International Relations Final

Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests and Institutions- David G. Victor

"law of the least ambitious program" holds that the effectiveness of an international agreement is limited by the commitment level of the agreement's least interested party Crafting a more effective climate change response requires returning to fundamentals, and here I brieºy address three: the demand for international cooperation; the numbers of countries participating and their interests; and the design of the institutions that aim to promote cooperation . The Demand for Cooperation: n. International institutions—such as treaties, organizations, and behavioral norms—aid cooperation by reducing those transaction costs, focusing efforts on particular solutions, creating reputational risks for failure and the like.4 These four attributes of the climate problem make it possible to venture some predictions. It seems likely that all societies will be willing to contribute at least marginally to the effort to avoid extreme dangers. However, nobody knows how to chart the thresholds, and societies are likely to vary in their tolerance of risk For the same reasons, efforts to build an international regime to control climate change on a shared "objective" are likely to fail because countries, in fact, do not have shared assessments of the danger and opportunity The Supply of Cooperation: Numbers: climate change is a global problem and thus requires a global solution large membership costs include, notably, the complexity of negotiating package deals among countries whose interests are highly diverse. Complexity probably rises exponentially with membership because each new member creates new nodes in a network of relationships (and thus complications). And leverage over the problem—measured by emissions—saturates quickly as numbers rise possibly more beneficial to start with a smaller group of nations and then eventually expand Avoiding the distraction of peripheral or contrary interests is especially important for the case of climate change because many of the countries that have been centrally involved in the "broad then deep" approach to regime building would be harmed by successful efforts to control emissions . Organizing Cooperation: The Role of Institutions , the common assumption is that legally binding instruments, negotiated within the universal framework of the United Nations, are the best keystones for international cooperation. The evidence for this proposition is scant, and the Norwegian team organized around Arild did a series of studies that suggested that nonbinding institutions often perform much better. Nonbinding agreements are more ºexible and less prone to raise concerns about noncompliance, and thus they allow governments to adopt ambitious targets and far-ranging commitments. In contrast, binding agreements are usually crafted through processes dominated by lawyers who are particularly focused on assuring compliance. A binding commitment might be useful for codifying an effort that is already in hand (or which requires actions that are easy for governments to deliver). But uncertain, strenuous efforts at cooperation are easier to organize when the commitments are not formally binding. Non-binding commitments, alone, can be as ineffective as much binding law (or even more so). However, the nonbinding instrument allows for a process through which governments commit to (and implement) more ambitious courses of action the nonbinding efforts alone did not lead to more effective cooperation. Rather, at least three elements were necessary for effectiveness First, the commitments required high level attention— usually at ministerial level—to improve the prospects for real implementation. Second, the nonbinding commitments worked because they were embedded within institutions that could mobilize detailed performance reviews, which are especially important when commitments concern areas of activity where it is difªcult to gauge the best implementation strategies at the outset . Third, the commitments and review should be part of an ongoing relationship so that the shadow of future interactions (and linkages across issues) discipline current behavior

The tragedy of the tragedy of the commons- Matto Mildenberger

But here are some inconvenient truths: Hardin was a racist, eugenicist, nativist and Islamophobe. He is listed by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a known white nationalist. His writings and political activism helped inspire the anti-immigrant hatred spilling across America today. And he promoted an idea he called "lifeboat ethics": since global resources are finite, Hardin believed the rich should throw poor people overboard to keep their boat above water. . Its six pages are filled with fearmongering. Hardin practically calls for a fascist state to snuff out unwanted gene pools. Today, American neoNazis cite Hardin's theories to justify racial violence. These were not mere words on paper. Hardin lobbied Congress against sending food aid to poor nations, because he believed their populations were threatening Earth's "carrying capacity." . Hardin wasn't making an informed scientific case. Instead, he was using concerns about environmental scarcity to justify racial discrimination. But that future was stolen from us. It was stolen by powerful, carbon-polluting interests who blocked policy reforms at every turn to preserve their short-term profits. They locked each of us into an economy where fossil fuel consumption continues to be a necessity, not a choice. This is what makes attacks on individual behavior so counterproductive But the point is that interest groups have structured the choices available to us today. Individuals don't have the agency to steer our economic ship from the passenger deck. The truth is that two-thirds of all the carbon pollution ever released into the atmosphere can be traced to the activities of just ninety companies.

Can China Rise Peacefully- Mearsheimer

China wants to be unchallenged hegemon in its region This could possibly lead to an Asian arms race this could create a balancing coalition against China This will be lead by the US Cold war type efforts: containment rollback-toppling regimes that are friendly to Beijing and perhaps even by fomenting trouble inside China bait and bleed Bait and bleed-when there is an opportunity to lure the other side into a costly and foolish war. There is a mutual hardening of rhetoric and positions in the security competition Asian Geography makes area for possible conflict security actors may feel that conflicts can be managed perceived threat of nuclear war is lower this will reduce trigger thresholds and heighten danger unbalance multi-polarity China dominates smaller powerful states worst posible architecture for inter-related states worried about hypernationalism victory mentality as well as victimhood creates hatred of the 'other', especially US China values strategic realism even more than the US and USSR Tries to debunk their economic independence interdependence Complaint of US provokation government aware of Chinese rise

Emerging Multipolarity: Why Should We Care? - Barry R. Posen

Current discourse seems to expect that the structure of power will, if anything, revert quickly to bipolarity with the rise of China. It seems plausible, however, that a prolonged period of multipolarity will occur before bipolarity reemerges, if indeed it ever does. Since the industrial revolution, military power has depended on the economic power from which it is distilled. Yet most states typically do not distill as much as, in extremis, they could Today the United States uses 4 to 5 percent of its GDP for military purposes. None of the other major powers allocates this much, though some could This world was multipolar because the United States spent a tiny percentage of its wealth on military power, and involved itself only haltingly and episodically in relations among the great powers in Europe and Asia. different systems of polarity should produce different patterns of behavior. The two major powers in a bipolar system face no security threats remotely as significant as each other. They can find no allies in the world that can consequentially alter the balance of power with the other. The prediction then is that they are obsessed with one another's behavior, internally and externally. Because allies do not add much, the superpowers focus on "internal balancing." They are obsessed with their relative economic and technical prowess, but more specifically they focus on the military balance. bipolarity is a system of chronic overreaction, internal and external "Offensive realists" would expect the single pole to try to take advantage of its moment of superiority to consolidate that moment: "Defensive realists" expected the United States to lose its interest in international politics, and simply do less. The unipole has thrown its weight around as the offensive realists would expect, and has tried to shape the system according to its perceived interests. On the other hand, lacking the discipline provided by an imminent threat, the United States has engaged abroad capriciously, and with limited energy, which the defensive realists might expect Mulipolarity: The overall balance of capabilities, and the military balance in particular, are easily altered in a significant way depending on who sides with whom All will try to improve their own coalitions and erode those of others. First, despite Western military-technological prowess, the gap appears to be narrowing between the great powers' military capabilities and those of middle powers, small states, and non-state groups that choose to oppose them—at least when it comes to military forces pertinent to conquest and occupation. One reason for this was the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, which permitted a vast outflow of infantry weapons. At the same time, some of the former Soviet republics and East European Warsaw Pact states inherited arms production capabilities in search of markets. China will soon begin to produce and export moderately sophisticated military equipment Military skill also seems to have diffused.The upshot is that great powers may have to pay a higher premium to push the smaller ones around than has been true in the recent past. weak central governemnts: Even before the Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the great powers were uneasy about these weak or failing states. They loathed the human rights violations that are a hallmark of civil war. And they feared the negative externalities of refugee flows and criminal enterprises. The 9/11 attacks added a concern that these poorly governed spaces would prove hospitable to terrorist groups Finally, there is particularly great concern about states that are capable enough to build advanced weapons, especially nuclear weapons, but nevertheless weak enough to risk collapse and the loss of control over said weapons.

operational- Kenneth N. Waltz

Economic interests become so strong that markets begin to replace politics at home and abroad. That economics depresses politics and limits its significance is taken to be a happy thought. The first section of this paper examines its application domestically; the second, internationally. Countries wishing to attract capital and to gain the benefits of today's and tomorrow's technology have to don the "golden straitjacket," a package of policies including balanced budgets, economic deregulation, openness to investment and trade, and a stable currency. The herd decides which countries to reward and which to punish, and nothing can be done about its decisions. Globalization isn't a choice, it's a reality, . . . and the only way you can grow at the speed that your people want to grow is by tapping into the global stock and bond markets, by seeking out multinationals to invest in your country, and by selling into the global trading system what your factories produce. And the most basic truth about globalization is this: No one is in charge." Globalization is shaped by markets, not by governments The "end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism have discredited all models other than liberal democracy." The herd does not care about forms of government as such, but it values and rewards "stability, predictability, transparency, and the ability to transfer and protect its private property." " Liberal democracies represent the one best way. The message to all governments is clear: Conform or suffer. No longer is it "Do what the strong party says or risk physical punishment"; but instead "Do what the electronic herd requires or remain impoverished." First, within advanced countries at similar levels of development that are closely interrelated, one expects uniformities of form and function to be most fully displayed Second, even if all politics have become true today: The global, economies remain local perhaps to a surprising extent. Third, the "transformative capacity" of states, as Linda Weiss emphasizes, is the key to their success in the world economy Economic globalization would mean tht the world economy, or at least the globalized portion of it, would be integrated and not merely interdependent. . Events following the Cold War dramatically demonstrate the political weakness of economic forces. The integration (not just the interdependence) of the parts of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, with all of their entangling economic interests, did not prevent their disintegration. Governments and people sacrifice welfare and even security to nationalism, ethnicity, and religion. Political explanations weigh heavily in accounting for international-political events. National politics, not international markets, account for many international economic developments Political explanations weigh heavily in accounting for international-political events. National politics, not international markets, account for many international economic developments. A number of students of politics and of economics believe that blocs are becoming more common internationally. Under bi and unipolarity the degree of interdependence declined markedly. one another not by function but primarily by capability. For two reasons, inequalities across states have greater political impact than inequalities across income groups within states. First, the inequalities of states are larger and have been growing more rapidly. Rich countries have become richer while poor countries have remained poor. Second, in a system without central governance, the influence of the units of greater capability is disproportionately large because there are no effective laws and institutions to direct and constrain them. More than any other state, the United States makes the rules and maintains the institutions that shape the international political economy. The world is sustained by "the presence of American power and America's willingness to use that power against those who would threaten the system of globalization.... The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist"

Deterrence- Richard Ned Lebow

It can be defIned as an attempt to influence other actors' assessment of their interests It seeks to prevent an undesired behaviour by convincing the party who may be contemplating such an action that its cost will exceed any possible gain Deterrence presupposes that decisions are made in response to some kind ofrational cost-benefIt calculus, that this calculus can be successfully manipulated from the outside, and that the best way to do so is to increase the cost side of the ledger. Bargaining outcomes do not necessarily reflect a balance of interests or military capabilities. Three other influences are important. The first is context, which for Schelling consists of the stakes, the range of possible outcomes, the salience of those outcomes and the ability of bargainers to commit to those outcomes The second consideration is skill. Threats to use force lack credibility if they are costly to carry out. To circumvent this difficulty, clever leaders can feign madness, develop a reputation for heartlessness or put themselves into a position from which they cannot retreat. Other tactics can be used to discredit adversarial commitments or minimize the cost of backing away from one's own The third, and arguably most important, determinant of outcome is willingness to suffer. General deterrence is based on the existing power relationship and attempts to prevent an adversary from seriously considering any kind of military challenge because of its expected adverse consequences. Immediate deterrence is specific; it attempts to forestall an anticipated challenge to a well-defined and publicized commitment Immediate deterrence The political component concerns the motivation behind foreign policy challenges. The psychological component is also related to the motivation behind deterrence challenges. To the extent that policymakers believe in the necessity of challenging the commitments of their adversaries, they become predisposed to see their objectives as attainable general nuclear deterrence: 1 leaders who try to exploit real or imagined nuclear advantages for political gain are not likely to succeed; 2 credible nuclear threats are very difficult to make; 3 nuclear threats are fraught with risk; 4 strategic build-ups are more likely to provoke than to restrain adversaries because of their impact on the domestic balance of political power in the target state; 5 nuclear deterrence is robust when leaders on both sides fear war and are aware of each other's fears.

"Lies Your High School History Teacher Told You About Nukes".

Mutually assured destruction, according to a growing body of scholarship, is a myth If the theory were correct, then neither country would need to alter its nuclear strategies or upgrade its arsenals, which would already ensure mutual annihilation and therefore mutual deterrence. Instead, both sides spent billions on larger and more numerous warheads as well as faster and more accurate missiles. They conducted high-risk drills and exercises to prepare for nuclear war, gamed out how to fight such a war and, according to internal documents, worried desperately that one might come about. Even if Soviet and American leaders both declared as policy that nuclear war was unthinkable, they behaved as if it was very much foreseeable. counterforce- The United States could at some point, in theory, launch a series of rapid nuclear strikes against Soviet nuclear arsenals, disarming the country before it could retaliate. they tried to ensure that they would retain second-strike capability — the guaranteed ability to fire a return volley after an American first strike. But these steps, by design, increased the risk

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS (TANS)- HANS PETER SCHMITZ

Proponents argue that there can be no peace and security without justice, and that prosecutions are key to deterring future atrocities. Skeptics disagree and argue that peace after major episodes of violence requires political solutions that are often undermined by prosecutions. A third position based on ideas of transformative justice critiques prosecutions as unable to address root causes of mass atrocities. In explaining this rise of international criminal justice norms, the scholarly literature offers both agency-driven explanations focused on the role of norm entrepreneurs and structuralist accounts either highlighting the role of states and material power or identifying diffusion and acculturation processes that have unfolded based on a culture of modernity Scholars focused on the role of power and politics argue that the global rise of individual criminal accountability is the result of Western hegemony and the geopolitical trends of the post-Cold War era Focus on power and politics suggests that prosecusion of foreign leaders can either lead to the governments collapse, like in Argentina, or stregnthen the supposrt of the leader domestically, like The Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir Sociological institutionalism offers some answers here by highlighting a long-term process of expanding individual rights and accountability Institutionalist accounts rely on a range of mechanisms to explain the diffusion of norms, including material pressures (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 208), persuasion or acculturation Agency-driven accounts add norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) not only as key players producing the ties across borders, but also as independent shapers of norms and their implementation. TANs in the human rights field became major proponents of criminal justice because it mirrored their existing emphasis on high-profile advocacy and legal strategies targeting individual "villains" to address injustice. TANs were able to exert agenda-setting power especially during the 1990s when failures to prevent mass atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda left Western states vulnerable to moral pressures that featured both an explanation for the problem (individuals' decisions to unleash mass violence) and a feasible solution (trials promising justice and future deterrence). The key advantage for TANs supporting criminal justice was not simply that they promoted universalism and human rights and exposed atrocities, but that they promised a policy solution that was broadly compatible with existing norms of Western legal systems. Rather than relying only on "naming and shaming" efforts, advocates offered policy solutions for states to adopt. TANs make choices about how to organize, deploy their resources, respond to counter-mobilization, and adapt their strategic approaches. These choices are not simply a reflection of an ever-expanding culture of modernity, but they shape the nature and reach of rights Arguments for and against criminal prosecutions rely on assumptions about how trials affect the decision making of those considering mass atrocities. Scholars of democratic transitions in southern Europe and Latin America highlighted the need for elite pacts and argued that prosecutions may precipitate coup attempts As former leaders maintain power resources and democratic institutions are still weak, prosecutions create incentives to disrupt transitions to democracy Critics of international justice claim that prosecutions drive government officials to use the threat of violence as a bargaining chip, Deterrence has also been a core claim of TANs agitating for prosecutions, in addition to assertions of cost-effectiveness, enhanced rule oflaw and security, and justice for victims What remains unclear in the accounts of both proponents and critics is how largescale social outcomes, such as more or less violations, are linked to the individual decision making that drives these arguments. A first issue arises when seeking to establish that individual leaders are actually responsive to incentives emanating from a prosecution threat. A second issue emerges when drawing causal linkages between individuals' decision making and large-scale violence Similarly, research considering both the effects of trials and amnesty laws has argued that a combination of trials and amnesties is most effective in deterring future abuses Advocates for transformational justice reject superficial efforts of expanding victims' assistance and argue that deep-seated causes of communal violence require sustained local engagement, rather than a performance of justice. The cascade metaphor describes well the rise in prosecutions since the 1990s, but the justice pursued remains narrowly focused on retributive outcomes (Moyn 2012) and TANs spent limited time and resources on validating the wide-ranging claims about the positive effects of trials exposing human rights violation, (2) naming a perpetrator, and (3) proposing a remedy There are several challenges in moving away from the current, professionalized model of human rights fact-finding. First, efforts to engage in broader framing and analysis will likely create more uncertainty with regard to individual responsibility and causes. Second, the generation of expertise about structural forces has to rely on local sources, which often lack the capacities of powerful INGOs. Increasing the bottom-up input from communities requires investment in local capacity to articulate narratives as well as expanded capacities among INGOs to listen to and process diverging opinions. One way of enhancing local agency from the outside is to document resistance and not just violations (Leebaw 2011) and prioritize a focus on processes of ongoing political mobilization, rather than narrow judicial procedures Trials do not always solve the deep societal divide

Pompeo presses U.N. Security Council to 'pick a side' in Venezuela's crisis- Carol Morello

See article-2 pages

Governance in . World Affairs- ORAN R. YOUNG

Some observers react t~ this question with a deep sense of frustration and growing pessimism regardfrig humankind's ability to cope with the world's troubles. ~ticipating a "coming anarchy," they offer no clear recipe for contending with ~e crisis of governance they foresee.' A second response to the growing demand for governance emphasizes efforts to reform the UN as a preferred mechanism for the supply of global governance. Yet a tllird response emphasizes the distinction between governance and government and directs attention to a variety of innovative social practices that have come into existence during the postwar era to solve discrete or distinct problems by creating regimes or sets of roles, rules, and relationships that focus on specific problems and do not require centralized political organizations to administer them.' the third response looks to piecemeal or issue-specific arrangemen ts that mayor may not be legally binding, mayor may not assign some role to the UN or its specialized agencies, and often accord important roles to nonstate actors. Creative efforts of this sort are particularly notable in-but by no means confined to-the realm of environmental issues.' when understanding regimes: Contractarians assume the prior existence of actors with a clear sense of their own identities and the interests flowing from these identities. Such actors will be motivated to create institutional arrangements when they find that proGeeding individualistically leads to joint losses or to an inability to reap joint gains. On this account, regimes are devices created by self-interested actors to solve or at least ameliorate collective-action problems The constitutive perspective, by !=ontrast, assumes that institutions playa major role in defining the interests ofparticip'ants.and even in shaping their identities. States seeking membership in the European Union, for example, must adjust their domestic systems to conform to the requirements of the union. Thus institutions have formative effects on their members rather than the other way around." Regimes are sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and/or programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and govern their interactions. Taken together, reg~l!les form a horizontal rather than a vertical or hierarchical system of public order. The result is a complex pattern of decentralized authority If we draw a distinction between regimes as institutions and organizations as material entities possessing offices, budgets, personnel, and legal personalities, it is possible to say that this approach to governance highlights the idea of "governance without government" and may fulfill the function of governance while minimizing tlle establishment of new bureaucracies or administrative entities." If we draw a distinction between regimes as institutions and organizations as material entities possessing offices, budgets, personnel, and legal personalities, it is possible to say that this approach to governance highlights the idea of "governance without government" and may fulfill the function of governance while minimizing tlle establishment of new bureaucracies or administrative entities." We are experiencing the emergence of a variety of recognized and significant roles for nonstate actors in me development and operation of international regimes What is needed to make progress analytically is a clear separation between regimes, on the one hand, and both international society and global civil society, on the other.22 The point of drawing such a distinction, which parallel~ the state/society distinction with regard to domestic systems, is not to argue that regimes and society· are unrelated to each other. On the contrary, the distinction opens up a new research agenda that focuses precisely on the links between regimes and societies International regimes, the central concern of most contributors to the new instit.utionalism in int.ernational relations, are institutional arrangements whose members are stat.es and whose operations cent.er on issues arising in int.ernational society. Arms control regimes, such as t.he arrangement. governing nuclear nonproliferation, exemplifY this cat.egory of instit.utions. Transnational regimes, by contrast., are instit.utional arrangements whose members are nonstat.e act.ors and whose operations are pertinent. t.o issues that. arise in global civil society. The rapidly emerging social practice connecting users of t.he World Wide Web is an example. realworld regimes are oft.en-perhaps normally-a mix of international regimes in which nonstat.e act.ors play significant. roles and transnational regimes in which stat.es have important roles t.o play?3 What. is more, societal influences can and oft.en do cut. across the pure types of regimes. An economic criterion stresses efficiency and asks whether the same results could have been achieved at a lower cost or, alternatively, better results achieved at the same cost A political criterion directs attention to equity and raises questions about the fairness both of the results of institutional arrangements and of their procedures or processes. When it comes to environmental regimes, there is also an ecological criterion that emphasizes the degree to which the results flmving from institutional arrangements are sustainable in that they do not disrupt key biotic or abiotic systems. Moreover, regimes at the international or transnational level have a limited capacity to alter the behavior within societie Two distinct elements of this piecemeal approach to the reform of international society are worthy of particular notice. The first focuses on the activities of nonstate actors as catalytic agents in the creation and operation of international regimes. 4l The striking growth in the roles that environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play in a variety of regimes exemplifies this point A second element involves the constitutive principles governing the interactions among members ofinternational society.

The Purpose of Intervention- MARTHA FINNEMORE

Strong states continue to intervene in weaker states on a massive scale when it suits them. What has changed is when it will suit them. What have changed are state understandings about the purposes to which they can and should use force. . We have good theoretical reasons to expect differently constituted and . differently situated states to use military force differently. If states are states only because they have control over force within their territory and other states recognize that control, then military intervention is an explicit challenge to sovereignty States understand intervention as being different from, and usually less than, war "Intervention" is the term used for compromises of sovereignty by other states that are exceptional in some way, yet lines that differentiate and constitute these exceptions are not always clear and have varied over time. Distinguishing between intervention and war poses similar problems. We tend to think of interventions as· smaller in scale and having more limited objectives than wars; however, when the objectives are to replace whole governments, it is hard to see what is limited about the objectives except that they do not include territorial conquest and absorption. I classify cases of intervention according to two features: the explanation states give for intervening and what they actually do on the ground. My goal in these cases is twofold. I want to show that systemwide changes in the purposes to which states use force occur, and to say something about how those changes came about. This book does not, however, offer lawlike statements or if-then predictions about when purpose will change no law-like assumptions about state intrests My more modest effort here simply makes the initial demonstration that purpose changes and identifies mechanisms by which change occurs. One central issue., explored in detail in the final chapter, involves how changing purpose or beliefs cause changes in intervention behavior Rather, new beliefs make possible (and inthat sense cause) new intervention behavior by creating new norms of behavior and new reasons for action When states justify their interventions~ they draw on and articulate shared values and expectations that other decision makers and other publics in other states hold. Justification is literally an attempt to connect one's actions with standards of justice or, perhaps more generically, with standards of appropriate and acceptable behavior. The cases analyzed here share certain characteristics that suggest both substantive generalizations about the way we use force in the world and some conceptual confusion, about the way we think about force. Conceptually the cases suggest that we, as analysts, need to rethink the relationship between utility and legitimacy in political analysis. States or other political actors do what they do, including using force, because it is useful or fulfills some function. Arguments of this kind are often opposed to normative or ideational arguments in which actors do what they do because such actions are viewed as legitimate, right, or good. For example, extant arguments about humanitarian intervention posit that humanitarian intervention is "really" driven by some underlying geostrategic interest as opposed to being motivated by altruistic: humanitarian sympathies Force must be coupled with legitimacy for maximum effect. This coupling, in turn, has at least two dimensions: The goal being pursued by force must be seen as legitimate, and force must be viewed as a legitimate means to that goal. Humanitarian activity in the 1990S suggests that certain claims, particularly human rights claims, now trump sovereignty and legitimatize intervention in ways not previously accepted These three themes-the malleability 9f strong state interests, the normative devaluation of force over time, and the growing importance of rational-legal authority in governing the use of force-run through all three cases and form the basic features of intervention's normative terrain.

Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics

TANs may be key contributors to a convergence of social and cultural norms able to support processes of regional and international integration. By building new links among actors in civil societies, states and international organizations, they multiply the opportunities for dialogue and exchange In issue areas such as the environment and human rights, they also make international resources available to new actors in domestic political and social struggles. Motivated by values rather than by material concerns or professional norms, they fall outside our accustomed categories. advocacy networks often reach beyond policy change to advocate and instigate changes in the institutional and principled bases of international interactions A transnational advocacy network includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.1 mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories, and to persuade, pressurize, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. Simultaneously principled and strategic actors, transnational advocacy networks 'frame' issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage action, and to 'fit' with favorable institutional venues. Networks are communicative structures. To influence discourse, procedures and policy, transnational advocacy networks may become part of larger policy communities that group actors from a variety of institutional and value UNESCO 1999. positions. Transnational advocacy networks may also be understood as political spaces, in which differently situated actors negotiate - formally or informally - the social, cultural and political meanings of their joint enterprises. In both of these ways, transnational networks can be key vehicles for the cultural and social negotiations underpinning processes of regional integration Major actors in advocacy networks may include the following: (1) international and domestic NGOs, research and advocacy organizations; (2) local social movements; (3) foundations; 92 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (4) the media; (5) churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, intellectuals; (6) parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations; (7) parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments. . Initial research suggests, however, that international and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a central role in most advocacy networks, usually initiating actions and pressuring more powerful actors to take positions. NGOs introduce new ideas, provide information, and lobby for policy changes. The movement of funds and services is especially notable between foundations and NGOs, but some NGOs provide services such as training for other NGOs in the same, and sometimes other, advocacy networks. Personnel also circulate within and among networks This convergence highlights important dimensions that these networks share: the centrality of values or principled ideas, the belief that individuals can make a difference, creative use of information, and the employment by nongovernmental actors of sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaigns Boomerang pattern- Where governments are unresponsive to groups whose claims may none the less resonate elsewhere, international contacts can 'amplify' the demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo these demands back into the domestic arena Advocacy networks in the north often function in a cultural milieu of internationalism that is generally optimistic about the promise and possibilities of international networking. For network members in developing countries, however, justifying external intervention or pressure in domestic affairs is a much trickier business, except when lives are at stake. Linkages with northern networks require high levels of trust, because arguments justifying intervention on ethical grounds often sound too much like the 'civilizing' discourse of colonial powers, and can work against the goals they espouse by producing a nationalist backlash. because they are not powerful in the traditional sense of the word, they must use the power of their information, ideas and strategies to alter the information and value context within which states make policies information politics, or the ability to move politically usable information quickly and credibly to where it will have the most impact; (b) symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far away (see also Brysk, 1994, 1995); (c) leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and (d) accountability politics, or the effort to oblige more powerful actors to act on vaguer policies or principles they formally endorsed information politics- An effective frame must show that a given state of affairs is neither natural nor accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions. Symbolic politics-, the Transnational advocacy networks 500th anniversary of the voyage of Columbus to the Americas, to raise a host of indigenous issues revealed the ability of networks to use symbolic events to reshape understandings Leverage politics-In order to bring about policy change, networks need to both persuade and pressurize more powerful actors. To gain influence the networks seek leverage - a word that appears often in the discourse of advocacy organizations - over more powerful actors. By exerting leverage over more powerful institutions, weak groups gain influence far beyond their ability to influence state practices directly. Identifying points of leverage is a crucial strategic step in network campaigns. We discuss two kinds of leverage: material leverage and moral leverage. material leverage- Material leverage usually takes the form of some kind of issue-linkage, normally involving money or goods... Human rights groups obtained leverage by providing US and European policymakers with information that persuaded them to cut off military and economic aid. Moral leverage-e the behaviour of target actors is held up to the bright light of international scrutiny. Where states place a high value on international prestige, this can be effective. Accountability politics- Once a government has publicly committed itself to a principle - for example, in favour of human rights or democracy - networks can use those positions, and their command of information, to expose the distance between discourse and practice. This is embarrassing to many governments, who may try to save face by closing the distance.

Will the Liberal Order Survive?- Joseph S. Nye, Jr

The Bretton Woods institutions were set up while the war was still in progress. When other countries proved too poor or weak to fend for themselves afterward, the Truman administration decided to break with U.S. tradition and make open-ended alliances, provide substantial aid to other countries, and deploy U.S. military forces abroad Washington gave the United Kingdom a major loan in 1946, took responsibility for supporting pro-Western governments in Greece and Turkey in 1947, invested heavily in European recovery with the Marshall Plan in 1948, created NATO in 1949, led a military coalition to protect South Korea from invasion in 1950, and signed a new security treaty with Japan in 1960. To protect itself and prevent a third world war, Washington chose to isolate the Soviet Union and bind itself tightly to the other three, and U.S. troops remain in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere to this day. And within this framework, global economic, social, and ecological interdependence grew. And even when its power was greatest, Washington could not prevent the "loss" of China, the partition of Germany and Berlin, a draw in Korea, Soviet suppression of insurrections within its own bloc, the creation and survival of a communist regime in Cuba, and failure in Vietnam Others claim that the foundations of the order are eroding because of a long-term global power transition involving the dramatic rise of Asian economies such as China and India. And still others see it as threatened by a broader diffusion of power from governments to nonstate actors thanks to ongoing changes in politics, society, and technology. Some observers see the main threat to the current liberal order coming from the rapid rise of a China that does not always appear to appreciate that great power carries with it great responsibilities. They worry that China is about to pass the United States in power and that when it does, it will not uphold the current order because it views it as an external imposition reflecting others' interest more than its own Even so, the order may still be threatened by a general diffusion of power away from governments toward nonstate actors. The information revolution is putting a number of transnational issues, such as financial stability, climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and cybersecurity, on the global agenda at the same time as it is weakening the ability of all governments to respond Even if the United States remains the largest power, accordingly, it will not be able to achieve many of its international goals acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change and rising sea levels will affect the quality of life, but Americans cannot manage these problems by themselves Increasingly, however, the openness that enables the United States to build networks, maintain institutions, and sustain alliances is itself under siege

The Chinese Century

The crucial implication was that the United States could trade freely with China— and thereby contribute to Beijing's skyrocketing national wealth and power— without fearing the geopolitical consequences, because the forces of economic modernization and integration would ultimately transform the regime. "Trade freely with China," George W. Bush remarked, "and time is on our side." This idea, dubbed the "Soothing Scenario" by James Mann, had the virtue of appealing to Americans' deep-seared belief that their form of government is both morally desirable and universally desired. It reflected the immense ideological optimism of the post—Cold War moment, and was well attuned to the best social-science literature on the relationship between prosperity and democracy, and between democracy and peace. Not least, it was useful in providing assurance that Americans could deepen their commercial engagement with China Chinese leaders, rather, have used prosperity to buy legitimacy while also ruthlessly but skillfully repressing dissent. According to the Polity IV dataset, China is just as authoritarian as it has been for decades regime is actually becoming less liberal Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger argued that the United States could gain China's cooperation on weapons proliferation and other important issues only if it refrained from isolating that country after the Tiananmen massacre.

THE EUROPEAN UNION- John Pinder and Simon Usherwood

The idea of binding Germany within strong institutions, which would equally bind France and other European countries and thus be acceptable to Germans over the longer term, seemed more promising 0. Following the 12 years of Nazi rule that ended with devastation in 1945, the Community offered Germans a way to become a respected people again. The idea of a Community of equals with strong institutions was attractive The system that has provided a framework for over half a century of peace is regarded as a guarantee of future stability The European Union of today is the result of a process that began over half a century ago with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. Those two industries then still provided the industrial muscle for military power; and Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, affirmed on 9 May 1950 in his declaration which launched the project that 'any war between France and Germany' would become 'not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible'. The concept of the common market was extended to the whole of their mutual trade in goods when the ~ European Economic Community (EEC) was founded in 1958, e opening up the way to an integrated economy that responded to " ~ the logic of economic interdependence among the member states. The EEC was also, thanks to French insistence on surrounding the common market with a common external tariff, able to enter trade negotiations on level terms with the United States; and this demonstrated the potential ofthe Community to become a major actor in the international system when it has a common instrument with which to conduct an external policy There are two main ways of explaining the phenomenon of the Community and the Union. Adherents to one emphasize the role of the member states and their intergovernmental dealings; adherents to the other give greater weight to the European institutions.

US.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION- ROBERT GILPIN

The international corporations have evidently declared ideological war on the "antiquated" nation state .... The charge that materialism, modernization and internationalism is the new liberal creed of corporate capitalism is a valid one. The implication is clear: the nation state as a political unit of democratic decision-making must, in the interest of "progress," yield control to the new mercantile mini-powers. While the structure of the multinational corporation is a modern concept, designed to meet the requirements of a modern age, the nation state is a very old-fashioned idea and badly adapted to serve the needs of our present complex world.2 On the one hand, powerful economic and technological forces are creating a highly interdependent world economy, thus diminishing the traditional significance of national boundaries. On the other hand, the nation-state continues to command men's loyalties and to be the basic unit of political decision making "The conflict of our era is between ethnocentric nationalism and geocentric technology." Ball and Levitt represent two contending positions with respect to this conflict. Whereas Ball advocates the diminution of the power of the nation-state in order to give full rein to the productive potentialities of the multinational corporation, Levitt argues for a powerful nationalism which could counterbalance American corporate domination On the one hand, politics largely determines the framework of economic activity and channels it in directions intended to serve the interests of dominant groups; the exercise of power in all its forms is a major determinant of the nature of an economic system. On the other hand, the economic process itself tends to redistribute power and wealth; it transforms the power relationships among groups. Thus, the dynamics of international relations in the modem world is largely a function of the reciprocal interaction between economics and politics. three prevailing conceptions of political economy: liberalism, Marxism, and mercantilism. Liberalism regards politics and economics as relatively separable and autonomous spheres of activities Marxism refers to the radical critique of capitalism identified with Karl Marx and his contemporary disciples; according to this conception, economics determines politics and political structure Mercantilism is a more questionable term because of its historical association with the desire of nation-states for a trade surplus and for treasure (money). One must distinguish, however, between the specific form mercantilism took in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the general outlook of mercantilistic thought. The essence of the mercantilistic perspective, whether it is labeled economic nationalism, protectionism, or the doctrine of the German Historical School, is the subservience of the economy to the state and its interests-interests that range from matters of domestic welfare to those of international security The basic assumption of liberalism is that the nature of international economic relations is essentially harmonious. Following Smith, liberalism assumes that there is a basic harmony between true national interest and cosmopolitan economic interest. In essence, the pursuit of self-interest in a free, competitive economy achieves the greatest good for the greatest number in international no less than in the national society. Both mercantilists and Marxists, on the other hand, begin with the premise that the essence of economic relations is conHictual. There is no underlying harmony; indeed, one group's gain is another's loss. Thus, in the language of game theory, whereas liberals regard economic relations as a non-zero-sum game, Marxists and mercantilists view economic relations as essentially a zero-sum game. For the liberal, the goal of economic activity is the optimum or efficient use of the world's scarce resources and the maximization of world welfare. While most liberals refuse to make value judgments regarding income distribution For the Marxist the distribution of wealth among social classes is central; for the mercantilist it is the distribution of employment, industry, and military power among nation-states that is most significant. Thus, the goal of economic (and political) activity for both Marxists and mercantilists is the redistribution of wealth and power. In Marxist analysis, the basic actors in both domestic and international relations are economic classes; the interests of the dominant class determine the foreign policy of the state. For mercantilists, the real actors in international economic relations are nation-states; national interest determines foreign policy. Marxists of class interests, mercantilists recognize only the interests of particular nation-states. liberal emphasis is on the individual consumer, firm, or entrepreneur. The liberal ideal is summarized in the view of Harry Johnson that the nation-state has no meaning as an economic entity.12 Subsequently, from nineteenth-century economic liberals to twentieth-century writers on economic integration, there has existed "the dream ... of a great republic of world commerce, in which national boundaries would cease to have any great economic importance and the web of trade would bind ali the people of the world in the prosperity of peace." 14 For liberals the long-term trend is toward world integration Engels argued that when contradictions arise between economic and political structures, political power adapts itself to the changes in the balance of economic forces; politics yields to the dictates of economic development Mercantalism: politics, in this view, determines economic organization. stressed the primacy of national security, industrial development, and national sentiment in international political and economic dynamics. it sees change as taking place owing to shifts in the balance of power; Marxism is essentially a theory of social change. It emphasizes the tendency toward disequilibrium owing to changes in the means of production and the consequent effects on the everpresent class conflict. When these tendencies can no longer be contained, the sociopolitical system breaks down through violent upheaval. Thus war and revolution are seen as an integral part of the economic process. Politics and economics are intimately joined. for liberalism maintenance of harmonious international market relations is the norm, for Marxism and mercantilism conflicts of class or. national interests are the norm. However, when economists stop taking the system for granted and start asking questions about distribution, they have really ventured into what I regard as the essence of politics, for distribution is really a political issue. In a world in which power rests on wealth, changes in the relative distribution of wealth imply changes in the distribution of power and in the political system itself. This, in fact, is what is meant by saying that politics is about relative gains. Politics concerns the efforts of groups to redistribute gains to their own advantage. In a world in which power rests increasingly on economic and industrial capabilities, one cannot really distinguish between wealth

The tragedy of the commnons- Garrett Hardin

people utilize the commons to maximize personal benefits without considering the effects on the entire resources as it suffers only a fraction of what is gained by the individual in total. Can be prevented by private property/taxation disincentives freedom To Breed Is Intolerable It is a mistake to think that we can control the breeding of mankind in the long run by an appeal to conscience. The argument assumes that conscience or the desire for children (no matter which) is hereditary To make such an appeal is to set up a selective system that works toward the elimination of conscience from the race. double bind- help community, or if you do resources will be exploited by someone else "No good has ever come from feeling guilty mutual!! coercion through taxation is a viable option Or make it private property Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of somebody's personal liberty The most important aspect of necessity that we must now recognize, is the necessity of abandoning the commons in breeding Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all The temptation must be resisted, because an appeal to independently acting consciences selects for the disappearance of all conscience in the long run, and an increase in anxiety in the short. The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon. "Freedom is the recognition of necessity"-and it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons.

The Sources of Chinese Conduct- Odd Arne Westad

the containment strategy that Kennan laid out would de¿ne U.S. policy until the end of the Cold War According to the CCP, Western talk about democracy is simply a pretext for robbing poorer countries of their sovereignty and economic potential. Just as China has needed dictatorship to achieve extreme economic growth, the thinking goes, other countries may need it, too. The CCP issues relentless propaganda about the greatness and righteousness of China, and the Chinese people, understandably proud of what they have achieved, embrace it enthusiastically. The party also claims that the outside world, especially the United States, is out to undo China's progress, or at least prevent its further rise , the CCP also makes the frightening claim that the party itself is the only thing standing between the Chinese and further exploitation Another troubling aspect of nationalism in China today is that the country is a de facto empire that tries to behave as if it were a nationstate. More than 40 percent of China's territory—Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang—was originally populated by people who do not see themselves as Chinese. Although the Chinese government grants special rights to these "minority nationalities," their homelands have been subsumed into a new concept of a Chinese nation and have gradually been taken over by the 98 percent of the population who are ethnically Chinese Unless the United States acts to countervail it, China is likely to become the undisputed master of East Asia, from Japan to Indonesia, by the late 2020s. The more the United States and China beat each other up, the more room for maneuver other powers will have. The result may be a world of regional hegemons, and sooner rather than later. The U.S. economy is also intertwined with the Chinese economy in ways that would have been unimaginable with the Soviet economy As Kennan knew well, economically speaking, the Soviets did not need to be contained; they contained themselves by refusing to join the world economy. China is very dierent, since about one-third of its GDP growth can be traced to exports, and the United States is its largest trading partner China's determination to hack away at the United States' position in Asia is more tenacious than anything Stalin ever attempted in Europe. Today, likewise, U.S. alliances in Asia must have not only a security dimension but also an economic dimension. Washington should try to bring Moscow into a more cooperative relationship with the West by opening up more opportunities for partnership and helping settle the conÇict in eastern Ukraine. If Washington refuses to do that, then the strategic nightmare that haunted U.S. ocials during the Cold War yet never fully materialized may actually come true: a real Sino-Russian alliance. Today, the combination of Russia's resources and China's population could power a far greater challenge to the West than what was attempted 70 years ago.