Fascist Foreign policies 1926-1940
Driving force: ideology
+1937 Anti-Comintern Pact reflects ideology, as does Mussolini's genuine horror at August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact +Intervention in Spanish Civil War could be seen to reflect genuine ideological commitment to crushing Socialism and furthering Fascism in Europe
The Spanish Civil War consequences
+Franco's victory weakened the Western democracies and strengthened the Fascist regimes. +gained some of the prestige and political advantages Mussolini had hoped for -The war brought Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy closer together- ultimately this would have disastrous consequences in WWII. It disrupted Italian trade and so reinforced trading relations with Nazi Germany. -Huge drain on Italian military and industrial strength- at height of Italian involvement, 80,000 Italian troops backed by 150 tanks. 660 Italian aircraft were deployed in Spain. The war used up much needed weapons/ammunition, perhaps contributing to Italy's military unpreparedness in 1939 -The war was not short-lived as Mussolini had predicted but lasted until the end of 1938 and 4.000 Italians died, many of them in a humiliating defeat at Guadalajara in November 1937. -Italian troops were not trained army units but Blackshirt militia, not prepared for the intensity of fighting in Spain. Franco had actually wanted weapons and money more, so arguably the Italian dead were unnecessary. -Italy paid a high price diplomatically- Western democracies saw clamour to defend democracy in Spain-40,000 volunteers joined the International Brigade. Franco became a hate figure for the left and British public opinion turned against Mussolini, links were now much harder and so intervention in Spain pushed Mussolini towards greater subservience to Nazi Germany.
The impact of the Abyssinian war on Mussolini's prestige and popularity at home and abroad
+In May 1936 Mussolini claimed propaganda success, the territory was renamed Italian East Africa (AOI), mass national rejoicing and his popularity rose higher than ever -in reality, not a spectacular victory (this didn't matter initially). It took longer than planned, was expensive and fighting had not finished- it was Feb 1937 before Graziani had 'pacified' the country and dealt with guerrilla warfare +the war demonstrated the ineffectiveness of League of Nations when decisions not supported by the Great Powers. -The diplomatic crisis caused by the war did not end, Mussolini ignored the warning signs in 1934 and Britain and France did not quickly resume pre-war diplomatic relations and the international crisis carried on for 2 years. Selassie himself had effectively raised international condemnation, addressing the League of Nations in July 1936 after he had been forced into exile, having a strong impact on public opinion. This helped to push Mussolini towards an alliance with Germany and even if governments wanted to rebuild the Stresa front, public mood against Mussolini's aggression made this very difficult. +BUT Italians took victory at face value, this was what mattered to Mussolini. Mass demonstrations took place in his favour and the Catholic Church leaders expressed their approval.
Driving force: over-confidence
+Mussolini was fuelled by his desire to assert Fascism's superiority, over-confident after easy victories in 1934 and 1936. +believed his own myths, especially after 1936 when he was hailed as New Ceasar following Abyssinia, boosted by negligible opposition? +Mussolini increasingly dominated foreign policy: dismissed Grandi in 1932, FM himself until 1936, shows he thought he could never be wrong -no blueprint, reactive, Mussolini thought he could just react to events -hesitation in 1939 exact opposite of overconfidence
Abyssinian War consequences
+P.Bell has said Mussolini ''succeeded where the Old Italy had failed, winning the support of the people and overruling the League of Nations''. But, Whittam says this euphoria would not be sustained, sense of disillusionment would come when couldn't be sustained +a great victory, helping to avenge Adowa 1896 +consolidated territory in ''Italian East Africa'' +sanctions rallied the nation, boosting patriotic support: the Queen Mother led the campaign to sacrifice gold rings to finance the war effort. +Church praised the civilising mission +Mussolini at the peak of his popularity -boosted Mussolini's already inflated ego, helping to make his foreign aims unrealistic? -Italy could not afford the drain on economic and military resources -In October 1936 the lire was devalued by 40% -Pointless? By 1939 only 2% of Italian trade was with its colonies -From a modern perspective, Italian rule was oppressive and corrupt -Sanctions forced trade shift to Nazi Germany -Showed the weakness of the League of Nations, which encouraged Hitler's ambitions and allowed him to remilitarise without foreign intervention, thus increasing the German threat and power.
Driving force: desire to keep up with Nazi Germany, links to prestige as don't want to be overshadowed
+This overruled Church's opposition to Nazi-encouraged radicalisation in Mussolini's eyes. Either ideology/fear of being left behind more important than public opinion +Successful Blitzkrieg attack May 1940 prompted Italy to join war, fearful of German-dominated Europe with Germany angry at Italy's refusal to honour pact of steel +1938 reform of customs, copying Nazi goosestep, shows Mussolini's desperation to imitate Nazi regime +threat in Austria, northern border +got involved in Spanish Civil War not truly because of ideology but because he feared if Italy wasn't involved Hitler would gain strategic advantage in Med
Why did Mussolini enter the war in 1940?
- He was backing down on a previous decision, showing the same indecisiveness characterised by the Ribbentrop Memorandum -the onslaught of Blitzkrieg in west Europe meant he saw fall of France as imminent and he didn't want to miss out on the glory/spoils of war (greed) -wanted to be a world power and enhance prestige -prisoner of his own propaganda: he had created an expectation of war which he had to fulfil to create his 'nation of Fascists' -prior to entry, he wouldn't
What was it that made the war fail?
- lack of military resources, not really modernised -public opinion not really primed to accept war. Mussolini believed in willpower- he may have had a strong will but the Italian people did not, creating a disparity between what Mussolini expected of his country and what they were prepared to give -between 1935 and 1939 Mussolini had already been involved in two wars which had reduced its military capacity -Mussolini's own poor decisions: getting involved in May 1940, attacking Greece, committing troops in Russia, centralised power onto himself and overconfident with a lack of strategic awareness so bad. -Inability of economy to meet challenges, only 25% of GDP so perhaps didn't try enough -Events out of his control eg. america getting involved ALl the above contributed to military unpreparedness: for lots of different reasons and in lots of different ways
Flaws of the Stresa Front
-Agreements were vaguely expressed and avoided specific commitments. None of the powers were willing to invade Germany so there was no real threat of action -The powers had different aims: shared concerns about Hitler's rise but not how to deal with him. Britain wanted to leave open the possibility of negotiating agreements. -Mussolini was already planning to launch a war against Abyssinia. This would be against the Covenant of the League of Nations and would cause a rupture between Italy and Britain. Mussolini concealed his true intentions at Stresa, which was bound to weaken the agreement. The Stresa Front fell apart within weeks, in June 1935 Britain negotiated the Anglo-German Naval agreement without consulting France or Italy. This restricted the German navy to 35% of the Royal Navy, which was reassuring for Britain, but broke the terms of the Treaty of Versailles- no navy at all. Mussolini and the French said the agreement undermined Stresa, but Mussolini used this as a convenient excuse to invade Abyssinia, which had always been bound to cause a breach with Britain.
The impact of the Pact of Steel
-Mussolini had second thoughts almost immediately after the Pact had been signed. He sent a memorandum to Ribbentrop the week after, stressing that Italy did not want any major war for the next 3 years which he had omitted in the Pact. +On the other hand, this memorandum showed how Mussolini still had aggressive intentions as it was full of statements of ambition to achieve dominance in the Balkans.
The Abyssinian war
After Stresa, Mussolini had wrongly assumed there would be no international opposition to an invasion of Abyssinia. He relied on indication from B and F they would not intervene, wanted Italy on their side to shift power balance. He had been considering invasion for a long time, and Italian forces had been building up in Eritrea since 1932. 1934 Wal Wal incident showed how he was looking for an excuse- 150 Abyssinians killed at Italian fort set up within Abyssinian border when Selassie appealed for international arbitration. The invasion began on 3 October 1935 and De Bono attacked from the North whilst Graziani commanded in the South. The day before, Mussolini had done one of his set-piece speeches in Rome and effort was made over radio to whip up patriotic enthusiasm for the war. Mussolini's plan depended upon a quick victory- the capture of Adowa on 6 October was symbolically important for satisfying past frustrations, but advance was slow and in December he replaced De Bono with Badoglio. The Abyssinian armies led a counter-attack and the Italian advance stalled completely. Mussolini now faced military and international pressure to back down. -During 1936, he managed to win the war but only by huge military force. In addition to pre-existing troops. Mussolini added 600,000 troops with modern weapons and air support. He urged brutal methods including poison gas. -A quick and decisive victory might have prevented a major international reaction but the war lasted 8 months, allowing time for opposition to grow and the LofN to get involved. Badoglio launched his final assault, the 'March of Iron will' before Graziani, Selassie went into exile and the war ended on 5 May.
The invasion of Libya and the conduct of the war
Bringing Libya under Italian rule was not just a matter of immigration from Italy and developing its economy, but of using armed forces to 'pacify' the native population. This was carried out 1928-1933, De Bono was in overall command but Badoglio and Graziana actually carried out the pacification. There was rivalry between them all but they gained big reputations in Libya. Nowadays the pacification would be described as 'ethnic cleansing'. More than 100,000 members of the native population were expelled from their land, and penned up in concentration camps in harsh conditions. Death rates were high. Badoglio openly encouraged his men to be 'ferocious'. The Italians used poison gas to bomb the rebels putting down a native rebellion 1930-1. By the 1933, the conquest of Abyssinia was seen as complete and the concentration camps were closed, Mussolini was ready to move on to his next target, Abyssinia.
Mussolini's ambitions in the Balkans
By the late 1920s, Mussolini was more assertive and confident and ready to pursue his Balkans ambitions. After acquiring Fiume, he hoped to extend his influence in Yugoslavia and gave secret aid to separatist groups there, hoping to break it up so he could one day get hold of Croatia and then whole Adriatic (temporarily achieved in WWII). Mussolini's ambitions inevitably caused tension with Greece, 1923 Treaty of Lausanne confirmed Italian possession of the Dodecanese islands which Mussolini wanted to 'italianise' and use as a springboard for seizing other islands eg. Crete. By 1935 Albania was basically an Italian protectorate.
Historiography of Italo-German alliance
Denis Mack Smith blames Mussolini's own errors and muddled thinking, Nicholas Parrell blames British policymakers, especially Eden, for failing to maintain good relations with Italy and recently historians such as Gooch have emphasised the role of ideology, suggesting the links between Mussolini and the armed forces from the 1920s reveal long-term plans for aggressive warfare.
The neutrality of Italy in 1939
Despite the Pact of Steel, Italy remained 'non-belligerent' after Hitler's invasion of Poland until 1940 when the German conquest of France was nearly complete. Mussolini insisted not in 'neutrality' but 'non-belligerent', indicating he was still on Germany's side. Why? -He was, typically, being indecisive. Despite all his post-1935 aggression he wanted to keep options open and was not fully committed to Germany. Being a mediator at European conferences in the meantime would give his propaganda and regime legitimacy. Ciano said in 1938 the Duce said ''the timing will be settled by events'' -Propaganda claims aside, he was afraid war would expose Italy's military and economic unpreparedness. He had wanted a defensive military alliance with Germany but the Pact of Steel did not offer this as it had been written on Hitler's terms. -Mussolini had not expected war so soon- when he had realised an attack on Poland was imminent in summer 1939, he had begged Hitler not to do it. -Hitler did not really need Mussolini's help in Poland. Italy's forces value lay in their ability to tie down the enemy in the Mediterranean, making invasion of Germany unlikely. -Mussolini could easily sit on the sidelines 1939-40 during the 'Phoney War', he had the opportunity to stay out until June 1940.
Foreign policy ambition: Empire in Africa
Further east, Mussolini aimed to replace British influence in Egypt and in East Africa with an Italian colonial empire. The Italian colonial possessions in Libya would be exploited to the full. Libya, although huge in Libya, had very little economic value (only 50,000 Italians had settled there and Mussolini was not aware of the huge oil reserves buried under the sand) but nationalists like Federzoni promoted grandiose ideas about Italy's 'civilising mission' there. These were pre-war nationalist ideas which would have a strong influence on the Fascists in the 1920s. The idea of Living Space for an expanding population was a key theme of Fascist ideology and there was excited speculation about the millions who would be settled in Italian empire and the need to make room for them, although despite propaganda claims about 50,000 actually settled in North Africa. Predictions of the wealth that would flow into Italy as a result of developing its empire were unrealistic, the cost of running the colonies was much greater than any economic returns. These realities didn't affect Mussolini's policy and his regime prioritised African empire
The Stresa Front- April 1935
Hitler's rise changed Mussolini's attitude towards him and concerned Britain and France. !934, Hitler announced his decision to ignore T of V and raise an army of 400,000 men, introduce conscription and develop an air force. The Stresa Front was formed to react to this threat. Mussolini met the FM's Laval and MacDonald at Stresa, another chance to show off on the international stage. He made a flamboyant arrival, going across the beautiful Lake Maggiore by speedboat. 14 April, Final Declaration of the Stresa Conference set out joint agreement of the three powers to underline their support of Locarno and to maintain the independence of Austria. Germany was never mentioned by name but it was obviously directed against it. In theory the Stresa Front should have brought the powers closer together...
Italian influence in Austria
In 1929, Italy began providing arms and money to right-wing political groups in Hungary and Austria. In 1927 he made a treaty with Hungary aligning both countries in agreement with the 'unfair' post-war settlement. The policy continued into the 30s, and in 1930 Mussolini signed the Friendship Treaty with Austria, already sensitive to Italy's needs to protect its northern border. Mussolini hoped a right-wing Austrian government would come under his influence and established close links with Dolfuss and poured financial assistance into Austria- salaries of Austrian government officials almost entirely depended on italian aid. From 1933, the Austrian situation was complicated by Hitler's rise to power, he supported the strengthening Austrian Nazi Party against Dolfuss, who therefore faced dangerous opposition form the Left and Right. Italy increased its aid and Mussolini pushed Dolfuss to 'act decisively' against Socialist opposition. 1933, Dolfuss suspended Parliament and made himself dictator, provoking opposition. February 1934 there was civil war in Vienna as left-wing militias occupied areas of the city,. Mussolini supported Dolfuss against the Nazis, confident he could prevent Anschluss. The situation became urgent for Mussolini when Dolfuss assasinated July 1934- Italy made the uncoordinated Nazi coup a failure stationing troops on the Brenner Pass. +This boosted his prestige -gave an unrealistic impression of his power against Germany at a time when Mussolini knew there was no chance of German military intervention in Austria. In June, Hitler had reassured him he did not intend to force Anschluss, but Mussolini's position would grow less secure in Austria as Hitler got stronger.
Corfu 1923: Cheap boost to prestige
Intervention in Corfu was a propaganda success for Mussolini at an important time, although its significance lay in the image it generated, not in tangible gains. It was catalysed by a dispute over the Greece-Albania border, the Great Powers organised a Conference of Ambassadors to oversee the negotiations; Italian army formed part of the inspection team and the leader of this team, Tellini, and several of his men were killed in Greek territory. No clear proof of responsibility but Mussolini demanded huge financial compensations from Greece, which it did not meet. Mussolini bombarded the Greek island of Corfu in retaliation, and Italian troops occupied Corfu. This may have been pre-planned- was the killing just a convenient excuse? This amounted to a blatant act of war, Greece protested and went to the League of Nations but Italy refused to accept its adjudication. +crisis fizzled out and no major confrontation, as France wanted good relations with Italy and Greece lacked military strength for a shooting war +Corfu helped Mussolini gain support in run-up to 1924 elections. +Italy's actions weakened League of Nations, dress rehearsal for his approach to Abyssinia. It let Mussolini know the League of Nations would step back if actions supported the interests of Britain/France (Abyssinia, they don't want to put troops on line for something insignificant to them)
Changing relations with Nazi Germany II
Inwardly, Mussolini was furious at Hitler's annexation of Rome, which was a clear breach of one of his policies since 1930, but he was realistic and recognised he could not prevent annexation. Thus, he told Hitler that Italy would not interfere and Hitler was delighted. -The Anschluss integrated the Austrian economy into the Third Reich, increasing Italian economic dependence on Germany and so the prospect of an Italian-German alliance grew stronger. Also, another reason to ally with Hitler as Mussolini didn't want a hostile power sharing a border directly... +Sept 1938 Hitler began pressuring Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland causing international tension- Mussolini had no direct interest in the territory but he seized the opportunity to act as an international mediator. He proposed a Four Power Conference to be held in Munich to discuss the Italian 'peace plan'- in reality the plan was a German one, merely rubber-stamped by Mussolini. Mussolini was not acting as a mediator, he was just giving Hitler a cover for imposing his demands but it was a propaganda success and raised his domestic popularity Mussolini was not yet committed to an alliance with Hitler but neither did he have total freedom. During 1938, Ciano changed his mind and supported Hitler and Hitler and Von Ribbentrop were working hard to persuade an alliance.
Food for thought...
Italians knew that their living standards were declining, they didn't believe propaganda and Mussolini knew this. Internal police reports noted working class discontent in Northern cities like Milan and Turin, his foreign policy based more on fear of losing his position and a sense of weakness he wanted to change, than strength and confidence
The invasion of Albania
Italy had already gained economic influence in Albania before WWI- Mussolini wanted to turn this influence into dominance. Albania was increasingly dependent on Italian military and economic assistance and it had cultural influence- by 1935 Abania was virtually an Italian protectorate and by 1939 it was under virtually complete Italian control. Italians controlled its banks, King Zog was dependent on Italian 'loans' to carry out government and Italy had exclusive rights to mining operations and fishing in the Adriatic. From 1938, Mussolini and Ciano had been making plans for the complete annexation of Albania. April 1939, Mussolini invaded Albania. He wanted to 'compensate' for the loss of influence over Austria after its Anschluss. Fascist leaders eg.Ciano were convinced Albania was ripe for economic exploitation and wanted to settle 2 million Italians there. The drive to annex Albania was really about prestige. Italy blocked attempts by King Zog to encourage foreign investment from Germany and Japan. -In reality, Albania was already costing way more than supposed profits -military efforts were bungled and badly led but it was a one-sided war. Italy took complete control of Albania and Victor Emmanuel became King of Albania. -Although Mussolini claimed this as a propaganda success, the conflict shows how unprepared the Italian forces were for major conflict.
Changing relations with Hitler's Germany- coming together until September 1937
Mussolini admired and feared the strength of Nazi Germany, but could be negative about Hitler personally, calling him in private a 'sexual degenerate'. Conversely, Hitler looked down on Italy and had no respect for their military or economic strength, but liked Mussolini personally. Their relationship lasted 10 years and involved 15 crucial face-to-face meetings. Initially, Mussolini saw Hitler's rise as advantageous to Fascism and saw himself as the senior superior partner when they met in Venice in 1934. His sense of superiority was strengthened when in July Hitler supported Austrian Nazis in a failed coup that got Dolfuss assassinated and Italy sent troops to 'protect' Austria. 1934-38 Austria was a source of friction between the two as Mussolini became increasingly worried about Germany's growing military and economic strength. The 1935 Stresa Front was virtually an anti-Hitler Alliance. However, the two were drawn closer together by the Abyssinian war which isolated Italy from Britain/France and the Spanish Civil War in which they both gave support. 1936-37 Italy became more dependent on the German economy and Italy-Britain relations continued to be difficult, particularly due to bad personal relations with Eden. November 1937, Italy joined anti-comintern pact with Germany and Japan and pulled out of the League of Nations in December Mussolini became increasingly impressed with Germany's dynamism and in 1937 made a high-profile State visit to Munich, speaking in German at a mass open-air rally. The propaganda element of the event made a big impression on Mussolini. In November 1937 Mussolini signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, joining Germany and Japan in the Axis. Britain tried to improve relations and finally agreed to recognise Italian possession of Abyssinia in 1938- but 2 days later Hitler annexed Austria
Another apparent Triumph: 1933 Four Power Pact
Mussolini claimed glory in bringing together Britain, France, Germany and Italy in the Four Power Pact. He wanted this to demonstrate his importance, and to be able to by-pass the League of Nations in favour of direct agreements. The Pact had no practical results (theme of his policy) as Hitler only signed the Pact reluctantly and still risk he would break free from Versailles restrictions. This raised fears for the continuation of Locarno agreements for France and made Mussolini concerned by the continued independence of Austria.
Locarno, 1925: another boost to prestige
Mussolini gained further prestige from his role as a mediator alongside Chamberlain at the 1925 Locarno Treaties. The Franco-German borders had been defined by diktat in 1919 but by this point relations had improved and diplomacy to reach a voluntary agreement was the way forward. Mussolini claimed his role was vital for securing international peace and was happy for his supporters to suggest he receive a Nobel Peace Prize. In reality, his role was little more than symbolic and the real architects of Locarno were the FMs of France and Germany , but in 1925 it was not reality but prestige which was important to Italians' and Mussolini's own perception of his greatness. By the end of 1925, foreign successes, though in reality insubstantial, had augmented Mussolini's domestic popularity and gained him respect from Britain and France. Chamberlain later met Mussolini several times, important for his image of respectability.
Relations with Britain and France
Mussolini had always had contradictory attitudes towards Britain and France, viewing them as colonial rivals blocking his ambitions but also as potential allies in countering the rise of Germany. From 1932, Italy's ambassador to Britain was Dino Grandi, who favoured good relations with Britain. Certainly, the rise of Hitler worked in allying Italy with Britain and France by the way of negative cohesion- none of the three countries wanted to be overpowered by Germany and so at the beginning of 1935 Mussolini was viewed as an ally. Step by step over the 1930s, Mussolini would move closer to Nazi Germany, a decision which had disastrous consequences for Mussolini and Italy. The Abyssinian war complicated Italy's relations with Britain and France. On the one hand, they wanted to support the LofN and block Fascist aggression by imposing economic sanctions, which were imposed eventually and numerous public statements demanded respect for Ethiopian independence. However, they did not want to drive Mussolini into the arms of Hitler, hoped to maintain the Stresa Front and were not completely opposed to Italian empire in Africa- as a result, oil was excluded from economic sanctions.
Foreign policy ambition: the restoration of prestige
Mussolini promised to rescue Italy from the sense of 'mutilated victory' and humiliation after WWI- this became a foreign policy theme only gradually, originally he just wanted to consolidate his position by protecting Italy's interests. Ever since unification, Italians had been motivated by a sense of frustrated Nationalism, Italy not a great power she deserved to be. WWI helped to foster a culture of violence, idealising the belligerent stormtrooper, and glorified war. Mussolini promised to restore national pride and make Italy a recognised power on an international level. He saw gaining an empire as the way to do this. He used violent lexis, promising to turn the Italian people 'from sheep into wolves'. +He gained prestige through outward successes over small nations like Austria and ALbania +Prestige from acting as a statesman - Locarno treaties +1935 formation of Stresa Front seemed to mark Britain and France's acceptance of Italy as a European status
Fiume 1924: significant foreign policy success
Mussolini secured Italian possession of the sea port of Fiume in 1924. Fiume was a disputed territory after the collapse of Austria-Hungary and had been claimed by both Italy and Yugoslavia. Fiume had become a free city, and then Italy's government had reluctantly expelled D'Annunzio's forces in December 1920, which was unpopular with most Italians and severely weakened the Italian government, and so Mussolini was lucky in that he was playing to a very receptive audience. Mussolini was still fairly cautious in these years, and showed more diplomatic skill than he had over Corfu. He persuaded the government of Yugoslavia to accept Italian annexation of Fiume by the 1924 Treaty of Rome. This promised to establish order and the situation had been very chaotic, and Mussolini toned down the claims he had made against Yugoslavia. -economically, occupation was useless as Fiume was cut off from its hinterland +Mussolini cared more about prestige- Fiume was a risk-free way for him to strengthen his popularity
The Spanish Civil War 1936
Mussolini supported the nationalist rebellion against the legal government of the Spanish Republic. This was an ideological decision - he wanted to support a fellow Fascist against the dangers of Communism. He also wanted the prestige from seeming decisive, and wanted to match anything Hitler did to help Franco so as not to seem inferior. Perhaps he had become overambitious after the Abyssinian victory... The war began on July 1936 with Franco's revolt but soon widened into 3 wars- a nationalist revolt against the Spanish republic (internal Right vs Left), a war between the centre and the regions (Francoists against Catalans achieving self-rule) and an international war of strength between fascist regimes and Western democracies. By March 1939, the nationalists had achieved a decisive victory and Franco dominated Spain until 1975. +Mussolini did have an impact in this- his air force was integral in tipping balance away from Republican cause and the Italian raid on Barcelona in March 1938 was psychologically and militarily very damaging to them. Franco could win because he received large-scale military support from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy whereas legal republican democracy did not receive the same help from Western democracies. Britain and France were non-interventionist and just imposed economic sanctions. The Republican forces got military backing from Stalin and the UsSR and from International Brigade but this was ineffective. Stalin's assistance was counterproductive as it associated the republican cause to Communism.
Military strategy in WWII
Poor to non-existent: lack of a clear plan meant resources were wasted in wars which were not strategically important which, coupled with a lack of cooperation with German forces rendered the Italian forces ineffective -failed to prioritise, wasted resources in Greece and Russia -indecisive: Oct 1940 ordered demobilisation, then to attack Greece a week later -poor resources, not modernised: rifles from 1891 were only arms for 35 of 80 army divisions.
Why did Hitler ally with Nazi Germany?
Prestige- Mussolini wants to ally himself with another Fascist leader and doesn't want to be overshadowed by Hitler. Hitler had refused to apply sanctions against Italy during the Abyssinian crisis and had provided arms, was becoming a crucial supplier of arms and energy to Italy Ideology-Germany was a fellow Fascist state showing the dynamism which Mussolini respected. Like Italy, Germany had visions of living space, and favoured war. Territory- Hitler accepted the Med as Mussolini's sphere of influence. Italy also contained a quarter of a million German speakers, but Hitler had made no claims on this territory. Practicality- Put off Britain and France- League of Nations had imposed sanctions (but omitting coal, oil and steel) and relations soured during Abyssinian war and further with Spanish Civil War. They were democratic states which Mussolini considered to be declining. France had protected anti-Fascist exiles eg. Rosselli brothers, and had previously blocked Italian colonial expansion. On the other hand, Britain had the world's largest naval fleet, Britain was a neighbour, and both were closely linked to the powerful USA, so the choice was not an easy one.
Foreign policy ambition: The Mediterranean and 'Mare Nostrum'
The concept that the Mediterranean sea should belong to Italy was very appealing to many Italians, as it reflected the glory of Ancient Rome and the prolific nature of Venice as a port. It fitted in with the idea of Italian cultural superiority, enabling Mussolini to project Fascism as a new and glorifying concept. He hoped control over the Adriatic would be extended to include key strategic islands such as Malta and Crete. Further east, 'Mare Nostrum' encompassed Italian dominance over North Africa.
Foreign policy motivations
The escalation of Fascist aggression in the years 1934-40, which grew from the mutual involvement of Italy and Germany in the Spanish Civil War to Italy's entry into WWII on the side of the Axis, could be seen to be largely motivated by Mussolini's desire to glorify himself. The prestige and territory to be gained from invasions and resulting glorification, as Mussolini hoped for with his invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, may logically seem to explain his foreign interventions, and he certainly utilised his already-excessive propaganda base to further the Cult of the Duce by exploiting the successes of his foreign policy. However, there were certainly other motivations, not least his fear of being overshadowed by Hitler's growing regime, which threatened not only Mussolini's ability to pose as the European pioneer of Fascism but also the independence of Austria and Italy's Northern borders. Mussolini's belief that he, not Hitler, should be the ''New Caesar'' could exemplify the role ideology played in his foreign policy, as he began to believe his own myths and create unrealistic aims based on his extreme ideology. In reality, the motivations behind Mussolini's foreign policy, a policy which vacillated wildly between non-belligerence to belligerence, perhaps confused by his unclear aims, are probably not as distinct as this, and it was a culmination of factors which led to Mussolini's foreign policy in this period.
Frustrated Nationalism: The legacy of the past
There was a desire to recreate the glory and Italian empire of Ancient Rome- Mussolini pledged to compensate for Italy's missing out of the imperial era pre-1914 in comparison to Germany's rise to Great power status under Bismarck's unification. There was further frustration as the Risorgimento had aroused patriotic fervour and raised expectations for Italy's future as a great European power. These expectations were not fulfilled and Mussolini promised to put this right Despite success in Libya in 1911, 1896 in Adowa was particularly humiliating as other European powers made clear their superior military power successfully expanding African empires Also the hope of gaining territory from Austria-Hungary and the German empire, which had motivated Italy's entry into WWI, had only been partly realised. The most important battle, Carporetto, was a disaster. The sense of a 'mutilated victory' pervaded, Fiume was made a free city and not awarded to Italy, German colonies were not gained. Mussolini promised to 'right this wrong'
The Pact of Steel creation - signed May 1939
This formalised the relationship between Italy and Nazi Germany. It came as a surprise as there had been scant detailed preparation beforehand. Hitler's preparatory negotiations had been logical and focused; he knew he was going to war against Poland in 1939 and wanted an Italian alliance to tie down British and French forces in the Mediterranean. In April, Hitler sent Goring to Rome to convince Hitler he would not be going to war for 2-3 years and so deceived Mussolini. -Mussolini's negotiations were muddled and improvised, and he was thinking of being ready for war around 1943. He was still tempted by the idea of Italy holding the balance of power in Europe and had hoped the invasion of Albania in April would demonstrate Italian strength. It was an impulsive decision that he made on 6 May when he told Ciano to go ahead with a full alliance, more than the Germans had been asking for. -Thus, the terms of the Pact of Steel were drawn up by the German society, without any haggling over the details by Ciano.
Hoare-Laval Pact 1935
This was the result of the confused British-French position after Abyssinia. It aimed to be a compromise, preserving the independence of a smaller Ethiopia but giving large parts to Italy to tempt Mussolini to call off his war. -Mussolini would never have accepted- he was already set on military victory -huge public protest against 'appeasement' of Mussolini Overall, the Pact sunk without trace, Hoare resigned and Laval lost power when a new government was formed in 1936. British/French policy remained weak and contradictory after the war ended- the AOI was not granted recognition until 1938, and whilst some efforts were made to revive the Stresa Front the new British FM Eden was v hostile towards Mussolini. In 1936, Mussolini said 'the present situation forces me to sek elsewhere the security I have lost on the French side and on the British side' Relations were then made significantly worse by Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War
Historians and Mussolini's foreign policy
Traditionally historians put the blame on the muddled thinking of Mussolini for siding with Germany eg. Mack Smith Others, eg. Farrell see Mussolini as a 'rational opportunist' and blame Britain for missing opportunities to maintain good relations with Mussolini and say he only sided with Germany when he was convinced there was no possibility of a worthwhile deal with Britain/France. Modern historians dispute this argument, emphasising the role of ideology in Mussolini's policies eg. Knox who said Mussolini had a single-minded determination to launch war. It is difficult to decipher Mussolini's policy as his words and actions could be so contradictory.
