European Union Polity

What is meant by 'ever closer union'?

"Ever closer union" - an EU aim and is enshrined in the EU Treaties. "Ever closer union" in the Treaties is "among the peoples of Europe", not among the Member States. The 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community contained the objective of "ever closer union" in the following words: "Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe .....". Article 2 of the Treaty also promoted the 'spirit' of closer union in its description of the aims of the Community, ending with "closer relations between the States belonging to it".

How does the Court often approach legal problems when there is no clear-cut answer?

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Why do many scholars reject characterizing the EU as a federal system?

2. Mainstream theorizing on European integration avoided the concept of federalism because it was too normatively loaded in the EU context: the term federal was associated by most observers with a particular normative position and/or a teleology. Those who analysed the EU in federal terms were seen as favouring the creation of a European federation and/or anticipating that the process of European integration would inevitably lead to the formation of a federal United States of Europe. Encouraged scholars interested in positive analysis of the integration process instead turned to novel theoretical frameworks, such as multilevel governance. As the EU has gained more and more authority - including in areas of core state powers traditionally reserved to sovereign states - the relevance of comparative federalism to the study of the EU has become more obvious. Comparative federalism has gone mainstream in the study of the EU. Federalism provides the most useful lens to analyse the overall dynamics of European integration to nevertheless recognize that useful insights can be gained from applying the comparative federalism perspective in particular policy areas.

How and why have the EP's powers increased?

A key shift in the EU has been the increased parliamentarization of decision-making, which has primarily manifested itself in the increase in the EP's right to exercise a range of legislative powers. The parliament has become increasingly involved in areas that are traditionally intergovernmental, especially since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, so that it is now involved in nearly all policy areas. Ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) The main vehicle through which the EP expresses its preferences and shapes legislation is the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). The OLP makes the EP a genuine co-legislator with the Council: the Parliament's agreement is required before a proposal can become law. The OLP consists of three readings of legislation and introduced a formal conciliation process between the EP and Council after the second reading if the two sides cannot agree.

How is the Commission administration organized, and what are the possible implications for patterns of conflict within the Commission?

Administration The Commission administration prepares legislative, budgetary, and other policy proposals for the College of Commissioners as well as monitors implementation of EU policies after being finally adopted by the two legislative bodies: the Council and the EP. The key components of the administration are the departments or Directorates-General (DGs), which are equivalent to national government departments and which now cover almost all possible policy fields. While DG Agriculture and DG Energy reflect a sectorally structured Commission, DG Budget and DG Human Resources (personnel and administration) are organized around the functions that they perform ('horizontal services'). The Secretariat-General The Secretariat-General is an important horizontal service. As the permanent office of the Commission President, it plays an important role in shaping a coherent policy profile for the Commission as a whole and has a crucial part to play in managing relationships between the Commission and other key institutions inside and outside the Union, e.g. Eurostat and the Legal service are other horizontal services. Special tasks forces or interdepartmental working groups Lastly, there are special tasks forces or interdepartmental working groups, some tasks and new policy initiatives that do not fit well into this strictly specialized hierarchical structure.

What role do national parliaments play in EU policy-making?

All legislative initatives must be submitted to the national parlaiments at the same time as to the Council and the EP for 'subsidarity control'. Within eight weeks as national chamber may send a 'reasoned opinion' to the Commission of it believes the proposal does not respect the principle of subsidarity - in other words, they consider that this matter does not need to be dealt with at EU level. If one third of the total votes (two per country) are against the initative, a 'yellow card' of warning is held to have been issued, and the Commission must review its proposal.

What is 'comitology'?

Comitology - regarding the delegated acts, the Commission is monitored by comitology committees set up by the Council. They're composed of formal representatives of national governments, although it's the Commission that calls and chairs the meetings, sets the agenda, submits the proposals, requiring discussion, and writes the protocols. Some committees are entitled to advise the Commission, others have competence to overrule the Commission's proposals under certain conditions.

Which roles do 'national' officials evoke in EU committees?

Commission officials chair expert committees and advisory groups, calling officials from member governments to participate as experts. In line with the role expectations in this case, national officials participating in such committees assign considerably less weight to their role as government representative than those attenting Council working parties.

What is the role of the Commissioners' cabinets?

Commissioner's cabinets The Commissioners' cabinets are organizationally separate from the administration of the Commission. The cabinet is composed of people trusted by the Commissioner in question, who may be hired and fired at the Commissioner's discretion. Consists of about six or seven advisors, plus several clerical staff. The cabinet pushes the Commissioner's ideas down to the departments and to edit and filter policy proposals coming up from the departments before they are referred to the Commissioner and the College. With regard to the principle of collegiality, each of the 27 cabinets covers all Commission portfolios to keep their Commissioner well-informed. The cabinets have important functions at the interface between the Commission and the outside world. They can be seen as a crucial point of access for governments, lobbyists, and other actors and institutions keen to influence the Commission. For instance, cabinets can inform the national governments about forthcoming Commission proposals that might become politically interesting from a national point of view, while at the same time acting as a conduit for information about national positions on policy initiatives under consideration in the Commission. Cabinets have often been portrayed as national enclaves. On one hand, the nationally of cabinet personnel almost directly reflected the nationally of the lead Commissioner in the past. On the other hand, since the Prodi Commission, at least three different nationalities must be represented in each cabinet and the head or the deputy head of the cabinet should be a different nationality from that of the Commissioner. In addition, at least half of the cabinet members should be recruited from within the Commission's services. Thus, the role of cabinets as the interface between national governments and the Commission is less important than it was in the past.

How do the member states coordinate the represention of 'national interests' in the EU Council negotiations?

Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), the preparatory body of the EU Council, illustrates how the Council defends national interests and is a collective decision-making process embedded in social relations and informal norms of mutual responsiveness, empathy, and self-restraint. The most critical feature of Coreper is not discernible in the treaties - namely, the intensity of the negotiations that take place to prepare the ministers' meetings. Over the years, Coreper has functioned under a fairly heavy cloak of confidentiality and insulation from domestic politics and domestic constituent pressures. This enables the level of frankness in Cooper discussions that is essential for reaching a compromise across so many different subject areas. For instance, the permanent representatives partly develop close personal relationships with one another based on mutual trust and a willingness to try to help each other, and partly always on the lookout for ways in which to reach a compromise. This exemplify the enigmatic identity of the Council: in order to succeed, they must at the same time represent a national set of interests and share a responsibility for finding collective solutions.

Why did the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference fail to adopt the institutional reforms necessary to prepare the EU for enlargement?

Commonly known as the 'Amsterdam leftovers' the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, and the possible extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council. What pushed the European Council into calling an IGC for 2000 were changes in the EU's handling of the enlargement process, more specifically the Commission published Agenda 2000 - its blueprint for enlargement. Opening the possibility of large-scale enlargement made the need to address the Amsterdam leftovers more urgent, thus the IGC was called. The 2000 IGC opened in February 2000 with a limited agenda. Most member states preferred to focus on the Amsterdam leftovers. Others, as well as the Prodi Commission and most MEPs, favoured a broader agenda. Strong support was voiced for a reorganizaiton of the treaties and the integration of the WEU into the EU as a step towards a common defence policy. A Commission report reminded the member states that it was incumbent on them to ensure that the IGC reformed the EU with the goal of European integration. Such calls were initially overlooked by the IGC. Certain member states were beginning to think more openly about the future of the EU. Negotiations were taking place against a backdrop of speeches from Germany ('a European federation') and France ('European constitution'). Many of the proposals were too ambitious for the IGC, in which progress was already proving to be slow, not least due to major differences on how best to deal with the Amsterdam leftovers and France holding the Presidency.

What advantages, if any, can be gained by analysing the EU as a federal system?

Compared to other theories of integration, the federalism perspective on the EU offers two main advantages: 1. Treating the EU as a federal polity helps EU scholars overcome the so-called 'n=1' problem: perspectives that treat the EU as one-of-a-kind instance of multilevel, supranational governance face an inherent limitation: with only one case to work with, these the approaches offer no basis for comparative empirical assessment of their theoretical claims about the EU. The federalism perspective opens up scholars to a range of relevant comparative cases that provide analytic leverage and insight on the EU. 2. Understanding the EU through a federal lens helps EU studies avoid parochialism: the assumption that the EU is a sui generis polity has led most scholars to rely on theories specific to the process of European integration. Applying theories of federalism enables scholars of the EU to draw on and contribute to a well-established literature in comparative politics, helping connect their findings about the EU to broader academic debates. To sum up, it encourages comparative federalism. The literature on federalism provides a range of theories that can help explain both the overall dynamics of European integration and developments in specific policy areas.

How does neofunctionalism help explain the current economic and financial crisis in Europe?

Cultivated Spillover The Commission, the EP and the European Central Bank shared a clear preference for substantial action towards further integration. The Commission sought to exploit the opportunity through proposals that would reinforce its authority in fiscal, budgetary, and banking arenas, e.g. the resulting regime of economic and financial governance. The EP made sure that the ESM and the Fiscal Compact were subjected to revisions. The ECB reacted with standard and non-standard monetary policy measures, e.g. the rapid reduction of its key interest rates: LTROs, OMT, SMP. To sum up, the above supranational institutions (Commission, EP and ECB) exploited the crisis and the substantial dysfunctions of the EMU system, it revealed to push for more integration, strengthened their involvement in the emerging economic and financial regimes.

What characterises EU agency networks, and what are their tasks?

EU agency networks There are now more than 30 such administrative bodies across the EU, employing about 5,000 officials. Although they are all located outside Brussels, they are still EU-level agencies, meaning that their activities cover all member states. While member states might agree in general that more even application of EU legislation across countries is desirable, they may sometimes be hesitant to transfer more power to the Commission. A possible compromise was to establish these EU-level executive bodies outside the Commission - bodies that were planned to be under considerable member state control and which were at the outset, assigned mainly 'soft regulatory power'. The first constraint, however, was member state control, i.e. agencies became formally subordinated to management boards numerically dominated by government representatives. The second constraint is 'soft power', i.e. agencies should primarily deal with information exchange on 'best (implementation) practice' and the facilitation of transnational agency networks.

How well have the treaties coped with the eurozone crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic?

Eurozone crisis There was a moment during the most intense phases of the eurozone crisis when it was clear that appropriate mechanisms and formal competences were either inadequate or demonstratively absent. On one hand, there was no shortage of calls for treaty reform to provide the EU with the necessary competences and improve the institutional framework for economic governance. On the other hand, nothing came of the calls for treaty reform beyond the establishment of the ESM and Fiscal Compact. Despite the eurozone and migration crises the EU continued to function. Responses to the eurozone crises, while often at least seemingly sub-optimal and tardy, nevertheless came, and primarily because of the commitment to maintaining the EU and European integration. COVID-19 pandemic COVID-19 pandemic stretched the EU's crisis response capabilities and posed major challenges to its free movement fundamentals. Collective action has been pursued, as evidenced by the fiscal response and the coordinated approach to the procurement of vaccines, although these have not been without their tensions and problems.

Which entities take the lead in the common foreign and security policy?

External action encompasses some areas of EU exclusive competence, notably trade and international agreements, and other areas of shared competence that are managed under EU law and often through legislative procedures set out in TFEU. While the Commission represents the EU on the basis of negotiating directives from the Council, it's still the Council that concludes agreements on behalf of the EU. The Commission is also responsible for the practical management of international development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The EP has co-decision powers over framework decisions on trade policy and is to be kept informed about the state of negotiations in international agreements. For instance, the EP must give it consent to the Council before agreements are concluded. With that being said, external action covers the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including the common security and defense policy. The main actors in these policy areas are the European Council, which defines the EU's 'strategic interests and objective', and the Council that adopts decisions by unanimity that are binding on the member states.

What is a federal system of government?

Federalism is not a single theory, but a system of government about which there are many theories. Federalism is 'an institutional arrangement in which (a) public authority is divided between state governments and a central government, (b) each level of government has some issues on which it makes final decisions, and (c) a high federal court adjudicates disputes concerning federalism.

How have Council-Parliament relations changes since the 1990s?

For most of the Union's history they were very much at arm's length and mostly one-sided. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the Council merely had to consult the EP before adopting legislation and proposed EP amendments were not binding. The EP is now a co-legislator with the Council, and it's much more difficult for the latter to ignore or overrule EP amendments. Since the 1990s, with each treaty, co-decision was introduced or extended to more issue areas. The Lisbon Treaty goes further, codifying co-decision as the EU's 'ordinary legislative procedure' (OLP), rather than something exceptional (Article 289 TFEU). Under OLP rules, where the Council disagrees with EP amendments, there is a procedure known as 'conciliation' in which the two sides meet to reach a compromise on a final text. Conciliation meetings, and compromise-seeking negotiations to stave off conciliation with an 'early' (first or second reading) agreement, have dramatically intensified Council-EP relations since the mid-1990s. For example, 85% of all OLP agreements are reached without the need for conciliation. The growth of co-decision represents a new dynamic of inter-institutional networking in the EU and shows how the legislative process has evolved to become more like that of other bicameral federal political systems.

How does neofunctionalism help explain the current economic and financial crisis in Europe?

Functional Spillover The progress towards deeper economic integration that came about during the process of managing the crisis can be explained as steps taken to alleviate functional pressures arising from an incomplete architecture created in Maastricht. For instance, the monetary and exchange rate policy is an exclusive EU competence vs. fiscal policies are largely determined at the national level. We can identify three dysfunctionalities that brought about substantial integrative pressures during the crisis: 1) The creation of crisis management tools (e.g. ESM and a tighter fiscal and economic framework) sought to alleviate the functional dissonances between a stable single currency and the 'no-bailout' clause and decentralized national policies leading to public over-indebtedness. 2) The establishment of the banking union reflects steps taken to reduce the functional dissonances emanating from European financial stability and integration on the one hand, and, on the other, a banking system that was functioning under essentially national policy allowing private over-indebtedness. 3) A close correlation arose between sovereign and bank debt with European-wide financial instability implications, simultaneously interrupting the smooth transmission of monetary policy by the banking system. Functional pressures may to some extent explain the timing of change. The crisis can be seen as the result of existing, and amplifier of subsequent functional pressures. To sum up, some elements of the crisis can be attributed to the first two dysfunctionalities, and the lack of crisis management tools led to the third dissonance, whereby the support of illiquid banks to ensure financial stability became difficult for over-indebted national governments.

What can the literature on fiscal federalism tell us about the EU leaders' response to the eurozone crisis?

Given the 'federal' level budget in the EU remains tiny and incapable of supporting significant countercyclical policies in periods of recession, imposing clear, absolute balanced budget rules on member states would be economically ruinous and politically unsustainable. For example, the EU has made a series of exceptions to the rules of the Fiscal Compact over the last three years, allowing states (e.g. Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Belgium) to run higher deficits than should be allowed under the EU's fiscal rules. The EU's new regime of fiscal governance is unlikely to prove sustainable, and that it may simply be a matter of time until the eurozone is stricken by another debt crisis.

How and why have the EP's powers increased?

Holding the Commission to account The EP has always enjoyed the right to dismiss the whole Commission. The EP had no powers of appointment under the original treaties but carved them out over time using its role as an elected institution to pressurize new Commission Presidents to submit themselves to a vote of approval by the Parliament. Formal recognition of the EP's right to appoint the Commission came in the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, which gave the EP a right to veto the Commission President-designate and the whole team of Commissioners. The Treaty of Lisbon went further by requiring the Council to take into account the outcome of the elections to the EP and to consult the party leaders within the EP before nominating a candidate who is then elected by an absolute majority of all MEPs. If the MEPs reject that candidate, then the Council must propose a new one. The Parliament has successfully used its rights of appointment to force individual candidates to step aside or to push for a reorganization of individual portfolios. When it comes to scrutinizing the executive, the EP's scope is more limited. On the one hand, it can invite Commissioners, Commission officials, and Council presidency representatives to Committee meetings to explain and justify decisions. On the other hand, the main leverage that the Parliament possesses to hold the Commission to account is via its power of appointment and dismissal, and members of the Council or be held to account by their own national parliaments.

What impact does the emergence of a larger bloc of 'Eurosceptic' parties have upon the operation of the Parliament? What, if any, impact has Brexit in this regard?

In both the eight (2014-19) and ninth (2019-24) Parliamentary elections, Eurosceptic parties performed well, raising the prospect that MEPs from these groups would seek to undermine parliamentary business. The larger mainstream political groups sought to prevent this eventuality by putting in a place a cordon sanitaire, which has limited the access of Eurosceptic parties to positions of responsbility in the Parliament. However, the other political groups ignored the informal rules to allow the election of ID members to positions of responsbility. Whilst this move reduced the opportunity for Eurosceptic groups to disrupt parliamentary processes it also exemplfied behaviour that Eurosceptic parties were challenging and disenfrancshied MEPs who were democratically elected to pursue Eurosceptic policies. The rise of Eurosceptic parties underlines the challenge raised for the EP about how it should accommodate MEPs who have been democratically elected but whose mainpurpose is to undermine the effective operation of EU policy processes.

What are the commonalities and differences between early and revised versions of neofunctionalism?

In response to the events occurring in the integration process itself (and to some of the criticisms), a few neofunctionalists sought to reformulate their theory in the 1960s and early 1970s. 1) Leaves open the issue of whether actors' loyalties and identities will eventually shift to the European level. 2) Places greater emphasis on transnational exchange (and supranational institutions): cross-border transactions generate a demand for EU rules that the Union's institutions seek to supply, and observe that a supranational society emerges as business actors and other societal groups realize that one set of regional rules is preferable to the multiple (and often conflicting) sets of old national rules. Once they had tested the limits of the new supranational rules, they demand more precise rules departing further from the original intentions of member governments. - E.g.: the transfer of competences to the EU is uneven and depends on the intensity of demands for regions-level regulation in a given issue area. 3) It rejects the automaticity of spillover, refines the functional and political spillover dimensions of the concept, and conceptualizes other strategic responses. - Strategic responses (spill-around and spill-backs): points not only to endogenous tensions and contradictions inherent to regional integration (e.g. the integrated single market) but also to the importance of exogenous factors not related to regional integration as such (e.g. external shocks) as being not just as an impediment, but potentially as a spur to integration. - E.g.: the role of the CJEU in making major contributions to the assertion of EU supranationality. As regional processes take greater effect, national actors may become more receptive to changing the competencies and authority of regional institutions. - Functional and political spillover: integration is no longer viewed as an automatic and exclusively dynamic process, but rather occurs under certain conditions and is better characterized as a dialectic process. It expands the scope of functional spillover beyond mere economic linkages, and redefines the concept of political spillover to include the quality of interaction and how it impacts on cooperative norm sociali

Why do autocratic state governments sometimes persist within democratic federations? What can this tell us about the EU's response to 'democratic backsliding' in some member states?

In the EU, as in other federal polities, party politics is crucial for the survival of state-level authoritarian regimes, and party politics may - under certain conditions help to dislodge them. Where an authoritarian leader in an EU member state delivers votes to one of the EU-level party groups, his EU-level co-partisans have incentives to tolerate his democratic backsliding and shield him from EU sanctions. The stronger the autocrat's national coalition - the more effective protection he will receive. The EU will only bring serious pressure to bear on a national autocrat if he lacks powerful partisan allies at the federal level or engages in behavior so flagrant that he comes to be seen as a serious political liability for his federal partisan allies. Hungary Orbán's Fidesz party is a member of the most powerful EU-level political party (EPP). In the interest of party loyalty and of maintaining their majority in the EP, EPP leaders have proven themselves willing to tolerate Orbán's violations of democratic values. For example, leading figures in the EPP repeatedly sought to block the efforts of EU institutions to censure the Orbán regime and EPP leaders repeatedly defended Orbán and dismissed criticism of his authoritarian practices. Poland Despite the similarities in the actions taken by the PiS and Fidesz, the EU has responded more forcefully to developments in Poland. While the EU has refused to deploy the Rule of Law Framework procedure against Hungary, it quickly launched the procedure against Poland in 2016. A crucial reason why the EU has responded more forcefully to developments in Poland than to those in Hungary is that PiS enjoys less partisan political protection at the EU level than does Fidesz. Where Fidesz is protected by the powerful EPP, PiS belongs to the far, smaller, nationalist/eurosceptic party group (ECR).

How influential is the Commission within the EU policy processes?

Intergovernmentalism Intergovernmentalists believe that national governments are the real driving forces in the European project. From a liberal intergovernmentalists' point of view, they have accepted that the Commission has an important role to play. However, the authority that the Commission exercises as an agenda-setter and overseer of implementation at the national level is merely a derived and delegated authority. The Commission may facilitate intergovernmental cooperation, but it has no real power basis of its own, because the Commission's powers are decided upon and framed by the member states within treaty negotiations. The Commission appears very much as an arena permeated by national interests. On one hand, Commissioners, their personal offices ('cabinets'), as well as officials in the Commission's departments (or services), are primarily pursuing the interests of their respective national governments. On the other hand, the Commission furnishes its leaders and staff with particular interests and beliefs that rise above national concerns, and that the Commission may even be able to re-socialize participants so that they gradually come to assume supranational identities. To conclude, the Commission plays an important role in the EU polity, an agent acting on behalf of member states, thus without its own political will. Institutionalism and neo-functionalism There is ample evidence that the Commission has displayed strong leadership and, on several occasions, has even had a profound effect on the outcomes of 'history-shaping' and frame-setting intergovernmental conferences (IGCsI and European Council meetings. For instance, the Commission's role in the creation of the Single Market, Justice and Home Affairs have been transferred from the Council to the Commission, the Commission's role in economic governance, the Commission's influence on the EU's security and defense policies. Thus, from institutionalist's and neo-functionalist's perspective, the Commission has an independent impact on policy outcomes.

What is the difference between a judge on the Court of Justice and an Advocate General?

Judges The Court of Justice consists of 27 judges and eleven advocates-general. A judge on the Court of Justice is nominated per member state 'from persons whose independence is beyond doubt' (Article 19(2) TFEU). Judges nominated to the Court must possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence (Article 253 TFEU). In other words, they should have the professional status and experience that makes them eligible for appointment to the highest national court. The judges in the CJEU have the same task as judges in general, i.e. to judge in the cases submitted to them on the basis of the applicable law and the nature of the case. For each case, the Court only gives one decision and the reasons for that decision. There are no 'dissenting' views expressed by judges, and therefore not possible to 'work out' what the individual judges' views on any particular issues are. The judges are not to be regarded as representatives of the Member States, but must be completely independent in their positions. Advocates-General The Advocates-General 'assist' the Court of Justice (Article 19 TEU). There is no comparable position of Advocates-General in many legal systems of EU member states and their creation is the result of the early influence of the French legal system. The role of the Advocate General in the CJEU is to give an independent and impartial 'opinion' that is then considered by the judges when deciding the case (Article 253 TFEU). The opinion will set out the various legal questions, the legal background, and give a view on what the Court should decide and on what basis. The Advocates-General's view does not bind the Court when making its decision, but usually, the Court does arrive at the same outcome as the Advocate General.

Which are the three steps of a liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of European integration outcomes?

Liberal intergovernmentalism rests on two basic assumptions about international politics: 1) States are the critical actors in a context of international anarchy: states seek to achieve goals primarily through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, rather than through a centralized authority that makes and enforces political decisions. 2) States are purposive and at least boundedly rational: rationalism is an individualist or agency assumption: actors calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and choose the one that satisfies (or maximizes) their utility. One way to restate the states-as-actors and bounded rationality assumptions is that decisions to cooperate internationally can be explained in a three-stage framework: 1) National interests: states first define preferences. 2) Inter-state negotiations: states bargain to substantive agreements. 3) Regional institutions: states create (or adjust) institutions to commit to and secure those outcomes in the face of future political uncertainty. Each stage is distinct and each must be explained by a separate theory about preferences, bargaining and institutionalization. Cooperation, or its failure, emerges only at the end of the multi-causal sequence. To sum up, states are the critical actors in European integration. They pursue integration in order to manage globalization and mitigate policy externalities that arise among them.

Is it acceptable that many compromises over EU law are reached through informal interinstitutional negotiations?

Most EU legislative acts are agreed between representatives of the EU institutions in informal meetings known as 'trilogues'. The documents supporting these meetings are not made public while negotiations are taking place. This has led to debate as to whether this practice satisifies norms of transparency, participation and accountability, especially at first reading. On one hand, the process is opaque and secretive. Moreover, it does not seem to be a very 'parliamentary' way of acting. Discussons seem to take palce between a small number of people behind closed doors, while the plenary does no more than formally ratify the provisional agreement by a single vote. On the other hand, a reasonable balance has now been found. They argue that such meetings represent the only efficient way to manage negotiations between a 705-member Parliament and 27 member states. Negotiations cannot take place without formal mandates that can be identified by citizens, and the teams are accountable to their political principals throughout the process. The Council Presidency reports back to the member states through Coreper after each meeting and the mandate may be changed; likewise, the EP team reports back to the political groups in the committee.

How do neofunctionalists define regional integration?

Neofunctionalism offers no single authoritative definition of integration. Its practitioners have always considered it to be a process rather than an outcome or an end state. They agreed that the process involved the creation and role expansion of distinctive regional institutions. The approach has always been 'transformative', stressing change in both expectations and activities on the part of actors participating in the process. To sum up, integration is a process that involves not only the creation of regional institutions and the gradual expansion of their role, but also the transformation of participating actors' expectations and activities.

How may European crises affect EU policy-making?

On one hand, a hard core of uniform commitments around a common project (the 'internal market plus'), protected by a strong legal and institutional system, can hold things together. Around this, controlled flexibility in methods and in participation may be desirable in order to manage the pressures that arise when some member states face political or constitutional obstacles to joining new common arrangements. On the other hand, acceptance of a hard and uniform core has been challenged not only by Brexit but by the deep splits that have emerged in the enlarged EU over key aspects of the internal market, as well as by the search for common responses to the migration crisis. Brexit may foster some fresh interest among the 27 to reinforce integration, and the changing international environment may also push the EU in the direction of deeper common approaches to key issues, such as climate change and security. Although initial responses to the COVID-19 pandemic seemed to show an alarmingly low level of both agreement between EU governments and solidarity between EU peoples, by early 2021 the Recovery Plan seemed to promise a net positive impact on the 'resilience' of EU governance. Yet the public mood across the EU remains mixed and troubled.

What are the prospects for future treaty revision?

On one hand, there continue to be calls for closer European integration. The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFE) will lead to any major reform of the EU remains to be seen. On the other hand, there remains limited appetite to pursue reform, particularly given increased Euroscepticism. EU leaders continue to be cautious, and generally avoid any commitment to treaty change. For the present, the focus is now on seeking to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and deal with the significant social and economic disruption this is causing. This could lead to a reconsideration of the role of the EU and reform, as was seen in the 2010s with the eurozone crisis.

How does neofunctionalism help explain the current economic and financial crisis in Europe?

Political Spillover 1) The role of interest associations: many European-wide organized interest groups have a strong preference for further integration. In fact, specific associations have been able to influence outcomes. For instance, in the negotiations for the 'six-pack', BusinessEurope acted as a policy entrepreneur, arguing for stricter binding sanctions - both in terms of greater automatism and transfer of fines to a crisis resolution fund - even before this was taken up by the Commission or Task Force. 2) The role of the financial markets: although financial markets may be treated simply as arenas in which actors play out their individual strategies and respond to each other, a majority of authors have viewed them (mostly implicitly) as actors during the crisis. They acted, largely autonomously, both directly and indirectly to promote integration during the crisis.

What are preliminary references?

Preliminary references A preliminary reference occurs when the national court is faced with an issue of EU law it is unable to answer (Article 267 TFEU). If there is a question of interpretation or validity that only the CJEU can answer, then the Court may make a preliminary reference in terms of a question or questions to the CJEU. Since any court or tribunal in a member state may make a preliminary reference, the enlargement of the EU and the development of law and policy in a growing number of areas have contributed to the consistent growth in the number of cases referred. Some of the most important points of EU law set out by the CJEU (e.g. Cassis de Dijon and Francovich) have originated in the references from national courts, and the decisions of the Court are made publicly and published. In this regard, the relationship between the CJEU and national courts can be seen as a 'partnership', rather than a hierarchy.

What are the main inputs and outputs of the European semester?

Since the Maastricht Treaty, the member states have agreed on some common goals and guidelines in economic policy and submit their programmes and their performance to review at the EU level. This has evolved on two dimensions: 1. To ensure sound public finances and price stability: e.g. the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which provides a set of rules for the coordination of national fiscal policies in the EU. Stability programme and convergence programme. Euro area countries are obliged to submit their draft budgetary plans for comment by the Commission. 2. To achieve more positive results through cooperation, peer review, and mutual learning: e.g. Europe 2020 strategy by the European Council. A reference framework and themember states set their own national targets and submits a 'natioanl reform programme' every year. The two dimensions were brought together, commonly known as the European semester, in which the plans and performance of member states are subject to review and recommendations at EU level.

How and why did the Court establish the principles of direct effect, supremacy, and state-libaility?

Some of the most significant decisions came very early on in the history of the EU. Direct effect A dispute involving the import of chemicals from (West) Germany to the Netherlands and customs charges resulted in one of the most ground-breaking decisions of the Court regarding the case of van Gend en Loos (1962). The Court stated that the parties to the Treaty (i.e. the member states) had created a 'new legal order' in the EU and that the Treaty created rights that had 'direct effect' in the member states - every company and citizen could use EU law against the state. Therefore, EU law was characterized as something which was neither akin to national nor international law, since the latter would not have 'direct effect'. Supremacy The Court stated in the case of Costa v ENEL (1964) that EU law was supreme over provisions of national law and, in cases of conflict between the two, then EU law prevails. The Court went further in 1971 by saying that this included national constitutional law too. What is remarkable about the case is that the Treaty did not mention supremacy. Rather, the Court inferred that the intention of the drafters and signatories of the Treaty was to ensure the effectiveness of EU law via supremacy. State-liability There was nothing in the Treaty to cover the situation where an individual suffered harm due to the breach of EU law by a member state. In the case of Francovich v Italy (1991), the Court stated that Italy had failed to implement a Directive that would have given employees a minimum level of protection in case of the insolvency of the employer. In the absence of Treaty provisions, the Court of Justice established the principle of state liability for harm caused to individuals by breaches of EU law. These early decisions have set the tone for the most longstanding debate over whether the CJEU was right or justified in coming to this characterization, or whether it overstepped the mark and has allowed itself to be 'activist' in terms of creating law rather than simply interpreting and applying it.

Does Brexit necessitate further EU treaty change?

Some tidying up of the TEU and TFEU will be needed at some point to remove the 30 plus references and provisions relating to the UK now that it has left the EU. This could end up being the limit of treaty of changes for the foreseeable future.

How does LI explain state preferences on integration? Under what circumstances will these predicted preferences be more or less in line with producers or other economic groups?

Stage one: Forming national preferences The theories of national preference formation shows how state preferences can be shaped by domestic pressures and interactions, which, in turn, are often conditioned by the constraints and opportunities that derive from economic interdependence. States preferences are formed, as groups compete for the attention of government elites and these feed into inter-state negotiations. To put it in another way, national policy preferences are constrained by the interests of dominant, usually economic, groups within society, e.g. individual companies or sectors (the oil industry or powerful representative bodies). National governments represent these interests in international forums. National interests are derived from the domestic politics of the member states, not or rarely from the state's perception of its relative position in the states system - that is from geopolitical concerns. For example, Moravcsik found that the preferences of national governments regarding European integration up to 1989 mainly reflected concrete economic and regulatory interests rather than more general concerns, e.g. Cold War security or European ideals. To sum up, the issue-specific interests of powerful domestic constituents drive state preferences on European integration. Economic interests of powerful domestic constituents is the correct explanation of state preferences on integration.

How does LI explain the cause of and response to the euro crisis?

Stage three: Creating regional institutions As LI and regime theory predict, governments designed these new institutions where they were required to overcome specific collective action problems within the EMU system. These new and reformed institutions are deliberately designated to be limited in scope and power. Intergovernmental financial assistance with fixed limit on lending capacity. Supranational fiscal and economic surveillance in the reformed SGP and the Fiscal Compact. A banking union that combines supranational supervision with more intergovernmental resolution. This is because the level of commitment tends to track the underlying preferences of more solvent countries, who possess the greatest bargaining power. They have sought to strengthen the credibility of the high indebted countries' commitment to fiscal discipline, but tried to limit their own financial commitment and exposure.

How does LI explain the cause of and response to the migration crises?

Stage three: Creating regional institutions Centralized enforcement institutions play a relatively modest role in migration policy due to the universal desire of governments to maintain a measure of national autonomy. Instead, many policies are tacitly coordinated and implemented through unilateral action or ad hoc coalitions of the willing, e.g. EASO and FRONTEX.

What is the third stage in the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of European integration outcomes?

Stage three: Creating regional institutions Once states are prepared to strike a substantive agreement to coordinate policy, LI theory moves into a third stage, in which it seeks to explain the establishment and design of international institutions. This stage relies mainly on a 'regime-theoretical' ('rational' or 'neo-liberal institutionalist') account, which conceives of international institutions as instruments to cope with unintended, unforeseen, and often unwanted consequences that arise when states commit to coordinate their policies. To put it in another way, governments delegate and pool sovereignty to these institutions to secure the substantive bargains that they have made by ensuring that all parties are obliged to commit to cooperation. For example, in the EU context, the European institutions create linkages and compromises across issues on which decisions have been made under conditions of uncertainty and in instances in which non-compliance would be a temptation. To sum up, regional institutions are designed to bolster the credibility of state commitments to the negotiation outcomes. Domestic institutions can often play a critical role.

How does the role of the European Parliament in policy-making vary?

Stage two: Examination of the proposal in Council and Parliament The second stage in the adoption of a legislative act is the examination of the proposal in parallel within each of the EU's two co-legislators, the EU Council and the European Parliament. Inside the EP, one of the 20 standing committees is isually recognized as the 'committee respinsible' for the file. Within the committee, the file is given to one of the political groups. That group nominates then the rapporteur for that file. Stage three: Decision by the legislator The way in which decisions are taken depends on which kind of legislative procedure is specificed in the treaty article that is being used as the legal basis. 1. Ordinary legislative procedure: can be summed up through the following twin principles: the Council acts by qualified majority, and the EP and the Council have to agree. There are up to three readings of legislation in this procedure, meaning that there are four successive moments at which the two institutions can come to an agreement. 2. Special legislative procedures: - Consultation procedure: the Council must request, and wait for, an Opinion from the EP before acting, but that Opinion is not binding. - Unanimity: in most cases, the Council must act by unanimity, e.g. taxes. - Consent: the Council must request the EP's consent before it can adopt a legislative act, e.g. international agreements.

How does LI explain the cause of and response to the migration crises?

Stage two: Reaching a substantive bargain National preferences (relative bargaining power) in migration policy stem primarily from domestic social and political pressures to manage a particular form of issue-specific interdependence - in this case, the movement of migrants and asylum seekers - advantageously. All European governments share a primary and stable national interest in managing issue-specific social interdependence by reducing migration to levels tolerable to the prevailing domestic political consensus in their countries. While the underlying goal of controlling migration has been consistent for decades, an issue-specific exogenous shock has recently boosted public opposition to granting asylum. The primary goal of all European governments today is to limit the total number of migrants in their respective jurisdictions. A secondary goal is to cope with those who do enter. In both cases, each governments prefers that other governments pay the financial and adjustment costs of doing so. When it became clear that the front-line countries (e.g. Greece and Italy) didn't have the capacity to accommodate more migrants, intergovernmental negotiations within the EU, and between the EU and third actors proceeded. The front-line states had the most bargaining power since they could simply refuse to accept migrants reaching their territory. To avoid a legal and humanitarian embarrassment, the destination countries (e.g. Sweden and Germany) agreed on closing ports, building fences and negotiations with countries outside the EU, e.g. Turkey.

What are the sources of bargaining power and how do the affect integration outcomes?

Stage two: Reaching a substantive bargain The second stage rests on intergovernmentalist theories of inter-state relations with European integration supplied by intergovernmental bargains. This stage 'draws on general theories of bargaining and negotiation to argue that relative power among states is shaped above all by asymmetrical interdependence, which dictates the relative value of agreement to different governments' (Moravcsik). States must overcome collectively suboptimal outcomes and achieve coordination or cooperation for mutual benefit. At the same time, they must decide how the mutual gains of cooperation are distributed among the states. Bargaining power may result from many factors, but in the EU context, one critical factor is asymmetrical interdependence, that is, the uneven distribution of the benefits of a specific agreement and information about preferences and agreements play a crucial role. - Those states that are least in need of a specific agreement, relative to the status quo, are best able to threaten the others with non-cooperation, thereby compelling them to make concessions. - Those actors that possess more and better information about other actors' preferences and the workings of institutions can often manipulate outcomes to their advantage. To sum up, intergovernmental negotiations consist in hard bargaining about the distribution of the integration gains. The relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence (the main source of bargaining power) shapes the outcomes.

How does LI explain the cause of and response to the euro crisis?

Stage two: Reaching a substantive bargain These mixed motives in the euro crisis constituted a 'chicken game' characterized by hard intergovernmental bargaining and brinksmanship - in which those with lower short-term costs and risks were advantaged. The solvent countries repeatedly rejected and delayed (additional) support to the crisis countries and pushed them to make fiscal cuts up to the point at which sovereign default was imminent. The indebted countries sought to postpone painful adjustment measures and demonstrate their incapacity to counter financial market pressure until the solvent countries came to the conclusion that rescue was inevitable. Yet the basic pattern of interdependence was asymmetrical - and this, as LI predicts, proved decisive in explaining the bargaining outcomes over who had to adjust in the euro crisis. The stakes were high for all eurozone countries, yet the immediate consequences of the crisisa nd potential disintegration were significantly more severe for the highly indebted countries. Creditor countries consistently found themselves in a better position than the southern countries to impose their preferences on others. To sum up, the solvent countries (Germany and others) cooperated to provide sufficient financial assistance to debtor countries to forestall sovereign default, yet they were able to shape the terms of adjustment in line with their preferences.

To what extent can the Commission be compared to 'national' governments?

Structure The Commission, like a government, is composed of a political executive wing (the Commissioners and their cabinets) and an administrative wing (the departments and services). Initiation and formulation of policies The Commission drafts the legislation that is passed on to the two legislative bodies, the EP and the Council. In the majority of policy areas, e.g. Single Market and Justice and Home Affairs, the Commission performs an important agenda-setting role. Other actors, e.g. the European Council, the EP, national governments, and interest groups, may also take initiatives and advance policy proposals but it's generally up to the Commission to decide whether these ideas will be picked up and subsequently passed on by the legislature in the form of a formal legislative proposal. The Commission, however, does not enjoy such a privileged agenda-setting role in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since this function is primarily shaped now by the EEAS. However, the Lisbon Treaty brought the head of the EEAS closer to the Commission in the sense that the incumbent is no longer the Secretary-General of the Council, but rather a Vice-President of the Commission, and now physically located in the Commission headquarters. Implementation of EU policies In line with the functions performed by national executives, the Commission has an important role to play in the implementation of EU policies. What this means is that the Commission is responsible for the monitoring of implementation within the EU's member states. Before implementation can take place at the national or sub-national levels, it may be necessary for more detailed legislation to be agreed, commonly known as delegated legislation or implementing acts. The Commission then, in close cooperation with the member states, detail and fill in EP/Council legislation by agreeing more specific rules. Only in a few policy areas, e.g. competition policy, is the Commission responsible for implementation in the sense of handling individual cases.

Do MEPs vote according to nationality or ideology? To what extent are MEP's free from national control?

Studies of the Parliament's voting behavior show that, as a general rule, the MEPs behave ideologically: they vote with their political groups, not with their fellow nationals. Hence, while the EP is unique as a parliamentary chamber, given its multinational and multilingual composition, in practice it behaves like an ordinary parliament, organizing and voting along classic left-right ideological lines.

How does the Council system perform both legislative and executive functions in the EU?

The Council (legislative function) The legislative function of the Council system, which involves the adoption of legal acts into the EU's acquis, is fulfilled by national ministers meeting as the EU Council. The Council, despite the EP's increased decision-making power (OLP), has not altered the basic fact that the Council remains at the core of the EU's legislative process. The Council is a single legal entity but there are ten configurations organized by policy specialization. Each Council configuration manages a specialized policy sector and the participants authorized to adopt legislative acts are the national ministers from each member states who hold domestic responsibility for that sector (e.g. AGRIFISH, ENVI and ECOFIN). Each formation has its own pace and legislative agenda, with some meeting monthly (GAC) and some barely twice per year (EYCS). Each Council has its own organizational culture, including a set of informal (unwritten) rules and distinctive working habits. Under the Council we have the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) that is responsible for preparing forthcoming Council meetings and this often involves intensive discussions to pave the way for agreement by the ministers. Coreper has one EU ambassador and one deputy, whom runs the permanent representation in Brussels. Lastly, we have the working groups that are tasked with examining proposals in the early stages of negotiation. They serve as clearing house for less controversial and more technical issues as well as an early warning system for complications that need attention at the level of Coreper or the ministers.

Does the Council system resemble a hierarchy or a network?

The Council is perhaps the least documented EU institution, partly due to its inaccessibility and enigmatic appearance. It's an institutional 'chameleon' because it blurs intergovernmental and supranational organizational traits and behaviors. From an intergovernmentalist's perspective, it's a stronghold of individualistically oriented national actors who focus more or less exclusively on their own self-interests, rather than on the welfare of others or the group as a whole. Supranationals, however, argue that the national actors in the Council system act collectively, and many develop a shared sense of responsibility to produce results and reach consensual agreements. To conclude, member states' officials' engagement with the work of the European COuncil and the EU Council involves socializaiton into a collective decision-making system.

Is the Council system intergovernmental or supranational?

The Council is perhaps the least documented EU institution, partly due to its inaccessibility and enigmatic appearance. It's an institutional 'chameleon' because it blurs intergovernmental and supranational organizational traits and behaviors. From a intergovernmentalist's perspective, they have a stronghold of individualistically oriented national actors who focus more or less exclusively on their own self-interests, rather than on the welfare of others or the group as a whole. Supranationals argue that national actors in the Council system act collectively, and many develop a shared sense of responsibility to produce results and reach consensual agreements.

What is meant by the Court of Justice being an 'activist' court? Is this a justified label?

The Court has engaged in what is known as 'teleological' interpretation. The Court has looked at the broad terms in which the Treaty has been drafted in and interpreted them in light of the objectives of the Treaty. The Court's decisions can be seen not just as filling in the gaps left by the drafters of the Treaty but relying on the intentions behind them. Although the Commission is the 'motor of integration', the Court of Justice is an institution created by the Treaty to uphold the law. The 'dynamic character of the process of integration' is guided by the overall objective of creating 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' (Article 1 TEU). This explains why the Court, although acting independently, tends to favor a solution which lies on the side of more European integration, not less. For example, the Treaty allows for member states to make exceptions to free movement law in some circumstances, e.g. the protection of public health (Article 36 TFEU). The CJEU has, however, intercepted this very narrowly to avoid the temptation for member states to widen these expectations.

What was the original purpose of the Court of Justice and how has its role changed?

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was one of the original institutions created by the European Coal and Steel Community (1952). With the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Court became a fully-fledged institution of the Community. The Court was originally not assumed to play a major role in the EU's institutional framework or the development of the law at the outset of the European integration process in the 1950s. The Court's formal role has in fact changed a little since the creation of the EU in 1957. However, the Court has been vigorous in developing and applying legal principles that have enhanced its role and status. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court made a series of 'constitutional' decisions, which had a far-reaching effect and enabled the process of integration to move forward, especially when the other institutions were unable to.

How does LI explain the cause of and response to the euro crisis?

The Crisis of the Euro (2009) From a liberal intergovernmentalist's perspective, the national preferences on monetary integration reflected an interdependence-induced mix of convergent economic interests in monetary integration and conflicting distributional preferences regarding its terms. The euro crisis resulted from an exogenous shock: starting in 2008, the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression revealed internal contradictions in the system. Stage one: Forming national preferences LI predicts that the threat of common catastrophe creates strong incentives for both northern and southern countries to avoid the immediate costs of defaults. As LI predicts, this mixed-motive situation - one in which all countries had a strong joint preference for avoiding an extremely costly short-term outcome of a euro collapse, but also sought to avoid the costs of backing down and taking over the burden of adjustment - dictated the major intergovernmental coalitions of the euro crisis. On one hand, we had the southern coalition that advocated strong European financial commitment in combination with looser fiscal and financial regulation. On the other hand, we had the northern coalition that favored a limited financial commitment together with strict fiscal and financial supervision.

What function does the European Parliament serve in the EU system of governance?

The EP is the only directly elected institution. Until 1979, it was an unelected, weak, and marginalized body. The EP has gradually extended its legislative prerogatives so that under the terms of the Treaty of Lisbon it enjoys a range of powers comparable to those enjoyed by national legislatures. The extension of the EP's powers has led to a parliamentarization of the EU's political system. The EP has been an agent of deeper integration by pushing for increases in its powers, and a beneficiary of such processes as the EU has extended the range of competences upon which it legislates, and therefore upon which the EP can express its preferences. The EP has mainly three key areas of importance: 1. The legislative work of the Parliament - namely, its role in shaping EU policies and laws. 2. Its internal politics, both in relation to the organization of the chamber and the nature of cooperation and competition between the political groups. 3. The representative role of the parliament, as a link between the electorate and EU decision-making process.

How and why have the EP's powers increased?

The EP's powers fall into three key areas: 1) Enjoys considerable influence in relation to the EU Budget, 2) The right to scrutinize, appoint, and dismiss the Commission, 3) The right to amend and reject Commission proposals for legislation. These powers have expanded enormously in recent years largely as a result of the EP's proactive engagement with the process of treaty reform. Budgetary powers The first major increase in the EP's power came with the Budget Treaties of 1970 and 1975, under which the Parliament had limited powers to amend, reject, and sign off the EU budget, and be consulted on appointments to the European Court of Auditors. However, these powers were limited. The EP could request modifications to compulsory spending (largely agricultural policy), but could only insist on changes to non-compulsory spending, which comprised about 20% of the budget. To extend its budgetary prerogative, the Parliament engaged in a series of battles with the Commission and Council in the early 1980s over spending levels and the allocation of funds between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, which was resolved in 1988 by a series of inter-institutional agreements. The Treaty of Lisbon removed the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, thereby extending the EP's scope to amend the Budget across all areas. Today, the EP and Council act as a genuine bicameral budgetary authority, sharing a relationship based upon mutual respect and recognition of the need for stability and certainty when determining the EU's overall expenditure.

To what extent has the EU been characterized structurally by a complex mix of supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, and differentiated forms of integration?

The EU assumed, during its first decade, many of the characteristics of a union. For some, especially eurosceptics, it soon resembled, or was deemed to be becoming, a superstate. Yet for many, particularly supports of integration and political union, it has always been a much looser and more fluid organization than its name suggests. Its initial pillar structure - which would eventually disappear with the Treaty of Lisbon - embodied a complex mix of intergovernmental cooperation and supranational integration that brought together, in various combinations, a range of supranational institutions and the member states to further a variety of policy agendas. Adding to the complexity, and reflextive of the tensions, which persisted between member states over integration, were the various opt-outs that Denmark, and the UK introduced, notably regarding certain JHA matters and in particular Schengen, as well as the differentiated integration created by EMU and the emergence of the eurozone. Moreoever, successive rounds of treaty reform sought to facilitate a more multi-speed EU through the introduction and refinment of mechanisms for enhanced cooperation. What the various rounds of treaty reform reveal, however, is that the EU and its member states were aware of the challenges raised by its complex structure and procedures, particularly in the light of enlargement. There was, and there remains, considerable difference of opinion, e.g. ' Future of EUrope' debate and the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty (2004), Treaty of Lisbon (2007), and Brexit. To conclude, several reforms in the 2000s and the 2010s have made the EU more like the union that its name implies. However, since its establishment in 1993, it has been, and remains, a complex - indeed messy - evolving mix of supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, and differentiated forms of integration.

What can the literature on fiscal federalism tell us about the EU leaders' response to the eurozone crisis?

The EU leaders, however, chose to bail out states at risk of insolvency, and established a permanent bailout system in the form of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The EU focused on making the rules on member states deficit and debt levels stricter and more legally binding. To be eligible for potential bailouts, states meet a set of conditions, e.g. balanced budget rules and 'automatic' debt brakes. To be sure that these rules would be enforced, the EU required member states to sign a Fiscal Compact Treaty, which required them to entrench fiscal rules in domestic law where violations could be challenged before domestic courts. The approach is unlikely to work due to two reasons according to fiscal federalists: 1. As scholars of fiscal federalism have shown, in practice it is bond markets, not courts, that play a central role in enforcing fiscal rules: the EU's emphasis on legal enforceability of balanced budget rules is misguided because courts rarely enforce fiscal rules. The fiscal rules the EU has put in place in reaction to the eurozone crisis are anything but clear: what constitute a balanced budget under the terms of the Fiscal Compact is extremely vague and subject to interpretation and exceptions - making it impossible for bond markets to play their role in constraining excessive borrowing by threatening coordinated 'punishment' to discourage states from crossing fiscal red lines. 2. Bondholders will only discourage the accumulation of unsustainable debts if they do not anticipate that insolvent states would be bailed out by the federal government: the new regime of fiscal governance establishes a permanent bailout fund - ESM - which will inevitably undermine the efficacy of bond market discipline. The balanced budget rules in the Fiscal Compact are far too ambiguous to serve as a basis for enforcement by bond markets, and they are further undermined by the existence of an EU bailout fund.

How does the Council system perform both legislative and executive functions in the EU?

The European Council (executive function) The European Council has gradually come to have centralized executive-like functions as a result of increased politicization since the 1990s, and more recently, in the face of serial crises such as the eurozone crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic. The regular practice of the European Council - vetting decisions and defining 'general political directions and priorities' - now serves as a safety-valve to modulate the Union's perceived democratic deceit. The expansion of post-Maastricht policy areas - e.g. economic governance and eurozone policy coordination - has empowered the European Council as a 'new centre of political gravity' that coordinates policies and reacts to crises, e.g. economic recovery packages in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Does the Lisbon Treaty enhance the role of the European Council? If so, how?

The European Council was created in the early 1970s and was informally institutionalized by 1974. Many EU scholars credit the European Council with holding the Union together during the nearly two decades of Eurosclerosis. For instance, the European Council played a crucial role in the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), the resolution of major budgetary disputes, and launching of new intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). However, the European Council was not even mentioned in the treaties until the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). The Lisbon Treaty acknowledged the central role of the European Council by formally establishing it as an independent institution with its own permanent President.

What are the principal challenges facing the EP and how should it address them?

The European Parliament faces a key challenge, it has predicted its calls for empowerment upon its status as a democratically elected body that can bring the voice of Europe's citizens to the heart of the EU's decision-making processes, but its legitimacy is undermined by the relatively poor turnout for European elections and the increasing popularity of Eurosceptic parties. Another challenge is that the EP is the representation since the parliament is still largely white and male. The EP has argued that it can act as a corrective to the EU's democratic deficit by on the one hand, holding the executive to account and participating in policy-making, and on the other hand, if only just over half of EU citizens vote, and in doing so elect a chamber that does not represent the diversity of EU communities, not only is the legitimacy of the EP undermined, but so too is that of the wider system of EU governance. The Lisbon Treaty sought to address concerns over democratic accountability by further extending the EP's powers and by including a greater role for national parliaments in decision-making. For instance the 'yellow card system': if a third (or a quarter in relation to freedom, security, and justice) of national parliaments feel that draft legislation could be better achieved by domestic legislation, the Commission must review the act.

Why was the European Parliament created?

The European Parliament started life as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and was introduced by the founding fathers to lend some democratic legitimacy to a set of institutions dominated by the unelected High Authority and national governments. The Assembly's powers were limited to dismissing the High Authority. Under the Treaty of Rome, the Assembly became common to all three Communities (ECSC, EEC and EAEC) and was awarded the further right to be consulted on Commission proposals before they were adopted by the Council. Member states representatives were not obliged to take the Assembly's position into account. Members of the Assembly were national parliamentarians and worked part-time. This circumscribed the ability of the chamber to fulfill its limited legislative prerogatives. The Treaty of Rome included, however, the right for the Assembly to draw up proposals on elections by direct suffrage. This right was subject to unanimity in the Council and, because the member states were reluctant to support an elected Parliament, fearing a challenge to their own autonomy, the first direct elections were not held until 1979. Since those first elections, the Parliament has, as anticipated by the Council, used its status as the only directly elected EU institution to push for increases to its powers. The Parliament has exercised this strategy so effectively that today, its members are regarded as equal legislative and budgetary partners with the Council, and can scrutinize and hold the Commission to account.

How does LI explain the cause of and response to the migration crises?

The Migration Crisis (2015) Stage one: Forming national preferences From an LI perspective, this mix of outcomes follows directly from national preferences, relative bargaining power, and interstate collective action problems. The arrangements of EU migration policy that have resulted from the migration crisis institutionalize a stable interstate compromise among national preferences more cost effectively than any other feasible alternative. Governments have succeeded in achieving much of what they seek.

Did the Treaty of Nice prepare the EU adequately for enlargement?

The Treaty of Nice (2001) - the Treaty paved the way for enlargement, but for many it produced suboptimal solutions to the institutional challenges increased membership raised. - QMV was extended to nearly 40 more treaty provisions. Reaching a decision using QMV did not, though, become easier since the proportion of votes required to obtain a qualified majority remained at almost the same level as before and was actually set to increase. - A new criterion was introduced: any decision could be required to have the support of member states representing 62 per cent of the EU's total population. - Each member state would have one Commissioner. - The size of the EP was revised upward to 732 and maximum sizes were agreed for the Committee of the Regions and the European Eocnomic and Social Committee. - Reforms were introduced to the competences and organization of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. - Yellow card procedure: member states deemed to be at risk of breaching the principles on which the EU is founded. - Closer cooperation became easier to pursue, reducing the number of member states needed to start a project as well as the opportunities to block such a project. - The treaty made the EU rather than the WEU responsible for implementing the defence-related aspects of policy.

Have opt-outs and mechanisms for enhanced cooperation undermined the EU as a union?

The Treaty on the European Union (TEA) Introduced treaty-based opt-outs from certain policy areas for some member states. The TEU's provisions did not apply to the same extent to all member states, which was signficaint, because such differentiated integration had never before been enshrined in the EU's treaties. Differentiation between member states had existed, but it had always been temporary, There were fears that the Maastricht opt-outs would set a precedent leading, at worst, to an à la carte EU, with member states picking and choosing the areas in which they were willing to pursue closer integration. Such fears were initially assauged when, at the time of the 1995 enlargement, the EU refused to consider any permanent exemptions or opt-outs from the existing acquis communautaire for the new member states. Austria, Finland, and Sweden had to accept all of the obligations of membership, including those concerning social policy, EMU, and the CFSP, the latter being signficant because each of the three countries was still notionally neutral.

What are the main differences between the EU's competences?

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) lists the categories of EU competences - that is, the powers that have been given to the EU - and indicates the policy areas in which these apply. There are mainly three types of competences: 1. Exclusive competences: only the EU may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. - E.g.: customs union, common commercial policy, competition (for internal market), monetary policy (euro area), international agreements. 2. Shared competences: member states shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union is not exercising its competence. - E.g.: internal market, social policy, economic, social, and territorial cohesion, agriculture and fisheries. 3. Supporting, coordinating or supplementary competences: the union may act without superseeing member states' competences. Harmonization of national laws and regulations is excluded. - E.g.: culture, tourism, education... 4. Policy coordination: - E.g.: economic policy, employment policy, some social policy.

Does the Court always pursue solutions which further European integration?

The assumption that the Court of Justice always favors a solution which results in more integration and powers of the Union continues to be debated. On one hand, one area where the Court has been active is in recognizing rights in the Treaty relating to free movement of persons and EU citizenship. The main example is the case of Cassis de Dijon, which shows the extent to which the Court removed barriers to free movement of goods and gave the completion of the Single Market in the 1980s a boost. On the other hand, more recent cases have cast doubt on whether the court is 'hard-wired' to always maximize the effect of EU law. In the case of Dano Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, the Court emphasized that member states do have the right to require individuals to have sufficient resources to live in that state, and that the Treaty free movement rights cannot be used 'solely in order to obtain another member state's social assistance' - a move away from the previous line of case law since it focuses on the entitlement of member states to impose restrictions rather than expanding the rights on the basis of Treaty goals and the Charter of Fundamental rights.

Why do autocratic state governments sometimes persist within democratic federations? What can this tell us about the EU's response to 'democratic backsliding' in some member states?

The democratic backsliding constitutes a profound crisis of values for the EU, which claims to be based on core values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. While the emergence of semi-authoritarian member state governments within the EU seems to have taken many observers by surprise, the comparative federalism literature suggests that we should not be surprised in the least. This comparative federalism literature demonstrates that it is common for authoritarian enclaves ('electoral authoritarianism', 'illiberal democracies' and 'competitive authoritarianism') to persist at the state level within regimes that are democratic at the federal level - typically referred to as 'subnational authoritarianism'. The comparative politics literature on state-level authoritarianism in federal democracies explains both why such regimes persist and the conditions under which federal actors may intervene to promote democratization: 1. The key to the persistence of state-level authoritarian regimes lies in the realm of party politics: if authoritarian state leaders deliver votes to a governing party or partisan coalition at the federal level,their co-partisans at the federal level may be willing to protect them against any federal intervention. Leaders at the federal level may put partisanship above democratic principles and overlook the authoritarian nature of rule in member states so long as the local authoritarian delivers needed votes to their coalition at the federal level. 2. Fiscal dynamics within multilevel polities may help perpetuate state-level authoritarianism: states with less developed economies will tend to be major recipients of federal transfers. Where authoritarian enclaves are located in such less developed states, these local rentier authoritarian regimes will be able to rely substantially on federal funds to finance their regime. 3. Federal partisan politics may help protect local authoritarians under some conditions, under specific conditions partisan politics may finally help oust them.

Why was supranational integration limited to 'the Six' in the 1950s and 1960s?

The establishment of the EU should not be seen as a radical and wholly new initiative of post-Cold War European politics since it was formally established only on 1 November 1993. Instead, it should be seen as a further stage in a process of ever closer integration between an increasing number of states. 'The Six' (Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) established new forms of supranational integration in a concerted effort to promote peaceful reconciliation and coexistence, economic growth and security, and social development. There has been two important and related developments. Firstly, the emergence of the European Communities (ECSC, the EEC, and the EAEC) created by 'the Six' in the 1950s and their evolution during subsequent decades. They established the supranational institutions, moving towards common policies and raising their ambitions for further economic and political integration. However, there was far from universal support for the activities of the Six. The states were divided over what forms and in what areas cooperation and integration should take place. Secondly, we have the establishment and early development of the EU in the 1990s. The idea of the European Union was rekindled in the 1980s with the Single European Act (1986) and the Single Market project acting as catalysts for a new era of dynamic Communities-based integration.

How well have these consolidated treaties bedded down?

The first question is whether the Treaty of Lisbon succeeded in its intention of increasing the democratic legitimacy and the efficiency of the EU? On one hand, there were clear democratic improvements giving more powers to national parliaments and the EP, introducing the citizen's initiative, and commitment to the ECHR and the EU's own Charter. The expansion of the Courts' jurisdiction can also be seen as reinforcing the legal and democratic nature of the EU. On the other hand, the criticisms made of it, its effects have not been revolutionary.

To what extent has European integration been an entirely elite-led process?

The history of European integration is a history of competing preferences and ambitions, primarily of states and their leaders but also of institutions and other elite actors. The early years of integration, with its multiplicity of organizations and efforts to establish more reflected the tensions that existed between supporters of bold new supranational forms of political organization and those limiting their perspectives to looser, less ambitious forms of intergovernmental cooperation. For instance, the 'Convention on the Future of Europe' was established to debate options and to make proposals. An active and open forum that published all its paper on the Iiternet and its plenary sessions were opened to the public. Yet the Convention failed to attract media or popular attention and was perceived as an elite-driven process. Essentially an elite-driven project, the question of 'more EU-rope' has become increasingly politicized as substantial levels of popular EUroscepticism and contention around EU policies and action continue to show. Not only must any substantial treatyr eform process now involve a convention, but the formal commitment of EU leaders and the EU institutions to greater transparency and citizen engagement mean that voters simply cannot be marginalized.

What can the literature on fiscal federalism tell us about the EU leaders' response to the eurozone crisis?

The literature can shed light on regarding two crucial questions about the EU's response to the crisis: 1. After the outbreak of the eurozone crisis, why did EU leaders demand that eurozone members sign on to strict new balanced budget rules and ask national and European courts to enforce them? 2. Does the literature on comparative fiscal federalism suggest this attempt to judicialize fiscal discipline through the Fiscal Compact will actually work? The eurozone faced a moral hazard problem that is common to any federal system that shares a common currency and a single market but in which member states control substantial aspects of fiscal policy. The EU had to establish a sustainable system to discourage state governments from building up unsustainable debt loads that could pose risks for the entire financial system. - If a state becomes over-indebted and faces default - the federal government may be pressured to provide a bailout in order to forestall negative spillover consequences for other states and for the system as a whole. - If the federal government is perceived as a guaranteeing the solvency of states, a situation of moral hazard arises - state governments may be tempted to borrow excessively or to expose themselves to excessive private sector risk through lax regulation anticipating that they will be bailed out by the federal government if necessary. The experience of federal polities suggests that there are generally two approaches to addressing this dilemma. The federal level can establish a credible 'no bailout' commitment by allowing one or more states to default. The federal system can impose legal restrictions on state borrowing. This was addressed by the Maastricht treaty with the 'no bailout principle', that is, prohibiting Brussels or other member states from bailing out any state. Moreover, the treaty set limits on states' annual deficits and their accumulated debt and established an excessive deficit procedure to punish violations.

How important is the 'national' background of Commissioners in shaping their preferences and decisions?

The political leadership of the Commission always has a fixed mix of nationals. The Commission tends to bring people into the College who have the same political background as the national government nominating them. Over time, nominations to College posts have increasingly included people with impressive political experience and it is now quite usual to see former prominent national ministers in the list of nominees. Such a recruitment pattern obviously furnishes the College with political capital, although not in a strict party-political sense. A coherent party platform for the College is almost unthinkable under the current appointment procedure; instead, Commissioners' nationality is likely to be a more relevant background factor to take into account in explaining their conduct. It should not be concluded from this, however, that Commissioners act primarily as agents of the national government that nominated them. In fact, a Commissioner's portfolio, or DG affiliation, may be more important in explaining his or her behaviour with regard to a particular decision. Like national ministers, Commissioners have multiple and often conflicting role expectations imposed upon them: at one and the same time, they are supposed to feel some allegiance, albeit informal, to the geographical area from which they originate, to champion Commission and EU interests, to advance their own portfolio, and to assume a party-political role. Balancing these diverse pressures is not always an easy task.

How and why did the EU move towards adopting the Treaty of Lisbon?

The pursuit of a reform in the second half of the decade occurred against the backdrop of the CT's decisive rejection in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, its rapid abandonment in a number of other member states, and increasing evidence of rising Eurosceptiscsm and concerns about the popular legitimacy of the EU. Many European decision-makers and commentators believed that enlarging the EU needed substantial institutional reform if it was to develop effectively. There's was a constitutional crisis following the CT. Germany was making preparations for its Council presidency during the first half of 2007, and Merkel thought CT's reforms were absolutely necessary for the EU. A unprecedently detailed IGC mandate envisioning the adoption of the bulk of the CT's reforms in a new amending treaty was produced. The Portuguese Council presidency made completing the negotiations on a new amending treaty its overriding objective. Following legal refinements to the text, a replacement to the CT was signed in Lisbon.

What role does the rotating presidency play in EU governance?

The rotating presidency The Council presidency is held by member states for a six-month period. The presidency is responsible for planning, scheduling, and chairing meetings of the ministers, permanent representatives, and working group experts. The Lisbon Treaty removes a number of roles from the rotating presidency with the creation on 'permanent' leadership jobs (e.g. European Council President and chairs for the Eurogrup and FAC). The value of the rotating presidency lies in how it acts as a power equalizer between big and small states. The rotation is set to give variation between big and small, and newer and older member states. Holding the rotating chair carries formidable logistical duties, and planning for the presidency typically begins 18 months prior to its date in coordination with the other two member states in the presidency trio. The presidency is highly coveted, since the member state holding the presidency not only organizes meetings, but also helps to set the agenda and to find solutions by brokering deals, suggesting compromises, and drafting conclusions. This creates a stakeholder interest in overseeing a raft of successful legislative outcomes during the six-month rotation, which participants claim carry significant reputation and status concerns. The rotating presidency is therefore a great example of the Council's enigmatic identity, since the country holding that position must simultaneously work to advance collective European solutions as well as its own national interest. Member states that handle this balancing act with a deft touch can accumulate a great deal of political capital and respect.

What impact has the empowerment of the European Parliament had upon inter- and intra-institutional relations?

The shift to informal decision-making has enhanced the inter-institutional relationship between the Council and Parliament as they have become genuine co-legislators. On the one hand, this informality facilitates agreement and the building of inter-institutional trust. On the other hand, it involves a trade-off between efficiency and transparency. For instance, small groups meeting behind closed doors with limited opportunity for input from the relevant EP committee or the wider plenary, which undermines the EP's claim to be the standard bearer for democracy in the EU. To sum up, the introduction of OLP has ushered in a more cooperative set of working arrangements between the Council and EP. However, its extension to new, traditionally intergovernmental policy areas has seen a series of disputes emerge between the two co-legislators over fisheries and the Council has struggled to accommodate the EP's greater inclusion in agricultural policy.

What impact did the Treaty of Amsterdam have on the pillar structure of the EU?

The shortcomings of the EU's structures were highlighted in reports produced by the Council, Commission, and EP in 1995. They all agreed that the pillar structure was not functioning well. For instance, pillar III (intergovernmental) had a significant constraint on the development of JHA cooperation. Pillar II (intergovernmental) showed the EU's ineffective foreign policy response to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Size and composition of the institutions had to be reviewed and WMV would have to be extended to avoid decision-making paralysis. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) - established an 'area of freedom, security and justice' N(AFSJ) to the EU's objectives and shifted much of JHA activity from Pillar III into Pillar I. - Introduced mechanisms for 'closer cooperation', Bolstering the EC's social policy competences, e.g. an employment policy chapter. - Enhanced EC competences concerning consumer and environmental protection. - Greater efforts to promote transparency and subsidiarity. - Reassertion that EU citizenship does not undermine national citizenship. - High Representative in order to improve the consistency of EU action by involving the European COuncil more. On one hand, the Treaty of Amsterdam failed to prepare the EU institutionally for enlargement. On the other hand, the treaty did not fail regarding institutional reform since the size of the EP was capped at 700 members, and use of the assent and co-decision procedures was extended, to enhance the EP's legislative role.

What are the different types of spillover?

The term spillover was first applied to as a sort of shorthand for describing the occurrence of (further) integration, and to explain the driving force and inherent logic of integration. There are mainly three types of spillover: 1) Functional spillover: provides the impetus for further integration. It happens because functional problems in some sectors are so interdependent that they can only be resolved by integrating yet more tasks. 2) Political spillover: when the initiative and pressure comes predominantly from national (governmental and non-governmental) elites. 3) Cultivated spillover: additional impetus for further integration from those employed by supranational institutions (e.g. the CJEU and the Commission).

What were the main features of the conslidated TEU and TFEU?

The treaty of Lisbon was an amending treaty. With its entry into force in 2009, it altered the existing TEU and TEC and then, in effect, disappeared from view. Together, the amended TEU and TFEU provide for a simplified and somewhat more efficient EU. Matters into line with common practice The Community disappeared, and the EU became the sole structure of integration. Apart from the CFSP, everything now functions according to the basic Community method. Member states The EU is a body based on powers conferred by the member states, enshrined in the treaties, and subject to subsidiarity and proportionality. EU policies EU policies were not greatly expanded by the Treaty of Lisbon. Energy, tourism, and civil protection were written more clearly into the TFEU, while space, humanitarian aid, sport, and administrative operation were added for the first time. The main change is JHA that is no longer subject to special, largely intergovernmental arrangement, but governed by normal EU procedures. Decision-making Co-decision is the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) and established it as the default legislative process and extended to some 50 new areas. Member states have retained unanimity or emergency brakes in areas, such as tax harmonization, the CFSP, criminal matters and social security. Institutional arrangements The EP received extra powers, notably over the budget and treaty change and virtual veto on the appointment of the Commission President. The European Council emerged strengthened and formalized as an 'institution' with a new role in external relations and overall strategy, which points to the continuing influence of member states. The Commission gained an expanded role in the area of freedom, security, and justice and in foreign affairs. Values and rights Values were expanded and given more prominens, while rights were given a dual boost. The CFR was given legal status. The treaty tried to make the EU more democratic with a separate title in the TEU. National parliaments gained new rights to query proposed EU legislation on subsidiarity grounds.

Do big states outweigh smaller states in power resources and influence in the Council system?

The value of the rotating presidency lies in how it acts as a power equalizer between big and small states. The rotation is set to give variation between big and small, and newer and older member states.

How has the EU's treaty base changed since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force?

The years since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force have seen only minor adjustments to the EU's treaty base. In line with expectations, and in a context of popular apathy towards the EU, increasing populism, and Euroscepticism, there has been very little enthusiasm for further major treaty reform over the last decade.

What are the key assumptions of neofunctionalism?

There are five assumptions encapsulate the driving forces behind its progress: 1) Its practioners assume self-interested and (imperfectly) rational actors who are able to learn and change their preferences, regarding both their interests and their strategies. Actors are (imperfectly) rational and self-interested, but are able to learn and change preferences over strategies. 2) Once established, regional institutions can acquire a degree of policy-making autonomy, and the employees of regional institutions can become agents of further integration by identifying new projects, influencing the perceptions of interest of private and public elites, and therefore, modifying the definitions of the national interest in their member states. Regional institutions can acquire autonomy. 3) Policy decisions by regional institutions tend to be incremental: they are based on successive compromises and seemingly marginal adjustments, which in turn lead to unintended consequences. Regional institutions and their policy decisions tend to be incremental. 4) Neofunctionalists reject the conventional realist axiom that all games played between actors are necessarily zero-sum. Exchanges between actors are positive-sum. 5) Actors - national, subnational, and eventually, supranational - become inexorably more interdependent and embedded in complex networks of production, exchange, and diffusion in an expanded and growing capitalist economy. During the process of integration, actors at different levels (supranational, national, subnational) become interdependent.

How is it possible to account for the turnout in European Parliament elections?

There are several explanations for the turnout in European Parliament elections. One explanation is that European elections are second-order, so they are viewed as less important than national elections, so voters do not turn out to vote. Voters think that there preferences do not count they can use the election to express dissatisfaction with the governing party of their member state, which may explain why smaller parties such as the greens and populist parties have done well in 2014 and 2019. Another explanation is that voters do care about EU issues and a party's position as being pro- or anti-European shapes how citizens vote. An alternative explanation is that EU election campaigns are organized and financed by domestic political parties rather than by the European political party groups. For example, the candidates do not seek re-election as a member of the S&D or EPP, but as a French Socialist or German Christian Democrat. Lastly, the parties often campaign on national, rather than genuinely European platforms. To conclude, both turnout and voting choices may be shaped by domestic rather than European political factors, which helps to explain the variation in voting behavior across the EU.

How might the ordinary legislative procedure be simplified in the light of practice?

There are up to three readings of legislation in the ordinary legislative procedure, meaning that there are four successive momemnts at which the two institutions can come to an agreement. The 'first reading agreements' are reached when the EP and the COuncil find a compromise through informal negotiations (trilogues) on the basis of the Commission's proposal. Around 90 percept of concluded files end here.

How does neofunctionalism help explain the current economic and financial crisis in Europe?

There are, however, at least two good reasons to question this conclusion: 1) The timing of the original EMU agreement had little or nothing to do with dysfunctional conditions in the European monetary system. EMU was clearly the product of an 'intergovernmental' decision taken on the basis of calculations of relative power and national interest. 2) One of the results of EMU was decidedly not predicted by neofunctionalists, namely that most of the immediate political mobilization would be against, rather than in favor, of further integration.

Why do many scholars reject characterizing the EU as a federal system?

There's mainly two reasons why scholars reject characterizing the EU as a federal system: 1. The conceptual disagreements over whether the EU could be categorized as a federation: mainstream theories of European integration long resisted the relevance of federalism to the study of the EU for two reasons: 1. Federalism was an institutional arrangement for sovereign states, and 2. Because the EU was not a state, it could not be a federation, and hence theories of federalism were not relevant to the EU experience. This view is misguided, because treating the EU as a federal polity does not require one to assume that the EU is a state. A polity can be a federation without being a state. A federal perspective on the EU can readily acknowledge that the EU is not sovereign and lacks some essential attributes of a state. Federalism, by its very nature, challenges traditional notions of sovereignty and statehood. For example, member states clearly retain ultimate sovereignty in that they are free to leave the EU. But as long as they remain in the EU, the EU acts as the highest governing authority in many spheres and EU law has supremacy over national law in the areas it covers. For that reason, today's EU fits the definition of a federal polity.

How do post functionalists theorise the conditions under which public opinion and party preferences become politicized?

This logic of party interaction and issue politicization appears consistent with what we know about the debate on European integration. Until the 1980s, most major parties steered clear of the issue: 1) European integration was not salient among the public: the creation of a single European market was conceived as trade liberalization which had large and transparent effects on importers and exporters, but small and opaque effects for the general public. 2) To the extent that citizens had opinions on Europe, they were more sceptical than mainstream parties: Christian democratic and liberal parties had long staked out pro-integrationist positions. Until the 1980s, social democratic parties were dubious about economic integration, but once they came to realize that exit was not feasible, most campaigned for regulated capitalism, which would extend the scope of integration. 3) Internal dissent was the reward for mainstream parties that toyed with the issue. The identity concerns raised by European integration are orthogonal to left/right conflict which predominated in European party competition. When nationalist-oriented Gaullists or British conservatives campaigned against further integration, they were resisted by market liberals with harsh results for party unity. The process of legitimating the Maastricht Accord (1992) was a turning point in the causal underpinnings of European integration.It opened a complex elite bargain to public inspection, and precipitated referendums and a series of national debates that alerted publics to the fact that European integration was diluting national sovereignty. The rejection of the Maastricht Accord in Denmark and its near rejection in France revealed an elite-public gap and sustained the populist notion that important EU decisions could no longer be legitimized by the executive and legislature operating in the normal way - direct popular approval was required. The ongoing debate on Europe has been framed by opponents of European integration, i.e. populist tan parties, nationalists in conservative parties, and radical left parties.

Do all questions of EU law go to the Court of Justice?

To ensure that the CJEU is not over-burdened, e.g. with preliminary references, courts in member states cannot ask questions on points of law where the CJEU has already given a ruling, nor should theoretical or hypothetical questions be referred to.

What role to the treaties play in developing the EU?

Treaty reforms raises questions of what the EU is, what it should be, and where it might go. Given this, it should come as no surprise that existing treaties have already been revised and supplemented as the EU has sought to deal first with the eurozone crisis, then with Brexit, and now with the pandemic.

How do post functionalists theorise the conditions under which public opinion and party preferences become politicized?

We assume that party leaders seek to politicize an issue when they see electoral advantage in doing so. We single out three (dis)incentives: a party's position on the issue in relation to other parties and the electorate; a party's ideological reputation; and the extent to which a party is united or divided on the issue. 1) The greater a party's potential electoral popularity on an issue, the more it is induced to inject it into competition with other parties: the key term here is 'potential', for party leaders strategize under uncertainty. How will opinion shift on an issue when it is debated? Will voters come to perceive the issue as salient, if they do not already? Elections are contests about what issues are important, and a party's decision to raise an issue in party competition rests on its strategic calculation that the issue will count, and will count in a particular direction. 2) The ability of party leaders to chase votes by strategic positioning is constrained by reputational considerations and the ideological commitment of party activists: political parties are not simply machines for aggregating the votes necessary to catapult ambitious individuals into government. Parties are membership organizations with durable programmatic commitments. These commitments constrain strategic positioning. Moreover, a party must strive to convince voters that it will actually do what it says it will do. 3) Leaders are reluctant to raise the heat on an issue that threatens to divide their party: disunity not only reduces a party's electoral popularity; it is the most frequent cause of party death.