The New Yorker sketched the life of an unusual personality and it possessed considerable popular news interest. The Court expressed no comment on whether or not the new worthiness of the matter printed will always constitute a complete defense.

Amalgamated Food v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)

Facts: The Plaintiff, Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. (Plaintiff) owned a public mall that was occupied by Weiss Supermarket (Weiss) and Sears. Weiss employed only nonunion employees so the Defendant, Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 (Defendant), picketed outside their parcel pickup areas. The picketing involved no violence. However, there were some instances of congestion in the parcel pickup areas. The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas enjoined all picketing outside the shopping center. The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas based its decision on the Plaintiff's property rights and that the Defendant's reason for picketing was to compel the employees of Weiss to join a union. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the injunction on the basis that the picketing was a trespass on the Plaintiff's property. Question: Is a privately owned shopping center considered a public location, so that the First Amendment of the Constitution applies? Conclusion: The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), held that private property may in some instance be treated as public property for First Amendment constitutional purposes. The Supreme Court analogized the private shopping center in this matter, to the business block involved in Marsh. The Supreme Court also determined that the shopping center was open to the public. Thus, the state could not by way of trespass laws, hinder access to members of the public who wished to exercise their First Amendment rights. Specifically, those who wished to exercise their First Amendment rights for a purpose consistent with how the property is used. However, this access could be tempered by the state in that the state could regulate First Amendment speech to prevent interference with the normal use of the property by others.

Midler v. Ford Motor Company, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)

Facts: Young & Rubicam, Ford Motor Co.'s (Ford) (Defendant) ad agency, developed a series of television commercials designed to appeal to evoking memories of college days through use of popular song hits of the 1970s. One such commercial was to feature the song Do You Want To Dance, originally performed by Bette Midler (Plaintiff).Midler (Plaintiff) was a nationally known singer/actress/comedienne whose albums had gone platinum and gold and had been nominated for an Academy Award. Ford (Defendant) approved the concept after viewing the proposed commercial with an actual recording of Midler (Plaintiff), but Plaintiff, through her agent, refused to rerecord the song for the commercial. Young and Rubicam subsequently hired a former back-up singer for Plaintiff to act as a sound-alike. The singer was told to sound as much as possible like the Bette Midler record, which she did so well that a number of people told Midler after the commercial aired that she sounded exactly like the original. Neither Plaintiff's name nor picture was used in the commercial. Plaintiff sued for misappropriation of her right of publicity in her voice, and although the district court held that Ford (Defendant) and Rubicam had acted like common thieves, it granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment because it believed Plaintiff had no legal basis for her claim. Question: Under California law, does intentional imitation of a celebrity's distinctive and widely known voice for commercial purposes constitute tortious misappropriation? Conclusion: Yes. When a celebrity's distinctive and widely known voice is intentionally imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California. California recognizes an injury from the appropriation of the attributes of one's identity, including the voice, which is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested. A singer manifests herself in her song; to impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity. The value of this attribute is what the market would have paid for Midler (Plaintiff) to sing the commercial in person. Plaintiff has made a showing, sufficient to defeat summary judgment, that Defendant appropriated her identity for it's own profit in order to sell its product. Reversed and remanded for trial.

Hosty et al. v. Carter et al., 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc)

In November 2000, Dean Patricia Carter ordered the printer of Governors State University's student newspaper, the Innovator, to cease printing unless an administrator read and approved the issue. This came shortly after the editors wrote about their adviser's dismissal, which administrators said was unethical. Rather than comply with the new policy of prior review, which was against long-standing university policy, editors stopped publication after the paper's Oct. 31, 2000 edition. Editors Jeni Porche and Margaret Hosty filed a complaint in March 2001 seeking compensatory and punitive damages. A federal district court dismissed the university's request to dismiss the case under Hazelwood v. Kuhlmier, which Governors State appealed. In 2003, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the students, saying that Hazelwood was not the appropriate standard for censorship of college student media. The school asked for a rehearing en banc, which the court granted and where the SPLC filed its amicus brief. The SPLC expressed grave concerns with the concept of applying the Hazelwood ruling to college students. Hazelwood, which concerned a high school administrator's censorship of the student newspaper's articles about teen pregnancy, was structured under the idea that not all topics are appropriate for a younger audience. The SPLC brief argued that this should not apply to the university level where the audience is more mature and comprised of adults. The brief also argued that colleges are intended to be facilitators of intellectual talent and a free press is integral to enhancing a free intellectual community. Applying the Hazelwood standard would allow the administration to be above scrutiny and thus undermine intellectual freedom. The Seventh Circuit rehearing vacated the previous ruling, finding in favor of the university. Despite a strong dissenting opinion, the court held that Hazelwood was the appropriate standard to apply to a newspaper subsidized by the school, despite the fact that the Innovator was an entirely extracurricular publication. The court declined to decide whether the Innovator was actually a public forum, but held that Dean Carter had qualified immunity from liability.

Ex Parte Lo, ____ S.W.3rd ____ (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

Section 33.021(b): Sexually Explicit Communications: prohibited "communucating online in a 'sexually explicit' manner with a minor if the person has the intent to arouse and gratify anyone's sexual desire." Overbroad. "(C)onsistent with the First Amendment, it is conduct designed to induce a minor to commit an illegal sex act with titillating talk that may be proscribed, not the titillating talk itself.

Ex Parte Thompson, ___ S.W.3d ____ (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)

Texas Penal Code 21.15(b)(1): "photograph or by videotape or other electronic means [visually] records, broadcasts, or transmits a visual image of another at a location that is not a bathroom or private dressing room: (A) without the other person's consent: and (B) with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; Overturned. Facially overbroad