International Relations - PhD Qualifying Exam (2019)

Powell. 2004. Bargaining and Learning While Fighting.

Model shows: 1. Crises over uncertainty over the distribution of power seem likely to last longer and entail more fighting than crises over the uncertainty over costs (indeed, there may be little or no fighting). 2. Bargaining environment through which actors convey information may play a critical role in informational accounts of war—how fast states can make offers can become more important than factors like the distribution of power on war duration.

Hainmueller and Hangartner (2011) Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A natural experiment in immigrant discrimination

"No" votes for naturalization were 40% higher for immigrants who originated in the former Yugoslavia and Turkey than for Europeans. Perceived wealth and country of origin matters for Swiss naturalization.

Keohane (2009) The Old IPE and the New

1960s-1970s -> explored political implications of economic interdependence New IPE -> Open economy politics (OEP) approach, more methodologically rigorous, common framework. Pays little attention to changes in world politics and global development. OEP ->individuals assumed to share nearly identical interests. Milner is an advocate. Keohane dislikes it. 5 BIG IPE questions Keohane identifies: 1) development 2) role of China internationally 3) extreme volatility in finance and energy markets 4) truly 'global' actors now important 5) e-tech now basis for global communications

Walter. 2009. Bargaining failures and civil war.

Bargaining in civil war faces the same sort of problems faced by bargaining between states. Rebels have especially strong incentives to misrepresent. Commitment problems are especially difficult since rebels must always weaken.

Powell. 1996. Stability and the distribution of power.

Bargaining model shows that the probability of conflict is smallest when the division of the status quo mirrors the distribution of power.

Ahmed (2012) The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid remittance and government survival

Models in this paper were stolen from the World Bank (plagiarism). Comapres foreign aid to natural resources (resource curse). Finds that authoritarian regimes can harness unearned foreign income such as aid and remittances to prolong their rule. These regimes use inflows of remittances to reduce welfare spending and fund patronage politics. Sarah Boromeo retorted with an article entitled "Aid is Not Oil"

Gartzke, Li & Boehmer. 2001. Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.

Capital interdependence offers nonviolent means to credibly inform opponents. Costly signaling helps resolve information problems.

Leeds, Mattes & Vogel. 2009.

Changes in social support for alliances leads to early abrogation in nondemocracies more than in democracies. Suggests that democracies have more reliable international commitments.

Cunningham (2016)

Civil war occurence requires having an incentive for violence and belief in its effectiveness. War will not occur if dissidents expect government will get external support. Motive for rebellion is necessary, but not sufficient. Builds heavily on Lake (2009). Uses US heirarchy as key IV. DVs are nonviolent campaigns and terrorist attacks. Logit, OLS, and negative binomial estimators. NATO states have lower repression.

Barber (1995) Jihad vs. McWorld

Clashing results of Liberalism are visible in today's world: Jihad (division into sects that are mutually exclusive) and McWorld (nondemocratic corporate globalization via open markets and communication technology. Proposes a "confederal" option: Withdrawl from the idea of the nation state to smaller communities with global market reach, i.e. a global market between local communities.

Mansfield and Mutz (2009) Support for Free Trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety

Little support for Heckscher-Ohlin or Ricardo-Viner factor models. Only exception is education, which proxies anxieties about involvement with outgroups, NOT skill level. Trade attitudes less about material self-interest, more about overall US economy and trade (sociotropic).

Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast (2003) Tragic Brilliance: Equilibrium hegemony and democratization in Mexico

RQ: How do unpopular one-party regimes attract votes? 'tragic' and 'brilliant': force citizens to accept corruption, poor policies, and crappy government services. Incentivize citizens to vote for them anyways, so as to avoid losing PRI benefits. Municipal governments depend on central government for money; PRI systematically punishes municipalities that elect other parties, thus PRI gets votes.

Narang (2015) Assisting Uncertainty: How humanitarian aid can inadvertently prolong civil war

RQ: How does aid impact coflict? A: Aid can increase each ombatanat's uncertainty about the other side's strength, prlonging civil war. Panel data on cross-national humanitarian aid from 1989-2008. Increased level of humanitarian aid lengthens civil wars, particularly with rebels on the outskirts of a state.

Wood and Sullivan (2015)

RQ: How does aid impact conflict? A: Humanitarian aid produces negative externalities. It encourages violence towards civilians by the state when it augments rebel capabilities; aid encourages state violence toward civilians when looting, etc. provides alternatives to revel authority.

Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz (2007) Institutions in international relations: Understanding the effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade

RQ: When and how do international institutions promote cooperation? A: Using dyadic data from 1946-2004 show that international trade agreements compliment each other. GATT/WTO boosted trade among signatories and in former colonies/territories. Also, international trade agreements help, not undercut, each other.

Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011)

RQ: Where, when, and how do efforts to improve material conditions (reduce grievances) in conflict zones enhance social and economic order? A: Use a new panel dataset on government service provision and conflict in Iraq. Triple interaction in statistical model and game theory to argue that improved service provision = reduced insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects. Critiques: Data is truncated. Only shows rebel acts. Substantive impacts are unaddressed until the conclusion, and only barely addressed there.

Gent (2017) Strange bedfellows: the strategic dynamics of major power military intervention

RQ: Why are joint interventions in civil war least likely when intervening states' preference are similar? A: When states agree, free riding becomes a problem. States are more likely to join intervention forces when their preferences diverge, so that they can exert inlfluence over policy outcomes of the intervention. Theoretical model that is then tested with a statistical model.

Zhukov (2015)

RQ: Why do combatants intentionally displace civilians? A: Rational response to information asymmetries. Control rather than earn support, reduce rebel activity. Uses game theory followed by an empirical [matched sampling] model with a spatial lag. Difference in difference, negative binomial.

Fizgerald, Lebland, and Teets (2014) Defying the Law of Gravity: The political economy of international migration

RQ: Why do immigrants choose one destination over another? Do differences in rights matter? Data on bilateral immigration flows from 178 origin countries, 1980-2006. Argue that citizenship regimes can attract or deter migrants (racial intolerance, reconnection with countrymen, and regime type matter, too). Gravity-based model of migration flows.

Joppke (1998) Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration

RQ: Why do liberal states accept unwanted immigration? Does accepting unwanted immigration equate to declining sovereignty? A: Not a decline in sovereignty; a self-limitation of it. Liberal states accept illegal immigration because they are liberal states.

Cohen (2013)

RQ: Why do some armed groups commit massive wartime rape, whereas others never do? A: Method of recruitment/social cohesion building. Cultivates cohesion of rebel group when pressganging and abduction are used to recruit. Also common with weak state capacity and the use of contraband to fund rebellion.

Abbott and Snidal (1998) Why states act through formal international organization

RQ: Why do states use IOs? A: Rational-institutionalist perspective, suggesting centralization leads to increasing efficiency, independence leads to increasing efficiency and legitimacy. IOs can function as community representatives and enforcers, help with developing common norms and practices. That states use IOs is evidence of their value.

Savun (2008) Information, Bias, and Mediation Success

RQ: Why does mediation sometimes product successful negotiated settlements between disputants of international conflict, and fail to achieve success other times? A: The degree of the mediator's bias can determine the success of mediated negotiation. Biased mediators are more likely to be successful than unbiased ones.

Wood (2003)

RQ: Does foreign military aid strengthen or weaken fragile states facing internal conflict? Colombian case. Foreign aid leads to an increased number of paramilitary attacks. Aid does not affect coca production. Mechanisms of resource sharing between military and paramilitary: 1) resource sharing, 2) complimentary tactics, 3) guerilla repression. OLS, difference-in-difference estimation.Multiple robustness checks. 21,000 war-related episodes over 950 municipalities, across the years 1988-2005.

Li and Resnick (2003) Reversal of fortunes: democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries

RQ: Does increasing democracy hurt or help FDI inflows to LDCs? A: BOTH. FDI is limited because MNC behavior is oligopolistic/monopolistic and constrains government behavior, BUT democracy promotes FDI because of better property rights protection. Tests across 53 LDCs, 1982-1995.

Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2008) The Curse of Aid

RQ: How are aid and political institutions related? A: Aid is often provided without consideration of regime type, and hence does not incentivize states to democratize. On the contrary, aid can damage democracy, and does so, likewise slowing development. Sample of 108 recipient countries, 1960-1999.

Bazzi (2012) Wealth heterogeneity and the income elasticity of migration: Theory and evidence from Indonesia

RQ: How do income shocks affect international migration flows from poor countries? A: Positive agricultural income shocks increase labor emigration flows, particularly in the villages with relatively more small landholders. However, in the most developed rural areas, persistent income shocks reduce emigration.

Saleyhan (2008) The externalities of civil strife: Refugees as a source of international conflict

RQ: How do refugee flows affect MIDs between host and receiving states? A: Using data from 1955-2000, argue that refugee-receiving states initiate MIDs to prevent further externalities, while refugee-sending states initiate MIDs in pursuit of dissidents.

Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, enforcement and international cooperation.

Model in which states bargain to determine which agreement to enforce. Long shadow of the future can thus create non-cooperative standoff. Relative gains really a commitment problem.

Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014) Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting

1st test of UN peacekeeping effectiveness in reducing battlefield violence in civil wars. More peacekeeping troops = reduced battlefield deaths. Police and observers don't affect battlefield deaths. UN peacekeeping missions can reduce violent conflict in 2 ways: 1) help reduce the security dilemma between belligerents using security guarantee, 2) increase the cost of conflict. Military most likely to fill this role.

Howard and Stark (2018)

3 waves of state behavior towards civil war negotiations: 1) Cold War (no negotiation), 2) End of Cold War to 9/11 (mediation), and 3) 9/11 to the present (US-imposed stabilization).

Hatton and Williamson (2017) Global Migration and the World Economy (Ch.s 10 and 11)

5 seismic changes (up from 4 in their 2013 piece) in immigration: 1) Europe's decline as a sending region, 2) Latin American becomes a sending region, 3) Increase in Asian and African migration, 4) OPEC states receiving East and Southeast Asians, 5) Eastern Europe becomes a sending region

Jensen (2003) Democratic governance and multinational corporations: Political regimes and inflows of foreign direct investment

79 states, 1980-1998 Democracy draws FDI (up to 70% more as % of GDP than authoritarian regimes).

Russett and Oneal (2001) Triangulating Peace

A combination of constructivist and rationalist mechanisms. Y(peace)=x(democracy)+x(economic interdependence)+x(IGO membership) Each x also produces the other two x's, as does peace. This leads to a virtuous cycle (via Kant's variables). Dyadic and systemic effects. Systemic evolution occurs. Virtuous cycles are the results of strategic choice. War is also possible with the reversal of the virtuous cycle - war is also an equilibrium.

Slantchev. 2003. The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States.

A diminished ability to hurt the enemy, not simply military victory, is a major reason to stop fighting.

Guisinger (2009) Determining trade policy: do voters hold politicians accountable?

A: Not really. This study questions voter-driven models. Those who are vulnerable to trade don't vote to preserve their job security. Trade policy salience is low overall AND for populations most likely to be affected by changes in trade policy. Uses data on senate incumbents with respect to CAFTA (2005).

Gartzke (1999) War is in the Error Term

Adds to and refines Fearon (1995), suggesting that commitment problems aren't very useful. They might explain onset, but not cessation of conflict. Preventive war is not a thing. If rationalism and Fearon are to be taken seriously, preventive war would always lead to all out WAR. The causal mechanisms that explain war are stochastic. Uncertainty matters and we can't eliminate it, we can only reduce it.

Dancygier (2010) Immigration and Conflict in Europe

Aims to explain "'why, where, and when immigration leads to conflict in the areas of immigrant settlement," explained by economic scarcity and immigrant political power. Argues that the elite story matters. Limited scope, which Dancygier admits.

Sabrosky. 1980. Interstate alliances: Their reliability and the expansion of war.

Alliances are only reliable about 27% of the time.

Bearce and Hallerberg (2011) Demcoracy and de facto exchange rate regimes

Argues democratic regimes should be associated with less de facto fixity because the median voter is likely to be a domestically-oriented producer with a monetary preference for domestic policy autonomy, requiring more a more flexible exchange rate regime. Post‐Bretton Woods era, defined by international capital mobility. Find democratic regimes are negatively associated with de facto fixity, that this negative relationship gets stronger as the median voter is more likely to be a domestically-oriented producer and as societal groups are more able to influence public policy.

Dustmann, Fattini, and Halls (2010) Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK

Argues fiscal impact of A8 immigrants is positive and A8 immigrants are likely to use less welfare than they are eligible for. Uses Labor Force survey data. N drop of 800,000 in models 4 and 5.

Haimueller and Hiscox (2010) Attitudes toward highly-skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment.

Argue against the idea of labor market competition as a driver of attitudes towards immigrants. Both high and low-skilled natives prefer high-skilled immigrants. Rich and poor natives oppose low-skilled immigration. Economic self-interest does a poor job of explaining voter attitudes towards immigration.

Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Saleyhan (2009)

Argue that microlevel factors deserve more attention, even when examining dyadic interactions. Find that stronger rebels increase the likelihood of all conflict outcomes. Conflicts that are 3+ years long have roughly equal outcomes. Those that are 50 days or less are most likely to result in a government victory. At the outset, strong rebel groups win ~50% of the time. Strong rebels are least likely to achieve a negotiated outcome. The presence of a political wing in a rebel group increases the likelihood of conflict cessation, but doesn't tell us anything about the type of ending that will occur. Argue that their study demonstrates the need to incorporate group-level data into civil war studies. Argue that geographic aggregation and ELF measures are problematic, repression plays a role worht examining, and survey data could be useful to civil war studies.

Saleyhan and Gleditsch (2006) Refugees and the Spread of War

Argue that population movements (specifically, refugee movements) are an important mechanism in cross-border conflict contagion.

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) Learning to Love Globalization: Education and individual attitudes toward international trade

Argue that the convergence around the Stolper-Samuelson theorem's conceptualization of attitudes toward trade as being conditioned by income effects is potentially incorrect. Education is not necessarily proxying skill level or income; it may be a proxy for exposure to more liberal economic ideas during university education. Use NES and ISSP data to confirm their theory, directly challenging existing findings in the literature (Maya and Rodrick, Scheve and Slaughter).

Duffy-Toft and Zhukov (2015)

Argue that ties to transnational and transregional organizations shift the effectiveness of coercion as a tactic the government can use. Paper asks if Islamist rebels behave differently on the battlefield than secular rebels. Tracks weekly patterns of violence across 7,584 towns and villages in 200 districts in 9 provinces of S. Russia between 2000-2012. 43,336 unique events between July 2000-March 2012. 9,405 rebel-initiated, 22,573 gov't initiated. All geocoded. Do see a difference in behavior between Islamist and secular rebels. Islamist rebels more likely to attack on religious holidays, and more closely reflect global trends in suicide terrorism in a way that potentially represents solidarity with outside groups. Islamist violence also becoming more common. Suggests Islamists are potentially more experienced fighters, face different counterinsurgerns, or are irrational. Governments should select tactics based on type of rebels they are engaging.

Altinkecic and Bearce (2014) Why There Should Be No Political Foreign Aid Curse

Argues aid revenue is "less fungible, more conditional, and less constant than state oil revenue". Aid not associated with repression or appeasement, rejection of "political resource curse" from foreign aid (i.e. rejection of Ahmed 2012).

Leblang (2017) Harnessing the Diaspora, Dual Citizenship, Migrant Return Remittances

Argues that dual citizenship rights help home countries leverage the financial and human resources of their diasporas, encouraging both remittances and return migration. Microlevel: Migrant surveys in 6 host countries. Macrolevel: Cross-national panel survey across 133 countries. Finds that migrants from homelands that extend dual citizenship rights are more likely to both remit and express a desire to return home. National policies of emigrant engagement enhance that relationship. The extension of political rights by the home country helps maintain connections and may provide better connections between host and home country governments.

Moses (2012) Emigration and political development: exploring the national and international nexus

Argues that if a significantly large portion of an area's population leaves, it forces political authorities to adjust in ways that facilitate political development. Critiques are plentiful. Very little to love in this article, apart from the novel use of data from microstates and inside China.

Lyall and Wilson III (2009)

Argues that the post WWI switch to "machine" war caused government forces to rely less on 'foraging' from local populations. This is a negative effect of technological innovation in warfare, as access to information is not as easy in insurgencies now; the advantage now goes to insurgents. Defines insurgency as different from civil war in that insurgency requries the use of guerilla tactics. Uses 1,000+ battle death indicator.

Smith (2000) The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts

Asks when member states adopt legalistic mechanisms for resolving disputes and enforcing compliance in regional trade accords. Proposes that trade dispute settlement design is based on the domestic political trade-off between treaty compliance and policy discretion. Focuses on the role of economic asymmetry, in interaction with the proposed depth of integration, as a robust predictor of dispute settlement design. Legalism improves compliance by increasing the costs of opportunism, but on its own is neither necessary nor sufficient for compliance. It does increase the reputational cost of noncompliance, however.

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences

Assesses determinants of individual trade policy preferences. Two main empirical results: A) Factor type dominates industry of employment in explaining support for trade barriers. Lower skill (lower levels of education) is strongly correlated with support for new trade barriers. B) Home ownership also matters for individuals' trade-policy preferences. Home ownership in countries with a manufacturing mix concentrated in comparative-disadvantage industries is strongly correlated with support for trade barriers. Different preferences lead to different trade-policy outcomes.

Abramitzky, Bowstan, and Eriksson (2013) Have the Poor Always Been Likely to Migrate? Evidence from Inheritance Practices During the Age of Migration

Assimilation patterns vary across sending countries and perisist in 2nd generation. Wages do not converge. Uses estimated wages, not actual. This is potentially problematic. Data is from the 1900, 1910, and 1920 US census and 16 sending states Argument is similar to Hatton and Williamson's.

Grossman and Helpman (1996) Electoral competition and special interest politics

Assume voters, candidates, and pressure groups exist along a 1D issue space. Each voter has a favored position with a concave utility function over policy; voters are risk averse. All actors are rational except the voters.

Hatton and Williamson (2004) International Migration in the Long-Run: Positive slection, negative selection, and policy

Assumes declining immigrant quality over time. Argues changing economic conditions, labor market quality drives changing voter attitudes. 4 seismic shifts in immigration. Degree of positive selection differs based on distance and costs. Argues size of immigration flow didn't matter, quality was responsible for provoking restrictions. US policy had int'l effects.

Muthoo (2000) A non-technical introduction to bargaining

Basics of bargaining theory. Muthoo is an economist. A bargaining situation is any exchange in which a pair of actors can engage in mutually beneficial trade have different interests. Muthoo's primary concern is with markets. Efficiency -> the possibility of not reaching an agreement or doing so after a cost delay Distribution -> how gains are divided between players Information problems are crucial, and suggested as a cause of war. Commitment problems also receive discussion as important, and potential for partial commitment is described. Outside options increase an actor's bargaining power. The absence of information leads to inefficient bargaining outcomes.

Singer (2010) Migrant remittances and exchange rate regimes in the developing world

Because remittances are stable and move countercylically to the recipient country's economy, they mitigate the costs of foregone domestic monetary policy autonomy and serve as a risk-sharing mechanism for developing countries. Examine 74 states from 1982-2006, show that remittances increase the likelihood that policymakers will adopt fixed exchange rate regimes.

Morgenthau. 1952.

Because some nations seek to change the status quo, other nations will seek to preserve it. Through balance of power. Methods: divide and rule, compensations, armaments (or proportionate disarmament) and alliances.

Allee and Peinhardt (2014) Evaluating three explanations for the design of bilateral investment treaties

Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) vary, particularly regarding dispute settlement provisions. 3 rationalist explanations for this variation: credible commitment, state power, and rational design. State power is the winning explanation. Rejects "hands tying", rational design. Powerful/captial-endowed states' preferences for stronger treaties wins out.

Stein. 1982. Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world.

Collective action problems from dilemmas of common interests. Coordination problems from dilemmas of common aversions. Collaboration requires solving the collective action problem—more formalized, concerned about cheating. Coordination is self-enforcing.

Olson. 1965. Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.

Collective action problem—temptation to free ride, especially in large groups where one's cooperation makes little difference and enforcement is problematic. May be overcome— - More powerful contribute more. - Leaders benefit from private goods. - Institutional solutions. - Ideology, communal experience of collective action.

Fearon (2013) Obstacles to ending Syria's civil war

Commitment problems drive rebels to make outright control their goal. Power-sharing agreements are difficult to create because of this, too. Power-sharing is rarely attempted and often breaks down when it is.

Walter. 1997. The critical barrier to civil war settlement.

Commitment problems make resolving civil wars difficult. External security guarantees make settlements much more likely. Y(civil war settlement)=x(credible commitment)+x(inclusive institutions)+x(international intervention) Civil war settlement is prevented by credible commitment problems. Third party involvement is NECESSARY. The difference between civil war and interstate war is that losers can't disarm after a peace agreement without fear of reprisal. For peace to occur, a third party needs to provide short-term security guarantees. For peace to last, inclusive institutions that prevent abuse of minorities are required. Third party should have self-interest in peace, be militarily strong and willing to step in, and send costly signals of resolve. Ethnicity, issue indivisibility, mediation, and information do NOT matter in civil war settlement.

Rogowski (1987) Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade

Compare with Hiscox 2001. What shapes institutions? A: Changes in exposure to trade affect domestic political cleavages. thus, structurally-induced factors (war, other country's tarriffs, etc.) can change exposure to trade AND affect domestic political cleavages. 3 groups: Landowners, labor, and capital. Relies too heavily on Stolper-Samuelson (perfect factor mobility)

Kelley. 2007. Who keeps international commitments and why?

Comparison of states which signed (or not) nonsurrender agreements with the USA. State preferences are partly normative. International commitments also constrain states, not just screen them.

Fearon & Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war.

Conditions that favor insurgency are better predictors of civil war than are indicators of ethnic and religious diversity or measures of grievances. Increase in civil wars is due to protracted conflicts that began in the 1950s and 1960s, not new conflicts. Not a sudden, Cold War related phenomenon, not due to ethnicity or religion, either. Poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations are tied to civil war.

Martin (1992) Interests, power, and multilateralism

Considers games that lead to international cooperation via constraints on actors. Defines multilateralism as indivisibility, nondiscrimination, and diffuse reciprocity. Erego, an attack on one is an attack on all, all parties are treated similarly, and states do not engage in quid pro quo exchanges - they look toward the future. 4 types of games examined by Martin: collaboration (Prisoner's Dilemma), coordination (Battle of the Sexes), suasion (asymmetric interests, and assurance (preferred outcome is mutual cooperation). Post-WWII multilateralism allowed for low transaction costs, small states have some say, and the international system has greater stability. Bipolarity makes threat to exit from multilateral organizations less credible, and encourages multilateralism. 2 changes increase temptation to defect from multilateral organizations: decreased shadow of the future and a decreased ability to gather information about other states' behavior.

Bearce and Bondanella (2007) International Organizations, Socialization, and Member-state Interest Convergence

Constructivism tested (institutional socialization). The authors find support, BUT IGOs must be structured to promote "interest convergence". Greater power disparity decreases the institutional socialization effect. RQ: What are the primary causal mechanisms through which IGOs are able to influence nation-state behavior in what can still be termed an "anarchic" system? "State interests become an intervening variable in this rationalist theory between international institutions and state behavior."

Leeds, Long & McLoughlin. 2000. Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises.

Contra Sabrosky 1980, when considering the specific treaty obligations, alliances are reliable 75% of the time.

Schultz (1999) Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?

Contrasts two explanations for the democratic peace: institutional (leaders held accountable) and informational (transparent policymaking process provides a more credible threat, so democracies attempt to limit conflict). Schultz favors the informational explanation, whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1999) prefers the institutional one. Critique: The analysis faces severe selection problems. The two perspectives could lead to the same result. Democracies may only pick fights they can win.

Kalyvas (2012)

Control-collaboration model of civil war. Components: Centrality of relations between armed groups and civilians. Armed groups maximize support from population and minimize support for rival groups from the same population (minimize defection). Violence is an interaction between armed actors and the civilian population characterized by asymmetric information. Coercion must be highly targeted in order to be effective. Indiscriminate violence is not effective; it is counterproductive. Uses a spatial model with 5 zones, similar to Kalyvas 2006. Glosses over potentially damning flaws in the model as "extending and refining" it. Emphasizes the need to synthesize existing knolwedge and scale up by generating testable implications from the microlevel that can be tested at meso- and macrolevels.

Downs, Rocke & Barsoom. 1996. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?

Findings of cooperation are contaminated by endogeneity and selection problems. Managerial school discourages sanctioning. Coordination games are self-enforcing. Deep cooperation seems rare. Connection between enforcement and compliance.

Mearsheimer. 1994. The False Promise of International Institutions.

Criticizes three varieties of institutionalist theories. Liberal institutionalism ignores relative gains, difficult to divide economic and security concerns, lack of empirical support. Collective security cannot explain how states overcome fears of other states, has demanding requirements, little empirical support. Critical theory (ideological not structural) basically wishful thinking, long continuity of realist behavior. War is inevitable and sometimes necessary. Argues that institutions have little effect on the behavior of states, even in the post Cold War period. States that the burden of proof is on political scietnists to show that IOs have an impact (today, the field largely agrees that they DO.)

Abramitzky, Bowstan, and Eriksson (2012) A Nation of Immigrants: Assimilation and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration

Data on 50,000 Norwegian men. Wealth and migration, 1850-1913. Wealth discouraged migration. Male primogeniture incentivizes 2nd son to migrate.

Milner. 1997. Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations.

Domestic politics make international cooperation more difficult. - Structure of domestic preferences (divided government). - Nature of domestic political institutions (ratification). - Distribution of information (endorsers can improve chances for cooperation). Interest groups may be both pressure groups and information providers. Unitary states do not exist, no single set of national policy preferences.

Gibler. 2006. Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict.

Democracy and peace are both symptoms—not causes—of the removal of territorial issues between neighbors. In this sense the "empirical law" of democratic peace may in fact be spurious.

Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF programs and government spending

IMF programs reduce social spending, and this impact is greater in democracies. Differences between regimt types in spending priorities vanish in the presence of IMG programs. Democracies decrease spending on programs associated with the least-organized interests. Cross-national, time-series data from 1980-2000 Heckman selection model

Balcells and Justino (2014)

Describe the importance of linking micro and macrolevel levels of analysis in civil war research. Macrolevel=state Mesolevel=community/social group/organization Microlevel=individual/household Problem with existing microlevel research is that the sample of countries is limited. Some are exhaustively studied, while others are untouched. We are left with a partial aggregations of knowledge that cannot be aggregated or comparatively studied. BUT local social, economic, and political dynamics may have important consequences for how a war and peace negotiations progress at the state level. We NEED theoretical links between levels. Network analysis and multilevel modeling may be able to make strong contributions to our identification of specific, relevant mechanisms and how they affect actors at multiple levels of modeling. Case studies may also be useful, as may spatial analysis. Prescribe that macrolevel research should pay attention to microlevel factors, implications, and tests. Microlevel research should look into its wider implications. There is a need to reconcile the insights and methods of these approaches.

Lake (2009) Open Economy Politics: A critical review

Describes Open Economy Politics (OEP) as a unique paradigm for the study of IPE. Contends it is broader and more flexible than often given credit for. Also seeks to extend and enlarge the paradigm. Lake argues that the focus on actor's interests is what makes OEP unique. He sees interests as the building blocks of all politics, and argues that how OEP's focus on the economic theories of the distributional implications of exchange, and predicts the interests of specific factors or sectors based on those economic theories. States that OEP is able to be applied to a wide variety of policies, including environmental and conflict-related policies, as well as trade, finance, and monetary policy. Notes that OEP's weakness is taking the global economy as exogenous, but the economy is the result of past state behavior. OEP has yet to deal with the endogenous nature of interests.

Waltz. 1979. Theory of International Politics.

Difference between domestic and international politics lies in their structure—self-help characterizes international politics. The distribution of capabilities is the key independent variable for important international outcomes like war.

Sambanis (2001) Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Wars Have the Same Causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry

Distinguishes between identity (ethnic/religious) and nonidentity civil wars. Finds that ethnic conflict is more common in presence of political greivances and less likely to occur in democracies. Finds that ethnic heterogeneity is positively and significantly correlated with the onset of ethnic conflict. "Neighborhood" conflicts play a stronger role in ethnci vs. nonethnic conflicts.

Matanock (2012)

Do post-conflict elections help create peace or stir conflict? Why do groups participate in elections? Looks at 672 militant groups in 97 states, 1980-2010. Sees war as commitment and information problem. Elections with participation by government and challengers do see commitment by parties. Critique: The role of pro-insurgent parties is poorly explored.

DeMeritt (2015)

Does a military intervention affect civilian death tolls? Uses principal-agent framework. 2SLS. Finds support for the ideas that military intervention against the state decreases observed civilian death tolls and decreases the positive relationship between government monitoring ability and the expected civilian death toll; intervention for the state increases civilian death tolls.

Goldsmith (2001) Foreign aid and statehood in Africa

Does foreign aid backfire in Africa? Tests the perversity hypothesis. A: Not always. Foreign aid appears to have a minor, positive impact on African states ability to govern well.

Beardsley (2008) Agreement without Peace? International mediation and time inconsistency problems

Dyadic data spanniong 1918-2001. Event history models (nonproprtional hazard rates and self-selection into mediation). Third party intermediares create artificial incentives that shape short-term arrangements that are not viable without third-party presence. Mediation is positively associated with short‐term peace agreements but not with the prevention of recurrence.

Cunningham. 2006. Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars.

External interventions with independent agendas make civil wars longer.

Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)

Examine the role of the international system in the study of civil wars. Cold War influenced the choice of tactics, encouraging irregular warfare (which dropped off after Cold War ended). Argue that the Cold War raised the military capacity of states and rebels worldwide. 4 contributions: 1) bring int'l system back into the study of internal conflict 2) identify technology as key source of heterogeneity in civil wars 3) suggest refocusing analysis of civil war on interaction of rebel and state strategies 4) confirm importance of theoretical and empirical disaggregation to uncovering mechanisms and clarifying causality. Argue that the rise of irregular warfare increased the likelihood of a draw or a rebel victory as the outcome of civil war. Article attempts to fill micro-macrolevel research gap without abandoning the international system's role. Stresses need for multilevel research.

Gent and Shannon (2010) The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and Adjudication: Getting into a bind

Examine the successful resolution of territorial disputes. Find that binding, legalistic conflict management techniques (arbitration and adjudication) are 2-4x more successful that nonbinding mediation and bilateral negotiations. Characteristics of 3rd parties aren't important; even bias, regime type, or major power status.

Milner (1991) The Assumptions of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A critique

Examines 'anarchy' in the IR literature. As a result, questions the validity and utility of the dichotomy between domestic and international politics. Suggests combining anarchy and interdependence. Suggests government is based on institutions, laws, practices, and norms and that IOs are have authority only so far as they are viewed as legitimate. Argues that the interdependence of states is important and lost if too much focus is placed on anarchy; the concept of anarchy itself is ambiguous.

Tezcur (2016)

Examines Turkish conflict with Kurds. Decision to rebel is political, social, and economic. Attempts to explain durability of insurgencies with limited funds, as well as recruitment of educated fighters. Original dataset with information on 8,266 combatants ad 68 in-depth interviews. Finds recruitment higher in areas with stronger insurgent presence. Radicalization via exposure to human rights abuses, family ties, and patterns, and the perception of nonviolence as ineffective. Argues that the nature of recruitment is not static and varies based on socioeconomic and political contexts. There is a strong network effect in recruitment. Greivances alone are not sufficient to motivate rebellion without added benefits to joining. Cultural ties and exposure to state violence increase the likelihood of joining rebellion.

Mueller (2000) The Banality of Ethnic War

Examines the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, arguing that the idea of 'ethnic war' is misguided. Argues that small groups of armed thugs drive ethnic war. Proposes 4 stages in "ethnic war": takeover, carnival, revenge, and occupation and desertion Ethnicity is an ordering device that makes it easier to mobilize participants in conflict. International policing could be effective. Genocide can happen anywhere, but was not inevitable.

Wood (2008)

Examines the social processes of war that occur regardless of conventional v. uncoventional battle tactics. Uses social network analysis at the local level in Peru, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone. Extends Lubkemann 2007, 2008. 1) Mobilization varies and uses local social networks. 2) Victims of indiscriminate and sexual violence often retreat from social contact, although some will join rebel groups. 3) Military socialization effects not well documented. 4) Local identity polarizes viz-a-viz conflict. 5) Local authority usually militarizes. 6) Gender roles vary widely across contexts, but women often gain more authority as a result of conflict, and the number of female-headed households increases. 7) The local political economy shfits; insurgent control can lead to strengthening and emergence of local markets, and introduce new tactics and agricultural practices. These changes may be temporary, reverting when war ends, but potentially with lasting impacts.

Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) Civil war settlements and the implementation of military power-sharing arrangements

Examining 16 peace agreements bw 1980-1996 with provisions for military power-sharing or distribution of military power between former combatants. Finds that power-sharing and military power distribution improves prospects for enduring peace because credible commitment problem is resolved during implementation of such agreements. Commitment to conciliation occurs and is apparent.

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) Why Civil Resistance Works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict

Examining campaigns from 1900-2006, nonviolent and violent, find that nonviolent campaigns are successful 53% whereas violent camapigns only succeed 26% of the time. Nonviolence encourages broad-based participation, enhances legitimacy, and makes it harder for government to justify responding with violence. Nonviolence is viewed as less extreme by the public. Nonviolent resistance can pose effective resistance to democratic and nondemocratic regimes, at times more effectively than violent resistance. Some issues with coding, and the case studies feel cut short.

Ruhs (2013) The Price of Rights

Excludable vs. rivalrous "public benefits" (not to be confused with public goods). Approaches immigration from a benevolent planner perspective (NOT valid). Assumes comprehensive rights package, but rights can be divided.

Hafner-Burton. 2013. Making Human Rights a Reality.

Expanding treaty signatories will not help worst abusers and will undermine treaty legitimacy. Steward states need to deploy their power to advance human rights, but strategically.

Gelbach (2006) A Formal Model of Exit and Voice

Expands and refines Hirschman's (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. The model treats exit as a preventable, costly decision. Voice is similarly costly, but provides a share of the surplus from avoiding exit. Exit can increase the effectiveness of voice by increasing individuals' bargaining power. When attempting to establish voice, exit can reduce voice by increasing the relative attractiveness of silence. When the exit of individuals is more costly to the leadership, voice may increase, as individuals understand that their exit option has increased their bargaining power potential. Loyalty may be sufficient to encourage voice. Whether loyalty results in greater welfare for an organization's members depends on its nature. When loyalty results in costlier exit, increased loyalty reduces welfare, as the leadership will be forced to concede less. In contrast, when loyalty is associated with less costly exercise of voice, then loyal members may be better off. Leaders typically are incentivized to supress voice.

Berman et al (2011)

Find that unemployment has a negative impact on the number of insurgent attacks that kill civilians. Examines unemployment and insurgency in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines.

Neuman (1993) The Lost Century of American Immigration Law

Free movement of immigrants in early America is a myth. Restrictions existed, but enforcement was difficult and international cooperation was limited. Subnational policy affected national and international policy. ~1/2 of migrants went back to Europe.

Kydd (2003) Which Side are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation

Game theoretic model that argues biased mediators are more effective. Shows that the effect of mediation, if the model is true, is a reduction in conflict and a greater likelihood of concessions. Derives two testable hypotheses: 1) Hypothesis 1: Mediators who attempt to persuade one side to make a concession because the other side has high resolve must be biased in favor of the side they are communicating with in order to be successful. 2) Hypothesis 2: Within the sample of successful mediation efforts, in the cases in which the mediator is biased toward one of the parties, that party will make a larger concessions in the negotiation in comparison with what the average party does in cases in which the mediator is unbiased. Asserts only biased mediators will be trusted, as unbiased mediators cannot be trusted to send messages that might increase the chance of conflict.

Gusinger and Singer (2010) Exchange rate proclamations and inflation-fighting credibility

Governments choose economic policies that often run counter to their public commitments, but these commitments are NOT meaningless. They may signal policy intentions. We argue that the official exchange rate regime is one of the most important signals of government's economic policy preferences. When a government makes a de jure public commitment to a fixed exchange rate, it sends a signal to domestic and international markets of its strict monetary-policy priorities. A government that proclaims a floating exchange rate signals a desire to retain discretion over monetary policy, even if it has implemented a defacto fixed rate. 110 developed and developing countries from 1974 to 2004. Fixed-effects econometric models. Find that governments that adopt defacto fixed exchange rates will experience less inflation when they back up their actions with official declarations; Also find that governments that abide by their commitments - as demonstrated by a history of following through on their public declarations of a fixed exchange rate regime - will establish greater inflation-fighting credibility. In developing economies, democratic institutions enhance this credibility.

Hirschman (1978) Exit, Voice, and the State

Governments need funds to survive. Mobile capital wants property rights. This leads to the induction of democratization. Increasing capital mobility leads to increasing development.

Simmons. 2009. Mobilizing for human rights.

Governments ratify treaties because they intend to comply. Some governments have incentives to ratify strategically—short time horizons or neighborhood pressure. But external enforcement of compliance faces collective action problems. Can increase chance of successful domestic mobilization.

Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch. 2014. Square pegs in round holes: Inequalities, grievances, and civil war.

Grievances matter but not in simple, individualistic ways. Intergroup inequalities matter more for civil war risk than vertical disparities.

Keohane. 1983. The Demand for International Regimes.

Hegemonic stability theory only focuses on the supply of regimes—needs to consider the demand. 1. Regimes with highly-regularized procedures and rules will provide more information, and so should be in greater demand. 2. Regimes that develop norms internalized by participants will be in higher demand. 3. Regimes accompanied by open governmental arrangements and extensive intergovernmental relations will be in greater demand. It is not clear that hegemony is a necessary condition for stable international regimes. Draws on microeconomics, uses a supply-demand framework in which the demanders and suppliers can be the same actors. Introduces the idea of "market failure" to describe state choices constrained by internal and external factors. Three problems lead to IOs: 1) asymmetric information 2) moral hazard 3) deception and irresponsibility. Repeated interactions can produce rational cooperation. Proposes that increased issue density should increase the demand for IOs and international regimes.

Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch. 2011. Horizontal inequalities and ethnonationalist civil war: A global comparison.

Horizontal inequalities between politically relevant ethnic groups can promote ethnonationalist conflict. In highly unequal societies, both rich and poor groups fight more often than those groups whose wealth lies closer to the country average. [Criticism—selection bias using the MAR—only politically active minorities]

Card (2007) How Immigrants Affect US Cities

How do immigrants affect the economies of US cities? A: Most cities with higher rates of immigration experience overall population growth and a rising share of low-skilled workers. Positive impact on native wages. Increasing number of immigrants increases rent, but this effect is roughly constant and the same as the impact on wages, so the average ratio of rent to income holds relatively constant. Neighborhood and school externalities may be larger, and may explain native reactions to immigration.

Rudra (2002) Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-developed Countries

How does globalization affect the welfare state? Argues that we DO see convergence in welfare state policy. Collective action problems of labor in LDCs prevent labor in LDCs from benefiting from globalization. The welfare state is in decline in LDCs as a result of globalization.

Kuperman (2008) The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian intervention and the "responsibility to protect" lead substate actors to rebel because they expect government retaliation will result in international intervention, thus enabling rebel success. States retaliate with genocidal violence before any decisive intervention to prevent genocide can occur. Intervention helps some rebellions succeed, encouraging additional substate groups to rebel. Examines two cases: Bosnia and Kosovo. Argues that 1) intervening everywhere is impractical, 2) the ICC is not a great solution 3) inhibiting rebellion is likely impossible due to small arms proliferation. Proposes 1) no intervention on side of rebels unless the state's retaliation has been grossly disproportionate 2) proposes states should be encouraged to address legitimate grievances from nonviolent groups 3) no coercion of regime change should be made without major military intervention to assure peaceful transition and 4) delivery of humanitarian assistance and aid should be done in a way that minimizes benefits to rebels.

Tomas, Sommers, and Clemens (2009) Migrants Count: Five steps toward better migration data

Impacts of immigration on development are unclear. We need to improve basic migration data. Statistics matter. Collect better data. Compile and release existing data, improve number of locations, and provide data access.

Powell. 2006. War as a commitment problem.

Indivisibility is really a commitment problem. Costly fighting implies a bargaining range always exists. Commitment problems when players have incentives to renege on commitments. A rapid and large shift in power creates incentives on formerly weak player to renege on commitment. Bargaining over first-strike advantages and sources of military power creates commitment problems. Rapid shifts in distribution of domestic power may also undermine commitments.

Kalyvas (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War

Indiscriminate violence in civil war is counterproductive. Political actors move gradually from indiscriminate violence to selective violence. Selective violence requires more information, and Kalyvas questions if truly selective violence is possible. Political economy of violence/political economy of the joint production of violence leads to selective violence. "Selective" violence often targets the innocent, but is not counterproductive (no backlash). Three distinct, but related, processes determine the use of violence: 1) individual calculus of defections, 2) individual calculus of denunications, 3) organizational calculus of violence. 5 zones of control: 1) total incumbent control, 2) primarily incumbent control, 3) equal control by both sides, 4) primarily insurgent control, 5) total insurgent control 5 zones of violence: ) indiscriminate by rival, 2) selective with many defectios and denunciations, 3) much defection, 4) selective with lots of defections and denunciations, and 5) indisciminate by rival Political actors will not use violence where they need it most; it is there that denouncers are most exposed to retaliation. In the absence of information to make violence selective, violence is unlikely.

Axelrod (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation

Institutionalism, but not really an IR book. Axelrod uses a Prisoner's Dilemma tournament, which while not really anarchic in nature, allows the exploration of the nonenforcability of agreements. This roughly approximates anarchy in the international system. Shows that the shadow of the future affects the probability of competition. TIT FOR TAT can only tie. It is a nice, nonexploitable, and forgiving strategy. Prisoner's Dilemma is a Realist model of the interactions between 2 states. Axelrod shows us that defection may happen in single interaction, but cooperation is likely in iterated games (more an institutionalist perspective).

Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions.

Institutions = explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, proscribe or authorize behavior. Dimensions: membership rules, issue scope, centralization (of tasks), rules for controlling the institution (how decisions are made and what voting rules are), flexibility (of arrangements). Independent variables: distribution problems (equity), enforcement problems (efficiency), number of actors and asymmetries among them (affects who wins), uncertainty about behavior, uncertainty about the state of the world, uncertainty about other states' preferences. Conjectures about how these variables influence institutional design. Uncertainty matters.

Garrett and Lange (1991) Political Responses to Interdependence: What's 'Left' for the Left?

International constraints encourage convergence of fiscal and monetary policy, but this convergence does not extend to other areas of economic policy. Partisan supply-side interests can still drive other facets of economic policy.

Gourevitch. 1996. Squaring the circle: The domestic sources of international cooperation.

International cooperation occurs when the domestic politics of each country lead towards convergence of preferences and commitments to regimes. Domestic politics led to the breaking of commitments to the gold standard in the interwar years.

DeMeritt. 2015. Delegating death.

Intervention supporting the government decreases the likelihood that a government orders civilians killed. Intervention against the government leads to a decrease in death tolls when killing occurs.

Kuran (1989)

Most major revolutions are not anticipated. Kuran wants to explain two things: Why revolutions tend to be spearheaded by leaders and why revolutionary regimes undertake campaigns of repression and indoctrination. Assumes competition in a two-party sphere, following Tullock's 1974 theory of revolution. Argues that relaxing government repression/pressure leads to revolution. The price of information matters. Those who hold revolutions believe revolutions in response to theirs are possible, hence the use of repression and indoctrination. Critique: Assumes that the incumbent leader's behavior is known to the public and there is a binary choice to rebel or not.

Mincer (1978) Family Migration Decisions

Most migration families include tied women. This can affect familial stability. The husband has higher market earning power, migration payoff is therefore lower for the wife. The effects of marriage on migration are unclear; may drop migration propensitites by 20% (33% for working women). Husband and wife face potential breakup over migration when both are wage earners and stability is already uncertain. Migration incentives increase martial instability, marital instability increases the likelihood of migration.

Feliciano (2005) Educational selectivity in US immigration: How do immigrants compare to those left behind?

Motivation for migration: relative deprivation. Research shows positive and negative selection of immigrants. Which is it? A: strong positive slection. Has it changed over time? Looks at 32 immigrant groups in US. Problem with variables in the model. The author is only using significant predictors, not all the theoretically relevant ones.

Barbieri. 1996. Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?

Mutually interdependent trading partners more likely to promote peace. But at high levels of interdependence, greater likelihood of conflict. [Did not control for relative power of dyads.]

Weil (2001) Access to citizenship: a comparison of twenty-five nationality laws

Nationality law straddles domestic and international law. Birthplace -> jus soli Bloodline -> jus sanguinis What explains convergence of nationality laws? jus soli is only possible with state borders that include most nationals, immigrants with right of permanent settlement, and consolidation of demcoratic values. Convergence is post-WWII. All stable democratic nation states with immigrants converge toward jus soli.

Hartzell (1999) Expalining the stability of negotiated settlements of intrastate wars

Negotited settlements that provide institutional guarantees for security threats actors face are more likely to prove stable. Examines settlements 1945-1997. Ethnic conflict, superpower conflict, and 3rd party guarantors were not found to be influential. Very small N (23)

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?

Neither SALT nor ABM changed international behavior. This is a powerful, Realist critique of institutionalism, even though it is not methodsy. The argument is similar to Mearsheimer's. Argue that we don't see deep international agreements or observe the unsigned. Further argue that most international agreements will be shallow.

Grieco. 1988. Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism.

Neoliberals argue that states are concerned with absolute gains, so see cheating as major obstacle. But anarchy constrains states—so that states must be concerned about relative gains. Neoliberalism is too optimistic.

Waltz (1988) The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory

Neorealism sees power as a means to an end, not an end unto itself (which would be Realism). Argues that we need to include structure if we want to understand state behavior (the international system matters). States desire survival, are unitary actors, and exist in an anarchic system. A multipolar world is more dangerous than a bipolar one.

Keck & Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond borders.

Networks promoting norm change Both rationalist and constructivist. Transnational advocacy network—voluntary, reciprocal, horizontal organization, including actors from civil society, governments and intergovernmental organizations. Boomerang pattern. Persuasion/socialization tactics—information, symbolic, leverage and accountability politics. Issue framing, but rarely involve mass mobilization. Issues of right and wrong with short causal chains = bodily harm or legal equality of opportunity. Tension between sovereignty and human rights. Realists / idealists cannot explain this sort of change well.

Clark and Hallerberg (2000) Mobile capital, domestic institutions, and electorally-induced monetary and fiscal policy

Never believed in the convergence/divergence debate, have a hidden hypothesis: Central Bank Independence doesn't matter. Find that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and CBI is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when exchange rate is fixed.

Moravcsik. 2000. The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe.

New democracies are the ones most dedicated to human rights treaties. Want to lock in gains at home. Little support for realist theory in promoting human rights.

Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A reinterpretation

Novel historical classification of exchange rate regimes. Argue that breakup of Bretton Woods didn't have as much effect as is often claimed. Bretton Woods: pegs were common. De facto floating 1970-2001. Crawling peg most common. Introduce concept of freely falling exchange rates (with inflation rates >40%/annum). Monthly dataset, 153 countries, 1946-2001. De jure and de facto exchange rates (dual rates and parallel markets included and important).

Zavodny (1997) Welfare and the Location Choices of New Immigrants

RQ: Do migrants move to places where welfare payments are higher? A: Not likely. It might look like that if we don't account for time, but when we account for time, we find that they settle in existing immigrant communities. Examines immigration patterns of immigrants from 18 countries who arrived between 1982-1992.

Broz (2002) Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes

Open political systems (i.e., transparent democracies) make it costly for central bank to conceal or misrepresent. Thus, transparency of monetary policy and political system are substitutes. Neither central bank independence nor political transparency are associated with lower inflation. Opaque institutions (i.e., autocracies) are more likely to peg currency exchange rates.

Bearce (2003) Societal preferences, partisan agents, and monetary policy outcomes

RQ: Do societal preferences matter with regard to national economic policy? A: Political party as agent argument. Political parties function as agents for different societal principles. Rightist parties represented internationally oriented business groupswith preferences for monetary convergence, whereas leftist parties prefer monetary autonomy and capital mobility. The partisan state is not working on behalf of any "national interest". Suggests sectoral and factoral moetary policy preferences DO matter for monetary and exchange rate outcomes.

Fortna. 2004. Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war.

Peacekeeping after civil wars does make an important contribution to peace stability.

Kadera (2013) The Social Underpinnings of Women's Worth in the Study of World Politics: Culture leader emergence and coauthorship

Political science holds women's research in low esteem. Increasing women's visibility and participation is a win-win for females and males, and the profession overall.

Rose (2004) Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?

Politics is largely missing from this article; Rose is an economist. Finds that there is little support for the idea that the WTO or its predecessors increased trade. Models are heavy on the methods, but missing basic political controls such as regime type.

Moravcsik (1997) Taking Preferences Seriously: a liberal theory of international politics

Poses Liberalism as a paradigmatic alternative to Realism and Institutionalism. Argues Liberalism focuses on the state-society relationship. 3 Assumptions of Liberalism, as defined by Moravcsik: 1) primacy of societal actors 2) representation and state preferences 3) interdependence and the international system (i.e. configuration of state's preferences determines their behavior) 3 Liberalisms: 1) ideational: compatability of social preferences across fundamental collective goods 2) republican: (nature of domestic representation and incentives for rent-seeking behavior 3) commercial: incentives for trade and cross-border economic interactions drive state behavior

Hartzell & Hodie. 2003. Institutionalizing peace: Power sharing and post-civil war conflict management.

Power sharing along more dimensions increases peace durability.

Levy. 1987. Declining power and the preventive motivation for war.

Preventive motivation for war arises from leaders' perceptions of relative decline and fears over the consequences of that decline. Strength of motivation depends on rate of military decline, margin of future inferiority, probability of future war, probability of victorious war now with acceptable costs, risk orientation of leaders, and influence of military in the domestic political process.

Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006) Competing for capital: The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960-2000

Proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) can be explained via competition between potential host countries. Use network measures of economic competition. Diffusion of BITs tied to competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture FDI.

Kertzer (2017)

Proposes a two-stage research design for unobservable phenomena. Argues that mesolevel theories require microfoundations. 3 key claims: 1) increasing interest in microfoundations of IR over the past 20 years (definition of microfoundations is unclear) 2) not all IR theories need to be tested at microlevel, BUT many already rest on lower-level mechanisms that they fail to test 3) microlevel testing can serve as part of a two stage design for the study of unobservable phenomena Example of unobservable phenomenon that could be tested is "resolve"; a latent variable we cannot observe, but the implications of which we want to test. Proposed answer: use microfoundational research to 1) articulate the logic or establish empirical regularities, and 2) rely on multiple indicators in testing to lend a richer understanding of the microfoundations of the construct.

Russett, Oneal, and Davis (2003) The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod

RQ: Does IGO membership contribute to peace? A: Yes. Joint IGO membership decreases the likelihood of conflict in a dyad; more IGO memberships a state has, the lower its likelihood is of engaging in conflict. States not involved in active conflict are more likely to join IGOs, too. Thus, peace->IGO membership-> peace. An increase in trade or GDP ratio of a dyad increases peace, too. If both states are democracies, the likelihood of conflict decreases.

Lyall (2010) Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents: Evidence from the Second Chechen War

RQ: Does ethnicity matter for explaining violence in civil war? Study of Chechnya. Prior experience as an insurgent and being a coethnic with the ability to issue credible threats for noncooperation provide a "coethnicity advantage". Critique: ethnicity here is very broad. Neighbors or locals might be more appropriate.

Staniland (2012)

Proposes conceptual typology of political orders in civil war. Civil war occurs within a broader set of processes that combine politics and violence. There is no single pathway to stabilization. Micro and macrolevel work is impressive, but we need to describe the nature of authority, politics, and order that emerge in civil wars. Conceptual stretching is rife at the mesolevel. Argues for the examination of state-insurgent cooperation as active, passive, or nonexistant and distribution of control as segmented or fragmented. When the distribution of control is segemented, we should see shared sovereignty under active cooperation, spheres of influence under passive cooperation, and clashing monopolies under nonexistant cooperation. When distribution of control is fragmented, active cooperation should be characterized by collusion, passive by tacit coexistence, and nonexistant by guerilla disorder. Argues there are methodological benefits to studying wartime political orders: 1) allows examination of multiple relationships within broader conflict (not just dyadic), 2) allows measure of dynamics of conflict at any given point in time, 3) allows spatial disaggregation of conflict without sacrificing the ability to talk about political authority, 4) the typology can be scaled and orders can be nested

Zinnes (1980) Three puzzles in search of a researcher

Puzzles provide an easy path to theory development. Zinnes conceptualizes puzzles as conflicting sets of evidence, and proposes three: 1) dyadic interactions, 2) relationship bw national attributes and war, 3) systemic structure and war. Puzzles require information, and arise because things don't work as expected, or because the evidence we have conflicts. No guarantee that puzzles will lead to theory, but they do provide a good start.

Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2015)

RQ: Are house demolitions effective against suicide terrorism? A: Punitive demolitions in Israel-Palestine dispute cause an immediate, significant decrease in the number of suicide attacks. Curfews and precautionary demolitions significantly increase the number of attacks. Critique: Lag time is potentially too short (1 month). It may take longer for retaliatory attacks to be planned, so can we really attribute these attacks to retaliation for demolitions?

Condra and Shapiro (2012)

RQ: Can civilians reward and punish armed actors in civil wars for their behavior? Study of geocoded events in IRaq 2004-2009. A: Yes, via information. Civilian agency exists and matters. Both sides pay a cost for collateral damage, although occupying forces pay larger cost and context matters.

Huth. 1996. Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International.

Shared alliance ties make peaceful resolutions of territorial claims more likely. Presence of bordering minority with linguistic/cultural ties is NOT a primary cause of territorial disputes.

Pierskalla and Hollenbach (2013) Technology and collective action: The effect of cell phone coverage on political violence in Africa

RQ: How does modern communication technology affect political collective action in Africa? A: Availability of cell phone coverage significantly and substantially increases probability of violent conflict. This article starts a debate with Weidmann (2016), who argues reporting bias drives Pierskalla and Hollenbach's (2013) results. Hollenbach and Pierskalla (2017) retort that there is no evidence their 2013 results were wholly driven by reporting bias (using sensitivity analysis).

Bearce, Eldridge, and Joliff (2016) Does Institutional Design Matter: A study of trade effectiveness and PTA felxibility/rigidity

RQ: How does the flexibility of PTAs affect trade? A: Too flexible or too rigid, and PTAs fail to promote trade. This is also true if they include unconstrained escape clauses. PTAs with limited escape clauses promote trade. Policymakers often opt for too few escape clauses Uses a gravity model

Davis and Blodgett Bermeo (2009) Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication

RQ: Under what conditions do weak states use international courts? A: There are high costs associated with starting litigation. These costs are barriers for developing countries. Past experience with the WTO/GATT increases the likelihood of dispute initiation. Wealthy states initiate the most disputes.

Goldstein and Price (2014) Nativism or Economic Threat: Attitudes toward immigrants during the Great Recession

RQ: What determines individual attitudes toward immigrants? A: Anxiety, skill-level, and baseline preferences all play a role. During the Great Recession, the authors were able to tap the sentiment of those who DID suffer from job loss or feared a decline in work opportunities. Americans had a pre-recession baseline preference for high-skilled migrants or those who came from high-skilled origin states. Also had an expressed preference for demographic similarity. During the Great Recession, American expressed decreased support for immigrants of the same skill level (high-skill against high-skill, low-skill against low-skill), demonstrating labor market threat hypothesis also has some credibility. Effect was more pronounced among those who were anxious.

Lyall, Blair, and Imai (2013)

RQ: What effects on civilian attitudes does combatant identity have? Specifically, what effects of violence on civilian attitudes can we observe based on combatant identity? Survey in the heart of Taliban insurgency. 2,754 male respondents in 204 villages located in 21 districts of 5 provinces of Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan. Find that ISAF and Taliban violence and victimization has asymmetrical impact on individual attitudes. ISAF harm decreases ISAF support and increases Taliban support. Taliban harm has a marginally negative impact on Taliban support, but does not increase support for ISAF. Attemtping to ameliorate harm works. There is little support for prior patterns of violence, distribution of territorial control, or the role of economic assistance in determining civilian attitudes.

Leblang (2010) Familiarity Breeds Investment: Diaspora networks and international investment

RQ: What explains cross-national patterns of international portfolio and foreign direct investment? A: Diaspora networks reduce transaction and information costs, encouraging FDI and other forms of cross-border investment.

Shin (2015 [unpublished version of 2018]) Primary Resources, Secondary Labor: Natural resources and immigration policy

RQ: What explains immigration policy variation toward low-skilled workers? A: Natural resource booms lead to restrictive low-skilled immigration policies and conditions the relationship between immigration openness and trade policy in labor-scarce, wealthy demcoracies. Expansion of Peters (2015) and uses an augmented version of her dataset. Model is OLS. Trade and immigration policies move in opposite directions during resource booms, but are otherwise positively correlated.

Zhukov (2017)

RQ: What explains local variation in violence against civilians? A: Disruptions in external support reduce government violence against civilians at the local level. Less or lower-quality information leads to lower violence. Looks at Belarus under German occupation in WWII. Finds interdiction->lower reprisals; coercion->higher reprisals.

Balcells (2017)

RQ: What explains the variation in the use of violence by rebel groups behind front lines? Indirect to direct violence exists on a continuum, but are two distinct phenomena. The greater the selectivity of violence, the greater the agency of civilian agency in its perpetration. Prewar mobilization is a precondition to violence against civilians in civil wars. Armed actors have weapons, can inflict violence against civilians, eradicate rivals' supporters, want to win, and secure territory. They may face information constraints, and will constrain their behavior to slective violence whenever possible. They fear international trials and local loss of support. Local political elites can enhance or restrain killing of locals, have political information on civilian preferences, are interested in helping their side gain territorial control, collaborate when useful, and want to maximize their own political dominance for the future. Benefits: military and political. Costs: local backlash, they take this into account, use violence instrumentally for domination of locale. Civilians aim to maximize chances of survival, when they are mobilized they want to win. Want their side to dominate their locality now and in the future. They have limited agecy in perpetration of violence, can be targeted if noncompliant, and keep their preferences hidden. Dynamics of violence can be endogenous to conflict through emotions. Cycles of revenge and rivalry (violence begets violence). The size of the community matters. Local dynamics have a political logic that may or may not mirror the macro context. The model is not limited to 2 actor scenarios. The relationship of political variables to violence is nonmonotonic. Understanding political violence necessitates theory that combines exogenous and endogenous factors; rivalry and revenge. Critique: Does her conceptualization of revenge match her operationalization of it?

Peters (2015) Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration Policy in the Era of Globalization

RQ: What explains variation in immigration policy, especially policy regulating low-skilled workers? A: Trade policy. Trade restrictions in labor-scarce states lead to an increase in production in labor-intensive industries. If labor supply does not increase, wages do. Businesses will push for open immigration. Open trade puts labor-intensive industries in labor-scarce states out of business (they can't compete).

Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War.

Rapid change in balance of power between Athens and Sparta led to war.

Fearon and Wendt (2002) Rationalism v. Constructivism: A skeptical view

Rationalism is a methodological approach, whereas constructivism is a set of arguments about social explanations that may imply preferences over specific questions and methods of social inquiry. If IR focuses on these as a paradigmatic debate, we aren't focusing on IR. We're focusing on how to study IR. We should choose our lines of study based on the question. Rationalism vs. constructivism should be seen as a conversation, not a debate.

Krasner (1982) Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables

Realist commentary that aligns with constructivism in many ways. Argues cognition and learning play a role in the "stickiness" of regimes. Regimes are "mechanisms through which ideas could influence outcomes." Uses billiard balls and tectonic plates as analogies for IR. Describes regimes as suitable in interactions or as endogenous to IR.

Weinstein. 2007. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence.

Rebels that depend on civilians much less likely to abuse civilians.

Lacina and Gleditsch (2013) The Waning of War is Real: a response to Gohdes and Price

Refute Gohdes and Price (2012), arguing that they misread the UCDP Battle-related Deaths Codebook, low intensity conflicts are unlikely to matter, and Gohdes and Price (2012) place too much emphasis on statistics while overlooking the benefits of count data of battlefield deaths. Argue that PRIO data is biased in different directions. Assert that if battlefield death decrease was a data artifact, then error would have to be systematically inflated early in the data and systematically deflated later in the data. View this as extremely unlikely.

Krasner (1982) Structural Causes & Regime Consequences: Regimes as intervening variables

Regimes are not equivalent to ad hoc agreements. Regimes are lasting sets of principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking strategies actors agree on in a specific area of IR. The primary distinction of regimes is their duration. Largely a Realist discussion. NOTE: Krasner is often criticized for mixing his use of the grand theories - particularly by Keohane.

Keohane. 1984. After Hegemony.

Regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Regimes mediate between the international system and states. Realism is too pessimistic about the prospects for international cooperation, even given assumptions of rational egoism. Institutions can be accounted for by examining the incentives facing the actors who created and maintain them. Regimes are easier to maintain than create. Self-interest can be defined to include the welfare of others. Decision-making is bounded—tend to satisfice rather than maximize. The value of international regimes is greater if we assume bounded rationality. Regime-eroding effects of hegemonic decline are counterbalanced by the value of rules and institutions. Hegemonic stability theory is deficient in that domestic politics matter, and intangible resources more important than tangible resource. Over-predicts regime collapse.

DeMeritt & Young. 2013. A political economy of human rights: Oil, natural gas and state incentives to repress.

Repression is less costly when states don't need to rely on citizens for revenues. As state's revenue from fuels increase, its cost for repression decreases.

Simmons. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.

Reputational concerns explain patterns of compliance of international monetary affairs. States commit to legal obligations if other states in their region do also.

Money (1997) No Vacancy: The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial Democracies

Similar model to Grossman and Helpman's Politicians will ignore immigration if it won't swing elections.

Garrett (1995) Capital mobility, trade, and the domestic politics of economic policy

Sees policy divergence, not convergence around neoliberalism. Study of 15 advanced industrial countries, 1967-1970 No political decline for left-wing organized labor. Fiscal policy conflicts with convergence. Left-labor fiscal expansion strengthens with greater internationalization.

Nye. 1990. Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power.

Soft power—when a state's values become widely shared enabling greater influence.

Fjedle & De Soysa. 2009. Coercion, co-optation or cooperation? State capacity and the risk of civil war, 1961-2004.

State capacity has three dimensions: coercion, co-optation, cooperation. Proxied by ability to extract taxes, relative size of government spending, trust of economic agents in state institutions. Better than using GDP/capita as a catch all term. High government spending and good institutions (trust in government) matter for predicting peace.

Waltz. 1989. The origins of war in neorealist theory.

States are security maximizers, not power maximizers.

Powell. 1991. Absolute and relative gains in international relations theory.

Structure of the international system does not explain variation in cooperation Relative gains matter when constraints imposed by military technology make it possible for a state to use its relative gains to its advantage. If cost of war is high, then states prefer not to attack even if experience relative gains.

Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) Who Fights: The determinants of participation in civil war

Study done in Sierra Leone. Argue that rivalry between competing theories of rebel recruitment are erroneous. All theories have some support. DO challenge the grievance framework as simply vulnerability or susceptability to political manipulation and violent participation.

Kydd and Strauss (2013)

Suggests intervention can affect conflict by altering the expected outcome and/or reducing costs of conflict. In settings of complete information, there is no war when parties are risk neutral. Lowering the threshold for intervention raises the probability of war and level of atrocities.

Collier & Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war.

Variables that proxy opportunities (greed) do better at explaining rebellion than variables that proxy grievances.

Blattman (2009)

Survey and interviews in N. Uganda of the impacts of civil war on voting behavior. Forced recruitment leads to a 27% increase in likelihood of voting, doubles likelihood of becoming a community leader. Explained by exposure to violence. Critique: What is the mechanism?

Cornelius and Saleyhan (2007) Does Border Enforcement Deter Unauthorized Immigration? The Case of Mexican Migration to the United States of America

Survey of 603 returned and potential migrants in rural MX. Tougher border controls have very little influence on the propensity to illegally migrate to the US.

Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp (2014)

Tests welfare outcomes of extortion payments to rebel groups. Argue payment does not guarantee protection. Several types of extortion: instituionalized (cash w/receipt) v. ad hoc, labor v. cash. Males were more frequently extorted, most for labor AND cash. 2nd most common tactic was cash only. There appear to be socioeconomic links, but no link to education level. Burundi. Critique: Do NOT have data showing relation of extortion and number of times extorted in temporal structure. Also, conflict is not a randomized control trial.

Gohdes and Price (2012) First things first: Assessing data quality before model quality

The authors attack Lacina and Gleditsch's UCDP Battle Death data, saying it if not fit for the analysis of battle deaths across countries or over time. Claim data availability and quality is too poor; the combination of probability-based estimations and "convenience based numbers and narratives" prevents authoritative discussion on global trends in battle deaths. Argue that they use the PRIO death data and find no decline in battle deaths over times and the combination of sources is partly to blame. Argue that survey data should have been used instead of the count data employed by Lacina and Gleditsch.

Oatley and Nabors (1998) Redistributive Cooperation: Market failure wealth transfers and the Basle Accord

The authors go after Keohane, and are similar to Grieco in this regard. They also criticize Kapstein (who was basically testing Keohane). The argument is one of imposed cooperation, similar to the argument posed by Gruber. Basle accord matches redistributive logic more than joint gains logic. Requires that an actor have agenda-setting power. Politicians propose international institutions as maximizing responsiveness to interest groups and voter pressures. The need to satisfy voter demands without imposing costs on domestic producers leads to int'l regulation that transfers wealth from foreign to domestic producers.

Wood. 2014. Opportunities to kill or incentives for restraint? Rebel capabilities, the origins of support and civilian victimization in civil war.

Where groups rely on local support, violence declines as group capabilities increase. Where groups rely on external support, violence increases as capabilities increase.

Cunningham. 2006. Veto players and civil war duration.

The more veto players (the more parties), the longer the civil war endures.

Simmons (2000) International law and state behavior: commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs

This should have been several papers (overwhelming number of dependent variables) Argues that a state's concern regarding its reputation in the international system explains its compliance with international agreements. She argues this can be used to help us understand why some states choose observer status v. Article VIII commitment.

Waltz. 1959. Man, the State and War.

Three images—or levels of analysis—for the causes of war. 1. Individuals. 2. States (e.g., Lenin's theory of imperialism). 3. International system (anarchic structure).

Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies

Trade and immigration are partial substitutes. Assumes skilled workers face decreased competition from immigrants. Trade and immigration are not substitutes where comparative advantage of services are concerned. Likely have a spatial correlation problem in their analysis. The argument is a strawman, justified by the use of "welfare."

Frieden (1991) Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance

Two bodies of literature that are not talking to one another, but should be: International capital mobility and political implications of foreign direct investment. Argues financial capital is highly mobile, but not equities and sector-specific capital. International financial integration favors capital over labor, particularly in developing countries. There is a political division between producers of tradable vs. nontradable goods that is likely to become important (if not already).

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy

Two main results: 1)Less-skilled workers are more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflows into the US, believing that wages decrease because of these inflows. This result is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin Model of international trade as well as the factor-proportions analysis labor model. 2) There is no evidence indicating that skills and immigration opinions are more strongly correlated in high-immigration communities. The hypothesized link between immigration policy preferences and skill is mediated by wage, in the sense that current factor income (what wage measures) determines immigration policy preference while being itself determined by skills.

Gleditsch. 1995. Geography, Democracy, and Peace.

Two strong regularities: (1) war between neighbors, (2) no war between democracies. The hypothesis that democracies don't fight because they aren't neighbors is rejected.

Tomz and Weeks (2013) Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace

Use an experiment to investigate whether democratic publics (in the US and UK) are averse to conflict with other democracies. Find that they are (particularly to military strikes), and that shared democracy changes public opinion by adjusting perceptions of morality and threat, not the expectations of costs or failure.

Thyne. 2006. Cheap signals with costly consequences: The effect of interstate relations on civil war, 1945-1999.

Use bargaining framework to help explain interstate conflict. Foreign players can send cheap or costly signals. Probability of civil war onset increases if cheap signals switch from supportive to hostile (negative shock). Or from hostile to supportive (positive shock) (surprising result).

Iversen and Cusack (2000) The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?

Use error correction models (controversial now, but they were the state of the art at the time). Argue that there may be convergence, but deindustrialization is driving it.

Wood and Malfino (2016) Aiding Victims, Abetting Violence: The influence of humanitarian aid on violence patterns in civil conflict

Use geolocated data on aid commitements and conflict events in 22 sub-Saharan African states to evaluate how aid impacts violence. Find athat humanitarian aid increases the frequency of fighting between the government and rebel groups in areas where aid is concentrated. Find no evidence that other types of foreign development aid prolong or increase violence in areas where they are allocated.

Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas (2011)

Uses bombing to proxy indiscriminate violence (following Kalyvas 2006). Argue that bombing systematically shifted control to Viet Cong insurgents. Bombing leads to a decrease in government control.

Quek (2016) Are Costly Signals More Credible? Evidence of Sender-Receiver Gaps

Uses three experiments to demonstrate that senders may believe in the logic of sunk-cost signaling, but it is not apparent to receivers. There is a gap in how the interaction is perceived at each end of the mechanism. Argues that signaling doesn't work.

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) Educated Preferences: explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe

Using data from the European Social Survey (2003), find that higher education and skill lead to more favorable views of immigration, regardless of immigrant skill level. Argue that the finding is largely driven by cultural values and beliefs. Greater education leads to lower levels of racism and greater appreciation for diversity.

Goldstein (2012) Winning the war on war

War is declining worldwide. The international community plays a key role in the decline of war. National and humanitarian interests often conflict, including over sovereignty. Peace is increasing in the post-WWII world, which implies the international community is doing a "good job".

Powell (2006) War as a Commitment Problem

War is either a commitment problem or an information problem. Commitment problems often poorly defined. Builds on Fearon (1995). Asymmetric info can explain onset, not prolonged conflict. There are three types of preventive war: 1) 1st strike advantage, 2) concessions that shift balance of power distirbution, 3) anticipated shift in power balance. All are responses to changes in potential benefits of a situation when power may shift, commitment of benefits is unclear, and use of power is inefficient/destroys some of the benefit flow, and each actor can lock in a share of benefit flow at time t.

Fearon. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war.

War is inefficient ex post. The puzzle is, why does it happen? Three causal logics lead to war (assuming rationality) 1. Private information and incentives to misrepresent (relative power, willingness to fight). 2. Commitment problems—incentives to renege on terms (preemptive, preventive). 3. Issue indivisibilities (likely to be info or commitment, really)

Malhotra, Margolit, and Mo (2013) Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between prevalence and conditional impact

What explains variation in individuals' opposition to immigration? Study of American attitudes toward H-1B visa immigration. Conditional impact between economic threat and immigration attitudes is sizable. Labor market threat is not prevalent, often not detected, but found in this sample. Cultural effects potentially understated in the literature. Critique: A very small group is affected, so does it really matter?

Rogowski (1987) Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions

What kind of state would be optimal in an advanced, trade-dependent economy? Not a developed autarky. Rather, this type of state must resist protectionism, needs to combat rent extraction by particular firms, classes, or sectors, and must pursue stable policy. (Insulation, autonomy, and stability). Rogowski argues this implies the presence of large electoral districts, proportional representation, and a parliamentary system. Small states are constrained to remain open to trade.

Dunning (2011)

When do actors choose to submit to elections v. violence? Popular support matters. Democracy is only an equilibrium when balance of electoral power is asymmetrical. Violence as an electoral strategy/political tool.

Werner and Yuen (2005) Making and Keeping Peace

When does peace last and how do the terms of agreements impact the duration of peace? The authors argue that agreements which differ from the expected outcomes of military battle are more likely to fail. Likewise, they argue that war renews when one side feels it could have gotten a better deal if fighting had continued/renews. As a result, third-party imposed agreements and those with significant third-party involvement are also less likely to hold.

Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed (2017)

When government is unsure how external support will affect rebels, government continues fighting. Fungible support generates the most uncertainty (money and guns). Uses a game theoretical model, then tests it empirically. Not all types of support have equal effects. Addresses why STATES continue fighting. The net effect of funding rebels may be harmful to them.

Nikolova (2018) Destined for Democracy? Labour markets and political change in colonial British America

Why would landowners want employees they know will leave? A: Racism. Why would the state be incentivized to protect labor? Commitment problems at core.