Ethics Final Exam

—Moral intuitionism G

Moral intuitionists often point out that the way we learn morality is by experience. We are conditioned to share toys, not to hit people, and honesty is (usually) the best policy. Moreover, most intuitionists claim we have an innate sense of compassion, so that we learn not to hurt others, because we observe the results.

what is the role of reason? G

Morality is determined by reason alone. Consequences do not count To Kant, rightness can be determined by reason. Humans are reasonable creatures, and so they have the ability to determine the moral act. We have no proof of this, but Kant says it is a "Transcendental Idea" that we must accept to make sense of our world. Morality then is determined by reason alone, and not by consequences. Kant's system of ethics attempts to derive the moral law from reason. Immorality, according to Kant, involves inconsistency, and is therefore irrational.

what is the scope of the moral community? G

Online notes: The second implication of Kant's use of reason to ground morality is that it explains the scope of morality. Rationality, for Kant, is definitive of human nature; it is universal among human beings. All human beings, then, because that have the capacity to be rational, ought to be moral. Other animals, lacking this rational capacity, are not subject to the moral law, and therefore cannot be judged by it.

what does it mean by humans as ends in themselves? G

Online notes: The word "end" in this phrase has the same meaning as in the phrase "means to an end". The philosopher Immanuel Kant said that rational human beings should be treated as an end in themselves and not as a means to something else. The fact that we are human has value in itself. If a person is an end-in-themself it means their inherent value doesn't depend on anything else - it doesn't depend on whether the person is enjoying their life, or making other people's lives better. We exist, so we have value. Most of us agree with that - though we don't put it so formally. We say that we don't think that we should use other people, which is a plain English way of saying that we shouldn't treat other people as a means to our own ends. This idea applies to us too. We shouldn't treat ourselves as a means to our own ends; instead we should respect our inherent worth. This can be used as an argument against euthanasia, suicide and other behaviours that damage ourselves. The idea also shows up in discussions of animal rights, with the idea that if they have rights, animals must be treated as ends in themselves.

—Problems with Prima Facie Duties ****

Online: For the most part I like this theory and I think that I follow it pretty well. I was raised basically by these different duties. I know which actions are morally right and wrong. However, these duties do bring about the problem of which to follow. Ross did a good job of explaining his theory and he even admitted that he didn't also have a clear cut answer as to which duty to follow when more than one were conflicting with each other. Ross was right to say that it is different for every situation. Although this does contribute to the confusion in people's moral actions, I think that there would be even more problems in this world if we tried to create clear cut answers to every hypothetical problem people might face. The moral actions people commit should be up to them (free will), but people must be punished for their wrong actions because they are wrong actions, no matter if there didn't happen to be a negative outcome. **

what is the role of cooperation in optimal outcomes? G

Only humans' ability to cooperate can solve this problem. At a minimum I must be guaranteed that I will not be harmed, and that agreements will be kept. But cooperation requires that that also be true for others. And of course, both of these require that there be an enforcement mechanism to ensure that these agreements are observed. This is the beginnings of government for Hobbes. Reflective equilibrium—we can figure out what is best for us. Better to get a few desires met than none Cooperation leads to stability "The reflective capacity of rational agents leads them from the given to the agreed, from existing practices and principles requiring constraint to those that receive each person's consent." (p. 545) Only Cooperation avoids S.O.N. Online notes: Contractarianism, which stems from the Hobbesian line of social contract thought, holds that persons are primarily self-interested, and that a rational assessment of the best strategy for attaining the maximization of their self-interest will lead them to act morally (where the moral norms are determined by the maximization of joint interest) and to consent to governmental authority. Contractarianism argues that we each are motivated to accept morality, as Jan Narveson puts it, "first because we are vulnerable to the depredations of others, and second because we can all benefit from cooperation with others" (1988, 148). Contractualism, which stems from the Kantian line of social contract thought, holds that rationality requires that we respect persons, which in turn requires that moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person. Thus, individuals are not taken to be motivated by self-interest but rather by a commitment to publicly justify the standards of morality to which each will be held. Where Gauthier, Narveson, or economist James Buchanan are the paradigm Hobbesian contractarians, Rawls or Thomas Scanlon would be the paradigm Kantian contractualists. The rest of this entry will specifically pertain to the contractarian strain wherever the two diverge.

what are the origins of social contract in human nature? G

Origins of Social Contract Theory No God. No Altruism. No transcendent moral facts. Where does morality come from? Us. One of the strengths of social contract theory is that there are no transcendent moral facts. For example, with Utilitarianism, we must accept some definition of good that is an axiom for all their other normative theory. Kant asks us to accept that all humans are rational, and that rational people will want to do the act that can be universalized. With social contract, morality is simply a human convention. Some take the origins of SCT to the Socrates, an idea that Shafer Landau seems to endorse. However, it is a flawed idea, in my estimation. The idea government for Socrates is a sort of benevolent dictatorship by a Philosopher King. It really does not meet the requirement of public endorsement, although, if the rules are those that rational people could accept, a leader could be some form of a Absolute Ruler. This is the idea of Thomas Hobbes.

what are the causes of state of nature for Hobbes? G

State of nature does occur Lack of social goods: Security, trade, farming, industry, or technology This State of Nature is intolerable, Hobbes says, and leads to the "War of all against all". Life is, in Hobbes' famous words, "nasty, poor, brutish, and short." Humans will do anything to get out of living in this kind of a world, a world in which trade, farming, and so on are impossible. But the main and bottom line need that the SON gives no one any security. 1. competition 2. diffidence 3. glory page 102

what is the categorical imperative? G

Reason requires universality "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (63) One of the ways that the mathematical statement and the categorical statement are alike is that they are universal. In Kant's view, reason requires universality, so any determination of morality is universal, otherwise it would be a subjective, not an objective, rational, truth. That is the background of the categorical imperative. There are very few things that are good to be able to quote in this class, but this is definitely one of them.

what was the goldilocks problem? G

Rules are too specific or too general If we universalize a maxim that one can steal if it is the only way to feed oneself, what about a person in modern urban society? Is it ok for them to steal, when there are other ways to feed a family? What about a person in post-Katrina New Orleans? The next critique is one I entitle the "Goldilocks" problem. Remember the 3 bears? This bed is too hard, this one is too soft, this one is just right? Many times it seems that Kant's duties can be the same way. For example, can we universalize a maxim that says it is ok to steal food? Well, that would become similar to the candy bar episode I gave earlier, so no, it doesn't seem that would be permissible. But what about stealing food if one is hungry? Again, it would create a nightmare for merchants, and in our society, there are many ways to get food at little or no cost to say that it is necessary to supports oneself or one's family. Could we say that in an extreme emergency, say after a natural disaster, one can steal food IF it is the only way to feed oneself and one's family? Can you see where this might be going? It all sounds rather ad hoc, and not really helpful in making moral decisions. In fact, it could even be construed that someone could come up with a maxim that would match only one situation, but is that universafiable in any meaningful way? This is the problem with rules, for many have pointed out that matching rules to specific situations is sometimes problematic.

what was the using someone as a mere means vs using someone as a means situation? G

This principle comes from Kant's view of what it means to be a human: Humans are rational creatures, possessing a will. When one uses a person as a means, they deny their will. Tuskegee Syphilis experiment In Macon Co. Alabama between 1932-1972, 600 Black males were recruited for a medical study. Some already had syphilus; others were to be injected with the syphilis bacteria. The men were not told why the study was being conducted, other than the vague "bad blood." The men were promised health care and other benefits, but these were never delivered. Even after penicillin was discovered to be effective against the disease, the study continued. The result were over 100 died of syphilis related diseases. This experiment has been called, "arguably the most infamous biomedical research study in US history." By misleading the men about the intent of the study, the researchers took away the men's right to make an informed decision, and thus their will. Respect for persons: Kant sees this as an extension of the CI, and it is perhaps the most immediately useful part of Kantian ethics. "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." Kant restates the CI at least three times in his classic "A Critique of Practical Reason," in which most of his moral theory is stated. All of them are valid inferences drawn from the CI that we have been considering, including the one that is perhaps the most applicable to our moral understanding. It simply says, "Act so that you treat humans, whether yourself or another, always as an end and never as a means only." This end-means language is familiar from consequentialism. Here, however, Kant is more specific, as he is concerned that humans do not use to humans to get what they want, but instead they treat them as humans simpliciter. Now this needs a little closer definition. You are taking this class because you want something from me—a grade that is necessary for you to complete your degree. I take heart in knowing that I want something from you—it is the way I earn my paycheck. That is not the sort of arrangement that Kant had in mind, for that is mutually agreed. You agreed to pay for the class when you enrolled, and I agreed to give you a grade. This is not the sort of arrangement that Kant is concerned about. He is more concerned with relationships that are deceptive or abusive, as we will soon see. Online notes: The second formulation that is important for us is the formula of the end in itself: roughly, "act so as to treat people always as ends in themselves, never as mere means" (see Bailey, p. 666). The idea here is that everyone, insofar as he or she is a rational being, is intrinsically valuable; we ought therefore to treat people as having a value all their own rather than merely as useful tools or devices by means of which we can satisfy our own goals or purposes. Other people are valuable not merely insofar as they can serve our purposes; they are also valuable in themselves. Note that the formula does not rule out all cases of using someone else to satisfy my own desires or projects. That would seem to eliminate a very large number of human interactions! Treating others as mere means, treating them only as devices we can use to help us satisfy our desires, seems a clear enough notion; certain kinds of corporate and sexual relationships seem like clear examples of it. But what would it be to treat someone as an end in him or herself? Kant's idea seems to be that we treat someone as an end only insofar as we act toward him or her in a way that he or she can understand as appropriate or justified: we should be able to explain our reasons in such a way that the person will see the reasonableness of acting in the way we propose. Thus, for example, Kant writes: "he who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another human being merely as a means, without the latter at the same time containing in himself the end. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting toward him, and therefore cannot himself contain the end of this action" (Bailey 666-667). What is ruled out by this formulation, therefore, appears to be actions which treat others in such a way that they do not have the opportunity to consent to what we are doing. So we treat others as mere means when we force them to do something, or when we obtain their consent through coercion or dishonesty.

what is the threats vs offers? G

Threats vs offers Threat: consequence of not doing what A wants wants has undesirable consequences Offer: .... Doing what A wants leads to desirable consequences This leads us to the difference between a threat and an offer. A threat is coercive; an offer is not. Watch the negatives in the threat, as they are important in distinguishing the two, for Mappes. Threats have an UNDESIRABLE consequence for NOT complying; offers have a desireable consequence that comes with compliance.

—role of practical wisdom-- G

We learn to work on a car by working on a car. When we see a car with the same problem, we do the same thing. This is practical wisdom, and morality requires the same thing. online:Another way in which one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking phronesis—moral or practical wisdom. The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels well, rightly, as she should. These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular (putative) examples of virtues to give these truisms up. We may say of someone that he is too generous or honest, generous or honest "to a fault". It is commonly asserted that someone's compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie they should not have told, for example, in their desire to prevent someone else's hurt feelings. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good, admirable person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion? The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. If one thinks of generosity or honesty as the disposition to be moved to action by generous or honest impulses such as the desire to give or to speak the truth, if one thinks of compassion as the disposition to be moved by the sufferings of others and to act on that emotion, if one thinks of courage as merely fearlessness, or the willingness to face danger, then it will indeed seem obvious that these are all dispositions that can lead to their possessor's acting wrongly. But it is also obvious, as soon as it is stated, that these are dispositions that can be possessed by children, and although children thus endowed (bar the "courageous" disposition) would undoubtedly be very nice children, we would not say that they were morally virtuous or admirable people. The ordinary usage, or the reliance on motivation by inclination, gives us what Aristotle calls "natural virtue"—a proto version of full virtue awaiting perfection by phronesis or practical wisdom. They are also, importantly, culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him. Quite generally, given that good intentions are intentions to act well or "do the right thing", we may say that practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied correctly without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom.

problems of incompleteness G

online: A. The Problem of Incompleteness (Rachels) If VE is proposed as a complete moral theory—i.e., as an alternative to rule/principle focused theories, then VE faces challenges when faced with particular questions about actions (i.e., about what we ought to do). Some 'purist' VEs are willing to bite the bullet on this:

Aristotle's definition of virtue

online: Aristotle defines moral virtue as a disposition to behave in the right manner and as a mean between extremes of deficiency and excess, which are vices. We learn moral virtue primarily through habit and practice rather than through reasoning and instruction.

—problem of no actual contract ***

what happens if there is no actual contact? Suppose we grant that a social contract is legitimate if free, rational people would agree to live by it Still, is it really true that all free, rational people would agree about all aspects of any given social contract? The big point: it's not clear that ideally rational people will agree about everything 214

—Doctrine of Doing and Allowing G

"It is always worse to do harm than to allow that same harm to occur." online: Is doing harm worse than allowing harm? If not, there should be no moral objection to active euthanasia in circumstances where passive euthanasia is permissible; and there should be no objection to bombing innocent civilians where doing so will minimize the overall number of deaths in war. There should, however, be an objection—indeed, an outcry—at our failure to prevent the deaths of millions of children in the third world from malnutrition, dehydration, and measles.[1] Moreover, it seems that the question is pertinent to the question of whether consequentialism is true, as consequentialists believe that doing harm is no worse than allowing harm while anti-consequentialists, almost universally, disagree. But is doing harm worse than allowing harm? We might divide approaches to this question into two broad kinds. First, those that attempt to answer it using examples without saying anything about the nature of the distinction. (Call this approach 'the contrast strategy.') And, second, those that analyze the distinction in depth and try to show that its underlying nature dictates an answer to the moral question.

—Doctrine of the Double Effect G

"Provided that your goal is worthwhile, you are sometimes permitted to act in ways that foreseeable cause certain types of harm, though you must never intend to cause such harms." (FE, 219) online:The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end. According to the principle of double effect, sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a side effect (or "double effect") of bringing about a good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same good end.

how to form the categorical imperative? G

1. Form maxim M 2. Universalize 3. Describe result of (2) 4. Determine whether (3) includes a contradiction in the conception of the rule. Is this universalization possible in a rational world? But what does this theoretical statement mean? How does the Categorical Imperative, the CI, affect moral behavior. The first step is to form a maxim. A maxim is a rule, or a statement that would allow a given action. It would look like "It is ok to do X. We can then universalize this maxim. "It is ok for everyone to do X." Third, we would assess the result of that universalization. "What if everyone did X?" If the answer is implausible or results in a contradiction, then we know it is an immoral action.

—Two types of pluralism G

1. absolutism: "... it is always wrong to break a fundamental moral rule." But does this even sound feasible? ALWAYS WRONG? No extenuating circumstances? 2. prima facies

—Derschwitz on why law is superior to utilitarianism and deontology G

Several of them seem to fit in the category of sweeping things under the rug, ignoring the issue, or taking a 'don't ask, don't tell' approach to the problem. However, "the truthful road of the rule of law," is that the 'law itself must insure a proper framework for the activity. In other words, Dershowitz is advocating for a social contract. the real issue...is not whether some torture would or would not be used in the ticking bomb case—it would. The question is whether it would be done openly, pursuant to a previously established legal procedure, or whether it would be done secretly, in violation of existing law." Doing so opening would Take into account the safety of citizens, but at the same time would.. Insure the preservation of civil liberties and human rights, because... There is open accountability and visibility in a democracy.

Examples of forming the CI: G

Form maxim It's ok to take a candy bar at Quik Trip when you want one and have no money. 2 Universalize maxim It's ok for everyone to take a candy bar at Quik Trip when they want one and have no money. 3 Result of 2. Quik Trip quits selling candy bars because they make no money. 4. Contradiction? No candy bars to want!Let's say that I am at Quik Trip, have a chocoholic attack, and want a candy bar. But I have no money! So, I want to decide if it is moral to steal a candy bar. I begin with a maxim—a rule that would allow me to take one. Next, I use the step that is key to Kant, universalize the maxim. We can have an open run on candy bars at QT, that is ok. But the universalization leads to a contradiction, because it will lead to unprofitability of carrying candy bars, so they will quit. So, there will be no candy bars for me to want at Quik Trip any more. (Shudders!) Taking a candy bar cannot be a moral act. But now, let's look at something a little more substantive. Example of lying: Step 1. Maxim. It is permissible for me to lie to gets me out of a jam. Step 2. Universalized. It is permissible for everyone to lie to gets them out of a jam. Step 3. Effects. If everyone adopted this maxim. No one would believe anything. Step 4. Contradiction? The act of lying presupposes that others will believe the falsehood! Is it ok to tell a harmless white lie? Well, using Kant's ideas, we form a maxim, as I have listed. Then we universalize it, it is ok for everyone to lie if it gets them out of a jam. But the effect is that we have no reason to believe anything that anyone says. So we have a contradiction—lying might not get you out of a jam after all. Example of planting evidence: Inefficiencies and injustices in the legal system lead to rogue decision making. Maxim—I will plan evidence to convict someone of a crime since it is highly likely he committed the crime. Universalization—anyone can plant evidence when they are convinced it is warranted. Result—juries are skeptical of evidence because it might not be accurate. Contradiction? Juries and judges could no longer believe evidence presented to them, including the planted evidence. While the statement of the CI is a bit abstruse, the application is rather easy and very broad. Again, we can apply this to the morality of planting evidence. This is the stuff of TV police dramas. From this, is it quite easy to see the problem with this practice, using Kant's ideas the problem with this moral issue. Even with good intentions (convicting a person who has been difficult to catch), one can easily see the problem with using Kant's system. And the contradiction is just as clear. While at first it may seem that the CI would be difficult to apply, in fact, it is broadly applicable, and can be determined in a minimal amount of time.

—why should we be moral? G

It accounts for the emotions as a part of moral decision making. Emotions as a warning system. Emotions as feedback. Emotions as motivation. Moral education VT gives a clear account of the need for moral education, and the method (habit) of gaining it. VT explains the grown of moral sensitivities in the human.

what was the lying axe murder? G

Many claim so.... The inquiring axe murder is a classic example. Is it permissible to lie in order to save the life of someone? Kant recognizes this problem and illustrates it with an interesting scenario. Imagine a good friend comes to your door and explains that there is an axe murderer out to get him, and if he finds him, he will kill him. He asks if he can hide in your home. You, of course, agree. Then, in a short time, the axe murderer comes to your door and asks if you are hiding his prey. You have a duty to protect human life, but you also have a duty not to lie. Neither can be universalized, so neither pass the test of the CI. What is a Kantian to do? Now, Kant gives an answer, although it is not altogether satisfying. He says that we can never universalize a maxim to lie. So, we are bound to tell the truth, that we are harboring the man he is seeking. He adds, by then, the man has probably slipped out the back. However, it seems that in doing so, one has put himself and his family at risk. That is beside the point. He has done his duty. Online notes:The main problem with the categorical imperative is its rigidity. The famous example that illustrates this is that of a crazed axe-murderer coming to your front door and asking you where your children are. You could lie - many would say you should lie - but imagine if everyone in the entire world lied all the time. If everyone lied, there would be no "telling the truth" and, thus, no real lying. As the law is logically contradictory, you have a perfect duty not to lie. You have to tell the axe-murderer the truth, so he can go and kill your children. Kant was asked about this personally, and he said that this was indeed the case. It would be immoral to lie to the man. He did, however, say that you could also choose to lock your door and call the police. Here's another example - you're in a room with a man who's holding a gun to your mother's head. You know he'll shoot her any second. Right next to you, there's a button. If you press the button, the man will fall through a trap door and land in a spike pit, dying instantly. Your mother will be saved. According to the categorical imperative, this would be the wrong thing to do. You can't press the button. But if you don't, your mother will die. It's in situations like this that strict ethical systems with specific decision procedures tend to fall apart. Morality is simply too complex, too full of exceptions for these theories to ever fully work.

—flexibility-moral motivation-role for partiality—

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—virtue and the Bishop

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—advantages of virtue theory G

1. emphasis on moral pleasure and emotion...its good to be acting virtuously and to enjoy it online: Examines the moral agent unlike many other ethical theories. It holds human relationships in high regard unlike others such as Kant, who sees close bonds as morally dangerous. Human emotions and responsibilities are important. This separates Virtue Ethics from most other ethical theories as they regard emotions as illogical and therefore dangerous. Allows the moral agent to make ethical decisions based on his or her moral well-being, not just based on what is legally right. Acknowledges that morality is complex and so rejects simplistic maxims as a basis for moral truth. It does not claim to be a miracle solution for every problem but tries to equip us so as to deal with the problems. It places virtues at the centre of morality.

effects of social contract ***

1. why be moral? is one problem Hobbes and some other social contract theorists think that you have no reason to be moral if it's not in your self-interest to do so We've also seen that Hobbes and others try to show that acting morally and abiding by the social contract is always in your self-interest You might get away with immorally within a Social Contract society, but the risks of getting caught outweigh the possible benefits At least in the long run, it's likely you'll be found out And in the long run, ethical people tend to do better for themselves than unethical people So it's always a bad bet to be immoral But this isn't so clear: is it really always too risky/a bad bet? Example: societies that are less than well-ordered

what is the Prisoner's Dilemma? G

A very apt illustration of Nash is seen in the popular "Prisoner's Dilemma." Here is the scenario. 2 men have been arrested for a petty crime, but police suspect they are involved in much more. They offer them both the same offer. If neither of them confess to the greater crime, they only have enough on them to hold them for 2 years. But if one will roll on the other, the one who rats gets no time, and the other gets 6 years. If they both rat each other out, they both get 4 years. Assume that the two men have previously agreed that if they are caught, they will not rat each other out. Oh, and by the way, Dilbert doesn't understand the prisoner's dilemma! Obviously, it would be best for both not to confess. We both would get the minimum time. But how can I be sure my partner will not rat me out? The fact is I can't, and so in that case, it is better to be in jail for 4 than for 6 years, and so I should confess. That is what Nash was talking about, "If we all go for the blonde she will ignore us all. So let's go for the other girls instead, our second choice." And it is a perfect illustration of social contract theory. I would rather do what I want, but I will accept reasonable constraints on my behavior, with the understanding that you will do so also. These situations arise all the time when: One's interest affected by what others do, & Everyone will be worse off if everyone pursues their own narrow self-interest without cooperation of others Examples: hunting party, catalytic converter, etc. These situations occur all the time. I realize that I may have to share the birds that we get on our hunting trip, but we will all have more birds when we hunt together. Another example is the catalytic converter. These devices in the exhaust system of the car reduce significantly the amount of pollutants that are released into the air. It also adds about $100 to the cost of a car. However, if I were the only one to buy it, it would make little difference in the air quality. It takes everyone's cooperation. I will spend $1000 extra for a car to get clean air, with the understanding that you will also. That is a constraint on our behavior, and it is acceptable, at least in mind, because it gives us all better air quality. Online notes:The prisoner's dilemma provides another kind of argument for social contract theory. Rachels presents the standard version of the dilemma. You are arrested in a totalitarian society, and accused of treason (more specifically, of conspiring against the government with a man named Smith). Even though you say you are innocent and do not even know Smith, your captors press for a confession, and offer you the following deal: if you confess and Smith does too, you each get five years in prison; if you confess and Smith does not, you go free while he serves ten years; if you do not confess but Smith does, you serve ten years while he goes free; and if neither of you confess they will have to release you both after one year. You Confess You Do Not Confess Smith Confesses 5 You, 5 Smith 10 You, 0 Smith Smith Does Not Confess 0 You, 10 Smith 1 You, 1 Smith Your captors inform you that they are offering Smith the same deal; but they do not let you talk with him. Assuming that you are a rational egoist, which of the options presented in the deal should you choose (in other words, which option is it in our own interests to choose?)? The answer is that you should confess, because you will be better off confessing than not confessing whether Smith confesses or not (in other words, the left column result is better than the right in either row). Supposing that Smith is rational (and self-interested) too, though, he will confess as well. So you will both get five years - not a very good result. If the situation were changed so that you could communicate with Smith and reach an agreement about what to do (and if we assume that the agreement would be enforced somehow, so you can be confident that it will be kept), then it would be rational to agree that neither of you will confess. In that case, you would each be released after only one year. Obviously this is a better result than if you both confessed. The conclusion social contractarians draw from the dilemma is that we are better off if we cooperate, adopting an (enforced) agreement or social contract, than we would be if we acted as "independent egoists" (in other words, as people who pursue their own interests without cooperation or agreement). The prisoner's dilemma is a very artificial situation, of course; but there are many real situations that are similar in the sense that independent egoism will produce worse results than accepting a social contract. Suppose, for example, that two timber or logging companies operate in the forests of a particular region; but the forests are shrinking at an alarming rate as a result. If the companies act as competing independent egoists cutting down as many trees as they can, they may destroy the forests and, therefore, their businesses. Alternatively, however, they might adopt a social contract (and enforcement procedures) requiring them to limit the number of trees they can harvest in a given period of time, plant new trees, etc. - an agreement which would be mutually beneficial, leaving both companies better off than they would be without it. Online notes: real life PD examples:Commuting- Each gets to work faster by driving car than by bus. But each would get to/from work faster if all agree to take bus Studying for test graded on pre-set curve- Can study a lot or little. If all study a lot then everyone's efforts cancel each other out and all get same grade so unnecessary extra work. Better if all agree to study a little, same grades as if study a lot & save time on work

—What makes some normative theories monistic G

All of the classical ethical theories are monistic All of the classical ethical theories have significant problems So as a result do we Give up on Monistic theories? Try to find a monistic theory that does not have these problems? Try to fix the monastic theories we have? Online:When ethical intuitionism says that we can directly intuit or apprehend moral principles, it is epistemological and undoubtedly belongs to meta-ethics. But, ethical intuitionism has another sense in which it can be considered to be part of normative ethics as it methodologically refers to unranked pluralism that claims that there are a plurality of moral principles, and that none of these moral principles is more basic or important than any other. Ethical intuitionism in this sense is a normative ethical theory contrasted with versions of monism such as utilitarianism and Kantianism, which assert that there is only one basic moral principle: the principle of utility (utilitarianism) or the categorical imperative (Kantianism). The most well-known theorist in ethical intuitionism in this sense is probably W.D. Ross (1877-1971), who is the author of The Right and the Good. According to him, there are a number of irreducible moral duties (for example, to keep promises, to refrain from harming the innocent, and so on), none of which takes precedence over any other. Ross thinks that the right action in a given situation is determined by a careful weighing of various moral principles which apply in that situation.

--Aristotelian eudaimonia G

Aristotle concludes that we do every good for the sake of eudaimonia "happiness onlineEudaimonism is an ethical theory which maintains that happiness (eudaimonia) is reached through virtue (aretê). Eudaimonia and aretê are two central concepts in ancient Greek ethics. Eudaimonia, which literally means "having a good guardian spirit," is often translated into English as "happiness," and while this is adequate in so far as it goes, it does not entirely capture the meaning of the Greek word. One important difference is that happiness seems closely bound up with a subjective assessment of the quality of one's life, whereas eudaimonia refers to an objectively desirable life. Eudaimonia is then a more encompassing notion than happiness since bad events that do not contribute to one's experience of happiness do affect one's eudaimonia. All ancient ethical theorists understand eudaimonia to be the highest human good, but they differ from one another regarding how to achieve it in its relation to aretê. Specifying the relation between these two central concepts is one of the important preoccupations of ancient ethics, and a subject of much disagreement. As a result, there are a various forms of eudaimonism. Two of the most influential forms are those of Aristotle and the Stoics. Aristotle takes virtue and its exercise to be the most important constituent in eudaimonia but does acknowledge the importance of external goods such as health, wealth, and beauty. By contrast, the Stoics make virtue necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia and thus deny the necessity of external goods.

—problem of who is in the contract G

Being a part of a social contract requires that we all consent to live up to the contract But relatively few adults have explicitly consented to such a social contract Replies: Tacit consent: we accept it implicitly by keeping silent, not opposing the government, and reaping the benefits of one's society A more sophisticated reply: ideally rational tacit consent: every ideally rational agent would consent to an ideal social code (think of Kant's FKE) the role of consent 215

—implicit vs. explicit contract G

But all of this presupposes an enforcement mechanism of some sort. Of course on the macro level, that is government, although it is also social relationships. I won't hang around with people who lie to me, just as I am sure they wouldn't hang out with me if I lied to them. That is a more implicit contract, an understood one, although in most cases, our relationship with the government is implicit also. What makes the implied contract binding is the implicit participation in the benefits of the contract, both on a micro, interpersonal level, and the macro, governmental level. Tacit consent[edit] The theory of an implicit social contract holds that by remaining in the territory controlled by some society, which usually has a government, people give consent to join that society and be governed by its government, if any. This consent is what gives legitimacy to such government. online: However, other writers have argued that consent to join the society is not necessarily consent to its government. For that, the government must be according to a constitution of government that is consistent with the superior unwritten constitutions of nature and society.[16] Kinds of Social Contract We have explicit and implicit social contract of which an actual consent is required and on theother hand, we have hypothetical social contract in which even though there is no actualagreement to the social contract, you would agree, in some ideal circumstances. Locke thinksthere was an explicit agreement at the start of most states though David Hume objected this ideaof Locke by saying that origins of all or most actual governments is either usurpation orconquest. In implicit social contract one agrees to the contract through actions rather than words.Citizens implicitly consent through residence, acceptance of benefits and through politicalparticipation

virtue theory's relation to the other ethical theories—

Do you see how Aristotle's ideas are related to prima facie duties? Unlike deontological and consequentialist theories, theories of virtue ethics do not aim primarily to identify universal principles that can be applied in any moral situation. And virtue ethics theories deal with wider questions—"How should I live?" and "What is the good life?" and "What are proper family and social values

--What is particularism? G

Ethical Particularism: Rejects both monism AND absolutism Best exemplified in the thought of a British ethicist, W. D. Ross (1877-1971) His "non-absolutist" rules were called prima facie (first glance or look) duties

what is the hypothetical vs categorical statements? G

Hypothetical statements? Conditional and limited in scope Often come in the form "If...then....." Categorical statements? Unconditional and Universal Statements are often classified as either hypothetical or categorical. Hypothetical statements are in response to a specific request. "If you want to get to St Louis from Kansas City the fastest route is Interstate 70." It is only applicable to that specific question, and is subject to change. Suppose I-70 is closed at some point. Perhaps the best route would be another way. Interestingly, the "Golden Rule" is a hypothetical statement. It matches the form, If X, then Y. If you want people to treat you a certain way, then treat them in the same way. Of course, that has rather incongruous results. "If you want someone to do surgery to you, you should do surgery to them." Of course, few of us are qualified to do that, nor would there be many medical doctors who would agree to such an arrangement. Categorical statements, now, are unconditional and universal. It is a unqualified answer to a question, that does not change. A good analogy might be drawn to a mathematical questions. If one were to ask, what is the sum of the interior angles of a triangle, the answer is always the same, 180 degrees. That is similar to the categorical statement. "hypothetical imperatives are commands of reasons. they command us to do whatever we need to do in order to get what we care about. and tell us how to achieve goals" 167 "whereas categorical statements or imperaritives... these are rational requirements that do not depend on what we care about." 168 Online notes: Hypothetical imperatives tell you what to do in order to achieve a particular goal: "If you want to have enough money to buy a new phone, then get a job"; "If you don't want to go to prison, then don't steal cars". Hypothetical imperatives only apply to people who want to achieve the goal to which they refer. If I don't care about having enough money for a new phone, then "If you want to have enough money to buy a new phone, then get a job" doesn't apply to me; it gives me no reason to get a job. If I don't mind going to prison, then "If you don't want to go to prison, then don't steal cars" doesn't apply to me; it gives me no reason not to steal cars. Morality, according to Kant, isn't like this. Morality doesn't tell us what to do on the assumption that we want to achieve a particular goal, e.g. staying out of prison, or being well-liked. Moral behaviour isn't about staying out of prison, or being well-liked. Morality consists of categorical imperatives. Categorical imperatives, unlike hypothetical imperatives, tell us what to do irrespective of our desires. Morality doesn't say "If you want to stay out of prison, then don't steal cars"; it says "Don't steal cars!" We ought not to steal cars whether we want to stay out of prison or not.

what are the types of deception for Mappes? G

II. Deception & Sexual Morality --The coercion and deception rules help us define what is immoral about many sexual relationships. But if this were the end, it would be a very easy story to tell. Unfortunately, it is not. 'Use Rule' explained the moral wrongness of sexual interaction in cases of: Pedophilia; date rape; A lying to B about marital status; B lying to A about having a disease; etc. Lying is not the only form of deception. --Deception by withholding information Online notes: Deception (All deception is intentional.) a. Lying or misrepresentation: stating what is not the case or making a gesture that conveys such a statement (e.g., saying one is single when one is not, saying one has been recently checked for STD's and is clean, when this is not true) b. Withholding relevant information (=failure to disclose)

what are the types of coercion, for Mappes? G

III. Coercion and Sexual Morality Most immoral form of coercion is the use of physical force, as in rape 'occurent' and 'dispositional' coercion Dispositional coercion takes form of threats to violence, reputation, family We also must consider coercion, and you guessed it, it is not as easy as it sounds either. Dispositional coercion can take the form of physical force, or it can be situational in nature—things like blackmail, for instance. Mappes' four cases: 1 Mr Employee and 2 Ms Debtor 3 Mr Theatergoer and 4 Mr Jetset 1 and 2 attempt to use someone for sex 3 and 4, Mappes says, do not Mappes gives four instances, two of which are coercive—one an employee not receiving an earned promotion without sex, one a person not receiving money she was owed. The other two are not—for the people are upfront about their offer coming with "strings." Online notes: Coercion a. Occurrent coercion: involves the direct use of physical force (e.g., forcible rape) b. Dispositional coercion: normally involves the threat of harm (but coercive offers too seem to be cases of dispositional coercion) i. Uncontroversial cases: some forms of rape; quid pro quo sexual harassment ii. Offers are often non-coercive (Target of offer is not worse off if he/she refuses) iii. Note: The fact that A has an intense desire for something B can offer A in return for sex does not make the transaction coercive. Key idea: WANT (The case of Starlet and Moviemogul.) c. Coercive Offer: Exploitation of economically vulnerable adults. (The case of Mr. Troubled and Ms. Opportunistic). Key idea: NEED.

what are problems with passive deception? G

Passive Deception: "If A has good reason to believe that B would refuse to consent to sexual interaction should B become aware of certain factual information, and if A withholds disclosure of this information in order to enhance the possibility of gaining B's consent, then, if B does consent, A sexually uses B via deception." (p4) Example: Mr A meets Ms B, who is the sister of Ms C....... Perhaps a more insidious violation of VIC is passive deception—lying by omission. It is just as deceptive as active deception. Note the intent that is necessary for passive deception to occur. Passive deception is having to tell EVERYTHING, but it is telling everything PERTINENT to the other party making an informed decision. Is Mappes' rule about 'passive deception' true? --Passive Deception rule is too strong Questions remain This is even more prominent in medical ethics. The question remains, however, about what constitutes passive deception. This is a pertinent question in medical ethics as well, and I want to take a bit of a digression at this point to talk about it. Suppose you go to the Doctor, let's say about a sore foot. He examines it, and assesses that you have a mild case of plantar fasciitis. He recommends that you do some exercises and take Motrin for pain as needed. Now, suppose he does not tell you that in .1 of 1% of the cases, that it is not plantar fasciitis, but instead a small tumor that is growing on a nerve, and is probably malignant. Suppose you go home and do the therapy, but over a period of time it does not get better. Now, did the Dr violate your VIC by being passively deceptive in not telling you ALL the possible options of what might be wrong with your foot? Think of what is now a 20-30 minute appointment now taking an hour, possibly more. How remote a possibility must the Dr share in order NOT to be violating VIC by being passively deceptive.

what is the imperfect and perfect duties? G

Perfect duties are those actions done for the right motive—duty alone. Imperfect duties are those actions that would be perfect, if performed with the right motive. Kant makes an interesting distinction that is necessary for his moral theory to make sense. Many times people do good things, but for less that universalizable motives. Does that mean they are immoral? Kant says, no, for there are perfect duties, those done with pure motives, and imperfect duties, those done with impure motives. Imagine this scenario. I go down to work at the soup kitchen, because there is this really attractive young woman who works there, and I would really like to go out with her. So, I keep going to help at the soup kitchen. Is that a good thing? Surely it is, but is it an imperfect duty. A perfect duty would be going to help because it the result of consideration using the CI, and thus performing one's duty. It would be helping at the soup kitchen because helping others is one's duty. Now, there is a certain attraction to many in making this distinction. Imagine if the beauty I want to date moves away and can no longer help at the soup kitchen. If my motive for helping is to hang out with her, do I now keep helping, or have I lost my motivation? Emotions neglected Perfect and Imperfect duties (p. 286) Online notes: Perfect Duties Kant also calls these "strict or rigorous (inflexible)" duties. These are duties, such as the duty not to commit suicide and the duty not to make a lying promise, which admit of no exceptions. (It is not okay to make lying promises as long as you don't do it much.) Imperfect Duties Kant also calls these "laxer (meritorious)" duties. These are duties, such as the duty to help people in need, which do admit of exceptions. They are still duties, but you have some choice about how to fulfill them. (You don't have to give all your money to every charity; your inclinations can enter into which charities you choose to give to.)

—Prima Facie Duties G

Prima facie is a Latin phrase, literally 'first face', that means 'at a glance' or 'when first viewed' However, Ross does not use that phrase in that way. In fact, his prima facie are not really that at all ...what I am speaking of is an objective fact involved in the nature of the situation, or more strictly in an element or its nature, though not, as duty proper does, arising from its whole nature." And it is not really a duty It is instead something 'related in a special way to a duty. what are they?? They are not arbitrarily chose, but instead, "rest on a definite circumstance which cannot seriously be held to be without moral significance. There are 'duties based on previous acts'—promise-keeping and reparation for wrongs committed Duties based on previous acts of others—gratitude Duties based on equitable distribution of happiness—justice Duties based on the benefit of others—benefiscence Duties based on our own worth—self-improvement Duties based on the need for a more stringent character And why are these things 'duties' and not other things? They are SELF-EVIDENT (that means they are obvious, so that further proof is not necessary) What Ross means by that is that they are discovered by experience, much like math is learned. You learn that the square of the sides equals the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle, and you have no other proof. The same is true of the right action in a given situation. You learn that there are times when breaking a promise is necessary to prevent a greater harm. For example, if one's child was taken to the hospital, I might not meet someone for lunch. There is no other proof needed that in such a situation, breaking a promise is permissible. They are: "...an excellent, nonabsolute, permanent reason to do (or refrain from) something..." Ross lists seven Fidelity (keeping promises Reparations (correcting harms) Gratitude Justice Beneficence Self-improvement Nonmaleficence (preventing harm to others) These rules only present 1. A consistent, straightforward rule that ceteris parabis benefits everyone 2. These rules may conflict at times 3. THE ONLY CONSTANT MORAL CONSIDERATION IS BENEFITING OTHERS

—Rawl's original position and the veil of ignorance— G

Rawls's Veil of Ignorance test A worry: Rawl's solution says that all ideally rational agents behind the veil of ignorance will agree about many issues, that these issues will be the Social Contract, and that all issues they don't agree on won't be a part of the contract But if too many issues aren't agreed upon, and so aren't a part of the contract, this could be bad Online notes: The original position is a central feature of John Rawls's social contract account of justice, "justice as fairness," set forth in A Theory of Justice (TJ). It is designed to be a fair and impartial point of view that is to be adopted in our reasoning about fundamental principles of justice. In taking up this point of view, we are to imagine ourselves in the position of free and equal persons who jointly agree upon and commit themselves to principles of social and political justice. The main distinguishing feature of the original position is "the veil of ignorance": to insure impartiality of judgment, the parties are deprived of all knowledge of their personal characteristics and social and historical circumstances. They do know of certain fundamental interests they all have, plus general facts about psychology, economics, biology, and other social and natural sciences. The parties in the original position are presented with a list of the main conceptions of justice drawn from the tradition of social and political philosophy, and are assigned the task of choosing from among these alternatives the conception of justice that best advances their interests in establishing conditions that enable them to effectively pursue their final ends and fundamental interests. Rawls contends that the most rational choice for the parties in the original position are two principles of justice: The first guarantees the equal basic rights and liberties needed to secure the fundamental interests of free and equal citizens and to pursue a wide range of conceptions of the good. The second principle provides fair equality of educational and employment opportunities enabling all to fairly compete for powers and positions of office; and it secures for all a guaranteed minimum of all-purpose means (including income and wealth) individuals need to pursue their interests and to maintain their self-respect as free and equal persons. 214

Function argument G

What is the good human? The good sculptor is the sculptor who does his craft well. The good knife? The good Ipod online: "Eudaimonia" is an Aristotelian term loosely (and inadequately) translated as happiness. To understand its role in virtue ethics we look to Aristotle's function argument. Aristotle recognizes that actions are not pointless because they have an aim. Every action aims at some good. For example, the doctor's vaccination of the baby aims at the baby's health, the English tennis player Tim Henman works on his serve so that he can win Wimbledon, and so on. Furthermore, some things are done for their own sake (ends in themselves) and some things are done for the sake of other things (means to other ends). Aristotle claims that all the things that are ends in themselves also contribute to a wider end, an end that is the greatest good of all. That good is eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is happiness, contentment, and fulfillment; it's the name of the best kind of life, which is an end in itself and a means to live and fare well. Aristotle's Virtue Ethics Function Argument Aristotle's argument from the Nichomachean Ethics, as I see it, runs as follows: 1) The good of anything that has a function resides in its function. (Explicit Assumption) 2) A thing's function is peculiar to itself. (Explicit Assumption) 3) Reason is peculiar to humans. (Explicit Assumption) 4) The activity of reason is the human function. (Explicit Inference from 2&3) 5) The good of a human resides in the activity of reason. (Implicit Inference from 1&4) 6) A 'human' and a 'good human' both have the same function. (Explicit Assumption) 7) If we deem a thing as 'good,' it performs its function in accordance with virtue. (Explicit Assumption) Conclusion) Therefore, the human good, namely happiness, is the activity of reason in accordance with virtue.(Explicit Inference from 5,6,&7) Is this argument flawed? To me, it seems that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, mainly because he assumes that being a good human is the human good. I'm not sure how he can make this jump without adding an ad hoc premise before the conclusion, stating something similar to the following: 8) If something is predicated as good, then it has achieved its good. When it comes to ethics, I find myself adhering to virtue theory. If I am not mistaken, this argument is the foundation of Aristotle's virtue ethics. Is his theory irreparably flawed because the theory's founding argument is flawed?

—Do prima facie duties lead to skepticism? G

Where do the rules come from? Part 1 Skepticism—otherwise known as "I dunno!" The biggest issue is that we can give reasons, but they become regressive Why is it wrong to steal? Because it hurts others. Why is hurting others wrong? Because then they are apt to retaliate. Why would they retaliate......... Online:W.D. Ross and prima facie duties In his account of what makes right acts right Ross arrives at the notion of prima facie duty and, as we shall see in subsequent postings, this account is one that has been taken by some recent authors to be worth building in to a revised description of some aspects of Kant's moral theory. Because it has been so adapted it is worth exploring in this posting exactly the motivations for Ross' introduction of it and giving a careful characterisation of the view of such duties that he explicitly presents. The discussion of these duties occurs early in the second chapter of The Right and the Good. Ross has been expressing dissatisfaction with utilitarianism and its commitment to viewing production of amounts of good as the basis for what makes right acts right (which has been rendered in recent treatments as making the good prior to the right). In opposing this position Ross refers to a "plain man" making a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, a situation that in this case is one that Ross takes to involve no thought of consequences. However, whilst this seems like a simple and direct opposition to the utilitarian position Ross in fact concedes a point to the utilitarian enquiry because he admits that circumstances can so conspire that fulfilling a promise is something that can have very adverse consequences such that we judge it right not to do this. Hence, whilst fulfilment of the promise might well be performed for reasons that have no reference to consequences the action of non-fulfilment of the promise is one that arises in an account in which consequences are taken account of. Now, examples follow this statement that help to clarify it such as the point that the promise might concern something relatively trivial and non-fulfilment of it might be due to attending to victims of an accident. However, the example is clearly not the real point since its salient characteristic has already been described by including references to consequences so Ross' account appears to have become consequence-sensitive. This doesn't entail for him, though, that the reason for such sensitivity is due to a commitment to bringing about more good in the world. If this is not the reason then there can be a basis for consequence-sensitivity that does not lead one to embrace consequentialism. It is when considering this point that Ross first introduces the notion of prima facie duties. In the example cited we can balance the duty of fulfilling a promise against a duty of relieving distress but, and here comes the specific mention, this latter notion does not strictly speaking involve thought of a duty but instead of "things that tend to be our duty, or prima facie duties" (18n). This is defined by the notion that there can be circumstances in which something that tends to be a duty can be set against something similar and one or the other of them will, "in the circumstances", tend to be more of a duty. So the notion of prima facie is introduced as a way of speaking about consequence-sensitivity with the conception being that such sensitivity arises when there would be a conflict between two candidates for a duty to be performed which cannot both be adopted in the circumstances. Ross terms them, not unreasonably, "cases of conscience". This view is summarised neatly in the following statement:

what is the State of nature? G

Without morality, homo sapiens would remain in a state of nature (S.O.N.) Four factors create state of nature: equality of need, scarcity, equality of power, and limited altruism Competition for power, resources, & status. Hobbes considers humans that lived without any authority—in other words, no government. He calls this state the "State of Nature." It is characterized by four things—equality of need, meaning all humans have need of the same necessities, i.e., food, shelter, need to reproduce, and so on. Further there is only so much food, only so many good caves. To complicate this picture, humans are equal in their ability to meet these needs. But that, he did not mean we are equality strong, but that some are smarter, some stronger, some better coalition builders. Further, humans will work together, but only so long as that cooperation benefits me. Does this sound like any reality show we all have seen at one time? It is the premise of Survivor, and its motto, Outwit, Outplay, Outlast

—virtues as means between extremes G

online: Aristotle holds the view that moral virtues are states of character lying at the mean between extremes of excess and deficiency. Moral virtues, for Aristotle, are to be distinguished from intellectual virtues. Moral virtue has to do with feeling, choosing, and acting well. Intellectual virtue is identified as a kind of wisdom acquired by teaching. Here we are concerned only with moral virtue. In holding that moral virtues are states of character, Aristotle gives us a view of what sorts of things virtues are. But not all states of character are virtues. Many more states of character are vices. Aristotle's view that virtues lie at the mean between two extremes, sometimes called 'the doctrine of the mean', is intended to help us identify which states of character are the virtuous ones. Here I will explain Aristotle's reasons for holding that moral virtues are states of character and I will explain and illustrate how Aristotle's doctrine of the mean marks the distinction between virtuous and vicious states of character. It is taken for granted that virtues belong to the soul. Aristotle's notion of the soul is perhaps closer to our notion of the mind. His view of the soul is not a view of some non-material thing that exists independent of our bodies. On Aristotle's view, the soul has three sorts of components. These are our passions, our faculties and our states of character. Our passions are our feelings, our desires, fears, ambitions etc. Our faculties are our natural capacities for feeling and acting in the various ways that we can. Our states of character can be thought of as complex tendencies or dispositions to act and feel in certain ways under certain circumstances. Given this view of what the soul consists of, moral virtues must be identified with one of these three. Aristotle rules out the first two possibilities and is left with the view that virtues are states of character.

—conflict between virtues G

online: Following up the criticism about decision making, we might ask the virtue ethicist what they would do in the situation where there is a conflict between virtues. This would appear to put them in the same quandary as the deontologist where a conflict of duties arises. Using our mad axeman example again, is the virtue of truthfulness to have priority over the virtue of compassion? And if so, what makes us decide in favour of one virtue rather than another?

What is pluralism? G

online: In ethics, value pluralism (also known as ethical pluralism or moral pluralism) is the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other. online:Ethical pluralism is the idea that there are many theories about what is "right" and "wrong" (moral norms) which may be incompatible and/or incommensurable with your own personal moral norms.

—situational nature of virtues

online: The golden mean represents a balance between extremes, i.e. vices. For example, courage is the middle between one extreme of deficiency (cowardness) and the other extreme of excess (recklessness). A coward would be a warrior who flees from the battlefield and a reckless warrior would charge at fifty enemy soldiers. This doesn't mean that the golden mean is the exact arithmetical middle between extremes, but that the middle depends on the situation. There is no universal middle that would apply to every situation. Aristotle said, "It's easy to be angry, but to be angry at the right time, for the right reason, at the right person and in the right intensity must truly be brilliant." Because of the difficulty the balance in certain situations can represent, constant moral improvement of the character is crucial for recognizing it. This, however, doesn't imply that Aristotle upheld moral relativism because he listed certain emotions and actions (hate, envy, jealousy, theft, murder) as always wrong, regardless of the situation at hand. The golden mean applies only for virtues, not vices. In some ethical systems, however, murder can be justified in certain situations, like self-defense.

—virtue theory and character G

online: Virtue ethics (or aretaic ethics[1] /ˌærəˈteɪɪk/ from the Greek arete) emphasizes the role of one's character and the virtues that one's character embodies for determining or evaluating ethical behavior. Virtue ethics is one of the three major approaches to normative ethics, often contrasted to deontology, which emphasizes duty to rules, and consequentialism, which derives rightness or wrongness from the outcome of the act itself.[2]

—role of self-knowledge in the virtues G

online:One of the most controversial claims of Aristotelian Ethics is that "we can contemplate (theorein) our neighbors (tous pelas) better than ourselves and their actions (praxeis) better than our own".1 To be sure, it is a highly relevant statement that mirrors the importance that Aristotle grants friendship within human life. It is not a matter of chance, therefore, that the philosopher makes such an emphasis on the need of having friends.2 These, among many other things, help man to know himself. Self-knowledge, according to Aristotle, is not an accidental feature of the virtuous life but a fundamental part of it. The only way in which we can be adequately conscious of our moral virtues and flaws is to rely on friends who make us aware of the nature of our own conduct and condition. Such an apparently radical position can only be understood once the assumptions it entails are clarified. In the first place, it is clear that underneath all the Aristotelian discussion on self-knowledge lies a wider and broader analysis on the role of knowledge in human life. The importance of knowledge and self-knowledge is underlined in the Nicomachean Ethics by an argumentation that has aroused many interpretations among scholars and that has been reconstructed with a great number of variants.3 I refer in particular to a passage in which Aristotle speaks of the consciousness we have of our own existence and virtues. I quote extensively the passage due to its importance for our discussion: But if life itself is good and pleasant, (agathon kai edu) which it seems to be, from the very fact that all men desire (oregesthai) it, and particularly those who are good and blessed (epieikes kai makarious); for to such men life is most desirable, and their existence is the most blessed; and if he who sees perceives (aisthanetai) that he sees, and he who hears that he hears, and he who walks that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive (kan aisthanometh' oti aisthanometha), and if we think, that we think (kan nomen oti noumen); and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence is defined as perceiving or thinking) (to gar einai en aisthanesthai e noein); and if perceiving that one lives is one of the things that are pleasant in themselves (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is good present in oneself is pleasant) (fusei gar agathon zoe to de agathon uparxon en eauto aisthenesthai edu); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good men, because to them existence is good and pleasant (for they are pleased at the consciousness of what is in itself good) (sun-aisthenomenoi gar tou kath auto agathou edontai); and if virtuous man is to know himself, he is to his friend also (for his friend is another self) (heteros gar autos o filos estin): then as his own existence is desirable because he perceived his own goodness (aireton), and such perception is pleasant in itself (to aisthanesthai autou agathou). He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well (sunaisthenesthai ara dei kai tou filou oti estin), and this will be realized in their living together and sharing in discussion and thought (logon kai dianoias); for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place. Self-knowledge is a sufficient condition to the good life. Socrates identifies knowledge with virtue. If knowledge can be learned, so can virtue. Thus, Socrates states virtue can be taught.

—limitations of social contract in re: legal vs. moral scope ***

pages 214-215

what is the universalizability? G

reason requires universality One of the ways that the mathematical statement and the categorical statement are alike is that they are universal. In Kant's view, reason requires universality, so any determination of morality is universal, otherwise it would be a subjective, not an objective, rational, truth. That is the background of the categorical imperative. There are very few things that are good to be able to quote in this class, but ethis is definitely one of them. "An act is only only morally acceptable if and only if its maximum is universizable. " 162 Online notes:The concept of universalizability was set out by the 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant as part of his work Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. It is part of the first formulation of his categorical imperative, which states that the only morally acceptable maxims of our actions are those that could rationally be willed to be universal law. The precise meaning of universalizability is contentious, but the most common interpretation is that the categorical imperative asks whether the maxim of your action could become one that everyone could act upon in similar circumstances. If the action could be universalized (i.e., everyone could do it), then it is morally acceptable. Otherwise, it is not.

what is the lex talons problems and nathansons solutions? G

the famous lex tailbones or the eye for an eye principle is that in which is fraught with much diffulcyies and left with problems. the lex talons tells us to treat criminals as they have trated their victims. --nathsansons solutions are that to ultimately concluded to end the death penalty and claims that we express a respect for each persons inalinaleble rights by refraining from depriving a murder his life page 395