CRIM1 CASES 1

White Light Corp v. City of Manila FACTS

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

People v. Lol-lo PIRACY; INSTANT CASE

One Moro who participated in the crime of piracy was sentenced to death and another to life imprisonment.

People v. Abilong How COMMITTED; CASE AT BAR.

One who, sentenced to destierro by virtue of final judgment, and prohibited from entering the City of Manila, enters said' city within the period of his sentence, is guilty of evasion of sentence under article 157, Revised Penal Code (Spanish text).

Minucher v. Scalzo Diplomatic Immunity; Only "diplomatic agents", under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits.

Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Police Power; Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.—

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation's legal system, its use has rarely been denied.

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen Continuing Offenses; The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed. Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner's child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Bill of Rights; The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.

US v. Bustos GENERAL PRINCIPLESS—

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.

People v. Echegaray Furman did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se.

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against racial discrimination. x x x Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial-judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.

People v. Formigones PENALTY.

The penalty applicable for parricide under article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed only of two indivisible penalties, to wit, reclusión perpetua to death. Although the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, Article 63 of the said code is the one applicable and must be applied.

People v. Lol-lo PIRACY; ARTICLES 153, 154, PENAL CODE; WHETHER IN FORCE

The provisions of the Penal Code relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in the United States.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila The general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing. In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.

Corpuz v. People The Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code ( RPC).—

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is illequipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; Requisites for Validity.—

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

People v. Ferrer Statutory construction; Title of bill need not be a catalogue of its contents.

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow or technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.

Garcia v. Drilon The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."

Lozano v. Martinez B.P. 22 does not conflict with constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debt Police power may override a constitutional guarantee.—

There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on nonimpairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

Garcia v. Drilon Statutes; An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. Yet, petitioner insists that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.

US v. Bustos STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

These paragraphs in the Philippine Bill of Rights carry with them all the applicable English and American jurisprudence.

Garcia v. Drilon Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the Violence Against Women and Children case or any issue thereof to a mediator.

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought.

Guingguing v. CA Criminal Law; Libel; Definition of Libel; Elements of Libel.

Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.

US v. Diaz Conde RULING

WON the defendants can be punished for violating a law that did not exist when they executed the contract in question. Acts by the defendants did not constitute a crime, hence the sentence of conviction was revoked and the complaint dismissed, with the defendants granted discharge from custody. Ex post facto laws, or retroactive laws, are prohibited unless they are favourable to the defendant. Since the Usury Law was passed after the execution of the contract between the defendants and their obligee, they cannot, therefore, be punished for having stipulated an interest rate, which at the time they executed said contract, was legal. A law imposing a new penalty or a new liability or disability, or a new right to action, must not be construed as having a retroactive effect, otherwise, it would impair obligation of a contract, which is prohibited in legislation. For all of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and so decide, that the acts complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time they were committed, and therefore the sentence of the lower court should be, and is hereby, revoked; and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the complaint be dismissed, and that the defendants be discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

People v. Ferrer Criminal law and procedure; Guidelines to be observed in prosecutions under the Anti-Subversion Act.—

We cannot overemphasize the need for prudence and circumspection in the enforcement of the Anti-Subversion Act, operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the Act. The Government, in addition to proving such circumstances as may affect liability, must establish the following elements of the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippines or any other subversive association: In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime under the domination of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization; and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectives which led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing the country under the control of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined the CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts.

People v. Ferrer Act does not infringe freedoms of expression and association.

Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country.

People v. Ferrer R.A. 1700, other known as The Anti-Subversion Act, not a bill of attainder

When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definition purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

People v. Tulin RULING

Whether or not the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the Philippine waters and territory? RULING: We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants. Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighbouring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws. After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao," or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore. All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accusedappellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto. SO ORDERED.

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan RULING

Whether or not the case may be reopened for further reception of evidence NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify the penalty imposed in view of the enactment of an amendatory law favorable to the accused. The Court upheld Sandiganbayan's ruling that the absence of the first requisite that the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples theMotion to Reopen the Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. However, the Court held that it is still necessary to reopen the instant caseand recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan,not for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but inorder to modify the penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification ismeant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by thecourt that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability. To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is anexample of such exceptional circumstance. Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we have here a novel situation whereinthe judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to theaccused, she may even apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any groundfor disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707. The Court also held that when exceptional circumstances exist, such as thepassage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not somuch the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prisión mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days of prisión mayor as maximum period to reclusion temporal maximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P11,300.00. Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification. Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to the government the amount of P11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of the filing of the Information up to the time the same is actually paid. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that the indeterminate penalty to be imposed on the accused should be from 6 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days of prisión mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of P11,300.00 to be restored by the accused. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum term, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prisión correccional, as maximum term. Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for dissemination to the First and Second Level courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the appellate courts, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance, and appropriate action. Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines, and the House of Representatives, be furnished copies of this Decision for their information. SO ORDERED.

Minucher v. Scalzo Exception; The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.

(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.

People v. Ferrer Constitutional law; Bill of Attainder, defined.

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.

Lozano v. Martinez The text of the 2nd paragraph of B.P. 22 was what was approved on second reading as per minutes of the Batasan and a committee report, contrary to the argument that said text was clandestinely amended on 3rd reading.

A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows that, indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact text of the paragraph in question which the body approved on Second Reading. Part of the confusion was due apparently to the fact that during the deliberations on Second Reading (the amendment period), amendments were proposed orally and approved by the body or accepted by the sponsor, hence, some members might not have gotten the complete text of the provisions of the bill as amended and approved on Second Reading. However, it is clear from the records that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually approved by the body on Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved Minutes for that day. In any event, before the bill was submitted for final approval on Third Reading, the Interim Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the Committee in its report, which was approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that "the clause in question was . . . an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately the provision in question as approved on Second Reading. We therefore, find no merit in the petitioners' claim that in the enactment of BP 22 the provisions of Section 9 (2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.

People v. Ferrer Remedial law; Distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact.

A conventional formulation is that legislative facts—those facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment —will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a rational basis for believing that they exist, while adjudicative facts—those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant— are to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinary standards prevailing for judicial trials.

People v. Formigones CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; IMBECILITY AS EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE; REQUISITESS.

A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.

US v. Bustos FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; PRIVILEGEEE

A petition, prepared and signed at an assembly of numerous citizens including affidavits by five individuals, charging a justice of the peace with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal, was presented through lawyers to the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance of the district. The judge of first instance, after investigation, recommended to the GovernorGeneral that the justice of the peace be removed from office. Later, on the/justice of the peace filing a motion for new trial, the judge of first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of the peace of the same. Criminal action was then begun against the petitioners, now become the defendants, charging that portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were libelous. The trial court found thirty-two of the defendants guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a nominal fine. On a review of the evidence, we find that express malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary. The defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, they should rather be commended for their good citizenship.

US v. Bustos QUALIFIED PRIVILEGEE

A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny will defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications.

Garcia v. Drilon Remedial Law; Temporary Protection Order; Words and Phrases; A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs; The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. "The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.

Garcia v. Drilon Gender-Based Violence; According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence."

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence." Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.

People v. Simon No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian or be accompanied by the taking of pictures.—

Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or police authorities. These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures.

People v. Tulin Alibi; Alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses.—

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accusedappellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.

Corpuz v. People Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, the Supreme Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.—

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case. The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.

People v. Simon Drug-pushing when done on a small scale belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time, and in any place.

Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger. We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place. It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.

Ladonga v. People Criminal Law; Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22); Article 10 of the RPC is composed of two clauses—the first providing that offenses which in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws; The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished, and the second clause contains the soul of the article, the main idea and purpose of the article being embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.—

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled. The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.

People v. Lol-lo PIRACY; ARTICLES 153, 154, PENAL CODE; WHETHER IN FORCEEE

Article 153 of the Penal Code now reads as follows: "The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."

Ladonga v. People To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity; Mere presence when the check was issued does not necessarily lead to an inference of concurrence with the criminal design to issue a bad check.—

Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068. With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioner's participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.

People v. Echegaray Congress has the power to re-impose the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails: (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."

Ient v. Tullett Prebon Mercantile Law; Corporations; Rule of Lenity; The rule of lenity applies when the court is faced with two (2) possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.

As Section 144 speaks, among others, of the imposition of criminal penalties, the Court is guided by the elementary rules of statutory construction of penal provisions. First, in all criminal prosecutions, the existence of criminal liability for which the accused is made answerable must be clear and certain. We have consistently held that "penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. When there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. Since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether their application is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law." Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.

Ient v. Tullett Prebon Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.

As for the assertion that the present petitions are dismissible due to forum shopping since they were filed during the pendency of petitioners' motion to quash and their co-accused's motion for judicial determination of probable cause with the trial court, we hold that there is no cause to dismiss these petitions on such ground. Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also involve the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. There is no forum shopping where the suits involve different causes of action or different reliefs. Jurisprudence explains that: A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the Information. The motion, as a rule, hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint or information. The rules governing a motion to quash are found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule enumerates the grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information.

Guingguing v. CA As it has been established that complainant was a public figure, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of Lim and petitioner when the latter published the article subject matter of the complaint; Any statement that does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.

As it has been established that complainant was a public figure, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of Lim and petitioner when the latter published the article subject matter of the complaint. Set otherwise, the prosecution must have established beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the statements in the advertisement was false or nonetheless proceeded with reckless disregard as to publish it whether or not it was true. It should thus proceed that if the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had. Any statement that does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection. An examination of the records of this case showed that the précis of information contained in the questioned publication were actually true.

People v. Tulin International Law; Jurisdiction; Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Garcia v. Drilon Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); It bears stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against Violence Against Women and Children.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted) The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

People v. Ferrer Mere membership in Communist Party not punished.

As to the claim that under the statute organizational guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragnet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organizations unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.

People v. Ferrer FACTS

Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag, together with five others, were charged with violation of R. A. No. 1700 or the Anti-Subversion Law which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization. Both accused moved to quash the informations on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Law is a bill of attainder. The trial court agreed, and thus, dismissed the informations against the two accused.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Overbreadth Doctrine; In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties—generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights; Motel operators have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.

Assuming arguend that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.

Garcia v. Drilon Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts; Family Courts Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8369); It must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law.

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Hierarchy of Courts; Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 674 SCRA 320 (2012), lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court (SC) without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 674 SCRA 320 (2012), which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail.

At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent Office of the Special Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an improper remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail. It bears stressing that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. If the Order or Resolution sought to be assailed is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner, in the instant case, seeks to assail the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 wherein said court denied her motion to reopen the malversation case against her. Said resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose the proceedings completely. The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, therefore, improper.

Ladonga v. People Conspiracy; In the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily, including the provisions on conspiracy.

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People, the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22. The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

Garcia v. Drilon Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.—

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001), courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

People v. Echegaray Constitutional Law; Death Penalty; Our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and welldefined criminal acts.

Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that: "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions." and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion.

Estrada v. Escritor The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance; What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its "burdensome effect," whether by the legislature or the courts.

But the more difficult religion cases involve legislative acts which have a secular purpose and general applicability, but may incidentally or inadvertently aid or burden religious exercise. Though the government action is not religiously motivated, these laws have a "burdensome effect" on religious exercise. The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish." In the ideal world, the legislature would recognize the religions and their practices and would consider them, when practical, in enacting laws of general application.But when the legislature fails to do so, religions that are threatened and burdened may turn to the courts for protection. Thus, what is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its "burdensome effect," whether by the legislature or the courts. Most of the free exercise claims brought to the U.S. Court are for exemption, not invalidation of the facially neutral law that has a "burdensome" effect.

People v. Ferrer Purpose of Anti-Subversion Act does not stifle fundamental personal liberties.—

By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in section 4 thereof), Congress reaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." The requirement of knowing membership, as distinguished from nominal membership, has been held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membership in a subversive organization.

Lozano v. Martinez Negotiable Instruments; Any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes can be deterred to prevent havoc in trade and banking community

By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash, and payable on demand. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred, for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

Estrada v. Escritor By juxtaposing the American Constitution and jurisprudence against that of the Philippines, it is immediately clear that one cannot simply conclude that we have adopted—lock, stock and barrel—the religion clauses as embodied in the First Amendment, and therefore, the U.S. Court's interpretation of the same; Unlike in the U.S. where legislative exemptions of religion had to be upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court as constituting permissive accommodations, similar exemptions for religion are mandatory accommodations under our own constitutions.

By juxtaposing the American Constitution and jurisprudence against that of the Philippines, it is immediately clear that one cannot simply conclude that we have adopted—lock, stock and barrel—the religion clauses as embodied in the First Amendment, and therefore, the U.S. Court's interpretation of the same. Unlike in the U.S. where legislative exemptions of religion had to be upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court as constituting permissive accommodations, similar exemptions for religion are mandatory accommodations under our own constitutions. Thus, our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain provisions on tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instruction. Our own preamble also invokes the aid of a divine being. These constitutional provisions are wholly ours and have no counterpart in the U.S. Constitution or its amendments. They all reveal without doubt that the Filipino people, in adopting these constitutions, manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach that requires accommodations in interpreting the religion clauses.

Ladonga v. People Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.—

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

Guingguing v. CA FACTS

Cirse "Choy" Torralba, a broadcast journalist with two radio programs aired over Visayas and Mindanao, filed a criminal complaint for libel against Segundo Lim and petitioner, Guingguing for causing the publication of records of his criminal cases as well as photographs of his arrest. The items were published in a one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and published by the petitioner. Torrablba asserted that he had been acquitted and the cases referred to had already been settled. He sought Lim and petitioner's conviction for libel as well as mora, compensatory, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. He alleged that the publication placed him in public contempt and ridicule and was designed to degrade and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist. Lim, in his defense, claimed that Torralba was attacking him and his family through the radio and his paid advertisements via newspaper was self-defense. The trial court concluded that the publication was libelous stating that malice is the most important element of libel because every defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the part of the author and publisher. It also ruled that publication of calumny even against public officers or candidates for public office is an offense most dangerous to the people. It further held that a private reputation is as constitutionally protected as the enjoyment of life, liberty and property such that anybody who attacks a person's reputation by slanderous words or libelous publications is obliged to make full compensation for the damage done. The CA affirmed RTC's decision with a modification on the penalty. It held that the purpose of self-defense in libel is to repair, minimize or remove the effect of the damage caused to him but it does not license the utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in return for what he received. Hence, petitioner filed for petition for review on certiorari contending that as editorpublisher of the Sunday Post, the finding of guilt against him constitutes and infringement of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press.

Liang v. People International Law; Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Immunity; Courts; Due Process; Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face a communication from the Department of Foreign Affairs that a particular person is covered by any immunity; Due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.

Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.

Corpuz v. People FACTS

Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and Lito Corpuz, petitioner, met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that Tangcoy had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tongcoy was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Corpuz. On the prosecution, it was established that Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with Tongcoy. However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see. RTC and CA - accused is guilty of estafa

People v. Formigones FACTS

Defendant Abelardo Formigones lived in his farm in Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. They went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father. Defendant Abelardo signed a written statement wherein he admitted that he killed his wife. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to him, he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had become indifferent to him. The accused pleaded guilty during the preliminary investigation and trial. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refuse to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty. Dr. Francisco Gomez, witness of the defendant who examined him opined that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan Criminal Law; Malversation of Public Funds; Elements of.—

Elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal uses.

Garcia v. Drilon Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), is instructive: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

Estrada v. Escritor FACTS

Escritor, a member of the Jehovah's Witness, was charged for immoral conduct for co‐habiting with a man without the benefit of a marriage, their relationship bearing a child. She secured a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," indicating their church's approval of their union in accordance with the beliefs of the Jehovah's Witness.

People v. Formigones FEEBLEMINDEDNESS AND ACT IN A FIT OF JEALOUSY AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.—

Feeblemindedness of the accused warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code and the fact that the accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy, he is, likewise, entitled to the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article—that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Judicial Review; Courts; If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government.—

Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.

People v. Ferrer Even if Anti-Subversion Act specifies individuals it will not be Bill of Attainder.

Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan, In the Philippines, the validity of section 23(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods," was upheld by this Court.

Corpuz v. People Penalties; Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally, more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

US v. Bustos QUALIFIED PRIVILEGEE.

Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. Personal injury is not necessary. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. Finally, if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials, such an unintentional error would not take the case out of the privilege.

People v. Simon Witnesses; Minor error or discrepancy neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witness' honesty.

Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty.

Estrada v. Escritor The records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any evidence to show that the means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to respondent Escritor's religious freedom —Escritor's conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.

Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the test. Other than the two documents offered as cited above which established the sincerity of respondent's religious belief and the fact that the agreement was an internal arrangement within respondent's congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In fact, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor's conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—including religious freedom—may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

People v. Abilong FACTS

Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of sentence. The said accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy. Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from that decision with the following assignment of error: Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article which in part reads as follows: Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.

Corpuz v. People Penalties; For acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice (DOJ), the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation

For acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be noncommensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

People v. Simon Penalties; Court holds that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 is prision correccional.

For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

US v. Bustos CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; AsSEMBLY AND PETITION; HISTORY.—

Freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. It was among the reforms sine quibus non insisted upon by the Filipino People. The Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its bill of rights, zealously guarded these basic rights. A reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost should now be protected and carried forward.

People v. Simon FACTS

Herein accused Sunga was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana. After his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained, he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference, after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded. Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant. On the other hand, Sunga alleged that on the day in question, he was watching television when three persons, whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about something from him he boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but they were taking a different route. He was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. He was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times and was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office because he could no longer endure the maltreatment. Trial Court rendered judgment convicting accused and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.

People v. Ferrer Bill of Attainder, history of.

History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the - constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.

People v. Tulin Conspiracy; Right to be Informed; One charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 may be validly convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of said law; If there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal.

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law? x x x The ruling of the trial court is within wellsettled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

People v. Simon Constitutional Law; Court finds and declares the exhibits inadmissible in evidence

However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel. Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel, hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.

People v. Tulin Miranda Rights; The right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel, x x x Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.

Liang v. People RULING

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the petitioner's case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov't. NO. The petitioner's case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in "official capacity". Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. (2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative. NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Hence, SC denied the petition. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Minucher v. Scalzo RULING

ISSUE: Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. RULING: Yes, a foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo. These may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995, the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged: "WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in the manner following: " 'Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000,00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs. 'The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper litigant.' " All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit. WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Ient v. Tullett Prebon RULING

ISSUE: Whether or not Ient and Schulze could be criminally liable RULING: No, Ient and Schulze could not be criminally liable because the Corporation Code is not a penal statute. The penalties suggested in the code are only administrative. The Supreme Court applied rule of lenity as a principle related to liberal interpretation in favor of the accused in criminal cases. The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused. According to SC, a close reading Section 144 shows that it is not purely a penal provision because it provides that when the violator is a corporation, an administrative penalty is imposed in form of dissolution, which is not a criminal sanction. The Court also added that there is no provision in the Corporation Code using an emphatic language to compel the SC to construe the provision as a penal offense. WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated August 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P No. 109094 and the Resolutions dated April 23, 2009 and May 15, 2009 of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. 08-J-8651 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

Gonzales v. Abaya RULING

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition. HELD: NO, the petitioners are not entitled to the writ of prohibition. Article 2 of the Articles of War (C.A. No. 408) provides that all officers and soldiers in the active service of the AFP are subject to military law. On the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 provides the general rule that those persons subject to military law who commit crimes or offenses punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), other special laws, and other government ordinances, shall be tried by the proper court. The law provides for the sole exception that service-connected offenses shall be tried by the court martial. The law also provides, as an exception to the exception, that the President, in the interest of justice, may order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts. The law specified the term "service-oriented crimes" in the following paragraph, stating that these service-oriented crimes are "limited to those defined in Article 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 98". This delineation is necessary in order to preserve the peculiar nature of the military justice system over military personnel. The Court ruled that the offense for the violation of Article 96, or conducting unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, is indeed service-connected. They emphasized the wordings used in the Information filed against them - i.e., their alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and that their behavior allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession - was indicative of the of the "service-connected" nature of the offense, as it has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Also, the penalty prescribed for the offense - that is, dismissal from the service - is also indicative of the same. The Court also ruled that they cannot sustain the RTC's declaration that the offense is "not service-connected, but rather absorbed in the furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat", as it practically amended the law. As such, the declaration made by the RTC is void. Hence, as the offense for the violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is clearly service-connected and cognizable under the military court, their petition for prohibition must fail. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

Estrada v. Escritor RULING

ISSUES: Whether or not Escritor may be sanctioned in light of the Free Exercise clause. RULING: No. The state has the burden of satisfying the "compelling state interest" test to justify any possible sanction to be imposed upon Escritor.This test involves three steps:1) The courts should look into the sincerity of the religious belief without inquiring into the truth of the belief.2) The state has to establish that its purposes are legitimate and compelling.3) The state used the least intrusive means possible.The case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the government would have the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing Escritor's position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.Since neither Estrada, Escritor nor the government has filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the August 4, 2003 ruling, the 2003 decision has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case. Any attempt to reopen this ruling constitutes a contravention of elementary rules of procedure. Worse, insofar as it would overturn the parties' right to rely upon the Supreme Court's interpretation which has long attained finality, it also runs counter to substantive due process.In its June 20, 2006 ruling, the Supreme Court held that, Escritor's sincerity is beyond serious doubt. She procured the certificate 10 years after their union began and not merely after being implicated. The free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights. The state's broad interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the family is not a compelling interest enforcing the concubinage charges against Escritor. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Even assuming that there was a compelling state interest, the state failed to show evidence that the means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to Escritor's religious freedom.Hence, Escritor's conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her right to freedom of religion.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED.

People v. Ferrer Constitutional law; Test of due process.—

If laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. The recital of legislative findings implements this test.

Ladonga v. People FACTS

In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga, petitioner, became the regular customer of Alfredo Oculam in his pawnshop. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a loan from him, guaranteed by check of United Coconut Planters Bank, issued by Adronico. On last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990 the spouses obtained additional loan guaranteed by UCPD. And between May and June 1990, the spouses obtained the third loan guaranteed by UCPD. The three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason that the account was closed. When the spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, Oculam filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the spouses claim that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature, and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.

Ient v. Tullett Prebon Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Certiorari; The Supreme Court (SC) had held that where the action of the Secretary of Justice is tainted with arbitrariness, an aggrieved party may seek judicial review via certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

In Yambot v. Tuquero, 646 SCRA 249 (2011), we observed that under exceptional circumstances, a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an appeal of the prosecutor's ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an information with the trial court. We reiterated the doctrine in Ching v. Secretary of Justice, 481 SCRA 609 (2006), that the acts of a quasi-judicial officer may be assailed by the aggrieved party through a petition for certiorari and enjoined (a) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice; (c) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused. In the case at bar, it is unsettling to perceive a seeming lack of uniformity in the rulings of the Secretary of Justice on the issue of whether a violation of Section 31 entails criminal or only civil liability and such divergent actions are explained with a terse declaration of an alleged difference in factual milieu and nothing further. Such a state of affairs is not only offensive to principles of fair play but also anathema to the orderly administration of justice. Indeed, we have held that where the action of the Secretary of Justice is tainted with arbitrariness, an aggrieved party may seek judicial review via certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

Guingguing v. CA Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code as applied to public figures complaining of criminal libel must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free expression and this Court's precedents upholding the standard of actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous.

In convicting the defendants, the lower courts paid particular heed to Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. . . ." We hold that this provision, as applied to public figures complaining of criminal libel, must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free expression, and this Court's precedents upholding the standard of actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous. The provision itself allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense "good intention and justifiable motive." The exercise of free expression, and its concordant assurance of commentary on public affairs and public figures, certainly qualify as "justifiable motive," if not "good intention."

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen Conflict of Laws; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Foreign Laws; International Law; In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592 (2000), has already enunciated that: True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

People v. Formigones CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; IMBECILITY AS EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE; REQUISITES.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

Corpuz v. People Civil Indemnity; In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

Lozano v. Martinez B.P. 22 is constitutional.

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

People v. Ferrer Character of Communist Party as construed by Court.—

In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines."

People v. Ferrer Statutory construction; Use of word "over-throw" in the Act.

In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use of the word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardly consistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow," namely, "establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place [sic] the Government under the control and domination of an alien power," What this Court once said in a prosecution for sedition is apropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood. The word "overthrow" could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. ..."

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.

In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation.

People v. Tulin FACTS

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates including the accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and completely took over the vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the Philippines. A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the accused were charged with qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal. Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.

People v. Echegaray R.A. No. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.

In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No, 7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No, 7659 in pari materia with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when: (1) aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. No. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. No. 7659 is replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.

US v. Bustos FACTS

In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary (privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

People v. Echegaray Definition of Heinous Crimes.

In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that: "x x x crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus," meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton," denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.

US v. Bustos MALICE

In the usual libel case, malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff.

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen Doctrine of Processual Presumption; Foreign Laws; If the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.

In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the noncompliance therewith.

People v. Abilong CRIMINAL LAW; EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE; REVISED PENAL CODE; ENGLISH AND SPANISH TEXT OF ARTICLE 157, COMPARED

Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privación de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.

People v. Ferrer Even if Anti-Subversion Act specifies individuals it will not be Bill of Attainderr

Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination.

People v. Ferrer Under the Anti-Subversion Act guilt of accused must be judicially established.

Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic, objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.

Garcia v. Drilon Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961), that, "[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue."

Estrada v. Escritor Actions; Judgments; Law of the Case; The issues which have already been ruled upon prior to the remand of a case constitute "the law of the case" insofar as they resolved the issues of which framework and test are to be applied in this case, and no motion for its reconsideration having been filed.

It bears stressing, therefore, that the residual issues of the case pertained NOT TO WHAT APPROACH THIS COURT SHOULD TAKE IN CONSTRUING THE RELIGION CLAUSES, NOR TO THE PROPER TEST APPLICABLE IN DETERMINING CLAIMS OF EXEMPTION BASED ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION. These issues have already been ruled upon prior to the remand, and constitute "the law of the case" insofar as they resolved the issues of which framework and test are to be applied in this case, and no motion for its reconsideration having been filed. The only task that the Court is left to do is to determine whether the evidence adduced by the State proves its more compelling interest. This issue involves a pure question of fact.

People v. Tulin Justifying Circumstances; Obedience to Lawful Order of Superior; An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.

It cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.

People v. Lol-lo PIRACY; JURISDICTIONN

It does not matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs, Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

Corpuz v. People Cruel and Unusual Punishment; It has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like.—

It has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern time.

People v. Echegaray Remedial Law; Appeal; Matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court.—

It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals: "If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court."

People v. Ferrer Act deals with only one subject which is expressed in the title thereof.—

It is argued that the last proviso to section 4 of the Act punishes any conspiracy to overthrow the government even if the intention is not to establish a communist totalitarian regime, but a democratic regime. This, it is said, is not germane or embraced in the title of the Act. HELD: The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 provides that "This Act shall be known as the Anti-Subversion Act." Together with the main title, the short title of the statute unequivocally indicates t that the subject-matter is subversion in general which has for is s fundamental purpose the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Government and not merely subversion by Communist conspiracies.

Garcia v. Drilon The respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side; "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.—

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

People v. Ferrer Statutory construction; It is not court's duty to examine validity of legislative findings.—

It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of these legislative findings and reject them. ... They are the product of extensive inves-tigation by Committees of Congress over more than a decade and a half. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfounded or irrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we must, as a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threat which Communist organizations pose not only to existing government in the United States, but to the United States as a sovereign, independent Nation. ... we must recognize that the power of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of this nature is extensive. This statement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Communist Party vs. S.A.C. Board, 367 U.S. 94 (1961), mutatis mutandis, may be said of the legislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.

Garcia v. Drilon Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.—

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan Appeals; An appellate court will generally not disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters except only when it clearly overlooked certain facts or where the evidence fails to substantiate the lower court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.

It is the trial court, and neither the Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which receives evidence and rules over exhibits formally offered. Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the day to advance additional allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do so in the lower court. An appellate court will generally not disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters except only when it clearly overlooked certain facts or where the evidence fails to substantiate the lower court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.

People v. Tulin There is a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial where such waiver is unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer.

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).

Lozano v. Martinez The legislature may not validly punish nonpayment of a debt ex contractu, and an act may not be considered and punished as malum in se, but such act may be penalized under police power as malum prohibitum because of harm it causes to the public.—

It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for nonpayment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

Minucher v. Scalzo Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.—

It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.

People v. Echegaray Criminal Procedure; Affidavits; An affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal.

It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by the victim herself in open court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter might do the same sexual assaults to other women." Thus, this is one occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the accusedappellant. We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare, that: "As pointed out in People v. Lim (190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by the accusedappellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge."

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan Statutes; Retroactivity of Laws; For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun.

Judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such other officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing circumstances attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.

Garcia v. Drilon Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The Barangay Protection Order issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."—

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."

People v. Lol-lo PUBLIC LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF TERRITORYY

Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed.

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan Judgments; Doctrine of Finality of Judgments; The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law.

Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions is present in this case. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this litigation.

People v. Tulin Piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code, and, as such, is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law; It is likewise well settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

Estrada v. Escritor Due Process; Since neither the complainant, respondent nor the government has filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the ruling in this case, the same has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case—any attempt to reopen this final ruling constitutes a crass contravention of elementary rules of procedure, and insofar as it would overturn the parties' right to rely upon the Court's interpretation which has long attained finality, it also runs counter to substantive due process.

Mr. Justice Carpio's insistence, in his dissent, in attacking the ruling of this case interpreting the religious clauses of the Constitution, made more than two years ago, is misplaced to say the least. Since neither the complainant, respondent nor the government has filed a motion for reconsideration assailing this ruling, the same has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case. Any attempt to reopen this final ruling constitutes a crass contravention of elementary rules of procedure. Worse, insofar as it would overturn the parties' right to rely upon our interpretation which has long attained finality, it also runs counter to substantive due process.

Lozano v. Martinez B.P. 22 reasonably differentiates between the swindler and the swindled. It does not violate the equal protection clause.

Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.

Corpuz v. People Demand; No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.

People v. Ferrer To be Bill of Attainder statute must not only specify persons or groups but also it must reach past conduct.

Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement ement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legeslative legislative adjudication of guilt.

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen FACTS

Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland and were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son however, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.

People v. Simon The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction.

Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In the present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.

Gonzales v. Abaya FACTS

On July 27, 2003, more than 300 officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), led by Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes IV, entered the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments, disarmed the guards, and planted explosives around the building. Through media, they announced their grievances against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's government and demanded that she - along with her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) - resign. President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427, declaring a state of rebellion, and General Order No. 4, which called upon the PNP and AFP to suppress the rebellion taking place in Makati. The government also sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers, in order to prevent a bloody confrontation. After several hours of confrontation, the negotiators succeeded and the soldiers laid down their arms and defused the explosives around the premises. A total of 321 soldiers were surrendered to the authorities. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) respectively recommended that those involved be charged with coup d'etat, and the filing of the corresponding information against them. General Narciso Abaya, herein respondent, also ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers and directed AFP to conduct their separate investigation regarding it. The accused in the criminal case filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), invoking Republic Act (RA) No. 7055, prayed that the trial court also assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. However, Colonel Julius A. Magno, the officer-incharge of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the incident, including the herein petitioners, be prosecuted before the general court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War. On June 27, 2004, Colonel Magno's recommendation was approved. Instead of filing their answer to Colonel Magno's charge, the petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Prohibition, praying that the respondents desist from charging them with a violation of Article 98 of the Articles of War. They cited the RTC's determination that the offense for violation of Article 98 is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, hence, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. The petitioners also claim that the offense charged against them before the General Court Martial has already prescribed. They claim that, almost two years after the incident, only Lt. Trillanes was arraigned. They claimed that the offense prescribed on July 25, 2005. The respondents counter, under R.A. No. 7055, the offense charged against them (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) is service-connected and properly cognizable by the court martial. They further assert that, contrary to the petitioner's claim, the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005.

People v. Echegaray FACTS

On June 25, 1996, Supreme court rendered a decision affirming the conviction of Echegaray for raping his 10-year-old daughter, imposing R.A. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which was already in effect at the time of the commission of the crim in 1994. On July 9, 1996, Accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, saying he was falsely accused because of sinister motives of the victim's grandmother. On August 6, 1996, Echegaray discharged his counsel Atty. Vitug but retained services of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG). On August 23, 1996, SC received a Motion which asked for the reversal of death sentence.

Liang v. People Courts; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC—being purely a statutory right, it may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.—

On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.

People v. Tulin Right to Counsel; Waiver; Waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clauses shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer.

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accusedappellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accusedappellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

Estrada v. Escritor A look at the evidence that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has presented fails to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override respondent Escritor's fundamental right to religious freedom, and neither did the government exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.

On the sincerity of religious belief, the Solicitor General categorically concedes that the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice are beyond serious doubt. Thus, having previously established the preliminary conditions required by the compelling state interest test, i.e., that a law or government practice inhibits the free exercise of respondent's religious beliefs, and there being no doubt as to the sincerity and centrality of her faith to claim the exemption based on the free exercise clause, the burden shifted to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice justifies a compelling secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that objective. A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override respondent's fundamental right to religious freedom. Neither did the government exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Liberty; Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done, but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.

One might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms— which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence—that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.

People v. Tulin Piracy; Statutes; Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532—piracy under Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan FACTS

Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By virtue of his position, she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection officer. As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for thepayment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The collections shereceived were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of thePhilippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch. On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of accounts handled by Hernan wasconducted. It was found out that the deposit slips dated September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of P11,300.00 and P81,348.20, respectively, did not bear a stamp receipt by LBP nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then informed that the two aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20 remittance but not for the P11,300.00. Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds with the amount ofP11,300.00. RTC found the accused guilty. Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside itsdecision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case.Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbay an which affirmed RTC's decision but modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which wasdenied in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's MR became final and executory. On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Courtand with Prayer to Stay the Execution. Sandiganbayan denied the same and directed theexecution of the judgment of conviction. Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall ofEntry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January9, 2014 which was likewise denied

Garcia v. Drilon FACTS

Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private respondent (wife and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the household help. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him. All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her. The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.

Liang v. People FACTS

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

Garcia v. Drilon Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states: SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party.—The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: x x x x (c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence; x x x x Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan Reopening of Cases; Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/ or further evidence should be terminated within thirty (30) days from the issuance of the order.

Petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage has no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.

Lozano v. Martinez FACTS

Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

People v. Lol-lo PIRACY; JURISDICTION

Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.

People v. Lol-lo PIRACY; DEFINED

Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

US v. Bustos FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; PRIVILEGEE

Previous decisions of this court concerning libel reviewed and distinguished.

US v. Bustos QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE.

Qualified privilege is a prima facie privilege which, may be lost by proof of malice. "A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable." (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; 1 Jur. [N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)

People v. Tulin The absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused make them invalid.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.

Gonzales v. Abaya Courts; Jurisdictions; Republic Act No. 7055; Coup D'etat; Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 lays down the general rule that or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d'etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court, except that, where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial, and with the further exception that, where the President, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads: SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts. As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the courtmartial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances. Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes o offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d'etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

Garcia v. Drilon Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. Thus: SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. — (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued; (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

Liang v. People Criminal Law; Slander; Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement between the Asian Development Bank and the Republic of the Philippines because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.—

Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Separation of Powers; Words and Phrases; Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case.

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

Estrada v. Escritor Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause; Words and Phrases; In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices.

The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, it should be noted, were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal—to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.

Gonzales v. Abaya Jurisdictions; Republic Act No. 7055; The delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses—the military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. The administration of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war.

People v. Ferrer Constitutional law; Political law; Doctrine of right to selfprotection

That the Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a proposition too plain to require elaboration. Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcends every other value, "for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, ... no subordinate value can be protected." As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States (341 U.S. 494): "Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial govern-ments is without force where the existing structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it is not within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the government by force and violence."

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Police Power; A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.

Garcia v. Drilon Evidence; Constitutional Law; The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.

Corpuz v. People Criminal Law; Estafa; The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

US v. Bustos CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; AsSEMBLY AND PETITION; HISTORYY.—

The Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition. —Beginning with the President's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, these guaranties were made effective in the Philippines. They are now part and parcel of the Organic Law—of the Constitution—of the Philippine Islands.

Minucher v. Scalzo Heads of diplomatic missions, classified.

The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank.

Ient v. Tullett Prebon The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute.

The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute. Sections 31 to 34 in particular were intended to impose exacting standards of fidelity on corporate officers and directors but without unduly impeding them in the discharge of their work with concerns of litigation. Considering the object and policy of the Corporation Code to encourage the use of the corporate entity as a vehicle for economic growth, we cannot espouse a strict construction of Sections 31 and 34 as penal offenses in relation to Section 144 in the absence of unambiguous statutory language and legislative intent to that effect. When Congress intends to criminalize certain acts it does so in plain, categorical language, otherwise such a statute would be susceptible to constitutional attack. As earlier discussed, this can be readily seen from the text of Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 and Section 74 of the Corporation Code. We stress that had the Legislature intended to attach penal sanctions to Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code it could have expressly stated such intent in the same manner that it did for Section 74 of the same Code.

Guingguing v. CA Court has likewise extended the "actual malice" rule to apply not only to public officials but also to public figures; Definition of a public figure propounded by an American textbook on torts.

The Court has likewise extended the "actual malice" rule to apply not only to public officials, but also to public figures. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, the Court cited with approval the following definition of a public figure propounded by an American textbook on torts: A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world—the solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product, rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.—

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city—the Pearl of the Orient—as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

Estrada v. Escritor Strict Separation; Words and Phrases; The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state's hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two.—

The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state's hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two. According to this Jeffersonian view, an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state needs to be erected. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers. Only the complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views, thus a strict "wall of separation" is necessary.

Minucher v. Scalzo International Law; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; Diplomatic Missions; Function; Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.—

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct. By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary international law. Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.

Ient v. Tullett Prebon Even assuming separate actions have been filed by different parties involving essentially the same subject matter, no forum shopping is committed where the parties did not resort to multiple judicial remedies.

The action at bar is a review on certiorari of the assailed Court of Appeals (CA) decision wherein the main issue is whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the City Prosecutor's dismissal of the criminal complaint. These consolidated petitions may proceed regardless of whether or not there are grounds to quash the criminal information pending in the court a quo. Neither do we find relevant the pendency of petitioners' co-accused's motion for judicial determination of probable cause before the trial court. The several accused in these consolidated cases had a number of remedies available to them and they are each free to pursue the remedy which they deem is their best option. Certainly, there is no requirement that the different parties in a case must all choose the same remedy. We have held that even assuming separate actions have been filed by different parties involving essentially the same subject matter, no forum shopping is committed where the parties did not resort to multiple judicial remedies. In any event, we have stated in the past that the rules on forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility.

Garcia v. Drilon The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.

People v. Ferrer Act not unconstitutionally overbroad.

The argument that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow" of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the phrase "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the definitions of and the penalties prescribed for the different acts proscribed are stated in section 4 which requires that membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear that the overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means." The absence of this qualification in section 2 appears to be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberate omission. Moreover, the word "overthrow" sufficiently connotes the use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a metaphorical sense may one speak of peaceful overthrow of governments, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Third-Party Standing; American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.

The concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests." Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit. American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that: "The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them."

Ient v. Tullett Prebon There is no compelling reason for the Supreme Court (SC) to construe Section 144 as similarly employing the term "penalized" or "penalty" solely in terms of criminal liability.

The crux of the Court's ruling in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 553 SCRA 370 (2008), is that, from the wording of Section 450(j), there is a clear legislative intent to treat as an election offense any violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189. For this reason, we do not doubt that Section 46 contemplates the term "penalty" primarily in the criminal law or punitive concept of the term. There is no provision in the Corporation Code using similarly emphatic language that evinces a categorical legislative intent to treat as a criminal offense each and every violation of that law. Consequently, there is no compelling reason for the Court to construe Section 144 as similarly employing the term "penalized" or "penalty" solely in terms of criminal liability. In People v. Temporada, 574 SCRA 258 (2008), we held that in interpreting penal laws, "words are given their ordinary meaning and that any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to a criminal statute." Black's Law Dictionary recognizes the numerous conceptions of the term penalty and discusses in part that it is "[a]n elastic term with many different shades of meaning; it involves idea of punishment, corporeal or pecuniary, or civil or criminal, although its meaning is generally confined to pecuniary punishment."

US v. Diaz Conde FACTS

The defendant-appellants entered into a contract with Oliveros and Engracia Lianco to lend the latter parties a sum of P300, subject to an interest rate of 5% per month. During the execution of the contract, there was no existing Usury Law that prohibited any individual to charge any interest rate they deemed appropriate. Four months and a half after the contract in question was executed, the Usury Law, which set the maximum interest rate to 12% per annum, was passed, rendering any amount of interest paid or stipulated to be paid in excess of such rate usurious, and therefore unlawful. On this basis, the defendant-appellants were found guilty for violating the Usury Law for having imposed an excessive interest rate.

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Their Children; The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children.

The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children. In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner's claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Garcia v. Drilon The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

US v. Bustos FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; PRIVILEGE.

The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, "which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may, in some instances, afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer." (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property; Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause—it inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

Corpuz v. People Estafa With Abuse of Confidence; Elements of.—

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

Garcia v. Drilon The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner's contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Judicial Review; Words and Phrases; "Strict Scrutiny," "Rational Basis," and, "Intermediate Review," Explained

The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.

People v. Lol-lo PUBLIC LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF TERRITORY.

The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force.

Estrada v. Escritor Bill of Rights; Substantive equality—a reading of the religion clauses which leaves both politically dominant and the politically weak religious groups equal in their inability to use the government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others—makes the most sense in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document designed to protect minorities and individuals from mobocracy in a democracy (the majority or a coalition of minorities).

The government's conduct may appear innocent and nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In the interpretation of a document, such as the Bill of Rights, designed to protect the minority from the majority, the question of which perspective is appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the text, history, structure and values implicated in the interpretation of the clauses, all point toward this perspective. Thus, substantive equality—a reading of the religion clauses which leaves both politically dominant and the politically weak religious groups equal in their inability to use the government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others—makes the most sense in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document designed to protect minorities and individuals from mobocracy in a democracy (the majority or a coalition of minorities).

Garcia v. Drilon Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of Violence Against Women and Children may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.—

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.

Lozano v. Martinez Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Gravamen of B.P. 22 is the issuance of a worthless check, not the non-payment of an obligation.

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

US v. Bustos GENERAL PRINCIPLES.—

The interests of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is necessary for free speech. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div. N. Y., 510.) Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation.

US v. Diaz Conde CRIMINAL LAW; USURY; CONTRACT, LAWS VIOLATING TERMS OF;

The law is well established that when a contract contains an obli gation to pay interest, the interest thereby becomes part of the principal and is included within the promise to pay. The obligation to pay interest on money due under a contract is a part of the obligation of the contract. Laws adopted after the execution of a contract, changing or altering the rate of interest, cannot be made to apply to such contract without violating the provisions of the constitution which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing the obligation of contract." The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law must govern and control the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect its validity, its construction or discharge. Any law which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself. It is an elementary rule of contracts that the laws in force at the time it was made must govern its inter pretation and application. Laws must be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is legal in its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legis lation. Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this jurisdiction.

People v. Ferrer Anti-Subversion Act not violative of constitutional freedom 'of speech and association.

The legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippines is an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government is intended not to provide the basis for a legislative finding of guilt of the members of the Party but rather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are so fundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a "preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise must be justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This is the reason why before enacting the statute in question Congress conducted careful investigations and then stated its findings in the preamble of the Act. In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be open to question if, instead of making those findings in enacting the statute, Congress omitted to do so.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State.

The oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented. Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.

Lozano v. Martinez Police power defined.

The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."

Minucher v. Scalzo Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself—the proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim—par in parem, non habet imperium.—

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim—par in parem, non habet imperium—that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Due Process; The purpose of due process guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.

Estrada v. Escritor The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if applied in interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de facto voiding of religious expression in the Free Exercise Clause.

The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if applied in interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de facto voiding of religious expression in the Free Exercise Clause. As pointed out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), strict neutrality could lead to "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious" which is prohibited by the Constitution. Professor Laurence Tribe commented in his authoritative treatise, viz.: To most observers. . . strict neutrality has seemed incompatible with the very idea of a free exercise clause. The Framers, whatever specific applications they may have intended, clearly envisioned religion as something special; they enacted that vision into law by guaranteeing the free exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science. The strict neutrality approach all but erases this distinction. Thus it is not surprising that the [U.S.] Supreme Court has rejected strict neutrality, permitting and sometimes mandating religious classifications.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms; The due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.

The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.

US v. Bustos ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

The right to assemble and petition is a necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply without fear of penalty to the appropriate branch or office of the Government for a redress of grievances.

People v. Ferrer To be Bill of Attainder statute must not only specify persons or groups but also it must reach past conductt

The statement of the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950—"Nor the statute made an act of 'outlawry' or attainder by the fact than the conduct which M regulates is described with such particularity that, in probability, few organizations will come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act to curb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare, whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by many persons or by one, So long as the incidence of legislation is such that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct, be they many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering the course of their own present activities, there can be no complaint of an attainder."—may be said of the Anti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly states 'that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed, "After the approval of this Act." ... Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive organization at the time of the enactment of the -law, were given opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability.

Estrada v. Escritor Unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view, which is a tamer version of the strict separationist view, believes that the "wall of separation" does not require the state to be their adversary—rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non believers. "State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."—

The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or separationist view, (or, the governmental neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946), where the Court declared that Jefferson's "wall of separation" encapsulated the meaning of the First Amendment. However, unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the "wall of separation" does not require the state to be their adversary. Rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers."State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." The strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action. It does not permit, much less require, accommodation of secular programs to religious belief.

Estrada v. Escritor Benevolent Neutrality or Accommodation; Words and Phrases; The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a different view of the "wall of separation," in that, unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state.

The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a different view of the "wall of separation," associated with Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of "In God We Trust" on American currency; the recognition of America as "one nation under God" in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the Supreme Court's time-honored practice of opening oral argument with the invocation "God save the United States and this Honorable Court"; and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of paying a chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives in prayer. These practices clearly show the preference for one theological viewpoint—the existence of and potential for intervention by a god—over the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and government agencies also cooperate in the building of low-cost housing and in other forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong moral dimension.

Estrada v. Escritor It is not enough to contend that the state's interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred—the State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom; The government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given—it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted.

There has never been any question that the state has an interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the sound administration of justice. Indeed, the provisions by which respondent's relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and even the provisions on marriage and family in the Civil Code and Family Code, all clearly demonstrate the State's need to protect these secular interests. Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights —"the most inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state's interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself. Thus, it is not the State's broad interest in "protecting the institutions of marriage and the family," or even "in the sound administration of justice" that must be weighed against respondent's claim, but the State's narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondent's faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the Solicitor General failed to do.

Estrada v. Escritor Benevolent Neutrality-Accommodation Standard; It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution—our own Constitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and exempt religion.

There is no ambiguity with regard to the Philippine Constitution's departure from the U.S. Constitution, insofar as religious accommodations are concerned. It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution. We therefore reject Mr. Justice Carpio's total adherence to the U.S. Court's interpretation of the religion clauses to effectively deny accommodations on the sole basis that the law in question is neutral and of general application. For even if it were true that "an unbroken line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions" has never held that "an individual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate," our own Constitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and exempt religion. Philippine jurisprudence shows that the Court has allowed exemptions from a law of general application, in effect, interpreting our religion clauses to cover both mandatory and permissive accommodations.

Gonzales v. Abaya Armed Forces of the Philippines; Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408); Courts Martial; Words and Phrases; Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of the Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer."—

There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2 provides: Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law.—The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles: (a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.

Gonzales v. Abaya Articles of War; Courts Martial; Jurisdictions; The trial court, in making the declaration that the charges against the accused before the court martial for violation of Article 96 are not service connected, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses"—such declaration by the Regional Trial Court constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.—

There is no merit in petitioners' argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be." Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan Service of Pleadings; Time and again, the Supreme Court (SC) has held that in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record.

Time and again, the Court has held that in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record. It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his address. If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds office.

Corpuz v. People Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads: ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties.—Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

Guingguing v. CA Measured against the definition provided in Ayer, complainant would definitely qualify as a public figure.—

There should be little controversy in holding that complainant is a public figure. He is a broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao. Measured against the definition provided in Ayer, complainant would definitely qualify as a public figure. Complainant even asserted before the trial court that his broadcast was listened to widely, hence, his notoriety is unquestionable.

Guingguing v. CA Court has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard governs the prosecution of criminal libel concerning public figures.

This Court has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard governs the prosecution of criminal libel cases concerning public figures. In Adiong v. COMELEC, the Court cited New York Times in noting that "[w]e have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."

People v. Lol-lo PIRACY; ARTICLES 153, 154, PENAL CODE; WHETHER IN FORCEE

Those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are still in force in the Philippines.

Garcia v. Drilon Temporary Protection Order (TPO); If a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered.—

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.

Estrada v. Escritor The State's interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic—the State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition.

To paraphrase Justice Blackmun's application of the compelling interest test, the State's interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to prosecute respondent nor her partner. The State's asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003, to deny the exemption would effectively break up "an otherwise ideal union of two individuals who have managed to stay together as husband and wife [approximately twenty-five years]" and have the effect of defeating the very substance of marriage and the family.

People v. Simon Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established.

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseurbuyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.

Ient v. Tullett Prebon FACTS

Tradition Group, where petitioners herein are employed, and Tullett are competitors in the interdealer broking business. On the Tradition Group's motive of expansion and diversification in Asia, petitioners lent and Schulze were tasked with the establishment Tradition Financial Services Philippines, Inc. However, Tullett, filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecution Office of Makati City against the officers/employees of the Tradition Group for violation of Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code which made them criminally liable under Section 144. Impleaded as respondents in the Complaint-Affidavit were petitioners lent and Schulze, Jaime Villalon, who was formerly President and Managing Director of Tullett, Mercedes Chuidian who was formerly a member of Tullett's Board of Directors. Villalon and Chuidian were charged with using their former positions in Tullett to sabotage said company by orchestrating the mass resignation of its entire brokering staff in order for them to join Tradition Philippines which was evident on their conduct of several meetings with the employees. According to Tullett, petitioners lent and Schulze have conspired with Villalon and Chuidian in the latter's acts of disloyalty against the company. Petitioners argued that there could be no violation of Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation as these sections refer to corporate acts or corporate opportunity, that Section 144 of the same Code cannot be applied to Sections 31 and 34 which already contains the penalties or remedies for their violation; and conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to the Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code. The city prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint however, on respondent's appeal to the Department of Justice, the dismissal was reversed finding the arguments of the respondent proper. CA affirmed the decision of the DOJ Secretary.

People v. Lol-lo FACTS

Two boats containing several people were on navigation for a number of days when they were surrounded by several armed men. These men first asked only for food, but once aboard the boat they took all the cargoes, attacked some men, and brutally violated two women. Thereafter, most of the people were left on the boat and holes were made by the armed men in the idea that it would submerge. Lol-lo who raped one of the women and Saraw were able to escape. Upon their return to Sulu, Philippines Islands they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands.

Estrada v. Escritor The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions as in Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 256 (1993), and the American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957), in cases involving criminal laws of general application.

Two things must be clarified: first, in relation to criminal statutes, only the question of mandatory accommodation is uncertain, for Philippine law and jurisprudence have, in fact, allowed legislative accommodation. Second, the power of the Courts to grant exemptions in general (i.e., finding that the Free Exercise Clause required the accommodation, or mandatory accommodations) has already been decided, not just once, but twice by the Court. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether this Court can make exemptions as in Ebralinag and the American Bible Society, in cases involving criminal laws of general application. We hold that the Constitution itself mandates the Court to do so.

Estrada v. Escritor Strains of U.S. Jurisprudence on the Religion Clauses; U.S. history has produced two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of jurisprudence on the religion clauses—the first is the standard of separation, which may take the form of either (a) strict separation or (b) the tamer version of strict neutrality or separation, and, the second standard, the benevolent neutrality or accommodation.

U.S. history has produced two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of jurisprudence on the religion clauses. First is the standard of separation, which may take the form of either (a) strict separation or (b) the tamer version of strict neutrality or separation, or what Mr. Justice Carpio refers to as the second theory of governmental neutrality. Although the latter form is not as hostile to religion as the former, both are anchored on the Jeffersonian premise that a "wall of separation" must exist between the state and the Church to protect the state from the church. Both protect the principle of church-state separation with a rigid reading of the principle. On the other hand, the second standard, the benevolent neutrality or accommodation, is buttressed by the view that the wall of separation is meant to protect the church from the state. A brief review of each theory is in order.

Garcia v. Drilon Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; Conspiracy; While the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—

VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 567 SCRA 231 (2008), the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.

Corpuz v. People Courts; The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.—

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

Minucher v. Scalzo FACTS

Violation of the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against Minucher following a "buy-bust operation" conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court. Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

People v. Formigones RULING

WON Abelardo is an imbecile and thus exempt from criminal liability. NO. In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. Further, in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. After a careful study of the record, the Court is convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless. But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half-brother, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking. In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with onehalf of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs. Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusión perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

Corpuz v. People RULING

WON the demand to return the subject the subject jewelry, if unsold, or remit the proceeds, if sold, is a valid demand under one of the elements of Estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the RPC? YES. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code; there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable; accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prisión Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prisión mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prisión correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice. Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Nationality Theory; Support; Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, the Supreme Court (SC) agrees with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.—

We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTCCebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

People v. Tulin Witnesses; Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime.—

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accusedappellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

People v. Simon The practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.

We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was effected. No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the selfserving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed, erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi.

Garcia v. Drilon Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Lozano v. Martinez Contracts; Checks are not mere contracts, but substitutes for money. Non-impairment of contract clause applies only to lawful contracts.

We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

People v. Echegaray R.A. No. 7659; Insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death.

We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion, This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Gonzales v. Abaya Armed Forces of the Philippines; Articles of War (C.A. No. 408): The offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected.—

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same—dismissal from the service—imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Ient v. Tullett Prebon Moot and Academic; The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.

We likewise cannot give credit to respondent's claim of mootness. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. The Court will not hesitate to resolve the legal and constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, particularly on a question capable of repetition, yet evading review.

People v. Tulin Criminal Law; Conspiracy; To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution—he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.

Estrada v. Escritor Freedom of Speech; It has been noted that unlike other fundamental rights like the right to life, liberty or property, the Religion Clauses are stated in absolute terms, unqualified by the requirement of "due process," "unreasonableness," or "lawful order"—only the right to free speech is comparable in its absolute grant.

We must consider the language of the Religion Clauses vis-à-vis the other fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights. It has been noted that unlike other fundamental rights like the right to life, liberty or property, the Religion Clauses are stated in absolute terms, unqualified by the requirement of "due process," "unreasonableness," or "lawful order." Only the right to free speech is comparable in its absolute grant. Given the unequivocal and unqualified grant couched in the language, the Court cannot simply dismiss a claim of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause, solely on the premise that the law in question is a general criminal law. If the burden is great and the sincerity of the religious belief is not in question, adherence to the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach require that the Court make an individual determination and not dismiss the claim outright.

Estrada v. Escritor The adoption of the benevolent neutrality accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it; Although benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, the interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection—under the framework, the Court cannot simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution; Our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases.

We must emphasize that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. This is an erroneous reading of the framework which the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio seems to entertain. Although benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, the interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose of the test—to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden religious exercise. Thus, under the framework, the Court cannot simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or the orthodox view, as proposed by Mr. Justice Carpio, for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution. As stated in the Decision: x x x While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree of burden on religious practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a doctrine on the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly, because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty "not only for a minority, however small—not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare—the State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.—

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests.

People v. Formigones ATTENTION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE INVITED TO THE CASE

When the court believes that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty the case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusión perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

People v. Simon The corpus delicti of the crime has been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.—

When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448- 88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.

People v. Lol-lo PUBLIC LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF TERRITORYYY

Wherever "Spain" is mentioned in the Penal Code, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression, "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands."

People v. Lol-lo RULING

Whether CFI of Sulu can have jurisdiction over the case Yes, CFI of Sulu can have jurisdiction over the case. In one case decided by the Supreme Court (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.), it was ruled that Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes. Here, Lol-lo and Saraw committed the crime on Dutch East Indies waters but were apprehended only in Sulu, Philippines. Therefore, CFI of Sulu has jurisdiction over the case as it is a competent tribunal where the offenders were apprehended. The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of 'the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo (the accused who raped one of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since one member of the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

People v. Echegaray RULING

Whether RA 7659 is constitutional? Yes. The death penalty is not a cruel and unjust punishment. Jurisprudence provides that punishments are cruel and unjust when they involve torture or a lingering death. As long as our law provides for its imposition in certain cases, the courts must impose it. RA 7659 meets all the requirements for the reimposition of the death penalty. The defendant says that the death penalty is unconstitutional for (1) having been enacted in the absence of compelling reason therefor and (2) death penalty for rape is cruel and excessive. The constitutional exercise of the limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails: (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition of decription set in the death penalty bill; (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. The assailed law provides "...the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just civilized and ordered society." The SC finds this a sufficient definition of "heinous crimes". SC does not agree that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not is the attendance of the circumstances of death on the part of the victim. The SC has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as held in the case of People v. Cristobal. Two types of crimes punished by death penalty: (1) those which are punished by RP to death; (2) those with mandatory capital punishment with the presence of certain qualifying circumstances. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED for LACK OF MERIT. SO ORDERED.

US v. Bustos RULING

Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press. Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio, So ordered.

Ient v. Tullett Prebon Constitutional Law; Courts; It is a long standing principle in jurisprudence that "courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be settled on other grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary."

With respect to the minutiae of other arguments cited in the parties' pleadings, it is no longer necessary for the Court to pass upon the same in light of our determination that there is no clear, categorical legislative intent to define Sections 31 and 34 as offenses under Section 144 of the Corporation Code. We likewise refrain from resolving the question on the constitutionality of Section 144 of the Corporation Code. It is a long standing principle in jurisprudence that "courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be settled on other grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary."

Lozano v. Martinez RULING

Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered granting the petition in G.R. No. 75789 and setting aside the order of the respondent Judge dated August 19, 1986. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 63419, 66839-42, 71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13 and 75765-67 are hereby dismissed and the temporary restraining order issued in G.R. Nos. 74524-25 is lifted. With costs against private petitioners. SO ORDERED.

White Light Corp v. City of Manila RULING

Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to "wash up" or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Garcia v. Drilon RULING

Whether or not R.A. No. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause. No, the gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women. RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen RULING

Whether or not Wilsem, a foreign citizen, may be held liable for violation of RA 9262? YES. The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children. In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner's claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case. SO ORDERED.

People v. Abilong RULING

Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro." It is the Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt for the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. Destierro is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. Hence, appellant Abilong is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City. In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City. Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Ladonga v. People RULING

Whether or not the petitioner, who was not the issuer of the three checks that bounced, could be held liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "a conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held liable guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have perform an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. It was not proven by direct evidence; petitioner was merely present at the time of the issuance of the checks. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

People v. Simon RULING

Whether or not the use of the penalty found in the Revised Penal Code is considered as an offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code. No. It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code. For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Thus, the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code. ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof. SO ORDERED.

People v. Ferrer RULING

Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder HELD: No. Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact, the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power. As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragnet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives (People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, 27 December 1972, 48 SCRA 382) In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of the Anti- Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the need for prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the Act. The Government, in addition to proving such circumstances as may affect liability, must establish the following elements of the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippines or any other subversive association: (1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the Commmunist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime under the domination of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization; and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and (2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectives which led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing the country under the control of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined the CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts. We refrain from making any pronouncement as to the crime of remaining a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any other subversive association; we leave this matter to f uture determination. ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September 15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.

Guingguing v. CA RULING

Whether the publication subject matter was indeed libelous. No. Torralba failed to established actual malice in the case. Aside from the fact that the information contained in said publication was true, the advertisement in question falls squarely within the bounds of constitutionally protected expression under Art. 3, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution. Under the Revised Penal Code, libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. In libel cases involving public figures, actual malice standard rule applies. As held in New York Times vs. Sullivan and reiterated in Agiong vs. Comelec, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Therefore, in order to justify a conviction for criminal libel against a public figure, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice. In the present case, Torralba was a public figure, being a broadcast journalist who hosts a public affairs program. By entering into this line of work, complainant in effect gave the public a legitimate interest in his life. He likewise gave them a stake in finding out if he himself had the integrity and character to have the right to criticize others for their conduct. Aside from the fact that the information contained in said publication was true, the intention to let the public know the character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed under the mantle of having been done with good motives and for justifiable ends. Since Torralba failed to establish actual malice against Lim and Guingguing, the petition for reversal of the judgment of libel against petitioner was granted. WHEREFORE, the court finds accused SEGUNDO LIM and BOY 'BG' GUINGGING, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principals of the crime of libel as charged in the information, defined and penalized in Art. 353 in relation to Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the said accused to a prison term of, ranging from, One (1) year, Eight (8) months and Twenty-one (21) days as minimum to, Two (2) years, Eleven (11) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum; to indemnify the complainant, damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED." WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 29 July 1996 and 3 October 1996, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they affect petitioner. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, promulgated on 17 May 1994, as regards petitioner is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the charge of libel therein. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Corpuz v. People It is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.

Gonzales v. Abaya Prohibition; In a petition for prohibition, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts; Prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.

With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts. Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.

Lozano v. Martinez B.P. 22 does not involve an undue delegation of legislative power of the payee.

lt is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws, which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefore has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the off ended party is farfetched.

Lozano v. Martinez Judgments; Foreign judgments on worthless checks legislation must be read in context We recognize the wisdom of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander.

lt is needless to warn that foreign jurisprudence must be taken with abundant caution. A caveat to be observed is that substantial differences exist between our statute and the worthless check acts of those states where the jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to remember is that BP 22 was not lifted bodily from any existing statute. Furthermore, we have to consider that judicial decisions must be read in the context of the facts and the law involved and, in a broader sense, of the social, economic and political environment—in short, the milieu—under which they were made. We recognize the wisdom of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander.