Curtis's IR Stubs

FEARON (1998)

"BARGAINING, ENFORCEMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION" Neoliberals focus on two types of problems: (1) cheating and enforcement problems and (2) distributional problems (relative gains). Fearon introduces a third problem: bargaining over the terms of the agreement. A long shadow of the future can help with enforcement problems (as neoliberals believe), but it can inhibit cooperation in the bargaining stage. Future interaction makes states less likely to cheat but more likely to bargain harder for terms that could be in place for a relatively long period of time.

SCHROEDER (1994) "HISTORICAL REALITY VERSUS NEOREALIST THEORY

"_Does neorealism explain historical reality? He finds history does not support four neorealist predictions: 1. States generally balance against power._2. States are not functionally differentiated._3. Potential hegemons are countered by balancing efforts._4. Unipolar periods motivate others to rise to great power status. Three of the four are directly related to balancing behavior.

HOROWITZ (1985) ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT

A classic work on ethnic conflict. Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict in strongly divided and newly in- dependent nations is greatest in unranked systems (ethnicity does not correspond to class). He suggests European regimes intensified this potential for conflict by developing advanced and backward ethnic groups as the heirs of the colonial nations. Thus, he suggests that groups will fear domination by other groups in the competition to have control over the newly independent state. He also claims diversity and democracy can work with federalism and preferential access to education and employment.

INGLEHART (1990) CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

A gradual but steady and profound shift has been occurring in the basic values of the mass publics of the more advanced industrial societies. The shift is away from concern with material well-being and physical security and toward greater concern for the quality of life, self-expression, sexual freedom, and interpersonal relations that are less formal. This "post-materialist" condition is shaped by the level of affluence and security common during the formative years of ones life.

ANDERSON, P. (1974) LINEAGES OF THE ABSOLUTIST STATE

Absolutism arose as a response to foreign threats. This thesis is supported with a case study of Europe. The advanced wealthy states of Western Europe were able to create strong militaries, allowing them to dominate Eastern Europe at will. This compelled Eastern Europe to raise armies, which required absolutist governance in this relatively underdeveloped region. In sum, international rivalry forces states into rapid military devel- opment. Because doing so requires a strong central system, these states often turn to centralized autocratic rule.

ALMOND & GENCO (1977) "CLOUDS, CLOCKS, AND THE STUDY OF POLITICS"

Almond and Genco reflect on the positivist turn in political science. They warn against treating political phenomena as natural events. Humans are not "clocks" that can be dissected to be understood like the subjects of hard science. In its positivist push to become a hard science or like economics, political scientists cannot neglect "cloud-like" attributes of our subjects that demand sociological and historical approaches.

AMES (1995) "ELECTORAL RULES, CONSTITUENCY PRESSURES, AND PORK BARREL"

Ames examines why legislatures sometimes pursue pork spending while neglecting national issues with a case study of Brazil. Ames says legislatures are interested in reelection and they are most likely to be reelected by attacking key parts of the selectorate. Thus, incumbents use targeted pork spending to attract a winning coalition. This is more efficient than work on broader national issues.

ANDERSON, B. (1983) IMAGINED COMMUNITIES

Anderson attributes the rise of nationalism to language. In Europe, technology such as the printing press increased the use of local languages at the expense of Latin. Communities developed around these languages and leaders used official nationalism to eradicate weaker linguistic groups. Leaders also used holidays, myths, and symbols to generate imagined nationalist identities.

OSTROM (1990) GOVERNING THE COMMONS

Any group that attempts to manage a common resource (e.g., aquifers, judicial systems, pastures) for optimal sustainable production must solve a set of problems in order to create institutions for collective action. Ostrom studies such institutions and concludes common resources can be managed if boundaries of the resource are clearly defined, most individuals can participate in rule modification, community members themselves participate in monitoring, sanctions are used, and conflict resolution mechanisms exist.

AMES (1987) POLITICAL SURVIVAL

Assuming leaders want to remain in power, leaders spend more on public goods when they are vulnerable to executive replacement. Leaders have less incentive to provide public goods when institutions insulate them from potential rivals. Ames examines two institutional dimensions: competitive vs. non-competitive and military vs. civilian. He finds leaders must spend the most on public goods when the government is in transition following elections or military coups. Therefore, democracies and military juntas have the greatest incentive to spend on public goods.

SCHWELLER (1994) "BANDWAGONING FOR PROFIT"

Balancing and bandwagoning are not opposite behaviors. The aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension to obtain values coveted. Therefore, systemic factors do not determine state behavior. Instead, states' preferences for the status quo or for revision determine balancing and bandwagoning behavior. These preferences are not predicted by the distribution of power.

BATES (1997) ''AREA STUDIES AND THE DISCIPLINE"

Bates documents the decline of area studies in the literature on comparative politics. He attributes the decline in area studies to (1) decrease grant money towards area specific research in the post-Cold War and (2) graduate training that emphasizes "social science" and quantitative methods. He says area studies must be transformed into social science capable of general testing, and rational choice should be used in this transformation.

BATES (1981) MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA

Bates explores the causes of Africa's struggling agriculture sector. His study leads him to conclude African agriculture is inefficient because the states' interventionist policies compromise the efforts of individual producers to respond to the dictates of the market. The state intervenes to serve the interests of the elites that exercise political clout. Therefore, development economists must also account for the politics of wealth distribution in unstable countries.

BATES (1997) OPEN-ECONOMY POLITICS

Bates uses a case study of the world coffee trade to discuss how domestic politics affect the formation of inter- national trade regimes. States' international goals are attributed to their domestic institutions. International- level outcomes, such as the International Coffee Organization, are reflections of domestic preferences that were shaped by domestic institutions.

BINDER (1986) "THE NATURAL HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY"

Binder distinguishes between two forms of development theory: 1. Liberal development theory/modernization theory: Individuals are rational utility-maximizers who best pursue their interests when government does not constrain their behavior. This theory calls for liberal government to the detriment of established institutions, traditional structures, etc. 2. Conservative development theory: Development is best achieved via stringent state oversight of the economy. This requires state stability, control, and order.

BLAINEY (1973) THE CAUSES OF WAR

Blainey uses a historical case study approach to argue that the cause of war is disagreement over relative power. Wars begin when states have contradictory expectations of the likely duration and outcome of the war. Wars only end when these expectations cease to be contradictory. States are most likely to have contradictory expectations in times of rapid growth and prosperity.

BOIX (2003) DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION

Boix predicts regime type with income inequality, capital mobility, and the distribution of political resources. Unlike Acemoglu and Robinson (2007), Boix believes income equality increases the likelihood of democracy because the redistributive costs are lower. Capital mobility keeps tax rates stable so democracy can prevail, but fixed assets, like natural resources, allow autocrats to charge higher taxes. Therefore, development affects democracy via the generation of mobile capital and human capital.

BOLLEN (1980) "ISSUES IN THE COMPARATIVE MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY"

Bollen defines democracy and introduces a quantitative measure for the purposes of comparative analysis. The measure is similar to Polity, which it predates by a decade. Bollen rejects procedural definitions of democracy, instead claiming it is the "extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the non-elite is maximized."

KING, KEOHANE, AND VERBA (1994) DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY

Both qualitative and quantitative research follow the same logic of inquiry. (1) Research should be designed to make inferences on the basis of empirical information; (2) methods should be made clear so reliability can be tested; (3) conclusions should be uncertain and the uncertainty of the inference should be made clear; and (4) research should adhere to a set of rules about data collection and observations that will make the results produced as unbiased and efficient as possible.

PERSSON & TABELLINI (2003) THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS

Both taxes and government expenditure will be higher in parliamentary systems because checks and balances in the presidential systems (including divided government) prevent both. In majoritarian systems, politicians have incentives to cater to the preferences of those who can help them to get the plurality of the votes. They will do so by promising pork barrel projects. In proportional representation systems, on the other hand, targeting makes less sense because every vote counts which is why politicians will provide more public goods. Their prediction is, hence, that the composition of the government budget will be different depending on the electoral regime.

BRATTON & VAN DE WALLE (1997) DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS IN AFRICA

Bratton and van de Walle generate several propositions from their analysis of democratic transitions in 29 sub-Saharan countries. First, the course of each transition owes much to the nature of the previous author- itarian regime, specifically, the formal rules and procedures (or lack thereof) that shaped political competi- tion. Second, mass protests initiate transitions. Third, internal political struggle takes primacy in explaining the shape and pacing of transitions. Economic and international variables play secondary roles in this pro- cess. Finally, democratic transitions remain incomplete and are occasionally reversed. Not surprisingly, the authors find that authoritarian regimes which permitted limited opposition party organizing experienced the most frequent protests. Military regimes faced the least. More interesting is the finding that plebiscitary single-party regimes face significant mass protest. This could mean that the electoral exercises of authoritar- ian regimes in Africa were taken seriously by people in these states, despite the declining legitimacy of such regimes. One might conclude that people actually believed they should hold their rulers accountable and, even when ratifying pre- determined outcomes, maintained their expectations that accountability should be enforced at some point in the future.

BROOKS (1997) "DUELING REALISMS"_

Brooks argues realism has divided into two branches: Waltzian Neorealism (WNR) and Post-Classical Realism (PCR). o WNR assumes states react to the possibility of conflict, while PCR assumes states react to the probability _of conflict. o WNR assumes states value short-term goals, while PCR assumes states value long-term goals. o WNR assumes military goals trump economic goals, while PCR assumes states pursue military goals and economic goals. _BROOKS (2005) PRODUCING SECURITY _Brooks explores the relationship between interdependence and peace. Interdependence causes peace via the "globalization of production" in the defense industry. States with interdependent defense industries have an edge in defense technology, but interdependence compromises their capacities. Thus, they have an edge over states that are not globalized, but they cannot effectively fight each other. _BROOKS & WOHLFORTH (2005) "HARD TIMES FOR SOFT BALANCING" _Some realists have adopted the concept of "soft balancing" to explain the lack of conventional balancing against the United States in the post-Cold War period. However, soft balancing has two fundamental flaws: (1) the absence of any empirical support, (2) and the failure to consider alternate explanations for "soft balancing behavior." They use alleged "soft balancing" from China, Russia, and the EU to support this claim.

BENNETT & GEORGE (2004)

CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN SOCIAL SCIENCES Responding to a quantitative mainstream, Bennett and George discuss the importance of context-sensitive methods for theory generation. They believe case studies are important to understand the causal mechanisms that may or may not underlie statistical correlations. The book emphasizes the benefits of process tracing, a method that identifies links between possible causes and observed outcomes by examining histories, archival documents, interview transcripts and other sources to see whether the causal process hypothesized by theory is evident in the sequence. Process tracing can also have heuristic function by generating new variables or 3 hypotheses. They also recommend typological theory (theory to specific subsets of observations) to better understand the multiple causal chains that could led to the outcome of interest.

PRZEWORSKI (1991) DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET

Capitalism is suboptimal because when self-interested economic agents allocate scarce resources in a de- centralized way, the productive potential of the economy cannot be fully utilized unless they receive a full return on the resource allocation. Socialism is not feasible because it relies upon truthful self-reporting by households and firms as well as a perfectly rational planner. Przeworski concludes that the more rational and humane economic system is one that relies on regulated markets to allocate resources and on the state to assure the minimum material welfare of everyone. Reforms will occur in fits and starts in response to crises and public support of said reforms.

CARNOY (1984) THE STATE AND POLITICAL THEORY_

Carnoy offers five competing conceptions of the interaction between state and economy: 1. Smithian Liberalism: Free markets allow each to pursue his own interest and government intervention should be minimal. Policy should be laissez-faire and pro-business, and it should be resistant to pressure for redistributive policies. 2. Pluralism: Few have the ability to make decisions, so direct democracy is not trusted. Government serves the interests of those who participate at the expense of those who do not. 3. Social Corporatism: The state is best run by creating a large bureaucracy and selecting leaders from that bureaucracy. This meritocracy leads to the best policy and insulates the state from leaders favored by the uneducated public. 4. Logic of Capital Theory: Capitalism demands growth and overproduction so the government must manage this overproduction with economic policy and government spending. 5. Independent State Theory: Capitalism causes class conflict and the government must be an independent mediator of the conflict between capital and labor.

ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON (2006) "ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE"

Changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence, eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites. New technologies may enrich competing groups, increasing their threat to incumbents. These considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change, even when such change will benefit society as a whole. The political instability caused by new technologies is called the political replacement effect.

LIJPHART (1977) DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES

Consociational democracy is associated with (1) grand coalitions representing societal segments, (2) the mutual veto, which serves as an additional protection of minority interests, (3) proportional representation (such that a minimum winning coalition is less profitable and therefore less probable), and (4) segmen- tal autonomy (federalism). The conditions necessary for the success of such institutions include segmental elite commitment to democracy and the maintenance of the political community, multiple balances of power among the segments of a society, a moderate multiparty system with no majority party, a fairly small popu- lation, segmental isolation, and prior traditions of elite accommodation.

LIPSON (1984) "INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND SECURITY AFFAIRS"

Cooperation is more likely in economic than security affairs for two reasons. In security, the immediate and potentially grave losses to an actor who attempts to cooperate without reciprocation are too great for states to risk cooperation. Second, the risks associated with inadequate monitoring of others' decisions and actions disallows cooperation. Economic issues are more transparent and less subject to devastating surprise.

COPELAND (2000) THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR

Copeland argues major war is caused by shifts in the distribution of material capabilities. Specifically, major war occurs when a dominant state attacks a rising rival to thwart the rival while the distribution of power is still favorable. Copeland calls this theory dynamic differentials theory.

COPELAND (1996) "ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND WAR"

Copeland introduces trade expectations theory to explain the relationship between economic interdependence and war. The effect on war is dependent upon states' expectations about future trading relationships. When states expect high levels of trade into the future, economic interdependence causes peace. When states expect lower levels of trade in the future, highly dependent states initiate for fear of losing future wealth.

COX (1997) MAKING VOTES COUNT

Cox uses formal modeling to test a number of extensions of Duverger's law. Cox finds the number of political parties is equal to M + 1, where M is the number of parties that can win. Both voter behavior and party elites limit the number of political parties. He finds party elites collaborate to position political parties. Voter behavior also limits the number of political parties so long as voters (1) know which candidates are viable, (2) vote according to rational short-term interests, and (3) are not intensively supportive of their first choice and opposed to the other candidates.

PRZEWORSKI & LIMONGI (1997) "MODERNIZATION: THEORIES AND FACTS"

Democracies have been said to occur once a country has reached a certain level of economic development (endogenous explanation), but it has also been said that democracies appear randomly with regard to levels of development, but die in poorer countries and survive in the wealthier ones (exogenous explanation). The endogenous explanation seems to fail because few authoritarian regimes developed over a long period of time and no level of income predicts when that would occur. Rapid growth is not destabilizing for democracies or dictatorships. Democracies are, however, extremely fragile in the face of economic crises and/or declining incomes.

MILNER & KUBOTA (2005) "WHY THE MOVE TO FREE TRADE?"

Democratization in the developing world has caused globalization. Democratization of the political system reduces governments' ability to use trade barriers as a strategy for building political support. Political leaders in labor-rich countries may prefer lower trade barriers as democracy increases.

DOWNS (1957) AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Downs assumes politicians seek private gains, such as income, prestige, and power. Parties formulate policies to win elections - they adopt policies in order to win more votes. Individuals also vote based on their self- interest. All political ideologies are means to obtaining more votes, and individuals rationally subscribe to whatever ideology offers the most private gains. Parties will not adopt the same policy platform because they will attempt to appeal to extremists at opposite ends of the spectrum.

DOYLE (1997) WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE

Doyle explores three major branches of international relations theory: realism, liberalism, and socialism (Marxism). He discusses the classical roots of each theory, dealing with the nuanced arguments of classical theorists at length. The book does not have a central thesis. Instead, he uses classical theory to map international relations theory.

WEINGAST (1995) "THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Economic development requires a credible commitment from a state to not confiscate, now or in the future, the property of private parties. Limited government developed in the West and federalism played a critical role on this. Weingast argues that the impressive economic growth of Britain, the US and China can be attributed to federalism and its effects on limiting the government. As long as capital and labor are mobile, market-preserving federalism constrains the lower units in their attempts to place political limits on economic activity, because resources will move to other jurisdictions.

HELLMAN (1998) "WINNERS TAKE ALL"

Economic reform often demands widespread short-term costs for concentrated short-term benefits. Over time, these benefits are shared by society (example: recent bailouts). Hellman shows the most common obstacles to economic reforms are not those who incur the costs, but by those who want to protect their short-term benefits (AIG execs). The short-term winners have often sought to stall the economy in a partial reform equilibrium that generates concentrated rents for themselves, while imposing high costs on the rest of society. States must insulate themselves from the influence of these short-term gainers.

EICHENGREEN (1996) GLOBALIZING CAPITAL

Eichengreen draws conclusions about the international monetary system through a series of case studies dating from the pre-1914 gold standard. The overall conclusion is that the world is likely to continue floating exchange rates. This is because the subordination of monetary policy to international requirements is too difficult in a democratic setting where governments are vulnerable to the pressures of interest groups.

ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON (2000) "WHY DID THE WEST EXTEND THE FRANCHISE?"

Elites extend voting rights to avoid social revolution from the lower classes. By extending voting rights, elites can credibly commit to future redistributive policies for the poorer masses. Note that this explanation is "top-down" rather than the "bottom-up" push for suffrage described by Barrington Moore (1966) and others.

HUNTINGTON (1991) THE THIRD WAVE

Five patterns of democratization: (1) the cyclical pattern, where countries alternate between democratic and authoritarian systems; (2) the second-try pattern, where democracy was finally established after a first failed attempt; (3) the interrupted democracy pattern, where instability led to suspension of democratic processes; (4) the direct transition pattern, where change occurred gradually or through a sudden replacement of authoritarian systems; (5) the decolonization pattern, where a democratic country imposes democratic insti- tutions on its colonies. Huntington identifies five independent variables which have played significant roles in bringing about those transitions: (1) declining legitimacy, (2) unprecedented global economic growth; (3) Catholic support; (4) EU/US foreign policy, (5) "snowballing."

RUSTOW (1970) "TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY"

For states to transition to democracy, the society must (1) have a sense of national unity, it then must (2) struggle with an entrenched domestic conflict, and it (3) must be aware of consciously adopt democracy in that order. Rustow claims this conflict is often due to economic growth, but could also be the result of a domestic conflict over social welfare as well.

SCHEVE & SLAUGHTER (2004) "ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION"

Foreign direct investment increases worker insecurity. FDI increases elasticity of demands for labor, causing volatility in wages and employment. Evidence from a cross-sector analysis of British industries finds individ- uals perceive more insecurity when their industry of employment experiences foreign direct investment.

FRENDREIS (1983) "EXPLANATION OF VARIATION AND DETECTION OF COVARIATION"

Frendreis provides a critique of what he calls the "most similar" and "most different" comparative methods from Lijphart and Przeworski and Teune, respectively. He argues that these methods can really be thought of as the same because they have the same logical structure. Both are concerned with eliminating variables that do not covary. The decision of which method to use, then, must be based on the researcher's a priori knowledge of whether cases can be compared on the dependent variable or whether an analysis of the independent variables that lead to different outcomes in the dependent variable would make more sense.

FRIEDEN (1991) "INVESTED INTERESTS"

Frieden analyzes the role of increased capital mobility. The effects of capital mobility depend on factor endowment. It favors owners of capital, but disadvantages workers in capital-exporting states. It increases the importance of exchange rate policy, which can be used to balance the needs of capital owners and labor. This increases the likelihood of domestic conflict between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated exchange change.

GEDDES (2003) PARADIGMS AND SAND CASTLES

Geddes provides a thoughtful analysis of the state of the comparative literature. While her criticism is focused on comparative politics, many of her conclusions apply to international relations as well. Geddes looks back to research of the last half of the twentieth century and finds scholars too hastily dismiss old theories when current events seem to contradict them. Because political science occurs in reality as we study it, it is not like the hard sciences. Paradigms are not always overturned by research. Often, they are overturned by contemporary political phenomena, and this is detrimental to the scientific progress of social science. Geddes calls for increased rigor and insulation from current events.

GEDDES (1999) "WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT DEMOCRATIZATION AFTER TWENTY YEARS?"

Geddes uses formal theory and new data to examine different patterns of authoritarian breakdown. Geddes distinguishes between three types of autocracy: 1. Military Junta: Breakdown occurs following internal divisions. Incumbents and political challengers must maintain favor with the military. 2. Single-Party States: SPS are the most resilient. Breakdown usually follows major external shocks rather than internal splits. 3. Personalist Dictatorships: As power is centralized around one person, the regime becomes increasingly vulnerable to the leader's death. This is the most likely autocracy type to see violent breakdown.

GILPIN (1975) US POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION

Gilpin argues that MNCs developed because the US' geographic location forces it to use economics to counter the land power of the well-positioned Soviet Union. Corporations gained an overseas presence following the Marshall Plan. As a consequence, the United States exported its comparative advantage and is now dependent upon multinational corporations. Gilpin calls for domestic investment and nationalization of important industries.

HAGGARD (1990) PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY

Haggard compares four East Asian NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) with two Latin Amer- ican countries (Brazil and Mexico). He suggests that the East Asian NICs have developed via export- oriented industrialization (EOI), while the Latin countries have favored an inward-oriented path of import- substituting industrialization (ISI). He reasons that rapid economic development requires drastic policy changes and social dislocations. Where societal groups can organize to influence policy, they form coali- tions to secure benefits for themselves, thereby hindering optimal developmental policy. Thus, if institutions limit collective action, states can insulate themselves and create autonomous policy environments to main- tain EOI.

KAHLER (1998) "RATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS"

How can rational choice and psychological theories be productively compared or reconciled? Rationality is questioned by those who stress culture, identity, and norms, but opponents to rationality have failed to create models that can be tested via positivism. Rationality takes multiple forms and is often burdened with auxiliary assumptions. Kahler calls for "problem-centered research" in which rational and psychological models can be used on a "level playing field."

JERVIS (1978) "COOPERATION UNDER THE SECURITY DILEMMA"

How can states overcome the security dilemma? Jervis says the likelihood of conflict is determined by states' subjective security. There are two components of a state's subjective security: (1) geography and (2) technology. The security dilemma increases with geographic vulnerability and offense-advanced technology. Cooperation is more likely when defensive tactics are advantageous and states are not vulnerable to their neighbors.

GLASER & KAUFMANN (1998) "WHAT IS THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE AND CAN WE MEASURE IT?"

How can we measure the offense-defense balance? The authors argue it should be measured as the ratio of the cost of the forces that the attacker requires to take territory to the cost of the defender's forces. Then, the authors argue that states can and do gauge the offensive-defensive balance.

WENDT (1987) "THE AGENT-STRUCTURE PROBLEM IN IR THEORY"_

How do agents and structure interact in the international system? Wendt defines the agent-centric and structure-centric positions before offering his alternative. o Individualism: Agent-centered view. The system is reduced to the "properties and interactions of its constituent elements." Neorealism is an example. o Structuralism: Agents are reduced to functions of the structure. World-systems theory is an example. o Structurationalism: Agents and structures are co-determined - one affects the other. Models must not subordinate one for the other. Rather, agents and structure define each other in a dynamic international system.

HELLWIG & SAMUELS (2007) "VOTING IN OPEN ECONOMIES"

How does globalization affect elections? These authors find exposure to the world economy weakens con- nections between economic performance and support for political incumbents. This suggests leaders of highly-integrated states successfully attribute (or buck-pass) blame for economic downturns to the interna- tional system. Disaffected voters hold other actors responsible for the negative impacts of globalization.

RUSSETT (1990) CONTROLLING THE SWORD

How does public opinion affect the foreign policies of democratic states? He shows the public has stable and informed preferences, but this is only true when the people feel foreign policy could affect their lives. However, Russett also finds leaders can and do frame foreign affairs to pander to public opinion. This can cause leaders to get involved in international affairs before elections.

HUNTINGTON (1996) THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

Huntington observes conflict among people of different civilizations and cooperation among those of the same civilization. Why? Leaders have psychological and political needs for enemies, in part to make their own identities. Globalization and democracy will not appease these leaders, as non-Westerners view capital- ism and democracy as Western ideas that threaten their own cultures. This clash only ends when one attains global domination.

FEARON (1995) "RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS FOR WAR"

If states are rational, they would only accept the costs and risks associated with war if (1) no peaceful settle- ment is mutually-acceptable (issue indivisibility) or (2) states are unable to identify a mutually-acceptable peaceful settlement due to information problems of commitment problems. Fearon is concerned with the second cause of war. States fail to identify peaceful settlements because (1) states have an incentive to misrepresent their resolve and capabilities and (2) states can't always credibly commit to uphold mutually- preferred bargains.

ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON (2001) "A THEORY OF POLITICAL TRANSITIONS"

In democracies, the poor impose higher taxes on the rich than in non-democracies. This makes the poor pro-democratic and the rich anti-democratic. Consequently, income distribution is an important determinant of democracy and democratization. When the masses organize, elites are likely to democratize the state to commit to future redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). However, if the poor demand too much from the elites, the elites can organize an anti-democratic coup.

GRUBER (2000) RULING THE WORLD

In emphasizing the disparate bargaining power among states and the consequent power of some to frame the agenda for others, Gruber seeks to challenge the assumptions of the liberal or neoliberal literature regarding the scope for mutually-beneficial cooperation among states. He explicitly sides with realists who see international relations as fundamentally a competitive struggle for advantage where cooperation is more of an accident than a norm.

FEARON (1994) "DOMESTIC POLITICAL AUDIENCES"

In interstate crises, when are states likely to back down? Fearon says this cannot be explained by military strength or relative interests. Instead, relative audience costs matter. Democracies generate audience costs because leaders can be punished by domestic audiences for backing down. Consequently, democracies make more credible threats and states are less likely to call their bluffs, but they are less likely to back down in conflicts.

O'DONNELL (1973) MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM

In late-industrializing states, modernization caused non-democratic political systems. Why? He states that imported technology in the 1960s transformed the socioeconomic structures of Argentina and Brazil in ways unforeseen by the proponents of modernization theory. For example, new technocratic roles spread through- out the economy. What ensued was a solidarity among the military and those in the technocratic roles, which fostered in them a belief that they could govern. Those in technocratic roles experienced a frustration about the failure of the current situation to meet their goals, such that they were motivated to mobilize in an effort to reshape the social context in a way that would serve their own aspirations. This is called "bureaucratic authoritarianism."

7 CHRISTENSEN & SNYDER (1990) "CHAIN GANGS AND PASSED BUCKS"

In multipolar systems, states can enter conflicts too readily (chain-ganging - WWI) or they can avoid conflict and wait for others to fight them (buck-passing - WWII). States chain-gang where offense is perceived to have an advantage. States buck-pass where defense is perceived to have an advantage.

NORTH (1981) STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY

In the neoclassical model, one assumes frictionless markets without institutions. North suggests this concep- tion is clearly incorrect. North suggests we must account for the role of the state in specifying the structure of property rights and facilitating the emergence of economic institutions which develop to reduce transaction costs and organize exchange. In his formulation, the state develops rules to maximize the wealth of the ruler and introduces rules to lower transaction costs and thereby increase efficiency and stimulate growth. Moreover, institutions (both formal rules and informal norms) provide the framework within which human beings interact and constrain peoples choice sets.

PRZEWORKSI & TEUNE (1970) THE LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL INQUIRY

In this classic book on comparative methodology, Przeworski and Teune claim the goal of comparative politics is to replace names of places and systems with names of variables and concepts that explain the differences among places and systems. In this book, the authors discuss the use of most similar and most different re- search designs. They advocate the use of the most different design because this method selects on invariance in the dependent variable to eliminate explanations based on variables shared by the cases.

LAITIN (1995) "DISCIPLINING POLITICAL SCIENCE"

In this introduction to an issue-long response to Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994), Laitin urges the discipline to truly become a discipline by taking the advice of the new book. He stresses the importance of a common vocabulary for the discipline and argues that the terms used by KKV, such as validity, heterogeneity, etc. must become part of the lexicon of every political scientist if we are to move forward. He notes that political science borrows from many other disciplines, but the study of political science will never be a discipline without adopting a common vocabulary.

PAPE (2005) "SOFT BALANCING AGAINST THE UNITED STATES"

Increased American aggression during the Bush era caused increased soft balancing against the United States. Unless the US becomes less aggressive, states will continue to soft balance, or even hard balance, against the United States.

KIM (2008) "COSTLY PROCEDURES"

Increasing legalization in international institutions imposes costs on countries by increasing the complexity and difficulty of procedures for them to utilize. Consequently, legalization works to the advantage of power- ful states with the resources to adopt new measures to the detriment of weak states that lack that capacity. This is supported by a study of the GATT/WTO.

WALTZ (1959) MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR_

International relations theory is organized into three levels of analysis: 1. First image: Attributes war to human nature, psychology, and personal characteristics. 2. Second image: Attributes war to characteristics of the state, including regime type, culture, etc. 3. Third image: All state behavior is determined by the state's position in the international system. States are not functionally differentiated - they have the same interests and identity.

COLARESI (2004) "WHEN DOVES CRY"

Interstate rivalries persist because "dovish" leaders are punished if their benevolent behavior is not recip- rocate by a rival. Conversely, "hawks" are not punished if rivals use aggression. Therefore, leaders have a domestic political incentive to exhibit the hawkish behavior that prolongs rivalry.

DAVIS (2004) "INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ISSUE LINKAGE"

Issue linkage allows states to overcome domestic resistance to economic liberalization. Furthermore, insti- tutions bolster the credibility of the linkage to make it more effective. Thus, liberalization and participation in organizations promote further liberalization and allow states to resist domestic pressure for protectionist policies.

JERVIS (1976) PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Jervis establishes misperception as an important factor in international relations and uses psychology lit- erature to explain foreign policy. Many of the sources of misperception discussed are individual-level: past experiences, deep-rooted beliefs, attempts at consistency, and a desire for truth all shape leaders' perceptions of the world. Jervis is most interested in how these sources of misperception influence leaders' predictions and perceptions regarding the interests and behavior of interstate rivals.

KANG (2002) CRONY CAPITALISM

Kang studies the economic effects of corruption in Korea and the Philippines. Although money politics (cor- ruption and cronyism) is generally seen as an inhibitor to economic growth, there are certain conditions in which it can actually be beneficial. If there is a balance of power among a small and stable set of government and business elites, money politics can actually reduce transaction costs and make long-term agreements and investments more efficient, while enriching those fortunate few who collude together

KEOHANE (1983) "THE DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES"

Keohane argues hegemony is not necessary for cooperation. A notable demand for cooperation exists be- cause regimes reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. Because regimes provide these benefits, cooperation occurs even when hegemons are not present to enforce international agreements.

KEOHANE [ED.] (1986) NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS

Keohane includes four chapters of Waltz (1979) and four criticisms of Waltzian neorealism. The critics say Waltz's parsimony has been purchased at too high a price. Cox and Ashley say neorealism simplifies complex processes in order to transform realism into a positivistic problem-solving theory. Waltz responds to his critics, calling them unpersuasive and "reductionist."

KEOHANE (1984) AFTER HEGEMONY

Keohane seeks to explain why international regimes persist even while American hegemony is waning. He argues that while hegemons effectively create institutions, the demand for institutions is high and they can exist without hegemons. Keohane advances a functionalist theory that emphasizes how institutions lower transaction costs, provide a legitimate venue for negotiation, reduce uncertainty, and use issue linkages to identify mutually-preferred cooperative outcomes.

KYDD (1997) "SHEEP IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING"

Kydd believes both offensive (Mearsheimer) and defensive (Glaser) realists overestimate the consequences of the security dilemma. Offensive realists say states always pursue relative gains because they cannot trust other states' motivations. Defensive realists say the security dilemma does not have harsh consequences in defensive systems. Kydd calls himself a motivational realist and he believes security-seeking states can signal benign motivations with transparent democratic processes, costly signals, etc.

LAKATOS (1970) "FALSIFICATION AND THE MSRP"

Lakatos is one of the more influential philosophers of science in the political science literature. In his frame- work, research programs consist of "hard core" assumptions and a "protective belt" of auxiliary hypotheses that are drawn from the hard core assumptions. Progress is made via "problemshifts." For a problemshift to be progressive, it must (1) predict novel facts and (2) verify these novel predictions with empirical evidence. If this requires a shift in the hard core, then the shift is an interprogram problemshift. If the shift does not alter the hard core and resulted from a well-posed question about auxiliary hypotheses, then the shift is an intraprogram problemshift.

LAKE & POWELL (1999) STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Lake and Powell introduce a "strategic choice" approach to international relations. This approach emphasizes unit-level rationality and uses formal theory to better understand the implications of systemic anarchy. By examining the micro-level foundations of realism, the authors find that rational actors do not always balance, as Waltz predicts. This approach captures what Waltzian realism misses: state strategies, such as bargaining, bluffing, and buck-passing.

GOLDSTEIN (1996) "INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS"

Leaders have domestic political incentives to join international institutions. When states join institutions, leaders can buck-pass to the institution, allowing the state to liberalize while insulating the leader from domestic pressure. The United States' membership in NAFTA is used to illustrate this point.

PUTNAM (1988) "DIPLOMACY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS"

Leaders play two-level games and must find solutions that simultaneously satisfy international and domestic win-sets. The two levels can be interactive. A small win-set in one level can provide bargaining power in the realm of the larger win-set. Domestic audience costs cause credible international agreements, or institutional constraints allow leaders to buck-pass to the international system during domestic crises.

LEMKE & REED (2001) "WAR AND RIVALRY AMONG GREAT POWERS"

Lemke and Reed argue rivalry and war have different causes. Therefore, studies of war must use selection models to distinguish the causes of rivalry from the causes of war. Among rivals, the authors find no evidence of a positive relationship between contiguity or power parity and war initiation. These variables cause rivalry, but they do not predict which rivals go to war and which rivals do not go to war.

LEVY (1997) "PROSPECT THEORY, RATIONAL CHOICE, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS"

Levy says scholars must focus on the effects of framing because policy-makers can frame the status quo in the domain of gains or losses. Because the perception of domain, rather than any actual position in a domain, is believed to determine risk-aversion, prospect theorists must account for framing and subjective understandings of the status quo.

DOYLE (1986) "LIBERALISM AND WORLD POLITICS"

Liberal states have a separate peace, but they are prone to make war on other states. There are liberal reasons for aggression that can be traced back to Kant, Schumpeter, and even Machiavelli, who says liberal imperialism is the most viable way for states to survive expansion. This article exposes liberalism's internal debates.

LIEBERMAN (2005) "NESTED ANALYSIS AS A MIXED-METHOD STRATEGY"

Lieberman discusses the potential contributions of nested analysis to political science research. In nested analysis, a scholar uses quantitative methods to evaluate a theory and identify outliers. Next, the researcher uses qualitative methods to identify the reason the regression did not account for the outlier. Next, the researcher uses the insights gained by this qualitative analysis to refine the quantitative model to provide a better fit. Two problems: (1) many scholars already perform "nested analysis" to make their desired variables significant. (2) This risks over-fitting the theory to the data, increasing the risk of inaccurate inferences and reducing the generalizability of the results to unobserved cases.

LIJPHART (1999) PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY

Lijphart argues against the conventional wisdom that claims new democracies should choose the efficiency and stability of majoritarian democracies over the greater inclusiveness and compromise characteristic of consensus democracies. He argues consensus democracies are superior because they are more democratic and no less effective relative to majoritarian states.

LINDBLOM (1977) POLITICS AND MARKETS

Lindblom compares the features of Western and communist political-economic systems. He suggests the industrial West primarily relies upon a market system based on exchange, which is an efficient allocator of resources and instruments of social coordination that are compatible with individual freedom. But, they are subject to market failures. The Communist countries, however, are organized around authority. People are given an incentive such as fear or expectation of future advantage in order to accept authority and do things they may not otherwise want to do. Authority systems can be very effective, but they are also imprecise and often irrational. Lindblom notes that no system is wholly distinct: each employs some facets of market and authority.

LOEWENSTEIN (1957) POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

Lowenstein says we need to look at several things to understand the political system in an individual state society: (1) how political power is designated or gained by the single or several power holders; (2) how power is then exercised and distributed; and (3) how the exercise of power by the holders is then controlled. Two types of societies are delineated: constitutional systems in which power is shared and autocratic systems where power is concentrated.

LUTTWAK (1987) STRATEGY: THE LOGIC OF WAR AND PEACE

Luttwak discusses the nature of strategy and then applies it to examples in contemporary international relations. He says states must not only consider the costs and benefits of their actions. Instead, they must anticipate the costs of the likely reaction. This must inform an actor's cost/benefit analysis.

MAINWARING (2000) RETHINKING PARTY SYSTEMS

Mainwaring takes issue with prior studies that compare democratic party systems along two main axes: the number of parties and the degree of ideological polarization. Mainwaring suggests that the degree of institutionalization is an important factor when explaining third-wave party systems. A weakly institution- alized system is characterized by unstable party competition, volatile voting behavior, low party legitimacy, and weak party organizations. This results in anti-party populist politicians, patronage (distributing state resources not based on merit), clientelistic politics, expensive campaigns, status quo-oriented public policy, and the under-representation of lower class interests.

GILPIN (1981) WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS

Major changes to the international system are caused by the law of uneven development. Empires are able to grow and expand quickly, but countervailing forces eventually arise and arrest hegemonic power. In these crises, hegemons must attempt to address this disequilibrium. Throughout history, the primary means of restoring equilibrium has been through war.

MEARSHEIMER (1994-1995) "THE FALSE PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS"

Mearsheimer discusses three institutional theories, claiming each has fatal flaws that keep it from producing a viable challenge to the realist claim that institutions do not matter. He exposes the flaws in (1) liberal institutionalism, (2) collective security theory, and (3) critical theory. He also offers four reasons American academics resist realism: 1. Realism is pessimistic and it offers no vision for progress. 2. Realism believes war has a purpose and does not seek an end to it. 3. Realism does not distinguish between good and bad states. 4. Realist behaviors like balancing and entanglement seem foreign due to the United States' geographic isolation.

MEARSHEIMER (2001) THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS

Mearsheimer is the authority on offensive realism, which is defined by the assumption that states always pursue power and are never satisfied by a security threshold. However, states are rational so they select times to be aggressive (calculated aggression). This includes a number of strategies, such as buck-passing, bait-and-bleeding, balancing, and blood-letting. Because global hegemony is virtually impossible to obtain, focus on regional domination while thwarting other states' attempts at regional domination.

MERCER (2005) "RATIONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS"

Mercer defends psychological approaches from three myths that emerge in the literature on rationality. o Rationality must be free of psychology._o Psychological explanations require rational baselines. o Psychology cannot explain accurate judgements. Realizing psychology offers alternate explanations for accurate judgements allows scholars to test rational and psychological frameworks without assuming psychology should only explain abberations or "inaccurate" decisions rationality would not predict.

MIGDAL (1988) STRONG SOCIETIES AND WEAK STATES

Migdal argues societies are composed of a "mlange of social organizations," including ethnic groups, villages, families, economic institutions etc. The state, therefore, is only one institution among others that seek to establish social control over society. Thus, we can find a state is weak where it exists within a strong society namely, one that is able to exercise a high degree of social control. So, the main problem for states is that they often must compete for social control with other "strongmen" whose powers are rooted in the structure of society such as tribal chiefs, landlords, or rich peasants.

MILNER (1997) INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION

Milner uses formal modeling to construct an elaborate two-level game of international cooperation. There are three actors on the domestic level: (1) the executive, (2) the legislature, and (3) interest groups. Three conclusions: 1. Relative to the unitary actor approach, domestic politics never improves the chances of cooperation and agreements reflect legislative, rather than executive, preferences. 2. Interest groups are important because they provide information to uninformed actors. Imperfect infor- mation increases cooperation. 3. Changes in a ratification procedure made after an agreement is signed scuttles chances of ratification because agreements reflect the preferences of the median legislator.

MOORE (1966) SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

Moore suggests three routes to the modern world: (1) the bourgeois revolution, which led to a modern world of capitalism and Western democracy; (2) the solely capitalist/conservative revolution from above, which led to fascism; and (3) the communist/peasant revolution, which Moore notes was followed by Russia and China. In particular, Moore looks at the ways in which industrialization and pre-existing agrarian regimes interacted to produce these three different political/governmental outcomes. Because democracy can only emerge from bourgeois revolutions, Moore's most famous conclusion is "no bourgeois, no democracy."

MORAVCSIK (1998) THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE

Moravcsik examines European integration and attributes it to: 1. Interest in economic integration_2. Relative power_3. The need for credible commitments He finds that in each stage of European integration, state strategies can be reduced to these three factors. States were not influenced by norms fostered at the international level. Instead, European integration was the result of rational and self-interested actors.

MORROW (1994) "MODELING THE FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION"

Morrow discusses two problems in international cooperation: distribution and information. 1. Distribution - Actors prefer to cooperate, but they prefer agreements with different distributions of goods. This is a "Battle of the Sexes" formal model. 2. Information - Actors prefer a certain distribution, but they do not know exactly how certain arrange- ments lead to certain distributions. Morrow uses formal models to find a number of solutions to these dual problems.

WADE (2000) "WHEELS WITHIN WHEELS"

Most Western observers attribute the Asian financial crisis to mismanagement by those governments. Wade traces the origins of the crisis to international financial markets. Wade thinks that the crises were completely an outcome of the world capital markets, and especially of the US' foreign financing of its spending, increas- ing the foreign reserves of East Asia and creating a bubble of credit. It was fueled with large capital inflows which exaggerated the profitability of East Asian markets. This perspective, which highlights causes outside of East Asia, suggests that emerging market economies will remain vulnerable to such crises in the absence of capital controls, a different system of international payments, and a more equal world income distribution.

GELLNER (1983) NATIONS AND NATIONALISM

Nationalism is not natural. Rather, it is a consequence of industrialization. Agrarian societies (pre-industrial) are characterized by local production, low mobility, and "vertical" political organization. Industrial societies need constant growth, requiring greater social mobility, education, and interaction across borders. National- ism is "born of contrast" and this interaction, fueled by public education and economic competition, creates nationalist sentiments.

KUHN (1962) THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

Noting that scientific progress is not linear without interruption, Kuhn stresses the importance of paradigm shifts. Dominant paradigms are tested with "normal science" and this process generates amendments to the paradigm and unexplainable results. When too many auxiliary amendments are made to the paradigm, the paradigm suffers a crisis and an alternative dominant explanation replaces the prior paradigm. Thus, progress is achieved through abrupt interruptions.

OLSON (1982) THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS

Olson attributes economic rise and decline to the density of distributional coalitions. Over time, especially in democracies, states acquire an increasingly dense network of organizations that lobby on behalf of their members. The presence of these groups make economies less efficient. As a result, the more distributional coalitions, the slower a state's economic growth and the greater its sensitivity to inflation, deflation, unem- ployment, and other economic shocks.

OLSON (1993) "DICTATORSHIP, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT"

Olson offers an economic account of state formation based on individuals' incentives to produce. Individuals will produce unless what they make is stolen. However, they will remain productive if part of what they make is taken regularly and predictably. This is why those with the most power set up states to institutionalize the acquisition of wealth by providing individuals with security from other individuals taking their wealth. Because autocrats often anticipate a shorter leadership tenure, they take too much and this explains their lower level of development.

14 GOLDSTEIN & GOWA (2002) "US NATIONAL POWER AND THE POST-WAR TRADING REGIME"

Open international markets will not exist unless the disproportionately most powerful state can make a credible commitment to free trade. This explains why the US encouraged the formation of international trading regimes after the Second World War. The rules of these institutions empower members to punish any US attempts to cheat.

SHUGART & CAREY (1992) PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES

Parliamentary regimes necessarily involve a trade-off between efficiency and representativeness. This is because parliamentary regimes have only one agent of the government. Presidential systems have two agents of the government; as a result they can maximize representativeness in the assembly and efficiency in the executive. However, presidential regimes may not be less efficient if they have PR legislatures. They warn against presidential-parliamentary systems due to conflicts over executive duties like cabinet formation.

LINZ (1990) "THE PERILS OF PRESIDENTIALISM"

Parliamentary systems are better than presidential systems in sustaining stable democracies. This conclu- sion applies especially to nations with deep political cleavages and numerous political parties. Presidential systems result in deadlock when government is divided and the fixed terms divide the political process into artificial and rigid periods.

ROSECRANCE (1986) RISE OF THE TRADING STATE

Peaceful development through international trade has become the primary path to prosperity and global leadership. Due to interdependence, war and expansion are no longer viable strategies for increasing power. Instead, states rise by becoming "trading states" like Japan and the countries of Western Europe.

POLANYI (1958) PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

Polanyi was a Hungarian chemist who posed a major challenge to Popperian positivism. He challenged the idea that science is objective. Instead, he argued that all knowing is personal, and as such relies upon fallible commitments. Our skills, biases, and passions are not flaws but play an important and necessary role in discovery and validation. Observers cannot remove themselves from their observations and judgements, nor should they; it is enough that we act in accordance with the consequences imposed upon us by our beliefs.

POPKIN (1979) THE RATIONAL PEASANT

Popkin uses pre-war Vietnam to illustrate that moral economists assumption that peasant societies are con- sidered by peasants to be moral, economically efficient, and stable are incorrect. Vietnamese villages in the 19th century were not egalitarian or necessarily harmonious. Individual behavior was governed by self-interest. Peasant revolts and economic transitions should be attributed to French colonial influences, which increased social stratification and caused an accumulation of peasant grievances. Peasant support for revolutions and protests may represent political competence, not decline and decay.

POSNER (2005) INSTITUTIONS AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN AFRICA

Posner asserts that in order to understand what effects ethnic cleavages may have on a populous, one must first understand why these cleavages exist in said populous. He advances a theory of the institutional effects on ethnic cleavages using the case of Zambia. Political actors (elites and masses) choose which cleavages are most salient based on the institutional set up of the country. For Zambia (and later Kenya), linguistic cleavages are the most salient in multiparty systems and tribal cleavages are salient during one-party rule. This is a result of individuals' rational tendencies to be a part of the minimum winning coalition.

LONG & LEEDS (2006) "TRADING FOR SECURITY"

Prior research suggests allies trade more than non-allies. These authors assess this claim with a new dataset on alliance agreements. They find allies are more likely to trade when economic arrangements are included in the alliance agreements. Long and Leeds find no evidence to suggest alliances increase trade when economic arrangements are not included in the alliance agreement.

PRZEWORKSI & TEUNE (1966-67) "EQUIVALENCE IN CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH"

Przeworski and Teune argue for the necessity of combining cross-national and nation-specific indicators to ensure reliability and validity. The authors devise a method in which indices are formed with measurements for the same concepts across countries. Since concepts will be measured differently depending on the con- text, the authors argue that indexing is necessary because the same variables cannot be used across cultures where meanings are different. This will allow theories to "travel" across space and time.

PRZEWORSKI (1985) CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Przeworski argues the decline in the socialist vote in many countries is due to the fact that parties have turned to non-worker groups for electoral support. Because parties are not organized around classes of workers, class differences have become less salient. Voters determine the policy of the state, but political parties affect the salience of different societal cleavages, and consequently, the type of competition within the state.

PUTNAM (2000) BOWLING ALONE

Putnam argues that membership in dense social networks, is a civic virtue and increases the productivity of individuals and their communities. There are two types of social capital: bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital directs connections inward and can exclude minorities from the communitys civic life. Bridging connections are inclusive and lead to external assets. He demonstrates the adverse effect of lower levels of social capital, which include harms to education and childrens welfare, safe neighborhoods, economic prosperity, health, and, obviously, democracy.

RUESCHEMEYER ET AL. (1992) CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

Quantitative analysts consistently find a positive correlation between socioeconomic development and democ- racy. They argue that comparative historical work is important for developing a theoretical framework for the transition to democracy. Using case studies, the piece examines three levels of analysis national, lo- cal/community, and international; concluding that to understand how democratic transitions are facilitated, one must look at all three levels.

VASQUEZ (1997) "THE REALIST PARADIGM..."

Realism is a degenerative research program for four reasons: 1. Its theoretical development is protean - it takes too many forms. 42 2. The balance-bandwagoning debate constitutes an unwillingness to specify what constitutes the true theory that could be falsified. 3. It continually adapts auxiliary propositions to explain flaws. 4. There is a dearth of strong research findings.

LEGRO & MORAVCSIK (1999) "IS ANYBODY STILL A REALIST?"

Realism is being undermined by those who reduce it to two assumptions: 1) rationality and 2) anarchy. These assumptions are not useful because these assumptions are not exclusive to realism. Realism must maintain at least three core assumptions: 1. States are rational unitary actors in anarchy._2. States have fixed and uniformly conflictual goals._3. The structure of the international system is dictated by the distribution of material capabilities. They accuse defensive and neoclassical realists of stretching and straying from these core assumptions.

VAN EVERA (1999) CAUSES OF WAR_

Realism is more powerful if its focus is shifted from power to national perceptions of power. Because he is interested in perceptions, he claims war has five general causes:_1. Optimism about the outcome of a future war_2. Perceived first-mover advantages_3. Opening and closing windows of opportunity and vulnerability 4. Cumulativity of resources 5. Beliefs about the offense-defense balance

DAHL 1971 POLYARCHY_

Regimes can be organized by their position on two dimensions: (1) public contestation and (2) participation. o High contestation and participation: Polyarchy_o High contestation, low participation: Competitive Oligarchy 8 o Low contestation, high participation: Inclusive Hegemony o Low contestation and participation: Closed Hegemony

REMMER (1991) "THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA"

Remmer examines the effects of economic crisis on electoral outcomes in Latin America from 1982-1990 in 21 competitive elections. She finds crises lead to decreased support for incumbents and high levels of electoral volatility. Furthermore, the relationship between economic conditions and electoral instability is mediated by party system structure rather than the number of years the country has been democratic. Two party democracies are insulated from the volatility experienced by more politically fragmented countries.

KHAN & JOMO [eds.] (2000) RENTS, RENT-SEEKING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Rent-seeking and corruption are often thought to decrease growth, but this depends on the types of rents offered. Monopoly rents decrease efficiency, but natural resource rents (rights to resources) increase growth. Rents to financial institutions can enhance growth, as can rents on intellectual property rights.

GOWA & MANSFIELD (1993) "POWER POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE"

Research on free trade agreements does not consider security externalities. These authors find free trade is more likely within, rather than across, political-military alliances. They also find alliances are more likely to develop into FTAs in bipolar, rather than multipolar world systems. This is due to less credible exit threats (longer shadow of the future) and clearer alliance responsibilities and stability in bipolar systems.

JOHNSON (1966) REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

Revolution is violence used to correct disequilibrium, which has a few forms. Revolution can result from: (1) endogenous value-changing forces, (2) exogenous value-changing forces, (3) endogenous environment- changing forces, and (4) exogenous environment-changing forces. Disequilibrium must be complemented with an "accelerator" which causes the state to lose authority. This accelerator can be any event that causes significant "power deflation." Any incident that suggests the elite might be deprived of its weapons of coercion can become the catalyst for revolution.

WADE (1990) GOVERNING THE MARKET

Robert Wade's book on Taiwan builds on previous work by Chalmers Johnson to articulate an alternative governed market theory of East Asian success. In contrast to neoclassical accounts, the governed market approach emphasizes the role of government in encouraging both high levels of investment and a sectoral composition of investment that varies from what would have been supplied by the market. The case of Taiwan shows how governments can impart directional thrust to the economy in line with an exercise of foresight about the economys future growth. It shows how governments can restrain the financial sector so that it is treated as a quasi-public utility - even when world norms (neoclassical) favor the idea that the success of the financial sector is to be judged by the return on capital in finance.

RUSSETT (1993) GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Russett uses post-war statistical analysis, Greek history, and pre-industrial anthropological evidence to argue that democratic polities are less likely to fight one another. He also argues democratic norms and democratic structures are complementary, rather than contradictory, explanations for democratic peace theory.

SACHS (1985) "EXTERNAL DEBT AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE"

Sachs compares Latin American and East Asian responses to the debt crisis. He finds Latin America did not develop export industries that could be used for future debt-servicing. Asian states rapidly developed export industries, and thus did not need to continue borrowing to build their economies like the Latin American states.

SARTORI (1976) PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

Sartori classifies political parties by dividing them by the number of parties. In two-party systems, parties tend to be left or right and competing for the center (centrifugal competition) while multi-party systems tend to compete for voters that can be brought in from the extremes (centripetal competition). For this reason, Downs' model of competition applies to two-party systems, but multiparty systems vary based on the ideological polarization of the parties, the strength of coalitions, and centripetal voters.

SARTORI (1970) "CONCEPT MISINFORMATION IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS"

Sartori observes that comparativists attempt to apply concepts to spatially and temporally diverse observa- tions. As a result, research can suffer internal validity because concepts to not have the same meaning in diverse contexts. Sartori advocates the use of a 'ladder of abstraction' for concept specification. When only similar cases are compared, one can specify concepts relatively specifically. However, as more diverse obser- vations are compared, one must climb the 'ladder of abstraction' to maintain internal validity and generate generalizable results.

SCHUMPETER (1950) CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

Schumpeter is famous for his procedural definition of democracy. He assumes voters to rationally vote for those who maximize their interests. Politicians compete for, and subsequently represent these voters. "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." For democracy to succeed, there must be quality competitors for office, assign specialists to make decisions that require expert information, and exhibit self-control and obedience.

PAUL (2005) "SOFT BALANCING IN THE AGE OF US PRIMACY"

Second-tier powers have not hard balanced against the US in the post-Cold War period, but they have engaged in "soft balancing." Soft balancing behavior includes the formation of temporary coalitions, institu- tional bargaining to constrain US power, etc. Paul uses the global reaction to the 2003 Iraq War to support his argument.

SKOCPOL (1979) STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Skocpol compares France, Russia, and China to understand the roots of social revolution. In each of these states, external pressure such as military competition or war with another state, forces the state to divert money away from domestic resources. This causes a breakdown of domestic authority and revolt begins. The outcome is communist if the revolt is motivated against capitalism. It results in capitalism if conditions are more favorable for capitalism. Most likely where peasants share solidarity and relative autonomy from state coercion.

KATZENSTEIN (1985) SMALL STATES IN WORLD MARKETS

Small European states recognized that they would be unable to change the international economic environ- ment, and accordingly, elected to live with it by pursuing a strategy of economic liberalization. In terms of political arrangements, Katzenstein suggests states turned to democratic corporatism, an organized re- lationship between the state and organized income interests generally labor and capital. By organizing corporations as unelected bodies with control over those within their sector, the state permits these groups to have input over policy and to assist in implementation. Thus, these states survive and prosper economi- cally because the key participants all have faith their interests will be accommodated.

SPRUYT (1994) THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS

Spruyt uses historical sociology to explain how the elements that constitute the international system change over time. For now, the system is comprised of sovereign states. Increasing commerce in feudal Europe caused cities to push for more efficient forms of political organization. States emerged over city-states because they more effectively collected resources, resolved free-rider problems, and maintained internal sovereignty. The success of a few states caused others to mimic them and create their own states.

BULL (1977) THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY

State perceptions and systemic norms create an international society. This society is a shared understanding about international relations. This understanding governs state behavior. Neorealism's Hobbesian anarchy is only one possible society. If state perceptions and behavior alter states' expectations and international norms, then a less competitive international society could emerge.

FINNEMORE (1996) NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

States are taught to accept new norms, values, and interests by international organizations. This is an important addition to the agency-structure debate because she claims the international system can teach actors new norms and preferences. Finnemore supports this argument with a series of case studies.

STEINMO (1993) TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY

Steinmo examines patterns of taxation in Sweden, Britain, and the United States. He finds that all three states extract more taxes today than a century ago, with warfare playing a major war. The public's resistance to tax increases abates during war, and levels of taxation never return afterwards. More importantly, political institutions account for differences in tax code. A decentralized Congress in the US creates a tax code with loopholes. The parliamentary system in Britain creates drastic shifts in party control and an unstable tax code. Because Sweden's Social Democrats enjoy prolonged power, the tax code is stable, but increasing revenue incrementally.

MARX & ENGELS (1848) THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO

The Communist Manifesto views the world in terms of struggles between the classes of societies. Marx believed that throughout history, two classes are always pitted against each other, beginning with masters and slaves and ending with the bourgeoisie and the working class. One class is always trying to exploit the other because of their opposing interests. However, Marx believed that ultimately the working class would revolt and there would only be one class with no class struggle.

TANNENWALD (1999) "NUCLEAR TABOO"

The United States hasn't used nuclear weapons since 1945 due to the existence of an international norm - a "nuclear taboo." Using four case studies, Tannenwald finds that rationality based on material concerns does not explain this behavior. Instead, norms constrain military capabilities and the practice of self-help.

ROSE-ACKERMAN (1999) CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT

The author studies corruption as an economic, cultural and political problem from a principle-agent point of view. Reform in systems of enforcement and monitoring that leave unchanged the basic conditions that encourage corruption cannot be expected to yield many results. Instead, successful anti-corruption reform must take as its point of departure an understanding of the underlying structure of incentives that gives rise to corruption in its particular context. Sometimes, democratic systems offer these incentives because representatives can be rewarded with re-election, campaign donations, etc. Sometimes, competitive elections successfully expose corruption.

SNYDER & DIESING (1977) CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS_

The authors attempt to synthesize three approaches to studying interstate conflict: o Bargaining: Strategic interaction, formal models, etc._o Decision-Making: Utility-maximization, bureaucratic role, bounded rationality, etc. o Systemic Structures: Polarity, alliance portfolios, etc. Critics say the book doesn't adequately test the models presented, but concede that the book has generated formal research.

KECK & SIKKINK (1998) ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS

The authors claim major changes in national and international policies and behaviors often result from concerted efforts by actors other than states to promote some shared principle. Using interdisciplinary methods and theories, they argue transnational networks successfully alter norms and behavior.

10 FARBER & GOWA (1997) "COMMON INTERESTS OR COMMON POLITIES?"

The authors find the democratic peace only existed during the Cold War. They test two explanations. First, during the Cold War, democracies had common interests. Second, democracies were not sufficiently democratic before the Cold War. They find support for the first explanation. Common interest, not common regime type, explains the democratic peace.

ALMOND & VERBA (1963) THE CIVIC CULTURE

The authors identify a "civic culture" that is conducive to democracy with a five-state case comparison. They find three types of political culture: 1. Parochial: Citizens are only dimly aware of the political system. 2. Subject: Citizens are passively aware of the political system._3. Participant: Citizens are knowledgeable, rational, and engaged. The civic culture is a fusion of these three types. It is "a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values."

GREEN & SHAPIRO (1994) PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

The authors make two central claims. First, rational choice fails to explain empirical realities, such as voter turnout and the free-rider problem. Second, rational choice contains methodological pathologies prevent- ing theoretical success, including the inability to falsify rational choice theories and the practice of ad hoc modifications to account for irregularities.

BINDER ET AL. (1971) CRISES AND SEQUENCES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The authors of this volume believe development is the result of a sequence of political crises described below. These crises lead towards greater development, defined as "the tendency toward greater political capacity, equality, and differentiation." 1. Identity crisis: refers to the definition of the set of individuals who fall under the authority of the government. 2. Legitimacy crisis: refers to the basis on which government decisions are accepted by the populace. 3. Participation crisis: refers to the problem of who takes part in government decision-making. 4. Penetration crisis: refers to the question of how much effective control the government should have. 5. Distribution crisis: refers to the extent to which government decisions are used to distribute or redis- tribute benefits to society.

MARCH & OLSEN (1995) DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE_

The authors suggest an institutional approach to governance: an approach which combines all four concep- tions of the agenda of democratic governance. The four conceptions are:_o Minimalist: governance creates rules for managing voluntary political exchanges among citizens o Redistributive: governance influences substantive outcomes through redistribution of resources o Developmental: governance builds a political culture of beliefs and shared purposes_o Structuralist governance constructs political processes and rules Thus, from an institutionalist perspective, democratic governance means improving the processes by which a society formulates ends, seeks to achieve those ends efficiently, and weaves an understanding of the good life by experiencing its pursuit.

FARNHAM [ED.] (1994) AVOIDING LOSSES / TAKING RISKS

The authors use case studies to compare prospect theory and expected utility theory. Expected utility theo- rists assume states to be rational and they do not allow for variation in risk-aversion. Prospect theory holds states will accept risks to defend the status quo, but they will avert risk when seeking improvements to their position. The book is criticized for comparing prospect theory to outdated and simplistic expected utility models.

BUENO DE MESQUITA & LALMAN (1992) WAR AND REASON

The authors use non-cooperative game theory to show war is caused by domestic politics. They begin by assuming states to be unitary risk-averse rational actors. Modeling neorealist assumptions, they find states always come to negotiation or the status quo. States only fight when domestic-level constraints keep states from reaching equilibria. Therefore, structural realism is indeterminate and scholars must study domestic politics to understand interstate conflict.

LIPSET (1959) "SOME SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY"

The average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and education levels are higher in more democratic countries. Stability of a depends not only on the systems modernization, but also upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system. Effectiveness is the "extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces." Legitimacy is the capacity of a political system to maintain the belief that existing political organizations are the appropriate ones for a society.

NEUSTADT & MAY (1986) THINKING IN TIME

The central theme of the book is that policy-makers often use history badly. They must learn to use it more discriminatingly. Neustadt and May recommend decision-makers divide the elements of a decision situation into (1) known, (2) unclear, and (3) presumed elements. Then, understanding a situation more clearly, leaders can make better use of historical analogies and better learn from history's mistakes.

MORGENTHAU (1948) POLITICS AMONG NATIONS

The father of modern realism maintains that war is the result of inherent forces in human nature that cannot be overcome by idealistic attempts to spread internationalism. This is an immense book, but its most important contribution is the list of principles of classical realism: 1. Politics is governed by human nature. 2. Interest is defined in terms of power. 3. Interests are not constant - the "content and manner" of power varies across diverse political and cultural environments. 4. All states pursue power, even if they pursue power under the cloak of some other purpose. 5. States judge actions by their anticipated political consequences. 6. Politics and morality are in different spheres, and morality is subordinate to power politics.

IKENBERRY (2001) AFTER VICTORY

The greater the power disparities following major armed conflict, the greater the probability that the leading power will avoid abandonment or domination strategies and instead seek to create a legitimate institution- alized order. This effort is most reputable when the strong state is a democracy. Successful international orders can take on constitutional characteristics by limiting the returns to power. When states fail to create these orders, other states must decide whether to bandwagon with the hegemon or balance against it.

WALT (1999) "RIGOR OR RIGOR MORTIS?"_

The growing technical complexity of formal theory has not been matched by greater insights. Therefore, the contribution of formal theory to security studies is limited._1. Formal theory is most useful for enhancing theoretical precision and for verifying its deductive logic.

ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON (2007) ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

The interplay between elites and common citizens determines the transition from non-democracy to democ- racy. Elites prefer non-democracy, while common citizens prefer democracy. Both elites and citizens want beneficial policies not only for today but also tomorrow (sustainability). Political institutions, which are durable today and tomorrow, can act as a negotiating mechanism and help in regulation and persistence of policies over time. Democratic transition will not occur unless there is a threat of revolution (implying that citizens need to be organized, otherwise the transition is delayed indefinitely).

NORTH (1990) INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

The key to economic growth is keeping the costs of exchange (transaction costs) from choking off the ben- efits from trade. Institutions can either limit or augment the per unit costs of exchange and result in either economic growth or stagnation. There exists considerable path dependence in institutions because of in- creasing returns to institutions and imperfect feedback on performance. Increasing returns result from high setup costs, learning effects, network externalities and adaptive expectations about the continued prevalence of an institution. Because institutions are designed by people with different bargaining strength and not for sake of efficiency, some patterns may be less efficient than others and due to path dependency, may persist for a long time, resulting in stagnant economy.

IVERSON & SOSKICE (2006) "ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF COALITIONS"

The middle class, which tends to decide who governs, has an incentive to ally with the poor to exploit the rich, but also an incentive to support the rich to avoid being exploited by the poor. In a majoritarian two- party system, the latter motive dominates because the middle-class cannot be sure that the poor will not set policies in a center-left leadership party. In a PR system with three representative parties, on the other hand, the first motive dominates because the middle-class party can make sure that a coalition with the left party will not deviate from pursuing their common interest in taxing and redistributing from the rich.

PRZEWORSKI & SPRAGUE (1986) PAPER STONES

The process of class organization cannot be reduced to economic conditions, to social structure, or to culture. Economic conditions acquire social meaning only in social interactions and they must be mobilized by a party. However, the effect of the quest to obtain votes forces parties to choose between keeping the party class pure without any prospects of electoral success or abandoning mobilization in terms of class altogether. Thus, electoral competition prevents the socialist revolution.

GLASER (1994-1995) "REALISTS AS OPTIMISTS"

The strong general propensity for adversaries to compete is not an inevitable logical consequence of struc- tural realism's basic assumptions. Glaser argues states might cooperate when the system shifts to a defensive balance or when states want to send benevolent signals. Glaser calls this theory contingent realism. Other realists might argue states would not send benevolent signals because power, not the intent to use it, causes threat.

GAUBATZ (1996) "DEMOCRATIC STATES AND COMMITMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS"

The traditional argument about the relationship between democratic states and commitment in the inter- national system focuses on the "inconstant commons" and the expectation that democratic governments will be particularly ill-suited to long-lasting commitments. However, this traditional argument does not ac- count for the development of shared preferences through liberal interdependence. Gaubatz tests democratic commitment by examining the relationship between alliances and regime type.

LIEBER & ALEXANDER (2005) "WAITING FOR BALANCING"

The world is neither hard balancing nor soft balancing against US power in the post-9/11 era. This is because American foreign policy, while aggressive, is clearly targeted at a small number of states and non- state actors. Because rogue states and terrorism pose more immediate threats than US power, the world has little incentive to balance against American hegemony.

THOMPSON (2003) "A STREETCAR NAMED SARAJEVO"

Theories of war are often "monocausal," but war often occurs when multiple factors converge to create the perfect storm. Thompson calls this "nonlinear causality" and it can include the formation of proximate rivalries, increasing bipolarization, etc. Multiple causes can create conditions in which a catalyst results in war. WWI is used as a case study.

HUNTINGTON (1968) POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES

Theory of political development based on order and strong institutions. He argues that the primary factor that will enable a country to ensure that interests are incorporated and peace is maintained is its ability to institutionalize, since institutions channel the competition for power in a peaceful, rather than conflictual direction, thus maintaining order. Institutions curb private desires and create a "public interest." They also create trust (because of regularized and predictable patterns of behavior) which is necessary for getting competing interests to play by the rules of the game. Without good and strong institutions, the government will be bad and corrupt.

SIROWY & INKELES (1990) "THE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INEQUALITY"

They identify three main perspectives on the relationship between democracy and economic development: (1) democracy as hindering development (the conflict perspective); (2) democracy as facilitating develop- ment (the compatibility perspective); and (3) democracy as bearing no independent relationship to develop- ment outcomes. They suggest that for the relevant theoretical debates to move forward, we must evaluate not just the relationship between democracy and development outcomes, but also the relationships between political democracy and a number of intervening factors through which democracy is considered to have its ultimate effects on development outcomes such as the instability that some suggest comes with democracy and hence hinders growth.

GOUREVITCH (1978) "THE SECOND IMAGE REVERSED"

This article argues international relations is not just "bottom-up," but also "top-down." Domestic politics affects international politics, but the international system also affects domestic politics. Thus, there may be an endogeneity problem in second image theories of international relations. This article is an important part of the agent-structure debate.

KOSLOWSKI & KRATOCHWIL (1994) "UNDERSTANDING CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS"

This article claims the international system is comprised of "ensembles of social institutions" and these institutions change in response to shifting distributions of capabilities and redefinitions of actors' identities. When political practices change, they fail to reproduce familiar international structures and the system changes. The authors apply this constructivist argument to the fall of the Soviet Union. They claim that systemic change followed revolutions in Eastern Europe (and the Soviet failure to response), which changed perceptions of superpower behavior rather than the distribution of capabilities.

NORTH & WEINGAST (1989) "CONSTITUTIONS AND COMMITMENT"

This article traces the evolution of constitutional arrangements in 17th century England. They argue that increased constraints on the sovereigns authority were put in place to make the government's commitments more credible. By instituting separation of power and a parliament, sovereigns could not so easily renege on economic rights and agreements, resulting in increased economic activity and prosperity.

KATZENSTEIN [ED.] (1996) THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY

This book argues interests are not determined by material factors or by economic rationalism. Rather, international and domestic "culture environments" influence the behavior and identity of states. Variation in strategic cultures helps explain variation in state preferences and behavior.

GOLDSTEIN & KEOHANE [EDS.] (1993) IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY_

This book attempts to reconcile ideas and interests in foreign policy, thus attempting to merge sociological approaches with rationalism._o Ideas serve as "road maps," providing guidance in an uncertain environment._o Ideas serve as "focal points" for cooperative solutions and starting points for agreements._o Ideas become embedded in institutions and then mediate between states' interests and outcomes. The book is criticized by sociologists for attempting to impose positivist assumptions and restrictions on concepts that are inherently subjective.

GILPIN (1987) THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This book continues the research program Gilpin established in US Power and the Multinational Corporation (1975). Gilpin is skeptical about the liberal political economy, arguing the world's best hope for economic stability is "benign mercantilism" and "strategic trade policy." Economists cannot ignore the politics of the global economy, and liberals cannot ignore mercantilism, protectionism, and states' pursuits of relative gains as threats to the current era of globalization.

FERGUSON & MANSBACH (1996) POLITIES: AUTHORITY, IDENTITIES, AND CHANGE

This book criticizes the discipline for state-centrism. They claim we must understand politics not in terms of states, but in terms of polities. A polity is any organization that can mobilize individuals for political purposes. Politics encompasses numerous layered, over-lapping, and interacting polities. To understand international relations, we must move away from "horizontal" statist theories and toward "vertical" theories that account for multiple polities. The authors use case studies to demonstrate this method.

LICHBACH & ZUCKERMAN [EDS.] (1997) COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE

This book divides comparative into three approaches: o Rational Choice: Assume actors who act deliberately to maximize their advantage. Individual interests affect groups, which affect states, etc. o Culture: Provide thick descriptions on specific cases, but less generalizable. o Structure: emphasize the formal organizations of government, studying class relations, political parties, _or how states and societies interact. _The authors also separate for substantive areas of research: (1) Mass politics (behavior), (2) social move- ments and revolutions, (3) political economy, (4) state-society relations.

GILPIN (2000) THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM

This book examines the "second great age of capitalism." They warn that the current wave of globalization could come to an end. Pointing to increased regional trading blocs, increasing grassroots pressure for pro- tectionist policies, and beguiled protectionism, this book warns that the liberal dream of free trade may be threatened.

GERSCHENKRON (1962) ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This book explores the causes of underdevelopment from the perspective of 1960s modernization theo- rists.Hindrances to economic progress in backward countries include the scarcity of a labor pool that has cut ties to agriculture, a lack of "quasi-religious fervor" to motivate people towards change, distrust in the financial sector that is needed for investment, lack of entrepreneurial talent, lack of natural development potentialities, and the effect of culture. Clearly writing during the Cold War, the author claims if advanced states do not understand these impediments to development, these states could become communist.

MOST & STARR (1989) INQUIRY, LOGIC, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

This book introduces a method for international relations research that synthesizes international-level and domestic-level theory. By framing theory in the language of "opportunity" and "willingness," scholars can account for systemic constraints and domestic influences on foreign policy. This requires a focus on leaders and the pressures they face. Decisions are not made from a "black box," nor are they made in a domestic vacuum void of international-level conditions.

MIDLARSKY [ED.] (1989) HANDBOOK OF WAR STUDIES

This book is a literature review of theories of war organized on three levels of analysis: systemic, dyadic, and state-level. There is no novel material. This is only a synthesis of work by other scholars, but it is cited often.

POPPER (1999) ALL LIFE IS PROBLEM SOLVING

This book is a major summary of the work of Karl Popper, perhaps the most important positivist of the 20th century. In seeking to separate true science from metaphysics, Popper stressed the importance of falsifia- bility through empirical testing and rejected historicism and other thick descriptive approaches. Popperian positivism stresses parsimony, falsifiability, replication, and empiricism.

BRADY & COLLIER [EDS.] (2004) RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY

This book is the most important response to Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). The overall aim of Rethinking Social Inquiry is to bring to light the inadequacies of DSI in terms of its over- reliance on quantitative methods as the primary means to understanding social and political phenomena. In this volume the authors recognize the importance of quantitative methods, while also identifying the limitations of these methods and emphasizing the relevance of qualitative methods. The authors dismiss the quantitative/qualitative methodological divide as being outdated and misguided, as the two branches of research are necessarily intertwined in the search for comprehending complex realities. They propose that qualitative methods have as much to contribute to structuring quantitative methods as the authors of DSI suggest that quantitative methods have to offer in increasing the rigor of qualitative methods.

TAAGEPERA & SHUGART (1989) SEATS AND VOTES

This book makes grandiose methodological claims - they seek to bring physics-like laws to the study of electoral systems. Specifically, they want to understand how voters become represented by the structure of the government. Their most famous finding is the cube-root theorem: the number of seats is approximately equal to the cube root of the population. They say this is ideal for minimizing communication costs both among legislators (internal) and to constituents (external).

ELMAN & ELMAN (2003) PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

This books describes Lakatos' (1970) Methodology of Scientific Research Programs and discusses its application to international relations. Research programs consist of "hard core" assumptions and a "protective belt" of auxiliary hypotheses that are drawn from the hard core assumptions. Progress is made via "problemshifts." For a problemshift to be progressive, it must (1) predict novel facts and (2) verify these novel predictions with empirical evidence. If this requires a shift in the hard core, then the shift is an interprogram problemshift. If the shift does not alter the hard core and resulted from a well-posed question about auxiliary hypotheses, then the shift is an intraprogram problemshift.

THUCYDIDES HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

This classic of realism can be summarized by Thucydides' best-known sentence: "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." This account of the classical world's greatest war offers a number of realist insights: o Sparta's growing fear of a rising Athens prompted the war. o Justice, virtue, etc. is empty talk. o Human nature is inherently evil and competitive. o Material power is paramount, and IR must be understood as each city-state's rational pursuit of more material power.

ROEMER [ED.] (1986) ANALYTICAL MARXISM

This collection of essays attempts to rework classical Marxism for modern applications. Many of the essays come to contradictory conclusions about the future of Marxism and the implications of Marxism on the late-twentieth century world. No cohesive message.

2 BALDWIN [ED.] (1993) NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM

This edited volume includes important neoliberal arguments and a few neorealist responses to neoliberalism. Contributors include Keohane, Axelrod, Grieco, and others. The neoliberals argue institutions can promote cooperation by prolonging the shadow of the future, providing information about payoff structures, and linking issues. The neorealists say states' concern for relative gains inhibits cooperation, especially in security because relative losses threaten state survival.

VALENZUELA & VALENZUELA (1978) "MODERNIZATION AND DEPENDENCY"

This essay reviews modernization theory and dependency theory. Modernization theory is a micro-level the- ory. Modernization is the process of rationalization of social behavior and social organization. It emerged endogenously in the first modernizers, but will happen via exogenous stimulation in late modernizers. De- pendency theory is macro-level because it attributes development to the structure of the international system. The developed states are actively exploiting and suppressing the less developed states. Modernization claims universal applicability, but dependency theory is specific to the dynamics of the current international system. Interestingly, dependency theorists believe human nature is constant: they will always attempt to exploit others. Modernization theorists believe preferences can change and individual strategies can be learned.

BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL. (2003) THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL

This important book introduces selectorate theory. Beginning with the assumption that leaders wish to main- tain power to extract private rents from office, the authors show that public goods spending can be traced to the size of the winning coalition relative to the selectorate. Regardless of other institutional characteristics, leaders always try to maintain support from a minimum winning coalition. This is why democracies provide public goods and important differences exist between different forms of autocracy. The model is very formal.

5 BRUBAKER (2004) ETHNICITY WITHOUT GROUPS

This important constructivist work on ethnic groups argues that the discipline is guilty of "groupism." By taking ethnic groups as given or primordial, scholars ignore the social forces at work that forge groups, make identities more or less salient, and use these identities for political purposes. We must study how ethnicity is used to form groups and how ethnicity can be used for political purposes.

JOHNSTON (1995) CULTURAL REALISM

This is a case study of Chinese strategic culture. Doing a textual analysis of seven Chinese classics, he argues China has two predominant strategic cultures. He finds evidence of a diplomatic "Confucian-Mencian" culture and a realpolitik inspired by classics that emphasize the power of military force. He concludes that states have unique strategic cultures that cause variation in their interests, preferences, and strategies.

KHONG (1992) ANALOGIES AT WAR

This is a case study of the LBJ administration's foreign policy during the Vietnam War. He finds evidence that suggests policy-makers use analogies to make foreign policy decisions. Analogies are used to support or refute policy options, and decisions are made based on how well analogies fit the given situation. The past provides a map for the future. This is why messages like "no more Munichs" and "no more Vietnams" are so powerful.

CLAUDE (1955) SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES

This is a classic case study of the United Nations from an early liberal scholar. He claims the UN can create a world order and argues a world government must be based on non-compulsive rather than coercive methods of control.

HIRSCHMAN (1971) A BIAS FOR HOPE

This is a collection of optimistic essays about Latin American development. Hirschman uses the word "possi- bilism" to express his optimism, which includes finding positive alternatives to aspects of development that are regarded as negative. Regarding FDI, to further economic development of the host country, Hirschman suggests foreign investors work to transfer their investments to local owners perhaps using some sort of agency to effectuate the transfer to the appropriate locals. He notes that some safeguards may need to be put in place to ensure that new holders are not tempted to sell out right away. Of course, he also suggests some fiscal incentives to the firms electing to transfer ownership.

ESPING-ANDERSON (1985) POLITICS AGAINST MARKETS

This is a comparative study of the development of working-class parties in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. Esping-Anderson argues working-class party formation depends on the impact of state policies on the class structure. Thus, state policy, through its affects on class relationships, alters political party platforms. o Denmark: Policy maintained income inequalities so the bourgeois and working-class parties did not unite. o Norway: Comprehensive housing policies and government intervention formed a coalition among bourgeois and working-class parties. o Sweden: Institutionalized entitlements for all citizens caused a transition from class-based parties to a social "people's parties." _EVANS (1979) DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT _Evans examines how underdeveloped states transition from dependence on developed states to dependent development. Dependent development relies on foreign direct investment. Evans' theory is supported by a case study of Brazil. Dependent development operates via relationships between three actors: (1) multina- tional corporations, (2) local entrepreneurs, and (3) state-owned enterprizes. MNCs invest in developing countries to maximize profits and locals cater to these companies for their own benefit. The state's devel- opment depends upon its ability to foster this relationship. Consequently, dependent development causes income inequality in developing states. Those with ties to MNCs become very wealthy, but the economic gains are not spread to the greater society. _EVANS ET AL. [EDS.] (1985) BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN _The editors of this volume bring together a number of case studies to stress that the state is a fundamental proponent of social change. The central message that ties the case studies together is the belief that the state is autonomous from class forces. States initiate and direct social change. The most famous chapter is Tilly's chapter on war and state-making in Europe. The book is criticized for failing to bring in alternate explanations of the cases discussed.

GELLER & SINGER (1998) NATIONS AND WAR

This is a literature review on the causes of war. It organizes theories into five levels of analysis: (1) decision- making, (2) nation, (3) dyad, (4) region, and (5) system. This is a bizarre scheme because the levels used are not widely recognized in the field.

GRIECO (1988) "ANARCHY AND THE LIMITS OF COOPERATION"

This is a neorealist response to neoliberal institutionalism. Neoliberals claim cooperation is possible given neorealist assumptions because sufficient incentives exist to prevent cheating. Grieco says neoliberals ig- nore a second neorealist obstacle to cooperation: concern for relative gains. According to Grieco and the neorealists, states are positional - their strength is determined by its relation to the strength of other actors. Therefore, cooperation isn't possible unless states can mitigate their concern for relative gains.

JOHNSON (1997) "PRECONCEPTION VS. OBSERVATION"

This is a rebuttal to Robert Bates' claim that area studies must be interpreted by rational choice scholars so these findings can contribute to social science. He claims the transformation of political science into an economic-like discipline has produced "junk" that pales in comparison to the useful findings generated by area specialists. He goes as far as to say rational choice scholars do not even understand the phenomena they attempt to generalize and make claims about.

LAYNE (2002-2003) "THE POSTER CHILD FOR OFFENSIVE REALISM"_

This is a response to Mearsheimer's Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Layne disagrees with Mearsheimer on three points: 1. Layne says the US is a global hegemon rather than only a regional hegemon. 2. Layne says the US intervenes overseas to promote peace, not only to "offshore balance" against other regional hegemons. 3. Layne says the US military presence overseas is for promoting peace and stability and will not be withdrawn.

HAGOPIAN (2000) "POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT REVISITED"

This is a very comprehensive review of the literature on political development since the 1960s. Hagiopan argues that the study of political development was organized around three paradigms in the 1960s, but the popularity of these paradigms was dictated by current events. o Modernization Theory: Political Development is the result of Economic Development. Questioned by dependency theorists and Marxists. o Structural Functionalism: All political systems have political structures that serve similar purposes. Questioned by links between development and regime type. o Teleological View: Political Development is the process of moving towards some political goal. Not related to economic development.

ARAT (1988) "DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT"

This is an early and unsophisticated, yet influential, refutation of modernization theory. Using time-series cross-subsectional data, Arat shows development does not cause democracy. Instead, democracies just hap- pen to be better off. This simple bivariate analysis neglects the possibility of serial autocorrelation but concludes there is no systematic relationship between development and democracy.

LIPSET (1960) POLITICAL MAN

This is an early work in modernization theory. Lipset attributes democracy to education and high per capita income. He also argues low education and low per capita income facilitate communist movements because these extremist movements promise dramatic change and reallocation of wealth. Rapid industrialization gives rise to far-left parties that threaten democracy.

RUSSETT & ONEAL (2001) TRIANGULATING PEACE

This is an empirical analysis of the Kantian Triangle (trade, democracy, and international organizations cause each other and peace). The authors find support for each leg of the triangle, but they fail to definitively isolate convincing causal mechanisms.

HIRSCHMAN (1970) EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY

This is an important book about the transaction costs and externalities in institutional reform. First, Hirschman assumes all institutions develop slack due to the human tendency to shirk. Clients respond via exit (leaving the institution) or voice (working for change within the institution). Clients are more likely to choose exit when viable alternatives are available, switching organizations is easy, voice could lead to uncertain or neg- ative consequences, and loyalty is low. Institutions are most efficient where they have a monopoly because the most interested clients must use voice rather than exit.

ALLISON & ZELIKOW (1999) THE ESSENCE OF DECISION

This is the anniversary edition of Graham Allison's (1971) classic case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The most famous sentence is "where you stand depends on where you sit." By this, Allison means we must understand leaders' decisions not by assuming leaders to represent unitary rational "national interests," but by examining how bureaucratic roles shape preferences. The book is criticized for attributing too much cause to bureaucracy, arguing foreign policy is the result of a process, not values or ideology.

KOREMENOS, LIPSON, & SNIDAL (2001) "RATIONAL DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS"

This is the core of a special IO issue on institutional design. The authors claim institutional features reflect the needs of their creators. Therefore, variables that measure states' needs should predict institutional characteristics. This is a functionalist and rational theory of institutions. The IVs are: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The DVs are membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility.

WALTZ (1979) THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

This is the seminal work in neorealism. The system is anarchic, which forces states to engage in a competition for power. The distribution of power, polarity, and relative levels of power determine state interests and behavior. The theory is systemic. The only relevant attribute of the actors is their relative position in the global distribution of power.

SMALL & SINGER (1982) RESORT TO ARMS

This is the source-book for the original Correlates of War project, the most important data source in the study of interstate conflict. The book contains the sources of the data, descriptions of the methods used, and notes on the variables related to the infamous CoW project.

BUNCE (2000) "COMPARATIVE DEMOCRATIZATION"

This literature review on democratization evaluates universal and regional generalizations about the causes of democracy. Bunce advocates a shift away from regional studies and cites a number of useful generaliza- tions from more universal studies: high GDP does not cause democracy, but makes it stable; parliamentary systems are more stable in new democracies; political leaders are central to the founding of democracy; the most important distinction between old and new democracies is certain vs. uncertain procedures.

ORGANSKI & KUGLER (1980) THE WAR LEDGER

This major work in power transition theory offers a number of important insights on the causes of war. Power transitions, not the distribution of power, causes war between great powers. Power should be measured by GDP rather than more complicated measures. Alliances do not change the likelihood of conflict onset, but they increase its severity and duration. The authors also discover a phoenix factor - war has virtually no impact on GDP in the long term because war participants often experience dramatic economic growth following war.

EMERSON (1960) FROM EMPIRE TO NATION

This massive book discusses nationalism in decolonized states. Nationalism is a modern phenomenon that emerged in the West and spread to colonies via Westernized elites. These elites mobilized urban populations to begin nationalist movements. These nationalisms were more democratic than other nationalisms because nationalist leaders must derive legitimacy from the people. This democracy was short-lived, however, be- cause decolonized states lacked preconditions for consolidated democracy, such as literacy, a middle class, and traditions of political rights.

CARR (1939) THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS

This monumental classic marks the rise of twentieth century realism. In this strong rejection of Wilsonian idealism, Carr attributes blame for the Great Depression and the world wars on naive utopianism. He asserts that states exhibit selfish behavior and seek power. He does not reject the argument that states are also moralistic, but he believes that morality comes second to power. Carr's work was inspirational to Hans Morgenthau and Carr's book is perhaps the most important piece of international relations scholarship published in the first half of the twentieth century.

SCHELLING (1960) THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT

This pioneer work in game theory offers a number of insights about conflict behavior. The most important concept is his theory of interdependent decision. He writes, "each opponent is concerned with constraining an adversary through his expectation of the consequences of his actions." Sometimes, bargaining power can be gained with a sacrifice of choice. States with no choices (due to domestic constraints, for example), make the most credible threats, allowing them to give opponents the clearest consequences of their actions. Schelling is credited for the quote, "in bargaining, weakness is often strength."

STEINMO ET AL. [EDS.] (1992) STRUCTURING POLITICS

This volume discusses the benefits of historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism examines the interactions between institutions and behavior, but unlike the proponents of rational choice, it allows insti- tutions to shape preferences over time. It also uses history to understand how institutions shape preferences and maintain that explanations offered by this approach are more accurate than those offered by rational choice analyses that do not account for the effect of institutions on preferences.

HAGGARD & KAUFMAN [EDS.] (1992) THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

This volume traces the consequences of debt in third world countries. A few of the more notable findings are: o International financial institutions continued to issue loans, despite prior non-compliance. o State intervention sometimes helps economic development. o Groups that cannot form lobbies to pressure the government, such as the poor, often lose during times of economic adjustment. o Economic decline promotes neither authoritarianism nor democracy.

2. Formalization has not led to powerful new explanations, but has taken arguments from other perspec- tives. 3. Formal work lacks empirical support. Therefore, scholars should use formal theory to inform quantitative work and case studies, but the conclu- sions derived from formal theory are limited. WALT (2005) TAMING AMERICAN POWER

To best maintain its primacy, the United States must "tame its power" and show discipline as not to threaten the rest of the world. If the US can show constraint by engaging the world via institutions, it can decrease perceptions of threat from other states. If it acts aggressively and independently, the United States will be balanced against by threatened rivals.

LIJPHART (1971) "COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND THE COMPARATIVE METHOD"

To overcome problems of generalizability due to the small number of observations, among Lijphart's recom- mendations is to use cases that are similar on almost all variables except the ones of interest. In this way the most similar cases are compared rather than the most different or a random selection of cases.

NORTH (1991) "INSTITUTIONS"

Transaction costs are a critical determinant of economic performance. Institutions and the effectiveness of enforcement (together with the technology employed) determine the cost of transacting. Effective institu- tions raise the benefits of cooperative solutions or the costs of defection, to use game theoretic terms. In transaction cost terms, institutions reduce transaction and production costs per exchange so that the poten- tial gains from trade are realizable. Both political and economic institutions are essential parts of an effective institutional matrix.

TSEBELIS (1995) "DECISION-MAKING IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS"

Tsebelis studies variation in democratic institutions by focusing on the ease of policy change, which he associates with the number of veto players in the system. A veto player is any actor whose agreement is necessary for policy change. Political stability increases with the number of veto players, their incongruence, and the internal cohesion of each one of them. Additionally, states with few veto players are less apt to write bureaucratic procedures into law and limit future policy with legal procedures. This is more likely in systems with more veto players, as veto players are more likely to balance each other by carefully delineating responsibility among different parts of the government.

PRZEWORSKI ET AL. (2000) DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

Use data from 1950-1990 to examine regime type and development indicators. Democracies are strong in rich countries and weak in poor countries. In poor countries, people are more likely to be ruled by dictators, consume less, live shorter lives, have more children, see more of them die, be less educated, and suffer from collective violence. While the gap between rich and poor countries with regard to mortality rates and life expectancies has been closing, the disparities between incomes and fertility rates have increased. Per capita income grows faster in democracies, but regime type does not affect the other DVs listed above.

AXELROD (1984) THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

Uses game theory (iterated Prisoner's Dilemma) to show that rational self-interested actors will cooperate so long as they anticipate future interaction. Because states fear punishment following defection, states adopt a tit-for-tat strategy - they are only likely to cheat if they were cheated on previously.

ROGOWSKI (1987) "POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING EXPOSURE TO TRADE"

Using the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of factor endowment as a starting point, Rowgowski shows how in- ternational economic shocks prompt the formation of predictable domestic coalitions. His model predicts coalitions among land, labor, and capital given a state's level of economic development and its land/labor ratio. o Advanced Economy, High Land-Labor Ratio: Class cleavage where labor wins and capital and land lose (US New Deal) o Advanced Economy, Low Land-Labor Ratio: Urban-Rural cleavage where land and capital win but labor loses (West European Fascism) o Backward Economy, High Land-Labor Ratio: Urban-Rural cleavage where labor and capital win and land loses (South American Populism) o Backward Economy, Low Land-Labor Ratio: Class cleavage where land and capital win and labor loses (East European Fascism)

ROGOWSKI (1987) "TRADE AND VARIETY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS"

Variety in democratic institutions is attributed to variation in patterns of international trade. Trade-dependent states must have institutions that (1) stabilize government, (2) insulate the state from protectionist pressures, and (3) avoid pork spending. This is best done by (1) large electoral districts, (2) strong parties encouraged by PR systems, and (3) a stable parliamentary, rather than presidential system.

VASQUEZ (1993) THE WAR PUZZLE

Vasquez attempts to summarize the literature on war from the normative perspective of a peace theorist. He believes war is a learned behavior, taught by realist teachings. Realism doesn't describe war because it is accurate. Rather, realism describes war because leaders have been taught to see the world through realist eyes. The findings are basic: contiguity and rivalry over territory cause war.

WALLERSTEIN (1974) THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM

Wallerstein argues that Europe moved towards the establishment of a capitalist world economy in order to ensure continued economic growth. However, this entailed the expansion of the geographical size of the world in question, the development of different modes of labor control and the creation of relatively strong state machineries in the states of Western Europe. The new capitalist world system was based on an international division of labor that determined relationships between different regions as well as the types of labor conditions within each region. In this model, the type of political system was also directly related to each region's placement within the world economy. As a basis for comparison, Wallerstein proposes four different categories, core, semi-periphery, periphery, and external, into which all regions of the world can be placed. The categories describe each region's relative position within the world economy as well as certain internal political and economic characteristics.

WALT (1987) ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES

Walt argues states don't balance against power - they balance against threat, which is determined by power, proximity, and perceived intentions. He also examines differences between balancing alliances and band- wagoning alliances. Balancing alliances are stable and credible because each joins out of self-interest. This self-interest is defense from a strong adversary. Bandwagoning alliances are less stable and more costly. Large states must make credible commitments to demonstrate it won't turn on weaker allies.

PUTNAM (1993) MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK

We do some democracies thrive while others fail? Putnam traces the roots of democratic performance to civic life and social capital with a comparison of northern and southern Italy. There are four key elements to social capital: social trust, norms of reciprocity, networks of civic engagement, and successful cooperation. He argues that economics do not predict civics, but that civics do predict economic performance.

WEBER (1905) THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM

Weber suggests that some Protestant denominations, specifically those of the Calvinist or Puritan school of thought, came to view economic success as an outward sign of an individuals chances of salvation. Those who worked hard, saved much, spent little, and prospered financially seemed to be marked (to mortal eyes) as Gods chosen, and their example fed back into the religious teachings of their communities and continued the same interconnected cycle of religion and economics. This contributed to the growth and development of capitalism in the economies of European countries like the United Kingdom and Germany, as well as in the American colonies.

KEOHANE & NYE (1977) POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE

What are the effects of economic interdependence on power politics? The authors argue that because power is the ability to coerce others to do what you want them to do, then power must be considered in terms of asymmetries in interdependence. Interdependence constrains state actions and results in less conflict. Issues can be linked (linkage politics), offering states more potentially mutually-beneficial compromises.

CAREY & SHUGART (1995) "INCENTIVES TO CULTIVATE A PERSONAL VOTE"_

What causes citizens to base their votes on personal characteristics rather than party identification? The authors attribute cause to four items: 1. Ballot Control: Citizens vote on party when parties select candidates and they vote for individuals when individuals are chosen in primaries. 2. Pooling: When votes are pooled (executive and legislative selection with same vote), parties rule. When votes are not pooled, voters look to personal traits. 3. Votes: Obviously, voters are more likely to vote on personality when names, rather than parties, are on the ballot. 4. District Magnitude: The greater the number of candidates from the same party, the greater the impor- tance of personal reputation over party reputation.

JOHNSON (1982) MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE

What explains Japan's rapid economic growth in the 1970s? The Japanese developed a number of mecha- nisms for better communication among elites, such as shared common education, extensive "old boy" net- works allowing for cross penetration of elites, and the existence of a number of unique institutions, such as government advisory councils, to permit cooperation to develop. A central message is that industrial policy in Japan is thus rooted in national political skills and a capacity for institutional innovation rather than in culture or in any other special characteristic of Japanese society.

COLLIER [ED.] (1979) THE NEW AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA

What explains the new forms of Latin American dictatorships some have called bureaucratic authoritarian- ism? States require a repressive, insulated regime so they can (1) deepen the process of industrialization following the exhaustion of easy import substitution, (2) limit the role of an increasingly active popular sector, and (3) professionalize the armed forces and tie them to civilian technocrats. This is necessary in late-industrializing states.

KRASNER (1978) DEFENDING THE NATIONAL INTEREST

What is the national interest? Krasner discuss three alternatives: o Marxism: The government pursues the interests of the capitalist class. o Liberalism: Government represents domestic interest groups and lobbies. o Krasner's Statism: The state's interests are independent from the interests of society. Leaders pursue the "national interest" in both domestic and international politics. _Krasner's case studies show state interests remain constant, regardless of interest-group or elite pressure. This suggests the existence of a "national interest."

FISH (2002) "ISLAM AND AUTHORITARIANISM"

Why are Islamic states more prone to authoritarianism? Fish examines both religious and social explanations. He finds little evidence to suggest religiosity is tied to authoritarianism. Instead, he attributes the lack of democracy to the subjugation of women. Furthermore, family and clan-level norms of patriarchy are compatible with authoritarianism on the state level.

CAMERON (1978) "THE EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC ECONOMY"_

Why are states increasingly extractive? Why are some more prone to tax and redistribute wealth than others? Cameron uses data from 18 states to compare five explanations: 1. Economic: As wealth increases, citizens demand more public goods. 2. Fiscal: As the economy grows, it becomes easier to justify public goods projects. 3. Political: Party competition in democracies "bids up" public goods spending. 4. Institutional: Government bureaucracies develop internal pressures for growth. 5. International: Interdependence makes states vulnerable to global economic shocks so government must insulate the public with goods spending. Cameron finds strong support for the fifth explanation.

SCOTT (1976) THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT

Why do peasants revolt? Scott studies southeast Asia and depicts peasant life as impoverished and insecure, positing the 'subsistence ethic' as the cornerstone of peasant morality. It is a rational principle which assigns priority to the assurance of a minimum livelihood. Peasants strive not to maximize profits, but to reduce the risk of falling below a bare survival income. Accordingly, they are resistant to drastic changes brought by Western capitalism. He explains some seemingly 'irrational' aspects of peasant society (i.e. working long hours for low wages, reluctance to adopt new agricultural technology), and he concedes this applies where peasants have very low incomes, little land, large families, highly variable yields, and few outside opportunities.

SIMMONS (1994) WHO ADJUSTS?

Why do some states adjust their economic policies more than others? Simmons finds states are most likely to adjust by external means (protectionism, depreciating currency) when left-wing governments oversee central banks. Left-wing governments are less willing than others to bear the domestic costs of deflation so they devalue currencies. Right-wing governments adjust by implementing protectionist policies. o Left Wing - Supported by Labor - Adjust with Currency Devaluation o Right Wing - Supported by Capital - Adjust with Protectionism

CHECKEL (2001) "WHY COMPLY?"

Why do states comply with international norms? Checkel finds both constructivist and rationalist explana- tions to be lacking. Rationalists believe agents are coerced into abiding by norms. Agents are deterred from violating norms if they believe defection would result in unfavorable amendments to the payoff structure of costs and benefits. Constructivists believe international institutions teach states to adopt new norms and behavior. Checkel believes these perspectives can be reconciled. International institutions spread norms, but their effect on state behavior is delimited by states' domestic politics.

SCOTT (1998) SEEING LIKE A STATE

Why does social engineering sometimes fail, drawing on cases from across the globe, Scott says states (1) impose legitimacy with censuses and "social empiricism"; (2) adapt a "high modernist ideology" that calls on states to plan using data gathered from social empiricism, (3) use its coercive power to achieve high mod- ernist goals. Conflict occurs when states (4) have societies organized enough to oppose the state's coercive power. Liberal democracy with strong local government is the only means of assuring local experience is considered in statecraft.

IKENBERRY [ED.] (2002) AMERICA UNRIVALED

Why hasn't the world balanced against the United States? The contributors provide a number of answers to this question. Waltz says the world is balancing against the US. He points to regional integration. Wohlforth says American power is so great that states cannot balance against it. It also doesn't pose a great threat to potential balancers because it isn't geographically proximate to rivals. Mearsheimer says states balance against the US in their regimes. They balance against American interests.

TILLY [ED.] (1975) THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Why is the state the dominant form of government? This edited volume looks at how states were better able to collect taxes and raise militaries relative to other forms of government. Tilly points to the issue of territory. States have territory and they have the power to extract taxes from that territory. Finer argues states had to build militaries to compete with other states and force citizens to pay taxes. Interestingly, most chapters link state policies to goals relative to other states in the system (second-image reversed).

_HAINMUELLER & HISCOX (2007) "EDUCATED PREFERENCES"

_Economic theories of preference with regard to immigration stress the role of labor-market competition: laborers competing for jobs will be less supportive of immigration than those who are not competing for jobs. The authors suggest this conventional wisdom is incorrect. Using European survey data, the authors find education to be an important predictor of immigration preferences, regardless of position in the labor market. Educated voters are less racist and are more aware of the benefits of cultural diversity relative to less-educated voters.

BELLIN (2000) "CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS"

_Explanations of democracy are both top down (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2007) and bottom up (Moore, 1966). Both sides of this debate share three assumptions:_o Democracy is not an evolutionary outcome - it is a product of social conflict. o Interest, not enlightenment, drives regime change_o Among many interests, material interests trump all others These three assumptions are central to economic theories of democratization. Bellin shares this perspective and uses case studies to show democracy will only occur where it produces favorable material benefits for both capital and labor.

GARTZKE (2007) "THE CAPITALIST PEACE"

_Gartzke asserts the liberal peace is the result of capitalism, not democracy. Capitalism causes peace via three mechanisms:_1. Market competition provides wealth more efficiently than military occupation or military aggression. 2. States are able to resolve conflicts by linking economic issues and do not need to fight over land._3. Markets provide a venue for interstate competition and communication that did not previously exist.

_HELLIWELL (1994) _EMPIRICAL LINKAGES BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

_Helliwel finds economic development causes democratization, but he examines whether democratization must be purchased with slower subsequent economic growth. He finds no robust results for this effect of democratization on economic growth, but he summarizes three perspectives on this issue: _o Conflict: As Olson argues, democracy gives rise to more interest groups, slowing down state economic growth. o Compatibility: Democracies are capable of redistributing income to interest groups while maintaining growth. o Skeptical: There is no relationship between democracy and subsequent growth.

_KRASNER (1999) SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY

_Krasner critically evaluates the international norm of sovereignty. He argues large states consistently violate the sovereignty of weaker states by forcing them into international agreements that they might not accept otherwise. He also claims leaders sacrifice their state's sovereignty when it is advantageous to the ruling elite. Sovereignty can be signed away to gain recognition or legitimacy, to tie a leader's hands so leaders can buck-pass to international institutions, and to insulate leaders from domestic opposition and international intervention.

_KRASNER (1991) "GLOBAL COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL POWER"

_Krasner examines international agreements concerning global communications to determine the role of _power in international cooperation. He finds three effects:_1. Power determines who plays the game in the first place. 2. Power can be used to dictate the terms of the game._3. Power can be used to change the payoff matrix. _By showing how the distribution of power affects aspects of formal games that neoliberals assume as given, Krasner poses an important neorealist challenge to neoliberal institutionalism.

_TICKNER (1992) GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

_Major Western political theories (realism, liberalism, and Marxism) have all drawn from culturally-defined notions of masculinity - autonomy, independence, and power. As a result, these theories make masculine assumptions about behavior, progress, and economic growth. These theories marginalize the feminine. A more feminine conception of IR theory is based on peace, economic justice, and ecological sustainability. For states to focus on these aspects of security, states must put more women in positions of power and more value must be given to care-givers and mediators rather than warriors.

_ROSE (1998) "NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY"

_Neoclassical realism is defined in this influential review essay. States' foreign policies are shaped by a state's position in the international system, but the effect of the system on foreign policy is determined by con- text and domestic instutions. In sum, material capabilities determine the "menu of choice" and domestic institutions influence which choices a leader can choose. Two major points: 1. States with comparable capabilities but different structures are likely to act differently. 2. Systemic pressures shape the general direction of foreign policy, but they may not be strong enough or precise enough to determine a specific course of action.

_ROSATO (2003) "THE FLAWED LOGIC OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY"

_Rosato argues against the democratic peace theory by examining a number of the mechanisms proposed to explain it. These mechanisms include peaceful norms, transparency, information, and slow mobilization. Rosato finds little evidence of any of these mechanisms, instead claiming the democratic peace is the result of American imperialism in the post-WWII era. A very large percentage of the democracy-democracy dyads in the empirical studies contain two members of NATO.

_LIDDLE (1991) "THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE THIRD WORLD POLITICIAN"

_The author attempts to explain Soeharto's decision to implement liberal market although the predominant cultural approach would have suggested such policies would not be implemented in "illiberal" Indonesia. Liddle suggests that we should think of political culture less as a set of fixed, deeply held values and beliefs, uni-directionally determining behavior, and more as a loose assemblage of ideas, some of which are flexible and open to change and manipulation by political actors. We should consider how four variables interact together: culture, regime type, economic crises, and international economic forces.

_HALL & SOSKICE [EDS.] (2001) VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM

_The authors describe two forms of capitalism: Liberal Market Economies [USA,UK] and Coordinated Market Economies [GER]. LMEs have competitive market arrangements and a neoclassical understanding. CMEs have non-market relationships and strategic action between actors and firms. LMEs allow for more radical innovation while CMEs provide more security for incremental innovation. LMEs react quickly to globalization while CMEs are more cautious. Globalization has not caused convergence. Rather LMEs and CMEs respond with differently.

DEUTSCH ET AL. (1957) POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC

_The authors study European history to understand the formation of effective security communities. Three conditions must be met:_1. The values of the units must be compatible and integrated. 2. Each unit must mutually respond to each other's needs._3. Units must grant the free mobility of persons across units. The authors also find security communities can't be forged by military force. They are the result of bandwag- oning rather than balancing, and they do not require supranational structure (formal institutionalization) to be effective.

_HAINMUELLER & HISCOX (2006) "LEARNING TO LOVE GLOBALIZATION"

_The authors use survey data to understand the relationship between education and support for trade restric- tions. Their findings suggest exposure to economic ideas and information among college-educated individu- als plays a key role in shaping attitudes towards trade and globalization. This finding refutes the widely-held belief that education only affects attitudes towards trade due to distributional concerns linked to job skills.

OYE [ED.] (1985) COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY

_The neoliberal contributors to this edited volume argue cooperation is possible under anarchy if: o Payoff structures are altered to make cooperation more advantageous._o The shadow of the future is prolonged to ensure iterated interactions._o The number of involved actors is reduced to curb collective action problems and free-riding.

_HAMILTON ET AL. (1788) THE FEDERALIST PAPERS

_These 85 articles outline the philosophy behind the American government. No. 10 argues the government must control the damage caused by factions. Representative government avoids mob rule. No. 51 says each branch should be separate to protect the government from abusing its own power. No. 78 says life tenure for judges frees them from political pressures. The judiciary must have the power to protect the constitution.

_ROGOWSKI (1989) COMMERCE AND COALITIONS

_This book continues his work from "Political Cleavages" (1987). Rogowski uses the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to predict coalition formation among land, labor, and capital given a state's economic development and land/labor ratio. Rogowski adds the factors could be updated to skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital.

_WENDT (1999) SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

_This is the seminal work in constructivist IR theory. Wendt says constructivism has a place in IR theory because it helps explain the constituitive elements of international relations, such as ideas and norms. Con- structivism is an alternative to materialism and individualism. Wendt's framework is extremely helpful for organizing IR theory. It is organized along two dimensions: holism-individualism and materialism-idealism. _o Holism-Materialism: Neo-Marxism, World Systems Theory_o Holism-Idealism: Constructivism, English School_o Individualism-Materialism: Realism, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, Rational Choice o Individualism-Idealism: Liberalism, Motivational Realism

_KRASNER [ED.] (1983) INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

_This volume contains twelve essays about the emergence of international regimes, defined as mutually- recognized patterns of behavior. The regime approach involves identifying norms and rules in a specific issue area. The case studies present both economic and sociological perspectives on international regimes: o Economic: Regimes are formed by rational actors to reduce transaction costs and overcome coordina- tion problems. o Sociological: Regimes represent meaning, learning, and converging expectations and they spread norms.

MORAVCSIK (1997) "TAKING PREFERENCES SERIOUSLY"

_Using Lakatosian language, Moravcsik reformulates liberalism as a positivist research program with three central assumptions:_1. The primary actors in international relations are individuals and private interest groups. 2. States are amalgamations and composite representatives of domestic private interests. 3. State behavior is determined by the configuration of interdependent state preferences.

_WENDT (1992) "ANARCHY IS WHAT STATES MAKE OF IT"

_Wendt claims neoliberalism offers weak institutional analysis because it treats interests as exogenous and does not consider how institutions can alter state interests. According to neorealists and neoliberals, process (interaction and learning among states) cannot alter structure (anarchy and distribution of power). But to constructivists, institutions can alter states' perceptions of structure, thus altering the effect of structure on state behavior.

FEARON & LAITIN (1996) "EXPLAINING INTERETHNIC COOPERATION"

_What accounts for peace among ethnic groups? The authors use formal modeling to identify two mecha- nisms: o Spiral Equilibrium: Because any small conflict could set off a large conflict, groups are deterred by this likely chain of events and interethnics cooperate to avoid the loss of bigger future payoffs. o In-Group Policing Equilibrium: The prospect of conflict gives groups an incentive to sanction their own members for cross-group violations.

_WEYLAND (1998) "SWALLOWING THE BITTER PILL"

_Why are some publics more supportive to neoliberal reforms than others? In this examination of Latin American states, Weyland compares a rational choice and a psychological explanation. According to rational choice, voters should be more likely to suffer the costs of neoliberal reforms if they are accompanied by targeted social welfare programs. However, this compensation hypothesis comes up short compared to the psychological rescue hypothesis. Publics only accept the losses incurred by these reforms when they fear greater losses from hyperinflation. Like prospect theory suggests, individuals are risk-averse if gains are offered, but risk-acceptant if further losses can be avoided.

_WOHLFORTH (1999) "THE STABILITY OF A UNIPOLAR WORLD"

_Wohlforth challenges the conventional wisdom that unipolarity is unstable. He advances three central propo- _sitions that support the stability of unipolarity: o American unipolarity is so profound that there is little utility in balancing against it. o The second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the US as long as the expected costs of balancing remain prohibitive. o The United States' isolation reduces the threat it poses to the rest of the world, while the proximity of other states to each other favors regional balances against any potential rivals.

HAGGARD & KAUFMAN (1995) _THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

o The ability of both authoritarian and democratic leaders to maintain power is partly a function of economic performance which in turn is dependent on the conduct of economic policy. Institutions affect the coherence of policy both at the initiation phase, when executive authority is an asset, and during the consolidation phase when success rests on building bases of social support. Among authoritarian regimes, single party states are resilient because they have social structures that offer continued support. In democracies, economic crisis causes fractionalization and systems that compromise (moderate multipolar and two-party) are more stable than those with support at the ideological extremes. _HAGGARD & SIMMONS (1987) "THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES" The authors review the literature on international regimes and identify four types of regime theory: _1. Structural: Describes how systemic conditions affect regime formation_2. Game-Theoretic: Incorporates exogenously determined preference orderings_3. Functional: Ties institutions and their structure to the fixed needs of states_4. Cognitivist: Institutions must be explained by states' ideas, norms, and knowledge