HUME definitions

subtitle of the treatise

"Being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects" Moral philosophy: the science of what it is distinctively human Hume's study of philosophical systems convinced him that philosophy was in need of reform -Meaning of moral philosophy - natural is the immediate president of what we understand of natural sciences, and moral what we immediate of philosophy Particularly metaphysics: in attempting to go beyond anything we can experience, metaphysics makes false and unintelligible claims. A smokescreen for popular superstition He will counter "abstruse metaphysical jargon" with "accurate and just reasoning" (Enquiry, 1.12) Hume is proposing an empiricist alternative to traditional a priori metaphysics. His empiricism is naturalistic in that it refuses to countenance any appeal to the supernatural in the explanation of human nature. As a naturalist, he aims to account for the way our minds work in a manner that is consistent with a Newtonian picture of the world

what is the analogy of the republic or commonwealth?

"I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts (...) in like manner the same person (...) whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation" Treatise I.4.6. Sense of identity that doesn't require a substance over and above perceptions

THE NEGATIVE PHASE discuss the criticism of substantial self, application of the CP

"When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception" Treatise I.4.6. Not only that copy principle has impossible demands, is it that through introspection i never find a perception of the self. The content of the request cannot exist. If i look into my mental life i'm always occupied with a perceptions of trees, people etc. can't point at something ' like that is the self'. Only perceive what i have a impression of. The Copy Principle demands an impression with the same characteristics of the idea. But the experience of our mental life is a continued flux of different perceptions Such an idea (Intangible self)is unintelligible and unnecessary.

what are the two different propositions Hume thinks we can get a handle on this question by considering

(1) I've found that headache relief has always followed my taking aspirin; and (2) Taking aspirin similar to the ones I've taken in the past will relieve my present headache. There is no question that "the one proposition may be justly inferred from the other", and that "it is always inferred". But since their connection obviously isn't intuitive, Hume challenges us to produce the "chain of reasoning" that takes us from propositions like (1) to propositions like (2) (EHU 4.2.16/34). (1) summarizes my past experience, while (2) predicts what will happen in the immediate future. The chain of reasoning I need must show me how my past experience is relevant to my future experience. I need some further proposition or propositions that will establish an appropriate link or connection between past and future, and take me from (1) to (2) using either demonstrative reasoning, concerning relations of ideas, or probable reasoning, concerning matters of fact. Hume thinks it is evident that demonstrative reasoning can't bridge the gap between (1) and (2). However unlikely it may be, we can always intelligibly conceive of a change in the course of nature. Even though aspirin relieved my previous headaches, there's no contradiction in supposing that it won't relieve the one I'm having now, so the supposition of a change in the course of nature can't be proven false by any reasoning concerning relations of ideas. That leaves probable reasoning. Hume argues that there is no probable reasoning that can provide a just inference from past to future. Any attempt to infer (2) from (1) by a probable inference will be viciously circular—it will involve supposing what we are trying to prove.

2 ways Hume is a newtonian

1. METHODOLOGY Just as Newton provided an exhaustive and unifying explanation of the natural world with a few principles, Hume's objective is a complete theory of human nature to explain why human beings act, think, perceive, and feel the way we do. We only draw conclusions from the "experimental method of reasoning" (against a priori metaphysics) In the Enquiry, Hume tells us that he has two tasks: one purely descriptive, the other explanatory (I.14-15) Descriptive task: study of human nature as a kind of anatomy of the mind (again, what we perceive, and the mental faculties that operate on those perceptions) Explanatory task: discovering the "secret springs and principles" of the mind (metaphysics) "Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phenomena, the true motions, order and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: until a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces by which the revolutions of the planets are governed (...) there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution" (Enquiry I.15) 2. CONTENT OF THE THEORY I. First, he had taken inspiration from an atomic theory of matter: simple perceptions combine to create complex perceptions I. This is explained by principles of association, that explain ultimately thought, behavior, feeling, perception. II. Also, attraction has a crucial role in his theory of mind. More important than other mechanically modelled notions He accepts the Newtonian maxim "Hypotheses non fingo", roughly, "I do not do hypotheses". Any laws we discover must be established by observation and experiment. Following Newton's example, he argues that we should "reject every system ... however subtile or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation", and accept only arguments derived from experience.

4. FREE WILL definition

A "faculty" (capability, ability, power...) to choose • A feature of agency that is necessary for people to be morally responsible for their conduct

what are the 2 types of perceptions for hume

A distinction is needed Two types: IMPRESSIONS: lively perceptions of wither sensation or reflection IDEAS: "faint images" of these impressions in thinking and reasoning perceptions = impressions and ideas 'Perceptions' are divided into 'impressions' and 'ideas', the difference between the two being by marked by a difference of 'forcefulness' and 'vivacity' so that impressions relate roughly to 'feeling'(or 'sensing') and ideas to 'thinking'.

what is a miracles according to Hume?

A miracle: a transgression/violation of the laws of nature v A law of nature: the best confirmed regularity that we have • Hume does not forbid miracles a priori (we cannot rule out matters of fact in this way), so the occurrence of a miracle could in principle be established by testimony • But, whereas interruptions in the laws of nature are always possible, before experience they are incredible

moral responsibility

Ability to be held accountable for morally significant conduct

the interpretations - what is projectivism?

Adds the mental determination component to the reductionist analysis. Regularity theory only captures how things look before the acquired habit of inference.

what are perceptions

All his treatments of philosophical questions will employ his theory of ideas as foundation PERCEPTIONS: all objects of the mind. They all come from experience What we are immediately and directly aware of are 'perceptions'. He uses perception to designate any mental content whatsoever

Principles of Association

Although we are capable of separating and combining our simple ideas as we please, there is, nevertheless, a regular order to our thoughts. If ideas occurred to us completely randomly, so that all our thoughts were "loose and unconnected", we wouldn't be able to think coherently (T 1.1.4.1/10). This suggests that There is a secret tie or union among particular ideas, which causes the mind to conjoin them more frequently, and makes the one, upon its appearance, introduce the other. (Abstract 35) Hume explains this "tie or union" in terms of the mind's natural ability to associate certain ideas. Association is not "an inseparable connexion", but rather "a gentle force, which commonly prevails", by means of which one idea naturally introduces another (T 1.1.4.1/10). In the first Enquiry, Hume says that even though it is obvious to everyone that our ideas are connected in this way, he is the first philosopher who has "attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association" (EHU 3.2/24). He regards his use of these "universal principles" as so distinctive that in the Abstract he advertises them as his most original contribution—one that entitles him to be called an "inventor" (Abstract 35). "Our imagination has a great authority over our ideas, and there are no ideas (...) which it cannot separate, and join, and compose into all the varieties of fiction. But notwithstanding the empire of the imagination, there is a secret tie or union among particular ideas, which causes the mind to conjoin them more frequently together" .From raw materials of sensory materials → we have ideas of unicorns, golden cities- we can do all sorts of things with ideas (imagination has no restrains- can do anything it wants and construct any fiction) .Certain conjunctions of ideas that happen in our minds more often than others-- WHY? Newton's atomary Hume tries to copy by principles: Three principles: 1. Resemblance e.g. see portrait of person → think of person in it 2. Contiguity e.g. temporal and spatial: look at a garden close to me → look at my garden. Think of something in 2016 → think of something else from 2016. When you're reminded of something that happened in the 1960s—miniskirts, for example—you may think of the Vietnam War, because they are temporally contiguous 3. Causation e.g. the thought of something → we think of its effect. Causality works both from cause to effect and effect to cause: meeting someone's father may make you think of his son; encountering the son may lead you to thoughts of his father.ONLY one that enables us to go beyond the evidence of our senses Hume doesn't try to explain why we associate ideas as we do. He is interested only in establishing that, as a matter of fact, we do associate ideas in these ways. Given that his claim that the associative principles explain the important operations of the mind is an empirical one, he must admit, as he does in the first Enquiry, that he cannot prove conclusively that his list of associative principles is complete. Perhaps he has overlooked some additional principle. We are free to examine our own thoughts to determine whether resemblance, contiguity, and causation successfully explain them. The more instances the associative principles explain, the more assurance we have that Hume has identified the basic principles by which our minds work. Hume concludes that it should be "easy to conceive of what vast consequences these principles must be in the science of human nature". Since they "are the only ties of our thoughts, they are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in great measure, depend on them" (Abstract 35). Just what these "vast consequences" are will become clear when we examine Hume's revolutionary accounts of our causal inferences and moral judgments.

Hume's response

Amending the Copy Principle There are two possible solutions that allow the case of the shade of blue, while maintaining a strong link between ideas and impressions. The first solution weakens the Copy Principle: Any ideas that are not copied from impressions are only meaningful if they could be copied from impressions. In other words, what the idea is an idea of is something we can encounter in experience. The missing shade of blue clearly meets this condition, but perhaps many metaphysical ideas will not. The second solution keeps the Copy Principle as it is - ideas are copied from impressions - but explains how and why the missing shade of blue is an 'exception'. The simple impressions of different shades of blue are related to each other, as they can be arranged according to how they resemble each other. From the arrangement, we can form the idea of the missing shade drawing on other similar impressions we already have. This only works when impressions are structured by resemblance like this. If we have no relevantly similar impressions which strongly resemble the missing impression, we cannot form the missing idea. This is the same reason that a blind man cannot form an idea of colour, and so it fits well with Hume's theory.

what does Hume argue is the answer of these question?

Argue through elimination, prove it to be imagination Answer THE SENSES: "they convey to us nothing but a single perception" (Treatise I.4.2.3) REASON: reason informs us that those perceptions are different and interrupted IMAGINATION: the idea of identity must be the product of some of the qualities of objects plus certain activities of the imagination.

his lasting influences

Argument for the claim that induction (reasoning from the observed to the unobserved) depends on habit, not reason His treatment of constant conjunction as essential to the relation of cause and effect Naturalistic fallacy in moral reasoning empiricist, he argued things are only real if they can be verified by senses His criticism of substance

This is a very old puzzle. Therefore what are some old responses?

Aristotle particular substances have 2 types of properties - essential (if change you change) and accidental (if loose no consequence). Descartes self asa a simple and identity entity, makes us one of the same across the course of our life, a never changing substance. What makes something the same over time - ship starts to decay, so substitute planks, after a few years more decay so change a bit of rotten wood - after century the ship has changed 100% - is it true that it is the same ship

physical unity ?

As all cells are different from when you were ten, they substitute but carry same d and a politically but numerically they are different cells- no body continuity. Same with values, morals, beliefs and perceptions changing.

belief and evidence

Belief and evidence Rational beings proportion their degree of belief to their best available evidence v Recall that Hume is not recommending that we give up on inductive practices v An example by Hume: "the Indian Prince" v He has greater reason to reject the testimony than to alter his beliefs in light of testimony v When evaluating testimony, rationality does not so much prescribe which beliefs are to be accepted, but rather how to change degrees of belief in the face of new evidence.

THE POSITIVE PHASE what is the bundle theory? confusion between ideas of idenity and diversity

Bundle theory - collection of perceptions, which makes up our identity. Perceptions do not belong to a self but constitute what the self is. Hume's notion of identity - we are a bundle of perception, nothing over or above that. "But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux or movement" Treatise I.4.6. The fast succession of perceptions produced a confusion between two ideas: a) Identity: idea of an object that remains invariable during a period of time b) Diversity: idea of several different objects existing in succession, connected in different. We take instances of the latter to be the former. Experience of mental life is very much like b, but i take it to be a. Perceptions are united by associations of idea (ressemblance and cause and effect) , that are so powerful i feel like a instead of b.

An example of Hume's methodology - What is Hume's copy principle?

COPY PRINCIPLE: the first principle in the science of human nature All our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent = Anti rationalist this is principle as something that everyone's experience confirms also gives argument to establish it -He argues first that there is a one-to-one correspondence between simple ideas and simple impressions. He can't prove that this correspondence holds universally, since he can't examine every individual impression and idea. But he is so confident the correspondence holds that he challenges anyone who doubts it to produce an example of a simple impression without a corresponding simple idea, or a simple idea without a corresponding simple impression. Since he is certain they will fail, he concludes that there is a constant conjunction between simple impressions and simple ideas.

CRITICAL PHASE what is causal inference

Causal inference is a relation established between event A and event B Event A appeards → project event B will appear as the effect This is not an inseparable connection, but a natural force: "a kind of attraction which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural" (Treatise, I.1.1.5 Empirical discoveries- created this on basis of his experience. It is the only way of making a taxonomy of the mind. Connections between ideas doesn't exhibit necessary connection- tries to mirror Newton vocabulary- force of attraction explains force between ideas. Causal inferences are the only way we can go beyond the evidence of our senses and memories. In making them, we suppose there is some connection between present facts and what we infer from them. But what is this connection? How is it established? If the connection is established by an operation of reason or the understanding, it must concern either relations of ideas or matters of fact. Hume argues that the connection can't involve relations of ideas.

where can the copy principle best be seen applied

Causation - it is the most common association between ideas He is applying the copy principles: causation is intelligible as we can find the atomic impression which is the source of it. "We must consider the idea of causation, and see from what origin is derived" (CP) The discussion of causation is a paradigmatic example of Hume's methodology in action as he starts with a negative phase → then to positive phase Critical (negative) phase: against the traditional idea of necessary connection, against the claim that reason identifies causal relations He denies reason identifies causes, BUT, it is habit and custom. Constructive (positive) phase: Hume presents a "sceptical solution": habit is responsible for our idea of causation Aims to construct a skeptical alternative

1st argument The Spontaneity Argument

Claim: the difference between "natural" and moral events is not the absence of cause, but the type of cause. • Actions that are not susceptible of moral evaluation (and thus not free and not creditable to the agent) have external causes • Actions that are susceptible of moral evaluation (and thus free and creditable to the agent) have internal causes (our willing) This is explained further by Hume's distinction between types of liberty • LIBERTY OF SPONTANEITY: absence of constraint • LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE: absence of causes (there is no such thing) In Hume's words: "By liberty we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may: if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains" Enquiry, 8.23

2nd argument Anti Libertarian

Complementary to argument the Key claim: the presence of causes is not dangerous to morality. What is more: it is essential to it Hume begins his reasoning by appealing to "liberty of indifference" Key claim : If we take liberty of indifference to exist, we are denying the existence of moral responsibility Let's analyse the term (Humean strategy) If there are no causes, every single event is CHANCE If there is only chance in the moral realm, there is no room for character traits Without character traits, no agent can be ever be object of praise or blame Note the Hume's background assumption about virtue ethics In Hume's words: "According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and consequently causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character anywise concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it" Enquiry, 8.29

explain this further with the problem of induction?

Deductive reasoning - bachelor is an unmarried man - if p true = c true Inductive - all swans are white - can't guarantee concussion - stronger or weaker. The future will not necessarily resemble the past. Law needs to guarantee the law to be the same as past - Hume says we have no impression of a law that will guarantee an effect. A happens then b happens, mind associates 2 things together, but u don't see the bringing about - it is only a habit. Suppose I say that I know the billiard ball will move, because it has always moved in the past. It's true that in the past the billiard ball always moved. But why think it will move again now? On what basis do I think that the future resembles the past? Past experience can give me 'direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which feel under its cognizance' (p. 114). If I am to infer that the billiard ball will move when struck, I'm going to have to do on the basis of the principle that 'the future will be like the past'. But this principle is in the same boat as my claim that the billiard ball will move when struck. It is not a contradiction to suppose that the future will not be like the past, so I can't prove the principle by deductive reasoning. But, of course, I can't prove it by appealing to matters of fact, since I am trying to establish a matter of fact by appealing to the principle! If I say, 'but in the past, the future was like the past', this still gives me no basis on which to infer that 'in the future, the future will be like the past'. [Margin: Explain Hume's challenge to inductive reasoning.] Hume argues that our belief that the future will resemble the past is not based on reason at all. He remarks that children are capable of learning from experience, and yet here we are, professional philosophers, struggling to produce the reasoning which we suppose the child easily employs (p. 118)! We can't produce the reasoning, because the inference is not based on reasoning at all. Hume has argued not just that there isn't a reason on the basis of which we make our causal inferences, he has argued that there is no type of reason which could serve.

Determinism

Every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events • The facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future

an example to illustrate the difference between impressions and ideas

Example = Impression of sun on my head, impression is pain from the burning, and in my mind i can latter reflect - i want suncream - distinguish of context on the mind causing reflection from vivid perception. Idea later - memory of me being under the sun, i can remember i wished i had sunscreen and from a desire to bring lotion next trip. All based on one original impression. Hume argues that ideas are 'faint copies' of impressions. Think what it is like to see a scene or hear a tune; now what it is like to imagine or remember that scene or tune. The latter is weaker, fainter. (Thinking, for Hume, works with ideas as images in the same way as imagination and memory.) However, Hume immediately qualifies his claim about liveliness - disease or madness can make ideas as lively as impressions. So Hume's claim that ideas are also copies of impressions is important.

what is an issue here

External bodies are not the only things we think continue to exist through time as one and the same entity. How would a corresponding impression - perceiving something invaluable through our whole life time - necessary to justify the idea of identity that we have - the copy principle. We don't have an impression that is unchanging and never not being perceived - hume

How does Hume show that causation is not a relation of ideas - the objection to reason

First, Hume shows that causation is not a relation of ideas We cannot discover by a priori reasoning → we can't say every cause has an effect- we don't know for certain. But, we are so well acquainted with causation we think it is a relation of ideas as we use every day... But, we cannot yield this idea from a priori .It's such a familiar inference that we think of it as intuitive But there is no amount of a priori reasoning that can get us from the sensible qualities of an object to its "causal powers" . But suppose you were suddenly brought into the world as an adult, armed with the intellectual firepower of an Einstein. Could you, simply by examining an aspirin tablet, determine that it will relieve your headache? When we reason a priori, we consider the idea of the object we regard as a cause independently of any observations we have made of it. It can't include the idea of any other distinct object, including the object we take to be its usual effect. But then it can't show us any "inseparable and inviolable connection"—any necessary connection—between those ideas. Trying to reason a priori from your idea of an aspirin, without including any information you have of its effects from your previous experience, yields only the simple ideas that compose your idea of its "sensible qualities"—its size, shape, weight, color, smell, and taste. It gives you no idea of what "secret powers" it might have to produce its usual effects. Hume concludes that a priori reasoning can't be the source of the connection between our ideas of a cause and its effect. Contrary to what the majority of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors thought, causal inferences do not concern relations of ideas. We cannot gather a priori Then, causal inferences must involve matters of fact Our sensory experience, however, only gives us information about objects as they are when we experience them (past of present) But causation is precisely characterised by projection into the future Observed → the future

humes newtonianism

For his "constructive" phase, Hume modelled his philosophy on the scientific achievements of Isaac Newton 1687 - Publication of Newton's Principia Mathematica he was in ore with atomism, taking that image into epistemology

conclusion

From Argument 1: a free action is internally caused From Argument 2: we can only regard people as morally responsible if, thanks to repeated experiences that are connected (causes and effects) we can infer actions from stable characters From Argument 3: A necessary connection (understood as constant conjunction) between motives and actions enables us to see human beings as moral agents "Liberty and necessity" are not only compatible, but also essential for moral responsibility

how does Hume proves these sources to be inadequate

He argues that external impressions of the interactions of bodies can't give rise to our idea of power. When we see that the motion of one billiard ball follows another, we're only observing their conjunction, never their connection. Attending to internal impressions of the operations of our minds doesn't help. Although voluntary bodily movements follow our willing that those movements occur, this is a matter of fact I learn through experience, not from some internal impression of my will's power. When I decide to type, my fingers move over the keyboard. When I decide to stop, they stop, but I have no idea how this happens. Were I aware of the power of my will to move my fingers, I'd know both how it worked and its limits. Our ability to control our thoughts doesn't give us an impression of power, either. We don't have a clue about how we call up our ideas. Our command over them is limited and varies from time to time. We learn about these limitations and variations only through experience, but the mechanisms by which they operate are unknown and incomprehensible to us. If I decide to think about Istanbul, my idea of that city comes to mind, but I experience only the succession of my decision followed by the idea's appearance, never the power itself. When ordinary people can't determine an event's cause, they attribute it to some "invisible intelligent principle". Malebranche and other occasionalists do the same, except they apply it across the boards. True causes aren't powers in the physical world or in human minds. The only true cause is God's willing that certain objects should always be conjoined with certain others. Anyone aware of our minds' narrow limits should realize that Malebranche's theory takes us into "fairyland"—it goes so far beyond our experience that we have no way of intelligibly assessing it. It also capitalizes on how little we know about the interactions of bodies, but since our idea of God is based on extrapolations from our faculties, our ignorance should also apply to him.

simple and complex concepts

Hume agrees with Locke's claim that all concepts are either simple concepts or complex concepts that have built out of simple concepts. He claims, like Locke, that all concepts can be analysed into simple concepts which each correspond to an impression. Therefore, all concepts ultimately derive from experience. For example, in direct opposition to Descartes, Hume claims that the concept GOD, based on concepts of PERFECTION and INFINITY, is extrapolated from concepts of IMPERFECTION and FINITUDE: 'The idea of God - meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being - comes from extending beyond all limits the qualities of goodness and wisdom that we find in our own minds'. Hume response =Hume introduces a complete taxonomy of mental objects Simple / Impressions Perceptions / \ complex simple \ / ideas \ complex How we understand everything in our mind- all through perceptions and impressions Since "all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones"; we are restricted to "compounding, transporting, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience" (EHU 2.5/19)

objection to this

Hume and Locke argue that in no concept, no matter how abstract or complex, is more than a putting together, altering or abstracting from simple concepts. Hume challenges us to find a counterexample. Very well. If he cannot give us a satisfactory analysis of how we derive whatever counterexample we choose from experience, that is a reason to think that the concept does not originate from experience. Now, attempts to analyse philosophical concepts like KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, and BEAUTY into their simple constituents have all failed to produce agreement. A good explanation for this is that they don't have this structure and Locke and Hume's theory of the origin of concepts is wrong

how does this connect to the three principles of associations of ideas

Hume focuses only on two of them for PI: • RESEMBLANCE: crucial for memory, what characterises memory. When remembering we are looking to an idea that resemblance something of another idea. Fact you can remember things and think i am the same person, gathered some memories, that is enabled by relations of resemblance between my perceptions. Locke says this is problematic as if links between memory are the only things that prove identity what about times with no memories. • CAUSATION: we cover the gaps of memory so we can attain an idea of a continuing self. Hen object united towards end, it seems it doesn't matter - mind tends to ascribe identity nonetheless. We can find phycological instances, disregarded a change, by means of relation between cause and effect by means of perception I can ascribe identity to the acorn and the tree as the same thing. Cause and effect allow us to generate a stream of perceptions that are un interrupted. The experience of our mental life is that of a perpetual flux of perceptions connected by the imagination by means of principles of association (resemblance, causation)

the interpretations - what is causal reductionism?

Hume is talking about causation out there in the world. Causation is no more than contiguity, priority, and constant conjunction. • This is meaning-empiricism •

therefore where does Hume locate the source of the idea of NC

Hume locates the source of the idea of necessary connection in us, not in the objects themselves or even in our ideas of those objects we regard as causes and effects. In doing so, he completely changes the course of the causation debate, reversing what everyone else thought about the idea of necessary connection. Subsequent discussions of causation must confront the challenges Hume poses for traditional, more metaphysical, ways of looking at our idea of causation. Hume's treatment of our idea of causation is his flagship illustration of how his method works and the revolutionary results it can achieve.

therefore Hume must move to the only remaining possibility - what is this

Hume now moves to the only remaining possibility. If causal inferences don't involve a priori reasoning about relations of ideas, they must concern matters of fact and experience. When we've had many experiences of one kind of event constantly conjoined with another, we begin to think of them as cause and effect and infer the one from the other. But even after we've had many experiences of a cause conjoined with its effect, our inferences aren't determined by reason or any other operation of the understanding. In the past, taking aspirin has relieved my headaches, so I believe that taking aspirin will relieve the headache I'm having now. But my inference is based on the aspirin's superficial sensible qualities, which have nothing to do with headache relief. Even if I assume that the aspirin has "secret powers" that are doing the heavy lifting in relieving my headache, they can't be the basis of my inference, since these "secret powers" are unknown. Nonetheless, Hume observes, "we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those we have experienced, will follow from them" (EHU 4.2.16/33). Since we neither intuit nor infer a priori that similar objects have similar secret powers, our presumption must be based in some way on our experience. But our past experience only gives us information about objects as they were when we experienced them, and our present experience only tells us about objects we are experiencing now. Causal inferences, however, do not just record our past and present experiences. They extend or project what we have gathered from experience to other objects in the future. Since it is not necessarily true that an object with the same sensible qualities will have the same secret powers that past objects with those sensible qualities had, how do we project those experiences into the future, to other objects that may only appear similar to those we've previously experienced? For causal connection we need repetition A and B exhibit constant conjunction But, on closer inspection: constant conjunction creates a record of how experiences have been like, but does not give us information about how the future will be like Two clearly different propositions: A. Aspirin has relieved my headache x times in the past B. Aspirin will relieve my headache in the future B is beyond sense experience, it is about the future Hume's question: what is the chain of reasoning that lead us from A to B? What we need is a proposition that connects the past with the future - What is prompting us to make an inference from the observed to the unobserved This propositions needs to be proved either demonstratively or empirically (by probable reasoning) We have seen that a relation of ideas cannot bridge this gap There is no contradiction in thinking that the sun will not rise tomorrow The only empirical proposition that bridges the gap is the principle of the uniformity of nature

how does Hume start his investigation, for his skeptical alternative

Hume starts his investigation with his rendering of a common distinction between knowledge and belief. HUMES FORK -a distinction between two types of meaningful propositions There are things we know for certain vs things we doubt , for everything we know in the world: ideas and facts. "All the objects of human enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds" (Enquiry, 4,1): RELATIONS OF IDEAS: demonstratively certain - a prior analytic ideas are known as 'intuitively and demonstratively certain' because 'Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe' A mathematical example: 'If A is longer than B, and B is longer than C, then A is longer than C'. we gain knowledge of relations of ideas through merely understanding concepts and through deductive inference.he says that the negation of a (true) relation of ideas is a contradiction; the negation of a matter of fact is not. anything we know that is not true by definition or logic alone, every 'matter of fact', we must learn and test through our senses. MATTERS OF FACT: depend on how the world is, knowledge that expands what we know about the world - a posteriori synthetic knowledge It is contingent on the world, negation doesn't result in a contradiction. We gain it by using observation and employing induction and reasoning about probability. All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on causation- we gather experience from past and present and project it. He claims that all reasoning concerning matters of fact seems to be based on relations of cause and effect. It's how we go beyond our senses (present) and memory (past) fro example If I receive a letter from a friend with a French postmark on it, I'll believe that my friend is in France - because I infer from the postmark to a place. I do this because I think where something is posted causes it to have the postmark of that place; and if the letter was posted by my friend, then I believe that he must be in France.

Locke as an inspiration

Hume takes the basis of his theory of ideas from the empiricist John Locke (e.g. distinction between simple and complex mental contents). The Tabula Rasa= the humans mind before being born ( a blank slate- the mind contains no ideas -no thoughts or concepts) Locke's definition of idea: "whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought or understanding" (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II viii 8). E.g the difference between an idea of a tree and the tree itself. Hume sees a problem in Locke's account: there is no distinction between thought and perception (concepts and percepts). Locke's treatment of thinking involves a transaction with materials of the very same kind as the materials involved in perception. Distinguish concepts from precepts - generate new distinctive terminology.

CONSTRUCTIVE PHASE - sceptical solutions to the sceptical doubts raised earlier what is constant conjunction and custom

Hume's account is this: on the basis of our past experience in which the cause is repeatedly followed by the effect (which Hume calls 'constant conjunction') when we perceive the cause again, our minds immediately infer the effect; or vice-versa. From seeing one billiard ball strike another, we immediately believe that the second will move. From receiving a letter with a French postmark, we immediately believe the letter was posted in France. We draw the inference without reasoning or argument, but on the basis of a principle of association by which the imagination has bound the two ideas - of the cause and of the effect - together in our minds: 'When the mind...passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another it is not determined by reason, but by certain principles which associate together the ideas of these objects and unite them in the imagination' (Treatise, I.iii.vi). This movement of our minds repeats a previous sequence of thought, originally, our experiences of the repeated conjunction of cause and effect. And so Hume calls the principle that governs it 'custom', without pretending that such a label explains it at all. (It is unclear whether 'custom', as a principle of the mind, is just another name for the cause-effect principle of association. If not, then it is very closely related.) Custom is not a reason or principle of reasoning. It is not that we think 'this object has constantly been conjoined to this second object, so the second will occur again'. We don't even need to notice the constant conjunction; our experience of it is enough for our minds to move from the impression of the cause to a belief in the effect. Custom is a natural instinct of the mind, a disposition we simply have in the face of experience of constant conjunction. Without custom, we would be unable to draw causal inferences, and so we would have no knowledge of anything beyond what was present to our senses and memory.

CONTEXT Hume's approach

Hume's development of these three philosophical orientations remains an important influence on contemporary philosophy Empiricism, naturalism and scepticism If the idea has no corresponding context in the world, it must be rejected.

3rd argument the necessity argument

Hume's new definition of necessity (established in Book 1) is instrumental to his compatibilism (Book 2) Recall: the world seems to operate with chains of causes and effects and, indeed, the same applied to the moral domain But the two elements of necessity were: • Constant conjunction • Inference of the mind from one to another This is what he calls "necessity without force" The elimination of metaphysical necessity accommodates free will (in Humean terms: liberty of spontaneity)

What is the Humean approach towards this issue of personal identity?

Hume's objective is not to investigate whether external objects exist, or whether they exist over time... (metaphysics). As that would mean going beyond the senses. He is doing epistemology, doesn't want to find the ultimate proof of the external world (descartes) , but capturing why we acquire a belief, tracing back a non empirical belief - here belief in identity - no empirical basis. Hume wants to reconstruct the way in which we have acquired beliefs that do not seem to be warranted empirically: the idea of the identity of objects and the idea of an identical self. Destroy traditional and put forward an alternative. He will follow the same methodology as with the idea of causation/necessary connection: Copy Principle and Principles of Association of Ideas, exemplified in positive and negative phases

1. HUME THEORY OF THE MIND Theory of Ideas- intro

Hume's philosophy encompasses critical (negative) and constructive (positive) phases - negative about the possibility of metaphysical insights that go deeper then science can - clearing the way for the constructive phase of project - the development of an empirical science of human nature. Book I, Part 1 of the Treatise includes the foundations for developing key themes afterwards v These foundations are a theory of ideas = a theory of mind Objective: explain the workings of the mind with the economy that Newton displayed in his physics - as To explain the workings of our minds with the economy Newton displayed in his physics, Hume introduces the minimal amount of machinery he thinks is necessary to account for the mind's operations. Each piece is warranted by experience. Hume believes he will be equally successful in finding the fundamental laws governing our "mental powers and economy", if he follows the same caution Newton exhibited in carrying out his inquiries. Hume explicitly models his account of the fundamental principles of the mind's operations—the principles of association—on the idea of gravitational attraction. By appealing to these same principles throughout, Hume gives an explanation of these diverse phenomena that enable him to provide a unified and economical account of the mind.

what is Hume's target?

Hume's target: at least, theories of the self as a substance to which perceptions belong and inhere in. we don't have such perceptions - there is nothing in our mental life that has remained un interrupted since we were born

summary

Hume, on the other hand, gives priority to experience. There is nothing in the mind that we have not before experienced. One of the chief aims of his philosophical project is to explain the genesis of our beliefs; particularly those that do not seem to be empirically warranted. key points Approach: empiricism, naturalism, scepticism • Philosophical project: "science of human nature" • Theory of ideas: - Taxonomy of perceptions: impressions & ideas - The Copy Principle - Principles of Association of ideas • Hume's Fork: matters of fact and relations of ideas • Hume applies all these background notions for accounting for the formation of non-empirically warranted beliefs • CAUSATION (negative and positive phases) • Not a relation of ideas • Not a matter of fact • Reduced to non-causal properties • How to we infer the future from the past? • The problem of induction • The idea of NECESSARY CONNECTION • Inference of the mind brought about by habit • PERSONAL IDENTITY (negative and positive phases) • Problem of persistence (objects and persons) • Target: substantial self • Copy principle applied • Confusion between identity and diversity • Bundle theory

what are the two types of impressions Hume distinguishes

Impressions of sensation include the feelings we get from our five senses as well as pains and pleasures, all of which arise in us "originally, from unknown causes" (T 1.1.2.1/7). He calls them original because trying to determine their ultimate causes would take us beyond anything we can experience. Any intelligible investigation must stop with them. Impressions of reflection include desires, emotions, passions, and sentiments. They are essentially reactions or responses to ideas, which is why he calls them secondary. Your memories of last year's sunburn are ideas, copies of the original impressions you had when the sunburn occurred. Recalling those ideas causes you to fear that you'll get another sunburn this year, to hope that you won't, and to want to take proper precautions to avoid overexposure to the sun.

outline Hume's strategy in the causation debate

In the critical phase, he argues that his predecessors were wrong: our causal inferences aren't determined by "reason or any other operation of the understanding" (EHU 5.1.2/41). In the constructive phase, he supplies an alternative: the associative principles are their basis.

counter examples of Hume's theory of the mind

It seems that I can find ideas without corresponding impressions, and impressions without corresponding ideas. Things we experience but have no idea of, or an imperfect one. Example = "I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies, although I affirm I never saw any such" "I have seen Paris ; but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of the city, as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions?" (Treatise, I, 1:1, 4)

NC critical phase what possible sources were put forward by Hume's predecessors to explain power or NC

Locke thought we get our idea of power secondarily from external impressions of the interactions of physical objects, and primarily from internal impressions of our ability to move our bodies and to consider ideas. Malebranche argued that what we take to be causes of the motion of bodies or mental activity aren't causes at all. They are only occasions for God, the sole source of necessary connection, to act in the world. Hume rejects all three possibilities.

what is there now to interpret?

Now we know the circumstances (internal and external) that give rise to our ability to call certain events "causes" and "effects" But what it is to talk about causation? Are we talking about the world? About a state of mind? This question has produced a variety of interpretations of Hume's position

3. PERSONAL IDENITY what is one general characterisation of identify as a general concept?

One general characterisation: if something really changes, it can't be one and the same thing before and after the change. However, if it's not a different thing before and after the change, nothing has really undergone any change. It seems problematic to say that the very same thing has completely different properties at different times. A question: what does it take for an object to persist over time as one and the same? Perhaps we should change the name of it.

what is PUN

Perhaps surprisingly) Hume held that some statements express neither matters of fact nor relations of ideas • Such statements reflect psychological habits rather than expressing propositions (e.g. induction) • Induction is a type of inference: an extrapolation that follows from a sufficiently large set of (past) cases • Swans observed many times in a wide variety of environments have always been white. • Therefore, the next swan observed will also be white (= all swans are white) Hume states that we tend to reason inductively. But what justifies the inference from the observed to the unobserved? • It is a presupposition based on habit: that the future will be like the past • Whenever we reason from experience, we must assume that experience is a reliable guide to the unobserved. • Thus, induction cannot be justified in a non-circular way final thoughts tho = We tend to use induction because we are psychologically compelled to do so • Therefore: induction is epistemologically unjustifiable BUT psychologically inescapable • This lead us to the positive phase of Hume's account of causation The only empirical proposition that bridges the gap is the principle of the uniformity of nature Principle of uniformity of nature: the future will resemble the past (PUN) will certainly lead us from A to B: A. The sun has risen every day B. The sun will rise tomorrow But what is the basis for adopting (PUN)? (PUN) itself!- circular argument that the future has resemble the past

applying miracles to the proportion the belief to the evidence

Recall Hume's claim about how the reasonable person proportions her belief to the evidence. Where is the evidence coming in the case of miracle testimony? • Credibility of the witness • Credibility of the reported fact itself • Now, given that we have experience of the uniformity of the laws of nature: No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the testimony is of such kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact it endeavours to establish.

what is identity ascription ?

Resemblance and causal relations amongst perceptions makes the passage of the mind so easy that we start contemplating those perceptions as being of one and the same thing But, in fact, we ascribe to them "fictitious identity" or "imperfect identity". Because it is a product of the imagination. Hume isn't an ideality, but empiricist methodology. The function of the resemblance and caution - those associations make the passage between different ideas so easy that we ascribe identity to those perceptions thinking they are the very same thing. similar to the dispossess of the innate idea of god - never met him, and where does the idea come from No innate idea - as every idea derives from internal or sensual impressions Internal idea - seen gold imagine a city made of gold from idea of gold and a city - build gold out of similar ideas - arises of reflecting of our own mind and the qualities of goodness and wisdom - building it up until it's so big that it's infinite Personal identity constructed by same habits of mind "A succession of related objects places the mind in this disposition (...) The passage between related ideas is so smooth and easy that it produces little alteration in the mind, and seems like the continuation of the same action (...) for this reason we attribute sameness to every succession of related objects. The thought slides along the succession with equal facility as if it considered only one object; and therefore confounds the succession with the identity" Treatise I.4.2.34

NC constructive phase what is the missing ingredient then for NC

Since we've canvassed the leading contenders for the source of our idea of necessary connection and found them wanting, it might seem as if we have no such idea, but that would be too hasty. In our discussion of causal inference, we saw that when we find that one kind of event is constantly conjoined with another, we begin to expect the one to occur when the other does. We suppose there's some connection between them, and don't hesitate to call the first, the cause, and the second, the effect. We also saw that there's nothing different in the repetition of constantly conjoined cases from the exactly similar single case, except that after we've experienced their constant conjunction, habit determines us to expect the effect when the cause occurs. Hume concludes that it is just this felt determination of the mind—our awareness of this customary transition from one associated object to another—that is the source of our idea of necessary connection. When we say that one object is necessarily connected to another, we really mean that they have acquired an associative connection in our thought that gives rise to this inference.

summary

Some of our beliefs express neither matters of facts nor relations of ideas: they reflect psychological habits - The Humean task is to explain the acquisition of non-empirically warranted beliefs (e.g. the idea of causation as necessary connection) • We saw the negative and positive phases for the idea of necessary connection - The only change in the constant conjunction of events is in us. It's a mental association and the acquisition of an expectation. • Interpretations: Old Hume vs New Hume debates

Account Of Definition

The CP is the trademark of Hume's brand of empiricism Also, his use of the reverse formulation of the CP provides an account of definition Hume's account of definition uses a simple series of tests to determine cognitive content. Begin with a term. Ask what idea is annexed to it. If there is no such idea, then the term has no cognitive content, however prominently it figures in philosophy or theology. If there is an idea annexed to the term, and it is complex, break it down into the simple ideas that compose it, and trace them back to their original impressions. If the process fails at any point, the idea in question lacks cognitive content. When carried through successfully, however, it yields a "just definition"—a precise account of the troublesome idea's content. Hume uses his account of definition in his critical phase to show that many of the central concepts of traditional metaphysics lack intelligible content. He also uses it in his constructive phase to determine the exact meaning of our terms and ideas. "It is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have not antecedently felt (...) by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reason.

key questions on personal identity:

The discussion starts with the idea of identity in general, of which personal identity seems to be a species. Hume is not an ideality, he's just making a point- inquiring why we have the belief why things exist as one of the same when we don't perceive them over time. Acorn to tree - in which sense is it the same thing Question 1: why do we believe that we are presented with the same object despite of the interrupted nature of our experience? Question 2: do we get the idea of the persistence of objects through the senses, through reason, or through the imagination?

what could be an issue with Hume's fork?

The distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact is often called "Hume's Fork", and is generally used with the negative implication that Hume may be illicitly ruling out meaningful propositions that don't fit into these two categories or fit into both of them. To defuse this objection, however, it is important to bear in mind that Hume's categories are his translations of a traditional absolute categorical classificatory distinction between knowledge and belief that all of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors accepted.

Why think that all ideas derive from impressions? Hume gives two arguments

The first relates to 'simple' and 'complex' ideas The second is that without having a particular type of experience, a person lacks the ability to form an idea of that experience. Thus, a blind man does not know what colour is and a mild man cannot comprehend the motive of revenge.

2. CAUSATION what are the traditional beliefs about causation before Hume entered the debate?

The medieval synthesis Thomas Aquinas (1224-74) forged between Christian theology and Aristotle's science and metaphysics set the terms for the early modern causation debate. Aristotle (384-322 BCE) drew an absolute categorical distinction between scientific knowledge (scientia) and belief (opinio). Scientific knowledge was knowledge of causes and scientific explanation consisted in demonstration—proving the necessary connection between a cause and its effect from intuitively obvious premises independently of experience. Modern philosophers thought of themselves as scientific revolutionaries because they rejected Aristotle's account of causation. Even so, they accepted his distinction between knowledge and belief, and regarded causal inference as an exercise of reason, which aimed at demonstrating the necessary connection between cause and effect. Malebranche (1638-1715), and others following Descartes (1596-1650), were optimistic about the possibility of demonstrative scientific knowledge, while those in the British experimental tradition were more pessimistic. Locke was sufficiently sceptical about what knowledge we can attain that he constructed one of the first accounts of probable inference to show that belief can meet standards of rationality that make experimental natural philosophy intellectually respectable.

shade of blue case - one contradictory phenomenon - as an empirical counterexample to the principle

The missing shade of blue However, Hume notes that there is an exception to his principle that all simple ideas are copies of impressions. If you present someone with a spectrum of shades of blue with one shade missing, then using their imagination, they will be able to form an idea of that shade. This idea has not been copied from an impression.Hume dismisses the example as unimportant, but it is not. If it is possible that we can form an idea of a shade of blue without deriving it from an impression, is it possible that we could form other ideas without preceding impressions? The question is important because Hume uses his 'Copy Principle' repeatedly in his philosophy. He closes §2 (p. 10) by saying that in metaphysics, we become confused because the ideas we work with, e.g. SUBSTANCE, are 'faint and obscure', so we don't understand them well. But if ideas derive from impressions, we can solve metaphysical debates by asking, of the words used, 'From what impression is that supposed idea derived?'. If we can't find the associated impression, we can conclude that the word is used without a proper meaning, and reject the debate. However, if we can form ideas without copying them from impressions, then we can't use Hume's Copy Principle to cut through metaphysical debates as he suggests. So can the Copy Principle be defended against the counterexample of the missing shade of blue?

5. MIRACLES what is the key question?

The question: could we ever rationally accept someone's testimony that a miracle has occurred? - Hume does not seem concerned with the factual question of whether miracles have occurred or not, but with the epistemic question of whether it can be rational to believe in miracle reports. - Broadly speaking, Hume held that reasoning correctly is about the way in which we change our beliefs according to available evidence - This relates to his understanding of inductive reasoning. Hume's "pragmatic solution" to the problem of induction requires that we maintain a proportion between degree of belief and evidence (Richmond & Pritchard, 2012)

what causes Simple impressions and their correspondent simple ideas, to exhibit constant conjunction

This is not by chance: there is a causal dependence (every time there is one there is another). Whatever causation means it seems that impressions are always the cause of ideas. he argues that experience tells us that simple impressions always precede and thus cause their corresponding ideas. To support this claim, he appeals to two sorts of cases. First, if you want to give a child an idea of the taste of pineapple, you give her a piece of pineapple to eat. When you do, you are giving her an impression of the pineapple's taste. You never go the other way round. His other case involves a person born blind, who won't have ideas of color because he won't have impressions of color. This is an empiricist principle - something which he has discovered. - Simple impressions always go first = "original" = "atomic"

the interpretations - what is regularity theory?

Traditional interpretation. To say that A causes B is to say As and Bs stand in relations of contiguity, priority, and constant conjunction.

how does this connect to the self?

We also have an idea of the self (or mind, or person) as a persisting entity Each of us has an idea of herself/himself as something that remains the same throughout a lifetime. Hume argues that for this idea to have correspondent impression, we need an impression that remains invariable throughout a whole life.

the interpretations - what is sceptical realism?

We can emphasizes the same passages in the text but reading them along epistemic, rather than ontological lines. Rather than demarcating the limits of what causation is, Hume is demarcating the limits of what we can know about it • Against meaning-empiricism • Supported by the textual fact that Hume makes realist-sounding claims: • "The powers and forces, by which the course of nature is governed are wholly unknown to us" (Enquiry 5.21)

what does it mean for impressions and ideas to be one of degree, not of kind

We can see that the distinction between IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS is one of degree, not of kind - they are the same type of thing, but we have distinguish that they are distinct. The difference is of something that only appears in my private experice of them. The distinction is always phenomenological, and not of causal origin - they come from experience (so the exact same place)- all beliefs wishes hopes and memories all traced back to the actual experience. For every idea there is an impression that corresponds it. Every experience creates and idea therefore It seems that all perceptions of the mind are double. But this faces some counterexamples...

ending the critical (negative) phases therefore with what characterisation ?

characterisation of causation: • Contiguity of events • Priority of the event we call "cause" • And, importantly, CONSTANT CONJUNCTION of the two • This repetition gives rise to the idea of NECESSARY CONNECTION

scepticism

doubt (or recommendation of doubt) about what we can know Hume, With a caveat: follows Academic scepticism and rejects Pyrrhonian (radical) scepticism

having located the missing ingredient, what are the two definitions of cause Hume offers

in Enquiry 7.2.29 cause is "An object followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second" gives the relevant external impressions, while the second cause is "An object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other" captures the internal impression - our awareness of being determined by custom to move from cause to effect.

As a result of thus, what must our perceptions exhibit:

our perceptions exhibit: Constancy: brought about by resemblance amongst perceptions. Ascribed identity as the objects have consistency - e.g leave house, tree in garden get perception in the afternoon and see what i take to be the same tree - resembles tree saw in morning. Perceptions have content that resemble one another. Coherence: brought about by relations of cause and effect amongst perceptions. Relation of causation the most powerful from the 3 association of ideas - can bridge gaps between perceptions that don't relate to each other. Bridging gap with relations of cause and effect, that allows me to ascribe identity to that thing i am looking at - same plant i saw last year. Despite the fact they change and we are not always piercing items - this is how we we prove objects persist.

Naturalism

pursuit of explanations without invoking entities, properties, or events that would be outside the scope of ordinary laws of nature

what does the problem of general identity refer to?

the problem of personal identity refers to trying to justify a practice which seems strange and even paradoxical: talking about people as single beings in spite of the fact that they are constantly changing and, over a period of time, they might have changed completely (Penelhum 2000:23). What is the criteria from claiming we are the same entity over time? More precisely, the question of PERSISTENCE (i.e. identity over time): what does it take for a person to persist over time as one and the same person? What determines what past or future being is you? Memory or a swim of consciousness? Physical unity? All the criteria run into problems.

empiricism

the view that knowledge originates in experience and that science should, therefore, rely on observation and experimentation primacy of experience over reason → Methodological empiricism → Concept empiricism

Treatise on Human Nature

written and published by David Hume 1737; argued that observation based on reason would lead to a complete understanding of human nature and the laws which govern it Philosophical project: a "science of human nature" - as the only appropriate foundation for the rest of the sciences What we are able to achieve in the sciences depends on understanding what can we know His answer is that while scientists have cured themselves of their "passion for hypotheses and systems", philosophers haven't yet purged themselves of this temptation. Their theories were too speculative, relying on a priori assumptions, and paying too little attention to what human nature is actually like. Instead of helping us understand ourselves, modern philosophers were mired in interminable disputes—evident even to "the rabble without doors"—giving rise to "the common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds", that is, "every kind of argument which is in any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended" (T xiv.3).

The problem

• A problem arises if we apply determinism to a person's actions • So, if we admit that causal determinism is true: P1. The world is ruled by causal necessity P2. Human beings are a part of this world C. Therefore, human beings are ruled by causal necessity • Then, is it still possible to claim that we are free in a relevant way? And, if we admit that free will is a necessary condition of moral responsibility: P1. Human beings are ruled by causal necessity P2. Causal necessity excludes free will P3. Free will is necessary for moral responsibility C. Therefore, there is no moral responsibility • Is there a way to argue for free will and moral responsibility? • Compatibilists think there is

an intro to Humes compatibilism - the issue of liberty and necessity

• Hume deals with this issue in the Treatise (Book 2, 3.1) and the Enquiry (8) and he refers to it as the issue of "liberty and necessity" • Initial point: it is a dispute of words. We need to clarify the terms and we'll agree (typical Humean strategy) • His theory: compatibilism (he calls it a "reconciling project") • He claims that free will and causal determinism are not only compatible, but both necessary for moral responsibility • He offers three arguments