international conflict exam 1, International Conflict, International Conflict Midterm, International Conflict Review, International Conflict Midterm, International Conflict Test 1, International Conflict Exam 1, International Conflict Midterm 1, Inte...
territoriality
neighbors fight bc they disagree about the distribution of territory among them
liberalism
A political ideology that emphasizes rule of law, representative democracy, rights of citizens, and the protection of private property. This ideology, derived from the Enlightenment, was especially popular among the property-owning middle classes.
Ho Chi Minh Trail
A network of jungle paths winding from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam, used as a military route by North Vietnam to supply the Vietcong during the Vietnam War.
Lake: extensions of bargaining model
taking influential actors into account, adding post-war costs to understand BOP, adding component of behavioral theory to account for misrepresentation
Which factor consistently increases the risk for war in Senese & Vasquez's analysis? - Arms races - outside alliances - territorial disputes
territorial disputes
what is the definition of rivalry?
competitive relationships that persist over time, through consecutive conflictual encounters
Secretariat
completes the day-to-day work of the UN, supports the other programs of the UN, Secretary-General is the head of this organ, Ban Ki-Moon (his name today)
Defensive Structural Realism
concerned about the relative position- do what is necessary to maintain position
Bremer's 7 factors for dangerous dyads
contiguity, joint democracy, power preponderance, major powers, joint alliance, advanced economies, & militarization
under the assumption: war is costly what groups may benefit from war?
corporations (such as mining/oil)
state
country
Critical constructivists
social epistemology that addresses the socio-cultural context of knowledge construction and serves as a referent for cultural reform
explain how accidents makes war more likely
some states can inherit nukes
independent variable
something we believe explains variation in the DV
Dependent Variable
something we want to explain
arms races represent which model and why?
spiral model because they increase war
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl note that most militarized disputes in rivalries have what type of outcome? - stalemate - compromise - victory
stalemate
when is a stalemate more likely?
stalemates become more likely as rivalry persists
In the reciprocity/routine puzzle what does X =?
state X's Military expenditures
Reciprocity: dx/dt = ay - kx+g dy/dt = bx - Iy + h Q: b>0 , state Y increases its military spending in response to what? Q: the larger B gets the larger the what?
state X's military spending arms race
In the reciprocity/routine puzzle what does Y = ?
state Y's military expenditures
Reciprocity: dx/dt = ay - kx+g dy/dt = bx - Iy + h Q: a>0, state X increases its military spending in response to what? Q: the larger A gets the larger the what?
state Y's military spending arms race
state Y: dy/dt = bx - Iy + h Q what is bx a response to?
state x
State X: dx/dt = ay - kx + g Q: what ay a response to?
state y
Causes of war: intuition
states can't commit to prewar solution
Theories of Democratic peace: Normative arguemnt
states export their own domestic conflict resolution norms to the international arena, democracies are most likely to have nonviolent conflict resolution methods and these norms carry to their actions internationally
militarized
states must be sufficiently important to warrant threat, display, or use of force
what does new proliferators mean?
states that recently developed nukes
why form alliance?
states use alliances for security
Cult of the Offensive
strategic military dilemma, where leaders believe that the advantages of attack are so great that a defending force would have no hope of repelling the attack; consequently, all states choose to attack. It is most often used in context of explaining the causes of World War I
proximity-as-opportunity
suggests neighbors fight bc they can
proximty-as-interaction
suggests states fight over points of interest
central conclusion of offense-defense balance
systemic war is more likely when there's an imbalance toward offense and/or leaders can't tell the difference
38th Parallel
Line that divided Korea - Soviet Union occupied the north and United States occupied the south, during the Cold War.
what are the most common DVs in this line of peace science?
MID onsets
Rally Around the Flag Effect
Rally effects may create incentives for leaders to use force to draw attention away from domestic political and economic troubles. People "rally around the flag" because international conflicts can: • Cause an increase in patriotism (in group vs. out group) • Ease criticism of the government • Create a diversion from other problems (e.g. high inflation) • Scapegoat or blame the country's problems on foreigners
Blainey's arguments regarding: the balance of power
Ratio of power capabilities between states -Blainey doesn't believe that's enough to stop war, its about how you perceive it.
war dynamics
duration of war, winner of war, overall fatalities, was it multilateral?
what is an example of - extended deterrence (3 actors)
during the cold war US- defender Soviet Union - attacker Europe - protege
what is issue rivalry?
dyad with 2 or more issue disputes (territory, maritime disputes)
Theories of Democratic peace: Normative argument: what system level argument can this only be?
dyadic
Klien, Goertz, and Diehl find that most wars begin ________ - early in a rivalry - in the middle of a rivalry - towards the end of a rivalry
early in a rivalry
what the difference between economic dependence and economic interdependence
economic dependence is when 1 state with in the dyad is dependent on the other for resources economic interdependence is when both states are dependent on each other for resources making them more intertwined
what is economic interdependence
economic interdependence is when states are economically intertwined (trade for resources) and if a war were to break out it would disrupt trade: if states are dependent on one another for resources then it would lead to no war
commercial liberalism
economic theory advocating free markets and the removal of barriers to the flow of trade and capital as a locomotive for prosperity
"Genro"
elder Japanese statesmen, charged with picking the cabinet ministers for the emperor. The oligarchs wanted a constitution that secured the governing bodies and protected the imperial house through which they exercised power. After the promulgation of the constitution in 1889 oligarchs designated themselves as _____to pick cabinet ministers for the emperor.
Theories of Democratic peace: informational: how do democratic Institutions/ democracies help reveal information
electoral outcomes/ process reveals intention, policy stance transparency to public free press - access to information secret preemptive strikes unlikely
Kodo
emphasizes the divine nature of the emperor; Japanese were descendants from the Gods and everyone else was a mistake;
what is the difference between enduring rivalries and strategic rivalries?
enduring is # of rivalries and strategic is perception of enemy
Bosnian Annexation Crisis 1908
erupted when on 6 October 1908, Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, territories formally within the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. This unilateral action—timed to coincide with Bulgaria's declaration of independence (5 October) from the Ottoman Empire—sparked protestations from all the Great Powers and Austria-Hungary's Balkan neighbours, Serbia and Montenegro.
what are arms races the result of?
external competition
joint democracy -
no 2 democracies have ever fought war against each other is the closest thing to an empirical law in all polisci -measures constraint & recruitment
in terms of democracy what does competition mean?
who can run
in terms of democracy what does participation mean?
who can vote
irrelevant dyads: substantive concerns
why bother estimating the probability of conflict between Mongolia and Nigeria?
"democracies only go to wars they can win" this explains?
why two democracies wont go to war because it is unlikely that they both believe they will win
in her study "the outcomes of military buildups: minor states vs major powers", Susan Sample (MV CHAPTER 6) uses which world war to illustrate how arms buildups can lead to war:
ww1
are serial crisis behavior assumed to be an established cause of war?
yes
are strategic rivalries comparable in capabilities?
yes
does Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) have an deterrence effect? and why
yes, because if a state has an ability to strike back with the same force both states are probably going to use smaller scale war tactics
ATOP Alliance Types
• Defensive cooperation • Offensive cooperation • Neutrality • Non-aggression • Consultation
Issue Rivalry (Mitchell & Thies 2011)
• Focuses on density of geopolitical issues in contention, using ICOW data • Rivalry: - Issue dimension: dyads with two or more territorial, maritime, or river claims ongoing at same time- Militarized dimension: dyads with two or more previous MIDs over issue • Issue rivalry increases the chances for militarized disputes:- Some issues are multidimensional which raises the stakes of winning (e.g. Falkland Islands).- Handling of one issue can lead to further challenges to SQ (e.g. Cod Wars) • We compare issue rivalries & militarized rivalries to see which process increases risks for war the most.
rivalry hypotheses
• H1: The greater the number of past crises, the higher is the propensity for future crises.• H2: The greater the number of past crises, the higher is the propensity for future violent crises.• H3: The greater the number of past crises, the lower is the propensity for future crises (war weariness).
alliance hypothesis
• H1: When a conflict initiator has an offensive alliance in place when a dispute begins, the potential for more dispute participants increases.• H2: When a conflict target has a defensive alliance in place when a dispute begins, the potential for more dispute participantsincreases.• H3: Neutrality pacts decrease the number of dispute participants. • H4: Multilateral conflicts are more likely to escalate to war than bilateral conflicts.
Alliance Reliability
• Initial findings by Sabroskysuggested alliances were "scraps of paper"; most were violated.• Once we take into account the obligations in treaties, we find that allies do what they promise 75% of the time (Leeds, Long, Mitchell)• MV Chapter 4 (Leeds) also shows that allies enter into conflicts more often when alliances are in place at the start of a MID, consistent with partners being reliable.
Rivalry Lock-in
• M&T results are consistent with KGD findings that most wars happen early on in a rivalry (50% by 3rd; 90% by 6th). • Also a function of increasingly stalemated outcomes as rivalries progress.
Alliance Issues
• Many alliance studies treat alliances as "blank checks", yet they vary considerably in terms of obligations.- Against specific adversaries- In specific geographical locations• We need to match obligations more carefully to potential conflicts.• Timing issues: may be hard to disentangle causal relationship if events are close together.
Alliance Violations
• Prof. Leeds finds that alliance violations are explained well by conditions that changed since the time of the treaty signing:- Change in state's power- Change in state's regime- Consistent with the bargaining model of war• Democratic states make more credible alliance commitments.
The Context of Rivalry
• Relations between rivals can be seen as a context that comes out of the past and shapes their relations into the future. • The rivalry context may be more escalatory than the non-rivalry context. • Many theories of conflict assume a conflict of rivalry.- Arms races- Power transitions- Deterrence• Rivalry has been used as a case selection mechanism to test such theories .• The rivalry context has also been used to more fully develop other theories of conflict (e.g. diversionary theory).
according to Leeds what percent of alliances are up held?
75%
Laos
A country bordering Vietnam; part of the Ho Chi Minh trail ran through this country
Limited war
A war fought to achieve a limited objective, such as containing communism
Enforcement costs
Costs of ensuring agreement
strongest correlate of war
contiguity
solving PD
find Nash equilibrium
according to waltz nuclear weapons make war more likely or less likely?
less likely
what are neutrality alliances?
promise to remain neutral
Clausewitz: Friction
"Countless minor incidents- the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal." •Friction is like Murphy's Law • Examples: Human error & Lack of intelligence
Blainey: War-weariness/long cycle
-Exposure to war makes you more hesitant to start a war -A 100 year cycle that consists of: A General War, Breathing Space, Supplementary Wars, General Peace
Blainey: Delinquency
"Nations are lads who scuffle and fight in the streets because they are bored or idle; if nations are busy, they can be kept out of mischief." • Evidence: The U.S. was fairly "busy" during both Vietnam and the American Civil War
Blainey's arguments regarding: Accidental wars
"One may suggest that what was unintentional about war was not the decision to fight but the outcome of the fighting." they preferred a peace beneficial to them: War occurs when there are no bargains that are mutually preferable to war
Bushido
"the way of the warrior"; Japanese word for the Samurai life ; Samurai moral code was based on loyalty, chivalry, martial arts, and honor until the death
Issue Approach Assumptions
#1: Foreign policy is issue directed. #2: Cooperative and conflictual foreign policy tools are substituable means to pursue issue-related ends .#3: Actors' preferences and decisions regarding issue management are influenced by desires to maximize the probability of achieving issue-related goals and minimize the costs that are incurred in doing so, as well as by the saliencethey attach to the issue.
scale of democracy
(-10,10)
Sino-Japanese War
(1894-1895) Japan's imperialistic war against China to gain control of natural resources and markets for their goods. It ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth which granted Japan Chinese port city trading rights, control of Manchuria, the annexation of the island of Sakhalin, and Korea became its protectorate.
Korean War
(1950-3) A conflict between UN forces (primarily US and S Korea) against North Korea, and later China; Gen. Douglas Macarthur led UN forces and was later replaced by Gen. Ridgeway; Resulted in Korea remaining divided at the 38th parallel.
Scientific Approach to studying warfare
1) Identify generalizations 2) Constructing an explanation of theory of the observed 3) Deriving a testable hypothesis 4) Testing the hypothesis against other empirical evidence
Bremer's criticisms of war literature (LIBFQ)
- Limited spatial-temporal domain (problematic given how rare wars are) - inappropriate unit of analysis (should focus on dyads, not systemic of monadic) - Bivariate analytical methods (could be spurious relationship) - Faulty case selection (a lot of "no war" cases) - Questionable measures of war
7 Predictors of War (PPPMADD)
- Proximity(contiguity) - Power Status (major powers more likely) - Power difference(= strength increases MID) - Militarization (more militarized = more likely to fight) - Alliances (more likely) - Democracy (less likely) - Development (developed countries less likely)
problem of international politics
- actors compete for scarce resources -they compete under conditions of anarchy
Steps to war model
- dyadic territorial disputes MORE likely to escalate to war than regime/policy changes - dyadic territorial disputes where both side have alliances INCREASES likelihood of war - territorial disputes + alliances + recurring disputes = MORE likely for war - the effect of prior disputes is curvilinear (first increasing, then decreasing chance for war) - territorial disputes + alliances + recurring disputes + arms races = MORE likely for war
what are mitchell and Prins findings?
- rivalry (opportunity with economic incentives results in initiation of a MID - go to opponent that you can use violence against -they look at MID initiation by states - non democracies are more likely to use diversionary force
Waltzian Neorealism
- structure - anarchy - distb'n of power - distinction between unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar
Bargaining Model of War
- war is irrational, given the cost - causes of bargaining failure: asymmetric information commitment problem indivisible issue - mechanisms for making credible threats: tying hands sinking costs brinkmanship
Powell: puzzle and theory
-"Why does war occur despite being inefficient?" Credible commitment problems cause war & large shifts in the balance of power
Powell: assessment of the causes of bargaining failure
-Incomplete information and incentives to misrepresent (no, assumes if they had all info thered be no war. also, misrepresentation only explains outbreak of war but not prolonged conflicts) -Credible commitment problem (agrees) - Issue indivisibilities (no, this is a credible commitment problem)
Trends in Interstate Warfare
-Increasing severity (until recently) but decreasing intensity (% of population killed) -Decrease in number of great power wars (16thcentury-22; 19thcentury-5; 20thcentury-5) -Decline in frequency of interstate wars since 1945, but increasing frequency of civil warsShift from wars fought in Europe to other regions -Warfare is increasingly asymmetricIncreased diffusion of conflict
Blainey: Great Ideas
-More civilized = less likely to start war -Blainey disagrees, civil wars
ally around the flag effect.
-Rally effects may create incentives for leaders to use force to draw attention away from domestic political and economic troubles.-Example: Thatcher's approval rose from 29% prior to Falklands war to 51% at war's end. The Argentine junta's domestic support also increased.
neorealism assumption
-anarchic -states possess some type of offensive military capability -can never be 100% sure of other states' offensive intentions -motivated to survive -rational/strategic actors
explanations are flawed how?
-assumptions do not logically imply the hypothesis -empirical record doesn't vindicate the hypothesis
July crisis:
-austria delivers 10 demands to serbia -serbia acquiesces but negotiated for 5 days -serbia & russia mobilize -france threatens both central powers
PP: measures democracy as
-competitiveness of executioner recruitment -openness of executive recruitment constraints on chief executive
Poli-Sci Model
-formulate some hypothesis (H) from theory (T) -deduce prediction (P) from H with necessary qualifiers -Test P -Judge whether H is confirmed or not, contingent on P or ~P
outlining a rational actor model
-identifying a problem -identify & rank goals -gather info (can be ongoing) -identify alternatives for reaching goals -analyze alternatives by considering consequences & effectiveness of each, weighted probability -select alternative w/ greatest expected utility -implement decision
rationales for war under offense dominance
-leads to opportunistic expansionism -1st strike advantages are observable -costs-benefit calculus favors over defense -defensively oriented states are compelled to offense
Empirical implications of theoretical models (EITM)
-start with theory, case study etc -outline model establishing causal linkages -stipulate deductions & hypothesis - outline measurement & research design to test deductions
Fearon/Bargaining: Causes of bargaining failure
...
Post-Cold War Findings
008 Steps to War book includes analyses for 1990-2001 period.Results show that territorial disputes more likely to escalate to war than policy/regime disputes.If states are allied to each other and have outside alliances, war is more likely.The absence of alliances perfectly predicts peace.Post-Cold War findings look more like pre-Cold War period.
What makes deterrence successful?Success depends on credibility, which depends on:
1) Capabilities 1)You can achieve a battlefield victory 2)You can inflict other unacceptable losses (e.g. through nuclear attacks)2) Intentions1) Long term reputation for resolve2) Strong defender-client ties in extended deterrence
Interstate War (Small and Singer)
1) Fatalities: minimum 1,000 military personnel battle deaths among all participating system members 2) On each side, there must be at least one participant that is a memberof the international system:-Minimum 500,000 population-Diplomatic recognition by France and UK through WWI-After 1920, UN or League of Nations member or received diplomats from any two major powers 3) To be a warparticipant, a state must suffer 100 battle deaths orhave a minimum of 1000 armed personnel engaged in active combat.Note that the COW threshold for battle deaths is higher than what Lewis Fry Richardson used in his study (317).
Types of Deterrence
1) General deterrence: threat by the attacker is not immediately imminent 2) Immediate deterrence: the potential attacker's threat to use force is imminent 3) Direct deterrence: the defending country is trying to prevent an attack on its own territory 4) Extended deterrence: the defending country is trying to protect a 3rd party (protégé)
Dangerous dyads (the seven factors that make conflict most/least likely & why theoretically; Bremer's empirical findings)
1) Geographical Proximity-War and militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) are more likely between states that share a land or water (up to 150 miles) border-War is more likely between states whose capital cities are closer to each other-Causal explanations•Proximity creates contentious issues•Military reach•Territorial disputes-Measure: land contiguous, sea contiguous (up to 150 miles of water), or non-contiguous 2) Power Parity and War-Systemic level: balance of power versus power transition/long cycle theories-Dyadic level: parity (pairs of countries with similar levels of military, economic, and demographic capabilities) increases chances for MIDs and wars-Relates also to the bargaining model of war•In parity, both sides overestimate chances of winning-Measure: CINC score, states' global share of military (personnel & expenditures), economic (iron & steel production & energy consumption), & demographic (population & urban population)-Large difference (dyadic capability ratio > 10), medium difference (ratio between 3 & 10), small difference (< 3) 3) Power Status and War-Major powers (as defined by COW) are more likely to engage in war than minor powers. 4) Alliances and War-Deterrence: if states have credible commitments of defense from allies, they are less likely to be attacked (Leeds)-Escalation: alliances constitute a step to war and increase the risks of conflict (Vasquez)-Allies may have incentives to fight each other (Bueno de Mesquita): e.g. USSR vs. China, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia-Measure: COW categories of defense pacts, neutrality agreements, ententes or no alliances 5) Democracy and War-Democratic dyads are less likely to experience wars than non-democratic or mixed regime dyads.-Measures for both democratic, one democratic, or none democratic from Chan & Gurr 6) Development and War-Leninist thesis: economically advanced states will have more conflict due to competition over resources.-Dependency thesis: conflict is more likely in asymmetric dyads involving a developed and a less developed state.-Measure: A state is economically advanced if its share of systemic economic capabilities > its share of demographic capabilities 7) Militarization and War-Deterrence theory: militarization makes for less war (e.g. nuclear weapons in the Cold War: Waltz)-Escalation: militarization/arms races constitute a step to war and increase tensions/escalation of disputes (Vasquez, Wallace, Sample)-Bremer: pairs of more militarized states are more likely to fight wars than other states.•A state is militarized if its share of systemic military capabilities > its share of demographic capabilities
Bremer's Criticisms of War Literature
1) Inappropriate unit of analysis-In the early 1990s, most studies of war had been conducted at the systemic or monadic level of analysis.-Example: democratic peace (Maoz & Abdolali1989)•Systemic: Does the level of international conflict in the system decline as the number of politically free states increases? (Yes for war, no for MIDs)•Monadic: Are politically free states less conflict prone than states that are not free? (No)-Bremer argues that we should instead focus on dyads or pairs of states given that most theories of war focus on questions of who fights whom. 2) Limited spatial-temporal domain-Many studies limit the spatial domain to major powers only.•Example: Levy's study of alliances and war (1981) that focuses on great powers from 1495-1975-Other studies limit the temporal domain (e.g. post WWII)•Example: Oneal & Russett (1997) democratic peace study, 1950-1985-Bremer argues that this is problematic given how rare wars are in history.•1816-1965 for all possible pairings of countries (N = 202,778)•85 cases of war onset (baseline probability = .000419) 3) Faulty case selection strategy-Many war studies select on the dependent variable and fail to examine cases of no wars.•Example: Stoessinger'sWhy Nations Go To War-This approach is only valid for testing necessary conditions.-Bremer includes a lot of "no war" cases (202,693 of 202,778)•Issue: does not control for states' opportunities to fight•Issue: Treats all 0's as the same even though the quality of peace varies across dyads 4) Bivariate analytical methods-Many earlier studies of war focus on relationships between a single variable (e.g. arms races) and war (e.g. Wallace's 1982 study).-Problems•Could be a spurious relationship•Does not consider correlations between risk factors (e.g. militarized and alliance)-Solution: Bremer estimates the effects of seven major risk factors on interstate war using both bivariate and multivariate models. 5) Questionable measures of war-Tendency to equate the onset of war with the duration of war; e.g. include all years of an ongoing war in the analysis-Failure to separate the originators of wars from the joiners; the processes by which wars spread to a larger number of states could be distinct from the original motivations for war.-Solution: Bremer includes only the original warring dyad•Problem: excludes all WWII cases except Germany-Poland•Question: What predictors (variables) does Bremer include in his model of the onset of dyadic warfare?
Trends in Warfare
1) Increasing Severity but decreasing intensity 2) Decrease in the number of Great Power wars 3) Decline in frequency of interstate wars 4) Increase in frequency of Civil Wars 5) Shift from wars fought in Europe to other regions 6) Warfare increasingly asymmetric 7) Increased diffusion of conflict
alliance empirical findings
1)Alliances were associated with peace in the 19thcentury, but war in the 20thcentury (COW project) 2)Findings since 1980s show support for both positions: alliances increase/decrease chance for conflict. 3)Alliances make the expansion of war more likely 4)Findings on reliability show support for both positions: allies are not reliable during war (Sabrosky); allies are reliable during war (Leeds, Long, and Mitchell)
Armaments-Tension Spiral Model (armsrace)
1)Arms races increase tension and hostility (security dilemma) 2)Arms races increase uncertainty 3)This produces a spiral of arms buildups and tensions, which can lead to conflict Note: this will be part of the steps to war modelSusan Sample (MV Ch6) notes that arms buildups could deter attacks (reduce dispute onset) but be associated with escalation to war once deterrence fails (like alliances; Ch4)!).
Components of a Causal Hypothesis
1)Dependent Variable (DV)-effect 2)Independent Variable (IV)-cause-bivariate analysis (one IV)-multivariate analysis (> one IV) 3)Statement of causal direction- positive relationship (as X ↑, Y ↑)- negative relationship (as X ↑, Y ↓)
scientific approach to studying warfare
1)Identify generalizations 2)Construct an explanation, or theory, of the observed generalizations 3)Derive a testable hypothesis 4)Test the hypothesis against empirical evidence
Para Bellum (Preparedness) Model (armsrace)
1)If you desire peace, prepare for war 2)Anarchic self-help system; nations must be ready to defend their sovereignty 3)In this model, arms races can deter the onset of war, especially if both sides have nuclear weapons with second strike capability (Waltz).
Levels of Analysis for Studying Warfare
1)Individual:focuses on foreign policy decisions made by leaders 2)Nation-State:Focuses on characteristics of the states such as regime type, economic system, public opinion 3) Dyadic Level:Focuses on history of interactions (rivalry), issues at stake (territorial disputes) 4) Systemic level: focuses on the structure of the system (bi-polar)
Diversionary Theory
1)Leaders have a desire to stay in office. 2)In group-out-group hypothesis: when faced with an external threat, groups become more cohesive. 3)A leader's approval increases following a use of military force—rally around the flag effect.
Diversionary Theory of War
1)Leaders have a desire to stay in office. 2)In group-out-group hypothesis: when faced with an external threat, groups become more cohesive. 3)A leader's approval increases following a use of military force—rally around the flag effect. At times, political leaders may face a diversionary incentive: • A temptation to spark an international crisis in order to rally public support at home Diversionary force: leaders using force to divert attention away from domestic turmoil • Internal conflict (protests, riots, etc.) • Economic woes (high inflation, high unemployment, etc.) • Political incentives: approval, elections
Small and Singer's (COW) definition of interstate wars
1,000 battle deaths On each side, there must be at least one participant that is a member of the international system State must suffer 100 battle deaths or have a minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged in active combat to be a war participant
Definition of arms races
1. 2 or more states increase their military more rapidly than normal 2. the buildup occurs in peacetime 3. the race is a result of external competition, not domestic politics
Arms Races
1. 2+ states increasing military more rapidly than normal 2. buildup occurs in peacetime 3. Race is a result of external competition, not domestic politics
Steps to War Post Cold War Findings
1. 2008 Steps to War book includes analyses for 1990-2001 period 2. Results show that territorial disputes more likely to escalate to war than policy/regime disputes 3. If states are allied to each other and have outside alliances, war is more likely 4. The absence of alliances perfectly predicts peace 5. Post-Cold War findings look more like pre-cold war period
The 3 major data collection projects on war
1. A Study of War-Quincy Wright 2. Statistics of Deadly Quarrels-Richardson 3. Resort to Arms- Small and J. David Singer
Empirical Findings of alliance test
1. Alliances were associated with peace in the 19th century, but war in the 20th century (COW) 2. Findings since 1980s show support for both positions: alliances increase/decrease chance for conflict 3. Alliances make the expansion of war more likely 4. Findings on reliability show support for both positions: allies are not reliable during war (Sabrosky); allies are reliable during war (Leeds,Long,Mitchell)
Fearon/Bargaining: Literature
1. Anarchy. It does not explain why states fight rather than bargain 2. Preventative war. changes in the balance of power do not prevent bargains- which always exist due to costs 3. Positive Expected Utility (costs vs. benefits). These arguments don't consider negotiated settlements 4. Disagreements about relative power (Blainey's argument is non-rational. With a rational explanation, both sides must reach the same conclusion given the same info-no emotional component. Rational disagreements can only arise with incomplete info- if both sides do not have all info. But, if sharing info would lead to bargains, why don't states reveal info? 5. Miscalculation of the enemy's willingness to fight. Even if you agree on power, if you don't know the enemy's costs of fighting, you might not be able to find a bargain. (risk return tradeoff)
Richardson's Arm Race Model
1. Arms accumulate because of mutual fear 2. There is resistance from society against constantly increasing arms expenditures 3. there are factors independent of expenditures that contribute to the buildup of arms
Armaments-tension spiral models
1. Arms races increase tension and hostility 2. Increase uncertainty 3. Produces a spiral of arms build-up and tensions which leads to conflict
Armaments-Tension Spiral Model
1. Arms races increase tension and hostility (security dilemma) 2. Arms races increase uncertainty 3. This produces a spiral of arms buildups and tensions which can lead to conflict
Offensive Realism
1. Benign intentions can change if countries undergo changes in power or regime 2. Aggression sometimes pays and accumulation of power leads to further aggression
Offensive Realism
1. Benign intentions can change if countries undergo changes in power or regime 2. Aggression sometimes pays and the accumulation of power leads to further aggression 3. The best way for states to provide for their security is to achieve regional or global hegemony (mearsheimer) 4. Problem: cannot account for decline in territorial revisionism
What are the 3 mechanisms for making threats credible?
1. Brinksmanship 2. Sinking Costs 3. Tying Hands
Ways to make threats credible
1. Brinksmanship (Crisis Bargaining) 2. Sinking Costs (Arms spending, nukes) 3. Tying Hands (Alliances)
Mechanisms for Making Threats Credible
1. Brinksmanship (See the other's resolves, push them) 2. Tying Hands (Make backing down difficult; troops) 3. Sinking Costs (deterrence, nuclear)
criteria for state
1. geopolitical entity - must occupy territory 2. must have population > 500,000 3. must be diplomatically recognized writ large 4. must have a sovereign political authority
3 COW alliance types
1. Defense Pact 2. Neutrality/Non-aggression pact 3. Entente
Alliances: ATOP types
1. Defensive Cooperation 2. Offensive Cooperation 3. Neutrality 4. Non-aggression 5 .Consultation
5 ATOP alliance types
1. Defensive cooperation 2. Offensive cooperation 3. Neutrality 4. Non-aggression 5. Consultation
Components of a Casual Hypothesis
1. Dependent Variable (Effect) 2. Independent Variable (Cause) 3. Statement of casual direction (positive or negative relationship)
Components of a causal hypothesis
1. Dependent Variable-effect 2. Independent Variable-cause 3. Statement of casual direction
Fog of War Lessons
1. Empathize with your enemy 2. Rationality will not save us 3. There's something beyond one's self 4.Maximize efficiency 5.Proportionality should be a guideline in war 6.Get the Data 7.Belief and seeing are both often wrong 8. Be prepared to reexamine your reasoning. 9.In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil. 10. Never say never 11. You can't change human nature.
Classical Realism
1. Emphasizes role of human nature as source of aggressive behavior and war 2. Assumes states seek to increase power 3. Focuses on foreign policies and grand strategies designed to prevent war **a constant like human nature cannot explain variations in war and peace over time
Classical Realism (LT)
1. Emphasizes the role of human nature as a source of aggressive behavior and war 2. Assumes states seek to increase power 3. Focuses on foreign policies or grand strategies best designed to prevent war Cannot explain the variations of war and peace over time
Defensive Realism
1. Focuses on states perceptions of others states' intentions 2.
Defensive Realism
1. Focuses on states' Perceptions of other states' intentions 2. Walt's balance of threat theory argues that states balance against the greatest threats to their interests, rather than against the strongest power in the system 3. Geographical Proximity increases threat 4. War is more likely when military technology favors the offense 5. Aggressive foreign policy is a function of domestic factors, not the systemic power distribution 6. Problem: relies on domestic politics to explain anomalous behavior even though theory focuses on interstate interactions
Waltzian Neorealism
1. Focuses on structure of the system 2. Balances of power will emerge, states imitate each other and become socialized **Unable to predict specific events; Difficulty explaining why power/polarity changes
Long Cycle Theory
1. Focuses on the cycles between the 5 global wars 2. Distinguishes between the rise and fall of land and sea powers which tend to be in opposition Conclusions: *Global wars occur every 80-100 years *Each global war leads to significant increase in sea power concentration *Unipolar, Bipolar, Multipolar-most to least peaceful *States with superior naval capabilities win global wars
Issue Approach Assumptions
1. Foreign policy is issue directed 2. Cooperative and conflictual foreign policy tools are substituable means to pursue issue-related ends 3. Actors' preferences and decisions regarding issue management are influenced by desires to maximize the probability of achieving issue-related goals and minimize the costs that are incurred in doing so, as well as by the salience they attach to the issue
what are the three assumptions that richardson makes with the reciprocity model
1. in part, arms will accumulate because of mutual fear ( security) 2. resistance from society against constantly increasing arms expenditures 3. other factors can also contribute to arms buildup
Issue-Balanced Approach (assumptions)
1. Foreign policy is issue directed 2. Cooperative and conflictual foreign policy tools are substitutable means for pursuing issue-related ends 3. Actors preferences and decisions are influenced by maximizing probability of achieving issue-related goals and minimizing costs
4 Types of Deterrence
1. General deterrence: threat by the attacker is not immediately imminent 2. Immediate deterrence: the potential attacker's threat to use force is imminent 3. Direct deterrence: the defending country is trying to prevent an attack on its own territory 4. Extended deterrence: the defending country is trying to protect a third party (Protege)
Deterrence types
1. General: Threat not imminent 2. Immediate: Threat is imminent 3. Direct: Defending country trying to prevent attack in own country 4. Extended: Defending country is trying to protect 3rd party
Bremer's 7 risk factors
1. Geographical Proximity (increase when closer) 2. Power Parity (closer they are the more at risk) 3. Power Status (Major powers more likely) 4. Alliances (both) (Leeds=deterrence; Vasquez=escalation) 5. Democracy (less likely) 6. Development (more developed more likely) 7. Militarization (both) (Deterrence=Waltz; escalation=Vasquez, Wallace, Sample) Bremer says more likely
Para Bellum (Preparedness) Model
1. If you desire peace, prepare for war 2. Anarchic self-help system; nations must be ready to defend their sovereignty 3. Arms races can deter the onset of war, especially if both sides have nuclear weapons with second strike capability (Waltz)
Para Bellum
1. If you desire peace, prepare for war 2. Anarchic self-help system, nations must be ready to defend sovereignty 3. Arms races can deter onset of war, especially if nukes involved
Stuart Bremer's criticisms of war literature
1. Inappropriate Unit of analysis 2. Limited Spatial-temporal domain 3. Faulty Case Selection 4. Bi-variate analytical methods 5. Questionable measures of war
Causes of Bargaining Failure
1. Incomplete Info 2. Commitment Problems 3. Indivisible Issues
Bargaining model of war: Causes
1. Incomplete information 2. commitment problems 3. indivisible issues
Trends in Interstate Warfare
1. Increasing severity (until recently) but decreasing intensity (% of population killed) 2. Decrease in number of great powers wars 3. Decline in frequency of interstate wars since 1945, but increasing frequency of civil wars 4. Shift from wars fought in Europe to other regions 5. Warfare is increasingly asymmetric (powerful vs. weak) 6. Increased diffusion of conflict
Power Transition Theory
1. International system is hierarchical 2. Dominant nation is on top 3. Potential challengers are those with 80% of the capabilities of the dominant power
How to measure rivalry (Goertz and Diehl)
1. Isolated conflict (1 or 2 MIDs) 2. Proto-rivalry (3-5 MIDs) 3. Enduring rivalry (6+ MIDs)
How alliances relate to MID onset and escalation of war (Leeds)
1. Lead to counter-alliances and arms races 2. Expand bilateral conflicts to multilateral ones 3. May embolden alliance partners * A potential challenger is more likely to initiate an MID against a potential target if challenger has one or more allies on offensive support
Small and Singer's (COW) definition of interstate system membership
1. Minimum of 500,000 population 2. Diplomatic recognition from France and UK through WW1 3. After 1920, UN or League of nations member or received diplomats from any two major powers
Measurement Levels
1. Nominal (discrete categories that distinguish cases; war initiation 0=no 1=yes) 2. Ordinal (categorizes and rank orders cases) 3. Interval (categorizes, rank orders, and has some standard unit of comparison; military spending)
Measurement Levels
1. Nominal (distinguishes cases, 0=no 1=yes) 2. Ordinal (categorizes and order-ranks, 1=best 2,3,4=worst) 3. Interval (categorizes, order ranks, and has standard unit of comparison, ie military spending)
Powell: three types of credible commitment problem and how they are related
1. Preventive war 2. Preemptive war/First strike advantage 3. Bargaining over sources of power These are all caused by large, rapid shifts in the balance of power • Preventive war is the logic we just covered • Preemptive war is when the outcome of war is more favorable if you attack first • This is akin to a shift in the balance of power • If this shift is sufficiently large, there can be no bargain
Dangerous Dyads: What factors make conflict most/least likely
1. Proximity 2. Power Status 3. Alliance 4. Militarization 5. Democracy 6. Development 7. Power Difference
3 competing explanations for contiguity-war relationships
1. Proximity (near each other) (opportunity for war) 2. Interaction (borders are more opportunity for conflict) 3. Territoriality (specific territorial disputes) (willingness for war) (tendency to occupy and defend territory)
What are the 3 major data collection projects on war?
1. Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Origins: technology, law, social organization, the distribution of opinions and attitudes concerning basic valuesAq 2. Lewis Fry Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (wars are random, higher population does not mean more deaths, cultural factors do not reduce likelihood of war, sea powers less belligerent than land powers, all nations not equally likely to engage in war...geography, arms races increase) 3. Melvin Small and David Singer, Resort to Arms: COW
What are the enduring rivalry characteristics of KGD? (dispute density, repitition)
1. Spatial consistency (same issues, same countries) 2. Duration 6 MIDs over 20+ years 3. Militarized Competition 4. Linked Conflict
Waltzian Neorealism (LT)
1. States are unitary actors and are the system's constituent units 2. The essential structural quality of the system is anarchy 3. States seek survival not power as an end in itself 4. States behave rationally 5. Focuses on the structure of the international system 6. Balances of power will emerge; states will imitate each other and become socialized 7. Bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity (iffy)
Routine and reciprocity
1. States' behaviors are driven by bureaucratic routine and other internal factors 2. States' behaviors respond in part, to the actions of other countries
Hegemonic Stability Theory
1. Strong concentrations of power in the hands of a single power are the most stable and peaceful systems 2. power transition theory 3. long cycle theory 4. Dyadic version: power preponderance in a pair of states predicts to a lower probability of militarized conflict (bremer-MV)
Wallace's findings
1. Strong relationship between arms races and dispute escalation to war
Dissatisfaction
1. The dominant power establishes the SQ 2. Some great powers are satisfied with the SQ, others are dissatisfied 3. Dissatisfaction can be based on historical, ideological, religious, territorial, personal, or cultural factors 4. Dissatisfied states want to change the SQ, or the rules of the game
aggregating incidents to disputes
1. all incidents must involve same or overlapping set of state system member 2. each issue and geographic dispute area must be discrete, unless historical evidence suggests 2 seemingly separate issues are in fact connected 3. there are specific rules for start and end dates 4. disputes that escalate to war end other ongoing disputes between state system members 5.in cases of MIDs within context of Civil War, whichever side controls the capital, controls the govr 6. disputes & wars of independence are included only if there are at least 1 state system member on each side. 7. MID "joiners" have different start dates and possibly different end dates case in which 1 state system member threatened, display or outright used military force against the government or official representatives, property or territory of the government
Bargaining model of war: Mechanisms for making threats credible
1. Tying hands 2. Sinking costs
How alliances relate to MID onset and escalation to war (Leeds)
1. When an initiator begins a dispute with an offensive ally, it is more likely to receive outside assistance and the target is less likely to get help 2. When a target has a defensive ally at the time the dispute begins, it is more likely that the target will receive assistance and less likely the initiator gets help 3. When the initiator has a neutrality pact, though, the target is less likely to get help
Measures of Association
1. Yule's Q (for cross tabulations) Q=[(a*d)-(b*c)]/[(a*d)+(b*c)] 2. Pearson's r correlation (for interval data) 3. Both measure range from +1 to -1, 0=no relationship
Effects of issue salience on militarized conflict and peaceful conflict management
1. as within issue salience increases, militarized disputes and peaceful attempts to settle issues are more likely 2. a history of militarization and failed settlement attempts increases likelihood of future conflicts and peaceful attempts
through the Armament-tensions spiral models why do arms races increase uncertainty? (3 reasons)
1. because you are uncertain to what extent the other side is building up its military 2. produces a spiral of arms build ps and tensions which will result in security dilemma 3. security dilemma
Bremer's Criticisms of the war literature
1. inappropriate unit of analysis (use dyadic, not systemic or monadic) 2. Limited spatial-temporal domain (not just major powers, don't limit) 3. Faulty case selection strategy (include "no war" cases) 4. Bivariate analytical methods (uses 7 risk factors in both bivariate and multivariate models) 5. Questionable measures of war (include only the states that started the war)
What are the strategic rivalry characteristics of Thompson?
1. independent states 2. Evidence for/timing of rivalry is based on leaders' statements/perceptions about their enemies 3. no minimum duration 4. positional (great power) vs. Spatial (borders) rivalries Has to be threatening
3 things to know when evaluating regression analysis
1. know data used 2. know what objects in the regression table are saying 3. know what regression table isn't saying
incident coding rules
1. must be between state system members 2. must not be authorized by treaty or invitation of a target state 3. must be explicit, non-routine, & govt authorized 4. must be done by official forces of the govt 5. will not be treated as separate if 2 states are at war 6. actions against private property do not count 7. territorial claims must be in a well-defined geography area
why do leaders benefit from diversionary incentives?
1. patriotism goes up 2. to ease criticism 3. changing the news cycle 4. rallies
why do leaders need opportunities for diversion?
1. rivalry 2. disputed territory 3. major powers have more opportunity for diversion because they interact with more states and have more ability 4. international events
What is the Para Bellum (Preparedness) model
1. the international system is anarchic self help system 2. arms races deter war from 3. nuclear second strike capability (MAD)
Territoriality (Vasquez)
1. wars arise from specific territorial disputes 2. Proximity provides the opportunity for war while a territorial dispute provides the willingness for war 3. humans have an inherited tendency towards territoriality, the tendency to occupy and defend territory 4. Learned behavior: the use of force to resolve territorial disputes
Levels of Analysis for Studying Warfare
1.Individual (leaders 2. Nation-state (regime type, economic system, public opinion) 3. Dyadic (rivalry, territorial disputes) 4. System (bipolarity)
in Sample's study, which historical period shows the strongest relationship between arms races (mutual military buildups) and escalation of militarized disputes to war?
1816-1944
Ho Chi Minh
1950s and 60s; communist leader of North Vietnam; used geurilla warfare to fight anti-comunist, American-funded attacks under the Truman Doctrine; brilliant strategy drew out war and made it unwinnable
Tet Offensive
1968; National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese forces launched a huge attack on the Vietnamese New Year (Tet), which was defeated after a month of fighting and many thousands of casualties; major defeat for communism, but Americans reacted sharply, with declining approval of LBJ and more anti-war sentiment
Future Power Transitions?
2016 GDP for US is about 18.57 trillion versus 11.2 trillion for China. China is projected to overtake the US due to its growth rate being 2-3 times current US growth.Predictions imply that this transition is likely to occur between 2025-2040.Also possible for a future US overtaking by India.China already surpassed the US in 2014 in purchasing power parity (combining GDP with cost of living).
how many total rivalries did Klein, Goertz, and Diehl identify empirically in chapter 5?
290
Clausewitz: the trinity: parts, interpretation and who is involved
3 parts: 1. Violence 2. Politics 3. Uncertainty
Pearl Harbor
7:50-10:00 AM, December 7, 1941 - Surprise attack by the Japanese on the main U.S. Pacific Fleet harbored in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii destroyed 18 U.S. ships and 200 aircraft. American losses were 3000, Japanese losses less than 100. In response, the U.S. declared war on Japan and Germany, entering World War II.
International Atomic Energy Agency
A UN agency created in 1946 to limit the use of nuclear technology to peaceful purposes. The purpose of this organization today is to ensure compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to ensure that signatories are not using nuclear technology to develop nuclear weapons. This organization does this through regular on-site inspections of nuclear facilities inside all countries that have joined the NPT.
Verdun
A battle in WWI. Is considered some of the bloodiest fighting in WWI and the German offense was stopped; offensive battle on the western front initiated by Germany in which they hoped to crush France and taken them out of the war, however France was in a very good defensive position and French held it for 10 months. Nearly a million killed. French drew reserve troops from the Somme to help defend. No territory was gained; Battle in WWI that ended in massive casualties and had little direct result
Cambodia
A country bordering South Vietnam to the west, and was a stronghold for Viet Cong troops to build up and then penetrate S. Vietnam borders with ease. Consequently, Nixon proceeded to enact a military procedure to eradicate Communist troop bases and villages in this country. While he believed that this plan would allow him to end the war quickly and decisively, it only succeeded in igniting a civil war in this country and a new procession of protests in America.
Alliance:
A formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force
Triple Entente
A military alliance between Great Britain, France, and Russia in the years preceding World War I.
Cultural nationalism
A process of protecting, either formally (with laws) or informally (with social values), the primacy of a certain cultural system against influences (real or imagined) from another culture.
neoliberal institutionalism
A reinterpretation of liberalism that posits that even in an anarchic international system, states will cooperate because of their continuous interactions with each other and because it is in their self-interest to do so; institutions provide the framework for cooperative interactions
Security paradox
A situation in which two or more actors seeking only to improve their own security, provoke, through their words or actions, and increase in mutual tension, resulting in less security all around,
Red Scare
A social/political movement designed to prevent a socialist/communist/radical movement in this country by finding "radicals," incarcerating them, deporting them, and subverting their activities
Balance of threat
A theory of offensive "realism" where states will generally balance by allying against a perceived threat, although very weak states are more likely to bandwagon with the rising threat in order to protect their own security.
Domino Theory
A theory that if one nation comes under Communist control, then neighboring nations will also come under Communist control.
Eschatological view of war
A view of history which would culminate in aA view of history which would culminate in a final war leading to the unfolding of some grand design either divine natural human
WWI
A war fought from 1914 to 1918 between the Allies, notably Britain, France, Russia, and Italy (which entered in 1915), and the Central Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire.
Total war
A war that involves the complete mobilization of resources and people, affecting the lives of all citizens in the warring countries, even those remote from the battlefields.
League of Nations
A world organization established in 1920 to promote international cooperation and peace. It was first proposed in 1918 by President Woodrow Wilson, although the United States never joined the League. Essentially powerless, it was officially dissolved in 1946.
Norms
Rules that define the boundaries of acceptable behavior.
what are examples of lobby and interest groups
APEC, NRA - national rifle association, green peace, PACs- political action committees, friends of the earth, commonwealth fund, animal defense fund, ACLU- american civil liberties union
Anarchy
Absence of law or government; chaos, disorder
Rally Around the Flag
Academic evidence is mixed Some studies find rallies (e.g. Iranian hostage crisis, Gulf War, Falklands; Lai & Reiter 2005 Others find that rally effects in the US vary and are typically short-lived and small (Lian& Oneal1993). Leaders do not have longer terms in office after uses of force (Chiozza& Goemans 2004) & may even lose office when cooperating with their rival states (Colaresi 2004).
The House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC)
An investigating committee which investigated what it considered un-American propaganda.
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
Agreement designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Existing nuclear powers promise not to aid others in acquiring nuclear weapons, and those without nuclear weapons agreed not to build them. Isreal, India and Pakistan are the only 3 nations that have not signed this.
Triple Alliance
Alliance among Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy at the end of the 19th century; part of European alliance system and balance of power prior to World War I.
NATO
Alliance made to defend one another if they were attacked by any other country; US, England, France, Canada, Western European countries, allied against the Soviets.
Alliance-War Relationship
Alliances make war lesslikely- Balance of Power theory• Alliances deter war by enhancing the credibility of military intervention; aggressors know who they could face after attacking.- Deterrence• A potential challenger is less likely to attack if it knows it will face two or more enemies in battle.• If alliances are attacked, they must be judged to be unreliable by potential challengers (Smith 1996).- Alliances reduce uncertainty in the system & reduce chances for war based on misperception. • How do alliances serve as costly signals?- Sunk costs in alliance formation- Audience costs for abrogation of commitments- Allies do as promised 75% of the time (Leeds, Long, & Mitchell 2000).- Major powers intervene more often in minor power disputes when they have alliance ties to the disputants.•Hypothesis (defensive): Potential challengers are lesslikely to initiate a militarized dispute against a potential target if the target has one or more allies committed to intervene on behalf of the target if attacked by the challenger. • Alliances make war morelikely- They generate counter alliances and arms races- Expand bilateral conflicts to multilateral ones- Permanent alliances reduce the number of potential coalitions against the aggressors- Alliances encourage restraint in adversaries but may embolden alliance partners towards increased aggression (Smith); entrapment•Hypothesis (offensive/neutrality): A potential challenger is morelikely to initiate a MID against a potential target if the challenger has one or more allies who have promised offensivesupport or committed to remain neutral.
Peaceful Dyads (factors that reduce risks of war)
Alliances, Democracy, Trade, International Organizations, Border Settlement, Nuclear Weapons, Domestic politics/leaders' resolve
Definition of Deterrence
An attempt to preventsomething undesirable (war) by threateningto retaliate and cause unacceptable damageto the enemy if he goes through with it. Deterrence involves more than defense. Deterrence is achieved through the ability to punish(Waltz)
Balancing
Appropriate response to threatening concentrations of power.
In Sample's study, which historical period shows the strongest relationship between arms races (mutual military buildups) and escalation of militarized disputes to war? A. 1945-1993 B. 1750-1815 C. 1816-1944
Answer: 1816-1944
If the expected number of wars (e.g. both democratic = 9.1) is (significantly) higher than the observed number of wars (e.g. both democratic = 1) historically, we would conclude that this factor (e.g. both democratic) _________ the probability of dyadic war. A. increases B. decreases C. had no effect
Answer: Decreases
According to Hensel et al (MV Chapter 3), what is the effect of previous militarized disputes on conflict management? A. if a pair of states experienced previous militarized disputes, they are more likely to experience militarized conflict, but less likely to use peaceful settlement tools B. if a pair of states experienced previous militarized disputes, they are less likely to experience militarized conflict, but more likely to use peaceful settlement tools C. If a pair of states experienced previous militarized disputes, they are more likely to experience militarized conflict and more likely to use peaceful settlement tools
Answer: If a pair of states experienced previous militarized disputes they are more likely to experience militarized conflict and more likely to use peaceful settlement tools
In his study "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965" (MV Chapter 2), Professor Stuart Bremer finds that _______ is the factor most likely to lead pairs of states to fight wars. A. land/sea contiguity B. major power status C. Power status
Answer: Land & Sea contiguity
In her study "The outcomes of Military buildups: Minor states vs major powers" Susan Sample (MV Chapter 6) uses which world war to illustrate how arms buildups can lead to war A. napoleonic wars B. WWI C. WWII
Answer: WWI
In Bremers bivariate analysis (table 1) which of the following factors decreases the chances for war in a dyad A. the dyad includes states that are land or sea contiguity B. both states in the dyad are democratic C. the dyad contains one or more major powers
Answer: both states in the dyad are democratic
In her analysis of all militarized disputes from 1816-1993, Sample finds that mutual military buildups significantly ____ the chances for escalation to war, while nuclear weapons significantly _____ the chances for escalation to war. A. increase, increase B. decrease, increase C. increase, decrease
Answer: increase, decrease
Hensel et al (MV Chapter 3) note that if a disputed territory contained a sacred religious site and was claimed as an historical homeland for a group living in the area, this would be evidence the issue has high____? A. intangible salience B. tangible salience C. power salience
Answer: intangible salience
According to Hensel et al (MV Chapter 3), which of the following factors reduces the chances for militarized conflict in issue claims A. previous militarized disputes B. joint democracy C. dyadic power parity
Answer: joint democracy
Analyzing all years in her dataset, Sample finds that arms races (mutual military buildups) significantly increase the chances for dispute escalation to war in each type of power pairing EXCEPT: A. major power-minor power B. major power-major power C. minor power-minor power
Answer: major power-minor power
According to Hensel et al (MV Chapter 3), what happens to the chances for militarized conflict when (within) issue salience increases? A. militarized conflict is less likely B. issue salience is not related to the chances for militarized conflict C. militarized conflict is more likely
Answer: militarized conflict is more likely
Sample defines _______ as growth rates in military expenditures that exceed a country's historical average in a ten year period. A. rapid military buildup B. defense burden C. power parity
Answer: rapid military buildup
Bremer identifies each of the following variables as a factor that can help to predict the onset of war except? A. militarization B. rivalry C. alliance
Answer: rivalry
In Bremer's bivariate analyses (table 1) which of the following factors increases the chances for war in a dyad? A. the dyad contains one or more major powers B. the dyad is not land or sea contiguous C. both states in the dyad are democratic
Answer: the dyad contains one or more major powers
In "Bones of Contention (MV, Chapter 3), the authors collect data on each of the following contentious issues EXCEPT? A. cross-border rivers B. trade C. maritime areas
Answer: trade
Bait and bleed
Antagonizing states into making war on each other while standing aside, and engaging competition in long and costly conflicts.
Zero sum
Any game in which interest of the players are diametrically opposed, all equilibrium pairs of both equivalent and interchangeable. John Nash 1951.
The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive
Approval ratings for a leader often jump at the onset of a war. People "rally around the flag" because international conflicts can: •Cause an increase in patriotism (in group vs. out group) •Ease criticism of the government•Create a diversion from other problems (e.g. high inflation) •Scapegoat or blame the country's problems on foreigners At times, political leaders may face a diversionary incentive:•A temptation to spark an international crisis in order to rally public support at home Gambling for resurrection:•Taking a risky action, such as starting a war, when the alternative is certain to be very bad•Hockey teams remove goalie when losing at end.
Immanuel Kant
Argued that universal justice and perpetual peace for categorical impurity lives that humanity was compelled to pursue by virtue of its rational nature. Associated with idealism and utopianism.
Brett Ashley Leeds: Do alliances Deter Aggression? The influence of Military alliances on the initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes ICON
Argument: Potential challengers are less likely to initiate a militarized dispute against a potential target if the target has one or more allies committed to intervene on behalf of the target if attacked by this challenger. A potential challenger is more likely to initiate a militarized dispute against a potential target if the challenger has one or more allieswho have promised offensive support in the conflict. A potential challenger is more likely to initiate a militarized dispute against a potential target if the challenger has one or more allies committed to remain neutral in a conflict in which the challenger attacks this target . Conditions: The first variable is a dummy variable representingwhether the potential target had any allies who were committed to defend the target in the event the target was attacked by this potential challenger. The second variable is a dummy variable representing whether the potential aggressor had any allies who were committed to join in an offensive attack against this target. The third variable is a dummy variable representing whether any states had alliance commitments to the potential challenger that would preclude their intervention on the side of the target if the challenger attacked. Use ATOP Conclusion:Stronger challengers and contiguous states aremore likely to initiate disputes, and states are less likely to initiate disputes against those that have similar alliance portfolios potential challengers are less likely to initiate disputes against targets whom they know have allies committed to intervene in their defense if they are attacked.18 Challengers who have commitments from allies to cooperate offensively or to remain neutral in the event of conflict with the potential target, however, are more likely to initiate disputes than those without such allies. Policy Prescriptions:
Stuart A. Bremer: Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War (MV Ch. 2)
Argument: 7 predictors of war Conditions: Bivariate and multivariate (interstate dyads, COW) Conclusion: Summary of Bivariate Results • Shared land and sea borders increase chances for war • Relative power has no significant effect • War is more likely in dyads involving major powers • Allied dyads are more likely to fight wars • Democratic dyads less likely to fight wars • Advanced economically states fight more wars • Militarized dyads are more likely to fight wars Summary of Multivariate results- Similar to bivariate results: contiguous, democratic, major power • Differences: - Economically advanced dyads less likely to fight - Power parity has a positive and significant effect on war - Alliance and militarization have no effect, but when combined (interaction term) they increase the risks of war (Table 4) • Dyads who are allied & militarized are more likely to fight wars. • Dyads who are allied but not militarized are less likely to fight wars. • Dyads who are not allied or militarized less likely to fight wars. Policy Prescriptions: Are the risks higher or lower
Jeffry Frieden, David Lake, Kenneth Schultz: Why are there Wars, Chapter 3, World Politics, 3rd Edition Icon
Argument: Bargaining model of war, security dilemma Conclusion: useful because it makes us think of all the ways in which it could go wrong
Sara Mclaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins: Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force (MV 8)
Argument: Domestic turmoil will be more likely to result in the initiation of militarized force by states in opportunity-rich environments of rivalry Increasing domestic turmoil will have little or no effect on the initiation of militarized force by democratic states in opportunity-rich environments of rivalry Increasing domestic turmoil will be more likely to result in the initiation of militarized force by nondemocratic states in opportunity-rich environments of rivalry Conclusion: economic weakness increases use of military force in enduring rivalry
James Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul Diehl: The New Rivalry Dataset (MV Ch. 5)
Argument: Enduring rivalry escalating to war Conditions:Spatial consistency, duration, militarized competition, linked conflict Conclusion: most are minor-minor dyads, most wars happen early on in rivalry Policy Prescriptions:
Paul R. Hensel, Sara Mclaughlin Mitchell, Thomas E Sowers II, and Clayton L Thyne: Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues (MV Ch. 3)
Argument: States are more likely to threaten or use militarized force over issue types that are generally more salient than over issues that are generally less salient States are more likely to threaten or use militarized force when the specific issue under contention is more salient Conditions: uses tangible and intangible issues and territorial, maritime, and river issues Conclusion: As within issue salience increases, militarized disputes and peaceful attempts to settle issues are more likely. A history of militarization & failed settlement attempts increases likelihood of future conflicts & peaceful attempts. Some variation across issues too. Policy Prescriptions: factors that promote peace: demoracy, foreign direct investment, stable borders, international organizations
Introduction to the study of Warfare (MV Chapter 1)
Argument: uncover general patterns, construct a theory, derive a hypothesis, test hypothesis Assumption #1: Leaders want to stay in office, and doing so depends on public support. Assumption #2: International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Assumption #3: When faced with a displeased public, democratic leaders are more likely than non-democratic leaders to lose power, due to regular, competitive elections. Conditions: When we want to model the relationship between regime type and success in war, we must take into account other factors that could affect our dependent variable (winning or losing a war). Conclusion: No democracies have ever fought each other We can see that initiators anddemocracies are more likely to win. Policy Prescriptions: Democracies are more likely to win wars, and states that lose wars are more likely to experience regime changes, thus we should observe an increasing proportion of democratic states over time.
Brett Ashley Leeds: Alliances and the Expansion and Escalation of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MV ch. 4)
Argument: when a conflict initiator has an offensive alliance in place when a dispute begins, its more likely that more than one state will be involved in the dispute on the initiator side. when a conflict target has a defensive alliance in place when a dispute begins, it is more likely that more than one state will be involved in the side of the target when an initiator has a neutrality pact in place when a war begins it is less likely that more than one state will be involved in the target side Conclusion: defensive=deterrence, when deterrence fails, then alliances make war more likely alliances are a good measure of if wars become multilateral
Susan Sample: The Outcomes of Military Buildups (MV Ch. 6)
Argument:Examines the arms races-war relationship, but distinguishes between: Major-major power dyads Major-minor power dyads Minor-minor power dyads Conditions:Domain: all MIDs from 1816-1993 Multilateral MIDs divided into bilateral cases Rapid military buildup: higher than average military growth rates in a ten year period (compared to country's own historical average). Conclusion: Sample finds that mutual military buildups have a stronger effect on the escalation of disputes involving major powers (Table 3) rather than minor powers (Table 4) and its territorial and states are contiguous Policy Prescriptions:
Michael P. Colaresi and William Thompson: Hot Spots or Hot Hands? Serial Crisis Behavior ICON
Argument:H1: The greater the number of past crises, the higher is the propensity for future crises. • H2: The greater the number of past crises, the higher is the propensity for future violent crises. • H3: The greater the number of past crises, the lower is the propensity for future crises (war weariness). Conclusion:Previous crises make subsequent crises more likely. Policy Prescriptions:
Paul Senese and John Vasquez: Assessing the Steps to War (MV Ch. 7)
Argument:dyadic territorial disputes< prior+alliances<prior + recurring disputes< prior+more disputes (curvilinear)< prior+arms race (probaility wise) Conditions: Starts with all dyadic MIDs from 1816 -1992 Conclusion: Results show that territorial disputes more likely to escalate to war than policy/regime disputes. curvilinear
Jack Levy and William Thompson: Causes of War Chapters 1-4
Argument:power preponderance, trade, power transition
according to the reciprocity/routine model (richardson) what are the two types of behaviors
Arms races and No arms race
Kim Il Sung
Communist leader of North Korea; his attack on South Korea in 1950 started the Korean War. He remained in power until 1994.
issue salience findings
As within issue salience increases, militarized disputes and peaceful attempts to settle issues are more likely. A history of militarization & failed settlement attempts increases likelihood of future conflicts & peaceful attempts. Some variation across issues too.
Stage 2: Construct a Theory
Assumption #1: Leaders want to stay in office, and doing so depends on public support.Assumption #2: International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Assumption #3: When faced with a displeased public, democratic leaders are more likely than non-democratic leaders to lose power, due to regular, competitive elections. Implication: Democracies will initiate war only when they are relatively certain of victory. Democracies may also place more effort into war fighting:"We examined the link between institutions and policy choice in the context of international disputes. We demonstrated that democratic leaders, when faced with a war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocratic leaders. This follows because...the prospects of political survival increasingly hinge on successful policy performance." Bueno de Mesquita et al (1999: 804)
Power Transition Theory
Assumptions (Organski1958; Organski& Kugler 1980)-The international system is hierarchical.-A dominant nation sits at the top.-Potential challengers: those with 80% or more of the dominant country's power-There are also regional hierarchies (Lemke).-States experience S shaped economic growth rates and at varying historical times. Definition of power -The number of people who can work and fight-Economic productivity-Effectiveness of government in extracting resources•Hypothesis: war is most likely when there is parity(equality) between the dominant power and (dissatisfied) challenger. Problemsin explaining the timing of war-Why no preventive war by the declining state in most cases?•Note: preventive war is distinct from preemptive war (Levy & Thompson p. 46)-Can nuclear weapons alter the possibility of war?•PT theorists say no•Distinctions between realists' focus on land-based military power and power transition theorists' focus on economic power.-L&T argue that each theory could be correct within their own domains (Europe more stable with military BOP while global system more stable with a dominant economic/naval power)-Why declines in naval power combined with rises in land power are dangerous (e.g. Napoleonic wars, WWI, WWII)
Emperor Hirohito
At the start of his reign, Japan was still a fairly rural country with a limited industrial base. Japan's militarization of in the 1930's eventually led to Japan's invasion in China and involvement in WW2.
Small and Singer's definition of major power status
Austria-Hungry, Prussia-Germany, Russia-USSR, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, US, China
Rolling Thunder
Bombing campaign escalating against North Vietnam. target was the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and network of trails, bridges, and shelters in North Vietnam to Cambodia and Laos to South Viet. This bombing had little affect on Vietcong and they began to make underground tunnel systems.
Fearon/Bargaining: the difference between knowledge of balance of power and resolve
BOP: different assessment on outcome if you fight. Resolve: different assessment whether they'll fight at all
Ken Waltz
Balance of power--bipolar A structural theory of realism that views states as security maximizers--more concerned with absolute power as oppose to relative power. According to this view, it is unwise for states to try to maximize their share of power and seek hegemony
Deterrence
Basic feature of American foreign policy to maintain massive military strength in order to prevent any attack upon this country or its allies.
Offensive Realism
Benign intentions can change if countries undergo changes in power or regime.•Aggression sometimes pays and the accumulation of power leads to further aggression.-In 63 wars between 1815 and 1980, the initiator won 39 times, for a 60% success rate (Mearsheimer).•The best way for states to provide for their security is to achieve regional or global hegemony (Mearsheimer2001)-Stopping power of water-Balancing fails because it is costly and states free ride-Impossible to distinguish offensive/defensive weapons•Problem: cannot account for decline in territorial revisionism
B-52
Bomber Planes, supported ground tactical operations, used to interdict enemy supply lines in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and to strike targets in NV.
Disaggregated Effects
Breaking the analyses into separate issues (MV Ch3) Issue salience significantly increases the chances for militarized conflict for each issue type separately. Issue salience only significantly influences the chances for peaceful settlements involving territorial issues. For territorial issues, higher tangible and intangible salience levels result in more militarized disputes (Hensel and Mitchell 2005), although intangible territorial issues also produce more peaceful agreements than tangibly valued territories.
Three mechanisms for making threats credible:
Brinksmanship (Crisis bargaining)Sinking Costs (Arms spending, nukes) Tying hands (Alliances) We discussed brinkmanship, which involves the willingness to escalate disputes to demonstrate resolve in an effort to get the adversary to back down, and tying hands via alliances.
Saigon
Capital of South Vietnam where the US carried a last-minute evacuation before the city fell to the Communists in April 1975
Stage 4: Test the Hypothesis
Collect data for key conceptsRegime type (Polity project's data)War (Correlates of War data)Make sure we have variation on the independent and dependent variables.Consider wins & losses in wars Avoid spurious correlations by controlling for other relevant variables.Example: initiators might win more wars
Kantian triangle
Combined impact of international institutions, economic interdependence, and democracy mutually reinforce the global propensity toward international cooperation and peace
John Pershing
Commander of American Expeditionary Force of over 1 million troops who insisted his soldiers fight as independent units so US would have independent role in shaping the peace
UN General Assembly
Comprised of representatives of all states, it allocates UN funds, passes non - binding resolutions, & coordinates third world development programs & various autonomous agencies through the ECOSOC
Clausewitz: Center of gravity
Concentration of your opponents strength. example: the military, capital, allies. "In order to totally defeat an enemy, you should locate their center of gravity and concentrate your efforts on destroying it"
System level analysis
Concerned with how a country's political structure and the political forces and national actors in the country cause it's gov to adopt another foreign policy
Security studies
Concerned with political interactions marked by their importance to actor/state security. Alternative arguments assert that the discipline should extend beyond a miliaristic focus and perhaps consider all actors in relation to a range of threats
Brinksmanship: The "Slippery Slope"
Crucial problem in crisis bargaining is to ensure one's threats are credible.-A credible threat is a threat that the target believes will be carried out.-Problems•Carrying through on threats is costly•Incentives to get the best deal increases motives for states to conceal information about their true strength•Two mechanisms for making threats credible:-Brinksmanship and tying hands•Thomas Schelling: -While it was understood that no state would bring about its own destruction by starting a total nuclear war, weapons could be used for diplomatic effect through the strategy of brinksmanship. State could signal their resolve in a crisis by approaching the "brink" of war through provocative actions. -Must decide whether to step onto the "slippery slope" and increase the risk of starting a war-Example: Cuban Missile Crisis (Kennedy's use of naval blockade)•It is the willingness to risk war that separates the resolved from the bluffers.
Lai: how do you make signals credible
Creating a costly signal which allow you to demonstrate resolve. Distinct from "cheap talk"
Issue Approach
Diplomatic issues vary considerably in importance/salience which influences the chances for issue militarization (Mansbach& Vasquez 1981; Diehl 1992; Hensel et al 2008) Territorial issues (border disputes) identified as particularly contentious (Vasquez 1993; Hensel, 2001; Huth and Allee, 2002)Territory important for defense, economy, psychological/historical reasons, etc.
Parity/Transitions
Defender Preponderant-->Parity(overtaking)--> Challenger Preponderant
COW Alliance Types
Defense pact• Neutrality/Non-aggression pact• Entente
Self-help
Defined by an overwhelming concern with survival and a view of conflict as an inevitable feature of world politics.
Political view of war
Defines warfare as an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.
Balance of power
Distribution of military and economic power that prevents any one nation from becoming too strong (especially in Europe).
Do Leaders Use Diversionary Force?
Diversionary force: leaders using force to divert attention away from domestic turmoil •Internal conflict (protests, riots, etc.) •Economic woes (high inflation, high unemployment, etc.) •Political incentives: approval, elections
Logrolled Coalitions (Snyder)
Domestic groups create coalitions in favor of aggressive foreign policies to mutual benefit.•Example: "coalition of iron & rye", a coalition in Germany prior to WWI between iron producers (ship builders) & rye growers (wanted protection from Russian imported grain).•Price = Germany facing hostility from Britain & Russia•Use of symbols or appeals to patriotismLess likely in democratic countries•Large electorate creates more diffuse interests•Free press provides multiple view points
Power Transition Theory
Economic Power, dissatisfaction
what are the criticisms of the Democratic peace theory?
Economic dependence and satisfied states - which means that democracies are satisfied with the world order
Classical Realism
Emphasizes the role of human nature as a source of aggressive behavior and war.•Assumes state seek to increase power•Focuses on foreign policies or grand strategies best designed to prevent war.•Problem: a constant like human nature cannot explain the obvious variations in war and peace over time.
Stage 1: Identify generalizations
Empirical Finding: No two democracies have ever fought an interstate war against each other . This result is referred to as the democratic peace.
Lai: cheap talk
Example: Japan telling Russia that their military is just as strong as theirs but not showing costly signals, resulting in Russia not believing them
Michael Doyle
Expanded on Kant's ideas and formed Democratic Peace Theory
Realpolitik
FP includes making alliances, increasing arms, engaging in repeated crises, having hawkish leadersIncreases security dilemma between statesThus brinkmanship, tying hands, and sinking costs strategies can increase rather than decrease risks for war.
Issue Rivalry (Mitchell and Thies)
Focuses on density of geopolitical issues in contention using ICOW data Issue dimension: dyads with 2 or more territorial, maritime, or river claims ongoing at the same time Militarized dimension: dyads with 2 or more previous MIDs over issue Increases the chances for militarized disputes: some issues are multidimensional which raises the stakes of winning; handling of one issue can lead to further challenges to SQ We compare issue rivalries and militarized rivalries to see which process increases risks for war the most
Defensive Realism
Focuses on states' perceptions of other states' intentions•Walt's (1979) balance of threat theory argues that states balance against the greatest threats to their interests, rather than against the strongest power in the system.•Geographical proximity increases threat -Impact of military power declines over distance; loss of strength gradient (Boulding1962)-Importance of technology; offense-defense balance War is more likely when military technology favors the offense (ease of conquest, first strike advantage).•Aggressive foreign policy is a function of domestic factors (e.g. hostile leaders, decision-making pathologies), not the systemic power distribution.•Problem: relies on domestic politics to explain anomalous behavior even though theory focuses on interstate interactions-Development of neoclassical realism to explicate role of domestic politics, esp. mobilization of societal resources
Long Cycle Theory
Focuses on the cycles between five global wars (Modelski1961)-The Wars of Italy and the Indian Ocean (1494-1516)-The Spanish-Dutch wars (1580-1609)-Wars of the Grand Alliance (1688-1713)-Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon (1792-1815)-World Wars I and II (1914-1945)•Distinguishes between rise and fall of land & sea powers, which tend to be in opposition-European land powers tend to be at their strongest when global sea powers are at their weakest European land power peaks (based on army personnel) -Spain (1585)-France (1692)-France (1805)-Germany (1sthalf of 20thcentury)•Conclusions of the theory1)Global wars occur in roughly 80-100 year cycles. 2)Each global war leads to a significant increase in sea power concentration (Dutch, UK, US).3)Hypothesis: Unipolar systems are more peaceful than bipolar and multipolar systems.4)States with superior naval capabilities win global wars.
Long Cycle Theory
Focuses on the cycles between the 5 global wars (Italy and Indian Ocean, Spanish-Dutch, Grand Alliance, French Revolution and Napolean, WW1&2) Distinguishes between rise and fall of land and sea powers, which tend to be in opposition European Land power at strongest when global sea power is weakest 1. Global wars occur in roughly 80-100 year cycles 2. Each global war leads to a significant increase in sea power concentration 3. Hypothesis: unipolar systems are more peaceful than bipolar and multipolar systems 4. States with superior naval capabilities win global wars
Chiang Kai-shek
General and leader of Nationalist China after 1925. Although he succeeded Sun Yat-sen as head of the Guomindang, he became a military dictator whose major goal was to crush the communist movement led by Mao Zedong.
General Westmoreland
General based in Vietnam that helped cause the credibility gap by telling the American people the war was almost over when 1000 of Americans were being killed.
WMDs
Generally nuclear weapons with tremendous capability to destroy a population and the planet. This refers to the application of force between countries using biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
Bipolar
Geopolitically, the Cold War created this, or a world divided into two opposing groups
Blainey: Manchester Theory
Globalization = peace -Blainey says endogenety and spuriousness can cause this (icecream =/ murder). More trade ← → peace -Manchester people saw trade occurring at same time as peace and assume this was causal, but correlation =/ causation
Clausewitz: War in theory: goals, purpose, execution
Goal: Completely disarming their territory, military, & will. Purpose: To get them to do what you want Execution: Maximum amount of force
Clausewitz: War in practice: goals, purpose execution
Goal: Political goals Purpose: Execution: Political goals drive amount of force used
Copenhagen School
Group of authors who extend definition of security to include economic, political, societal, and environmental policy areas
Colaresi and Thompson repeated crises and risk of future crises/war
H1: The greater the number of past crises, the higher is the propensity for future crises. H2: The greater the number of past crises, the higher is the propensity for future violent crises H3: The greater the number of past crises, the lower is the propensity for future crises (war weariness)
which naval ship sparked an arms race between the british and Germany (other states were involved) before WWI
HMS Dreadnought
Blainey: Peace treaty/War Termination
Harsh treaties = additional war (WWI on Germany) •Blainey says harsher treaties have longer peace after.
UN Peacekeepers
Helps countries in conflict create the conditions necessary for prolonged peace. Peacekeepers may include soldiers, police officers, and civilian personnel from many different countries.
Why is territory important for studying war?
Holsti says 80-90% of the wars from 1648-1989 involved territory MID data 1816-1992: over 1/4 of all disputes involve territory territory important for defense, economy, psychological/historical reasons
Lai: Puzzle
How does mobilization effect the onset of war?
Conditioning Effect of Regime Type
Hypothesis 2:Increasing domestic turmoil will have little or no effect on the initiation of militarized force by democratic states in opportunity-rich environments of rivalry. Hypothesis 3:Increasing domestic turmoil will be more likely to result in the initiation of militarized force by nondemocratic states in opportunity-rich environments of rivalry.
Stage 3: Derive a Testable Hypothesis
Hypothesis: Democracies are more likely to win the wars they fight because:-they are cautious initiators, selecting themselves into those wars they think they can win-because they put more effort/resources into fighting wars.
Michael Wallace's StudyHypothesis: (arms race)
Hypothesis:Disputes which are accompanied by arms races are more likely to result in war.Data: Great Power disputes from 1816-1965Arms races:both sides averaging at least 10% growth in military expenditures over a 10 year period (arms index >90).
Neorealism
IR theory that explains behavior of states based on polarity of the international system and the options countries have to increase or maintain power in that system; it minimizes the role of domestic politics, ethics, and leadership.
democratic peace theory
Idea that democracies tend not to fight wars against one another and that the spread of democratic government can be the antidote to war in the international system
Conflict Recurrence
If nations fight repeated crises or militarized disputes, they become more likely to fight a war.- Wallensteen: 75% of major powers between 1816-1976 that had repeated MIDs went to war- Leng: war is increasingly likely by the third crisis- Hensel (1994): stalemates in previous MIDs increased chance for future MIDs in Latin American dyads
Fearon/Bargaining: why bargains must exist
If war is a way to allocate a good, there must be some division of the good
"Perpetual Peace"
Immanuel Kant, Peace is an end to all hostilities. A state is a society of men based on original contracts. Abolition of standing armies necessaries because they are merely instruments of war. No debt allowed in external affairs and no forcible intervention in the affairs of other states (principle of self-determination). No dishonorable stratagems such as poisoning
classic case of revisionist state
Imperial/Nazi-Germany
Balkan Wars 1912-13
In 1912, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria joined in a league and attacked Turkey and captured territory in Europe (1st Balkan War). Create a power vacuum. Peace conference held in London by Grey. Decisions made on what countries the Balkans will take from turkey. Serbia not happy with Albanian Independence - Austria is trying to prevent Serbia becoming too strong (outlet to sea). Bulgaria not happy with Macedonia going to Serbia. BULGARIA ATTACKS SERBIA (1913) 2nd Balkan War. Bulgaria loses gains from 1st Balkan war. Serbia strengthened and plans to stir up Serbs in Austria. Germans think Grey is drifting from France and Russia. Grey is pleased that Austria has been curtailed (he thinks by Britain and Germany). Turkey was weaker than ever and turning to Germany for help.
United Nations emergency force
In November 1956 UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, submitted a plan for setting up an emergency UN force to supervise the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. The UN General Assembly then authorized the established the force, the first UN peacekeeping force. Between 1956 and 1967 approximately 3,500 - 6,000 troops were deployed along the Egypt-Israel border and maintained a post at Sharm al-Shaykh, which controlled access to the Gulf of Aqaba.
Counter Terrorism Committee
In the wake of the 9/11, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1373, which obliges all States to criminalize assistance for terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists and share information about groups planning terrorist attacks. The 15-member Counter-Terrorism Committee was established at the same time to monitor implementation of the resolution.
Fearon/Bargaining: Risk-return trade-off
Incomplete info, miscalculation on what the enemy is willing to fight over •If you think they are unwilling to fight, you can demand a lot.. if you give them an offer unacceptable based on their actual level of resolve.
Contiguity (three reasons why it increases likelihood of conflict
Increases the likelihood of conflict because of proximity, interaction, and territoriality
Levels of Analysis for Studying Warfare
Individual level -Focuses on foreign policy decisions made by leaders Nation-state level- Focuses on characteristics of the state such as regime type, economic system, public opinion Dyadic level -Focuses on history of interactions (rivalry), issues at stake (territorial disputes)
War from Indivisibility
Indivisible good: a good that cannot be divided without destroying its value.-An example; the difference between 100 pennies and a $1 bill•What goods are truly indivisible?-Indivisibility is usually not a physical property, but rather due to the way it is valued-Intangible aspects of issue salience less divisible (e.g. historical homeland, sacred sites, ethnic kin)•An example: the city of Jerusalem.-Contains some of the holiest sites of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism-How to divide the city has defied resolution
intangible
Intangible Values Culture/Identity: Related to one's cultural, religious, or ideological beliefs or identity Equality/Justice: "Fairness" or impartiality in the distribution of other values Independence: Ability to formulate and implement one's own policies Status/Prestige/Influence: The degree of respect one is accorded by others
Classical realism
International politics as a result of human nature
Measuring Rivalry
Isolated conflict1 or 2 militarized disputes Proto-rivalry3 to 5 militarized disputes Enduring rivalry6 or more militarized disputes
give an example of an alignment
Israel and the U.S.
The Political Costs of War
Leaders who fight losing or costly wars are more likely to be removed from office than those who win wars (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson1995). Leaders may see war as a gamble not only for the state, but for their political interests. Leaders should initiate wars they expect to win.
Blainey: What goes into estimates of war outcomes
It is not the actual distribution of balance of power which is vital: it is rather the way in which national leaders THINK that power is distributed
Battle of the Somme
It took place between 1 July and 18 November 1916 on both sides of the River Somme in France. The battle was one of the largest of World War I, in which more than 1,000,000 men were wounded or killed, making it one of the bloodiest battles in human history.
General Tojo
Japanese army officer who initiated the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and who assumed dictatorial control of Japan during World War II
Deterrence Theory
Militarization = less war When leaders pin an issue or engage in foreign relations to deter attention from domestic issues
Syngman Rhee
Korean leader who became president of South Korea after World War II and led Korea during Korean War.
In his study "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965" (MV Ch. 2), Professor Stuart Bremer finds that ________ is the factor most likely to lead pairs of states to fight wars. - major power status - power status - Land/sea contiguity
Land/sea contiguity
Gorbachev
Leader of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991. Wanting reform, he renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, pulled troops out of Afghanastan, supported Glasnost, and urged perestroika; but all this failed.
Alliances and Deterrence Failure
MV, Chapter 4 (Leeds)- On the one hand, alliances were known a priori and thus should not alter the bargaining process.- On the other hand, an ally may reveal more information about her preferences once war is underway, which could alter bargaining.- Alliances turn bilateral wars into multilateral ones, which makes cooperative solutions more difficult to achieve.
Mutual military build ups (arms races) have no significant effect on which dyad?
Major - Minor states
which of the three possible arms race dyads (Mm, MM, mm) significantly increases the likelihood of escalation of a dispute?
Major-Major states minor-minor states
Sample's Findings
Mutual military buildups have a stronger effect on the escalation of disputes involving major powers rather than minor powers
Audience Costs
Negative repercussions that arise in the event that a leader does not follow through on a threat International (other states doubt future threats) Domestic (punish leader especial democracies)
Measurement Levels
Nominal(discrete categories that distinguish cases) War initiation (0=no, 1=yes) Ordinal(categorizes and rank orders cases) MID hostility level (0=none, 1=threat of force, 2=show of force, 3=use of force, 4=war) Interval(categorizes, rank orders, and has some standard unit of comparison) Military spending
Zagare: Incomplete information and how it causes war
Not enough to cause war because countries can get together and clear it up •Misrepresentation that causes bargaining failure
nuclear proliferation
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons
John Mearsheimer
Offensive realism
Offense-defense balance
Relative ability to attack or defend in the case of war. Military technology: mobility favors offense, firepower favors defense; geography: flat, open terrain favors offense, obstacles (water, forests, etc.) favor defense.
Opportunities to Use Force?
One way to reconcile varying results is to focus on states' opportunities for diversionary uses of force (Meernik) .Where do opportunities come from?•International events (Meernik1994)•Major power status (Foster 2006)•States involved in interstate rivalries (Mitchell & Prins 2004): e.g. India-Pakistan•States with ongoing border disputes (Mitchell & Thyne 2010): e.g. Falklands, Turkey's uses of force over Aegean Sea & Tigris River in 2000s
Lai: costly signals
Publicly mobilizing troops
Scientific approach to studying Warfare
Purpose: to uncover general patterns, not unique. to uncover the nomothetic (lawlike) from the idiographic (the particular Stages of Scientific Research 1. Identify generalizations 2. Construct an explanation, or theory, of the observed generalizations 3. Derive a testable hypothesis 4. Test the hypothesis against empirical evidence
Realist Theories
Origins-Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in the 5thcentury BCE-Morgenthau's 1948 book, Politics Among Nations•Key assumptions -Sovereign states are the key actors in world politics.-States seek power as an end in itself (Morgenthau-human nature) or as a means to other ends (e.g. survival-Waltz)•Revisionist intentions (e.g. Hitler initiation of war in 1939) vs. SQ maintenance (e.g. USA in Cuban Missile Crisis)-States act rationally to advance their security, power, and wealth in an anarchic international system.-States have two means for seeking power: •Internal efforts: moves to increase military and economic capabilities•External efforts: moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink the opposing one The distribution of power in the system has an important influence on international interactions.-Balances of power form in the international system.-Balance of power theory: war is least likely when there is a balance of power among multiple poles (major powers plus allies)-Role of an offshore balancer (e.g. Great Britain, US)•Security dilemmas can arise (spiral model).-Most weapons serve offensive & defensive functions•But deterrence is possible, especially in a system of nuclear weapons.•Realists have disagreements about which balances of power are best and to what extent domestic politics influences outcomes.
Steps to War Propositions
P1: Dyadic territorial disputes more likely to escalate to war than policy or regime disputes.Intangible salience increases risks for recurring disputesHawkish leaders more likely to come to power and use realpolitik strategies to pursue territorial claims. P2; Dyadic territorial disputes where both sides have outside alliances have a higher chance for war than disputes where neither side has alliances.Emboldens both sides in a territorial dispute to use aggressive FP strategies to get what they want. P3a: Territorial disputes + outside alliances + recurring disputes makes war more likelyCrises between relatively equal states tend to stalemateRepeated crises escalate to war (Leng, rivalry literature) P3b: The effect of prior disputes is curvilinear first increasing, then decreasing chance for warWith a high number of previous MIDs, both sides learn how to manage their relations peacefully P4: Territorial disputes + outside alliances + recurring disputes + arms races makes war more likelyArms racing is a way to prepare for warMilitary buildups result in counter military buildups and increase threat perception and hostilitySenese& Vasquez also expect realpolitik strategies to increase chances for war in non-territorial disputes, but with lower risks than for territorial disputes.
what are the two models for how arms races relate to war?
Para Bellum (preparedness model) and The armament-tension Spiral Model
Tonkin Gulf Resolution
Passed by Congress on August 7, 1964 in direct response to a minor naval engagement in Vietnam. It gave U.S. Pres. LBJ authorization, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, for the use of military force in Southeast Asia.
Blainey: How states come to these conclusions
Patriotism, Leader groupthink, Leadership, military, economy, Territory, Mood
Which country is making a move to end its military cooperation agreement with the United States?
Phillipines --> naval base
Players
Potential attacker: state that is trying to change the status quo Defender: the state that wants to prevent the attack Protégé: A state that has ties to a defender, where the defender is trying to prevent any attacks against it
Bait and bleed
Power tactic where a state tries to get two other states to complete in a war of attrition which weakens them while retaining their own strength
Two-level game
Putnam talks about how politics influences international relations. He says that while international negotiations are happening there are domestic negotiations going on simultaneously.
Securitization
Process in which an actor declares a particular issue, dynamic or actor to be an "existential threat", and if accepted by audience, it justifies the use of emergency measure in response to the percieved crisis.
Competing Explanations for the Contiguity-War Relationship -- PROXIMITY
Proximity Neighbors fight because they can reach each other (loss of strength with distance)Problem: contiguity remains fairly constant, but war is infrequent Technology alters military reach over timeYet influence of contiguity on war has increased since 1870, not decreased.Interaction Borders provide more opportunity for conflict Problem: we cannot account for cooperation in some contiguous dyads and conflict in others
Carl von Clausewitz
Prussian General (1780-1831) Explained that professional armies were difficult and costly to replace, so leaders were weary to engage in significant war. This limited war until Napoleon developed absolute war.
Russo-Japanese War
Russia and Japan were fighting over Korea, Manchuria, etc. Began in 1904, but neither side could gain a clear advantage and win. Both sent reps to Portsmouth, NH where TR mediated Treaty of New Hampshire in 1905. TR won the nobel peace prize for his efforts, the 1st pres. to do so.
what is an example of a crisis threatening the international system?
Russian revolution is considered a crisis because of its threat to Russias place in the world
Sample's Findings
Sample finds that mutual military buildups have a stronger effect on the escalation of disputes involving major powers (Table 3) rather than minor powers (Table 4). Escalation is 656% more likely in the major power disputes & 232% more likely in minor power disputes with mutual military buildups; no effect for major-minor disputes (Table 5). The results are much stronger in the 1816-1944 time period; no relationship in the Cold War era. Territorial disputes, contiguity, and nuclear weapons are consistent predictors of war & peace. Power parity increases escalation to war from 1816-1944, and for minor-minor disputes (all years)
Cataclysmic view of war
Sees war as a catastrophe that befalls some portion of humanity or the entire human race, more as a punishment by God or an unfortunate byproduct of human nature
Bargaining Model of War
Sees war as politics all the way down; war is a continuation of bargaining; it ends when a deal is struck.•Conflicts involve some kind of issues; bargaining is the process of arriving at mutual agreement involving the issues at stake.•Common issues that are related to war include territorial disputes, policy disputes, and regime disputes.
Munich Crisis
September 1938 Hitler demanded Sudetenland (part of Czechoslovakia) be annexed by Germany, Neville Chamberlain→ prime minister of Great Britain, Negotiates with Hitler→ Hitler allowed to take territories (Sudetenland) but nothing else→ policy of appeasement
Lai: Theory and results,
Signaling vs. Non-signaling •If you mobilize private - war •if you mobilize public - bargain "Private mobilization by one state in a crisis is more likely to result in war than is public mobilization
Dangerous Dyads: Bremer's empirical findings
Similar to bi-variate results: contiguous border=war, major powers=war, democracies less likely to fight Differences: Econ adv dyads less likely to fight,
Manchurian Incident
Situation in 1931 when Japanese troops, claiming that Chinese soldiers had tried to blow up a railway line, took matters into their own hands by capturing several southern Manchurian cities, and by continuing to take over the country even after Chinese troops had withdrawn.
under the assumption: war is costly, are costs of distributed evenly?
no the costs of war are distributed un evenly
international state sovereignty
Sovereign territorial rule recognized by fellow state
Key Hypotheses (Bones of Contention)
States are more likely to threaten or use militarized force or pursue peaceful settlement strategies: over issues that are generally more salient than over issues that are generally less salient (across-issue salience) when the specific issue under contention is more salient (within-issue salience)
Unresolvable uncertainty
States can never be 100% certain about the current and current and future motives and intentions of those able to do harm to them.
Tying Hands
States can send credible signs of their willingness to fight by making threats in a way that would make backing down difficult.-Example: Operation Desert Shield (deployment of over 500K US troops in the Persian Gulf in 1990) •Audience costs: negative repercussions that arise in the event that a leader does not follow through on a threat.-International audience costs•Other states doubt future threats-e.g. lack of Chinese resolve on Taiwan led US to believe they would not intervene in Korea-Domestic audience costs•Voters and political opponents may punish a leader who makes empty threats•Democratic leaders face higher costs for foreign policy failure and hence make more credible threats. Tying hands separates the resolute from the irresolute. -Both brinksmanship and hand-tying are strategies for communicating resolve.-Example: tie hands by forming a military alliance and placing troops on your ally's soil.•Incomplete information can be overcome if states can find costly ways to signal their intentions.
War from Commitment Problems
States may have difficultly in making credible promises notto revise the terms of a deal/treaty l a t e r.-This is called a commitment problem.•Commitment problems are common in the absence of any enforcement mechanism.•Examples: strategically important pieces of territory and weapons programs.-States will be reluctant to make concessions if the adversary, who is made stronger by the deal, might press for more concessions in the future. This aspect of bargaining helps to explain:-Preventive war: a war that is fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the future.-Power transition/long cycle theory: why changes in power can be dangerous-Preemptive war: why first strike advantages are dangerous-Why peace tends to fail when states' power and regimes change over time•Example: alliance partners more likely to renege on agreements in wartime after power and regime changes occurred (Leeds 2003)
Powell: the costs of deterrence
States might prefer war, if the costs of fighting are less than the long run costs of deterrence over time
Revisionist state
States whose foreign policy is shaped by perceptual selectivity and a desire to destabilize international BOP for the purpose of promoting their own interests. Such states often decide that conflict is in their best interest. Vs. Status quo states
Routine
States' behaviors are essentially driven by bureaucratic routin and other internal factors
Reciprocity
States' behaviors respond, in some part, in kind to the actions of other countries
Hegemonic Stability Theory
Strong concentrations of power in the hands of a single power are the most stable and peaceful systems (Gilpin 1981).•Power transition theory•Long cycle theory•Dyadic version: power preponderance in a pair of states predicts to a lower probability of militarized conflict (Bremer-MV Chapter 2).
Hegemonic Stability Theory
Strong concentrations of power in the hands of a single power are the most stable and peaceful systems (Gilpin)
Wallace's Findings
Strong relationship between arms races and dispute escalation to war 23 of 26 crises during arms races (88.5%) escalated to war; only 3 of 71 non-arms-race crises (4.2%) escalated to war 23 of 28 wars (82.1%) began during arms races Criticisms of this study (Diehl 1983) Only 25% of disputes preceded by a mutual military buildup escalated to war (one case is WWI, the other two are WWII) Arms races may help bring about large global wars
Applying Diversionary theory: Saudi Arabia case: - Shiite Cleric is killed in SA - SA is 85% Sunni - Iran is there rival and mostly Shia -What is Saudi's incentives: oil prices were dropping (economic) - Other factors at the time: Iran Nuclear deal, civil war in Yemen Qs: Who are they trying to rally? how does this fit with Mitchell and Prins predictions?
Sunnis Saudis and the nondemocraticness of Saudi Arabia fit mitchell and prins predictions that non democracies are more likely to use diversionary force
Tangible: Intangible:
T: Security, survival, Wealth I: Culture/identity, equality/justice, independence, status/prestige/influence
Brinksmanship:
Taking actions that increase the risk of accidental war in hope that the other side will back down
tangible
Tangible Values Security: Safety from external danger (absence of threats or protection from threats) Survival: Provision of basic human needs (food/water/shelter) Wealth: Accumulation of resources, goods, or money (beyond basic human needs)
Competing Explanations for the Contiguity-War Relationship -- TERRITORY
Territoriality (Vasquez)Wars arise from specific territorial disputesProximity provides the opportunityfor war, while a territorial dispute provides the willingnessfor warHumans have an inherited tendency towards territoriality, the tendency to occupy and defend territoryLearned behavior: the use of force to resolve territorial disputes
Dangerous Dyads (factors that increase risks of war)
Territory, Rivalry, Alliances, Arms Races, Power Parity, Power transitions (e.g. rise of China), Domestic turmoil
Issues & Interstate Conflict
Territoryis often a "good" that may:-Contribute to the wealth of state through industrial or agricultural resources•Example: Iraq coveted Iran's oil fields in 1980-1988 war-Have military or strategic value•Example: tactical value of Golan Heights between Israel & Syria-Be valuable for ethnic, cultural or historical reasons•Example: India & Pakistan's conflict over Kashmir•Conflicts over regimetype or the composition of another's government.-Example: US condemnation of Assad's regime in Syria•Conflicts over specific policies(e.g. Iraqi pursuit of WMD in Iraq War)•Conflicts may spring from concerns about relative power.-Example: power transition theory (e.g. Germany & UK prior to WWI)•Other issues (Holsti-e.g. dynastic succession)
Robert McNamara
The US Secretary of Defense during the battles in Vietnam. He was the architect for the Vietnam war and promptly resigned after the US lost badly
Compellence
The ability of one state to coerce another state into action, usually by threatening punishment. Schelling says it is direct action that persuades an opponent to give up something that is desired.
Relative gains
The actions of states only in respect to power balances and without regard to other factors, such as economics. Cooperation may be necessary to balance power, but concern for relative gains will limit that cooperation due to the low quality of information about other states' behavior and interests
Hanoi
The capital of Vietnam, in the northern part of the country on the Red River. Founded before the seventh century, it became the capital of French Indochina after 1887 and the capital of North Vietnam after 1954. The city was bombed heavily during the Vietnam War.
Transcender logic
The idea that human society is self-constructive, not determined. Humans have agency, as individuals and groups, and some human society can seek what chooses to be, through inherited social constraints will always be powerful.
Mitigator logic
The idea that security competition can be ameliorated or dampened down for a time, but never eliminated. Notions of regimes in societies are key, blunting the worst features of anarchy.
Dissatisfaction
The dominant power establishes the status quo (SQ). •Some great powers are satisfied with the SQ, others are dissatisfied. •Dissatisfaction can be based on historical, ideological, religious, territorial, personal, or cultural factors•Dissatisfied states want to change the SQ, or the rules of the game.
UN Charter
The founding document of the United Nations; it is based on the principles that states are equal, have sovereignty over their own affairs, enjoy independence and territorial integrity, and must fulfill international obligations. The Charter also lays out the structure and methods of the UN.
Autarky
The idea of economic self-sufficiency. In the world that has been created over the past 500 years, genuine ______ is virtually impossible. However, fascist dictatorships in the years prior to World War II believed that autarky could be achieved if borders were expanded; they believed that an _______ economic policy implicitly and inevitably entailed imperial expansion, creating a critical link between economic crisis and the outbreak of war. World War II was therefore a war driven by fascist dictatorships that believed that the only way to achieve autarky was expansion.
Fatalist logic
The idea that security competition can never be escaped. Human nature and the condition of international anarchy determine that humans will live in a conflictual world.
Hegemonic Stability Theory:
The international system is the most stable when there is a hegemon. The hegemon solves the collective action problem by enforcing rules and norms. The hegemon's power can keep other powers in check (blainey agrees)
Power Transition Theory
The most devastating wars are those when a declining power are challenged by a rising power - Status quo power: States that benefit from and want to defend the status quo - Challenging power: Disadvantaged by the current power structure and want to change it
Multipolar world
The new reality of the world in which there were several great powers, not just two (China, Japan, Western Europe, the US, and the USSR)
Polarity:
The number of independent power centers in the international system (Poles can be either individual states or alliances)
British Expeditionary Force
The professional army of Britain that went to France in 1914. Referred to as "contemptible" by Kaiser Wilhelm II. 100,000 soldiers were hastily sent to France at the start of the war but had lost 50,000 men by December 1914.
Balance of power:
The ratio of power capabilities between states -is the result of two processes 1. Balancing: allying with others against a threatening (or stronger) state 2. Bandwagoning: allying with a threatening (or stronger) state
Classical realism
The state is the dominant actor. Emphasis on the importance of power, especially military and economic power, and also the sovereignty of the state and the nature of world politics as a struggle for power, survival and hegemony.
Coercive diplomacy
The threat to use force to reverse an adversary's offensive action. Often caused by stronger powers to achieve foreign policy goals without violence.
Disarmament
The withdrawal or reduction of military forces and weapons. Notably of Germany and her allies following WWII and the SALT talks between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
liberal states
These States prefer peace to conflict, trade is generally a less costly means of accumulated wealth than war, sanctions and other coercive means.
Strategy of denial
This strategy precludes an opponent from taking undesirable action, but it does not seek to do so by changing an opponent's mind. Rather, the protagonist simply puts the opponent's objective out of reach, regardless of whether the opponent chooses to pursue it.
START treaty
This arms-control treaty signed by Bush and Gorbachev was the first genuine reduction of the nuclear warheads of the Cold War
MID Data Set (Small and Singer)
This dataset codes over 2,580 threats, displays, and uses of military force from 1816-2010. This data is often employed in dyadic form, where each case records a MID between two states in a given year. We can study escalation from dispute to war with the MID data.
'Other Minds Problem'
This refers to the inability of decision makers of one state to get fully into the minds of their counterparts in other states and so understanding their motives and intentions hopes and fears and emotions and feelings is difficult
Schlieffen Plan
Top-secret German strategy to fight a two-front war against Russia and France. The idea was to invade Belgium for a quick victory against France, and then direct German forces against a more slowly mobilizing Russia.
Lake: application of traditional bargaining models to Iraq War
Traditional models need to be modified to take into account the multiple actors & misinterpretation of own costs
Applying Diversionary Theory: Turkey case: - Erdogan - reelection in June-November - Launched military action against PKK (KURDS) - considered a democracy Q: what group is being rallied?
Turkish nationalists
explain how regime types make war more likely
non democracies are more likely to use nukes then democracy
Defining Arms Races
Two or more states increase their military more rapidly than norma lThe buildup occurs in peacetime The race is a result of external competition, not domestic politics
what are the two examples of arms races
U.S. and the Soviet Union during the cold war and Pre WWI naval arms race
States involved in the greatest number of rivalries
UK, Germany, USA, USSR, and France
what is an example of diversionary theory?
UK- Argentina over the Falkland Islands
Battle for Hue
US Forces and South Vietnamese forces tried to recapture the city of Hue from the communist forces that occupied it. American Forces and South Vietnamese Forces were successful in recapturing the city. They discovered the atrocities the NVA committed.
what is an example of a - direct deterrence? (2 actors)
US and USSR during the cold war
What two countries spend the most money on military expenditures?
US, China
Bargaining Theory of War
Uncertainty about the power and intentions of states pervades the international system, and that states cannot make binding commitments to each other
Non-directed dyad (most common)
Useful for explaining simple onsets. -USA-Canada & Canada-USA are the same.
in the movie "the fog of war", which war was Robert McNamara discussing when he talked about the lesson that "proportionality should be a guideline in war."?
WW11
Theories of Democratic peace: Structural/institutional constraints: when was the last time the US declared war?
WWII, the president can start conflict and ask for approval later
Waltzian Neorealism
Waltz (1979) develops a more rigorous theory that builds upon ideas in macro & micro economics•Assumptions-States are unitary actors and are the system's constituent units-The essential structural quality of the system is anarchy-States seek survivalnot power as an end in itself-States behave rationally-Focuses on the structureof the international system Elements of the structure of the international system-Ordering principle: anarchyvs. hierarchy-Functional differentiation of units (none)-Relative capabilities: only dimension that varies given that the international system is always anarchic and has like units•Balances of power will emerge; states will imitate each other and become socialized (e.g. realist culture). •Hypothesis: bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity-Less uncertainty & risk of war via miscalculation-Contrary to arguments that multipolar systems were more stable due to greater # of counter coalitions that could form, divided attention among poles (fewer arms races), and cross-cutting cleavages (Deutsch & Singer 1964) Mixed evidence-Some periods of multipolaritythat are peaceful (Concert of Europe) but others that are violent (WW I & WWII)-Some periods of bipolarity that are peaceful (Cold War) and others that are violent (Ancient Greece-Peloponnesian War; French-Hapsburg rivalry in 16thcentury)-More major power wars in bipolar systems, but they are lower magnitude wars (Wayman 1984)-Role of nuclear weapons is believed to increase prospects for peace in bipolar systems•Criticisms-Unable to predict specific events: "Although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war 's dismal recurrence through the millennia " (Waltz, 1988 :620).-Difficulty explaining why power/polarity changes
Lai: Value of the future
War is inefficient in the short run, but potentially efficient in the long run.
Blainey: Great Leaders
War is the result of either aggressive or pacifistic leaders -Evidence: It's difficult to evaluate the effect of a specific leader. it requires "counterfactual inference" -Example: If Hitler had never been born, would WWII have happened? It's extremely difficult to have any confidence in either answer
Fearon/Bargaining: Theory
War occurs because of 1. Incomplete Information and incentives to misrepresent 2. Credible Commitment 3. Issue Indivisibility
Overview of the Bargaining Model of War
War occurs when the bargaining parties fail to reach an agreement.•The model focuses on 1) preferences of actors, 2) their beliefs about outcomes & other actors, 3) structure of the system, & 4) information available.•Bargaining can fail when (Fearon1995):-There is incomplete information-Commitment to terms of deal is questionable-Disputed good is hard to divide
Continuing Cycle of Scientific Research
We can use these results are empirical generalizations for future theories.Because democratic leaders pay costs for failure in war, they may implement strategies to increase success rates (Valentino et al 2010).Build larger military capability Join wartime coalitionsAvoid attrition & guerrilla strategies (high casualty risks) and use maneuver strategies insteadFight wars farther away from home territory
Control Variables
We must take into account other factors that could affect our dependent variable (winning or losing a war).War initiators might be more likely to win wars than targets because initiators make calculations about whether they can win, and launch a war when they believe their chances for success are high. Perhaps we observe a relationship between democracy and victory in war only because democracies initiate wars more often than non-democracies.
Bloodletting
When a state's rivals have gone to war independently, the aim is to encourage the conflict to continue as long as possible, in order to let the rival states weaken or "bleed" each other's military strength, while the _______________ party stays out of the fighting.
War from Incomplete Information
When states have poor information about one another's willingness and ability to go to war, two mistakes are possible:-A state confronted by demands may mistakenly yield too little or not at all•Example: Kuwait not believing Iraq's threat of war in 1990-A state may demand too much under the mistaken belief that the other side will accede•Example: Iraq's belief Kuwait would forgive debt from Iran-Iraq war•States have incentives to hide their true capabilities and resolve whether they are weak (would get a worse deal) or strong (could evoke counterbalancing or weaken first strike potential) Two broad classes of unknowns:-Capabilities: the state's physical ability to win (e.g. Hitler's misperceptions about Russia's capabilities)•Troops, armaments, economic resources, military strategies-Resolve: a state's willingness to fight (e.g. US underestimating North Vietnamese resolve to fight)•This helps to explain:-Why states of equal capabilities are more war-prone than are states of unequal power-Why decisive victories tend to be followed by longer periods of peace (Blainey)-The logic of the security dilemma
Buck-passing
When states refuse to confront a growing threat in the hopes that others do, thereby increasing the likelihood of war. Countries shift burden and force a powerful state into taking care of the mess. This promotes an imbalance of power because one power can become more dominant if no one keeps them in check.
Thermonuclear device
When the Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb , the United States responded by intensifying efforts to develop hydrogen bomb?
Plutonium
Which substance is used to produce a nuclear explosion by the fission process?
Bargaining and War
Why do some diplomatic issue conflicts become wars while others do not?•Consider a conflict over territory worth $100 million. If a state is certain of victory, but costs of war are equal to $20 million,the expected valueof going to war is:-$100 million - $20 million = $80 million•A state will accept a bargain that gives it at least as much as it expects from war.•Key assumption: war is costly; there is always some peaceful deal preferable to fighting
Blainey: The role of third parties
Will your allies participate? Will your enemies allies participate? Will third parties stay neutral?
911 problem
Within each country, citizens can maintenance peace because they have the government. Yet, our global community does not have the world government & therefore individuals countries cannot rely on it for peace maintenance. Absence of higher authority.
explain how terrorism makes war more likely
non-state actors could get ahold of them and it would create more wars
advanced economies -
assumes a 1 if both dyad members' share of steel production & energy consumption > share of total population in a given year. otherwise 0
Measures of Association
Yule's Q (for cross-tabulations)Q = [(a*d) -(b*c)]/ [(a*d) + (b*c)]
Measures of association (Yule's Q, correlation)
Yule's Q: 1 is very strong positive (blocks a&d), 0 is evenly distributed, -1 is strong negative Pearson's R: same as Yule
Zagare: what Zagare argues happened that led to WWI
Zagare believes the war started because they had incomplete info on Russia's resolve. Austria did not update their resolve like Germany did, WWI started.
Panay
a US ship sank by the Japanese on Pearl Harbour on a Chinese river. Inspired more isolationism in the U.S.
what is an arms race?
a competition between nations for superiority in the development and accumulation of weapons
initiation
a conflict is started when 2 states enter into a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID)
what does multilateral conflict mean?
a conflict that involves two or more nation states
Blainey's arguments regarding: Arms race
a cycle in which each side tries increase their military capabilities beyond their enemy's Blainey thinks endogenity is what does that. Arms race ←→ war
expected utility theory
a decision maker chooses between uncertain prospects by comparing their respective probabilities gives us a tool for understanding decision making
Indivisible Good
a good that cannot be divided without destroying its value; intangible aspects of issue salience less divisible (important)
Security community
a group of states whose high level of institutionalized or customary collaboration results in the settlement of disputes by compromise rather than by military force
Ottoman Empire-"sick man of Europe"
a label given to a European country experiencing a time of economic difficulty or impoverishment. The term was first used in the mid-19th century to describe the Ottoman Empire
why does mutual military build ups (arms races) have no effect on Major - Minor states disputes?
a military build up by either state will not be viewed as aggressive or targeted
what is mutually assured destruction?
a military theory of nuclear deterrence holding that neither side will attack the other if both sides are guaranteed to be totally destroyed in the conflict
dyad
a pairing of any 2 states (USA-Canada, etc)
Realpolitik
a system of politics or principles based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations - making alliances - increased arms - engaging in repeated crises - having hawkish leaders
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
a treaty that bans all nuclear weapons testing, thereby broadening the ban on atmospheric testing in 1963
what were the interesting results from barbs study
asymmetrical trading - dependent states are likely to go to war BUT the surprising result was that states that are economically interdependent have a high risk of conflict
operational defintion
actual implementation of the conceptual definition
evolutionary psych
aggression in defense of territory is a learned response
Alliances
agreements between nations to aid and protect one another
displays of force
alert mobilization show of force*most common* (includes airspace/maritime violations) border fortification nuclear alert border violation (by land only)
causes of war: research design
all dyadic (A vs B) disputes. DV: did dispute escalate to war? IV: were both sides democracies
Secretary Hull
an American politician from the U.S. state of Tennessee. He is best known as the longest-serving Secretary of State, holding the position for 11 years (1933-1944) in the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during much of World War II.
if defensive alliances fail to deter the attacker what affect do alliances have?
an alliance can expand or worsen the conflict because it will involve more nations which makes it harder to settle the dispute
What did the democratic peace theory start off as ?
an observation
Offensive Realism
anarchic nature of the international system is responsible for the promotion of aggressive state behavior in international politics
defensive realism
anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate and reserved policies to attain security.
features of alliances
anticipatory, unconcerned with cases of civil war/coup threats, non-binding, either lateral or multilateral
fatality threshold
any conflicts that arises in seriousness to 1,000 battle-related deaths per year is war
which of the assumptions made by richardson relate to arms race (reciprocity)
arms will accumulate because of mutual fear
explain international crisis behavior data
as the number of nuclear powers goes from 0 - 5 the likeliness of full scale war decreases result: nukes make war less likely
militarization +
assumes a 1 if both dyad members' share of military personnel > share of total population in a year. otherwise 0
Lake: relationship between behavioral assumptions, rationality and bargaining
behavioral: taking bias into decision making rationality: postwar cost bargaining: INT actors -Decision makers use intuitive decision making and are affected by groupthink and framing when making choices. also ignore information that goes against their decisions -incompatible with a rational theory of war, although not with bargaining as a concept
utility
benefit - cost
Pareto efficient
best outcome is when no player can maximize her payoff without making some other placer worse off
intrastate war
between state govt & domestic group. typically fought for control of govt or secession
neorealism hypothesis
bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems
use of force
blockade occupation of territory seizure *most common* attack/clash = attack w/o clear initiation declaration of war use of CRBN weapons
strategic rivalry: what is spatial
borders, usually involving minor powers
which factor increases the risks for war from 1816-1945 but has no effect on war chances in 1946-1992? - territorial disputes - both sides have outside alliances - the number of prior MIDs
both sides have outside alliances
In Bremer's (MV Ch. 2) bivariate analyses, which of the following factors DECREASES the chances for war in a dyad? - the dyad includes states that are land or sea contiguity - the dyad contains one or more major powers - both states in the dyad are democratic
both states in the dyad are democratic
in bremers bivariate analyses, which of the following facts decreases the chances for war in a dyad?
both states in the dyad are democratic
issue rivalry and militarized rivalry both do what and which one is worse?
both types of rivalry increases risk for MIDs but only militarized rivalries increase chances for fatal MIDs
_______ is a strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risks of accidental war, with the hope the other side will "blink", or lose its nerve first and make concessions.
brinkmanship
Military Keynesianism:
capitalist economy needs the constant threat of war to justify high levels of military spending & increase demand at home. Military-industrial complex: •An alliance of military leaders and arms manufacturers who have a vested interest in an aggressive foreign policy. Hawkish domestic interests create more opportunities for bargaining failures & wars.•Hawks are more likely to come to power when states have high opportunities for force (Vasquez-steps to war model).
why does arms races stop affecting likelihood of war post 1945?
changing culture of national security (nuclear response), nuclear weapons have deterrent effects which changes the meaning of military buildups
under the assumption: war is costly what group pays the most when states go to war and how?
citizens pay highest cost of war in human costs and economical costs through taxes
what is an defensive alliance?
commitment to defend ally who is attacked
what is an offensive alliance?
committed to aid ally even if it is the aggressor
power as relational
common argument is that power is some kind of coercion persuasion punishment coercion
Compellence vs. Deterrence
compellence -- held by those who want to change the status quo deterrence -- those who wish to preserve the status quo
in "bones of contention" (MV chapter 3), the authors collect data on each of the following contentious :
cross -border rivers, and maritime areas
What relationshop do the authors find between the number of prior disputes and escalation to war in the 1816-1992 period? - linear - curvilinear - no relationship
curvilinear
As noted in Bremer's study, if the expected number of wars (e.g. both democratic = 9.1) is (significantly) higher than the observed number of wars (e.g. both democratic = 1) historically, we would conclude that this factor (e.g. both democratic) __________ the probability of war. - increases - decreases - has no effect
decreases
if the expected numbers of wars is significantly higher than the observed number of wars, historically, we would conclude that this factor _______ the probability of dyadic war?
decreases
power preponderance -
decreases likelihood of MID onset
what are factors that influence deterrence success
defender need credibility defender needs capabilities defender needs intentions (resolve)
Correlates of War (CoW) typology
defense neutrality nonaggression entente
what are the different types of alliances?
defensive offensive neutrality nonaggression consultation
which alliances requires use of military force?
defensive and offensive
Theories of Democratic peace: Normative argument: what are democracies conflict resolutions?
democracies are most likely to have nonviolent conflict resolution methods and these norms carry to their action internationally
causes of war: further intuition
democracies can credibly commit & avoid war
Theories of Democratic Peace: Structural/Institutional constraints
democracies do not fight one another because of institutions (the way governments functions)
Theories of Democratic peace: Structural/institutional constraints: Part Two how does a democracy work?
democracy = separation of powers - wars requires legislative approval which takes time that provides a window of hesitancy and reconsideration this also requires public support to gain legislative approval
Prospect Theory
describes how individuals evaluate and choose between available options, and is used to explain why people consistently deviate from the predictions of rational choice.
Political Relevant Information Environment (PRIE)
disaggregating majors to regional/global qualifies majors for several majors
dispute
disagreement over how to resolve one or more issues
Deterrence
discouraging acts by threatening punishment
major powers +
disproportionately responsible for our MIDs & wars in the 19th century
revisionist states
dissatisfied with current order
cost
disutility that may follow from a decision commonly includes transaction costs & opportunity costs
what is strategic rivalry?
do you perceive each other as enemies comparable in capabilities
validity
does measure capture true concept in question without picking it up unintended characteristics
reliability
does measure consistently capture what we want it to
classical realism
drawn form Hans Morgenthau's politics among naions
richardson's arms race model: dx/dt = ay - kx+g dy/dt = bx - Iy + h x = state X's military expenditures y = state Y's military expenditures Qs: what does k, I represent?
fatigue (or routine)
richardson's arms race model: dx/dt = ay - kx+g dy/dt = bx - Iy + h x = state X's military expenditures y = state Y's military expenditures Q what does a, b represent?
fear (or reciprocity)
Uncertainty
fear induced by anarchy and the possibility of pre- dation; rationalists as ignorance (in a nonpejorative sense) endemic to bargaining games of incomplete information and enforcement; cognitiv- ists as the confusion (again nonpejoratively) of decision making in a complex international environment; and constructivists as the indeter- minacy of a largely socially constructed world that lacks meaning without norms and identities.
irrelevant dyads: statistical concerns
flooding analysts with irrelevant observation artificially deflates standard error
Regional security complex
focus on regional powers in shaping security orders with an emphasis on regional power roles, orientation, and regional structure that combines neorealist and constructivist theory
what are alliances?
formal agreements between two (or more) nations and are military in nature
alliance
formal, written agreements signed by 2 official representatives, & at least 2 independent states that include promises to aid a partner or remain neutral in case of conflict
what is a liberal democracy?
freedom of speech, press, religion ect. (civil and political rights)
benefit
gain in utility that may follow from a decision
give an example of logrolled collation
german ship builders and rye farmers banded together to change policy
the Armament tension spiral model says that arms races produces a spiral of arms buildups and tension which will result in a security dilemma. What does security dilemma mean?
greater insecurity and higher likelihood of war
what is a rapid military build up (mutual)
higher than average military growth rates and military spending in a ten year period
Theories of Democratic peace: Normative argument: what is democratic maturity?
how long the state has been a democracy- norms take a long time to be internalized so the longer the state has been a democracy the more likely it is going to act like a democracy
what is an enduring rivalry?
how many times have you fought in the past 6+ mids in the past 20 years militarized competition linked conflict
immediate deterrence
how soon will the attack happen
According to Hensel et al, what is the effort of previous militarized disputes on conflict management? - if a pair of states experienced previous militarized disputes, they are MORE likely to experience militarized conflict, but LESS likely to use peaceful settlement tools. - if a pair of states experienced militarized disputes, they are LESS likely to experience militarized conflict, but MORE likely to use peaceful settlement tools. - if a pair of states experienced previous militarized disputes, they are MORE likely to experience militarized conflict and MORE likely to use peaceful settlement solutions.
if a pair of states experienced previous militarized disputes, they are MORE likely to experience militarized conflict and MORE likely to use peaceful settlement solutions.
according the Hensel et al (MV chapter 3), what is the effect of previous militarized disputes on conflict management?
if a pair of states experienced previous militarized disputes, they are more likely to experience militarized conflict and more likely to use peaceful settlement tools
causes of war: deduction/hypothesis
if both sides in a dispute are a democracy, they won't fight
Systemic level of analysis on Democratic peace theory
if there is an increase in democracies worldwide then conflict worldwide decreases, the the system as a whole is more democratic then non democracies will start acting like democratic states
what does the Para Bellum (Preparedness Model) say?
if you want peace you have to prepare for war
Security dilemma
in an anarchic international system, one with no common central power, when one state seeks to improve its security it creates insecurity in other states.
"New Thinking"
in relation to foreign policy, Gorb wanted to reform but also keep the socialist model; essentially said that nuclear buildup was not an option and does no one good; so, find areas in which they can cooperate instead; leads to arms reductions and military scale back treaties; sig-ended the USSR theory that being a military superpower made them a world power and that heavy industry needed to be focused on at all costs
Explain Wag The Dog and how it applies to diversion theory
incentive for diversion: election and there was a presidential sex scandal fake war with Albania Albania was not a rival US is a major power (opportunity for diversionary force because they attack more often)
the idea of the steps to war model is that realpolitik strategies __________ the risk of war. - decrease - have no impact on - increase
increase
how do defensive alliances reduce the likely hood of war?
increase cost which deters aggression more information which decreases uncertainty credibility reduces misperception
how do offensive alliances increase the likely hood of war?
increase uncertainty bargaining is less flexible creation of counter alliances decreases cost of war for aggressive states and therefor emboldens them
in her analysis of all militarized disputes from 1816-1993, Sample finds that mutual military buildups significantly ______ the chances for escalation to war, while nuclear weapons significantly _______ the chances for escalation to war.
increase, decrease
what is rivalry lock-in
increasingly stalemated outcomes as rivalries progress because of the outcomes of previous disputes and the more we fight the less likely for negotiations
do alliances affect escalation directly or indirectly
indirectly
Rape of Nanking
infamous genocidal war crime committed by japanese military in Nanjing. started in 1937 and lasted a few weeks. japanese army raped, stole and killed prisoners of war and civilians
phases of conflict
initiation, escalation, war dynamics, post war
Hensel et al notes that if a disputed territory contained a sacred religious site and was claimed as a historical homeland for a group living in the area, this would be evidence the issue has high _________. - tangible salience - intangible salience - power salience
intangible salience
hensel et al (MV chapter 3) note that if a disputed territory contained a sacred religious site and was claimed as an historial homeland for a group living in the area, this would be evidence the issue has high....
intangible salience
what is the logrolled coalition
interest groups that when alone cant influence policy but when they band together they can influence policy
post war
interesting research agenda: states that have already fought a war tend to do it again
Theories of Democratic peace: Normative argument: definition of norms
internalized patterns of behavior and beliefs that non violent resolution is preferable
what are the three factors of the Kantian peace Tripod
international organizations democracy economic interdependence
Basic premise of PTT
international system is hierarchic
Power Transition Theory (PTT)
introduced in 1958 by AFK Organski
causes of war
intuition, further intuition, deduction hypothesis, research design, collect & analyze data
does when an arms race occur have an impact on its affect on war?
it depends on the time period
why are offensive alliances considered a blank check for aggressors?
it often times emboldens them and increases chance of war because they no that they have back up
is the para bellum preparedness model only used for total war if not explain why?
it says that total war (nuclear) may not happen but smaller scale warfare is a possibility
bandwagoning
join stronger side to join in spoils of domination
balancing
join weaker side to stop domination
According to Hensel et al, which of the following factors reduces the chances for militarized conflict in issue claims? - previous militarized disputes - joint democracy - dyadic power parity
joint democracy
according the Hensel et al (MV chapter 3), which of following facts reduces the chances for militarized conflict in issue claims?
joint democracy
Theories of Democratic peace: Informational
lack of information is a big influence on whether or not war happens more info = less likely to resort to war
primitive anthropology
land is important to survival and fecundity (ability to reproduce)
contiguity
land-contiguous states & those separated by 150 miles of water are disproportionately responsible for inter-state conflict
in his study, "dangerous dyads: conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war, 1816-1965 (MV chapter 2), professor stuart bremer finds that _________ is the factor most likely to lead pairs of states to fight wars
land/sea contiguity
Reciprocity: dx/dt = ay - kx+g dy/dt = bx - Iy + h Q: what does it mean when you increase A and B?
larger the arms race will be the more quickly escalating an arms race will be
fearon argue that each of the following factors could lead to war in the bargaining model of war except...
leaders incentives to re-elected...... commitment problems and private information= right answer
do defensive alliances make war more likely or less likely?
less likely
fog of war lessons:
lesson 1: empathize with your enemy lesson 2: rationality will not save us lesson 3: there's more beyond one's self lesson 4: maximize efficiency lesson 5: proportionality should be a guideline of war lesson 6: get the data
probability
likelihood of an outcome. between 0 and 1
Naval Disarmament Treaty
limited both the design and numbers of battleships of the major powers, with the United States and Britain limited to 15 battleships, Japan to 10, and Italy and France to 5 each. All powers were limited to battleships of not more than 35,000 tons displacement with guns limited to 16" (406mm) caliber. Carriers were also limited in size and total tonnage. New battleships could not be constructed except to replace older battleships that had reached twenty years' age, and modernization of older battleships and carriers could not increase their displacement by more than 3000 tons nor increase the caliber of their main batteries.
why does MAD (total war) not always work
limited warfare, because they both know that is not realistic to use bigger weapons (nuclear) but smaller scale warfare is still possible
Status discrepancy
linking such differential changes in rank position to conflict via their tendency to produce conflict
International Court of Justice
located in the Netherlands, settles international legal disputes (trade agreements, oceans/seas, boundary disputes, war crimes/genocide), gives advice on legal questions to the member states, 15 judges
criteria for a good theory
logical consistency, accuracy of predictions
polity project (PP)
longest running data set on democracy
which of the following factors makes an outside alliance relevant for their analysis? - major power allies - minor power allies from other regions - offense pacts only
major power allies
analyzing all years in her dataset, Sample finds that arms races (mutual military buildups) significantly increase the chances for dispute escalation to war in each type of power pairing:
major power- major power minor power- minor power
strategic rivalry: what is positional
major powers competing over international influence
Science
method, not discipline value neutral, seeks generalizations, each value is explicit
According to Hensel et al, what happens to the chances for militarized conflict when (within) issues salience increases? - militarized conflict is less likely - issue salience is not related to the chances for militarized conflict - militarized conflict is more likely
militarized conflict is more likely
according the Hensel et al (MV chapter 3) what happens to the chances for militarized conflict (within) issue salience increases?
militarized conflict is more likely
what are the nature of alliances and what does that mean?
military - cooperating/using/restraining military forces
determinants of offense-defense balance
military factors geography social & political order diplomacy
what three possible dyads can arms races exists between?
minor-minor states Major- minor states Major - Major states
Colaresi and Thompson ("Hot Spots or Hot Hands?") find that as the number of previous crises and wars increases, states are ______ likely to fight future wares and crises. - less - no more or no less - more
more
do offensive alliances make war more likely or less likely?
more likely
Reciprocity: dx/dt = ay - kx+g dy/dt = bx - Iy + h Q: larger a's and b's s = ?
more quickly escalating arms races
what does alliances indirectly effecting escalation mean?
more violence is being use and intensity goes up
unit of analysis
most common - dyad years
what is an example of a public good?
national defense
how does neorealist see alliances?
natural response to anarchy
explain how new proliferations make war more likely
new nuclear states are less rational than others who have had them for a long time layer of bureaucracy surrounding nukes
is consistency in power between the actors important for enduring rivalries?
no
Theories of Democratic peace: Normative argument: what happens when democracy and non-democracies interact?
nonviolent conflict resolution norms not present on both sides there for the non democratic state might resort to violence and the democracy may respond with force
Theories of Democratic peace: Normative argument: Nonviolent methods used between democracies =
nonviolent results
general deterrence
not immeidate theres no trigger or threat that is about to happen
what is successful deterrence?
nothing changes
which of the following is NOT a dimension that Klein, Goertz, and Diehl use to identify rivalries? - linked conflict - militarized competition - nuclear capabilities
nuclear capabilities
what does total war mean?
nuclear vs. nuclear
Blainey: Theory
o Optimistic outcomes of war -Different assessments of strength -Different estimates of how third parties (your allies, enemy's allies, neutral states) will behave
Alliance treaty obligations & provisions (ATOP)
offense neutrality nonaggression defense entente
sources of threats
offensive power proximity aggregate capabilities offensive intentions
The armament tension spiral model says arms races increase uncertainty for many reasons. What are the results of the reasons?
one state becomes more tense and will decide to launch a first strike which means war
why are contiguous state prone to conflict?
opportunity, interactions/willingness, territory
richardson's arms race model: dx/dt = ay - kx+g dy/dt = bx - Iy + h x = state X's military expenditures y = state Y's military expenditures Qs: what does g,h represent?
other factors
conceptual definition
outlining a term we use (all polisci)
Theories of Democratic peace: informational: talk about carying opinions on issues between branches of government
party division within government can be seen as public unresolved to conflict unity = resolve = conflict can sometimes fail example: Iraq 2003 high resolve but Saddam didn't back down
what is the only time an arms race can occur?
peacetime
Diversionary Theory of War
political actors often embark on adventurous foreign policy/resort to war in order to distract popular attention away from internal social and economic problems and consolidate their own domestic political support
what is the diversionary theory?
political leaders resort to war to distract the public from domestic problems (economic, scandal political unrest, high unemployment, upcoming elections)
what is a democracy?
political systems compete in elections (free, fair and frequent) sizable portion of population can vote (participation)
which time period does arms races no longer have an affect on?
post 1945
explain how the example of post 9/11 is an rally around the flag and the diversionary theory example
post 9/11- in group feeling of nationalism this existed because all of a sudden there was an out group (Al-Qaeda)
escalation
post initiation when 2 stakes are at risk of spiraling toward war (July Crisis)
which time period does arms races have an affect on?
pre 1945- arms races affect likelihood of war for states of mutual power and capability
joint alliance -
presence coincides with most prominent wars (WW1) major debate about whether alliances lead to peace or war
what is deterrence?
prevent an undesirable outcome ( attack)
how do nukes make war more likely?
preventative wars new proliferators regime type terrorism accidents
a war in which one country is trying to stop another country from becoming stronger in the future, such as the US war against IRAQ in 2003, is an example of
preventive war
rivalries are more likely to fight when...
previous conflict increases risk of future conflict long term policy on how to deal with a "rival" state is dissatisfied from previous conflict crisis begets crisis (serial crisis hypothesis)
what is a the serial crisis argument
previous crisis make subsequence crisis more likely
what is the definition of a public good?
products that are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption
what are nonaggression alliance?
promise to refrain military conflict with allies
what are consolation alliances
promise to talk or consult partners in international crisis
3 theories linking contiguity to war
proximity-as-opportunity proximity-as-interactions territoriality
what matters to our foreign policy at the state-national- societal level of analysis?
public opinion, leaders, lobby groups, special interest groups, military etc.
Theories of Democratic peace: Structural/institutional constraints: controversial assumption:
public wants peace - leading up to the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions public was in favor of going to war
how do we measure arms races?
rapid military build up that is mutual (are both sides building up their military?)
Sample defines _______ as growth rates in military expenditures that exceed a country's historical average in a 10 year period
rapid military buildup
Security
refers to the amalgamation of measures taken by states and international organizations, such as the United Nations, European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and others, to ensure mutual survival and safety.
how to measure opportunity
regional dyads, political relevancy, political relevant info environment, political activity
neorealism (structural realism)
remains the most prominent approach in security studies
which of the assumptions made by richardson relate to no arms race (routine)
resistance from society against constantly increasing arms expenditures
interstate
restricts focus off strictly domestic configurations
Bremer (MV Ch. 2) identifies each of the following variables as a factor that can help to predict the onset of war EXCEPT _________. - rivalry - miliratization - alliance
rivalry
bremer identifies each of the following variables as a factor that can help to predict the onset of war except....
rivalry
through the reciprocity/routine puzzle explain no arms race
routine - states behaviors are driven by bureaucratic routine and other internal factors
contiguity +
routinely the most robust predictor of MID onset
do alliances honor their alliance commitments? what would Sabrosky say and what would leeds say?
sabrosky would say that alliances are just scraps of paper and they mean nothing leeds would say that sabrosky is not thinking of alliances in the correct way because he thinks they are all or nothing but the way to look at the alliance would be the terms of the alliance
what is an alignment?
same as alliances but with out formal agreement
Offensive Structural Realism
should try to maximize power- everyone should seek to be a regional hegemony to minimize potential threats
do mutual military buildups significantly increase or decrease the probability that a dispute escalates?
significantly increases
implications of PD
situation w/ payoffs structured like PD. the prospects for cooperation vs. conflict location each player is better off defecting
Steps to War Model (Senese/Vasquez)
territorial disputes+realpolitik foreign policy behavior=increased chance of war Realpolitik FP includes making alliances, increasing arms, engaging in repeated crises, having hawkish leaders (increases security dilemma which makes mechanisms increase risks for war)
which issue is most likely to result in interstate war?
territory
Neoclassical Realism
the actions of a state in the international system can be explained by systemic variables, such as the distribution of power capabilities among states, as well as cognitive variables, such as the perception and misperception of systemic pressures, other states' intentions, or threats - and domestic variables like state institutions, elites, and societal actors within society, which can affect the power and freedom of action of the decision-makers in foreign policy.
why is extended deterrence more likely to fail
the attacker is usually decided that they want to go to war and absorb costs of war before the attacker threatens
if k>a and I> b (routine > reciprocity) then...
the balance of military weapons should be stable
why is the bargaining range reduced with offensive alliances?
the bargaining range is reduced because there are more states to take into account
Secretary General
the chief executive officer of the UN
deterrent capability and credibility are enhanced by what?
the costs of war which would be much higher with the presence of nuclear weapons there for making war less likely
Hegemon
the domination of one state or group over its allies
hegemony
the domination of one state or group over its allies
In Bremer's (MV Ch. 2) bivariate analyses, which of the following factors INCREASES the chances for war in a dyad? - the dyad is not land or sea contiguous - the dyad contains one or more major powers - both states in the dyad are democratic
the dyad contains one or more major powers
in bremers bivariate analyses, which of the following factors increases the chances for war in a dyad?
the dyad contains one or more major powers
Compliance costs
the expenses associated with meeting the requirements of agreement
Resistance costs
the expenses associated with resisting agreements
what is diversionary incentives?
the incentives that state leaders have to start international crises in order to rally public support at home
MID onset
the initiation of at least one threat, display or use of force from one dyad member to another
hegemonic stability`
the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single nation-state is the dominant world power
United Nations Security Council
the main governing body of the United Nations, it has the authority to identify threats to international peace and security and to prescribe the organization's response, including military and/or economic sanctions
what is the war weariness hypotheses?
the more you fight the more costs you accumulate therefore the less you are inclined to fight in the future
Nash equilibrium
the outcome of a game when no player has an incentive to unilaterally change behavior
Human security
the security of people, including their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity, and the protection of their human rights
what is the rally around the flag effect?
the tendency for people to become more supportive of their country's government in response to dramatic international events such as crises or wars
what is the scenario of an arms race?
where two states build up their military more rapidly than normal
Unitary state assumption:
the treatment of states as coherent actors with a set of interests that belong to the state.This assumption can be useful, but states are legal and political constructs, not beings capable of taking actions.
serial crisis are different from isolated disputes why?
their tendency to recur quickly and to recur with violence
through the reciprocity/routine puzzle explain arms race
theory 1: Reciprocity, the idea that states respond in kind to the actions of others (action-reaction)
what is layer of bureaucracy surrounding nukes
there is a chain of management already in place for who would direct the ordering of nukes in countries who have had nukes for a long time that doesn't exist in countries who just developed them
Why do democratic leaders avoid wars?
they avoid wars they believe they cant win so democracies are hesitant ton initiate conflict but are heavily engaged when they do
according to Vasquez and Mitchell why are alliances indirectly associated with a greater risk of war?
they say that alliances are good predictors that a dispute will be multilateral which are much harder to resolve in a low costly manner
rationality
thick vs. thin maximizing vs. satisfying bounded rationality, broadly stated
in theory one (arms race) what is the assumption that is often made with the idea of reciprocity
this assumes two states are already rivals
status quo states
those that are satisfied with the current conduct of international politics hegemon is by definition with the current order
what does crisis threaten?
threat to stability or the states place in the international system
threats of force
threats to: use force blockade declare war occupy territory use nuclear weapons
extended deterrence
three actors with protege, state the defender is defending
Theories of Democratic peace: Structural/institutional constraints: part one: Leaders (accountability ect.)
through elections the public chooses leaders they can count on leaders can be removed for making poor decisions this is because the public is paying costs of war so the public prefers peace OR short victorious wars
how do rallies have diversionary use?
through scapegoating process - blaming the rival for domestic problems
why do leaders engage in the diversionary theory?
to stay in power care about policy (MAYBE) responsive to the public (in a democracy) responsive to the elite (in a non democracy) can generate more "IN GROUP" through out a group rally around the flag
In "Bones of Contention", the authors collect data on each of the following contentious issues EXCEPT: - cross-border rivers - trade - maritime areas
trade
relationship between trade and peace: social liberalism
trade improves communication because the more you have to interact and participate in organizations the more opportunity you will have to negotiate peacefully
direct deterrence
two actors which are defend-deters a potential attackers
Dyadic level of analysis on Democratic Peace Theory
two democratic states don't go to war against each other and are less likely to fight MIDS
who is involved in an arms race
two or more states
what two factors make a MID more likely to escalate to war?
type of dyad and time period
The Armament-Tensions Spiral Model say arms races increase what?
uncertainty
Rise & Fall Realism
underexpansion or underbalancing behaviour leading to imbalances within the international system, the rise and fall of great powers, and war. Appropriate balancing occurs when a state correctly perceives another state's intentions and balances accordingly.
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl find that most rivalries occur between pairs of countries that are: - unequal in power (asymmetric) - equal in power (symmetric) - none of the above
unequal in power
what three types of power distributions were covered?
unipolar, multipolar, bipolar
MID
united historical case in which 1 state system member threatened, displacing or outright used military force against the govt or official representatives, property, or territory of the govt.
Small and Singer's (COW) definition of Militarized disputes
united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state.
Clausewitz: Trials of strength
upset the existing notion of the balance of power by undergoing "trials" that prove your strength instead of how the balance is currently perceived
cubic splines/peace years
used to make inferences stronger for temporal correlation
prisoners dilemma
useful description for most of international politics situation when the mutually optimal outcome is individually irrational
Directed Dyad
useful for explaining initiating/targeting. - USA-Canada & Canada-USA are different observations
relationship between trade and peace: economic liberalism
war disrupts trade
which of the following assumptions is most important for the bargaining model of war?
war is costly
indirect territorial issue
war over liberation, state creation, secession, unification, consolidation, empire, dynastic succession
direct territorial issue
war over territory, boundaries, "strategic territory, or irredentist (a country is not redeemed until it gets back all of the territory it lost
" the more we have fought in the past the less likely we are to fight in the future?" is an example of and one of the counter arguments to what?
war weariness and agaisnt the argument rivals are more likely to fight
interstate war
wars between at least 2 states
extrastate war
wars between state govr & independent non-state factor or dependent non-state factor
Douglas Haig
was a British soldier and senior commander (field marshal) during World War I. He commanded the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from 1915 to the end of the War. Most notably he was commander during the Battle of the Somme, the 3rd Battle of Ypres and the series of victories leading to the German surrender in 1918.
sociobiology
we are "soft-wired" to violence toward that end
power as structural case
we focus on distribution of power in the international system bc long-running paradigms are built around it
as the three factors of the kantian peace tripod increase what should the world see?
we should see peace icnrease
Routine: dx/dt = ay - kx+g dy/dt = bx - Iy + h k>0, state x is constrained by what?
what it spent last year
routine: dx/dt = ay - kx+g dy/dt = bx - Iy + h I>0, state Y is constrained by what?
what it spent last year
what is a stalemate?
when you fight but resulting in no true winner
Enduring Rivalry Characteristics (KGD)
• Spatial consistency- Dyadic relationships• Duration- Isolated conflict vs. rivalry • Militarized competition - Foreign policy conceived of/conducted in military terms- Can involve tangible or intangible issues • Linked conflict- Conflicts are related over time/space- Expectation of future conflicts
Strategic Rivalry Characteristics (Thompson)
• Strategic rivals must be independent states.• Evidence for/timing of rivalry is based on leaders' statements/perceptions about their enemies .• No minimum duration- E.g. Goertz & Diehl used 6 MIDs over 20+ years as criteria for enduring rivalry. • Positional (e.g. great power) vs. spatial (e.g. border disputes) rivalries
issues with rivalry
• Thompson's critique: some pairs of states that fight 6 or more MIDs are not really rivals, especially when there is significant capability asymmetry (e.g. US-Haiti).• Goertz and Diehl (2001) report that 30% of their total 63 enduring rivalries involve a major-minor power dyad (18% are major-major, 52% are minor-minor).
Lake: puzzle and theory
• Why did the Iraq War occur? Specifically, can bargaining explain the Iraq War? -Domestic politics, Multiple targets of signals, Costs of enforcing settlement, & Irrationality led to bargain failure in Iraq war
Fearon/Bargaining: Puzzle
• Why does war occur despite being inefficient? War is a dispute over the division of something. All wars entail costs, and this is known before hand.. As a result, there always exists a bargain that leaves both sides better than war
Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism
•Capitalist class benefits from war & "hijacks" the state. •Merchants of death: wars are fought to benefit military and business interests & handle under-consumption at home b/c of inequality in distribution of wealth (Hobson). •Aggressive foreign policies to secure natural resources .Though imperialism did not benefit Great Britain as a whole, it was profitable for wealthy people who could invest overseas•Example: 1898-1902 Boer War that Great Britain fought with the Boer states in South Africa claiming 50,000 lives
How Can We Make War Less Likely?
•Raising the costs of war-e.g. nuclear weapons•Increasing transparency-e.g. IAEA •Providing outside enforcement of commitments-e.g. US post WWII security guarantees •Dividing apparently indivisible goods-e.g. joint/shared control of territory or compensation
