Forensic Psychology Court Cases

State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1984)

Child Abuse/Neglect Andring charged with sexual misconduct with children. Checked himself into hospital and disclosed details during individual and group therapy sessions. Judge denied discovery for individual sessions but granted discovery for group therapy. Finding: confidentiality and privilege extends to group therapy.

Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389 (1976)

Child Abuse/Neglect Landeros, a minor, was seen in the ER by Dr. Flood for injuries inflicted by her mother and the mother's common law husband. Dr. Flood failed to diagnose "battered child syndrome" and also did not report the injuries to proper authorities in violation of California law. The child was released to the custody of her mother and the mother's common law husband, where she experienced further injury at their hands. The parents fled the state, but were apprehended and convicted of criminal child abuse. Landeros brought a civil suit in tort for damages/medical malpractice against Dr. Flood. FInding: you can be held liable for future injuries to a child if you fail to diagnose battered child syndrome. 1. It is established standard of care for physicians to suspect, work-up and diagnose child abuse when such a case presents in the emergency room or physician's office. 2. California statutory requirements obligate the physician to report suspected cases of child abuse to the proper civil authorities. Failure to do so is a violation of law. 3. The summary dismissal of the complaint and allegation that the failure to diagnose child abuse and report it alleging this to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's subsequent injuries was reversible error by the trial court. 4. The failure to allow the plaintiff to introduce expert testimony was reversible error. 5. The issue of foreseeability in negligence cases is a question for the jury under California law, and this applies to the actions of third parties.

Kentucky v, Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987)

Child Abuse/Neglect Sergio Stincer (defendant) was charged with first-degree sodomy for acts he committed 2 young girls. Court held a competency hearing in the judge's chambers to determine whether the girls were competent to testify at trial. Stincer's attorney, but not Stincer, was allowed to attend the hearing. Girls were questioned separately by the judge, prosecutor, and Stincer's attorney about basic factual information. The girls were also asked about their ability to tell the truth, but they were not asked any substantive questions about the case. Judge determined that both girls were competent to testify at trial. The girls were asked questions on direct and cross-examination about the allegations against Stincer. Stincer was ultimately convicted by the jury and subsequently appealed his conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Stincer's exclusion from the competency hearing violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment. FInding: a defendant does not have to be present during a witness's (child) competency hearing.

People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738 (1983)

Child Abuse/Neglect Strizinger convicted of child molestation with stepdaughter and claimed evidence allowed at trial violated his psychotherapist-patient privilege and his right to confrontation. When mother informed of abuse, she had family go to counseling and therapist reported abuse to CPS who reported it to police. Therapist expressed concern with providing additional details of reported abuse to police after a subsequent session with defendent due to confidentiality concerns and police explained that there was an exception to privilege for abuse. Doctor's testimony ruled admissable and stepdaughter was allowed not to testify due to mental illness and non-availability. Finding: a psychotherapist cannot be compelled to report past child abuse perpetrated by a patient, without the patient's consent and without knowledge of continuing abuse. Therapist was required to report initial report of abuse, but should not have given additional details when there was no further evidence of subsequent crimes or without defendent's consent. Additionally, stepdaughter should not have been declared unavailable given that she was available for pretrial testimony and no MH provider indicated her condition made her unavailable.

Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F. 3d 493 (7th Cir. 2005)

Child Abuse/Neglect The plaintiffs are child-care workers and foster parents who had been indicated, in reports maintained on DCFS' State Central Register as perpetrators of child abuse or neglect. They brought this suit against the Director of DCFS on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief on the ground that DCFS procedures for investigating and reporting allegations deprived them of due process of law. When abuse claim seems credible, caregiver is restricted from additional care for children until investigation closes. Claimed that delays in process meant they could be barred from their employment for years. FInding: there must be due process before someone is indicted of a crime. Case rewrote DCFS processes and shortened timeline for investigations.

Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)

Child Custody and Parenting A mother challenging a state court order divesting her of custody of her child contended that, contrary to the trial court's findings, it was not in her pre-school child's best interests to be removed from her custody, while the father alleged that the child would be damaged by being raised in a racially mixed household. While the Court found that the State of Florida had a substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause in protecting the interests of children, such an interest could not support the State's toleration of prejudices based on race. The reality of private biases and the possible injury such biases could inflict on a child were determined by the Court not to be permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from its mother. Finding: Certain private biases (race) and the possible injury such biases might inflict cannot be used to justify a change in custody. Doing so violates the equal protections clause under the 14th amendment. Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held."

Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990)

Child Custody and Parenting Bouknight abused infant child and child was removed from custody. Child returned but defendent violated order, so she was ordered to produce the child to return to DSS custody. She refused claiming this violated her 5th amendment rights. Finding: 5th amendment protection against self-incrimination only protects against being compelled to testify against yourself, not producing the body of a child that could lead to prosecution. assuming that the testimonial assertions involved in the production of the child were sufficiently incriminating and sufficiently testimonial for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege did not protect the mother's resistance to the order to produce the child because (1) once the child was adjudicated a child in need of assistance, his care and safety became the particular object of the state's regulatory interests, and by accepting the care of the child subject to the conditions of the juvenile court's custodial order, the mother submitted to the routine operation of the regulatory system and agreed to hold the child in a manner consonant with the state's regulatory interests and subject to inspection by the BCDSS; and (2) the order to produce the child was made for compelling reasons unrelated to criminal law enforcement and as part of a broadly applied regulatory regime not directed at a selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)

Child Custody and Parenting Child Abuse/Neglect During divorce proceedings, father (DeShaney) given custody of son. Evidence of child abuse resulted in CPS involvement, but despite ongoing evidence of abuse and nonadherence to CPS plan by father, no other actions were taken. Father beat child to point of a coma (eventually leading to premature death). Mother filed lawsuit against CPS claiming that by failing to intervene and protect him from violence about which they knew or should have known, the agency violated Joshua's right to liberty without the due process guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment Finding: the state does not have a constitutional duty to protect a child from abuse (perpetrated by a private citizen under the Due process clause). Due process is meant to protect citizens from the state's power, not individual people. Since child was not in CPS custody, it was not their job to protect him. Could be a tort but not a 14th Amendment violation.

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

Child Custody and Parenting Child Abuse/Neglect Under NY law, the State may terminate, over parental objection, the rights of parents in their natural child upon a finding that the child is "permanently neglected." Law requires that only a "fair preponderance of the evidence" support that finding. Neglect proceedings were brought in Family Court to terminate the Santoskys' rights as natural parents in their three children. Rejecting the Santoskys' challenge to the constitutionality of law's "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard, the Family Court found permanent neglect. After a subsequent dispositional hearing, the Family Court ruled that the best interests of the children required permanent termination of petitioners' custody. FInding: Clear and convincing evidence is needed (at the very least) to ensure due process is granted when terminating parental rights. States are free to determine the precise burden "equal to or greater than that standard."

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)

Child Custody and Parenting Craig was charged with sexually abusing a minor child. At trial, the child was reportedly unable to testify in the physical presence of the defendant due to severe emotional trauma. The trial court set her up in a separate room with the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney, so that the defendant and jury could only see her testify via the live television screen in the courtroom, and she could not see them. Craig was convicted, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that her Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the use of the transmitted testimony, because the Confrontation Clause guaranteed face-to-face confrontation. Finding: the 6th amendment confrontation clause does not prohibit testimony by one-way closed circuit TV for a child abuse victim. It's a case-specific finding of necessity. Provided for an exception when a child's testimony would result in "serious emotional distress."

Pennsylvania v. Richie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)

Child Custody and Parenting Defendant was convicted of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor, as a result of assaults on his minor daughter. During pretrial, defendant attempted to obtain the contents of the file that the Children and Youth Services (CYS) made in its investigation of the victim's complaint, but was denied access, since those files were confidential. Defendant was subsequently convicted before the Court of Common Pleas, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) that the withholding of the records violated the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment; (2) that the Court of Common Pleas on remand must examine the records in chambers, release any verbatim statements by the daughter, and then make the full record available to defense counsel for the limited purpose of arguing the relevance of the statements; and (3) that a new trial should be ordered unless the error was found to be harmless. Finding: A defendant does not have the right to unsupervised review of confidential files; the state decides what information is disclosed. Defendant was entitled to pretrial disclosure of confidential information only if that information were material as determined by the trial court, but his attorney did not have the right to examine the CYS file.

Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 42 (1881)

Child Custody and Parenting Father had given his daughter to his deceased wife's sister soon after birth because he was unable to care for her. 5 years later, he was able to provide an adequate home with his father and his unmarried sister. Aunt was married with her own children and provided safe home. Finding: custody given to aunt and not father; "best interest of the child" standard originated

Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d. 203 (1938)

Child Custody and Parenting For a boy of such tender years nothing. can be an adequate substitute for mother love-for that constant ministration required during the period of nurture that only a mother can give because in her alone is duty swallowed up in desire; in her alone is service expressed in terms of love. She alone has the patience and sympathy required to mold and soothe the infant mind in its adjustment to its environment. The difference between fatherhood and motherhood in this respect is fundamental and the law should recognize it unless offset by undesirable traits in the matter. Finding: tender years doctrine: no child should be deprived of their mother (and then 90% of custody cases went to mother).

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)

Child Custody and Parenting Granville had 2 kids with partner who lived with his parents. When partner died, his parents tried to get visitation, but mother appealed claiming parental rights. Finding: Parents' rights to make decisions for their children is a liberty/due process issue. The constitution permits a state to interfere with the parents' right to rear their children only to prevent harm to the child. Supreme Court citing a constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, struck down a Washington State law that allowed any third party to petition state courts for child visitation rights over parental objections.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967)

Child Custody and Parenting Interracial couple got married out of state and moved to VA where interracial marriage was outlawed. Pleaded guilty and sentenced to prison with sentence suspended if they moved out of state. Claimed sentence violated 14th Amendment. Finding: invalidated laws prohibiting interracial marriage

Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990)

Child Custody and Parenting Laura Wright charged with lewd conduct with a minor against her 2 young children (ages 5.5 and 2.5) for holding children down and allowing her boyfriend to rape them. Older daughter disclosed abuse to her father's girlfriend who reported it to the police. Doctor examined both children and found evidence of sexual abuse. Younger daughter determined not to be capable of testifying. Doctor allowed to testify about statements made by younger daughter. Appealed based on hearsay restriction stating that interview with doctor was not recorded and included leading questions, thus was not reliable. Finding: for hearsay evidence (from a child who is too young to testify in court) to be admitted at trial, it must have a "sufficient indicia of reliability to withstand the scrutiny under the constitutional clause). The admission of the child's hearsay statements violated Wright's Confrontation Clause rights.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

Child Custody and Parenting Oregon created law requiring children to attend public schools with a few exceptions. Exception for those attending private schools was removed. The Sisters' case alleged that "the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training, the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the right of schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or profession." Finding: due process protects individual liberties. Parents have the right to control their children's education without state interference.

Painter v. Bannister, 358 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W. 2d. 152 (1966)

Child Custody and Parenting Painter's mother and sister were killed in an automobile accident. The father, Harold Painter, after other arrangements for this seven-year-old boy's care had proved unsatisfactory, asked the maternal grandparents, Dwight and Margaret Bannister, to take care of Mark. Over a year later, Harold sought the return of the child. The trial court awarded Harold custody. Dwight and Margaret Bannister appealed. Finding: the court ruled a child custody decision based on what is in the best interest of the child. The Court reversed the trial court's award of custody to the father. The Court found that Mark had established a father-son relationship with his maternal grandfather, which he apparently never had with Harold. Mark was happy, well adjusted, and progressing nicely in his development. It was not in Mark's best interest to take him out of that stable atmosphere in the face of warnings of dire consequences from an eminent child psychologist and send him to an uncertain future in the home of Harold, who had a Bohemian approach to finances and life in general. Regardless of the Court's appreciation of the father's love for his child and his desire to have him with him, the Court did not believe it had the moral right to gamble with the Mark's future. The Court stated the child was to be encouraged in every way possible to know his father.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)

Child Custody and Parenting Prince was guardian of child and had her help distribute Jehovah's witnesses literature in violation of child labor laws. There were three complaints filed against Prince: 1)Refusal to disclose her child's identity and age to a public officer whose duty was to enforce the statutes; 2)Furnishing the girl with magazines, knowing she was to sell them unlawfully, that is, on the street; and 3)As child's custodian, permitting her to work contrary to law. Prince argued that the state's child labor laws violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to exercise her religion and her equal protection rights, in particular because the children themselves were ministers of their religion as well. Finding: the gov't has the broad authority to regulate the actions and tx of children. Parental authority is not absolute and can be restricted if doing so is in the best interest of the child.

Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)

Child Custody and Parenting The state court granted respondent department's motion to terminate petitioner mother's parental rights. The mother was not represented by counsel. On the mother's appeal, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina decided that appointment of counsel for indigent parents was not constitutionally required in proceedings to terminate parental rights. On writ of certiorari, the mother appealed. The mother's infant son was adjudicated a neglected child and placed in the custody of the department of social services. Finding: In child custody (not criminal cases) there is no constitutional right to have an attorney appointed, even for indigent parents. Presumption against the right to appointed counsel when no potential deprivation of physical liberty existed.

White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)

Child Custody and Parenting Witness challenges White charged with child molestation and court accepted hearsay evidence made my child's mother, an investigating officer, an ER nurse, and a doctor under hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations and for statements made in the course of securing medical treatment. The trial court also denied White's motion for a mistrial based on child's presence at trial and failure to testify. Finding: the confrontation clause: exceptions: the declarant does not necessarily need to be present and this clause doesn't pertain to certain statements, such as those said during medical treatments. That person doesn't always have to be made available by court

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Addington arrested on misdemeanor assault threat towards mother. Had previously been hospitalized numerous times and his mother had requested he be committed indefinitely. Sentenced indefinitely to hospital based on "clear and convincing evidence." Appeals attempted to change burden of proof. Decision: Raised the burden of proof requirement, in order to civilly commit a person, from preponderance, to clear and convincing. Also, permitted the courts to defer judgment regarding a person's need for commitment, to the doctor(s). Needs to be higher than civil committments but not as high as criminal cases.

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (1972)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Canterbury sued Dr. Spence for negligence related to surgery. Canterbury had back surgery but was not told about possible risk of paralysis and post-operative care requirements. He fell after surgery and was paralyzed. Dr. Spence stated risk was so small and because of fear that patient would not go through with surgery if he told of risk, he did not disclose it. Decision: Established informed consent requirements. Canterbury should have been informed by Dr. Spence of the risks and alternative treatment options prior to surgery to the extent that the patient could have made an informed decision to proceed or not with the surgery. Exceptions are when patient is unconscious or when information would harm patient (i.e. psychologically), but a doctor can't just keep info from a patient. Established the doctrine of informed consent as the proper basis for a suit of malpractice involving a failure to warn a patient of all of the potential risks of a procedure which a reasonable patient would wish to know. Causal link must exist between information doctor did not disclose and whether patient would have changed his mind about procedure resulting in injury. Jury must focus on what a prudent person would have decided if given all information. Physician has burden of proof of justifying that he made a reasonable decision not to disclose. Expert witnesses are not needed to establish reasonable decision making of nondisclosure cases. Shifted our culture from a 'professional practice standard' to a 'reasonable person standard' in malpractice cases, undermined the tradition and practice of physicians not testifying against each other, and largely opened the floodgates to the far more litigious medicolegal culture we have today.

Rogers v. Okin, 643 F.2d 650 (1980)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Case began as a federal class action suit filed by patients at Boston State Hospital challenging the hospital's restraint, seclusion and involuntary treatment policies. The lawsuit sought to enjoin the hospital from medicating patients against their will and from isolating them in seclusion cells. Case determined whether a person diagnosed with mental illness committed to a state psychiatric facility and assumed to be competent, has the right to make treatment decisions in non-emergency conditions. Decision: Court must hold a full evidentiary hearing, with counsel representing both sides and expert witness if needed, to make the decision whether an incompetent patient should be treated. This determination was to be made on the basis of "substituted judgment", that is, on an estimation of what the patient would have desired, were he competent. an involuntarily committed civil patient cannot be forcibly medicated or secluded except for in a case of emergency.

Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Case to determine if federal district courts have the power to order state mental institutions to provide minimum levels of psychiatric care and treatment to persons civilly committed to the institutions. The guardians of patients civilly committed to three Alabama facilities for the mentally handicapped brought this class action on behalf of their wards and other civilly committed patients at those institutions. Finding: Liberty deprivation. Treatment must be provided for individuals involuntarily committed who have an intellectual disability.

Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (1983)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Court to reconsider 1981 ruling due to other case Romeo v. Youngberg ruling. Decision: If we are to reconsider Rennie in light of the Supreme Court's teaching in Youngberg, we cannot employ the concept of "least intrusive means." Basis on which patient must have his constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs measured, is whether the patient constitutes a danger to himself or to others. Because that evaluation must be the product of the medical authorities' professional judgment, such a judgment and the resulting decision to administer medication will be presumed valid unless it is shown to be a "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards" (Romeo v. Youngberg standard). involuntarily committed patients have the constitutional right to refuse psychiatric medications if they are not dangerous to themselves or others.

O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Donaldson hospitalized against his will for 15 years and filed lawsuit. Decision: A state cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by themselves or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends. A finding of mental illness alone is not sufficient grounds for confining a person against their will. They must be found to be a danger to others or incapable of surviving safely without institutional care. 14th amendment: right to receive treatment when involuntarily civilly committed

Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F. 2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Dr. Caesar saw a patient after 2 automobile accidents. She decided to file suit and wanted him to testify on her behalf. Dr. Caesar provided notes to her defense but refused to testify due to concern that doing so would cause her distress and that she hadn't signed consent for him to do so. He then stated that even if she did sign, he wouldn't testify. She then revoked her psychotherapist-patient privilege and Dr. Caesar was required to give a disposition. In addition, court claimed she waived this privilege when she used emotional distress as part of her case. He participated in deposition but refused to answer questions about relationship between distress and the accident and was held in contempt. Decision: Holding that a "plaintiff - patient must forego any potential recovery for emotional or mental distress... to protect the confidentiality of communications to his or her psychotherapeutic doctor". there is no absolute privilege, every person who raises an issues (like mental condition) must bear disclosure of facts upon which the claim is based.

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Harper was an inmate who was violent when not medicated. Was involuntarily medicated and he sued due to not being given a hearing prior to involuntary medication administration. Finding: Internal review of medication administration is adequate. Due Process Clause permits a state to treat an incarcerated inmate having a serious mental disorder with antipsychotic medication against his will, under the condition that he is dangerous to himself or others and the medication prescribed is in his best medical interest. Prisoners have only a very limited right to refuse psychotropic medications in prison. The needs of the institution take precedence over the prisoners' rights. However, there must be a formal institutional hearing, the prisoner must be found to be dangerous to himself or others, the prisoner must be diagnosed with a serious mental illness, and the mental health care professional must state that the medication prescribed is in the prisoner's best interest. inmates can be involuntarily medicated if they 'suffer from a mental disorder and are gravely disabled or pose a likelihood of harm to self or others, and due process rights are followed (notification, review by non-tx doctors, appeals, etc.). This administrative hearing does not need to be a judicial review. No requirement for counsel to be provided at internal hearing.

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in "life, liberty, or property" is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law. Zinermon was found wandering, injured, and hallucinating and was taken to MH facility. Staff had him sign forms stating that he was there voluntarily. No hearing was held to justify admission. He sued hospital claiming he was incompetent to sign consent. Finding: Zinermon was entitled to receive the procedural safeguards provided by Florida's statutory involuntary placement procedure and the staff members had allegedly failed to initiate such procedure. According to the Court, liability was not precluded by the rule that state officials cannot be held liable. it is unconstitutional to deprive someone of liberty without due process of law. Even if not requested, the procedures for commitment must be followed.

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Kentucky permits the involuntary commitment of mentally retarded or mentally ill individuals who present a threat of danger to themselves, family, or others, who can reasonably benefit from the available treatment, and for whom the least restrictive alternative is placement in the relevant facility. The burden of proof in mental retardation commitment proceedings is clear and convincing evidence while the standard in mental illness proceedings is beyond a reasonable doubt. Guardians and immediate family members of the subject of a mental retardation proceeding may participate as if parties to those proceedings, with all attendant rights. In this action, respondents, a class of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons, claimed that the distinctions are irrational and therefore violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and that granting close family members and guardians the status of parties violates the Due Process Clause. Decision: Mentally retarded persons are not a 'suspect' class of persons (requiring the same level of protection as racial minorities); thus, governments are free to enact almost any legislation or rule to civilly commit them, and the courts will not intervene, short of illegal or ridiculous actions (called 'rational' scrutiny). Explained that there is a rationale explanation for the differences between mentally ill commitment and MR commitments. it is acceptable to have different standards of proof for MR and mentally ill for civil commitment because Addington set the minimum level at clear and convincing. It does not violate due process rights of MR people to have family involved in commitment proceedings. Family might have more info on person, tx needs, etc. and mentally ill people have a greater need for privacy than MR.

Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (1966)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Lake, 60 years old, found wandering in street and committed to hospital. Diagnosed with a dementia-like condition and due to family's inability to care for her was kept hospitalized. She appealed this hospitalization. Decision: The federal appellate court held that an indigent patient could not be required to carry the burden of showing the availability of alternatives. According to the court, because the government had the means to find alternatives, an earnest effort should have been made to review and exhaust available resources of the community in order to provide care reasonably suited to her needs. economic dependency is not a reason for sending someone to state mental hospitals. Burden on the state to find the least restrictive setting. Begins the move for due process rights for those civilly committed. The District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act provides that if the court or jury finds someone mentally ill and, because of that illness, is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public. This confirms the view of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare that the entire spectrum of services should be made available, including outpatient treatment, foster care, halfway houses, day hospitals, nursing homes, etc. The alternative course of treatment or care should be fashioned as the interests of the person and of the public require in the particular case. Deprivations of liberty solely because of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary for their protection.

Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Lessard was picked up by police officers and taken to a mental health center, where she was held on an emergency basis. After an ex parte proceeding, the judge issued a confinement order for 10 days. The doctor sought permanent commitment. The judge found that Lessard was mentally ill and ordered her commitment for an additional 30 days. Neither Lessard nor any representatives were informed of hearing. Committed without any clear justification. Decision: Civil confinement can be justified in some cases if the proper burden of proof is satisfied and dangerousness is based upon a finding of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another. The district court found that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to afford persons alleged to be mentally ill with adequate procedural safeguards. The scheme failed to require effective and timely notice of the charges for detention, permitted a detention for longer than 48 hours without a hearing on probable cause, and allowed the admission of hearsay. Psychiatric evidence was admissible without the detainee being given the benefit of the privilege against self-incrimination. Federal district court applied 5th Amendment to civil commitment proceedings and evals on grounds that a defendant's disclosures during a commitment hearing or a prehearing assessment are both "incriminating" and "compelled" (if individual is not informed of right to remain silent). In addition, the statute did not require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the detainee was both mentally ill and dangerous. Finally, less restrictive alternatives to commitment were not considered. deprivation of liberty for involuntary commitment. Right to: notify person; have an attorney; a hearing within 48 hours; me

U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Mafia member Salerno arrested and indicted for violating RICO Act. Decision: The Bail Reform Act of 1984 was constitutional, which permitted the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially a danger to society. The Act was held to violate neither the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor its Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Pretrial detainment-an individual's strong interest in liberty may be subordinated to greater needs of society. Government presented clear and convincing evidence for pretrial detainment (Genovese family)

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Nicholas Romeo had an intellectual disability with an infant level IQ and was committed to a state hospital. He was restrained for many hours of the day and repeatedly injured. Decision: Involuntarily committed residents had the right to reasonably safe confinement conditions, no unreasonable body restraints and the habilitation they reasonably require. Each individual has a due process protected interest in freedom from confinement and personal restraint; an interest in reducing the degree of confinement continues even for those individuals who are properly committed. freedom from undue physical restraint and from unsafe conditions of confinement. if you are involuntarily committing someone, in accordance with due process rights (14th amendment) you must provide habilitation and education (not just food and shelter). Similar to ruling in Wyatt v. Stickney, but that was only an Alabama decision.

Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Rennie was pilot who began showing signs of delusions, SI, and aggression in early 30s. Repeatedly hospitalized typically due to refusal to take his medication. Sued to prevent hospital from forcing medication on him in a non-emergency situation. Case to decide whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a constitutional right to refuse psychiatric medication. It was the first case to establish that such a patient has the right to refuse medication in the United States. Decision: An involuntarily committed patient who has not been found incompetent, barring an emergency, has a qualified right to refuse psychotropic medication, especially when forced treatment violates his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech or to practice his religion, or his Eighth Amendment rights to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Use "least intrusive means" to determine medication administration.

Parham v. JR, 442 U.S. 584 (1979)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Reviewed Georgia's procedures for the commitment of a child to a mental hospital based on the request of a parent. Decision: The Court rejected a class-action lawsuit from a group of minors, who claimed that the state's procedures were insufficient to ensure that parents did not use state mental hospitals as a "dumping ground" for children, and to ensure that minors committed to mental hospitals by their parents actually suffered from a condition sufficient to justify commitment. The Court ruled that minors may be civilly committed to mental health facilities without an adversary hearing; in essence, parents do have the right to commit their children. Because of the potential for abuse, the due process rights of minors required that state mental hospitals provide a neutral factfinder to review, after admission, parental decisions to involuntarily commit their minor child. voluntary hospitalization of a juvenile-private interest-liberty from hospitalization and being inaccurately labeled mentally ill. The risk of an erroneous decision is great so a neutral factfinder should evaluate the child for appropriateness of hospitalization. State/Gov interest-protect against spending resources on those who don't need hospitalization.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Treatment in Forensic Contexts Gamble, a prisoner, was assigned to labor to unload cotton bales and injured his back. He was not provided adequate medical care and instead was segregated for refusing work. Sued citing cruel and unusual punishment. Decision: Established the standard of what a prisoner must plead in order to claim a violation of Eighth Amendment rights. Medical malpractice is not automatically an 8th amendment violation. A prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Established that prisoners are entitled to a minimum level of treatment. prisoners have a constitutional right to medical treatment (because the gov is incarcerating them). To constitute 'cruel and unusual punishment' violation of 8th amendment, there must be 'deliberate indifference.'

Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966)

Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Treatment in Forensic Contexts Petitioner, while a prisoner, was certified as insane by a prison physician and transferred to Dannemora State Hospital, an institution under the jurisdiction of the New York Department of Correction and used for prisoners declared mentally ill while serving sentence. Dannemora's director filed a petition in the Surrogate's Court stating that petitioner's sentence was expiring and requesting that he be civilly committed under § 384 of the N.Y. Correction Law. At the proceeding, the State submitted medical evidence that petitioner was still mentally ill and in need of hospital care. The Surrogate stated that he had no objection to petitioner's transfer to a civil hospital under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Hygiene, but that, under § 384, that decision was up to the latter Department. That Department had determined ex parte that petitioner was not suitable for care in a civil hospital. When petitioner's sentence expired, his custody shifted to the Department of Mental Hygiene, but he has since remained at Dannemora. Writs of habeas corpus in state courts were dismissed, and petitioner's request that he be transferred to a civil hospital was denied as beyond the court's power. Decision: civil commitment following a prison term does not run afoul of double jeopardy principles. Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made. Baxstrom was denied equal protection of the laws by the statutory procedure under which a person could be civilly committed at the expiration of his penal sentence without the jury review that was available to all other persons who were civilly committed in the state, and by his civil commitment to the institution beyond the expiration of his prison term without a judicial determination that he was dangerously mentally ill. Prisoners require the same due process rights for civil commitment as anyone else facing possible civil commitment.

Budwin v. American Psychological Association, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (1994)

Communicating Forensic Opinions - Expert Testimony and Report Writing A private, voluntary association of psychologists is NOT prohibited from censuring one of its members for presenting false statements as a court-appointed expert in a child custody proceeding. Psychologist (Dr Budwin) testified in child custody case that he provided an hour of play therapy when he didn't and withheld documents from plaintiff and lawyer. She lost custody of one child. APA censured psychologist and he sued claiming his testimony was protected by immunity. Finding: A private organization can discipline one of it's members, not prohibited under quasi-judicial immunity.

Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs, 113 Wn.2d 123 (1989)

Communicating Forensic Opinions - Expert Testimony and Report Writing An engineer who testified as an expert witness on behalf of respondents at a previous trial is entitled to immunity from suit based on his testimony. Bruce sued neighbor for messing up soil. He hired Bynre-Stevens to testify about cost to fix soil. Engineers provided estimate to fix that was half of actual cost. Bruce then sued engineers. Guardians, therapists and attorneys who submit reports to family court are absolutely immune from civil suits based on their testimony. Finding: If an expert witness makes a mistake in their opinion (as long as it was a genuine mistake/not intentional), you can't be sued. Immunity applied to testimony but also actions in preparation for testimony. **Not offering immunity to expert witnesses would likely compromise the quality of testimony and encourage self-censorship in answers.

Deatherage v. Examining Board of Psychology, 948 P.2d 828 (Wash. 1997)

Communicating Forensic Opinions - Expert Testimony and Report Writing Licensing board brought disciplinary proceedings against a psychologist, alleging that he failed to meet professional ethical standards in work that formed the basis of his expert testimony in several child custody suits by his failure to qualify statements, his mischaracterization of statements, his failure to verify information, and his interpretation of test data; suspended his license for 10 years Psychologist sought judicial review claiming witness immunity. Finding: Supreme Court of Washington claimed that witness immunity does not extend to disciplinary proceedings by licensing boards. A disciplinary proceeding is a not a civil suit (which a witness is protected from).

Murphy v. A. A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1992)

Communicating Forensic Opinions - Expert Testimony and Report Writing Murphy hired Matthews to prepare engineering documents to help support a lawsuit against a subcontractor that did poor construction. Due to a poorly created report by Matthews, Murphy was only awarded $1M vs. $4M in damages. Murphy sued Matthews who claimed witness immunity. Because Matthews was not an unbiased 3rd party expert hired by the court, they can be sued for negligence. Finding: Missouri Supreme Court stated that witness immunity does not apply to proven cases of negligence and a witness can be sued.

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)

Competence to Stand Trial Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Ake (indigent) committed murder and was found not competent to stand trial. Was medicated and found competent if given antipsychotic. Attorney requested evaluation for sanity and was denied by court. Ake sentenced to death. Appealed and case was sent back stating Ake was entitled to psychiatrist for sanity eval. Finding: Based on 6th Amendment, a defendant must be given access to resources necessary to their defense (e.g., psychiatrists, psychologists) even if they cannot afford it themselves when dangerousness is an issue. Failure to do would be 'erroneous deprivation.' Government interest in denying is not substantial. Do not have a right to a clinician of their choosing or one who will support their legal position. Do not have right to private practitioner and report goes to defense and prosecution.

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)

Competence to Stand Trial Drope and others sexually assaulted Drope's wife. Wife explained that he was behaving bizarrely. He also attempted to kill her a week before the trial and attempted suicide during the trial. Psychiatrist hired by Drope indicated he needed treatment but court denied it and also denied pause to trial when he was absent due to injuries from suicide attempt. Sentenced to life. Decision was that denial of psychiatric evaluation denied Drope of due process. When deciding whether to evaluate a criminal defendant's competency, the court must consider any evidence suggestive of mental illness, even one factor alone in some circumstances. Therefore, the threshold for obtaining a competency evaluation is low. When the issue is raised, the motion should be granted. The defendant must not bear all the burden for raising the issue. The court added a fourth prong to the CST test by requiring that the defendant be able "to assist in preparing his defense." Finding: reaffirmed the fundamental right of competency is protected by the constitution (right to due process-14th amendment). Anyone can raise the issue of competence at any time before, during, or after a trial.

Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960)

Competence to Stand Trial Due process provides the right to a competency evaluation before a defendant stands trial. Test for CST must be whether he has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky had schizophrenia and drank alcohol and tranquilizers. He and 2 boys picked up a girl and the two others raped her and he attempted to rape her. Dusky found competent based on being oriented to time and place despite active psychotic symptoms. Affirming a criminal defendant's constitutional right to have a competency evaluation before proceeding to trial, and setting the standard for determination of such competence. Finding: To be competent, a defendant must be able to (1) consult with the lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; (2) otherwise assist in the defense, (3) have a rational understanding of the criminal proceedings. Being oriented/mental status is not enough.

U.S. v. Duhon, 104 F. Supp. 2d 663 (W.D.La, 2000)

Competence to Stand Trial Duhon charged with sexual exploitation for photos of young girls. 2 hearings held and Duhon determined not CST due to mental retardation. Sent to hospital for competency restoration. After 8 weeks deemed CST, but decision rejected due to argument for competency not meeting Daubert standard. Experts argues that he remains not CST due to permanent condition and does not present a threat to self or others so no further treatment is needed. Finding: MR can render an individual IST. The judge is the gatekeeper for expert testimony. · Federal District Court concluded that Duhon had received instruction and some basic facts about trial process via competence restoration program, but his intellectual disability prevented him from making intelligent legal decisions; required release or civil commitment; charges of sexual exploitation of children but found not dangerous and released

Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 1244 (1992)

Competence to Stand Trial Medina stole a gun and shot several people at various locations. Attorneys requested and were granted a competency hearing. Six psychs gave conflicting testimony. He was found CST and then tried to plead NGRI at trial. Sanity hearing found him sane. Was found to have premeditated murders and sentenced to death. Medina argued against burden on defendent (him) to show that he was incompetent. Supreme Court upheld decision by lower court and said it is defendent's burden to show. Finding: Supreme Court upheld consitutionality of CA statute that required a defendant who alleges incompetence to stand trial to bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996)

Competence to Stand Trial Oklahoma law presumes that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. "Clear and convincing evidence" is too high of a burden. Should be "preponderance of evidence" Cooper determined to not be CST and received treatment. He then faced trial as CST, but 2 experts disagreed on whether he was CST. Judge ruled that he was despite significant evidence that he wasn't. The burden for proving incompetency is only preponderance; due process would be violated if the burden is required to be carried by clear and convincing evidence. Finding: raising the standard of proof for CST from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing increases the likelihood of an IST defendant going to trial. This is a violation of due process rights.

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)

Competence to Stand Trial Pate killed wife and convicted to life sentence. Attorney claimed he was insane at time of crime and not CST. Sanity eval was not requested despite doctor testifying that he wasn't sane. Decision: cannot convict an incompetent person. There was enough evidence to suggest Pate was not competent and thus due process was violated. A retrospective determination of the defendant's competency could not satisfactorily be made because inter alia, "expert witnesses would have to testify solely from information contained in the printed record." Trial court had never inquired into the competency question, and thus medical experts had never examined Robinson at the time of the trial. Therefore, the only proper course was a new trial. A hearing about competency to stand trial is required under the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. Finding: anyone with a bona fide doubt can raise CST issues. Supreme Court suggested that it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent and yet knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have court determine his CST; courts should presume competence whenever defendant can clearly articulate decision to avoid a competence eval and attorney concurs with that decision

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)

Competence to Stand Trial Petitioner, a mentally defective deaf mute, who cannot read, write, or virtually otherwise communicate, was charged with two criminal offenses and committed. Determined that there was no way to make him CST. Essentially would experience a life sentence. Defendant cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain competency in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that he will not, the State must either institute civil proceedings applicable to indefinite commitment of those not charged with crime or release the defendant. Jackson was not determined to be "insane" and thus should have been treated in line with guidance for those that are "feeble-minded." Criminal defendants who have been found incompetent to stand trial are not permitted to be held indefinitely. There must be some possibility of becoming competent in a reasonable amount of time Due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." Reasoning that if commitment is for treatment and betterment of individuals, it must be accompanied by adequate treatment, several lower courts recognized a due process right Finding: - (commitment of individuals who are iST). A defendant committed solely on account of being IST cannot be held more than a reasonable period of time necessary to determine if they are restorable (violation of 14th Amendment). If person who is incompetent is unrestorable, then death sentence should be commuted.

Riggins v. Nevada, 524 U.S. 127 (1992)

Competence to Stand Trial Riggins facing murder and robbery charges and was psychotic. Prescribed antipsychotics and deemed competent. Riggins requested to discontinue meds until after trial because he wanted jury to see how he really was off meds. Was forced to stay on meds with rationale that experts would testify on medication's effects. Riggins was convicted and sentenced to death. Supreme Court decided that forced meds violated his due process rights because use of that med at that dosage was not justified and alternatives had not been tried. Involuntary treatment must be the least intrusive treatment for restoration of competence. The proposed treatment must be medically appropriate for the individual's safety as well as that of others. In a ruling very similar to Harper, the Court found that the State may force administration of psychotropic medications to a pre-trial detainee, if it establishes a medical need for the drug, and a need for the detainee's safety and that of others. To the Harper requirements, they added "less restrictive alternative" language, which requires the State to document that there are no behavioral, environmental, or other measures available that will be equally effective. Finding: it is a violation of the 6th and 14th amendments to force psychiatric meds on someone standing trial. The appropriateness of the RX was never shown by the state. The state didn't explore other reasonable alternatives to forced antipsychotic meds.

Seiling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973)

Competence to Stand Trial Seiling charged with assault with deadly weapon. 2 psychiatrists appointed to determine CST, who disagreed. 3rd psychiatrist appointed and all 3 determined Seiling was insane at time of crime but 2 said he was CST so he stood trial. Then he changed his plea to guilty. Sentenced but then filed writ of habeas corpus (unlawful confinement petition). Claimed no one determined if he was competent to waive his right to trial (only that he was CST). Decision: A defendant is not competent to plead guilty if a mental illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented to him and to understand the nature of the consequences of his plea. Determination of CST is inadequate to also state competent to waive Constitutional right to jury trial. Must specifically evaluate for competency to waive right. the 9th Circuit ruled that the standard to plead guilty is higher than the standard to proceed to trial (CST).

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)

Competence to Stand Trial Sell is a dentist who was convicted of multiple counts of health care fraud. He was diagnosed as suffering from "delusional disorder," and while the trial court did not find him to be a danger to himself or others, it did conclude that absent antipsychotic medication he was not competent to stand trial. Sell claimed allowing the government to administer antipsychotic medication against his will solely to render him competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses would violate his rights. Decision: Court may involuntarily administer antipsychotic medications to a mentally ill criminal defendant in order to render him competent to stand trial, "but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests." The Supreme Court laid down four criteria for cases involving the involuntary administration of medication to an incompetent pretrial defendant: 1) Did the defendant commit a serious crime? 2)Is there a substantial likelihood that involuntary medication will restore the defendant's competence and do so without causing side effects that will significantly interfere with the defendant's ability to assist counsel? 3) Is involuntary medication the least intrusive treatment for restoration of competence? 4)Is the proposed treatment medically appropriate?

Wilson v. U.S., 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968)

Competence to Stand Trial Wilson tried and convicted for assault. Evidence against him was substantial. Arrested due to car accident in stolen car in which he suffered significant brain damage. Wilson has amnesia and argues that violates his due process to try him for crime since he can't assist his defense. Deemed not CST and sent to treatment. Then deemed CST but 2nd hearing stated he could not assist with his own defense due to amnesia. Argument that he was sane at the time of the crime and was CST now so illegal to hospitalize him. Court found CST and convicted him. Decision: Amnesia without a mental disease can never render the accused IST. In making findings of an amnesic defendant's mental competency, the court should consider the following factors: (1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant's ability to consult with and assist his lawyer. (2) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant's ability to testify in his own behalf. (3) The extent to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically reconstructed in view of the defendant's amnesia. Such evidence would include evidence relating to the crime itself as well as any reasonably possible alibi. (4) The extent to which the Government assisted the defendant and his counsel in that reconstruction. (5) The strength of the prosecution's case. Most important here will be whether the Government's case is such as to negate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. If there is any substantial possibility that the accused could, but for his amnesia, establish an alibi or other defense, it should be presumed that he would have been able to do so. (6) Any other facts and circumstances which would indicate whether or not the defendant had a fair trial. After finding all the facts relevant to the fairness of the trial, considering the amnesia, the court will then make a judgment whether, under applicable principles of due process, the conviction should stand.

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)

Competence to Stand Trial Death Penalty Prosecution-retained psychiatrist (Dr James Grigson) conducted court-ordered assessment of Smith for competency and then used content from assessment to testify during sentencing ("severe sociopath") about sanity and violence risk. Conviction overturned due to violations of right against self-incrimination and right to attorney (who wasn't notified of assessment or that psychiatrist would be testifying) Same doctor that evaluated the criminal defendant for competency also testified at the penalty phase of the trial. That violated the defendant's right against self incrimination --primary case in which the court has considered the application of 5th and 6th amendments to forensic MH assessments; absent a defendant's willingness to cooperate as to the verbal content of his communications a psychiatric exam would be meaningless; Supreme Court condoned sanctions against defendants for non-participation with eval because allowing defendant to remain silent deprives state the only effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue he interjected into the case --Implied that Miranda warnings be given prior to every forensic eval, but this is not accurate because defendant does not have a right to remain silent during a court-ordered eval; attorney-client privilege could protect client so shouldn't remain silent; only when defense has not indicated an intent to use testimony of a MH professional and eval is designed to obtain sanity or sentencing info for the state does the clinician need to tell the defendant, "You may refuse to talk, and anything you say may be used against you." Finding: Supreme Court held that findings or data from forensic evals performed to determine trial competence could be used only for that purpose; otherwise violates 6th and 5th Amendment

PEOPLE v. GOLDSTEIN (2005)

Constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him was violated when a psychiatrist who testified for the prosecution recounted statements made to her by people who were not available for cross-examination Goldstein pushed woman into subway train. Claimed insanity. Prosecution psychiatrist interviewed third-parties and presented statements from third-parties in her testimony.

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Foucha charged with burglary and discharging weapon. Found NGRI. Sent to hospital where he would only be released once he was found to no longer be a danger to himself or others. Continued to be found dangerous due to Antisocial PD despite resolving psychosis. Decision: Potential dangerousness was not sufficient for continuing to hospitalize person found NGRI if there was no mental illness. committed NGRI individuals must be afforded due process rights (but states can differ in the protections offered). Must be mentally ill and dangerous for ongoing confinement.

Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354 (1983)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Civil Commitment & Civil Competencies Jones charged with misdemeanor shoplifting in DC. Diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia but found CST. Pleaded NGRI by preponderance of evidence (product of mental illness). Sentence would have carried 1 year maximum prison, but instead hospitalized for years because still suffering from schizophrenia. For NGRI, gets initial hearing at 50 days and then hearing every 6 months to determine when can be released. Found still suffering at each hearing. Appealed asking for release based on being hospitalized more the maximum sentence unless would be hospitalized following civil commitment requirements. Civil commitment requires jury trial and clear and convincing evidence both 1) proof of mental illness and 2) potential dangerousness Decision: When a criminal defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to a mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. NGRI acquittees don't have the same due process rights afforded to civilly committed mental patients. Indefinitely committing an insanity acquittee doesn't violate the requirement of due process when the defendant has established his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Clark killed police officer because he believed town had been taken over by aliens. Clark has paranoid schizophrenia and claimed he was both 1) insane and 2) did not have required mens rea. Court limited admission of MH info to only that which related to insanity defense and not mens rea. He was prevented by the trial court from introducing psychiatric evidence related to insanity when he was contesting the mental state element. Unless the defendant was insane, according to the trial court, Arizona law did not permit him to use evidence of a mental disorder to challenge that element. Since he knew right from wrong according to the prosecution's expert (not the defense's expert), he was convicted. AZ had previously removed the part of the insanity defense definition from M'Naghten related to whether he knew/appreciated what he was doing and only kept in understanding of right vs. wrong. Decision: Upheld Constitutionality of insanity defense as defined in Arizona. Due process permits a state to prevent a criminal defendant from providing evidence of diminished capacity. the insanity rule is substantially open to the state's choice. · testimony about observation evidence (what defendant did and said during period of alleged offense and expert testimony on how a person may think in certain way or behavioral characteristics) are allowed; mental-disease evidence (describing defendant's disorder at time of offense) and capacity evidence (about defendant's capacity for cognition and moral judgment) may be excluded.

U.S. v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) DC Court of Appeals case. Brawner and uncle got drunk and went to a party where a fight broke out. Brawner left to get gun and said he was going to kill someone. Came back and killed someone. Claimed insanity and diagnosed with explosive PD associated with epilepsy but ultimately experts disagreed whether diagnosis was related to crime. Decision: A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Overturned Durham rule. It proposed a rule that was adopted as the American Law Institute (ALI) Model Penal Code rule Expert must explain their conclusions, caveat: past criminal activity only relevant is related to mental illness.

Kansas v. Cheever 571 U.S. _ (2013)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Death Penalty Cheever killed deputy who came to arrest him for warrant. Was using meth at time of shooting. Asserted a voluntary intoxication defense and argued that the methamphetamine use rendered him mentally incapable of the premeditation required for murder. Prosecution had him undergo psych eval and used interview transcripts to impeach Cheever's testimony and then brought psychiatrist in as rebuttal witness to argue against voluntary intoxication defense. Appealed based on psychiatrist's testimony violating 5th Amendment rights because eval was not voluntary. Decision: Fifth Amendment does not prevent the prosecution from introducing psychiatric evidence to rebut psychiatric evidence presented by the defense. Also differentiated between mental status (i.e. intoxication not protected by insanity code) and mental disease/defect (part of insanity definition). if the defense offers evidence regarding the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime, the prosecution can use evidence (e.g., psych evals) to rebut the defense's evidence.

Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Durham had mental illness and committed numerous crimes. Charged with housebreaking and lawyer claimed insanity. Expert also said insane at time of crime but claimed most mentally ill people know right from wrong, but this was insufficient to say whether he was insane. Court rejected insanity defense and Durham found guilty. Decision: An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. Once "some evidence" of a mental disorder is introduced, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Durham Rule only adopted by 2 states

Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (1976)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Edney found guilty of kidnapping and killing ex-girlfriend's 8 year old daughter. Claim State violated his constitutional rights by calling a psychiatrist who had interviewed petitioner before trial at his counsel's request. At trial, sanity raised and defense psychiatrist said he was insane. Prosecution called another psychiatrist that defense had previously hired who said he was sane. Defense objected claiming this violated psychotherapist-patient privilege. Rule 504 states that no privilege exists if uses condition as part of his defense. Decision: When insanity defense is raised, waiver of privilege occurs. when an insanity defense is asserted and the defendant offers evidence to show insanity, a complete waiver of doctor/attorney-patient privilege is effected and the gov't can call this witness.

Rex v. Arnold (1724)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Edward Arnold is charged with attempting to murder Lord Onslow (a capital offense). The defense argued that Arnold suffered from the delusion that he was the victim of Onslow's persecution and bewitchment, which caused "imps" to dance in his bed all night. Established "wild beast" test for insanity: "it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast; such a one is never the object of punishment; therefore, I must leave it to your consideration, whether [the defendant] ... knew what he was doing and whether he was able to distinguish whether he was doing good or evil." Finding: the judge ruled for the defendant to be acquitted by reason of insanity because he did not know what he was doing, and was doing no more than a "wild beast" would do.

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Egelhoff picked and sold mushrooms with 2 others and then they all got drunk. Then he was found with their 2 bodies in the car with gunshot wounds to both. Charged with deliberate homicide ("purposefully or knowingly causing death") but he said he was too drunk to have mens rea. Judge instructed the jury to disregard evidence of his intoxicated condition in determining whether he had the mental state necessary to be held criminally liable for purposely or knowingly causing a death. Egelhoff appealed his conviction and obtained a reversal from the Montana Supreme Court, which ruled that intoxication was relevant to the mental state requirement. Claimed that law required mens rea to meet criminal offense definition and since intoxication would impair mens rea, then not guilty. Montana law did not allow intoxication as an excuse for murder. Decision: A criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to present evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the required mental state of a murder charge. states can limit the introduction of evidence for a valid reason (eg voluntary intox).

Frendak v. U.S., 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Frendak shot coworker, found CST after numerous evals but all deemed her not sane at time of crime. She refused to use insanity defense because she thought hospital was worse than jail. Forced by court to use insanity defense. Decision: Judge cannot impose insanity defense over defendent's objection. If the defendant appears to be intelligently and voluntarily waiving the insanity defense, the trial court should not deny this. Must be competent to waive insanity defense. This is DC decision but Supreme Court held the same decision in Godinez v. Moran and revised in Indiana v. Edwards. the court must ensure that the defendant is fully informed of the consequences of waiving the insanity defense and he must be competent to waive the defense. Court cannot impose an insanity defense if the defendant can 'intelligently and voluntarily' decide to forego this defense. The court listed several disadvantages to choosing the insanity defense, including: 1) an insanity acquittal may increase the period of confinement over a prison sentence, 2) better treatment may be received in a prison than a mental hospital, 3) the defendant may want to avoid the stigma associated with a mental disorder, 4) commitment may result in loss of other rights, such as a driver's license, 5) the defendant may regard the crime as a political or religious act

Ibn-Tamas v. U.S., 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Ibn-Tamas murdered her husband and was sentenced to prison. Significant history of DV in relationship. She appealed based on: (1) the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony offered by the defense on the subject of battered women; (2) the prosecution's use, for impeachment purposes, of appellant's testimony at her first trial; (3) the prosecutor's comments to the jury about appellant's consultation with her attorney before interrogation by the police after her arrest; (4) the court's allowing the prosecution to question appellant about her beneficial interest in her husband's life insurance policies; (5) an allegedly prejudicial variance between the prosecutor's description of the case in his opening remarks and the evidence adduced at trial; and (6) the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as to how appellant's particular physical condition should affect an evaluation of her self-defense claim. Decision: Court erred in excluding testimony of Dr. Leonore Walker, clinical psychologist, and expert on "battered women." To be admissible, must provide a relevant insight which the jury otherwise could not gain in evaluating appellant's self-defense testimony about her relationship with her husband. expert testimony can be allowed if the judge determines that the expert is qualified and competent to testify and is testifying about things generally accepted and based on sound methodology. (battered women).

M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl.&F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) M'Naghten shot victim whom he thought was British PM. Claimed NGRI. Experts argued that he had delusions and couldn't understand right from wrong as it pertained to the given crime. Found not guilty. Decision: Created M'Naghten Rules: defendant wishing to rely on the defence of insanity must show that: 1) They laboured under a defect of reason, 2) Caused by a disease of the mind; so that either 3a) He did not know the nature and quality of his acts, or 3b) that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Increased importance of medical testimony. If the person is delusional, the delusions must be related to the crime, such that someone else would act similarly if the delusions were true.

McDonald v. U.S., 312 F.2d 847 (1962)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) McDonald charged with 2nd degree murder for aiding employer in shooting someone. Had IQ of 68 and plead insanity, but convicted. Appealed based on 1) court failed to state that, if acquitted by reason of insanity, appellant would be confined in a mental hospital until it was determined that he was no longer dangerous to himself or others. This statement is required unless it "appears affirmatively on the record" that the defendant did not want it and 2) in its charge the court twice enumerated the alternative verdicts available to the jury. But both times it failed to include "not guilty because of insanity." Defined mental disease or defect as "includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." Stated Lyles jury instructions were required. Finding: juries should be told about the consequences of an insanity acquittal in the same way they are instructed about the meaning of other verdicts.

People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Patterson was convicted of murder after he shot his estranged wife's boyfriend. At his trial he raised the affirmative defense that he was acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the incident, which would reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter. The jury was instructed that the burden of persuasion was on defendant with respect to whether he had been acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, and defendant appealed claiming placing burden on defendent violated due process rights. Decision: Extreme emotional disturbance was merely a mitigating circumstance that did not alter the prosecution's burden to prove intent, which was not negated by such disturbance. Lack of emotional disturbance is not an element of murder. the burden of proof in the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance is on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.

People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588 (1991)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Saille drank excessively then got into fight with bartender. Got a gun and shot at bartender but ended up killing a patron. Appealed based on belief that court did not provide jury sufficient instructions that voluntary intoxication could lead to diminished capacity to form mens rea and be determined manslaughter vs murder. Court of appeals rejected premise of appeal based on new law in state that said diminished capacity was no longer viable defense. Decision: Agreed with Court of appeals. California abolished diminished capacity which would allow murder charges to be reduced to manslaughter and this was upheld. voluntary intoxication or mental condition could be considered in deciding whether there was actual malice in murder. Can show that this affected ability to form intent. CA doesn't allow a reduction of what would otherwise be murder to non statutory voluntary manslaughter due to voluntary intox and/or mental disorder.

Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 689 (1989)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Under Texas law, an individual may not be sentenced to death unless the State proves that there is a probability that he would commit future acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Powell arrested for capital murder. Court ordered psych eval for CST and sanity. Neither he nor his counsel was notified that he would be examined on the issue of future dangerousness, and he was not informed of his right to remain silent. He was convicted. At his sentencing hearing, the doctors who had examined him testified on the issue of future dangerousness, and he was sentenced to death. The Court of Appeals declined to vacate the sentence, holding that, by introducing psychiatric testimony in support of an insanity defense, Powell had waived his Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to object to the State's use of the testimony to satisfy its burden of proving future dangerousness. Decision: The evidence of future dangerousness was taken in deprivation of Powell's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Once a defendant is formally charged, the right to counsel precludes a psychiatric examination concerning future dangerousness without notice to counsel. defendants, and their attorneys, need to be informed when they are being evaluated for dangerousness. Especially in capital cases. Even when the defendant is raising an insanity defense. Still need informed consent for assessment of dangerousness.

Washington v. U.S., 129 U.S. App. D.C. 29, 390 F.2d 444 (1967)

Criminal Responsibility (including Diminished Capacity and Mens Rea Defenses) Washington convicted of rape, robbery, and assault. Claimed insanity. The court not only forbade testimony as to whether the act was the product of mental illness, but also provided that the judge must instruct the expert that his conclusions must be supported by testimony as to the "investigations, observations, reasoning and medical theory [leading] to [his] opinion." It was felt that this requirement would lessen the likelihood of psychiatrists testifying in terms of labels (e.g., schizophrenia, neurosis) which inherently contain moral and legal, as well as medical, judgments. The court did not, however, proscribe experts from speaking of "mental disease or defect," although part of the ultimate issue for the jury, because these terms have medical significance. Recommended: Noted medico-legal writers have objected to this diagnostic categorization and have urged instead that the testimony focus on describing and making intelligible the defendant's personality and behavior. To be meaningful and helpful to the jury, the testimony should include information on defendant's mental, emotional and voluntary processes; the nature of any mental disease or defect, and the relationship of such disease or defect to the type of conduct for which defendant has been charged; the degree of intensity with which he has delusions and hallucinations; the extent to which he is capable of deferring gratifications or to which he comprehends the consequences of his actions; and, the probability that any such condition which would be relevant to the crime charged was, in fact, influencing him at the time the crime was committed.' Labels and esoteric terminology should be avoided whenever possible, not only because they will more likely be incomprehensible to the jury, but because in the developing sciences of psychiatry and psychology, they imply a precision which is non-existent. An expository type of testimony is also called for because of the evidentiary requirement that expert opinion have an ascertainable basis in fact. Finding: a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity is appropriate only when a jury verdict of guilty would clearly violate

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)

Death Penalty An Ohio law required that the death penalty was mandatory for felons convicted of aggravated murder unless the victim had induced the offense, the offense was committed under duress or coercion, or the offense was a product of mental deficiencies. Sandra Lockett, the driver of the getaway car for a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pawnshop owner, was found guilty under the Ohio statute and sentenced to death. Decision: Sentencing authorities must have the discretion to consider every possible mitigating factor, rather than being limited to a specific list of factors. · Supreme Court decided that jury could not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of the defendant's character or record or any circumstances of the offense that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence of less than death; any info regarding the defendant's background can be considered relevant during sentencing

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)

Death Penalty Atkins and his accomplice robbed, abducted and then murdered Eric Nesbitt near a convenience store in Virginia. Atkins was convicted and sentenced to death, though a psychologist's evaluation found that he met the criteria for mild mental retardation. In a 2nd hearing, the Virginia Supreme Court again sentenced Atkins to death, relying on a standard determined by an earlier case that found that people with "mental retardation" (now referred to as "intellectual disability") are eligible for execution. The U.S. Supreme Court decided to review the case, given that many state legislatures were beginning to abandon this standard. Decision: Executing people with intellectual disabilities constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court ruled that juveniles who are mentally retarded cannot be executed for their offenses. Violates 8th Amendment.

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)

Death Penalty Ford convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but began showing signs of paranoid schizophrenia. Believed he was Pope John Paul II and appointed new Supreme Court justices. 3 psychiatrist evaluated him and all said he was psychotic but understood death penalty's effect on him. Ford sued secretary of Florida Dept of Corrections. Decision: 8th Amendment prevents the execution [capital punishment] of the insane, requiring an evaluation of competency and an evidentiary hearing.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)

Death Penalty Furman broke into house and shot resident when he was caught. Sentenced to death. Case was combined with 2 others in which death penalty was sentenced for rape. Due to apparent inconsistency and arbitrariness in application of death penalty, cases were appealed. Decision: Death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. Invalidated all then existing legal constructions for the death penalty in the United States.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 438 US 302 (1976)

Death Penalty In response to Furman, 37 states rewrote their death penalty statutes; North Carolina made all 1st degree murder convictions punishable by death with no discretion granted to judge or jury. Woodson was charged with first-degree murder as a result of his participation in an armed robbery at a convenience store, where the cashier was killed in the course of the robbery. Woodson pleaded not guilty, arguing that another defendant coerced him into participating, but the jury convicted him of first-degree murder. Woodson challenged his conviction on the grounds that North Carolina's mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder violated the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by the Eighth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation doctrine. Decision: North Carolina's law violated the Eighth Amendment and remanded the case to redetermine Woodson's sentence. · ruled death penalty should not be imposed upon every person convicted of a specific offense; need to individualize the factors to determine correct punishment; implied need for sentencing scheme that permitted consideration of relevant facets of character and record of individual offender or circumstances of the offense

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)

Death Penalty Juvenile Justice Simmons, 17, and a younger friend broke into the home of Shirley Crook, tied her up and blindfolded her, drove her to a state park and threw her off a bridge, and she drowned. Simmons received the death penalty, but the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the case to determine whether the death penalty for juvenile defendants in general is constitutional. APA, along with the Missouri Psychological Association, filed an amicus brief to help the court resolve whether the recognized purposes of the death penalty—deterrence and retribution—should apply to 16- and 17-year-olds as a group given developing nature of adolescent brain. Decision: The execution of minors constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. It violates the 8th and 14th amendments to execute someone who was younger than 18 years old at the time of the crime.

Lawlor v. Zook (4th Cir. 2018)

Death Penalty Lawlor worked at apartment complex and drank alcohol/took cocaine, then raped and killed a tenant. Sentenced to death because jury felt he was likely to reoffend. Defense was prevented from fully presenting a witness who would have testified that he had a low likelihood of reoffending and thus should be imprisoned for life. Despite only options for sentencing being life in prison without parole or the death sentence, witness was only allowed to talk about his dangerousness in "society" and not "prison society." Decision: Defendent should have been able to present witness testifying about future dangerousness in prison society.

Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S._(2019)

Death Penalty Madison killed police officer during DV situation. Sentenced to death by judge who overruled jury's sentence of life imprisonment. Appealed on basis that Madison did not rationally understand the connection between his crime and his execution. Madison had severe strokes and could not recall the actual crime but did understand he was being executed for his crime. Decision: Remanded to lower court to see if he could rationally understand reasons for his sentence.

Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. _ (2017)

Death Penalty Moore committed robbery and murder and was sentenced to death. Had IQ just above 70 but due to previous rigid standards, anything above 70 was not an intellectual disability. Decision: Contemporary clinical standards determine what an intellectual disability is, and held that even milder forms of intellectual disability may bar a person from being sentenced to death due to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. o Supreme Court held that adaptive functioning component of intellectual disability diagnosis in death penalty cases must conform with accepted professional definitions; adaptive functioning in other areas is irrelevant (i.e. prison bx, mowing lawns, opinion of relatives)

Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S.Ct. 2842 (2007)

Death Penalty Panetti killed his wife's parents and then held his wife and daughter hostage. Sought to represent himself and competency hearing held. Diagnosed with schizophrenia but CST and to waive counsel. Rejected NGRI and standby counsel indicated concern about his competency but he was still convicted and sentenced to death. Multiple appeals occurred eventually at Federal Court in which he claimed state did not follow Ford v. Wainwright procedures because although experts assessed his competency to be executed, a hearing did not occur. Despite Panetti understanding that he did the crime and was being executed for the crime, based on his delusions, he did not fully appreciate the connection between the 2 events. Decision: Criminal defendants sentenced to death may not be executed if they do not understand the reason for their imminent execution, and that once the state has set an execution date death-row inmates may litigate their competency to be executed in habeas corpus proceedings

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)

Death Penalty Part of combination of cases that ended moratorium on death penalty. Since Furman v. Georgia, states had either specified factors to be weighed and procedures to be followed when imposing a death sentence, or dictated that the death penalty would be mandatory for specific crimes. Decision: To use death penalty, states must follow 2 criteria: 1) provide objective criteria to direct and limit the death sentencing discretion. The objectiveness of these criteria must in turn be ensured by appellate review of all death sentences. 2) allow the sentencer (whether judge or jury) to take into account the character and record of an individual defendant. · Supreme Court ruled that Georgia's sentencing scheme, which called for established procedures as a method to prevent arbitrariness and capriciousness in Furman, was constitutional; state required that at least one aggravating factor must be established beyond reasonable doubt before defendant could be sentenced to death; permitted defense to introduce mitigating facts or circumstances; Court accepted bifurcated structure of trial; allowed jurors to consider all factors to determine whether death sentence is appropriate (AKA proportionality review)

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)

Death Penalty Payne raped and murdered neighbor and her daughter. Victim impact statements were allowed at sentencing. Decision: Testimony in the form of a victim impact statement is admissible during the sentencing phase of a trial and, in death penalty cases, does not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Payne's death sentence changed to life in prison due to intellectual disability.

State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992)

Death Penalty Perry killed 5 family members and then fled state leaving list of future victims including Supreme Court Justice. Sentenced to death. Found to only be competent to be executed if he was forced medications. Appealed on basis that forced medications were not in best interest of Perry. Case remanded to lower court for further deliberation.

Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003)

Death Penalty Singlelton convicted and sentenced to death for murder and then found incompetent for execution. He was diagnosed with psychotic disorder and was periodically forced medication. Hearing determined medication was needed to ensure safety. Appealed based on unconstitutionality of forcing medication to gain competency for execution. Decision: No violation of 8th amendment for force medication for execution, but this decision should be applied narrowly based on factors in the case. · 8th Circuit Court of Appeals held that because government's interest in carrying out lawfully imposed death sentence is essential, involuntary medication is permissible when no less intrusive way of fulfilling this interest exists and when the state can show by clear and convincing evidence that medication is likely to render the person competent, has no serious side effects, and is in person's best medical interests

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)

Death Penalty Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi-Criminal Commitment Convicted of murdering police officer and during sentencing jury was instructed to consider future dangerousness in determining whether Barefoot would get death penalty. Prosecution called 2 psychiatrists who did not evaluate Barefoot. One called him a "criminal sociopath" and said no treatment would help him and he was likely to reoffend. The other claimed he was one of the most dangerous sociopaths and was above a 10 on a scale of 0-10 for sociopathy. Appealed sentence claiming admission of this testimony was unconstitutional. APA filed amicus brief stating psychiatrists could not reliably predict future dangerousness. Decision: Supreme Court stated that psychiatrists could provide opinions about future dangerousness and that adversarial nature of court would allow contradictions if opinion was flawed. expert witnesses can answer hypothetical questions without evaluating the defendant and psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness is constitutional Psychiatrist expelled from APA for making claim about future dangerousness with "100% certainty" and for testifying about person he hadn't evaluated.

Strickland v Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

Death Penalty Washington plead guilty to 3 murders and burglaries and explained that he was trying to support his family. Defense counsel during sentencing didn't request psych eval or seek out character witnesses. He was sentenced to death. Appealed based on ineffective counsel. Decision: Established the standard for determining when a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated by that counsel's inadequate performance. The Court, in a decision by Justice O'Connor, established a two-part test for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: Counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel's performance gives rise to a reasonable probability that if counsel had performed adequately, the result would have been different.

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999)

Discrimination (ADA) & Educational Access (IDEA) 2 individuals hospitalized for serious mental illness and recommended to be transferred to community-based program. Instead they continued to be hospitalized based on claim that state funding shortages prevented immediate transfer. Claimed unnecessary institutional segregation was violation of ADA. Finding: under the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals with mental disabilities have the right to live in the community rather than in institutions. Mental illness is a disability. State must ensure that services provided are given equitably.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)

Discrimination (ADA) & Educational Access (IDEA) Ellerth sexually harrassed by boss and told she would not get job benefits unless subjected to his sexual requests. She sued for discrimination for violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finding: A company can be subject to vicarious liability for a hostile environment. Hostile environment requires harassment that's severe and pervasive. Can be merely uncomfortable and not necessarily blatant. In alleged sex discrimination cases without a Tangible Employment Action, employers may prove that: 1)the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and that 2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Generally, having an effective sexual harassment policy that is used and works is sufficient to satisfy the first prong.

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)

Discrimination (ADA) & Educational Access (IDEA) Ellison worked for IRS and was pestered by coworker until she was transferred to another office for 6 months. When she was set to return, she sued IRS alleging sexual harassment. Finding: the severity of seriousness of sexual harassment varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the sexual harassment. When examining these factors, the perspective of the victim or 'reasonable woman' should be adopted. Under Title VII, employers need to educate and respond appropriately to workplace harassment. A reasonable woman could consider the co-worker's behavior to be sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of appellant's employment and create an abusive working environment.

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009)

Discrimination (ADA) & Educational Access (IDEA) Firefighters took examinations to qualify for promotion. When the results of the exam showed that white candidates had outperformed minority candidates, a rancorous public debate ensued. Some firefighters argued the tests should be discarded because the results showed the tests to be discriminatory. They threatened a discrimination lawsuit if the City made promotions based on the tests. Other firefighters said the exams were neutral and fair. And they, in turn, threatened a discrimination lawsuit if the City ignored the test results and denied promotions to the candidates who had performed well. In the end, the City threw out the results based on the statistical racial disparity. Petitioners, white and Hispanic firefighters who passed the exams but were denied a chance at promotions by the City's refusal to certify the test results, sued the City and respondent officials, alleging that discarding the test results discriminated against them based on their race in violation of, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The City responded that had they certified the test results, they could have faced Title VII liability for adopting a practice having a disparate impact on minority firefighters. Finding: employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual's race. Violates Title VII, New Haven Fire Fighters. City improperly discarded the examination to achieve a more desirable racial distribution of promotion-eligible candidates, since there was no strong basis in evidence that the examination was deficient and that discarding the examination was necessary to avoid disparate impact. The threshold showing of statistical disparity in the examination results was insufficient by itself to constitute a strong basis in evidence of unlawful disparate impact, the extensively analyzed examinations were job-related and consistent with business necessity, and there was no strong basis in evidence of an equally valid, less-discriminatory testing alternative.

Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993)

Discrimination (ADA) & Educational Access (IDEA) Harris was sexually harassed by President of company. She complained to him and he said he would stop but he continued. She quit and sued him for discrimination claiming he made an abusive work environment for her based on her gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finding: even if there is no physical or psychological injury, an abusive work environment/sexual harassment can still exist. All circumstances/conditions should be considered when evaluating if this type of workplace environment exists. An abusive environment 'that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being can and often will detract from... job performance, discourage employees from staying on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.' If the environment 'would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive' this is enough.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)

Discrimination (ADA) & Educational Access (IDEA) Oncale filed suit against his former employer due to sexual harrassment based on discrimination due to sex. Finding: workplace harassment under Title VII applies to same-sex harassment.

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)

Discrimination (ADA) & Educational Access (IDEA) Vinson hired as bank teller and subjected to boss's sexual harrassment for years. Then fired for overuse of sick leave. Claimed she was subjected to a hostile work environment and sued. Finding: Recognized sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case was the first of its kind to reach the Supreme Court and would redefine sexual harassment in the workplace. Sexual harrassment leading to non-economic injury was form of sex discrimination prohibited by Civil Rights Act. Employers are not automatically liable for a hostile work environment. A hostile work environment does not have to be quid pro quo, tied to money, or a promotion. A Plaintiff with hostile environment-styled claims must prove that the challenged conduct was severe or pervasive, created a hostile or abusive working environment, was unwelcome, and was based on the plaintiff's gender.

Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.Supp.2d 668 (1977)

Ethics, Guidelines, Professional Issues and Duties Dr. Doe published verbatim detailed descriptions and diagnoses about a couple seen in treatment 8 years prior without the couple's consent. Suit filed and compensatory damages were awarded. Finding: A patient's confidentiality is violated by the publication of information obtained during psych treatment without consent. (don't write a book on it...). Physician who enters into an agreement with a patient to provide medical attention impliedly covenants to keep in confidence all disclosures made by patient.

In Re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557 (1970)

Ethics, Guidelines, Professional Issues and Duties Dr. Lifschutz was imprisoned after he was adjudged in contempt of court for refusing to obey an order of the San Mateo County Superior Court instructing him to answer questions and produce records relating to communications with a former patient. Dr. Lifschutz's patient, Housek sued Arabian for assault and during deposition, Housek acknowledged he received tx from Dr. Lifschutz. He did not claim or waive psychotherapist privilege and Dr. Lifschutz was ordered to turn over records and testify. Because Housek introduced relationship and content of relationship with Dr. Lifschutz, privilege does not apply and dr must produce records. Finding: Dr. Lifschutz refused to acknowledge treatment of or turn over records of a plaintiff that had already spoke about his treatment with the doctor. Dr. Lifschutz contends that this underlying court order was invalid as unconstitutionally infringing his personal constitutional right of privacy, his right effectively to practice his profession, and the constitutional privacy rights of his patients. He also attacks the order, or more specifically, the statutory provisions which authorize the compulsion of his testimony in these circumstances, as unconstitutionally denying him the equal protection of the laws since, under California law, clergymen could not be compelled to reveal certain confidential communications under these circumstances.Patient, not the doctor owns privilege. There is no constitutional right that allows psychotherapist to assert absolute privilege concerning all psychotherapeutic communications. Sometimes you have to disclose info when ordered.

Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786 (1992)

Ethics, Guidelines, Professional Issues and Duties Dr. Oziel saw Erik and Lyle Menendez as patients. Search warrant seized audio tape and notes of 2 sessions. Dr. Oziel asserted psychotherapist privilege. Court found that privilege did not apply for audiotapes because tape was made due to Dr. Oziel's concern for his own safety and his safety concerns were disclosed to his wife and lover, thus losing the privileged status. Decision partially reversed with tapes relating to "dangerous persons" exception and disclosed to 3rd parties losing privilege, but tapes relating to later sessions where no disclosure was made keeping privilege. Finding: Psychotherapist privilege covers all communications, even ones not necessarily considered privileged/confidential. Audio and video taped sessions do not negate privilege. Unless dangerousness exception is clear and present, privilege can superseded the constitutional right to due process of law.

Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 395 Mass 1004, 479 N.E.2d 674 (1985)

Ethics, Guidelines, Professional Issues and Duties Psychiatric records of certain patient communications are not "necessary fully to disclose the extent of the services provided." The critical issue in a Medicaid fraud investigation is whether the psychiatrist has accurately represented the number of patients seen, the frequency of patient visits, and the length of time per visit or psychotherapeutic session. Commonwealth may properly request that Dr. Kobrin submit to the grand jury those portions of his records documenting the times and lengths of patient appointments, fees, patient diagnoses, treatment plans and recommendations, and somatic therapies. --Dr Kobrin (psychiatrist) was under investigation for Medicaid fraud and ordered to turn over all his patient files. He cited psychotherapist privilege and did not turn over records. Was held in contempt, but ruling overturned. o primary case in which the court has considered the application of 5th and 6th amendments to forensic MH assessments; absent a defendant's willingness to cooperate as to the verbal content of his communications a psychiatric exam would be meaningless; prosecution-retained psychiatrist relied on results of his court-ordered competence eval to not only address sanity at trial but also to inform opinions about his violence risk at sentencing; Supreme Court condoned sanctions against defendants for non-participation with eval because allowing defendant to remain silent deprives state the only effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue he interjected into the case; capital sentencing eval should follow the same procedure as an MSO eval, so that until defendant indicates an intent to present an expert witness at the capital sentencing hearing, prosecution cannot obtain its own clinical eval on capital sentencing issues Implied

Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996)

Ethics, Guidelines, Professional Issues and Duties The administrator (Jaffee) of decedent Ricky Allen's estate filed suit alleging Mr. Allen's constitutional rights were violated when he was killed by the Respondent, Redmond, an on-duty police officer. Officer Redmond responded to a fight scene and shot Allen who was holding a knife. Officer Redmond had MH history and the court ordered his notes be turned over. He and his therapist refused and the judge stated that the jury should assume the contents of the notes would be unfavorable. Damages were awarded to Jaffee. Appeal turned over decision citing psychotherapist privilege should be maintained. Finding: Federal privilege for confidential communications between psychotherapist and patient exists and includes social workers.... Created privilege in Federal Rules of Evidence. Conversation between patient and therapist are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501. Federal privilege was found to apply to psychiatrists, psychologists, and to confidential communication made to SW but only in course of psychotherapy. Privilege prevented disclosure because officer did not raise mental state as an issue and therapy occurred after legally relevant event.

Clites v. Iowa, 322 N.W. 2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982)

Ethics, Guidelines, Professional Issues and Duties Timothy Clites, diagnosed with "mental retardation" was admitted to a long-term treatment facility and administered tranquilizers and restraints for years without informed consent or adequate medical oversight. Developed tardive dyskinesia. Suit filed against hospital and damages awarded. On appeal, original decision upheld. Finding: Doctors are held to such reasonable care and skill as is exercised by the ordinary physician of good standing under like circumstances. (tardive dyskinesia in an MR patient with aggression). There is a recognized standard that requires some form of informed consent prior to the administration of major tranquilizers or treatment in non-emergency situations. This was not done in the Clites case and damages were awarded.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)

Juvenile Justice Combined 2 cases in which juveniles were involved in murder charges and given mandatory life without parole sentences. Finding: No mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)

Juvenile Justice Graham along with 2 accomplices, attempted to rob a restaurant. Aged 16 at the time, Graham was arrested for the robbery attempt and was charged as an adult for armed burglary with assault and battery, as well as attempted armed robbery. The first charge was a first-degree felony that is punishable by life. He pleaded guilty and his plea was accepted. 6 months later, he was arrested again for home invasion robbery. Though he denied involvement, he acknowledged that he was in violation of his plea agreement. Sentenced him to life in prison. Because Florida abolished parole, it became effectively a life sentence without parole. Finding: 8th amendment prohibits life without parole sentence for a juvenile who didn't commit homicide. Also, state must give them a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)

Juvenile Justice Jones committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of robbery under state law, and in a subsequent jurisdictional or adjudicatory hearing, the Juvenile Court found that the allegations of the petition were true. At a dispositional hearing which followed, however, the Juvenile Court determined that the youth was unfit for treatment as a juvenile, and ordered that he be prosecuted as an adult. The youth was tried as an adult in Superior Court and found guilty of robbery. Finding: if tried in juvenile court, the youth cannot subsequently be tried in adult court (double jeopardy).

Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)

Juvenile Justice Martin charged with robbery, assault, and possession of a weapon after he hit victim on head with gun and stole his shoes and jacket. Incident occurred late at night and Martin lied to police so they detained him. Claimed he was unlawfully detained. Finding: pretrial detention of a juvenile delinquent isn't a violation of the right to due process (14th) if there is a serious risk that the juvenile will commit another crime; disagreed that risk for future violence could not be predicted

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)

Juvenile Justice McKeiver and Terry were teenagers charged with acts of robbery, theft, assault, and escape. Both were denied a request for a jury trial. A state Superior Court affirmed the order and, after combining their separate cases into one case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the decision stating that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for juveniles. Finding: juveniles are entitled to the same due process rights as adults, except for a jury trial in juvenile court. A jury trial could cause unwarranted attention.

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)

Juvenile Justice Thompson (15 years old) and his sister were subjected to abuse by his sister's husband, so he and 3 others murdered her husband. Appealed conviction based on cruel and unusual punishment. Finding: executing a 15 year old is a violation of the 8th amendment right against cruel and unusual. Have to be 16 to be executed at that time.....First case since the moratorium on capital punishment was lifted in the United States in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the death sentence of a minor on grounds of "cruel and unusual punishment."

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)

Juvenile Justice Winship charged with committing acts that, had they been done by an adult, would have been larceny. The juvenile court made its determination based on a preponderance of the evidence and ordered him to a training school for 1 1/2 years, with possible extensions to his 18th birthday. Finding: juveniles (like adults) are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when they are charged with a violation of criminal law. Juveniles can face the same stigmatization and loss of liberty as adults if convicted and need a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence.

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)

Juvenile Justice Kent had been interrogated by the police and had admitted that he had participated in housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Juvenile Court entered an order waiving its exclusive jurisdiction and authorizing the petitioner to be criminally prosecuted in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Although the order recited that it was based on "full investigation," the court had failed to grant or to rule on motions by Kent's counsel that a hearing be held and that he be given access to Kent's social records and probation and similar reports which would be available to the Juvenile Court in considering whether to waive or retain jurisdiction; moreover, the order recited no reason for granting the waiver, and it made no reference to the motions filed by petitioner's counsel. Kent found guilty and appealed. Finding: juveniles can be tried as adults, but only after due process rights are adhered to, which include a hearing, access to relevant records, representation/assistance from counsel, and a written statement of the reasons for the waiver.

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)

Law, Precedents, Court Rules, Civil and Criminal Procedure Carmichael driving car when tire blew out and killed passenger. Sued Kumho Tire. Expert witness presented evidence that tire was defective, but court ruled evidence didn't follow Daubert standard. Carmichael appealed but court upheld dismissed testimony due to evidence of process presented by expert not being used by most experts in the field. Argument initially was that Daubert standard should be interpreted flexibly. Expert testimony doesn't only have to be of a "scientific" nature but could also me "technical" "artistic" etc based on given expert. Finding: Cleared up that Daubert applies to all 3 types of knowledge in 702 (scientific, as well as technical and specialized). Test of reliability is flexible and Daubert list is not exclusive or inclusive for all experts; reliability of testimony's methods is most important, not necessarily accuracy

Jenkins v. U.S., 307 F.2d. 637 (D.C. Cir. 1961)

Law, Precedents, Court Rules, Civil and Criminal Procedure Communicating Forensic Opinions - Expert Testimony and Report Writing In a trial for housebreaking, assault and intent to rape, a defendant presented the testimony of three clinical psychologists in support of an insanity defense. All three psychologists testified, based on their personal contact with the defendant, review of his case history and standard psychological tests, that on the date the alleged crimes were committed, defendant had been suffering from schizophrenia. One of the three testified that he could give no opinion concerning the relationship between the illness and the crimes but the other two gave opinions that the two were related and that the crimes were the product of the illness. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the jury to disregard the opinions of the psychologists in that psychologists were not qualified to give expert testimony on the issue of mental disease. On appeal, American Psychiatric Association and American Psychological Association provided amicus briefs; psychologists argued that psychologists were professionally qualified to diagnose mental illness and should not be barred from presenting testimony regarding a diagnosis; psychiatrists argued that they were not physicians and instead were assistants to psychiatrists and not qualified as experts; The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, and held that psychologists were qualified as expert witnesses on the question of mental disease. Finding: Psychologists can testify as expert witnesses as long as the court deems them to be experts (based on experience, training, and the extent that their info would aid the jury) not simply based on their title.

Frye v. U.S., 295 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)

Law, Precedents, Court Rules, Civil and Criminal Procedure James Alphonzo Frye was convicted of murder, and he appeals. In the course of the trial counsel for defendant offered an expert witness to testify to the result of a deception test made upon defendant. The test is described as the systolic blood pressure deception test. It is asserted that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system. Scientific experiments, it is claimed, have demonstrated that fear, rage, and pain always produce a rise of systolic blood pressure, and that conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear of detection when the person is under examination, raises the systolic blood pressure in a curve, which corresponds exactly to the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear and attempted control of that fear, as the examination touches the vital points in respect of which he is attempting to deceive the examiner. Expert witness was not allowed to testify. Murder conviction upheld on appeal due to deception test not being widely accepted in scientific community. Finding: Admissibility of scientific evidence should be conditioned on its being "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs"; considered the general acceptance test; judge is the gatekeeper.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 516 U.S. 869 (1993)

Law, Precedents, Court Rules, Civil and Criminal Procedure Petitioners, two minor children and their parents, alleged in their suit against respondent that the children's serious birth defects had been caused by the mothers' prenatal ingestion of Bendectin. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment based on a well-credentialed expert's affidavit concluding, upon reviewing the extensive published scientific literature on the subject, that maternal use of Bendectin has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects. Although petitioners had responded with the testimony of eight other well-credentialed experts, who based their conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects on animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and the unpublished "reanalysis" of previously published human statistical studies, the court determined that this evidence did not meet the applicable "general acceptance" standard for the admission of expert testimony. Finding: the Federal Rules of Evidence (not Frye) provide standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in federal trials. Factors that a judge should consider include a) whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested, b) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, c) its known or potential error rate, d) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and e) whether it is widely accepted in the relevant scientific community. Only applied to scientific knowledge and mental health testimony could avoid such rigor.

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)

Law, Precedents, Court Rules, Civil and Criminal Procedure When reviewing a trial court's decision on whether to admit expert testimony, the proper standard is abuse of discretion. Joiner put hands in PCB-containing fluid as part of job. He developed cancer, but his family had history of lung cancer and he was a chronic smoker. Court ruled that PCBs were not connected to his form of cancer, but appellant court ruled expert testimony should have been allowed. Court upheld ruling that expert not be admitted due to evidence presented not relating to specific case. Finding: Helped to articulate Daubert. Standard: Consider validity but also relevance to the facts of the case. Court held that a trial judge's decision to allow or reject expert testimony under 702 may not be overturned on appeal unless the judge's ruling constituted a clear abuse of discretion. Judge is the gatekeeper.

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Alford seen retrieving a gun, stating he was going to kill someone, and then returned gun and said he killed the victim. Charged with 1st degree murder. On lawyer's recommendation, he pleaded guilty to 2nd degree murder to avoid death sentence. Appealed case stating that he was innocent and only accepted plea to avoid death penalty out of fear. Guilty pleas require that pleas be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and Alford claimed his plea was not voluntary. Is guilty plea valid if defendant claims his innocence? Decision: No constitutional barriers in place to prevent a judge from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant who wants to plead guilty while still protesting his innocence under duress as a detainee status. Can plead guilty and still profess innocence. the constitution does not require an admission of guilt when pleading guilty. As long as it was entered voluntarily, knowingly and with assistance of competent counsel.

Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Brown and 2 others were accused of murder. They were stripped and beaten and told the beatings would continue until they confessed, so they did. Sentenced to death, but conviction overturned. Ruled that a defendant's involuntary confession that is extracted by the use of force on the part of law enforcement cannot be entered as evidence and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finding: Convictions based on confessions that were coerced through violence violate due process rights and are unconstitutional.

Colorado v. Connelly, 497 U.S. 157 (1986)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Connelly approached police and said he wanted to confess to murder. Was read Miranda rights and still stated he wanted to confess. Told details of murder and brought police to her body. Diagnosed with schizophrenia and deemed not CST, then competency restored. Experts claimed that his confession was involuntary because voices told him to do it. Decision: Supreme Court stated that neither voluntariness analysis nor Miranda required exclusion of admissions because police did not act improperly; illness not police that caused confession; unless confession is coerced by police, it is admissible

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Crane on trial for murder and requested to suppress his confession. Court denied due to voluntary nature of confession. Crane claimed that since he was 16 at time of interrogation and interrogation was long, confession was not voluntary. Court declined to hear experts and convicted him. Decision: The exclusion of the testimony about the circumstances of his confession deprived petitioner of his fundamental constitutional right to a fair opportunity to present a defense. The court can look at everything when examining voluntariness of the confession.

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Dickerson charged with robbery and confessed to FBI. Moved to suppress statements due to no Miranda warnings being given. Government claimed that Miranda warnings no longer required based on law passed by Congress as long as confession was voluntary. Decision: Upheld Miranda requirements. Miranda is a constitutional ruling; therefore, it overrides congress' Rule 3501 (which stated incriminating statements need to be given voluntarily with no mention of a warning of rights. Rule 3501 was established 2 years post Miranda.

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Edwards attempted to shoplift shoes and then shot gun. Appointed attorney and found schizophrenic/delusional and not CST. Then gained CST. Asked to represent himself but denied. Convicted of criminal recklessness and theft, but not murder so new trial. Court determined he was CST but not competent to defend himself. Convicted and appealed due to inability to represent himself. Constitution allows for states to apply a separate standard of competence to proceed pro se. If the defendant was found to lack the mental capacity to conduct the proceedings himself, he may be required to proceed with the assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that prior precedents such as Dusky had assumed the presence of counsel. The Court further noted that mental illness impairs different abilities in different ways over time and said that this fact "cautions against using a single competency standard... ." The Court stated that the right to self representation would not "affirm the dignity" of a defendant who lacks the capacity to conduct his trial and may undercut the fairness of the trial. Decision: Standard for competency to stand trial is not linked to the standard for competency to represent oneself. Representing self is more complicated than choosing plea. There is a higher standard of competency to represent oneself than the standard of CST. So, a defendant can be CST and incompetent to represent himself.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Escobedo's brother in law shot to death and Escobedo arrested. Asked to talk to lawyer, but refused. Interrogation continued despite lawyer also being at police station and asking to speak to client without success. Escobedo put in same room with another person who turned him in, and he implicated himself. Moved to suppress statements due to right to counsel violated. Convicted. Decision: As soon as someone is in the custody of law enforcement, he or she has a Sixth Amendment right to speak to an attorney. if a defendant asks for his attorney, questioning is stopped. He must be allowed assistance of counsel.

Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Fellers indicted for drug trafficking and police went to his home. Police engaged him in conversation about drug related activities and he made incriminating statements. Then once at jail, they read his Miranda rights. He waived them, but they questioned him further and he made incriminating statements. Filed motion to suppress his statements. Claimed he had right to counsel which he did not waive when he made statements at his house and the 1st statements tainted the 2nd. Fellers convicted. Because no interrogation occurred, statements were allowed. Decision: Whether or not an interrogation occurred doesn't matter. Police spoke with Fellers without a lawyer and those statements are inadmissable. defendants cannot be asked case-specific questions after they have been indicted without first being informed of their rights (e.g., right to remain silent, right to an attorney).

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Finding: US Supreme Court case held that 6th Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to proceed to trial without counsel (AKA self-representation)when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so; defendant is not incompetent to waive counsel merely because he may be unable to understand technical legal matters

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Juvenile Justice 13 year old JDB taken out of class and pulled into conference room with police and admin to discuss recent break ins. Pressured by adults to confess and he did. Charged with breaking & entering and larceny. Moved to suppress statements made claiming he was in custody and wasn't read Miranda rights (Miranda required if going into custody). Claimed age of JDB should have been considered when determining custody analysis. Decision: Must consider child's age when determining custody (i.e. would they know they were free to leave?). A juvenile's age is relevant to a custody analysis when considering Miranda Warnings.

G.J.I. v. State 778 P.2d 485 (1989)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Juvenile Justice 13 year old charged with attempted rape and convicted of being a delinquent. Had history of mental illness but treatment discontinued due to no funds. Drs stated he was likely to be violent and deteriorate if treatment did not continue. 2 months after treatment ended, attempted rape occurred. GJI claimed he was not competent to aid in his defense. Ruling stated that no juveniles under a certain age are competent, which is why acts are handled as delinquency cases and not criminal cases. Additionally, since father was not notified of court appearance, findings are void. Finding: competency is not required an issue in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Parents need to be notified of juvenile's hearings. Juvenile courts are rehabilitative and not criminal.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Juvenile Justice 15 year old Gault made lewd phone call to neighbor. Arrested and parents weren't informed. Mom informed hearing would be taking place but no one served her or Gault. Informal hearing held without witnesses and no transcripts kept. Gault just asked questions. 2nd hearing held and no record kept and mom not allowed present. Gault sentenced to 6 years in juvenile detention. Decision: Gault's commitment to the State Industrial School was a violation of the Sixth Amendment since he had been denied the right to an attorney, had not been formally notified of the charges against him, had not been informed of his right against self-incrimination, and had had no opportunity to confront his accusers. juveniles must be afforded the same due process rights as adults, which start right away. Juveniles have a right to notice of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and privilege against self-incrimination.

Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Juvenile Justice Michael C. accused of murder at age 16.5. When arrested, he asked to speak with probation officer, but was denied. Then he made statements implicating himself. Motioned to suppress statements on grounds that being denied access to PO violated his Miranda rights. Denied and then overturned by State. Decision: Probation officer is not the same as an attorney as he cannot provide legal advice. Request for PO does not invoke Miranda rights. during an interrogation, a juvenile requesting to speak to a probation officer is fundamentally different than requesting to speak to an attorney.

U.S. v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Dir. 1991)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Marble attempted to open a bank account, then held up bank, then left with 2 money bags and a trail of bills behind him. Arrested by police. Lawyer urged him to plead not guilty by reason of insanity but he refused thinking he would be found innocent. CST was also questioned but he was found CST because he had been consistently taking meds (unlike prior to the robbery). After he was convicted, he was found competent to waive insanity defense. Decision: Court cannot impose an insanity defense on a defendent found CST. the court has no right to impose the insanity defense on a competent defendant against their will.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Miranda arrested due to circumstantial evidence that he was involved in kidnapping and rape. He confessed to the charges following a lengthy interrogation and signed a statement that said the confession was made knowingly and voluntarily. Miranda never was told of his right to remain silent, of his right to have a lawyer, or of the fact that any of his statements during the interrogation could be used against him in court. He objected to the introduction of the written copy of his confession into evidence at trial, stating that his ignorance of his rights made the confession involuntary. Decision: Under the Fifth Amendment, any statements that a defendant in custody makes during an interrogation are admissible as evidence at a criminal trial only if law enforcement told the defendant of the right to remain silent and the right to speak with an attorney before the interrogation started, and the rights were either exercised or waived in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner. Miranda warnings required when someone undergoing custodial interrogation (questioned and taken into custody or deprived of freedom of action). privilege against self-incriminating statements obtained during interrogation without full warning of constitutional rights are inadmissible.

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Moran entered saloon and killed 2 people and then ex-wife. Then confessed to police and charged with murder. 2 psychiatrists said CST. Then he wanted to dismiss lawyers and plead guilty. Court deemed he was competent based on previous evals. Sentenced to death. Appealed and claimed that pleading guilty and waiving right to counsel are different requirements than just CST. They reasoned that competence to stand trial requires only that the defendant have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and is capable of assisting his counsel, while competence to waive counsel or plead guilty requires that the defendant has the capacity for reasoned choice among those choices available. Decision: Competency to stand trial includes the abilities to plead guilty and to waive the right to counsel and to represent self. The standard for pleading guilty or waiving right to counsel is the same standard for CST. Not a higher or different standard.

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Thompkins suspect in a murder and during police interrogation remained silent for 3 hours despite questioning and being read Miranda rights. Police asked if he prayed to God for forgiveness for shooting victim and he stated "yes." Then he made a motion to suppress his statements claiming that he had invoked his right to remain silent and his statements were involuntary. Sentenced to life in prison. The Court held that unless and until the suspect actually states that they are relying on their right(s), their subsequent voluntary statements may be used in court and police may continue to interact with (or question) them. The mere act of remaining silent is, on its own, insufficient to imply the suspect has invoked their rights. Furthermore, a voluntary reply even after lengthy silence can be construed as to implying a waiver. Finding: A defendant must explicitly evoke the right to remain silent or request an attorney to stop police questioning. Staying silent is not enough to evoke these rights or imply you are invoking these rights.

Whalem v. U.S., 346 F2d 812 (1965)

Other Criminal Competencies (e.g., to waive rights/be sentenced/proceed pro se) Whalem had schizophrenia and was charged with robbery and attempted rape. He refused to use insanity defense and judge did not require him to. Found CST. Convicted and appealed due to belief that based on Whalem's history, a hearing should have been held to determine CST and insanity. Decision: Despite reports that Whalem was CST, a certification of competency should have affirmed this as long as there were no objections by either party or concerns by the judge. If objections or concerns occurred, a hearing should have been held. A trial judge must impose the insanity defense upon defendants-regardless of their well-considered rejection of the defense-if there is "a sufficient question as to [their] mental responsibility at the time of the crime." We are presumed competent. We can't later bring up the issue in the absence of an objection. Can't later raise it, once you stipulated to the report saying CST. o required trial judges to impose an insanity defense when the defense would be likely to succeed; court is obligated to interfere if individual suffering from mental disease is accused of crime (and is thus morally blameless due to nature of condition); overturned in US v. Marble but some jurisdictions still adhere to this standard

Molzof v. United States, 911 F.2d, 18 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 711 (1992)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages After a patient at a VA hospital suffered irreversible brain damage and was left permanently comatose as a result of negligence by hospital employees, the patient's guardian ad litem, filed an action on the patient's behalf which sought to recover damages from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court ordered the hospital to continue providing care and awarded damages for supplemental care not provided by the hospital. The district court, however, refused to award damages for medical care that would duplicate the free medical services provided by the hospital and for loss of enjoyment of life. FInding:Only recovery of what were legally considered "punitive damages" under traditional common-law principles were barred--that is, damages which were intended to act as punishment for intentional or egregious conduct—and did not limit the United States' liability to compensatory damages for actual pecuniary losses. The Court held that the damages for loss of enjoyment of life and for future medical expenses sought by the patient's estate were not punitive damages under the common law or under 2674, because their recovery did not depend on any proof that the defendant had engaged in intentional or egregious misconduct, and their purpose was not to punish.

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 US 624 (1998)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages Disability defined as: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such impairment. Abbott had asymptomatic HIV and needed dental work. Dentist said he would only perform filling in a hospital and said she would have to pay for extra fees. She sues based on violation of ADA. Finding: Asymptomatic HIV was a disability from the moment of infection that substantially limited Abbott's ability to reproduce, which was a major life activity. Remanded case to lower court to determine if risks of treating patient outside of hospital were reasonable. Professional judgement should be based on science and not personal judgement.

Gough v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 996 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1993)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages Fishing vessel ran over natural pipeline which should have been buried and killed majority of crew. Captain survived by jumping overboard. He sued pipeline company under Maritime Law claiming that he could no longer work his prior job due to PTSD. He also had physical injuries but these were not limiting. Finding: emotional injuries can be compensated for maritime plaintiffs that satisfy the physical injury or impact law or if the person is in the zone of danger. a jury's award of damages must be proportional to "the circumstances of the accident and the evidence of mental anguish and disability". Initial jury awarded $2M which was reduced to $1.2M

Christie Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680 (Ga. App. 1928)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages Horse pooped on lap of Turnage during circus performance and she sued due to mental anguish. Finding: expansion of the impact rule in its holding that [any] unlawful touching of a person's body, although no actual physical hurt may ensue therefrom, yet, since it violates a personal right, constitutes a physical injury to that person. . . . The unlawful touching need not be direct, but may be indirect, as by the precipitation upon the body of a person of any material substance

TXO Products v. Alliance Resources, 509 U.S. 443 (1993)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages In a common-law slander of title action in West Virginia state court, respondents obtained a judgment against petitioner TXO Production Corp. for $19,000 in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages. Accepting respondents' version of disputed issues of fact, the record showed that TXO knew that respondent Alliance Resources Corp. had good title to the oil and gas development rights at issue; that TXO acted in bad faith by advancing a claim on those rights on the basis of a worthless quitclaim deed in an effort to renegotiate its royalty arrangement with Alliance; that the anticipated gross revenues from oil and gas development -- and therefore the amount of royalties that TXO sought to renegotiate - were substantial; that TXO was a large, wealthy company; and that TXO had engaged in similar nefarious activities in other parts of the country. Petitioner argued that the punitive damages award violated the due process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, but the trial court denied the motions without opinion. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner appealed. Finding: punitive damages DO NOT have to be linked to actual damages. while no mathematical bright line could be drawn between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable punitive award, a general concern of reasonableness properly entered into the constitutional calculus. Thus, the Court rejected petitioner's U.S. Const. amend. XIV substantive due process challenge to the award, ruling that it was not so grossly excessive as to violate due process because the jury could have reasonably determined that petitioner acted in bad faith, in a scheme that was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery, and deceit, and in light of the large amount of money at stake with respect to the oil and gas rights at issue, along with petitioner's own sizable wealth, the award was not beyond the power of the State to allow.

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages Palsgraf was standing on a platform of defendant Long Island Railroad Company. A man carrying a package jumped aboard the car of a moving train at a nearby platform. A guard in the car reached to help him in, and a guard on the platform pushed the man from behind. The package was dislodged, fell onto the rails, and exploded. The shock of the explosion caused a scales to fall onto plaintiff passenger, who filed this lawsuit for injuries due to defendant's alleged negligence. Finding: Not in "zone of danger." To recover for negligence, the plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: duty, standard of care, breach of duty, cause-in-fact, proximate cause (scope of liability) and damages. conduct of the railroad's guards was not a wrong or negligence in relation to plaintiff, standing far away. There was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in newspaper would spread wreckage through the station. The Court explained that negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest--the violation of a right, which in this case was claimed to be the right to be protected against interference with one's bodily security. Bodily security is not protected against all forms of interference or aggression, but only against some. Negligence is the absence of care, according to the circumstances. The Court concluded that there was no negligence because defendant railroad could not have reasonably foreseen that its employees' conduct would have resulted in injury to plaintiff Palsgraff.

Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (1968)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her action to recover damages for emotional trauma and physical injury caused by witnessing the death of her infant daughter, who was struck and killed by a car negligently driven by defendant. Finding: The trial court dismissed plaintiff's action because she was not within the "zone of danger," but refused to dismiss a complaint filed on behalf of another of plaintiff's infant daughters, whom the court determined to be within the zone of physical impact. The court reversed the judgment, holding that the "zone of danger" doctrine was improperly restricted to those exposed to physical injury. The court extended the doctrine to encompass those exposed to emotional injury

Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 735 F.Supp. 686 (E.D.La.1990), 937 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1991)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages Plaisance witnessed a fire while working as the captain of a tugboat. The fire was extinguished, the TOMMY CROSBY was not damaged, and no one was injured as a result of the fire. Plaintiff did not participate in fighting the fire, and persons on other vessels in the vicinity of the fire escaped the fire by going to the vessel upon which Plaisance was working. Objectively, therefore, Plaintiff did not seem to be in a "zone of danger" during the fire but he perceived himself to be in danger. Plaisance asked to be removed as captain due to recurring nightmares about fire. Finding: Maritime law does not support emotional injury as sufficient in this case since no injury occurred to anyone and although he perceived he was in danger, he was never in actual danger.

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 616 P.2d 813 (1980)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages The husband brought an action against defendants, a medical center and doctors, for mental suffering and for loss of consortium caused by the emotional injury to his wife. The husband alleged that defendants had erroneously diagnosed his wife as suffering from an infectious social disease. A demurrer was filed by the defendantsa and the lower court sustained the demurrers to both causes of action. The husband appealed. Finding: you can receive damages for emotional injury without a physical injury and for emotional distress caused when it is foreseeable and happens to someone close to you. husband could recover for loss of consortium where his spouse had suffered a disabling, nonphysical injury. The court held that the lower court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the cause of action for loss of consortium. The court agreed with the husband that alleged tortious conduct of defendants was directed to him as well as to his wife. It held that the risk of harm to the husband was reasonably foreseeable and, thus, defendants owed the husband a duty to exercise due care in diagnosing the physical condition of his wife. The court also held that the husband was not barred from recovery by the fact that he suffered no physical injury.

Carter v. General Motors, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages Usually for worker's compensation, not awarded for the injury as such, but rather for the loss of earning capacity. Can also be paid out for mental anguish as a result of workplace injury. This case looked at whether worker's compensation was appropriate for individual diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. Carter worked assembly line and had history of layoffs. Was supposed to fix one assembly at a time, but pace was too fast so he would fall behind. When he took 2 assemblies at a time, he would mix up the work and get in trouble. Due to stress, he had mental collapse and was hospitalized and diagnosed with schizophrenia. There was no physical injury or one single event that caused condition but instead was the result of emotional pressures. Finding: a mental illness qualifies for workman's comp even if it isn't caused by 1 specific event.

Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497 (1935)

Personal Injury and Civil Damages Waube witnessed her child being struck and killed by the driver of a vehicle (defendant). Waube died shortly thereafter because of emotional upset. William Waube, as special administrator of the estate of Susie Waube, brought an action against the driver for damages and the lower court found for him. The defendant appealed. Finding: emotional distress or shock had to have been occasioned by fear of personal injury to the person sustaining the shock, and not fear of injury to his property or to the person of another. A plaintiff cannot recover for emotional or physical injuries incurred while witnessing another's injury if that person was not in fear of immediate impact herself; CA Supreme Court ruled that mother was a foreseeable victim of negligent driving; can recover damages based on victim being near scene of accident, witnessed accident, and plaintiff and victim closely related

United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010)

Sex Offender Assessment Comstock was about to complete his sentence related to possession of child pornography. Government requested to keep him in custody as sexual predator. Decision: Federal government has authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to require the civil commitment of individuals already in Federal custody.[1] The practice, introduced by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, was upheld against a challenge that it fell outside the enumerated powers granted to Congress by the Constitution. The decision did not rule on any other aspect of the law's constitutionality, because only the particular issue of Congressional authority was properly before the Court. The Court said: "We base this conclusion on five considerations, taken together." The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad power to enact laws that are "rationally related" and "reasonably adapted" to executing the other enumerated powers. The statute at issue "constitutes a modest addition" to related statutes that have existed for many decades. The statute in question reasonably extends the longstanding policy to cover the mentally ill and sexually dangerous persons already in federal custody. The statute properly accounts for state interests by ending the federal government's role "with respect to an individual covered by the statute" whenever a state requests. The statute is narrowly tailored to address only the legitimate federal interest.

United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009)

Sex Offender Assessment Roger Dean Tom pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor and was sentenced by the district court to 120 months imprisonment and 60 months supervised release. Two days before the end of his prison term the United States filed a petition under Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Adam Walsh Act) to have him civilly committed as a "sexually dangerous person." The Act defines a sexually dangerous person as "a person who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and who is sexually dangerous to others." A person is sexually dangerous to others if he "suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released." Hearing should be held and if the district court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the individual was accurately certified as a sexually dangerous person, it must commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General. Once a person has been committed, the director of the facility where he has been placed must submit an annual report to the district court with a recommendation about whether there is a need for his continued confinement. The district court granted Tom's motion to dismiss the petition after concluding that the authorizing legislation was unconstitutional. Decision: The United States appeals, and we reverse. States can civilly commit sexually dangerous predators.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)

Testing and Assessment, Judgment and Bias, Examination Issues African American employees were only hired into Labor section of plant and could only transfer to higher paying sections if they had HS diploma and passed cognitive tests. Cognitive tests were unrelated to job skills needed to perform job requirements. --Even if there is no discriminatory intent, an employer may not use a job requirement that functionally excludes members of a certain race if it has no relation to measuring performance of job duties. Testing or measuring procedures cannot be determinative in employment decisions unless they have some connection to the job. This case showed that discrimination could be found on the basis of disparate impact as well as an overtly discriminatory purpose. Employers thus could not camouflage their discriminatory intent through ostensibly neutral tests that disfavored certain groups without being targeted to test their job ability. Finding: under Title VII, if a company cannot show that a test is related to job performance, the practice of using that test is prohibited. It is the company's burden. "business necessity."

Hall v. Florida, 472 U.S. _ (2014)

Testing and Assessment, Judgment and Bias, Examination Issues Death Penalty After the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execution of persons with intellectual disability, Hall asked a Florida state court to vacate his sentence, presenting evidence that included an IQ test score of 71. The court denied relief, determining that a Florida statute mandated that he show an IQ score of 70 or below before being permitted to present any additional intellectual disability evidence. The state's highest court rejected Hall's appeal, finding the 70-point threshold constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Florida's rule disregards established medical practice that an individual score is best understood as a range. While nothing in its statute precludes Florida from considering an IQ test's standard error of measurement, a statistical fact reflecting the test's inherent imprecision, the interpretation of the Florida Supreme Court takes an IQ score as conclusive evidence of intellectual capacity. The interpretation fails to recognize that measurement's inherent imprecision and bars consideration of other relevant evidence, e.g., deficits in adaptive functioning, including evidence of past performance, environment, and upbringing. Current thinking does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane. When a defendant's IQ test score falls within the test's acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits. Freddie Lee Hall and Mark Ruffin kidnaped, beat, raped, and murdered Karol Hurst. Then killed Sheriff's deputy at store they intended to rob. Sentenced to death but appealed on grounds of intellectual disability. Finding: This flushed out Atkins v. VA. IQ tests have a margin of error (SEM) and cases that fall within the margin (70 to 75) must be allowed to present other evidence of disability (i.e., testimony of adaptive deficits). The states can still choose how they determine intellectual disability for sentencing people to death, but it cannot be an arbitrary number.

United States v. Greer, 158 F.3d 228 (1998)

Testing and Assessment, Judgment and Bias, Examination Issues Greer kidnapped a neighbor and had him drive to New Mexico. Inconsistent reports on whether he was competent to stand trial. Determined that he was malingering and sentenced to additional obstruction charge as a result. Greer claimed he was not malingering, but behavior was result of personality disorder. Court ruled you could have a personality disorder and still malinger. Finding: People who malinger can receive sentence enhancement for obstructing justice.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)

Threat Assessment 5 students planned to wear black armbands to school to protest Vietnam War. The principals of the Des Moines schools learned of the plan and met before the incident occurred on December 16 to create a policy that stated that school children wearing an armband would be asked to remove it immediately. Students violating the policy would be suspended and allowed to return to school after agreeing to comply with it. The participants decided to violate this policy. Students were suspended and filed suit. Decision: defined First Amendment rights of students in U.S. public schools. The Tinker test, also known as the "substantial disruption" test, is still used by courts today to determine whether a school's interest to prevent disruption infringes upon students' First Amendment rights. Student speech that has the potential to cause disruption is not protected by Tinker.

Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

Threat Assessment Brandenburg, KKK member invited reporter to rally in Ohio in which hate speech was given. Brandenburg was charged with advocating violence under Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute for his participation in the rally and for the speech he made. In relevant part, the statute - enacted in 1919 during the First Red Scare - proscribed "advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism". Decision: Government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". Specifically, the Court struck down Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence. Articulated a new test - the "imminent lawless action" test - for judging what was then referred to as "seditious speech" under the First Amendment

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)

Threat Assessment Fraser gave a speech including sexual innuendo while nominating a classmate for a student council position at a school assembly. Believing his speech to be inappropriate and vulgar, the school's administration suspended Fraser for three days and barred him from speaking at graduation. After unsuccessfully appealing his punishment through the school's grievance procedures, Fraser filed a lawsuit against the school board, claiming the suspension violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Decision: upheld the suspension of a high school student who delivered a sexually suggestive speech at a school assembly. Prohibited certain styles of expression that are sexually vulgar.

Schenck v. United States (1919)

Threat Assessment Schenck oversaw, printing and mailing more than 15,000 fliers to men slated for conscription during World War I. The fliers urged men not to submit to the draft, saying "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain," and urged men not to comply with the draft on the grounds that military conscription constituted involuntary servitude, which is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.[5] Decision: Schenck could be convicted of an attempt to obstruct the draft, a criminal offense. The First Amendment did not protect Schenck from prosecution, even though, "in many places and in ordinary times, Schenck, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within his constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." In this case, Holmes said, "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Therefore, Schenck could be punished. Circumstances of wartime allow greater restrictions on free speech than would be allowed during peacetime, if only because new and greater dangers are present. The phrase "shouting fire in a crowded theater" has since become a popular metaphor for the dangers or limitations of free speech.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)

Threat Assessment TLO was searched for contraband after she was caught smoking in a school bathroom. She was sent to the principal's office, where the vice principal searched her purse and found marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and documentation of drug sales. She was expelled from the school and charged by police for the paraphernalia found in the search, but fought the charges on the basis that the search of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. Decision: Established the standards by which a public school official can search a student in a school environment without a search warrant, and to what extent. Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials in a school setting. However, school officials do not need to have probable cause nor obtain a warrant before searching a student. Instead, in order for a search to be justified, school officials must have "reasonable suspicion" that the student has violated either the law or school rules.

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)

Threat Assessment The case concerned the censorship of two articles in The Spectrum, the student newspaper . Newspaper printing was funded by Board of Education. When the school principal removed an article concerning divorce and another concerning teen pregnancy, the student journalists sued, claiming that their First Amendment rights had been violated. Decision: public school curricular student newspapers that have not been established as forums for student expression are subject to a lower level of First Amendment protection than independent student expression or newspapers established (by policy or practice) as forums for student expression. School administrators could exercise prior restraint of school-sponsored expression, such as curriculum-based student newspapers and assembly speeches, if the censorship is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." School-sponsored student newspapers will not be presumed to be operating as public forums for student expression absent evidence indicating otherwise.

Watts v. United States (1969)

Threat Assessment Watts was drafted during Vietnam War and expressed disagreement with draft and stated 1st person he would "get in sights" when he receives his gun is LBJ. Arrested based on threat toward president. Decision: First Amendment does not protect true threats. The Court also explained that political hyperbole does not qualify as such a threat. Watts' statement determined to be hyperbole and not a true threat.

Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994)

Treatment in Forensic Contexts Dee Farmer, a trans woman, was convicted of credit card fraud and was incarcerated at medium-security federal prison for men with general male population due to federal prison guidelines that assigned trans prisoners to facilities based on medical transition status. Farmer was transferred to the general male population at a higher security facility that housed "more troublesome prisoners."She was beaten and sexually assaulted by another inmate in her cell, which potentially exposed her to HIV infection. She filed a Bivens lawsuit in federal court without a lawyer, alleging that the wardens of both of her prisons and other officials within the Federal Bureau of Prisons violated her Eighth Amendment rights. In an amended filing, she specified that the prison administration was deliberately indifferent to her safety when it transferred her to a general male prison population with a history of inmate violence, knowing that she would be particularly vulnerable to rape as a trans woman. Finding: prison officials can be held liable under the 8th amendment if they allow inmates to face harm knowingly and don't take measures to protect the inmate from harm (deliberate indifference).

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (1980)

Treatment in Forensic Contexts Jones, a convicted felon, was transferred from state prison to a mental hospital pursuant to a Nebraska statute which provided that if a designated physician or psychologist found that a prisoner "suffers from a mental disease or defect" that "cannot be given proper treatment" in prison, the Director of Correctional Services was authorized to transfer the prisoner to a mental hospital. Federal district court found that transferring him to the mental hospital without adequate notice and opportunity for a hearing deprived him of liberty without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment and that such transfers must be accompanied by adequate notice, an adversary hearing before an independent decisionmaker, a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision, and the availability of appointed counsel for indigent prisoners. Finding: You can't transfer an inmate from prison to a psych hospital without due process; it violates the 14th amendment. The stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of Jones to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constituted the kind of deprivations of liberty that required procedural protections. Also entitled to qualified and independent advocate to assist in hearing.

Hedlund v. Sup. Court of Orange County, 669 P.2d. 41 (1983)

Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi-Criminal Commitment A psychologist (Hedlund) and a psychological assistant were seeing a man and woman in treatment. The man threatened to harm the woman and the therapists warned her of the threats. Ultimately, the man ran the woman and her son off the road in her car and then shot her, leading to the loss of a leg. The woman sued the therapists, claiming that they did not warn her of the danger to herself or her son. The Supreme Court of California ultimately held that the therapists owed a duty not only to the woman, but also to her son because the injury to the woman's son was foreseeable because children are not usually far from their parents. APA filed amicus brief recommending that courts not extend this liability to therapists. Finding: In CA, if an identifiable bystander (like the person's child) is in danger from your patient, you have a duty to warn.

Coble v. Texas, 330 S.W.3d 254 (2010)

Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi-Criminal Commitment Coble shot and killed his in-laws and sentenced to death. Had rehearing because psychiatrist who testified on his future dangerousness provided testimony based on an 18 year old assessment and without any standardized method for assessment. APA filed amicus brief expressing concern about courts allowing unscientific testimony by experts and recommended using structured risk assessments. Court agreed that prosecution did not prove method for predicting future dangerousness was sound. Decision: Case was not reviewed by Supreme Court. dangerousness needs to be reliable and based on standard practices

Jablonski v. U.S., 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983)

Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi-Criminal Commitment Jablonski had made threats to his girlfriend and her mother. She took him to the hospital and the doctor claimed he was not a threat to himself or others, did not warn her of his dangerousness but told her to leave him, and did not read his past records which showed a history of violent behavior. Jablonski then killed his girlfriend. Decision: A mental health professional's duty to predict dangerousness includes consulting a patient's prior records, and that their duty to protect includes the involuntary commitment of a dangerous individual; simply warning the foreseeable victim is insufficient. Get the records for someone you suspect is dangerous, can be sued, negligent.

Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.Supp. 1333 (1983)

Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi-Criminal Commitment Plaintiffs were all shot and seriously injured by Hinckley in his attempt to assassinate President Reagan. The defendant was the psychiatrist who had been treating Hinckley. Plaintiffs filed a negligence suit against defendant therapist and alleged that the therapist failed to treat his patient in conformity with reasonable standards of psychiatric care and that the therapist had a duty to warn law enforcement of his patient's potential for violence. The therapist brought a motion to dismiss the complaint. Defendant argued that the duty to control the violent acts of another did not arise absent specific threats directed to a reasonably identifiable victim. Finding: duty [to warn] owed be measured by the foreseeability of the risk and whether the danger created is sufficiently large to embrace specific harm (Hinckley's psychiatrist wasn't liable, no warning for no identifiable victim). Nowhere in the injured parties' complaint were there allegations that the patient ever threatened anyone. The injured parties' injuries were not foreseeable. There was no relationship between the therapist and the injured parties that created any legal obligation from the therapist to the injured parties.

Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 415, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976)

Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi-Criminal Commitment Podar stalked Tarasoff at college. Then he began therapy and stated a plan to kill Tarasoff. Therapist committed him, but supervisor recommended his release. No warnings were made to Tarasoff or her parents. Eventually killed Tarasoff. Decision: Mental health professionals have a duty to protect individuals who are being threatened with bodily harm by a patient. The original 1974 decision mandated warning the threatened individual, but a 1976 rehearing of the case by the California Supreme Court called for a "duty to protect" the intended victim. The professional may discharge the duty in several ways, including notifying police, warning the intended victim, and/or taking other reasonable steps to protect the threatened individual. When a therapist determines, or should have determined, a patient presents serious danger of violence to others, therapist incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect victim. Duty to warn. o May not apply to forensic examiners due to lack of special relationship, but there are arguments against this. If Tarasoff applies to forensic evaluators, obligations include: 1) statutes in many jurisdictions provide that no duty exists unless potential victim is specifically identified; 2) Tarasoff did not create an automatic duty to warn the potential victim if and when the victim is identified; may instead allow for notification to police or commitment of individual; if person is in custody, notify the court or custodial agency of this suspicion

Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002)

Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi-Criminal Commitment Sex Offender Assessment Crane engaged in exhibitionism and threatened rape. Diagnoses with exhibitionism and Antisocial Personality Disorder. Labeled as Sexually Violent Predator, but appealed based on claim that he has volitional control of behavior. Decision: Upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) as consistent with substantive due process. The Court clarified that its earlier holding in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) did not set forth a requirement of total or complete lack of control, but it noted that the US Constitution does not permit commitment of a sex offender without some lack-of-control determination. to civilly commit an SVP, there doesn't have to be a complete lack of control due to a MI. just evidence of some. Supreme Court attempted to define "dangerous beyond control" predicated but ended its discussion with unhelpful conclusion that it is enough to say there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)

Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi-Criminal Commitment Sex Offender Assessment Under Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act), any person who has "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" and so is likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence" may be indefinitely confined. Hendricks had long history of pedophilia and was set to be released. State appealed release based on this act and hearing was held. Due to being labeled a sexually violent predator, Hendricks was civilly committed. 4 elements for commitment of sexually violent predators: 1)have hx of sex offending; 2) manifest a mental abnormality (mental dx or PD); 3) manifest a volitional impairment rendering them less able to control sexual bx; 4) pose significant risk for future sex offending Decision: Set forth procedures for the indefinite civil commitment of prisoners who are convicted of a sex offense and are deemed by the state to be dangerous because of a mental abnormality. the definition of mental abnormality in Kansas satisfies substantive due process rights. SVP proceedings aren't criminal, don't constitute double jeopardy.

Lipari v. Sears Roebuck, 497 F.Supp. 185 (1980)

Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi-Criminal Commitment Ulysses Cribbs had history of mental illness and treatment at VA but purchased gun from Sears and shot it at nightclub killing Mr Lipari and injuring his wife. Estate filed suit because Mrs. Lipari's personal injuries were caused by the negligence of Sears in selling a gun to one whom Sears knew or should have known had been adjudged mentally defective or had been committed to a mental institution. Sears filed a 3rd part complaint against U.S. stating that the VA should have known Cribbs was dangerous and taken actions to remedy that. Estate then also filed claim against U.S. echoing this claim. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is liable for the torts of its employees only to the extent that a private person would be liable to the claimant under the law of the place where the tortious acts or omissions occurred. Nebraska has no duty to warn law. Decision: Nebraska psychotherapists also have a duty to warn. Sears can seek damages from the U.S. In order for Sears to be liable to the plaintiffs, the jury must find, based on all the evidence, that Sears was in fact negligent. Sears is not eligible for indemnity. The parties' complaints, therefore, shall not be dismissed for alleging a cause of action barred by the discretionary function exception. you can sue the US to the extent that private person would be liable to claimant under the law. Despite no identified victim, jury was allowed to decide if therapist did enough to protect "the public."

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)

Witness challenges Biggers convicted of rape based on evidence including testimony concerning his identification by the rape victim at a pretrial police station showup. The victim had spent considerable time with her assailant, had given the police a description of him, and testified at the trial that she had "no doubt" about her identification of the accused and that there was something about his face "I don't think I could ever forget." The victim described the rapist's age, size, skin, and voice. Police conducted numerous photo lineups, but the victim made no identification. Biggers was arrested for an unrelated offense. Police could not find anyone fitting the rapist's description, so they conducted a showup identification. Police walked Biggers by the victim and asked Biggers to speak. The victim identified Biggers as the rapist. Claimed showup identification procedure violated due process. Finding: established guidelines for eye-witness testimony: 1. Opportunity of witness to view perp at time of the crime. 2. Degree of attention of witness. 3. Accuracy of witness's description of criminal. 4. Level of certainty of witness. 5. Length of time since crime.

Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716 (2012)

Witness challenges Man seen breaking into cars and caller identified Perry as perpetrator after looking out her window and seeing him standing next to police. For out of court identification, court must first decide whether the police used an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure; if they did, the court must next consider whether that procedure so tainted the resulting identification as to render it unreliable and thus inadmissible. Finding: The Due Process clause doesn't require a trial judge to conduct a preliminary assessment into the reliability of an eyewitness ID when the ID wasn't procured under unnecessary suggestive circumstances by police. It would only be excluded from improper state conduct.The Court stated that the Constitution does not protect a defendant against a conviction based on questionable evidence by not prohibiting introduction of the evidence. It protects the defendant by allowing them to persuade the jury that the evidence should not be believed. Therefore, Due Process will only prohibit the introduction of evidence when inclusion of the evidence is so extremely unfair that its inclusion would violate fundamental concepts of justice.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)

Witness challenges Petitioner was tried for assault and attempted murder. The State sought to introduce a recorded statement that petitioner's wife Sylvia had made during police interrogation, as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense. Sylvia did not testify at trial because of Washington's marital privilege. Petitioner argued that admitting the evidence would violate his Sixth Amendment right to be "confronted with the witnesses against him." Under case law, that right did not bar admission of an unavailable witness's statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears "adequate 'indicia of reliability,'" a test met when the evidence either fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." The trial court admitted the statement on the latter ground. The State Supreme Court upheld the conviction, deeming the statement reliable because it was nearly identical to or interlocked with, petitioner's own statement to the police, in that both were ambiguous as to whether the victim had drawn a weapon before petitioner assaulted him. Finding: Testimonial hearsay statements are excluded (includes statements made during police interrogation). Previously, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980), out of court testimony was permissible if thought to be "reliable." However, the court reasoned that the (Constitutional) Framers intended the Confrontational Clause to prohibit out of court testimony as evidenced against a defendant. The Court held that the State's use of the statement recorded by the petitioner's wife violated the Confrontation Clause because, where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is confrontation. The Court posited that the wife's statement during interrogation was testimon

State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011)

Witness challenges Rodney Harper was shot to death. James Womble was present when two men forcefully entered the apartment, seeking to collect money from Harper. Womble knew one of the men, co-defendant, George Clark, but the other man was a stranger. Clark shot Harper while the stranger held a gun on Womble. 13 days later, police showed Womble a photo array and he identified defendant Larry R. Henderson as the stranger. Trial court conducted a pre-trial Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of identification. That hearing revealed that the identification procedure was presided over by a detective who was not a primary investigator in the case. During the Wade hearing, Womble testified that he felt the detective was "nudging" him to choose Henderson's photo. Trial court found that the officers' behavior was not impermissibly suggestive and ruled that evidence of the identification was admissible. The trial court applied the two-part Manson/Madison test to evaluate the admissibility of the eyewitness identification, and found that there was nothing in the case that was improper, and nothing that was so suggestive to result in a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The jury convicted Henderson of reckless manslaughter, aggravated assault, and weapons charges. The appellate division reversed, presuming that the identification procedure in the case was impermissibly suggestive under the first prong of the Manson/Madison test. The court remanded for a new Wade hearing to determine whether the identification was reliable under the test's second prong. The state supreme court granted the State's petition for certification, and the court remanded the case and appointed a judge to preside at the remand hearing as a Special Master to evaluate the scientific and other evidence about eyewitness identifications. Finding: The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted portions of the Special Master's report and held that the current legal standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence set forth in Manson/Madison required revision because it did not offer an adequate measure for reliability, did not sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct, and overstated the jury's ability to evaluate identificat

State v. Hurd, 414 A.2d 291 (1980)

Witness challenges Sell attacked in her home and stabbed repeatedly with a knife. Could/would not recall identity of attacker but recommended police look at her ex. Had inconsistent info about the night of the attack. 3 weeks later, underwent hypnosis and identified her ex. Was told by police that if she couldn't identify the attacker, he would go free and leave her kids without a mother. Procedure did not take place following strict guidelines. Finding: · NJ Supreme Court rejected Harding ruling and closed per se rule of Mach; permitted hypnotically refreshed recollection to be used in court with 6 guidelines: 1) psychiatrists/psychologist experienced w/hypnosis must conduct session; 2) professional should be independent and not employed by court members; 3) info given to hypnotist by LE or defense must be recorded; 4) before inducing hypnosis, hypnotist should gather all recalled detailed facts; 5) all contacts btw. hypnotist and subject must be recorded; 6) only hypnotist and subject should be present during any phase of session

People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (1982)

Witness challenges Shirley was charged with sexual assault, but the victim could not remember what happened at the time of the alleged crime. On the night before trial, a lawyer for the prosecution hypnotized the victim to try to fill in gaps in the victim's story. Shirley moved to exclude all of the victim's testimony that resulted from the hypnosis, but the trial court denied the motion and allowed the victim to testify regarding matters that the victim had been unable to recall before being hypnotized. The jury ultimately convicted Shirley of sexual assault, and he appealed. Critics claim that hypnosis caused witness to give coherent story vs diverging stories previously which allowed her to confidently testify about possible false aspects of crime; however, given that defendant was not convicted of all crimes, testimony was not viewed as completely reliable Issues: 1) witness was drinking during and after crime so memory already impaired, which does not work for hypnosis; 2) biased prosecutor performed hypnosis on eve of testimony; 3) hypnosis used not for purpose of solving crime but for enhancing credibility of testimony Finding: testimony based on hypnosis is not admissible in California; witness cannot testify at all

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987)

Witness challenges Vickie Lorene Rock was charged with manslaughter in the shooting death of her husband. Because the accused could not remember the precise details of the shooting, she was hypnotized by a licensed neuropsychologist in order to refresh her memory. After hypnosis, she was able to remember that she had not held her finger on the trigger of the gun and that the gun had discharged when her husband grabbed her arm during a scuffle. A subsequent inspection revealed that the gun was defective and prone to fire. At trial, however, the court limited the accused's testimony to matters remembered and stated prior to being placed under hypnosis, and the jury convicted her of manslaughter. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas (1) rejected the accused's claim that the limitations on her testimony violated her right to present her defense, (2) concluded that the dangers of admitting the accused's hypnotically refreshed testimony outweighed whatever probative value it had, (3) held that hypnotically refreshed testimony of witnesses is inadmissible per se, and (4) ruled that the exclusion of the accused's testimony did not violate her constitutional rights. Finding: hypnotically refreshed memory can be admissible in court when certain measures (specialized training, neutral setting, recorded session) are employed. Only applies to the defendant. criminal defendants have a constitutional right to testify on their own behalf.

Cleveland v Policy Management Systems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 (1999)

Worker's Compensation/Disability Evaluation After suffering a stroke and losing her job, Cleveland sought and obtained Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, claiming that she was unable to work due to her disability. The week before her SSDI award, she filed suit under the ADA, contending that her former employer, had discriminated against her on account of her disability. In granting Policy Management Systems summary judgment, the District Court concluded that Cleveland's claim that she was totally disabled for SSDI purposes estopped her from proving an essential element of her ADA claim, namely, that she could "perform the essential functions" of her job, at least with "reasonable ... accommodation," Finding: Pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop a recipient from pursuing an ADA claim or erect a strong presumption against the recipient's ADA success. However, to survive a summary judgment motion, an ADA plaintiff cannot ignore her SSDI contention that she was too disabled to work, but must explain why that contention is consistent with her ADA claim that she can perform the essential functions of her job, at least with reasonable accommodation.

Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. ___ (2019)

Worker's Compensation/Disability Evaluation Biestek, former construction worker, filed for disability benefits due to inability to work due to physical and mental disabilities. Vocational expert testified about possible other jobs he could work based on her own market surveys but she refused to turn over surveys to Biestek's lawyers. Benefits were denied. Finding: A vocational expert's refusal to provide private market-survey data upon the applicant's request does not categorically preclude the testimony from counting as "substantial evidence" to support a denial of social security disability benefits.

Damascus v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, 935 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Cal. 1996)

Worker's Compensation/Disability Evaluation Damascus was a dentist who had mental illness and was covered by accidental/disease insurance for situations in which "total disability" occurred (unable to do job). License was revoked based on gross negligence (i.e. poor dentistry and overprescribing meds). Insurance did not support his claim for disability and he sued for breach of contract. Finding: to claim disability for insurance benefits, you must prove that you have a MI or condition that prohibits you from working. He lost his license for performance issues not MH issues.

Ervin v. American Guardian Life Assurance Company, 545 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. 1988)

Worker's Compensation/Disability Evaluation Doctor worked for insurance company and was asked to run EKG on client as part of request for insurance coverage. Doctor did not reveal underlying heart condition found on EKG and client died 1 month later. Estate sued for malpractice. Finding: for a malpractice suit, there must be an established physician-patient relationship. Doctor did not work for client. He worked for insurance company.

Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003)

Worker's Compensation/Disability Evaluation Nord filed disability claim with his insurance due to chronic pain. His physician and another stated his condition caused him to be unable to work. Insurance company referred him to a neurologist who said he could work with pain meds doing sedentary work. Claimed that neurologist should have clearly explained rationale for rejecting treating providers' opinions. Finding: ERISA does not require plan administrators to accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians or imposes a heightened burden of explanation on administrators when they reject a treating physician's opinion.

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Ouellette, 159 Vt. 187, 617 A. 2d 132 (1992)

Worker's Compensation/Disability Evaluation Optometrist imprisoned for lewd and lascivious conduct with a child filed a claim for disability because he suffered from pedophelia, a recognized mental disorder Finding: Because defendant could still be practicing optometry had he not surrendered his license and been incarcerated, his inability to practice was caused by legal consequences of his behavior and not by disability. you can't claim disability when you are incarcerated for criminal conduct and thus cannot work.

Ryans v. Lowell, 484 A.2d 1253 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)

Worker's Compensation/Disability Evaluation Ryans, alleges defendant Dr Lowell made an improper diagnosis of plaintiff's condition by failing to examine the plaintiff and then making recommendations to the New Jersey Commission for Blind and Visually Impaired (Commission). Plaintiff contends that as a result of these recommendations, plaintiff's benefits from the Commission were terminated. Dr Lowell worked on behalf of Commission and recommended Ryans be terminated from services based on his non-compliance with program services. Finding: a psychiatrist retained by a company owes duty to that company, not the person they evaluate. Know who is the client.