Conflict Management Midterm `

Third party activities

-"Good offices" --Parties are not participating in negotiations but helping set up a meeting where representatives can meet—just trying to get them to talk to each other without the third party actually participating in those talks -Fact-finding --Oftentimes the issue in conflicts is difference of perceptions --So fact-finding allows third party to settle disputes over disputed matters -Mediation or conciliation --Active role in trying to reach an agreement --Mediation is usually done by one actor while conciliation usually involves a group of actors -Arbitration and adjudication --Legal means, i.e. courts -Sanctions -Military aid, economic aid -Military intervention -Peacekeeping, peacebuilding -Guarantees

Biased vs. unbiased mediators

-Arguments for unbiased mediator: --More likely to be accepted by both parties --Parties more likely to follow recommendations --More fair, legitimate resolution -Arguments for biased mediator: --Can "deliver" the other side --Information is more credible if mediator is on your side --Willing to use more resources to bring about a particular settlement There is no scientific consensus about which is better, but a lot to say biased mediators are more successful in bringing about agreements.

Rivalry

-Dyad with an ongoing hostile relationship, characterized by military competition and an expectation of future conflict -Examples: Iran and Saudi Arabia, China and Taiwan, US and USSR during Cold War era

Consequences of external support and effects on civil wars

-Elevate violence of war, lengthen it, internationalize it -Difficult to bring to an end -Damages legitimacy -Uncertainty problems -Commitment problems -Increases civilian targeting (cannot rely on local population) -Increases rebel infighting -Increases probability of interstate conflict -Reduces prospects for post-conflict democratization -Contributes to onset of civil war

War: key characteristics

-Fought by units of the state -Organized violence -Contention over an object of value (which can be intangible, i.e. religion, policies, etc.) -Ordered activity with customs and rules -Does NOT have to be declared (nowadays in fact wars are rarely declared) -Battle deaths > 1,000 -Example:

When does arbitration/adjudication become more likely?

-Issue is less salient -Power parity -Previous successful peaceful settlements -Democracy -Experience with legal procedures and legal expertise -Type of legal system: civil law states more likely to agree to ICJ jurisdiction -Issues of higher salience will be solved by disputing parties, not third arbitrating/adjudicating parties

Bellamy et al: Cote d'Ivoire

-Laurent Gbagbo, President of Ivory Coast since 2000, was proclaimed the winner of the election of 2010, the first election since he had become president -International community said his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, had actually won -For months, negotiations and sporadic violence ensued until Outtara's forces began a military offensive -United Nations stepped in under United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), which had been established in 2003 to facilitate peace between warring parties -But UN appeared to be quite partial toward Outtara—conducted airstrikes, perhaps overstepping boundary to be neutral -UN officials said this was legal because they were obligated to protect citizens -Engagement with crisis surely included human protection as core goal, permitted use of force to that end, and proceeded through Security Council, but situation became more controversial once UN Secretariat and Council had defined legitimate president—not exactly impartial...It seemed UNOCI had abandoned impartiality -Episode raised questions about whether Secretary General's role should be more "secretary" or "general" -Also appeared France were overextending themselves, trying to regain control

Trends in intrastate conflict

-Lot more intrastate and internationalized conflict -Interstate and extra-state conflict has gone down -Interstate war is deadlier and longer, however

How are interstate and intrastate conflict similar?

-Main distinction between international and domestic politics doesn't hold for civil wars: also characterized by anarchy -So we can apply concepts related to interstate conflict to domestic level --Get security dilemma, for instance --Bargaining model can be fruitfully used to understand civil wars, especially the commitment problem -One ethnic group grows stronger and demands greater power --Example: Lebanese Civil War -The more even in power the government is with a rebel group, the more likely civil war will occur

Mechanisms for war

-Private information and incentives to misinterpret --Example: First Gulf War. Iraq underestimated allies Kuwait had, i.e. US --Asymmetric information, where both under/over estimated each other -Commitment problem: preventive vs. preemptive war --Preemptive war is legal under international law, preventive war is not --Preemptive is fought in self-defense against an imminent threat, whereas preventive is fought out of fear that opponent may become powerful -One-sided advantage --Example: Six Days' War -Issue indivisibility --No bargaining possible (think religion) --Examples: Kosovo, Jerusalem -Balance of power --Uncertainty of who would win conflict due to equal stances -IGO membership --Reduces tensions --Spying might be good for the purpose of gathering information

Bellamy et al.: Libya

-Roots of Libya's crisis lie in the political upheavals associated with the Arab Spring protests that spread from Tunisia to Egypt and beyond in the early months of 2011 -Regime cracked down on demonstrations and opposition group established itself under Interim Transitional National Council (Interim Council) -Qadhafi extended forces across country quell dissidents -As in case of Ivory Coast, UN officials framed problem as one of human protection, warning of the imminent threat to civilians in Libya -Libya was suspended from Human Rights Council when government refused to comply with R2P -As in case of Ivory Coast as well, regional organizations played a "gatekeeping" role by establishing the conditions under which the Security Council could consider adopting enforcement measures -US was initially reticent to use military -UN Security Council demanded end to violence, urged Qadhafi to ensure safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, established arms embargo on country, imposed indefinite bans on 16 individual members of the Libyan regime, froze the assets of its members, imposed sanctions, and called upon member states to send assistance to Libya -Learned quickly diplomacy alone would not prevent a massacre -After a lot of disagreement, Security Council agreed to intervene militarily, but differences emerged over how to do so -Important question emerging from this conflict is which regional organization can legitimately claim to be "gatekeeper" -Four other issues arose: -NATO has been criticized for what some states see as an overly expansive interpretation of Resolution 1973 and for causing civilian casualties -Questions have been raised about the relationship between human protection and other goals, particularly regime change -The case of Libya raises questions about which regional organizations should be given the gatekeeping role in situations where relevant institutions adopt different positions on the use of force -While air power can help prevent mass killing, it provides only indirect protection and may come at the cost of unintended additional harm to civilians -New politics of protection has four main characteristics: -Encouraged by the UN Secretariat, the Security Council has framed these crises in terms of human protection -Security Council has demonstrated a repeated willingness to authorize the use of military force for protection purposes and has broken through the final constraint of principle on humanitarian intervention—the nominal consent of the host state -Regional organizations have become important "gatekeepers," influencing how issues are framed and the range of plausible policy options available to the Security Council -International society has exhibited a commitment to working through the Security Council to fashion responses to human protection crises -Appeals to protecting civilians may in fact guise other agendas -Human protection requires external actors to engage in local wars and politics, and this will blur the lines between protection and other agendas such as regime change -Need to clarify framework for using military force to protect civilians

R2P

-States have responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity -International society has duty to assist states to fulfill their R2P -Should a state fail to protect its populations, international society must take action through the various provisions set out in the UN Charter

Conditions for effectiveness of sanctions

-Target needs to know that if it stops a particular behavior the sanctions will be removed -Sanctions need to impose significant costs on the target; target needs to be unable to find alternative suppliers -Sanctions shouldn't be too costly for the sender; otherwise sanctions cannot be maintained for long enough

Risk factors leading to war

-Territorial issues -Contiguity -History of conflict -Joint democracy -Relative power -Major power status -Trade ties -Alliance -IGO membership

Factors affecting mediation success

-The nature of the dispute (intensity, duration, issue type) -Intensity -Low number of fatalities--mediation successful (~40%) -High number of fatalities--mediation successful (~60%) (Midway through a war, not so successful) -Usually takes about 130 months to reach agreement during this time period -Duration -Issue type -Nature of the disputants -Regime type -Number of parties -Nature of the mediator

Mediation-supply and demand

-There may be a demand for mediation, or simply a supply (two disputants want third party to mediate their dispute to help them reach a resolution, or third party wants to take part in dispute for their own purposes) -Parties want to settle because conflict is costly but bilateral strategies failed (non-tangible issues, high intensity, fractionalized parties) -Parties believe they can get a better outcome -Parties want to ingratiate themselves with mediator -Parties believe third party-facilitated agreement is more enforceable

Militarized interstate disputes (MIDs): key characteristics

-Threat, display, or use of force -Battle deaths < 1,000 -All wars begin with MIDs, but not all MIDs lead to war -Example:

Civil war: key characteristics

-Violent, large-scale conflict between organized groups within a country that are fighting over control of the government, one side's separatist goals, or some divisive government policy -Battle deaths > 1,000 -Must be reciprocated and sustained -NOT the same as revolution--revolution is about replacing socioeconomic system of a country, so much more total in scope -Failed revolutions may however lead to civil wars -Civil war is also NOT terrorism--they differ in their intended targets, public support, organizational levels; civil wars also aim to directly defeat government whereas terrorism is indirect --Rebel groups rely on public participation while terrorists are more insulated

Luttwak: "give war a chance"

-War is evil, but it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace -Since UN was established, however, wars among lesser powers have rarely been allowed to run their course—ceasefires and armistices have frequently been imposed under the aegis of the Security Council in order to halt fighting -Ceasefires and armistices can systematically prevent the transformation of war into peace -Cites case of Bosnia and of Rwanda and argues letting civil war run its course in either instance would have let a truly postwar era commence—peace takes hold only when war is truly over -If the UN helped the strong defeat the weak faster and more decisively, it would enhance the peacemaking potential of war, but instead its first priority is to avoid casualties -The most disinterested and destructive of all interventions in war are humanitarian relief activities -They keep refugee nations intact and preserve resentments forever -Inserting material aid is bad—many NGOs that operate in an odor of sanctity routinely supply active combatants -Policy elites should actively resist the emotional impulse to intervene in other peoples' wars—not because they are indifferent to human suffering but because they care about it and want to facilitate the advent of peace -Let war serve its function: to bring peace

What does Drezner ultimately conclude about sanctions?

.Economic sanctions ultimately tend to be least effective against the countries that the United States is most eager to coerce, but when used selectively, against the vast majority of states that do not expect frequent bilateral conflicts with the U.S. in the future, they can be a valuable diplomatic tool. Whether sanctions are flowers or weeds, they always rest in a bed of politics. Effective to make them part of larger strategy in which military force is also employed Targeted sanctions, where you specifically target state leaders, are also quite effective.

R2P rules for intervention

1) Just cause -In order to justify intervention, civilians must be faced with severe and irreparable harm, i.e. ethnic cleansing 2) Right intention 3) Last resort 4) Right authority 5) Proportional means -Intervention's scale should be just enough and not more to prevent harm to people 6) Reasonable prospects -Have to be fairly confident you will be successful

Drezner's two arguments against sanctions' effectiveness

1) Sanctions are a costless, harmless alternative to force--sanctions can actually increase the prospects of war and are in fact often precursors, not substitutes, also have many unintended consequences 2) Congressional mandates will lead to effective sanctions policy--the executive branch is still ultimately in charge

According to Reiter, what are the three conditions under which war becomes possible?

1) The two sides disagree as to the likely outcome of war--underestimate opponent's resolve, overestimate their own capabilities 2) Commitment problem--inability of growing side to commit not to attack in the future 3) Indivisible issue--i.e. religion

Drezner's four arguments in favor of sanctions' effectiveness

A close look at the history of sanctions shows that they can be a strategic tool in some scenarios, but useless in others. He pulls apart four arguments against sanctions. 1) Sanctions rarely work--economic sanctions do tend to work if the political objective toward which they are aimed is narrow and clearly defined; they also work better on allies than adversaries because adversaries are more willing to accept short-term economic costs than long-term political costs , whereas allies have lower expectations of future conflict, so they will be less concerned about political concessions. 2) Unilateral sanctions never work--American sanctions can actually provide more diplomatic leverage and impose greater economic costs than sanctions imposed by international institutions 3) Sanctions hurt U.S. trade--sanctions may hurt businesses in short term but do not harm them in the long run 4) Sanctions are immoral because they hurt citizens more than elites--Iraq is the exception, not the rule. In most cases, sanctions are short and their aggregate costs far less than the ones imposed upon Iraq.

Huth et al: venue for negotiation

A focal point will not by itself predict which settlement venue disputants will choose for arbitration. They posit that the decision to pursue formal legal dispute resolution compared to bilateral settlements can be explained by identifying which leaders face higher political costs for making territorial concessions. Because territorial disputes are highly salient for the domestic public, leaders that are more accountable at home must consider the response of domestic actors before they agree to make concessions. They thus argue that legally disadvantaged leaders of democracies will more often prefer a formal process of legal dispute resolution, whereas their autocratic counterparts will be more likely to accept a settlement brokered in bilateral negotiations. Democratic leaders need greater domestic cover due to viable opposition and electoral check these factors encourage them to pursue politically popular decisions.

Key difference between bargaining and negotiation

Bargaining is more about winning and negotiating about communicating

Obstacles to cooperation: bargaining vs. enforcement problems

Bargaining problem: if there are multiple possible agreements but different actors prefer different agreements because of their different distributional consequences -Ex: air traffic control--it's important we all agree upon language (which is now English), because it cannot be changed...that would be disastrous -Ex: trade agreements--must negotiate on which tariffs to get rid of -You want to reach an agreement but you disagree on the terms because different terms benefit some parties more than others Enforcement problem: once states conclude an agreement it needs to be implemented, monitored, and enforced --Ex: Paris climate talks These are not separate phases—they are interlinked. How the bargain is reached has implications for how it can be enforced. If enforcement is guaranteed and both parties know whatever deal they reach will hold them accountable, they will be more incentivized to reach a deal with good terms. A number of trade agreements do not have perfect enforcement because they recognize that countries' economic circumstances may change. The longer the shadow of the future, the more enforcement problems will be mitigated—if you are going to be cooperating frequently in the future, it will incentivize you to sort out issues now.

Arbitration vs. adjudication

Both are methods of international dispute settlement that involve the referral of a dispute to an impartial third-party—either an arbitral tribunal (or single arbitrator) or an international court—for binding decision, usually on the basis of international law Arbitration- third party chosen to judge the dispute outside of court setting; have more control in that you select the arbitrator, determine procedures. But need to agree upon those and pay for them. Take less time. Private. Adjudication-parties' disputes judged by courts (i.e. ICJ); have less control--standing court with judges and defined procedures, but readily available and costs covered. More experience.

Mediation strategies-which are most successful?

Both manipulation and formulation are good at bringing about a formal agreement; manipulation is best. Facilitation is best at bringing about tension reduction. Formulation also works to some extent but not manipulation. Might be good to limit manipulative tactics if a durable agreement is the goal. Or manipulative mediator needs to guarantee agreement in the long run.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of providing external support? How do states choose rebels to support?

Delegating instead of going to war is much less costly -War requires time, troops, armaments -War creates domestic war weariness -Condemnation of international community -Allies may be drawn into war against wishes -It is easier for governments to conduct support for rebel groups in secrecy-Local advantages But it also has disadvantages -By delegating, principals give up some control over achievement of key objectives -In interstate war, states have direct control over their forces, but when they delegate action to rebel groups, they risk losing agency and autonomy over their foreign policy goals -If the rebel group's preferences are not closely aligned with that of the foreign patron, then the potential for agency loss is especially high So supporting rebel groups will be more attractive when the costs of foreign aggression are high and the potential for agency loss is low. Also, critical national security issues incline states to retain direct control over their foreign policy, whereas less vital concerns may be "contracted" to militant organizations. They propose that states will select rebel agents based on two criteria: their ability to pose a viable threat to the target regime and the degree of preference congruence -More capable groups with resources will be able to carry out goals -Groups with dissimilar preferences are unlikely to be reliable agents (common language and culture as well as ethnic or religious ties will reduce concerns about preference divergence).

Fearon: strategic structure of international disputes

He argues that international disputes share a common strategic structure: first a bargaining problem, and then an enforcement problem. These interact in an interesting way that cuts against conventional wisdom of cooperation theorists. They believe longer shadow of the future makes cooperation more sustainable and likely, but his analysis demonstrates that it can give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal. The more an international regime creates durable expectations of future interactions on the issues in question, the greater the incentive for states to bargain hard for favorable terms. This thereby possibly makes cooperation harder to reach.

Evans et al: Three advantages of R2P and six principles justifying military intervention.

He argues we need to reframe "right to intervene" as "responsibility to protect" when talking about international conflicts. Says this framework has three advantages: 1) Implies evaluating the issues from the point of view of those needing support, rather than those who may be considering intervention 2) Implies that the primary responsibility rests with the state concerned only if that state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibility to protect, or is itself the perpetrator, should the international community take the responsibility to act in its place 3) Umbrella concept, embracing not just the responsibility to react, but to prevent and rebuild as well Sovereignty is now understood dually, for states must respect the sovereignty of other states, but they must also respect the dignity and rights of all the people within the state. Military intervention must satisfy six principles: -1) Just cause: military intervention is an extraordinary measure; for it to be warranted, civilians must be faced with the threat of serious and irreparable harm -2) Right intention: the primary motive of intervening must be to halt or avert human suffering -3) Last resort: intervention can be justified only when every nonmilitary option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded -4) Proportional means: the scale, duration, and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined objective of protecting people -5) Reasonable prospects: there must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering that has justified the intervention; the consequences of action should not be worse than the consequences of inaction. -6) Right authority: the UN is the principal institution for building, consolidating, and using the authority of the international community, and so the task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the council work better It is important to reach consensus on these principles, but unless the political will is mustered to act when necessary, the debate will be largely academic. Too often more time is spent lamenting the absence of political will rather than analyzing its ingredients and how to mobilize them. -Moral appeals -Financial arguments -National interest appeals -National economic interests -Peace These days, good international citizenship is a matter of national self-interest.

Why do they decide to mediate?

IGOS -Resolving conflict is their raison d'etre -Might want to uphold norms States -Domestic pressure to stop violence -Self-interest -Preference for one side -Guarantee stability; keep conflict from spilling over -Prevent higher costs later -Ensure nobody else intervenes -Earn gratitude of parties -Enhance influence and prestige

Why agree to arbitration or adjudication?

If national leaders are blocked from reaching an agreement by domestic opposition--political cover. Domestic audiences are very resistant to giving up territory, so it may be more politically expedient to solve territorial disputes through arbitration or adjudication, allowing third parties to decide upon issue and preventing leader to be penalized by people. Weak countries think they can get a better outcome from legal process. May reduce tensions by de-politicizing an issue. Can sort through complex issues. Might be more likely to be impartial/neutral.

How are sanctions used today different than how they were previously according to Drezner? Differentiate between deterrence, denial, and compellance.

In 1990s, they were comprehensive and aimed to compel states to change their behavior, and usually in context of interstate conflict. By 2000s, started becoming more targeted and for deterrence/denial purposes. Deterrence and denial are much easier goals than compellance -Compel--trying to get target to change behavior - -Deter--prevent that behavior in the first place -Deny--refuse to continue helping state as punishment for a behavior .As US dollar becomes weaker, it becomes more difficult to use sanctions effectively. Already seeing China and Russia using more sanctions than they have in the past.

Fischer and Ury: focus on interests, not positions

Interests define the problem-the basic problem in negotiations is not conflicting positions, but different needs, desires, concerns, and fears. Your position is what you decide upon, but those interests are what motivated you to decide.

Criticisms of intervention

Interventions prolong war (Luttwak) --Victory leads to lasting peace, while intervention makes it more likely that fighting re-erupts --Intervention takes way the "hurting stalemate" and the SQ is frozen without true resolution How does this relate to the bargaining model? --Intervention stops revelation of information bargaining model enables two sides to realize each other's interests and to figure out how to achieve them --Military victory is correlated with lower probability of conflict recurring and overall number of fatalities --The problem is that letting parties fight does not necessarily lead to military victory --To say nonintervention will lead to longer lasting peace assumes it is preventing military victory when there is no guarantee that will happen --Concern about quality of peace is it just? Intervention is never neutral --To the extent that intervention seeks to end war, it needs to establish who will rule --Military intervene freezes the military SQ and in the process advantages some groups and disadvantages others Moral hazard --Protection against risk leads to greater risk-taking behavior --The emerging norm of R2P, by raising expectations of intervention to protect groups targeted by government violence, creates incentives by groups to rebel against governments when they wouldn't have done so otherwise

What is mediation?

Involvement of an outside state in a conflict upon the approval of both of the disputing parties, with the aim of reducing the hostilities between the disputing parties, by facilitating the formulation and/or implementation of a negotiated settlement -Non-binding--trying to find a solution that is not legally grounded -All about persuasion

Mediator as formulator

Involves a substantive contribution to the negotiation process—mediators conceive and propose new solutions to the disputants. Coordination. Example: in a 1992 crisis between Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS successfully structured the bargaining process and proposed the outcome to which the parties ultimately agreed.

Issues with those rules

Just cause --Many instances may fit but there cannot be intervention in all—how to pick? Inconsistency --Presupposes clear distinction between aggressor and victim Right authority --UN is the most legitimate body to give approval to a mission but is often blocked --Trade-off between legitimacy and efficacy --Problem of not having standing forces delay in putting them together --Multiple regional organizations may have different views over proper intervention Reasonable prospect --Difficult to react timely enough to make a difference

How do rebel groups decide when to accept support?

Salehyan et al. assume rebels want to maximize two things: the resources they have at their disposal to challenge the state or privately consume, and the autonomy they have over their own actions. Accepting funding from foreign patrons will often come with strings attached as the principal assumes some control over the rebel's agenda, even if it does expand resources there is a trade-off between the additional resources gained from accepting external support and the potential for lost autonomy. Based on these analyses, they make six propositions: -1) The strongest and weakest rebel organizations, relative to the target government, will be less likely to receive external support (strong central command assures foreign patron that troops in the field are carrying out orders effectively and makes it easier to monitor group) -2) Rebel groups will be more likely to receive foreign support if they have a clear central leadership that exercises control over the group's activities (when groups are able to obtain resources domestically, they will prefer to do so in lieu of accepting external support) -3) Rebel groups will be less likely to receive foreign support if they are able to control territory within the state (groups that have transnational appeal are more likely than groups with parochial interests to receive external assistance as sympathizers elsewhere pressure their states to come to their defense) 4) Rebel groups will be more likely to receive external support if they have a transnational constituency or audience (states involved in international rivalries have more disputes with others) 5) Rebel organizations are more likely to receive external assistance if their target state is engaged in an international rivalry (counterbalancing interventions are common; intervention on behalf of either the government or rebels leads other states to want to balance that influence by supporting the opposite side) 6) Rebel organizations are more likely to receive external assistance if their target state also receives external assistance

Sanctions

Sanctions can be economic or military in nature. Sanctions restrict or stop normal international economic exchanges, foreign aid, or provision of military assistance for the purpose of compelling, denying, or deterring political or military behavior by the target. -46% of sanctions are inflicted by the US -However, countries that used to rarely use them are not using them more often, including China and Russia -Average length is 2.7 years

Mediator as communicator

Serves as channel of communication among disputing parties, ensuring that they have access to all necessary information to best estimate the range of mutually preferable outcomes. They make no substantive contribution to the negotiation process. Example: in a 1990 crisis between India and Pakistan, the U.S. delegation to Pakistan made sure that Pakistan was aware of its military inferiority and that the United States had no intention of helping Pakistan in the event of a full-scale war.

New vs. old civil wars

Some argue that "new" civil wars are different from "old" civil wars. They are motivated by greed rather than political, economic, or social reasons -Factions lack broad popular support -Violence is more gratuitous and lacks purpose -Are they really different? And how do these differences affect our ability to enter into negotiations? -False distinction is based on incomplete and biased information--new and old civil wars really have very similar underlying causes -The way violence has been used over time is not that different -Seems plausible that causes of civil war are actually constant

Fischer and Ury: positional bargaining

The more attention paid to positions, the less paid to the underlying interests of two parties. Agreement reflecting their legitimate interests becomes less likely. Positional bargaining always becomes a contest of will whereby the parties assert what they will or will not do, and the task of jointly devising a solution becomes a battle.

Trends in interstate conflict

The number of armed conflicts has cecreased since the 20th century. There has not been a war since the Iraq War; this has been the longest period of peace since Westphalia. War doesn't pay anymore; it has very low benefits and high costs. Military force remains useful for territorial gains but for intangible objects of value such as policies, not so much. Nuclear weapons pose significant threat-no goals are seen as worth an entire country or even the world's destruction. Fatigue from war has also decreased desire to go to battle. New norms. Increase in prosperity in trade. More democracies. More IGOs. US dominance of international system. More effective conflict management strategies.

Huth et al.'s conclusions regarding international law

These findings challenge the thinking of realists like Morgenthau who believe international law merely guises states' interests. Instead, it appears that legal claims are extremely strong predictors of states' behavior. The international law variable performed strongly even when controlled for by variables like military strength. That they were also able to achieve these results in the context of territorial disputes, which are known for their intractability and high propensity for violence, further bolsters the importance of their findings. The shadow of power may be important, but the rule of law cannot be forgotten.

Beardsley et al: mediation strategies

They develop three forms of mediation through which parties can commit to alternatives within the ZOA: communication/facilitation, formulation, manipulation.

Pettersson et al: trends in conflict

They show that since WWII, we have seen a decline in interstate conflict, but a rise in intrastate conflict and internationalized disputes.

Huth et al: international law

They study the extent to which international law facilitates dispute resolution. Under anarchy, that possibility has always been contested. Many scholars have contended that international law is not a primary explanation of state behavior, especially in the realm of international security, which has very high stakes, such as territorial claims. But Huth et al. believe international law can facilitate dispute resolution even when security issues are at stake when one of the disputants has a clear legal advantage. Specifically, leaders with strong legal claims who are dissatisfied with the territorial status quo are more likely to challenge it by opening negotiations and less likely to resort to threats or the use of force. Their analysis focuses on three interrelated yet distinct stages of the "peaceful pathway" to dispute resolution: 1) "Challenge the status quo" 2) "Negotiations" 3) "Mode of settlement" Their argument consists of two related parts having to do with these three stages. The first part, which focuses on the first and second stages, speaks to how international law can help state leaders identify a solution to the problem of how to divide the contested territory, thereby enabling them to move toward a settlement agreement. They posit that international law will facilitate a peaceful path to settlement when it is able to help leaders solve distribution problems, under two conditions (if these conditions are met, a focal point based on international law is likely to emerge as both parties investigate the strength of their legal claims). 1) The relevant legal principles must be unambiguous, capable of suggesting a single way to divide the disputed territory 2) One state must have a definitive legal advantage over its opponent Focal points allow leaders to identify which legal principles are relevant to a dispute and to "coordinate their expectations." If a focal point indicates the leader of state A is entitled to 25% of a territory and state B 75%, then the leader of state A knows he or she must offer a settlement closer to 75% than 50% to reach an agreement and avoid the costs of allowing the dispute to continue on. In this way, focal points identify which of the infinite number of potential settlements to start with, thereby solving coordination and distribution problems. They posit that a focal point will most likely emerge if two conditions hold 1) The relevant legal principles must be clear and well-established 2) The relative strength of the disputants' legal claims must be asymmetric

Why do states decide to support rebels?

They use this tactic to destabilize the target government. They may wish to gain leverage over territorial issues, control over policies, or unseat unfriendly regimes. Such a tactic has become more popular since WWII.

BATNA

This is the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. It may be the case that the other side is more powerful. In response to power, the most any method of negotiation can do is to meet two objectives: first, to protect yourself from an agreement that you would reject, and second, to help you make the most of the assets you do have so that any agreement you reach will satisfy your interests as well as possible.

Beardsley et al: ZOA

This is the zone of agreement, and it consists of all possible outcomes that would allow the disputants to achieve their respective preferences. In any bargaining situation, the disputants' preference orderings should somehow overlap to create this zone. Can think of ZOA as Fischer and Ury's BATNA. The alternative to either a ZOA or BATNA is continued conflict because status quo is unacceptable to two disputing parties. Underscores idea that peace in a crisis can only be achieved if it is mutually preferable to continuing the crisis.

Reiter: the bargaining model of war

This model sees bargaining as pervasive of the whole process of war-from the beginning to the end. Negotiations occur during war, and war ends when a deal is finally struck. The model is built upon the economic idea that resources are scarce, and international politics is about the competition amongst states over those resources. Politics would be unnecessary if everyone could enjoy these resources, but they can't. This model is built upon the critical assumption that war is costly. Both sides lose resources when fighting, and so at the end of the war, both are left worse off than if they had not gone to war in the first place. The fighting breaks out because neither side can arrive at a mutual agreement on how to allocate desired resources, such as territory. Each side fights to improve its chance of getting its desired settlement. The war ends when both sides strike a bargain that they prefer to continuing to fight. The outcome is thus the bargain they struck. The peace following reflects both sides' desire not to break that deal-if peace ends, then they did not prefer it.

Valentino

To establish the premise that humanitarian intervention always works requires comparing the full costs of intervention with its benefits and asking whether those benefits could be achieved at a lower cost—evidence from last two decades is not promising on this score It saves lives, but at a moral, political, and economic price Moral -Proponents of intervention usually make their cause in terms of the United States' moral responsibilities -The ethical clarity that advocates of human rights have associated with saving human lives has almost always been blurred by a much more complicated reality -Usually involves arming factions claiming to represent victims who are in fact guilty of human rights abuses themselves -Using force to save lives usually involves taking lives, including innocent ones -May encourage retaliation, making victims appear not to be nuisances but enemies -Victims may rise up because they think military intervention is coming when it is not Political costs -US interventions have made many enemies -Increased distrust with Russia and China -Interventions also diminish authority of international organizations such as UN—US has sidestepped UN before, but if it tries to do it again, will be perceived as illegitimate Economic costs -Must consider opportunity costs of military force—expensive endeavor -Intervention is no substitute for prevention -Early but robust efforts at conflict prevention are almost always more cost-effective than reactive interventions -But predicting which hot spots will turn violent is extremely difficult In consideration of these three costs, there are three strategies which may offer people help at much lower premiums: investing in international public health initiatives, sending relief aid to victims of natural disasters, and assisting refugees fleeing violent conflict -Can save many more lives by investing money into treating diseases than by intervening in conflicts -Disaster-relief programs are expensive however they avoid the moral and political costs of military intervention -Helping victims reach safety across international borders and caring for refugee populations once they arrive have saved more lives than any other form of intervention

Fischer and Ury: insist on using objective criteria

Trying to reconcile differences on the basis of will has serious costs. No negotiation is likely to be efficient or amicable if you pit your will against theirs, and either you have to back down or they do. So focus on objective criteria to bring common sense into the negotiating process. That way people's judgments won't be clouded by subjective criteria.

Disadvantages of arbitration/adjudication

Unpredictable; and you may lose! Since it's binding, disputants either have to follow ruling or pay costs Adversarial process: win or lose--Might overlook win-win compromises

Types/causes of interstate conflict

War, Militarized Interstate Dispute, Rivalry

Fischer and Ury: invent options for mutual gain

As valuable as it is to have many options, people involved in a negotiation rarely sense a need for them. In a dispute, people usually believe they know the right answer-their view should prevail. But that won't help anyone. Cannot view situation as either/or, a fixed pie. Must see how pie can grow. There almost always exists the potential for joint gain.

Fischer and Ury: separate people from the problem

Dealing with human beings who have emotions, values, viewpoints, and backgrounds. Must respect those and understand they are unpredictable. Failing to deal with others sensitively by keeping those in mind can be disastrous for a negotiation. Don't deduce their interests from your fears (security dilemma). Involve each other in process so everyone has stake in outcome. Limit size of group meeting to negotiate. Keep in mind their perceptions. Communicate.

External support

External support is the opposite of sanctions-it expands rather than reduces economic interaction. Includes: -Diplomatic support -Economic aid -Humanitarian aid -Military aid (training, intelligence, weapons) -Direct troops support -Sanctuaries/operating bases It can be given by other states or diasporas (members of ethnic groups in other states sympathetic to cause)

Effectiveness of sanctions (explain the selection bias)

Goal of traditional sanctions is typically "compellance": getting target government to change its policies; or if it doesn't, to get it removed. Problem: traditional sanctions weaken the people, but leave elites unaffected and might even strengthen the regimes they seek to coerce -Example: groups in Iran like them because they control the black market, so sanctions make their business lucrative These are typically successful 1/3 of the time Sanctions are typically threatened before they are imposed--should look at both the ones that are threatened and imposed to decide how effective they are So can we really conclude that sanctions would be successful 1/3 of the time if we are only looking at the ones that have already been imposed? We would expect there to be a much higher rate of success when also looking at threat So sanctions may not be as toothless as Drezner posits Sanction threat is more successful than actual sanction. A sanction is usually imposed only after a target refused to give in to the threat. This suggests sanctions are imposed on particularly resolved targets--selection bias.

Risk factors leading to civil war

Grievances such as ethnic differences or political, economic, cultural, or social deprivation. But, it might be more so a matter of opportunity. Grievances are common while opportunities are rare, so this may in fact be what leads to civil wars.

Mediator as manipulator

Like formulation, manipulation also provides a substantive contribution to the negotiation process. Mediator uses position and leverage to influence crisis bargaining. Mediator shifts the reservation points of each actor, thereby increasing the probability that the actors will be able to identify some alternative within the expanding ZOA. Example: a 1972 crisis between North and South Yemen in which Colonel Qaddahfi of Libya reportedly threatened to hold captive the delegation leaders of both sides if they did not reach an agreement, and $50 million in annual aid if they did.

How do Salehyan et al. say external support changes internal conflicts?

Makes them longer, incur more casualties, and negotiation process more difficult because new actors get introduced into the bargaining process and change the dynamic.

International law

Many people argue international law has no teeth, but this conception is not true-see arguments set forth by Huth et al.

Supporters: opportunity and willingness-why do states provide external support? What are the risks they run when doing so?

Must think about opportunity and willingness—in terms of opportunity, who do you think is best able to provide support? Opportunity means you or neighboring countries have great supply of power Top 10 supporters are US, UK, Russia, China, Cuba, France, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Libya, Sudan These states may provide external support because they genuinely care, but they may also do it to force states to come to negotiating table May also want to fight a proxy war by funding rebels Protect interests Protect ethnic kin Tit for tat--may not have any particular reason to support rebels, but in past, other government has supported rebels against your government Willingness is contingent upon whether it will settle the dispute, sympathetic to goal, underlying dispute with another state (proxy war), reputation costs to consider, etc. Need to consider whether rebel groups are too weak or strong Risks of sponsoring rebels: -Reputation -Less control of outcome -Non-obvious loyalty -Double cross -Lose agency

Fischer and Ury: principled negotiation (four elements)

People: separate the people from the problem. Interests: focus on interests, not positions. Options: invent options for mutual gains. Criteria: insist that result be based on objective standards.

Who receives more external support: governments or rebels?

Prior to 9/11, it was fairly even, but now see a lot more going to government than to rebels due to the War on Terror—it is easier to label rebel groups terrorists. External support used to be given primarily to African countries but now see majority of it going to Middle East. We most often provide armaments tied to other forms of military aid, rarely direct troops.

Pro's and con's of sanctions

Pros -Can achieve goals without using force--no human losses for sender -Signals to others that a certain behavior is unacceptable--deterrence -Sanctions might decrease the chance of war Cons -Can lead to great harm in the target -Impose costs on sender--need to be costly to signal you care about issue -Adverse effects: benefit the wrong side; detrimental for all -Might actually increase the chance of war (depends on context)

How do they say you can think of states as principals and rebels as agents?

States (principals) may wish to retain foreign policy autonomy and will decide against backing rebel groups, so their willingness to support them will depend on the costs of direct military action and the states' ability to select and monitor appropriate agents. Rebel groups (agents) can significantly augment their resources by accepting external support, but by doing so they become subject to the wishes of their supporters and may therefore choose to remain autonomous.

Who mediates?

States, IGOs, NGOs, individuals

Salehyan et al: the supply and demand of external support

Supply: states are willing to support rebel groups. Demand: rebels are willing to accept state's support.