Jihad

Lecture 1: Daniel Pipes

"As non-Muslims and politicians (...) they are in no position to declare what is Islamic and what is not. As Bernard Lewis, a leading American authority of Islam, notes: "it is surely presumptuous for those who are not Muslims to say what is orthodox and what is heretical in Islam." The only good thing about this idiocy? At least it's better than the formulation by the Council on American-Islamic Relations which has the nerve to call the Islamic State "anti-Islamic". In the end, though, neither U.S.presidents nor Islamist apologists fool people. Anyone with eyes and ears realizes that the Islamic State, like the Taliban and al-Qaeda before it, is 100 percent Islamic." -> quote full of paradoxes Problem: first he says non-Muslims cannot declare what is Islamic and what is not, then he as a non- Muslim declares certain movements as Islamic!

Lecture 1: Hans Jansen

"I have gradually developed an opinion that doesn't please anyone. I have come to believe, in fact I am quite sure, that there are indeed decent Muslims who are capable of cherishing humane thoughts, but that there is no such thing as a moderate or liberal Islam. However, I cannot prove this, which sufficiently shows my ineptitude as an Islamographer." This actually says that there must be some essence of Islam that is independent of Muslims. Problematic: does Islam exist without Muslims? Can you see Islam as something different as Muslims? Is there an abstract Islam? You cannot defend this from an academic point of view.

Difference IS and AQ

- ISIS is more extreme than AQ ('the more promiscuous definition of kufr') - ISIS is less nihilistic than AQ (for AQ there was nothing outside jihad) - AQ was violent theatre, ISIS is grueling horror (Twin Towers vs. decapitations) - AQ had 'the argument of someone who expected to loose': if you do not plan for the future or creating an order after your ideological needs, you apparently do not think you will have the capacity to do so - AQ has an intellectual appeal, a carefully constructed and articulate ideological position; whereas IS mainly employs visceral propaganda, gut feelings. - ISIS' use of apocalyptic narrative is part of its populism (as opposed to AQ)

Kahoot:

- Islamism = political Islam - Caliph is not same as the pope in Catholics: the Caliph's job is to uphold sharia but not to write it: that is done by the ulama (religious scholars not organized hierarchically)

How unique is Islam in being a political vehicle and an excuse for violence (in the modern age)?

- Israel refers to itself as the Jewish state and they themselves have created Israel with violence. - In India, there is a Hindu extremist movement. - In Tibet, we find a religious-political movement in the monks. There is also a history of fighter monks. - The Greek orthodox church plays an important role in Greece, also with the conflict with the Turks. - The importance of Christianity in US politics and also the Christian organisations who blow up abortion clinics in the United States. - Next to Christianity, Islam is the only globally located religion. Its geography is not limited to one or two countries. There are other religions that are used as a political vehicle and also use violence, but Islam is unique in so far that it is the only globally present religion in a world that is dominated by a western Christian world. Historical approach: how did this classical order became unsustainable in the 18th and 19th century? Starting from the assessment that Islam as a religious tradition and large parts of the Muslim world's politics are in a crisis. This crisis revolves to a large extent around the question of authority and the quest for authenticity. - Authority: who speaks on behalf of the Islam? - Authenticity: what is the real Islam? And translated into the political crisis it is: authority, who speaks on behalf of the nation? Authenticity, what is the basis for a certain citizenship?

Four Key aspects of political Islam:

- Modern (as are all 'fundamentalisms') - Rejecting orthodoxy (rejecting the religious status quo: rejecting the way in which religious authorities are currently positioned and functioning) - Claiming authenticity (engaging in identity politics) - Seeking social change (ranging from mere improvement to utopia: visible in Euben's definition)

What is political Islam? Three definitions

- Political Islam is the manifestation of Islam beyond the religious domain into the realm of politics. Or it is? There is something problematic about this definition. That is wat Hirschkind points out (read Hirschkind: presumes religion and politics are inherently separated) - Islam is not an ideology but a religious cultural framework for engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims (Fuller, Hroub) Problems: this definition points out what political Islam is not. He stresses it is not an ideology, because it is too broad. The width of political Islam stretching from democratic groups to extreme violent organisations. - An interpretive framework reacting to and expressive of modernity, claiming authority over Islam and offering its interpretation as a cure to what is perceived as a (Muslim) world in crisis (after Euben). Political Islam is a response to a perceived crisis. Fundamentalists claim a cultural authenticity against the estrangement of modernisation, but Euben points out that these organisations of fundamentalists itself are not in line with longtime traditions so that is a paradox. Another paradox: Political Islam claims authority over the religion that shuts down decisions about the religion. At the same time, it claims authority over old claims. It is also a liberating movement because people have a personal responsibility to educate yourselves, that is very liberating. But they also claim authority over how to interpret.

Oliver Roy: "This is not a radicalization of Islam, it is an Islamization of radicalism"

-> people joined Islam not because they suddenly saw some sort of religious light, but because they saw an avenue for action:

A sketch of the Muslim world before modernization:

A sketch of the Muslim world before modernization: · No Caliphal authority since 1258 (= the year of the destruction of Bagdad after the Mughal invasions) (or even since mid 9th century) -> after this year no caliphat you can justifiably speak of. · No caliphal authority, but great empires (Ottomans, Safavid, Moghul à the Muslim empires) · Global network of religious institutions (scholarship, waqf-system = religious endowments/ foundations; a legal unit where you can put your money in and as long as it's a religious unit you are free from taxation, legal systems)

Roy, O., 'Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative', Microcon, 2008, 1-23.

AQ = Its strategy is defined by a precise ideology: to topple the existing regimes in the Middle East and replace them with a Caliphate based on sharia law. Hence the political radicalisation is part of a process of theological radicalisation, known as salafisme. Ideology is the key: people join Al Qaeda because they share its ideology and political goals The process of radicalisation in Europe is not a direct consequence of the conflicts in Middle East, although these conflicts are re-interpreted through the 'narrative' of Al Qaeda Factors that explain AQ's type of violence: 1. their de-territorialisation 2. Al Qaeda's strategy and ideology, embodied in the 'far enemy/near enemy theory'. 3. alienation at the core We underline below three aspects of this transversal fascination for violence. i) The recasting of a traditional leftist anti- imperialism into Islamic terms ii) A delinquent generation? iii) Individual suicidal violence Al Qaeda provides not so much an ideology as a narrative.

Another specific aspect of the 18th century that stretches to today: Wahhabi Saudi Alliance (1744)

Another specific aspect of the 18th century that stretches to today: Wahhabi Saudi Alliance (1744) Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) and his Muwahhidun/ Unitarians · Moral crisis · Individual access to the sources · 'literalist', stressing the presumed simplicity of Islam: it is not literally in the sense that they do not interpret, because they do à you still need to interpret, but do so in a certain manner · Suspicious of ijtihad and rational argumentation This man expresses a sense of a moral crisis; and he starts to proclaim a theology for the masses: · Easy and understandable language: this is new for this time à taking down of barriers for common people to participate in religious discourse · In this theology he stresses the importance of access to sources for all, people should be able to interpret it themselves. · He is distrustful of rational interpretation · Dismissive of other interpretations than his own = is a paradox: so he says that one the one hand people need to interpret texts themselves, but not how they see fit à thus a paradox in his message: He feels that the variety of Islam is a danger: he wants find the pure and original Islam: so yes, people should go to the sources, but understand it in the following fashion. 1744: this Mohammed dude enters into a reliance with some political authority called Iben Saud à done so because it takes political power to as a religious scholar to really establish a certain society: · An appealing alliance: - One to rule by sharia, another to interpret what sharia is - Obedience to the ruler: "better sixty years with a tyrannical ruler than one night without a ruler" This alliance was: - absolute - extremist (takfiri), - militant - destructive - making good use of political circumstances = in which the central authority (which officially was the Ottoman empire) was weak: Does this remind you of anything? à establishment of Islamic State Then, in 1818 the Egyptian army vanquishes the Saudi-Wahhabi state: Then, comes a second Saudi State (1819-1891): more a tribal power manifesting itself among other powers in the Arabian peninsula: still internally divided

Ahmad, I. 'Genealogy of the Islamic State: reflections on Mawdudis political thought', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 15: Issue supplement s1, 145-162.

Mawdudi is the Pakistani dude: So basically, his article is a reflection on Mawdudi's political thought: He believed that Islam was essential for politics, and that it was necessary to institute sharia and preserve Islamic culture from what he viewed as the evils of secularism, nationalism and socialism, which he understood to be the influence of Western imperialism. The logic and all encompassing power of the colonial indian state shaped Mawdudi's conception of islamism. His call for an Islamic state was distinctly modern as it arose in the milieu of colonial, and electoral politics. In a context where the colonial Indian state had begun to impact deeply on individual and collective lives, Maududi interpreted Islam to equate it with the state. As such, to argue that Islam was the state from the very start is, then, to impose a distinctly modern term on a pre-modern social formation. ____________________________________________________________________ Achmed reading: He is an anthropologists, so he doesn't like texts: he points that sharia was never at the core of governance Colonialism in in India - According to some scholars it is not possible to see a state without religion. But it is really up to your interpretation of Islam. Another interpretation is that political Islam was made to make Islam 'survive' but Islam is not the essence of the state. Most of the jurisdiction and governance was made by time and place and was not derived from Sharia. - Colonial rule destroyed a lot of the flexible way of life that was present in the Muslim world before the intervention. They came with structured laws and such. Muslim scholars were demoted as a consequence. Abu Al-A'lā Mawdūdī (1908-1979) - He was afraid that Hindus would take over in India after the British leave and that there is not a lot of room for Muslims. - Looking at the Moghul empire: they were not true to Islam and because of that the empire fell. Mawdūdī is afraid that this would also happen in India. He wants an Islamic State. People don't take it seriously at first because it was a very alien idea. "The conceptualization of the state by the nineteenth-century scholars of politics is now utterly outdated... Gone are the days when if the state presented its economic, educational, industrial, or social scheme people made fun of it calling it grandmotherly legislation. The situation has completely changed. Now the state's arena has almost become as all-encompassing as that of religion. Now it also decides what you are to wear or what not to wear; whom you are to marry and at what age; what you are to teach your kids and what mode of life you are to choose; ... what language and script you are to adopt. So, the state has not left even the most peripheral issues of life independent of its ultimate right to intervene." (Tarjuman, March 1938; 5) -> the extent to which the new conditions forced Mawdudi to come up with something new is very well illustrated with this quote -> he says the state now does things that religion used to do: Wikipedia: he believed that Islam was essential for politics, and that it was necessary to institute sharia and preserve Islamic culture from what he viewed as the evils of secularism, nationalism and socialism, which he understood to be the influence of Western imperialism. - If the state is creeping up to the extent that it has as much effect as religion would have, then religion IS the state. - The creation of an Islamic State has a universal message for all Muslims. Conclusion The logic and all encompassing power of the colonial indian state shaped Mawdudi's conception of islamism. His call for an Islamic state was distinctly modern as it arose in the milieu of colonial, and electoral politics. In arguing for the islamic state, Mawdudi did not reply to the idea of an islamic state allegedly intrinsic to islam since inception because of its unique theological character, he indeed invention the notion of the islamic state. As such, to argue that Islam was the state from the very start is, then, to impose a distinctly modern term on a pre-modern social formation Equally misleading is the dominant assumption that the so called theological character of Islam forces it to fuse religion and politics History and politics of indian muslim rulers show that most of them did not follow sharia, rather they framed secular laws independent of sharia As such: Ahmed's argument is ultimately → ground the theological approach in historical anthropology, primarily in the wider matrix of the modern colonial state formation and its impact on socio-political lives → explains maududi case

Authenticity and authority

Authenticity and authority: Historical approach: how did this classical order became unsustainable in the 18th and 19th century? Starting from the assessment that Islam as a religious tradition and large parts of the Muslim world's politics are in a crisis. This crisis revolves to a large extent around the question of authority and the quest for authenticity. - Authority: who speaks on behalf of the Islam? - Authenticity: what is the real Islam? And translated into the political crisis it is: authority, who speaks on behalf of the nation? Authenticity, what is the basis for a certain citizenship? These two themes are important for all sort of things that lay claim on identity (about creating in- and outgroups). Authority = how do we solve this piece within our group and who decides? You need an authority to decide and to protect the boundaries of, in this case, Islam. Purity of self (absence of doubt) and society. Salafi imitation (authenticity lies in the imitation of past) of pristine Muslim times. Reformist revival of original Islam. The struggle against tradition and orthodoxy. Estrangement in the age of globalization. Who commands a following and why? When does an authority lose his authority and what should be the consequence?

Lecture 12 - December 4th Bette Dam: Afghanistan - Reintroducing Taliban and Al Qaida

Bette Dam: Afghanistan - Reintroducing Taliban and Al Qaida 2006: her first time in Afghanistan (she entered the country as an embedded journalist) - this was also the time in which NL joined the coalition 2009: there were 43 countries and 140.000 troops Newspapers portrayed the country with bombs, armies, pictures of the enemy etc. Afghanistan was ALWAYS in the headlines: - Biggest mission and coalition ever between the global west - Reporting emphasized US v Them (specifically to do with Bush and Blair) - Embedded journalists often reported without having any knowledge of life outside the military camps - So Dam returned to Afghanistan unembedded in 2007: this reporting was much easier than expected, people were very willing to talk and tell their side of the story: led to her first book on President Karzai - Then, further research about the enemy, beyond the black and white picture portrayed by the West. When the US was there, they presented false information: · We all got to know the Taliban as men with weapons, suicide bombers, with a will to kill as well as human rights violators, forcing burkas on women etc. · Headlines we read today confirm the same picture: media presented what was communicated inside official Kabul by the US army or NATO -> presenting Taliban as a clear enemy. · Afghanistan is a very tribal country and the US often misused the terrorism narrative to further their goals The Taliban: - Exists an idea that is is created by Pakistan: this is not true, the leader never studied in Pakistan - very nationalist about Afghanistan SLIDE: Ahmed Rashid's influential and seminal work Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia: "Many of [the Taleban] had been born in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in Pakistani madrassas and had learnt their fighting skills from Mujaheddin parties based in Pakistan. As such the younger Taliban barely knew their own country or history, but from their madrassas they learnt about the ideal Islamic society created by the Prophet Mohammed 1,400 years ago and this is what they wanted to emulate." à however, this is the real education of the Taliban: No education in Pakistan. Leadership not alien to Afghanistan-culture and religion o They have a system of a houjera, guestrooms in village-mosques with mullah as teacher and taliban as students. · Informal education-system, no curriculum like madrassas in bigger cities. Level is extremely low · Never anti-Western education · Teachings in life-rules and local traditions main subject (strict rules for women copied from Pasthun culture, preserve society) · Poetry plays important role (RUMI) · Background: Orthodox Sufism, traditional Islam (not Wahabism, or Salafism or Deobandism). · No politics in school (no anti-Western slogans) · Use of Islamic law will create fairer dispute resolution compared to tribal law Jihad and the preachers: Radicalization from outside: - Islamist Zia (president of Pakistan) gains full control over Afghan jihad-groups - From US Fear for political Islamist to take over - like Hekmatyar Taliban from houjera play minor role in Jihad. Not good relationship with Pakistan. Taliban soon become the 'pastors' of the chaotic Jihad, prescribing their houjera life-rules like harsh sanctions, good behaviour, and clean clothes in their religious war Taliban and their apolitical regime, and focus rather on organizing an Islamic state: - Hoped to work with the EU/US/UN - The harsh rules become government policy - Fear of inexperience made them extra rigid as a result Jihad (of the Sovjet Union): changed Afghanistan tremendously - Radicalization from outside: Pakistan gets a lot of money from the US to fight the Soviets, and afterwards there would be an Islamic state - Also a coalition for the ideal of this Islamic state - "Americans created the Taliban at the time, during the proxy war" -> Taliban was never the biggest group in this Jihad against the Soviets. The larger groups were very political. - After the jihad against the Soviets, the US withdraws out of fear of civil war (after intervening in the 90s). During this time, around 1994, the Taliban are seen as the only group with clear hands, because they are apolitical small school students - Everybody has faith in the Taliban to deliver the promised Islamic state -> Taliban rules form 1996 to 9/11 in 2001 Taliban thanks the US and UN and hopes to work together with them: - They have a relative good relationship with the US - The educated mullah's had high hopes Then, - The Taliban brought the "harsh" sharia rules: the Jihad rules that became policy - Fear of inexperienced Taliban made them become extra rigid - However, finally through this people experienced an Islamic state, and Afghanistan started functioning again -> though other rulers remained in the south of the country Lack of accountability of Taliban in Kabul causes clashes: because the majority in Kabul are higher educated - Lead to harsh violence, but the Taliban disagreed, they wanted people to go to court instead of being violent US/EU narrative: o Before 9/11: Al Qaida and the Taliban are an alliance o 9/11: The Taliban were involved in Osama bin Laden his plans to attack o The Taliban and Al Qaida share a similar ideology Afghan narrative (reality): - Mullah Omar (dude who started the Taliban) tried to expel Osama three times. He asked for people to provide proof of is crimes. - Osama's jihad was against the wish of the traditionalist views of the Taliban (Taliban did not support international jihad and wanted a good relationship with the US) - Omar did not know about the 9/11 plans - Because of US fear, Omar became suspicious of Osama Bin Laden (and even informed the US about their suspicions) - Both have different ideologies: o Taliban = Sufism o Al-Qaida = Wahhabism Then, the US sends diplomats to Afghanistan to find Bin Laden: - Mullah Omar did not approve of the US doing this, which made the US think that Mullah Omar was protecting Bin Laden -> worsened the relationship between the US and Afghanistan Then, 9/11 happens: - US perceives it as an action done by both Al-Qaida and the Taliban - Mullah Omar, though this undermines the Taliban, refuses to give up Bin Laden After 9/11: missed opportunity for peace - When the war started 90% of the Taliban wanted Omar to deliver Osama - He rejected, and many who felt like they were losing to the American surrendered - Mullah Omar finally decided to leave fighting - December 6th 2001: the Taliban and the new government of Hamid Karzai agreed a surrender. Mullah Omar signed a letter where he allowed his cabinet to stop fighting, and support Karzai. Karzai offer for amnesty was accepted and promissed Mullah Omar to live in Dignity. = a historical moment but not at all covered by the media - One day later: there is a press conference: US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld: rejected the offer -> "there is no reason to make peace with the Taliban", and he blew off the whole thing It becomes clear with this that there is a Western side to the story and an Afghan side: Afghan side: · Taliban regime had withdrawn · Kabul government: one anti-Taliban group dominates · Mainly warlords become the government: 'The Americans are our true friends' US: · Special Forces started hunting down Al Qaida but also Taliban. .... · Media was convinced that is was a necessary war · Afghans were supporting of this war (Tajiks and Uzbecks did not necessarily have issue with the Taliban, rather they wanted power) · Instead of talking to the Taliban, any attempt to make an inclusive government was not discussed No reason to fight no more: no enemy - US military goes there to seek Taliban who are not there - Up to 150.000 troops in Afghanistan with no Taliban! - no peak in attacks - The Taliban were willing to talk into a sort of deal, and formed no threat Karzai (new president) had taken much of their weapons, but there was no diplomat ready to pick up on those talks → though it was a complex situation in Kabul between the anti-Taliban ministers in the cabinet, the warlords in the south, and foreign powers, this opportunity should've been taken more seriously. - International coalition lines up with the sitting government and they sink into the tribal conflict, fighting rivals of the government rather than the Taliban -> false intelligence about the enemy This created a vicious circle: Then the families of their rivals start to fight back: they drove these people to madness Taliban are everywhere in the news but never in the field. Enemy combatants (not soldiers) to subvert the Geneva Conventions = nom for Guantamano Bay. What this really shows is the role of the media and the bias towards Western sources being very problematic. - Nothing was crosschecked (even though this is a very basic principle of journalism) As such: 2015: Afghanistan is fragmented and dangerous. But not because the Taliban is so strong, or well organized, but because of the all the rivalries, the rich warlords, excluded families, tribes and other groups who defend themselves. The Taliban is still as mysterious as it was, which is dangerous for the future negotiations with the US. Ultimately: war in Afghanistan was totally unnecessary + media has been biased

1) Al-Qaeda to IS: pedigree and opposition - Chronology - Tensions between Zarqawi and ObL and their nachleben - Inspire to Dabiq

Chronology: 1990 - 1991: Gulf war: the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces start the war and end the friendly relationship between Iraq and the US: relationship was before governed by the US and Iranian bitter relationship at the time (because of the hostage of the embassy). A miscalculation on the part of Hussein, thinking he could take Kuwait: Americans come to aid in operation Desert Shield: Americans had fast success with quick bombing with lots of casualties -> causes a lot of anger among Iraqi's After that, a decade of sanctions: 1990 - 2003:UN sanctions (would only stop when they retreated, paid reparations and showed their situations on WMD's) He retreated from Kuwait, but he didn't show his WMD: first wasn't that much pressure on Iraq (simply just sanctions) (Video Madeline Albright): became infamous in Iraq Then, 9/11 happened: Bush invades Iraq: Bush wanted to get Osama Bin Laden, so he first invaded Afghanistan because he knew he wasn't in Iraq. Then pressure began building for him to invade Iraq (for alleged WMD) 2003:Iraq War - "Shock and Awe" of the Coalition of the Willing (49 countries led by the US). War is instantly won by the coalition: Interesting thing happens thereafter: all members of the Baath-party were declared unsuitable for any official job (party now illegal) + national army was dissolved (which was dangerous because these people who until then had an outlook, security etc., but now they didn't have that anymore). After 2003: a sectarian politics is facilitated Then, this dude: former petty delinquent Zarqaqiwas in Afghanistan in 1999 (after the Soviets had withdrawn), formed Tawhid Wa I-Jihad (active in Jordon) wit help of AQ, now moves operations to Iraq. 2004:an official allegiance by Zarqaqi to Al Qaida and Osama Bin Laden (back to the 1990's to clarify: the sanctions were not only damaging, but also offered opportunities for smuggling: often state authorized smuggling -> a lot of the smuggling went trough Syria) 2006 Zarqawi killed, take-over by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, rename ISI,with Abu Umar al-Baghdadi as 'Emir' (but without actual territory) èThere were some questions as to why call yourself a 'state' if you're not: but this shows a certain ambition 2006 Maliki becomes prime minister 2007 The Surge or: weaponizing the Sunni tribes (Sahwa/Awakening) = more boots on the grounds to quell the uprising that is crippling the Iraqi society. Not only the US boots helped but also: Weiss and Hassan book: the Sunni tribe being engaged by Bagdad: weaponizing the Sunni tribes = this is theAwakening(= the engagement of Sunni tribal forces) 2008 US forces disengage politically and start withdrawing troops; Baghdad disengages from Sunni tribes and Sunni Iraqis in general April 2010 Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi both killed (leadership of Al Qaida) May 2010 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is announced as new leader December 2011 US war in Iraq declared officially over. Sunni Arabs are politically deserted (they have no political angle now) This allows for a comeback for ISI in Iraq: March 2011:Syrian revolution allows ISI to expand: èAugust 2011 start of Jabhat al-Nusra (ISI/AQ initiative) by Abū Muḥammad al-Julānī (official announcement in January 2012) April 2013 al-Baghdadi announces merger of JN+ISI= ISIS. AQ and al-Julani reject this, leading to a split between AQ (Zawahiri) and ISIS (al-Baghdadi) So these two groups merge: call it Islamic State in Iraq and Syria June 2014 Declaration of the Caliphate (Islamic State) = after the capture of Mosul In short: 1999 Tawḥīd wa l-Jihād -> 2004 AQI -> 2006 ISI -> 2013 ISIS -> 2014 IS

The apocalypse question: sense and nonsense

Cohn (Pursuit of Millennium): A millennial movement is a movement that expects an imminent collective salvation of the in-group involving supernatural intervention leading to a perfect world. (p. 13) IS and apocalyptic thought: Islamic State is in its operations not expecting the end of times Why is it not an apocalyptic/ millennial movement: because it did not think of some supernatural idea of the end of the world. No use of apocalyptic language

Damir-Geilsdorf, S. and M. Menzfeld, "Who are 'the' Salafis? Insights into lifeworlds of persons connected to Salafis(m) in North Rhine Westphalia, Germany", Journal of Muslims in Europe 6:1, 2017, 22-51.

Damir-Geilsdorf Article: "Who are 'the' Salafi's?" Article explores the lifeworld of Salafism in North Rhine Westphalia: does so by four case studies: "The article is intended to shed light on their ways of life, convictions, and everyday practices by presenting four case studies. The subjects of our case studies show a highly heterogeneous and individual synthesis of personal guidelines for conducting what they call a "good Muslim life", according to their translation of the role model of the salaf ṣālih ("the pious ancestors", i.e. the first three generations of Muslims) as well as a heterogeneity in their emic identity ascription and definition of what Salafism means to them. Achmed was the most important person they interviewed: Achmed can serve as a very informative case study. Problematic about this article: - The methodology: they don't even say what mosque they mention - Are these four people really salafi's? They in various levels deny being Salafi: even Achmed: reason for this is related to the securitization of Salafism (especially in Germany) à Salafism is a topic of political conversation and it has become (to a certain extend) criminalized (not legally of course but you become known to the security services). - Salafism is, in a sense, also a product of Germany (and NL etc.): it is also produced there: you have people in NL who have a very global look of the world, and see that it is sometimes better to be a Salafi in NL, than in Egypt for example: because there is more freedom here (freedom to express your religion etc.). all Salafi's have to cope with the non-Salafi outside world, and then maybe it's better to do so her than in some countries in the Islamic world.

The establishment of a Muslim polity (lecture 2) Embyonic stage:

From the 10th Century to the 18th Century: there was a Muslim world comparable to the Modern Western world: there was a big Muslim civilizations from Morocco, to China etc.: An Islamic Civilization in which other religions existed as well: Big influence of the Muslim world: - Influence in the North West: from the perspective of Islamic leaders back then, the West was uncivilized. --> example of a coin to illustrate the Islamic influence in the North West back in the Middle Ages: a coin from England resembled one from the Islamic world: illustrated the weight of the Muslim world on the rest of the world (analogy of how the dollar rules now) The greatness of the Muslim world is not easily understood: where did this Muslim world come from? The establishment of a Muslim Polity (very compressed version of history): · Embyonic stage: Before there was no state, just tribal societies: but there was one big powerful trading town back then: Mecca. o Prophet Muhammed arose: he proposed a new form of solidarity, that eventually superseded tribal allegiance, which until then was the highest power abstraction at the time: now there is something above it. o Then in 622, this Mohammed travelled to Medina, settles there and becomes a local leader of, first of the people who moved with him (Muhājārūn = migrants), and secondly of the people who were there already and helped him and joined him (Ānsar = helpers). But there were already people who worked against him (Manāfiqun = were given the name of hypocrits: those who didn't follow Mohammed and fought against his cause). Last group was the group closest to Mohammed, his family (Ahl Al-bayt). à These names you will come across a lot (especially Muhājārūn, if you move for Islam you are coined this term: like IS fighters now who move to Syria) o Mohammed kinda formed a new tribe here: a community of believers, but who remains open to all: they start conquests for land and get a bigger territory. o Then, Mohammed dies, and people realize that he cannot be replaced as a Prophet, but he can be replaced in his leadership. What factors should then play a role in finding his successor? Options: lineage? Specific qualifications? Specific method? I. First they assign Abu Bakr (632-634) as a leader: he was from the same tribe as Mohammed. He soon dies, but before he dies he appoints: II. Umar (634-644): rules longer, but is eventually killed by one of his servants over a personal affair. III. Uthman: an electoral committee appoints this man: he is murdered, but it wasn't a personal affair like Umar, it was more of an collective effort of people who were displeased. After his death: IV. Ali (656-661): cousin of Mohammed, and his son in law. A conflict arises between his tribe and the tribe of Uthman who were displeased by Ali's rule and are angry about Uthman's murder: There is a battle between the clans and the battle ends in arbitration. Then, a small group of Ali's followers are displeased that Ali wants to made peace with the enemy (they say you cannot arbitrate with infidels) and say that Ali is no longer Muslim. These people form a new group called the Kharijites, and they later kill Ali. At which point, a man called Mu'Awiyya (a man who was fighter on behalf of Uthman) takes control and starts a dynasty (the Omayyad dynasty)

Lecture 1: Thomas Bauer

He described the tendency towards culturalism: the idea that there are essential differences between various cultures --> he says this is problematic because in practice this leads to distorted views because: Before modernisation, the Islamic world was characterized by ambiguity. There were formal regulations, but also others (example sex with younger boys). - influence colonialism: the Western views that were first adopted by a small elite [in the colonial world], are also adopted by the larger part of the populations as if they are one's own. --> Western values are internalized by large parts of the populations of non-Western countries but by the time they fully achieve doing so, these values have ceased to be valid in the West. ____________________________________________________________________ Thomas Bauer is a German scholar and he wrote a book about ambiguity. What he does in this book is that he points out that there is a tendency towards what he calls culturalism. That is the idea that there are essential differences between various cultures. There is a tendency to look for differences when studying other cultures. This is problematic, so he says, because in practice this leads to very distorted views. In reality, what Islam looks like today, is far removed to what Islam looked like before modern century. The rupture was in the 19th century. Before modernisation, the Islamic world was characterized by ambiguity. There were formal regulations, but also others. Older men had sex with younger boys, but people didn't think in strict categories. There were things in between, so there wasn't a strict boundary between homosexually and heterosexually. The fact that there is a strict boundary with homosexually in Islamic countries nowadays, has to do with the western influence. On Thomas Bauer's Law of Asynchronicity: "As time passes, the Western views that were first adopted by a small elite [in the colonial world], are also adopted by the larger part of the populations as if they are one's own. Now, values in the Western world of the 19th and 20th century have a rather short half life. And so we see again and again this paradox: Western values are internalized by large parts of the populations of non-Western countries but by the time they fully achieve doing so, these values have ceased to be valid in the West. A discrepancy of values is therefor to be found at both the beginning as well as at the end of this process, but in both cases the Western observer holds the Near-Eastern values to be 'typically Islamic'." (trans. RW) Modernization did not cause stoning (as a punishment to adultery) to be banned from the Muslim legal practice, it caused its emergence! Critique of the binary, culturalist approach. What is portrayed as authentically mine, need not be particularly different from yours. Pitfalls - A politicized topic - An abnormal topic - We have preconceptions that distort our understanding Edward Said: " The Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the west."

Hirschkind, Charles. "What is political Islam?" In: Volpi (ed.) Political Islam. A critical reader. Routledge 2011, p. 13-15

Hirschkind: presumes religion and politics are inherently separated So basically, Hirschkind says that Islamic movements engage in the political domain because they are subject to restrictions imposed by the state - licensing etc: modern politics has become a condition for the practice of many personal activities The modern state is so much more invasive in the private lives of people, and religious authorities need to respond to this --> this is thus part of the story of political Islam Hirschkind also warns that we should not take western categories as universal categories. ________________________________________________________________________ In what way does the distinction between the political and non-political domains of social life hold today? Islamic movements that involve preaching and other missionary activities engage the political domain because they are subject to restrictions imposed by the state (licensing, etc: modern politics has become a condition for the practice of many personal activities) and because they must compete with state or state-supported institutions. He says that the modern state is so much more invasive in the private life of people. Education, dress, etc., are all ruled by the state. Religious authorities need to response to this. That is part of the story of political Islam. Hirschkind also warns that we should not take western categories as universal categories. Our understanding of religions etc. need not to be universal, because other religions may function in a different matter. It is important to avoid making Islam a particularly special case. He suggests that political Islam is about social economic framework. People need a political platform, and political Islam provides such a platform. There is much to be said for it, however, it is not everything. There is also a question of other frames.

Internally divided: statist vs utopian

How IS is internally divided: this is typical in all utopian movements(has this promise of not just improvement of one's life, but more a radical change leading to the ideal perfect society). If such a movement becomes successful, you always get such internal divisions: you get territory: - You can illustrate this with what happens to the Saudi's: Saudi Ikhwan: Another internal issue was between Syria and Iraqi: the differences were significant: Iraqis were leading: - Nationals of failing states are no blank slates and Sunnism is no nationality - Iraqi's in the lead - Foreigners are sent to Syria, not Iraq - From mono-ethnic to multi-ethnic brigades

Wolf, A., 'An Islamist 'renaissance'? Religion and politics in post-revolutionary Tunisia', Journal of North African Studies, 18:4, 2013, 560-573.

ITS CONCLUSION: Despite the apparent fragmentation of the Salafist movement in Tunisia, ultra-conservative thought has come to form an active part of Tunisia's reality and Islamic landscape - and is likely to continue to do so for some time to come. The heterogeneous nature of Tunisia's ultra-conservatives means, however, that the Salafist movement has many competing narratives as to what represents 'the true Islam' and how to implement sharia, the main differences being the Salafists' respective method - violence versus non-violence - their approach - gradual versus immediate - and their outlook - national versus international. This will make it difficult for Tunisia's ultra-conservative Muslims to regroup as one single force, socially and politically, to constitute a political and social alternative to Ennahda. Despite that, the increase in religiously motivated violence, most significantly the assassination of Chokri Belaid by Salafist jihadists, shows that the mixing of criminal elements with Salafist jihadists provides for a dangerous cock- tail threatening the stability of the country. As the most important political force after the revolution, Ennahda is now facing the diffi- cult task of proving that it can render political Islam compatible with democracy, with Tunisia becoming in that respect a model for the region. Ennahda's 'pragmatists', dominating the lea- dership, have indeed promoted a moderate interpretation of Islam. Yet the party's base and particularly its youth seem to be moving closer to its 'dogmatic' wing, indicating that the latter might eventually be able to pressure the movement into more conservative and less democratic policies.

Voll, J. 'The Foundations of the Modern Experience. Revival and Reform in the Eighteenth Century', in: Islam. Continuity and Change in the Modern World 2nd ed. 1994, 24-56 & 83.

In his article, Voll writes about three general 18th century themes: - The decentralization of political control because of realignment of politico-economic elements, for example developments in western Europe, where new and bigger markets evolve for products from the Middle East and middle eastern merchants who produce the goods and bring them to Europe. This leads to the rise of a mercantile class in these areas, which makes good money, outside the control of Istanbul. In various parts of the Ottoman empire people got rich and gain more power and political influence, which diminishes the central power of the state. - Reorientation of the Sufi tradition: Voll explains how Islamic history shows a cycle tendency in the expansion and contraction of religious life, alternating between syncretism and purism. The 18th century seems to be a time of contraction. The Sufi tradition was very strong before the 18th century. Ibn Arabi: a great Sufi author. He has the principle of unity. There is nothing in existence, other than God. God is everywhere. That is a philosophy which opens many avenues to adopting other religious traditions. Ibn Arabi also said: my only religion is that of love. That is connected to syncretism. The open Sufi tradition becomes suspect in the eyes of many and gets rejected. This new Sufism also takes the shape of puristic and activist movements. - Emergence of revivalist movements seeking socio-moral reconstruction, feeling the need for a stricter adherence to Quran and rejecting the tradition that divides Muslims in schools of law, this is something many people feel bad about. We have this schools of law, but it is an institutionalised division between believers. This only weakens us. We should try to counter it. We should go directly to the sources and not rely on commentaries in specific schools. With this, you are opening ijtihad (interpreting Quran yourself). That's problematic, because not everyone will agree if they do ijtihad.

Voll, J. 'Introduction', in: Islam. Continuity and Change in the Muslim World 2. What are the four styles of action?

In the experience with coping with change and maintaining continuity, it is possible to define four styles of action: I. Adaptationist: represents a willingness to make adjustments to changing conditions in a pragmatic manner - this style is visible in the political realism of the early caliphs and sultans and is manifested in the intellectual traditions of those thinkers who adapted Greek philosophical traditions in explaining Islamic positions - this style made is possible for Muslims to cope with many great challenges (the first conquests, intellectual challenges) II. Conservatives: motivation behind this style is that the success of Islam brought achievements that are worth preserving hoping to preserve the giants that had been made characterised by a reserved attitude for change that is too rapid = mistrust of innovation tend to be the keynote efforts of the conservatives have served the Islamic community well in times of turmoil: they have helped to keep the compromise of the adaptationist within the bounds of what has become accepted as Islamic in the long run, this style has avoided supporting stagnation of the community by gradually accepting new circumstances as they have become pat of the established order to be preserved III. Fundamentalist: the scriptures of religions that accept the concept of recording divine revelations provide a basis for a permanent standard to use in judging existing conditions. - Quran is this unchangeable standard, and the fundamentals of the faith as presented in the Quran have a universally accepted validity - insist upon a rigorous adherence to the specific and general rules of the faith - presents a critique of existing conditions by calling for a return of the fundamentals of the faith --> distinction fundamentalist and conservative: fundamentalists are unwilling to accept adaptations and are more often critics than defenders of existing conditions. Fundamentalist are frequently political activists and disturbing elements who upset social stability and oppose the conservative establishments. - fundamentalist style serves as a corrective adjustment mechanism: in the context of change and adaptation, they work to keep the basic islamic message in full view: when there are new ideas or techniques that threaten to obliterate the unique and authentically Islamic elements, fundamentalist pressure begins to build MISSION: to keep the adjustments within the range of those options that are clearly Islamic IV. Personal and individual aspects of Islam: this style tends to subordinate legal structures and communal institutions to the personal aspect of piety and leadership by charismatic, divinely guided individuals. - this style of action permeates the whole Islamic experience, and in a general sense, the resistance of the Islamic tradition to the creation of a formal church structure and an ordained clergy is a product of this individualised spirit --> these styles are not formal, separate movements within the Islamic community but represent orientations for actions within the broader Islam experience as a whole.

Al-Khalil, S. 'Preface. On violence', in: Republic of Fear. The politics of Modern Iraq, 1990, ix-xvi.

Iraqi political history -> IS emerged here, and spread into Syria afterwards •1932 Iraq formally independent (from colonies) -> now ruled under King Faisal •1936 Military coup •1937-1941 Six more (military) coups •1943 Est. Arab Baʿth Movement (Damascus) •1940s Strong presence of Iraqi Communist Party •1949 Public hanging in Baghdad of the three leaders of the ICP (public executions become a bigger thing in Iraqi life) •1958 'Free Officers' revolution. Royal family and Prime Minister is murdered. ʿAbd al-Karīm Qāsim becomes PM •1961 Guerilla war breaks out in Kurdish North •1963 Baʿthist coup, street fighting, later Baʿthist party is sidelined •1968 Second Baʿthist coup •1969 public hangings of 17 'spies' in Liberation Square •1970s Intensification of violence •June 1979 Saddam Hussain becomes president, in July: massive purges •1980 Iraq starts a war with Iran (which would last to 1988 and lead to a million deaths) Video: the 1979 purges: - Saddam Hussein: footage where people are crying and hopelessly trying to impress him Islamist violence - Often theatrical: increasingly so -> intention is to shock as many people to make as many people afraid Back to theological justifications: - Religion is crucial not in causing the violence, but it is crucial in giving justifications for the violence. Quote of the spokesperson of IS: "or destroy his crops" -> crops have special meaning

Adnani (spokesperson of IS) responding to Zawahiri (head of AQ): with a poem why is this interesting:

It is ridiculing old age: is appealing to young people who feel like there is a glass ceiling of old people -> goes counter to the traditional idea of politics that appeals to the youth But they express this by the use of a traditional poem.

Badran, Margot 'Political Islam and Gender,' in Esposito & Shahin The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics (2013), DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195395891.013.0035

Its abstract: In examining political Islam and gender it is important to consider experience in specificplaces. There are commonalities as well as differences in Islamist approaches to women and gender across countries at any given time. There are also contradictory approaches within movements and divergent approaches between Islamist men and women as well as among Islamist women. Common features of political Islam's approach to gender across locations have included (1) calls for women to exit the public arena and retreat to thehome as their "proper place" ordained by Islam, (2) a rearticulation of separate roles forthe two sexes grounded in biological difference that religion is said to consecrate, and (3)the resumption of the hijabas a religious dictate vociferously promoted by Islamist movements and imposed by Islamist states

Today: 19th Century Collapse: the Era of modernization and the formation of nation states Kassab, E. 'The First Modern Arab Cultural Renaissance or Nahda', in: Contemporary Arab Thought. Cultural critique from comparative perspective, 2010, 17-39

Kassab: points out numerous times that as of the middle of the 19th C, the outset of the Nagda (intellectual modernist movement), that from this point questions were asked that would continue to be asked for over a hundred years: - He stresses the continuity of these questions: how is it possible that over a hundred years the Arab world has asked the same question? Is it really a hundred years of no progress? = answer found in Hirschkind and Kassab Understanding the emergence of the Middle East: = is best understood in light of these developments: Part 1 Politics & geography • Collapse of Ottoman Empire • The World Wars Part 2 Society & culture • Rise of modern ideologies • Religious reform Part 1 Politics & geography: Collapse of Ottoman Empire and The World Wars Characteristics Ottoman empire: • A dynastic multinational state (1300-1924) • The one who rules were a Turkish military elite versus common peoples (khāssa = the rulers & ʿāmma = the commoners) • Characterized by limited state functions: the state did not have that many responsibility: they only focusses on territory and order, but it really had its limits • Self-rule for minorities: it knew a culture of laisse affair with regards to minorities Problems for the empire that arose: - Economic problems as of 18th century - Establishment of European trading colonies in the Empire (European countries settles in North Africa etc.) - Empire starts losing control over money, peoples, territories: more and more decentralization - Especially the religious minorities are coopted by European powers: these minorities became organically linked to French of British colonial powers - Tunisia: a local dynasty had emerged and ignored the centralized power of the empire So you can see a complex political and economical crisis which needed to be countered: The Empire does what is can: - State takes in new responsibilities: § State adopts economic policies intended to bring back economic strength and control § Health care § Infrastructure (railroads, telegraphs) - To do this: you need something else: civil servants to organize this: § This is the start of state education: states take on education as one of their responsibilities - Parasiting old elites of the empire are brought down à these things were called Tanzimat = reorganizations: strong enough for the state to claim what it needed from its subjects, and eventually its citizens: - Citizens have more rights than subjects, but also more duties à modernization is costly: and thus lead to the bankruptcy of the empire à modernization also needs a story/narrative of cohesion: people do not necessarily want to become 'citizens' and are often fine with living at a distance from the state: modernization thus needs to narrative that convinces people it is worthwhile to be a part of this collective (people should actually believe in it/ willingness to sacrifice their money, labor, their ways of life and customs/ liberties, and once life in war) The empire, while struggling with these issues: enters WWI (on the side of Germany) Three developments then happen: I. A British diplomat McMahon contacts Sharif Hussayn (leader of Arabs): and they come to an agreement that the Arabs would fight the Ottoman empire and in return, when the Empire collapses, they get a Arab kingdom (Revolt in the Desert) II. However at the same time, A French, Russian and British agreement to divide up the Ottoman territories in case of a victory (Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916 (UK, FR, RU). III. The Balfour Declaration 1917: a deal "His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people .." à these three thing are going to play a big role, together with the increasing importance of oil + the British will to have access to India + the problematic relationship between FR and UK WAR ENDS Hussayn-McMahon correspondence, Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour declaration -> toxic mix in the broader context of post-war developments. New political geography: mandated territories intended not to look like colonies, but FR and UK should still have economic benefits - 1932: Ataturk revolts, and establishes the Turkish Republic - The rest: Arab mandates, new borders, local governing elites, gaining 'independence' à all these leaders have an ambition to make a modern state/ nation state: if this works, then there needs to be some kind of agreement with Western powers - Increasing nationalism, increasing state's influence in people's lives Who is governing these mandate territories? · Ambition: state building, stability, progress · Practice: national symbolism, security services, civil services, laisser faire economy · Political culture: nationalist rhetoric (clashing with 'aristocratic' political elites) Increasing pressures: ¨ Nationalist rhetoric contrasting with aristocratic elite: the elite was connected with European powers too ¨ Royal rulers seem to function as colonial pawns ¨ Parliamentary politics fails to bring stability -> people sensed a disconnect on the one hand this populist nationalist message on the one hand, but on the other and this elitism highly influenced by foreign interests WWII and decolonization: With these pressures present, the second world war breaks out. Interestingly, on the one hand economically things could go ok, but politically there was an increase on British control (the UK feared that Germany can take over their control, so there was a stronger British control in the territories in order to prevent this). - Soon after the war: this direct rule stops à independence of the Arab countries that were not independent yet - This decolonization meant the adoption of the colonial borders, and an destruction of the colonial systems of rule: analogy of "changing of the guard" They couldn't change the borders, but they could change the political systems:

Maher, '"JIHAD" in Salafi-Jihadism'. The History of an Idea. 2016, 31-68.

Maher reading: Theologies of Jihad: Verses of tolerance, e.g. Sura 109 (al-Kafirun) [109:1] Say: 'O disbelievers! [109:2] I do not worship what you worship [109:3] and you do not worship what I worship [109:4] nor will I worship what you have worshipped, [109:5] nor will you worship what I worship [109:6] You have your religion and I have a religion' Sword verses: Classical Quran verses tends to abrogate this verse by other verses (that came later). One of the verses that is said to abrogate this verse here above, is the so called Sword verse: there are a view Sword verses, but this is one: The firth verse of the 9th Sura: "But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans (people without religion) wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful." Then, another verse to illustrate this: Quran Commentary (tafsīr) by Jalālayn (is a dude) Why is it that classical Islam scholarship legislated for the possibility of an offensive jihad? Various possibilities: · Continuation of tribal concepts of war: that say that in the absence of an agreement, there is always a possibility of war: this tribal principle is then used on a state level. · Influenced by Byzantine notion of Holy War? Holy war, like crusades, made Islamic scholars reflect on a religiously based war · Ulama (the Islamic scholars) legislated for the state, states go to war: people in power wanted to go to war so influenced the ulama to legislate accordingly · Earlier conquests had to be justified: the conquest that made the Islamic world had to be justified, and certain texts were made to justify this. Into modern times: In the modern age, there is an important reform of Islamic law broadly, but also with regards to Jihad: Reading the same courses, in now different circumstances, scholars come to different conclusions à there is no effective Khalif now (it was common sense at that time that the Khalif is allowed to practice offensive jihad). But because there is no Khalif anymore, offensive jihad would be out of the question. = one conclusion Another conclusion: Jihad is not required in situations where Muslims aren't hindered in the execution of their religion. It is valuable to look people in authority in Lecture by Shawqī ʿAllām (the state Mufti of Egypt), April 2015: He was in the Netherlands and gave a lecture about Islam in the challenge of extremism. "Extremism means eschewing facilitation, leniency, tolerance and the acceptance of the other. Extremist tendencies include rigorousness, excessiveness, inflexibility, and the antithetical duality of inordinateness and forfeiture because all of these are tendencies that operate on the extremes of prevailing accepted beliefs and ideas beyond moderation which is one of the characteristic and established basic principles of Islam as well as deeply ingrained feature of the global community of Muslims. God the Almighty says, "Thus have We made you an Ummah, justly balanced" [2:143]. It is worth mentioning that some impartial analysts have created uproar by claiming that there are certain verses in the Qur'an that call for fighting, killing and slaughtering non-Muslims. Such accusations are totally fallacious and void of truth. There are indeed specific verses in the Qur'an that allow Muslims to defend themselves when they are attacked. This is something that can be found in every religious law and civil code, and more recently we find it being sanctioned by the Geneva Conventions. The Qur'an says, "Fight in the way of God against those who fight against you but avoid aggression for God does not like the aggressor" and "But if they cease (fighting) then God is Forgiving, Merciful". This statement has been repeated many times throughout the second chapter of the Qur'an and forms the basis for the Islamic law of warfare which has only been legislated for the purpose of repelling attacks and protecting one's self, family and nation." "The Arabic word 'jihad' in Islam refers to the struggle against one's lower self. The meaning is fundamentally spiritual, referring to the purification of the heart..."

Murji'a doctrine

Murji'a = a theological position which emerged in the 8th century as a consequence about all the discussions in the Muslim world about who was a good Muslim, who was an infidel, who was justifiably murdered, who is a good ruler etc. The Muji'a follows the theory of Irja: this theory says that these questions, are something you should postpone: you should leave that to god (in the final judgement) à because you cannot tell whether someone is a good Muslim because that is something that lies in the conviction: you cannot tell it from people's actions

Kassab part 1: Characteristics Ottoman empire:

Part 1 Politics & geography: Collapse of Ottoman Empire and The World Wars Characteristics Ottoman empire: • A dynastic multinational state (1300-1924) • The one who rules were a Turkish military elite versus common peoples (khāssa = the rulers & ʿāmma = the commoners) • Characterized by limited state functions: the state did not have that many responsibility: they only focusses on territory and order, but it really had its limits • Self-rule for minorities: it knew a culture of laisse affair with regards to minorities Problems for the empire that arose: - Economic problems as of 18th century - Establishment of European trading colonies in the Empire (European countries settles in North Africa etc.) - Empire starts losing control over money, peoples, territories: more and more decentralization - Especially the religious minorities are coopted by European powers: these minorities became organically linked to French of British colonial powers - Tunisia: a local dynasty had emerged and ignored the centralized power of the empire

Lecture 10 - November 27th Today: political Islam in Tunisia PART 2: after 2011

Past 2: Post-2011: Political Islam enters the public and political sphere On 14 January 2011: Ben Ali fled to country -> we call this a revolution in the sense that it led to a regime change = the end of "authoritarian secularism" This led to a couple of changes; but it's important to realize that the period since 2011 does not know a uniform period of the same relationship between state and religion: Two periods: - 2011-2014: Free Islam from the State A situation of freeing Islam from the state: this thing what Ghannouchi talked about: 'Thus, while the problem in the West centered round the means of liberating the state from religion, ... a major aspect of our problem is to liberate religion from the state.' Opening up the public sphere: · Laws on Islamic dress no longer applied (not appealed though) · Law on mosques no longer applied: as a consequence that these Muslims would kick out the state-appointed imams and replace them with people from Syria, Saudi Arabia etc. · Law on political parties and associations was reformed: which meant that political parties like Annahda could be legalized again -> Ghannouchi returned from exile An election took place: the first free elections was for the assembly of a constitutional assembly to rule the country and write a new constitution (worked kinda like a legislator). Outcome: Annahda received 40% of the seats -> relative majority It was in this period that important members of the Annahda movement said things about state-religion relations: it was possible now to make declarations on such matters in public and on a high level -> Islam would now be free from the state (maximum religious freedom and minimum control) Example of people who got out of prison (now that terrorism law was gone): Dude called: Abu Iyadh Al-Tunisi: his movement was jihad, but they didn't forbid it The religious freedom went very far: even jihadi movements they did not forbid That led to critique, also among people that initially voted on the Annahda movement: è Ambivalence in position towards (jihadi) Salafis è Increasing critique and more and more demonstrations about the relationship between the state and religion Debate of the new constitution: It was the task of the newly elected constitutional assembly (40% Muslim) to write the new constitution: a huge question arose about what is this assembly going to say about the relationship between state and religion? - Is Tunisia going to become a religious or civil state? - At the final moment that the assembly was going to vote on the various articles on religion: Annahda withdrew and compromised à January 2014: shirt from having no control on religion at all (with fear of the importance of religion on the institutional level) to kind of curtailing this influence Outcome: Article 1 (that which was feared to be turned into something like sharia) The new Article 1 actually repeated the old Article 1, by saying that "Islam is Tunisia's religion" In addition, they made a new Article 6: Article 6: "The State is the protector of the religion, It guarantees the Freedom of worship and of conscience, and of the free practice of religious rites (it also guarantees) the neutrality of mosques and places of worship vis-a-vis all ideological instrumentalisation.... Article 6 ...The State engages itself to diffuse values of moderation and tolerance, And to protect the sacred and forbid its violation. The State engages itself to forbid accusations of unbelief (takfir), and to forbid and oppose the incitation to violence and hatred." So, it Tunisia then a religious state or a civil state? à a civil state: since Art. 1 is so much open to interpretation, it can also become a tool for judges to apply sharia law Since Ennahda compromised, it is still an Islamist movement? Ghannouchi, May 2016: "Ennahdha is a democratic and civil political party which uses Muslim and modern values as its points of reference" àso it is not a Islamic movement anymore, simply a political party Is thus then the end of political Islam in Tunisia? NO, because of these remnants: § There are more 'hardcore' factions within the party § There is a rise of Salafism since 2011 § There are also other Islamist political Salafi parties § There are also illegal jihadi movements Where you see a decrease in importance of political Islam on the institutional level since 2014, you see an increase in violent attacks (claimed by IS and alSharia): à multiple attacks in 2015 and 2016 in Tunisia, but also Nice and Berlin Tunisians: "largest amount of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria are from Tunisia (around 6000)" So, it it the end of Political Islam in Tunisia: no, other legalized and illegal groups, and violent jihad has become more prominent WRAP UP: Before 2011: o authoritarian secularism o Repression of political Islam o Political Islam goes underground After 2011: o End of authoritarian secularism o Islamist and Salafist movements entered the public sphere and are able to participate in the elections After 2014: o Modernization Ennahda o Radicalization jihadist Then the question is: will Tunisia go back to authoritarianism again? People are afraid or terrorism now, so maybe they want a strong regime again to attain people, which can be abused again etc. etc.

Salafism: lecture example of article on bears

Salafism: - Example of the beard: example of the textual nature of Salafism = 'the sources speak for itself' Example of this article where it is just quotes of the Prophet and the author does not write that much. ARTICLE ON BEARDS Salafism: the methodology of the Salaf is to adhere to the Quran and the authentic Sunnah (the behavior set by Mohammed) as understood by the Salaf as-Saalih - Very broad in inclusive definition of Salafism - Something more specific: Salafism refers to the first three generations of Islam in which the Prophet Mohammed described as being the best generations of Muslim. - Other characteristics of her article: interest in enemies of the faith

Sayyid Qutb What are some of his notions? (three)

Sayyid Qutb: a classic figure in studies of political Islam - his importance has decreased now (he was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood: a bottom-up organization focused on actions, but not with a broad ideology). Some of his notions: - 'rule of God': not invented by him though - 'age of ignorance': more exclusively related to him -> it is used to refer to the period before the Islam, against which early Islam compares itself. He says that when we look in the world, there is nowhere where there is a Muslim society: he says we need to reboot (done by avant garde) - avant garde (Leninist): he says we need a front of people who are breaking through barriers to give a good example to the masses (to awake them of their false awareness) and make them realize what situation they are in Another thing on him: he was not exactly a great scholar: he did not have broad religious schooling, he had a very broad knowledge of the modern world: he turned extreme while in prison and radicalized there - he has weak credentials -> this standing becomes more important in times when Salafism became more important

Mawardi, Al (transl. Wahba) The Ordinances of Government, 1996, 1-7 & 238-245.

So basically, Mawardi's work is an Islamic legal assessment of the principles of government, but also an attempt to argue for more khalifl authority: but he also expresses pragmatics: express the principles of government and find theological justifications for it. --> then what you take from it is that is completely unrealistic to see a state function on that basis -> classical Islamic law, including its theories of governance as referred to here in Mawardi, were never about absolutes, but were rather part of a cultural discussion: the exchange of opinions - How does this compare to modern law? - it is flexible, and assumes an active receiver that works with the material: you can't just apply it: = classical Islamic law is therefore not a blueprint you can just use: they can still be an inspiration, but you cannot blindly follow it. = this text is ascribed to show how complicated it is to apply sharia _____________________________________________________________________________ Today: Politics and the State in the Muslim World: Mawardi: died in 1058, scholar of Islamic law and a Kurd: Diplomat for two caliphs who were ruling in the time of the Buyids dynasty in Baghdad, the seat of the caliphate. The Buyids are Shi'a Muslims but they do leave the caliph in place, because they did not want to disrupt society. - Mawardi's work is an Islamic legal assessment of the principles of government, but also an attempt to argue for more khalifl authority: but he also expresses pragmatics: express the principles of government and find theological justifications for it. - This text illustrate that it is impossible to adopt classical Islamic theories of the state as a blueprint for modern statecraft: this was a desire from the perspective of political Islam His text: I. Mawardi explains whether it is necessary to have a sovereign: it is possible to live without one supreme leader: Muwardi says that: "there is disagreement as to whether the obligation is derived on rational grounds or imposed by heavenly law". II. What are the conditions then? Who can become a khalif? à he says that he has to be of "notable Qurayshite descent" ? III. "Supreme leadership is established in two ways: selection by the electors, or appointment by a predecessor. There is considerable disagreement among scholars on the number of electors necessary for the valid investment of the sovereign". IV. Description of adultery: "The proper is the testimony of four just men, but no women, that he has committed fornication, attesting that they witnessed the entry of his penis into the vagina as the kohl-stick enters the cosmetics jar" -> classical Islamic law, including its theories of governance as referred to here in Mawardi, were never about absolutes, but were rather part of a cultural discussion: the exchange of opinions - How does this compare to modern law? - it is flexible, and assumes an active receiver that works with the material: you can't just apply it: = classical Islamic law is therefore not a blueprint you can just use: they can still be an inspiration, but you cannot blindly follow it. = this text is ascribed to show how complicated it is to apply sharia Early 20th century, people realized the importance of a strong state (not only to keep European interests at bay, but also enjoy a strong state's facilities like education, infrastructure etc.). Two mutually antagonistic quests appeared: I. How to get a strong state II. How to get a just state Problem: how to combine these two demands These were two bottom-up movements, so the opposite of elitist movements: 1. The idea of an 'Islamic State' emerged after the reassurance of the Caliphate was removed and the modern State made its entry into the Muslim world. - The political norm at the time was that established by liberal parties: liberal in their economic and cultural outlook (secular liberal politics was the norm). This was until WWII, where these movements (often connected to royal houses) were confronted with revolutions: this introduced enormous changes: now you saw, for a couple of decades, no longer liberal (but still secular) politics: 2. Political Islam is not about restoring some mythical 'Oriental despotism (= absolute power)'; much of it is quite the opposite in its bottom-up approach: it is a mass-movement ideology. - Both of these approaches are theological and focus on religious texts: Achmed reading: He is an anthropologists, so he doesn't like texts: he points that sharia was never at the core of governance

Tensions between Zarqawi and Osama Bin Laden and their Nachleben: Two incompatible characters

Tensions between Zarqawi and Osama Bin Laden and their Nachleben: Two incompatible characters Osama bin Laden in Nov. 2001: "We are only defending ourselves against the US. This is a defensive jihad to protect our land and people. That's why I have said that if we don't have security, neither will the Americans. It's a very simple equation that any American child could understand: live and let others live. Letter Al-Zarqawi to Bin Laden in 2004: "[The Shia] in our opinion are the key to change. I mean that targeting and hitting them in [their] religious, political, and military depth will provoke them to show the Sunnis their rabies and bare the teeth of the hidden rancor working in their breasts. If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and annihilating death at the hands of these Sabeans."

Euben, R. 'Fundamentalism', in: Böwering Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, 2012, 179-188.

So basically, fundamentalism refers to contemporary religiopolitical movements that aim to establish the primacy of scriptural authority as a defence against the moral, political and social decay that supposedly defines the modern world. - in everyday language: it is often used to describe inflexible and dogmatic beliefs of any kind --> but such common connotations tend to obscure the specific cultural and historical circumstances that produced both the term and the movement it originally described Islamism/ political Islam: is constituted by a complex dialectic between the selective appropriation of texts and precedents by Islamist thinkers and leaders, and the ways such ideas are enacted and reworked by Islamist activists. ___________________________________________________________________ Fundamentalism: refers to contemporary religiopolitical movements that aim to establish the primacy of scriptural authority as a defense against the moral, political and social decay that supposedly defines the modern world. Tradition becomes a conscious commitment in need of systematic justification when longtime rituals, beliefs and practices can no longer be taken for granted. Paradoxically, then, defenders of tradition are actually reconstructing it in response to challenge and change. Islamism is constituted by a complex dialectic between the selective appropriation of texts and precedents by Islamist thinkers and leaders, and the ways such ideas are enacted and reworked by Islamist activists. His conclusion: "Islamism is thus constituted by a complex dialectic between the selective appropriation of texts and precedents by Islamist thinkers and leaders, and the ways such ideas are enacted and reworked by Islamist activists forged in the crucible of Egyptian prisons, Pakistani villages, Gazan refugee camps, Saudi schools, French housing projects, British mosques, and the battlefields of Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq".

Lecture 1: Bernard Lewis

So basically, he says that there is something in the religion of Islam that gives way of a mixture of rage and hatred. _____________________________________________________________________________ Bernard Lewis, great name in Islamic studies. He has written an article in 1992, called 'the roots of Muslim rage'. He writes: "There is something in the religious culture of Islam which inspired in even the humblest peasant or peddler, a dignity and a courtesy toward others never exceeded and rarely equalled in other civilizations. And yet, in moments of upheaval and disruptions, when the deeper passions are stirred, this dignity and courtesy toward others can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and hatred." Bernard Lewis quote -> contains alternative explanations for this Muslim hatred: - Lewis would say no this is not the reasons, not US support for Israel etc.: he says it is something in the culture of Islam -> what is the purpose of this article then you might wonder? The purpose was to say that the other explanations are not correct explanations So basically, he says that there is something in the religion of Islam that gives way of a mixture of rage and hatred. This, of course, is not an explanation. It is pseudo-scholarly, but it has a politically meaning: it is this something in the religious culture of Islam that causes the hatred, not the attitude of the West, so the West can just continue as they are.

Kassab part 2 19th century:

So basically: 19th century = process of comprehensive transformation - ulama divested of their social prestige - emergence modern state with new category of national citizen (which replaced the religious category) - direct interference of European powers --> this all created a new cultural, political and social framework with an insecure position for Islam Part 2 Society & culture: Rise of modern ideologies and Religious reform Beyond political history and the adoption of modern techniques of war and governance: the socio-cultural aspects of modernization. Ask yourself: What did the life of the last caliph of Islam look like? -> lecture: picture of a room: a very European elitist vibe: classical music, paintings etc. (could have been Vienna) Two key issues: I. The expansion of the state: II. The decline of the ulama (please note that the rest of this course meeting we will be focusing on developments in the Arab world) - Transformation of public space: · European influences in architecture · Clock towers: means to collectivize people - Centralization of state powers: necessary for states to survive Modernization, Europeanization, estrangement -> these changes created a sense of urgency for scholars: the intellectual quest - How did we come to lag behind? - How to progress without becoming copies of Europe? We now focus on the Arab world -> the Nahda: discourse about where the Arabs should go to and how they should progress (= the Arabic renaissance): Belief in progress and a Great Past (invention of tradition): - Adoption of aspects of European life - Mobilization of 'authentic' heritage → strategy against Western hegemony → defining one's own modern identity: this quest for progress and authenticity took 2 forms: 1. Nationalism: First: cultural nationalism (Nahda was a precursor to this kind of nationalism: people first develop an awareness of cultural specificities and similarities Then: state nationalism Later: Panarabism/ Arab nationalism -> a great past would then encourage to modernize Nationalist ideologies typically sought to transcend religious divisions and to claim the public sphere for itself, to the exclusion of religious authorities. 2. Religious reform Names of religious reformers: Rifāʿah al-Ṭahṭāwī d.1873 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī d. 1897 Muḥammad ʿAbduh d.1905 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā d.1935 -> similar on how modernization was formed by nationalistic ideologies, religious thought also placed a role in the process of modernization: religion was kinda in a crisis (they were more and more irrelevant: there was now state secular education etc.) Concepts are given new meaning, e.g: Islam: religion -> civilization Umma: islamdom -> political community (might be Muslim, might not) Shura: consultation -> democracy Certain notions, approaches and scholars from the past become prominent again: Maṣlaḥa, ijtihād, Ibn Rushd (Averroës) Islam becomes part of modern public debate. Islam often employed as a social instrument instead of a route to salvation. The Nahda splits: • Liberal-nationalist-secular (Islam as a personal affair, but Islam needs to be modernized where necessary) Ṭaha Ḥusayn • Islamic fundamentalist (Islam as key, modernity needs to be Islamized) Rashīd Riḍā Shifts in Ideological power • Interbellum: state-nationalism (liberal) • After WWII: pan-nationalism (anti-imperialist), pan-arabism, socialism • From 1970s: growing popularity of 'Islamic fundamentalism' Until the 1980's there was no such thing as 'Islamism' or Islamic fundamentalism in the media. IN SUM: in the course of the 19th C a process of comprehensive transformation took place in most parts of the Muslim world, in which the class of ulama were divested of their social prestige and function, and in which modern states emerged with the new category of the national citizen, taking the place of the religious categories. All this happened with direct interference of European powers. This created a new political, social and cultural framework with an insecure position for the ordering framework of Islam. A continuing conundrum for decades to come.

Mahmood, Saba. 'Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival', in: Cultural Anthropology 2001, 16:2, 202-236.

So basically: Mahmood criticises that agency is always discussed in a liberalising context. Because maybe there is no universal desire for individual autonomy --> she criticises the presumption of the universality of resistance against male dominance (we should instead take into account the desires, motivations, commitments and aspirations of the people to whom these practices are important) Her argument: is that in order for us to be able to judge, in a morally and politically informed way, even those practices we consider objectionable, it is important to take into consideration the desires, motivations, commitments, and aspirations of the people to whom these practices are important. ____________________________________________________ - Feminist theory (post-colonial theory): imparting agency, identifying struggle - Why join a movement that reinforces your subservience? (false awareness?) Her article: she is a feminist, but her article is also a critique of something that is prevalent in feminism: the trouble which feminist tends to have with the phenomena of women being a part of political Islam -> this seems counterintuitive (why join that which suppresses you). - Is this 'agency' to adopt the veil in this context? Women who join Islamist movements are a problem for feminism. Why do they join such movements, while the movement goes against their interest? - Feminist theory (post-colonial theory): imparting agency, identifying struggle - Why join a movement that reinforces your subservience? (false awareness??) Mahmood: questioning assumptions - Maybe agency need not be liberatory? Mahmood criticizes the idea that agency is always discussed in a liberalising context. - Maybe there is no universal desire for individual autonomy? What would Mahmood say? - This is typically a Western feminist reading of vestiary custom. It presumes the universality of resistance against male dominance.

Difference Sunni and Shiites Islam

Sunni position --> accommodating position: They accept all 4 as legitimate rulers, so they say that the only thing until then that went wrong was the Omayyad dynasty, until then everything was legitimate Shiite position --> the Imamate was never legitimate except with Ali and after him his offspring (none of whom ever rules) à the Imam is a unique being with a superior relation to God. à so they need to be related to Mohammed and Fatima (in this bloodline qualify) = This notion of charismatic leader

Difference - Sunni and Shtes Islam iites

Sunni position:

Another Push factor :for IS proposed by Piketty:

The Piketty theory: in local regions you have an immense inequality (as a driver of social unrest). "Oil controls the money, not the people": the countries with the least population in the Middle East have the most wealth, suggesting a toxic level of inequality in the region. - With regards to the 3rdcategory: thus people from the poorer countries in the region (Tunisia, Eqypt etc.) perceive this as inequality and as a consequence join IS = people take the inequality personally: they do not accept the inequality because the inequality is not the result of hard work etc. èLecturer: says this is not a factor at all (local inequality yes, regional no)

The allure of IS: what makes IS appealing?

The allure of IS: what makes IS appealing? To get the answer, you have to look at the different constituencies of those who would support IS: - Locally Iraq - Locally Syria - Globally Muslim world - Globally Western world Iraq:those living in parts of IS territory; they had experienced the collapse of the state they were living in. 2003: US invaded, Syria let jihad's out of prison and they went to Iraq èIncreasing sectarian conflict Syria: people suddenly found themselves under IS control - But from 2011: the violence used by governmental forces was very sectarian: to terrify other minorities (very similar to Zawqabi IS leader's policies) Globally Muslim and Western world: seeking money, adventure, violence etc.

The battered dervishes of Bab Zuwayla:

The battered dervishes of Bab Zuwayla: Bab Zuwayla is the southern gate to the old city of Cairo. To the left of this get is the Zuwayla mosque, and it has two minarets placed on top of the tho gate towers. In 1711, this mosque was a place where people studies Islamic law, but also a place where Sufis come together and study. There was a Turkish student, who had certain objections: He says that certain behavior makes people infidels: he has very specific criticisms. This leads to reactions, and people listen and beat up some Sufis at the mosque + they remove certain holy items from the Mosque. The people in the neighbourhood were very displeased with this, because this is their way of life. These people go to the sheikh and say what has happened. They get a fatwa, signed by three schools of law (Hanbali doesn't sign), saying that the practice of Saints exists and the Turkish student (here called a 'mu'tazilit') is wrong. Denying that the prophet has seen the tablet, is a statement that you are not allowed to make. If you say so, you must rebuke or you must be killed. But what is missing in this fatwa? There is no argument: they just say "he is wrong". There are no theological arguments. The position of scholars is that their people are living their life like they are used to and that there is no gain in changing that.The Turkish student is quite pleased with the fatwa without the theological argument. He calls the scholars unbelievers. That is takfir. One normally does not do this very lightly. It is interesting to see that he does, while the scholars say he is wrong but do not call him kafir. In the end, it doesn't end well for him or his followers. The incident is interesting because of the arguments he brings: these are the types of arguments you can find today in Salafi discourse à same arguments of the dilution of the faith as Salafists today also claim. · Also interesting because Peters also goes into what goes on socio-economically: what it takes to make it as a religious scholar at the time · Also interesting are the ethnic slurs in the discourse

18th Century Revival, Reform and the Case of Wahhabism: Voll and Peters:

The term fundamentalism is problematic, also in these two articles: if these articles would have been written today, this word would not have been used: it is not super obvious what word we would use today: maybe reformism or Salafism VOLL: The general 18th Century themes of the Muslim world: I. Decentralization of political control because of a realignment of politico-economic elements (North-African transmediterranean trading centers): For example developments in western Europe, where new and bigger markets evolve for products from the Middle East and middle eastern merchants who produce the goods and bring them to Europe. This leads to the rise of a mercantile class in these areas, which makes good money, outside the control of Istanbul. In various parts of the Ottoman empire people got rich and gain more power and political influence, which diminishes the central power of the state. II. Reorientation of the Sufi-tradition (e.g. Naqshbandiyya order) In Voll's words: this was a time of contraction after a time of expansion (of Sufi thought) Can also be activist instead of just reading and contemplating: Sufism in this new fashion can be very activist too: creating army and waving jihad: Voll explains how Islamic history shows a cycle tendency in the expansion and contraction of religious life, alternating between syncretism and purism. The 18th century seems to be a time of contraction. The Sufi tradition was very strong before the 18century. Ibn Arabi: a great Sufi author. He has the principle of unity. There is nothing in existence, other than God. God is everywhere. That is a philosophy which opens many avenues to adopting other religious traditions. Ibn Arabi also said: my only religion is that of love. That is connected to syncretism. The open Sufi tradition becomes suspect in the eyes of many and gets rejected. This new Sufism also takes the shape of puristic and activist movements. III. Emergence of revivalist movements seeking socio-moral reconstruction: Feeling the need for a stricter adherence to Quran and rejecting the tradition that divides Muslims in schools of law, this is something many people feel bad about. We have this schools of law, but it is an institutionalized division between believers. This only weakens us. We should try to counter it. We should go directly to the sources and not rely on commentaries in specific schools. With this, you are opening ijtihad (interpreting Quran yourself). That's problematic, because not everyone will agree if they do ijtihad.

The (third) Modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Abd Al Aziz:

Then, the (third) Modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Abd Al Aziz: 1902: Sultan of Nejd, Abdelazziz captured Rijaad and becomes Sultan. After that he begins a wave of further conquests. That reaches a decisive moment in 1924, when the Hejaz is conquered, on the cost of the Hashimite clan. The Hashimite ruler came from the Hashim clan of Muhammad! Abdelazziz also becomes king of Hejaz.How did Abdelazziz conquer these areas? In 1912 he started a movement, the Ikhwan ('brothers'), they were former nomads who had abandoned the nomadic life. They made a migration from the desert to settlements where they wanted to be farmers and have a pure Muslim life. They were strict about praying times, dress and the separation of men and women. When they ceased to be a Bedouin, their entire life changed. The group is ready to sacrifice everything for religion, but it also a needy group, because they changed their life but had never been farmers. Abdelazziz offered them money and materials. United by the submission to God and His laws, makes the sense of cohesion in the group and Abdelazziz becomes the leader of the group. There are people from various tribes and ethnicities in this group. Abdelazziz is the leader, but he must lead in consultation with the scholars, the 'ulama. He did.After the conquest of the Hejaz there is a conflict between Abdelazziz and the Ikhwan. This is 1930- 1932. The Ikhwan want to conquer the north, which was then ruled by the British. Abdelazziz is in contact with the British and does not want to fight with them. This created anger among the Ikhwan, because they are not in it for the political success of Abdelazziz, but they are in it for God. In 1932 this comes to an open conflict where the Ikhwan are destroyed. After that, the two kingdoms, the Nejd and the Hejaz are put together and then you have the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.During the years after, there wasn't always such a strict religious rule in every part of the country. That changed in 1979, when it became really strict everywhere and when Saudi Arabia also started to teach its teachings elsewhere. Also, the little establishments of the four schools of law near the Kaaba were removed. 1979: the Islamic Revolution in Iran à this shocked the Saudi's, because a religion revolution threatens you when your political power is based on religious legitimacy. They started anti-shia propaganda.The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan à the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan was of great importance in the creation of Al Qaeda. Saddam Hussain takes presidency --> we'll discuss this later in the course. Occupation of the Kaaba à there was a man, Juhaiman, from one of the original Ikhwan settlements. Juhaiman is displeased with the internationalisation of Saudi Arabia (because of the oil trade). His father and grandfather were present at the battle in 1932. He joined a Salafi group, which was led by Sheikh Binbaz, who would later become the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia in 1990s. Juhaiman was known to led a simple life and he soon got a group of followers, who he called the Ikhwan. So, you see that there is a strong link between the early Ikhwan and this group of Ikhwan. On November 20th 1979, the first day of the year 1400 (this is an important date because in Islam people believe that every new century brings a renewer of faith), a few hundred of Juhaimans follower went into the Kaaba and declared that Juhaiman was the Mahdi and they rebelled against the Saudi state. The demand was that Saudi Arabia would cease all the export to the US and that Saudi Arabia would evict all the people from abroad. It took two weeks before, with the help of the French and Pakistani, this group of rebels were removed from the Kaaba. Those who were captured were captured for a lot of things: but not of kufr. They were however guilty of other things, which was serious enough for them to be killed. They were beheaded in eight different public places in cities in Saudi Arabia, to set an example for the people. It was a terrible shock for the Saudi authorities that a group of people could gain control of the holiest place of Islam. That is a sign that you are incompetent as the king of Saudi Arabia. What happened thereafter? You see that the answer of the Saudi authorities is that they bring more religion and more restriction to public life. They give more power to the religious police.

Peters, R. 'The Battered Dervishes of Bab Zuwayla. A Religious Riot in Eighteenth-Century Cairo', in: Levtzion & Voll Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform in Islam 1987, 93-115.

Today we are going to focus on the revivalist developments among the cosmopolitan world of the Arabian Peninsula, but first, let's take a look at the article of Peters: In his article, Peters talks about the battered dervishes of Bab Zuwayla. In 1711, at the Mu'ayyad mosque. Bab Zuwayla is a gate to get in the old centre of the Cairo, and on the left, was the Mu'ayyad mosque where the events took place. There were some attributes that referred to saints and djinns or something. There was a Turkish student from low background, who had a little following the in mosque. He argues that certain things are very wrong, like to believe in the miracle of saints. He also says it is not right to believe that the prophet Muhammad saw the tablet. It is not allowed to burn candles on or kiss the graves of saints. It is forbidden to do dhikr and it is forbidden to do dhikr at the gate of Bab Zuwayla during the month of Ramadan, others must stop them. When he preaches this, the same evening something happens. Some Sufi people do dhikr at the Bab Zuwayla. His followers stopped those of who did dhikr and took the amulets away. The people in the neighbourhood were very displeased with this, because this is their way of life. These people go to the sheikh and say what has happened. They get a fatwa, signed by three schools of law (Hanbali doesn't sign), saying that the practice of Saints exists and the Turkish student (here called a 'mu'tazilit') is wrong. Denying that the prophet has seen the tablet, is a statement that you are not allowed to make. If you say so, you must rebuke or you must be killed. But what is missing in this fatwa? There is no argument: they just say "he is wrong". There are no theological arguments. The position of scholars is that their people are living their life like they are used to and that there is no gain in changing that. The Turkish student is quite pleased with the fatwa without the theological argument. He calls the scholars unbelievers. That is takfir. One normally does not do this very lightly. It is interesting to see that he does, while the scholars say he is wrong but do not call him kafir. In the end, it doesn't end well for him or his followers. Islamic law Scholars feel the tendency to obey the strict texts, but also to create opportunities for the people. There is a case in Nigeria, ten years ago, where a Nigerian woman had had sex. There were not four male witnesses, but she was pregnant, so it was considered proven that she had had sex. Fundamentalists in Nigeria and Uganda felt that it was good to stone her, because it would show the world what is right and wrong. So, to go against the international norm is a way to show your point of view. Back to the case of Nigeria. In Nigeria, there is the Maliki school of law. This school says that the fact that a woman is pregnant does prove that she has had sex, but it could also be a sleeping foetus. The idea of the sleeping foetus is that the foetus can fall asleep in the womb, like a coma, and continue to do so for years, until he wakes up and finally grows etc. So, a Dutch lawyer of the woman argued that she had a sleeping foetus and that the baby was thus still the product of the man she had married before.What is important in this case is that you see the speed of shari'a appliance. It is the result of activists who want this and who urge the authorities to do see. However, there is hardly anything in place, like lawyers and judges who know enough to proceed with shari'a law. For example, here was a Dutch lawyer who came up with the possibility of the sleeping foetus.

Lecture 11 - December 2nd Today: Islamic Republic of Iran

Today: Islamic Republic of Iran - How it is Islam (Shia is dominant) - Its contemporary history - The mix of domestic oppression during the reign of various shad's and foreign interference: there were many answers to this: o Political Islam was one of them o But there are various other relevant ones Why is Iran an Islamic Republic? And what does that mean anyway? Structure for today: 1. Role of the ulama (clerics) and their role in the struggle against despotism and foreign denomination 2. The policies of XXX (two shahs): and the clothing policies 3. Then, the policies of his son o Repression of other forms of resistance in the 1940's and 1950's o Breakdown of the coalition o The ideology of Mohammed PXXX: the bloodshed 4. Homeni: how he became the figure head and leader of the revolution 5. The Irani revolution 6. The consolidation of the Islamic republic 7. The current structure Iran: lots of ethnicities (61% Persian) - Map on ethnicities: illustrates the various sources of identity in Iran -> very diverse - Map of relief: lots of mountains Late 19th century: Nasreddine Shah ruled the country: Iran's social hierarchy at the time: I. The Shah: II. Landed upper class: the notables served as gatekeepers to make sure the money came in for the shah and to be ministers etc. III. Propertied middle class (bazar, ulema): this one is relevant when looking at the revolution: close connection between bazar and religion IV. Urban wage earners: often not supporting of the shah V. Rural population: were general very supporting of the shah Why were people unhappy in Iran in the late 19th Century: - The concessions given to foreign entities: created anger among Iranian people: o To deal with this unhappiness, shahs would hire foreign Western individuals to aid in running the country o This means that the gap between the crown and the population grew bigger and bigger as the foreign influence increased o This growing interaction with the West, and more people becoming aware of Western ideas about democracy and constitutions, we see a demand for constitutional reforms § This was especially among the ulama: they were able to mobilize the bazaris and the lower classes to start strikes § Sha's reaction: usually he used repression, but this time the protesters went to the British embassy for refuge (12000 people there) à Ulama were able to mobilize so many people = this set a precedent we can see throughout history o Ulama: had a good position: § Close relation to the bazaris § They gave the Friday speeches 1907: the country got a constitution, and even a parliament è Didn't last long: the Shah's son took over (Reza Shah), and continued the concessions to foreign influences (especially Russia and UK) o Continuing of foreign denomination and the protests in response è How did he get to power? Military coupe o As soon as he had power he started to secularize the nation o 1927: he made it mandatory for the entire male population to wear the Pahlavi hat o 1928: uniform dress law o 1935: the Pahlavi hat got replaced by a phedora hat - There were exceptions to this: as a cleric you could apply for exception from these rules: but this essentially meant that the shah could decide who was a real cleric and who isn't o 1928: women were now allowed to unveil o 1935: veil was prohibited in schools and government offices o 1936: complete unveiling - Shah became notorious: his idea was to emancipate women, but what happen was that lots of women just stayed inside. - What does this mean for the ulama or political Islam? o Lots of unhappiness of the Pahlavi family - Mohammed Reza Phahlavi (his son) took over: (UK and Russia supported this because they wanted to occupy Iran and they thought that if they got rid of the shah the Persians would support them) o He wasn't very powerful (very young): was good for democracy. - This allowed two groups to come to power: 1. The communists: they gained a lot of support. Shah got scared and tried to get rid of it through defamation (talking about them badly) 1946: there was an attempt to attack the Shah, and this was blamed on the communists. They lost a lot of support. 2. The nationalists: Mohammed Mossadeq: he became the prime minister of Iran in 1951: he wanted to nationalize the oil industry (before that the British mostly enjoyed the oil), and he did. UK wasn't happy about this and convinced the US that they were actually just communists: so they put the Shah back in power (1953) (he had fled abroad), and since then the US increased its commitment to the shah -> the US then kind of replaced the UK. à sidelining the communists and nationalist meant that the only option that was left was political Islam: - The ulama supported the reinstated Shah now (they changed their mind because they were also convinced that the nationalist Mossadeq was actually a communist) June 1963: protests: - Land reforms made people angry: this meant that the people that owned land were forced to sell the land to the state, who then resold it to people who were previously tenants (meant that many people lost their jobs and land) This created a huge group of people who moved to the city and started slums: o The land reforms also reduced the powers of the notables and the ulama: the ulama and notables used to own lots of land, now they didn't anymore - The Shah's white revolution: a modernization policy from the Shah: is called a white revolution because the shah said that this is what the people want, so there doesn't have to be a violent (red) revolution to achieve it. ? wut US was happy: they supported this o The White revolution, not just land reforms and modernization: also deeply ideological (very Western): § Women were allowed to vote § More dependence on the West o Ulama thought this was a total downfall for Iran o - Mainly because of the economic crisis, and partly because of the anger of the ulama, the people were mobilized in 1962 against the Shah: horrible bloodshed (demonstrations were violently oppressed) What did this mean for political Islam? - Meanly the white revolution gave those people favoring political Islam a clearly identified ideology to fight against o Now more clear what the distinctions were; on the one hand the moral, domestic Islam, and on the other hand the message of the Shah (Western, pre-Islamic identities) - An other advantage of Political Islam: the shah was very violent, and political Islam was all about martyrdom against the shah. à this made political Islam the best alternative for the ideology of the Shah Now, the role of Khomeini (the leader of the Islamic revolution): - We was a cleric: held speeches against the white revolution - He was exiled in 1964: he then led the opposition from abroad - Why was he so powerful? Why was it him that became the leader of the revolution? 1) He was very charismatic (was seen as humble etc.) 2) His exile: while it was supposed to isolate him, it actually helped him: the shah could not oppress people from outside Iran 3) There wasn't an alternative: no one was like him or had the capacity to unite 4) He didn't compromise: he did not want to talk to the shah at all: this radical approach made him very effective 5) The revolution itself: the main motivation for the revolutions weren't ideological, but economic (even though maybe the opposition was all united because of anti-imperialism) -> Khomeini was able to unite all these groups The period of consolidation after the revolution: When the revolution succeed in 1979, Khomeini returned and a prime minister (liberal Muslim dude = Mehdi Bazargan) was put into place (Khomeini probs did that because he thought he was able to speak to a larger group of revolutionaries). However, in the years following the Islamic Republican Party (Khomeini's new party) got a hold of power: o Number of developments relevant here: · The referendum on March 30th 1979: "do you want to replace the monarchy with an Islamic republic of which the constitution still needs to be drawn up (which would also be voted to again). Ended in a 98% success for the Islamic Republic (Bazargan's first loss) · Then: the struggle for the constitution: the PM thought it was not liberal enough: he wanted a special council to draw up a new one (while others wanted a more religious/ fundamentalist constitution). As a result: he didn't know that the council also had members that wanted it to be more fundamentalist: so as a result the constitution ended up being even more fundamentalist than the initial draft (Bazargan's second loss) · Constitution got accepted: why? There was two events that created a sense of emergency to take harsher stands on certain issues: On the one hand the hostage crisis, and on the other hand the war with Iraq: it was in these circumstances that the IRP (Khomeini's party) was able to cancel out all opposition. · Bazargan had to resign (he was framed as a supporter of the West: just defamation): he fled · The IRP started a cultural revolution: closed universities, change the curricula, women were forced to wear a veil Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980: Houssein thought it was a good timing because the: 1) country was weak 2) he was scared because of the great appeal of the revolution in the rest of the Middle East 3) he was still upset about some land issue He thought it was gonna be easy, but is wasn't: they ended up being in a war for 8 years - within two years the Irani had fought back to the Iraqi's until their territory: the war could have ended here but the war had become so important for the consolidation of the new regime (its message of martyrdom and the extension of the Islam revolution), the Irani's continued and wanted to take Baghdad. - This was is very important for the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran now: it created an excuse to repress people - The scar of the War cannot be underestimated What did all of this result in? The current structure of Iran democracy today: importance of the Supreme Leader (appoints a lot of ministers and they need to be Islamic enough etc.) FACTORS - Iran: thus democratic and theocratic at the same time - Another factor: the close circles of elites that run the country Interestingly: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President from 2005-2013, was not from this circle of elite: one of the main reasons he came to power leads to another important source of political identity in Iran: The continued importance of revolutionary organizations: 1) the revolutionary guards or Bonjads: not just an army but also an economic and cultural actors Wrapping up: Why is Iran a republic and what does that mean anyway? è It is not only about Islam, it's about resistance (against the West) è Iran is the language, but it is not the message è The main source for political change: anger on Western interference: there were many answers to this anger on the Shah, but political Islam became the best option: Khomeini's charismatic leadership added to shit and united the anti-imperialist factions. After the Iraq war and the hostage crisis, both added to the consolidation of the IRP at the expense of other movements Since then, the system has been kept in place by close circles of elites and organizations (like the Bonjads and revolutionary guards), and a theocratic overlay in the system also makes sure that the Iranian regimes stays Islamic.

Lecture on jihad: What are the two broad tendencies/ approaches to extreme violence?

Today: Jihad: theologies and practices Greater and lesser jihad -> here: 'Lesser jihad' What we do today: Understanding contemporary jihadist violence in light of 1) religious justifications 2) in the context of experiences of political violence Theology not as a motivation, but as a (subjective) justification for violence. But first: how to approach extreme violence: In efforts to understand why people use extreme violence, or to offer their own lives for this, there are broadly two tendencies or approaches: 1. Rational choice: trying to explain things as if they were a rational choice - you look at the circumstances of this individual that drive a person to do a certain thing (socio-economic and political context) 2. Irrationality (religiously/ideologically driven): you explain it in such a way that it becomes very alien behavior. It is all by itself an irrational monstrous act (beastly), and you then look at the religion or ideology as a brainwash (the person has been made mad and lost its common sense). An example to illustrate this: the Maji Maji rebellion (1905-1907) against Germany: This story illustrates how people do things purely out of conviction, even though it is irrational. You should look at the history of political violence, but also contemporary political violence more broadly. Sayyid Qutb: a classic figure in studies of political Islam - his importance has decreased now (he was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood: a bottom-up organization focused on actions, but not with a broad ideology). Some of his notions: - 'rule of God': not invented by him though - 'age of ignorance': more exclusively related to him -> it is used to refer to the period before the Islam, against which early Islam compares itself. He says that when we look in the world, there is nowhere where there is a Muslim society: he says we need to reboot (done by avant garde) - avant garde (Leninist): he says we need a front of people who are breaking through barriers to give a good example to the masses (to awake them of their false awareness) and make them realize what situation they are in à another thing on him: he was not exactly a great scholar: he did not have broad religious schooling, he had a very broad knowledge of the modern world: he turned extreme while in prison and radicalized there - he has weak credentials -> this standing becomes more important in times when Salafism became more important

Lecture on gender: "Muslim practices of gender and sexuality is partially a product of the Western gaze" (link this with the concept of authenticity)

Today: authorizing sex, authenticating gender Readings for today: - Mahmood - Badran The political nature of sexuality and gender: they are both a part of the politics of violence Contents for this evening: I. A necessarily broader picture II. Concept of gender and that is it not immutable III. On how certain norms became 'typically Islamic' IV. Discuss the Doha Debate I. A necessary broader picture: Political Islam -> Islam -> religion -> social customs = To only look at religion, is too narrow: social norms on sexuality and gender behavior are not dictated by behavior, rather religious norms emerge in a context of existing social customs. Gender, in the context of social sciences, is not a reference to the sex, but rather a subjective notion of what meaning is given to maleness and femaleness. II. Concept of gender and that is it not immutable - These meanings often seem immutable and a given: within your own culture you are more familiar that the current gender norms have not always been like this: but of course in other cultures this concept is also not constant III. On how certain norms became 'typically Islamic' Many aspects now commonly seen as Islam, have become a part of the Muslim behavior repertoire: not in an effort to become distinctly Islamic, but rather the opposite -> they were a part of the process of assimilation -> from adoption of regional elite norms (assimilation) (of the Mesopotamian conquerors etc.), to markers of difference Veil example: to illustrate the instability of the social meaning of the veil - Video: Nassar on the Muslim Brotherhood and veiling: video shows a man expressing liberal views and a whole room laughing at the comments of another man that wanted to force all women to veil themselves when in the street o Illustrates how gender norms were perceived in Egypt at that time A key factor has been Western colonial interference and the post-colonial order: for centuries religious differences hardly correlated with gender norms differences (Westerns and Islamic were kinda the same) - Only from the 19th century, where the West/ Christians were in confrontation with the Muslim world, the Muslim world started to respond to the European perception of them (oppressive to women and against gays) -> "Muslim practices of gender and sexuality is partially a product of the Western gaze" (link this with the concept of authenticity: political Islam speaks the language of authenticity, but in fact is helping this process of modernization and binary categories (of gender) destroying these local older traditions) · The responses have been diverse: and we are especially interested in the responses of political Islam on this: Political Islam being the politics of identity, it is naturally interested in identity markers (which help to establish boundaries between us and them): if the self is under attack, you need a cultural defense: which leads to an important role for women, where women are often use as such a defense and they are urged to dress and behave in distinctive ways that are then seem to be bull works against cultural invasion, alienation and infiltration from the outside. § Important role of women Literature: Nordberg (the extra literature assigned for today) "Afghan girls raised as boys" Islamic histories: a rich tapestry of possibilities in gender and sexualities (khanith, mustergil, bacha posh) -> Complicated by modernity's binary categories and exclusive identities, enforced not in the least by agents of political Islam and its ironically purist stress on identity politics

Lecture 10 - November 27th Today: political Islam in Tunisia PART 1: before 2011

Today: political Islam in Tunisia 'Empire - Special interview: Rachid Ghannouchi', Aljazeera, 13 November 2011 Video: him being happy on his political victory Today: Part 1: Pre-2011: "authoritarian secularism" Part 2: Post-2011: Political Islam enters the public sphere Part 1: Pre-2011: "authoritarian secularism" Authoritarian secularism = denotes this idea of control of religious expression by the state - Turkey under Atatürk - Tunisia under Bourguiba and Ben Ali - France: separation of state and religion is key in their republic (Tunisia was a French colony so highly influenced until 1956 when they got independence) Bourguiba: became president when the country became independent (ruled from 1956-1987) · Educated in France, married to a French women. · Under him, the political identity remained very French, and even more so than under French direct rule · His cultural and identity politics: characterized by: 1. Modernization: wearing a fail or fasting for Ramadan would be too old fashioned etc. 2. Laïcité = secularism o This also meant a secularization of the law: For instance, the 1959 constitution had no reference to the Sharia (it does mention that Tunisia's religion is Islam but that doesn't say much). Also in family law. o Another aspect of this secularization: marginalization of the religious elite: nationalization of the big Mosque, and turned it into a faculty of the university (now the ulama were suddenly state officials). He also nationalized the Kuttab (kindergartens) and other mosques. o Repression of religious expression in public space: laws on 'sectarian outfits': forbidden wearing hijabs/ salafi/ traditional clothes 1987: Ben Ali came to power -> he continued these policies of modernization and secularism: For example: - He issued a law that said that you can only register as a political party if you do not mention religion in its name or party program (Law on Political parties and associations) - Forbidden for everyone in university to wear sectarian outfits: so no headscarf's - Anti-terror law (2003): very broad description of terror: so he could basically arrest anyone Consequences: There was, at the time, two different discourses on this situation: I. Secularist elite: were proud of the result of this policy: they think they are the exception in the Arab world: II. On the other hand: "the consequences of secularization went counter to the cultural representation that were dominant among a large majority of the population, including the elites" (Burgat, 1992). So people for whom this was the case, were people that felt alienated by these policies (like religious Muslim groups). It is in this light that we should see the emergence of political Islam: Where did religious convictions go? - Inside the private sphere of the home - Underground in political movements Three types of religious movements in Tunisia: 1. Islamist: their movement was called Jama'a Islamiyya (founded in 1972) The movement split, and then had to change its name to a non-religious one: Ennahda 2. (non-political) Salafi They thought they were a part of the Jama'at Tablighi 3. Jihadi movements: 1980's: part of this Jama'a Islamiyya split and became jihadi: Tunisian Combatant Group The relationship between the regime and these Islamic movements in practice: In theory: authoritarian secularism In practice: a relationship in flux: For instance: under Bourguiba: he was also facing an upsurge from the communists, and so in countering them he sought legitimacy with the religious elite (the ones he first tried to combat). 1970's: he sought State accommodation to increasing repression (this is also when Ghanoucchi could start his movement) But then, as Bourguiba noticed that the Islamist became more popular and better organized, he started the repression. Then, in the 1980's: first he sought dialogue with the Islamists, and then in 1987 after some terrorist attacks he started to oppress them again. This continued under President Ben Ali: In his first years he looks for reconciliation of Islamists (his law of banning religion for political parties in its name or party program), which made it possible for parties to change their name and then enter into the political sphere anyway (like Annahda party) 1991: turning point: as soon as Ben Ali found out how popular Annahda became, he just banned them in 1991. Two terrorist attacks followed. 2002: outright repression Zooming in: Rached Ghannouchi - Was religiously educated at that mosque that was turned into a faculty for the university - For people like Ghannouchi, Bourguibism was a form of violence: Suddenly his diploma was not worth anything anymore: he experienced alienation Consequence: he went to Egypt and Syria: he was interested in Panarabism and Nasserism 15 June 1966: Turning point: Arab nationalism conflicts with Islamic identity. He return to Tunisia, foundation Jama'a islamiya fi Tunis which later became Ennahda. His article we had to read for today: Ghannouchi, 'The state and religion' (2013) "[W]hile the problem in the West centered round the means of liberating the state from religion, ... a major aspect of our problem is to liberate religion from the state and to prevent it from imposing its hegemony on it." Islam and the State: The Prophet is the founder of both the religion and the State But: the words of the Prophet are fallible in State affairs He used this as an argument to talk about religion's role: Religion's role: "It is not religion's role to dictate [...] governance mechanisms, or the manner of managing State affairs[...]. Religion's role is to provide us with answers on major existential issues [...]; it provides us with a value system and a set of principles to steer our thinking, behaviour and governance system in the right direction, i.e. a set of guiding values" What he emphasizes is that what he preaches is not a separation of state and religion but a distinction

Lecture 9 - November 25th Today: post-Islamist, the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Today: post-Islamist, the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Video Egypt revolution: allowed us to see the magnitude of the emotions that were build up Readings for today: - Zollner, 'The Muslim Brotherhood' in: Akbarzadeh (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, 2012, 51-61. - Woltering, Post-Islamism in Distress? A Critical Evaluation of the Theory in Islamist-Dominated Egypt (11 February 2011-3 July 2013) Die Welt des Islams 54, 2014, 107-118. Today: · What is post-Islamism? · And the alleged post-Islamic character of the Muslim Brotherhood: wider context of the Egyptian revolution The middle East in 2010: - Remarkable stability - Remarkable how? -> · Jordan, Saudi-Arabia and Moroccan has kings: not remarkable that the crown-prince takes over Syria and Egypt though: had Presidents, but the sons of the Presidents succeeded them: remarkable · Also remarkable: the socio-economic conditions at the time: they had worsened and seemed to have emerged an ideological vacuum: Egypt: weak regional leadership from 1970's: Nasser was a big political leader who spoke in a promising manner. In 1967, the war against Israel that was lost by Egypt, was a great political tragedy for Nasser. Nasser stepped down, but there were demonstrations demanded for him to return. He returned, but essentially the Nasser dream exploded. Later on, Saddad became president of Egypt. He was a great statesman as well, but he does something entirely different. After the Yom Kippur war, Egypt makes peace with Israel, as the first Arab world. Egypt was the only one who could make this step, because it was a strong factor in the region and it was the only country who could take the heath it would get from the Arabs. It stood alone for a while (although it had support from the US). This political act required courage and a long-term view. Mubarak (after Sadad and Nassar) continued largely the socio-economic policies stated by Nassar -> characterized by a neo-liberal structuring In order to be given funding by the World Bank and IMF they had to cut costs: -> Also: a part of this restructuring was opening up the economy to private enterprises (Infitah = the opening) = only economic opening, not political -> This can also be called the retreat of the state (cutting subsidies, social services to the population): this all created openings for others to step in Who stepped in? Conservative Islamic organizations stepped in in those places where people do not get education, healthcare etc. o This is the start of the increasing visibility of Islamic organizations o Country becomes populist, and slowly became violent: The Islamist organizations turn populist, evolutionist and even violent in the 1990s. In 1997 Swiss tourists were attacked in Egypt. Later on, those people said they were wrong and Sharia did not allow violence. Gradually, people were released. The organization still exists but does not use violence anymore. Rise (1970) and the normalization (late 1990's) of violence: - Another aspect of this normalization movement of political Islam that had before not engaged in parliamentary elections moved towards participating in these elections - Muslim Brotherhood took a shell of a political party and merged: now they had seats in parliament - So now there Islamic organizations who are now participating in parliament (not a free elected parliament though) - Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by 2010 had become an intricate part of the political scene This normalization brings questions (specifically the participation of Islamist parties in parliament): - Does participation really lead to moderation? - What happens when you participate in a corrupt system? What does it mean for the popular appeal of the MB if it joins a system known for its corruption? Summarizing political situation more broadly: I. Conditions untenable: the socio-economic conditions could not continue II. (Islamist) opposition contained: the only opposition there was, an Islamist, was very contained III. No social resistance (or was there?): -> the end of a political narrative? = it seemed to not be able to continue as such What is going to happen? Short history of post-Mubarak Egypt (in three periods) SCAF 11 Feb 2011 - Aug 2012: Supreme Council of the Armed Forces: after 18 days of nationwide process Mubarak stands down. Power now lies with the SCAF The slogan of that time: "legitimacy is from Tahir square" 19th March: constitutional referendum was institution: do you want changes in the constitution yes or no? April-October: the revolutionary forces said that these changes would be too limited: they demanded a constitutional assembly first: people continued this protest because they didn't want to lose momentum (not the Muslim Brotherhood, they focused on politics) More and more people find these protest disrupting and not helping Nov-Jan 2012: parliamentary elections: ¨ Muslim Brotherhood party gets 38%, and the Salafi Nur party gets 28% May 2012: 1st round of presidential elections A lot of people did not want to choose between these two options -> Morsi was elected (at 52%) Why only 52% for Morsi? Why did the Muslim Brotherhood lost so much support? They were accused of being power hungry, they weren't the revolutionary party, not a leftist party + disappointing preoccupations in the news (just negative things about them in the news) Morsi Aug 2012 - 3 July 2013 August 2012: Muslim Brotherhood choses stability: they choose a course of not rocking the boat ('act normal') -> does not listen to the demands of the revolution. Morsi stays firm on keeping the status quo: November: a constitutional council has members, and they all slowly leave: after a while the only people that are left are Salafis and member of MB: then Morsi decrees a presidential decree allowing him to claim more power (he becomes a dictator). In the meantime: economy continues to worsen, breakdown of public order, state starts losing control December 2012: constitution is adopted by the constitutional council (funny enough not an Islamist constitution even though the council was only filled with MB and Salafi) 30 June 2013: Tomarrod (a movement called REBEL: against the Morsi President) campaign brings out masses 3 July 2013: Army (Sissi = minister of Defense at the time) assumes power Sissi 3 July 2013 - present The situation that the MB find itself in on the 3rd of July was a very big loss for them: they lost everything. The new government: people thought it was more likely that they continue what other governments had done before, only with more repression, and that this would lead to another popular uprising. This didn't happen: there was no uprising. How is the Sissi government staying in control? How does this social part play out? Under Mubarak there was an authoritarian regime, but is still was a provision pact: it did provide those things necessary for people to survive (so people will think twice before disrupting this). This is not the case anymore. Another possibility = protection pact: the state does not so much provide elementary services, but it is much more basic: simple protection from existential threats. For this to work, this 'threat' needs to be sufficiently significant (like the threat needs to be bigger than the poverty, lack of education etc.) = in Egypt right now: this 'threat' is the Muslim Brotherhood. -> Return of authoritarian rule

Woltering, Post-Islamism in Distress? A Critical Evaluation of the Theory in Islamist-Dominated Egypt (11 February 2011-3 July 2013) Die Welt des Islams 54, 2014, 107-118.

Two types of Post-Islamism: I. Roy: Post-Islamism should be understood in light of the assessment that political Islam had "failed". The objective of political Islam started to appear impossible to achieve. As a result, various alternatives were developed so distanced from the critical tenets of political Islam, that they warrant the label post-Islamism. II. Bayat: Post-Islamism is not only the contradictions and societal pressure to reinvent itself, it is also a conscious project to transcend the classical discourse without taking a secular or un-Islamic position. It is thus expressed in freedom from rigidity, in breaking down the monopoly of religious truth. DIFFERENCE The most important divergence between the two theories is that whilst Bayat defined post-Islamism as fundamentally inclined to open-mindedness and democracy (even if its application remains elusive), Roy includes the severest representations of religious myopia and tyranny (such as when he classifies the Taliban as engaging in a post-Islamist trajectory) COMMONALITIES What the two 'post-Islamisms' have in common is the idea that the state as a key instrument has waned in circles of Islamic activism, in favour of an individualized piety and a sense of private responsibility. With the emancipation of the individual (Muslim), the state loses its central position at least in the realm of religious activism. The state (if it is considered at all) is primarily considered responsible for worldly matters such as employment, infrastructure, health and education. An Islamic blueprint for these essentially secular fields no longer seems credible in post-Islamist circles. On the other hand, post-Islamism does not mean religion has no public role. The post-Islamist paradigm is still one of Islamization, only not through the instrument of an Islamic state.

Wahhabi phenomenon

Wahhabi Saudi Alliance (1744) Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) and his Muwahhidun/ Unitarians · Moral crisis · Individual access to the sources · 'literalist', stressing the presumed simplicity of Islam: it is not literally in the sense that they do not interpret, because they do àyou still need to interpret, but do so in a certain manner · Suspicious of ijtihad and rational argumentation This man expresses a sense of a moral crisis; and he starts to proclaim a theology for the masses: · Easy and understandable language: this is new for this time àtaking down of barriers for common people to participate in religious discourse · In this theology he stresses the importance of access to sources for all, people should be able to interpret it themselves. · He is distrustful of rational interpretation · Dismissive of other interpretations than his own = is a paradox: so he says that one the one hand people need to interpret texts themselves, but not how they see fit -> thus a paradox in his message: He feels that the variety of Islam is a danger: he wants find the pure and original Islam: so yes, people should go to the sources, but understand it in the following fashion. 1744: this Mohammed dude enters into a reliance with some political authority called Iben Saud -> done so because it takes political power to as a religious scholar to really establish a certain society: · An appealing alliance: - One to rule by sharia, another to interpret what sharia is - Obedience to the ruler: "better sixty years with a tyrannical ruler than one night without a ruler" This alliance was: - absolute - extremist (takfiri), - militant - destructive - making good use of political circumstances = in which the central authority (which officially was the Ottoman empire) was weak: Does this remind you of anything? àestablishment of Islamic State Then, in 1818 the Egyptian army vanquishes the Saudi-Wahhabi state: Then, comes a second Saudi State (1819-1891): more a tribal power manifesting itself among other powers in the Arabian peninsula: still internally divided Then, the (third) Modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Abd Al Aziz: 1902: Sultan of Nejd, Abdelazziz captured Rijaad and becomes Sultan. After that he begins a wave of further conquests. That reaches a decisive moment in 1924, when the Hejaz is conquered, on the cost of the Hashimite clan. The Hashimite ruler came from the Hashim clan of Muhammad! Abdelazziz also becomes king of Hejaz.How did Abdelazziz conquer these areas? In 1912 he started a movement, the Ikhwan ('brothers'), they were former nomads who had abandoned the nomadic life. They made a migration from the desert to settlements where they wanted to be farmers and have a pure Muslim life. They were strict about praying times, dress and the separation of men and women. When they ceased to be a Bedouin, their entire life changed. The group is ready to sacrifice everything for religion, but it also a needy group, because they changed their life but had never been farmers. Abdelazziz offered them money and materials. United by the submission to God and His laws, makes the sense of cohesion in the group and Abdelazziz becomes the leader of the group. There are people from various tribes and ethnicities in this group. Abdelazziz is the leader, but he must lead in consultation with the scholars, the 'ulama. He did.After the conquest of the Hejaz there is a conflict between Abdelazziz and the Ikhwan. This is 1930- 1932. The Ikhwan want to conquer the north, which was then ruled by the British. Abdelazziz is in contact with the British and does not want to fight with them. This created anger among the Ikhwan, because they are not in it for the political success of Abdelazziz, but they are in it for God. In 1932 this comes to an open conflict where the Ikhwan are destroyed. After that, the two kingdoms, the Nejd and the Hejaz are put together and then you have the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.During the years after, there wasn't always such a strict religious rule in every part of the country. That changed in 1979, when it became really strict everywhere and when Saudi Arabia also started to teach its teachings elsewhere. Also, the little establishments of the four schools of law near the Kaaba were removed. 1979: the Islamic Revolution in Iran àthis shocked the Saudi's, because a religion revolution threatens you when your political power is based on religious legitimacy. They started anti-shia propaganda.The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan àthe struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan was of great importance in the creation of Al Qaeda. Saddam Hussain takes presidency àwe'll discuss this later in the course. Occupation of the Kaaba àthere was a man, Juhaiman, from one of the original Ikhwan settlements. Juhaiman is displeased with the internationalisation of Saudi Arabia (because of the oil trade). His father and grandfather were present at the battle in 1932. He joined a Salafi group, which was led by Sheikh Binbaz, who would later become the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia in 1990s. Juhaiman was known to led a simple life and he soon got a group of followers, who he called the Ikhwan. So, you see that there is a strong link between the early Ikhwan and this group of Ikhwan. On November 20th 1979, the first day of the year 1400 (this is an important date because in Islam people believe that every new century brings a renewer of faith), a few hundred of Juhaimans follower went into the Kaaba and declared that Juhaiman was the Mahdi and they rebelled against the Saudi state. The demand was that Saudi Arabia would cease all the export to the US and that Saudi Arabia would evict all the people from abroad. It took two weeks before, with the help of the French and Pakistani, this group of rebels were removed from the Kaaba. Those who were captured were captured for a lot of things: but not of kufr. They were however guilty of other things, which was serious enough for them to be killed. They were beheaded in eight different public places in cities in Saudi Arabia, to set an example for the people. It was a terrible shock for the Saudi authorities that a group of people could gain control of the holiest place of Islam. That is a sign that you are incompetent as the king of Saudi Arabia. What happened thereafter? You see that the answer of the Saudi authorities is that they bring more religion and more restriction to public life. They give more power to the religious police.

Weiss & Hassan book

Weiss & Hassan The book: - Based on local fieldwork: how a certain parts of Iraq became part of IS territory: often to do with recent political history Local grudges and concerns about other political entities make it likely/ understandable that people submit to other political forces What does the book not talk about? = ideology: they do not mention ideology or religion Things happen without religious origins or ideological background: does not place its entirely irrelevant, but it means that you can write compelling stories how very specific local parts of countries became under rule of IS (has not so much to do that people were ideologically ready but more about political issues).

Kassab: who is governing these mandate territories?

Who is governing these mandate territories? · Ambition: state building, stability, progress · Practice: national symbolism, security services, civil services, laisser faire economy · Political culture: nationalist rhetoric (clashing with 'aristocratic' political elites)

Wiktorowicz, Q. 'Anatomy of the Salafi Movement', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, 2006, 207- 239.

Wictorowicz article: "United by a common religious creed" (p. 207) -> so Salafism isn't organized by a common goal or a central organization, but by a common creed. Three types of Salafi's: I. Purist/ daʿwa / 'scientific'/quietist II. Political: engaging in political activism, but not employing violence III. Jihadist: employs violence - "The splits are about contextual analysis" (p. 208) -> so not about the creed, you should be Muslim in the same manner and they all agree what kind of behavior that should translate in: but they have different opinion on what the world "asks of them" · He writes this: "the primary concern should be to counter political views rather than to undermine radical religious views" = a policy advice This thus denotes that the religious views in itself are already problematic: And of course it is also problematic is you say that from a security point of view, a whole religious creed is problematic. What is the Salafi creed? ('Aqida) - Tawhid (declaration of One-ness, monotheism) = monotheism is for all Islam, but historically there have been groups claiming to be more monotheist than others There are three kinds of Tawhid: Tawḥīd al-rubūbiya God as the sole creator and sovereign Tawḥid al-asmāʾ wa l-ṣifāt God has unique attributes (Lawgiver, Knower etc.) Tawḥīd al-ʿubūdiya God as uniquely worshippable The second one: god is the only lawgiver, so then the laws of the state are seen as illegitimate The third one: only to god you should pray, not to others (like the death) Characteristics of the creed of Tawhid: I. Sola scriptura (rejecting taqlīd of the traditional schools of sharia) = focus on the text by the script (Quran and Hadith literature) and not on symbolism, miracles, sainthood etc. II. 'Literalism' (which is impossible): it's in brackets because it is more of a claim (is a normative concept) III. 'Deculturalization' (in effect often: adopting ways of the Nejd and Hejaz) = seeking a globally uniform Islam against the historical variety in different locations. Salafism think that variety is a suspect: there can be no differences in Islam. This means that there is a big effort to stamp out cultural "additions" to religious practices. It should thus be about religion, not about culture. IV. Loyalty and disavowal (al-walāʾ wa l-barāʾ) = a notion of loyalty and nearness for true Muslims, whereas unbelievers and the "West" should be kept at a distance. What is literally means is love for the fellow Muslim, and hate for the infidel. The nearness of infidels is a danger: so one should distance yourself from them in the max way possible (clothes, speech, etc.) à not only to people of other religions, but also to Muslims that aren't Salafi This Salafi creed has as a consequence a lot of different behaviors: Bid'a: innovation in the religion Shirk: is the word for polytheism (setting someone next to God) Haram: forbidden Makruh: reprehensible (better not) To pray at graves for help bidʿa (innovation)/shirk (polytheism) To build a grave ḥarām (forbidden) To go to a soothsayer shirk To abide by a law other than God's law shirk To pray six times a day bidʿa To bite your nails makrūh (reprehensible) For a woman to pluck her eyebrows ḥarām (forbidden) To remove one's shoes when entering mosque bidʿa? To urinate standing up makrūh To applaud a person by clapping hands makrūh Salafi burn-out = if every single action can be weighed, this can be very stressful: often happens that people cannot upkeep this behavior and burn out and stop with the lifestyle Ridicule = Salafis are often ridiculed: reactions from the outside, especially the salafi's of a political nature who say this is getting out of hand: that they are losing themselves in historic sources and waste their time with little details Conclusion of his article: gives a policy advice - Policy advice is to facilitate the purist/ quietist group so that their interpretation can weaken the Jihadi interpretation - The paradox in the conclusion: In his conclusion, the author of the article says that we should give room to the quietists in order to reduce the jihadists. But there is a paradox in this: the quietists want to have distance from politics, while in order to strengthen it they should engage in politics/education. In terms of U.S. strategy, the primary concern should be how strategy can influence these interpretations of context to empower the purists. Although the purists are strongly anti-Western (and anti-American), they are also the least likely to support the use of violence. To the extent that the United States can amplify the purist contextual reading at the expense of jihadists, the movements of Salafists toward the radical extremists will likely show. At the same time, however, strengthening credentials related to contextual analysis undermines the identity of the purist scholars, which is based on isolation from the corruptive influences of politics and current affairs. These influences are seen as sources of emotional provocation. Western intrigue and guile, and threats to the purity of tawhid.

Ghannouchi, Rached "The state and religion in the fundamentals of Islam and contemporary interpretation," Contemporary Arab Affairs, 6:2, 2013, 164-171

Zooming in: Rached Ghannouchi - Was religiously educated at that mosque that was turned into a faculty for the university - For people like Ghannouchi, Bourguibism was a form of violence: Suddenly his diploma was not worth anything anymore: he experienced alienation Consequence: he went to Egypt and Syria: he was interested in Panarabism and Nasserism 15 June 1966: Turning point: Arab nationalism conflicts with Islamic identity. He return to Tunisia, foundation Jama'a islamiya fi Tunis which later became Ennahda. His article we had to read for today: Ghannouchi, 'The state and religion' (2013) "[W]hile the problem in the West centered round the means of liberating the state from religion, ... a major aspect of our problem is to liberate religion from the state and to prevent it from imposing its hegemony on it." Islam and the State: The Prophet is the founder of both the religion and the State But: the words of the Prophet are fallible in State affairs He used this as an argument to talk about religion's role: Religion's role: "It is not religion's role to dictate [...] governance mechanisms, or the manner of managing State affairs[...]. Religion's role is to provide us with answers on major existential issues [...]; it provides us with a value system and a set of principles to steer our thinking, behaviour and governance system in the right direction, i.e. a set of guiding values" What he emphasizes is that what he preaches is not a separation of state and religion but a distinction

Lecture 2: Some more on the legal framework of the Muslim world: The character of Muslim law before modern times:

o Islamic laws had gradually become divided in four great Sunni schools of law: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali -> they recognize each other's authority, but they are geographically divided o These practices of Islamic law were often in the service of the restauration of a social harmony: a legal system can be about multiple things: · Redressing wrongs · Finding the truth/ what happened · Punishing those who are guilty and returning rights to the grieved · Often also social aspect: resolving the social aspect when social harmony is disrupted -> preference is thus often given to what is socially desirable, instead of what literally happened The term of Hīla: the case of Amina Lawal: (2002) Hila = is "legalistic trickery" in Islamic jurisprudence. The main purpose of ḥiyal is to avoid straightforward observance of Islamic law in difficult situations while still obeying the letter of the law Nigeria: Lawal was a widow, and was suddenly pregnant: the judge said that because she was pregnant, she had thus committed adultery and shall thus be killed by stoning A Dutch lawyer presented the theory of the sleeping fetus, where the fetus falls asleep and it is possible where she gets pregnant later by the husband that died long time before. Islamic law: ambiguity in the service of social harmony: § What are the laws intentions? § Can it be helped with a hila? § Society's interest § The scholastic nature of the legal literature: only opinions: judges based their decisions on what religious scholars had decided in the past § Sharia criminal law always existed next to 'secular' criminal law On the religious life: Must Muslims after the 6th century were affiliated to Sufi order: it was the standard issue of Islam: Sufism · If you google it, you tend to find things about meditation, spirituality instead of religious doctrine · But, they have always had downsides of it: Sufism has always known charismatic leaders: very hierarchical, and can thus lead to abusive powers

The establishment of a Muslim polity (lecture 2) Omayyad dynasty

· That is the start of the early dynastic period: Omayyad dynasty (656-750) Under the Omayyads, the state becomes more and more established: o Adoption of local customs o Employing aspects of the Arabian peninsula: especially the primacy given to Arab tribal elitism/ aristocracy: So people can become Muslim, but it is perceived that thereby they join Arabic culture, so they need to join a tribe in order to do so. Sometimes difficult: like the Persians, who have their own culture and pride, do not feel that it is necessary to join a tribe and become Arabic. o Resentment is built up: at the same time theological questions arise: When are you a Muslim? What is a good Muslim leader? What happens when a Muslim commits a sin? o A rebellion arises in 750: à a confluence of regional, religious and tribal opposition leads to a successful revolt = done by non-Arab movements that demand equality, people that think that a successor of Mohammed should be one of his blood relatives, people in outer regions who are fed up with high taxes, and people who share a different ideology.

The establishment of a Muslim polity (lecture 2) Abbasid (high) caliphate

· This is how the Abbasid (high) caliphate (750-1258) came to power: They make their center in Baghdad: characterized by: o They are 'soft Shiites' (pragmatic acceptance of the first two caliphs = a religion Muslim leader) o Strong Persian influence in politics and theology o During this time there are more and more theological debates about what religion entails o Two methods of what the source of God is: § Ahl al-ra'y à follow rational interpretation § Ahl al-hadith à follow early Muslim example: they see you need data on how Mohammed and the other behaved: their behavior is what you should follow, not what you think is best. "Verily the best among you (to follow) is my generation, then those who follow, then those who follow them" (Saheeh Muslim, the Virtues of the Sahaabah) à a quote that this school of thought that thinks that you should follow early Muslim example. But you can also take it literally (like literally only these three generations that is mentioned here) · Mu'tazilan Doctrine (833-849): o A position that follows from God's absolute unity o The Quran comes from God, but is not part of Him, rather a part of His creation: god has created the Quran o Implications for position of the caliph: the Caliph is divinely guided and the Caliph has ultimate religious authority o In 833: the Caliph at that time ruled that everyone who worked for the state had to prescribe to this doctrine o From this, is flowed that because the Quran is a creation, is it vulnerable to decay and corruption à is a problem: there must be a divine power to prevent the corruption of the Quran: implied then that the Caliph is this power. à this position is logically related to the thought that the Caliph has some divine power o Opposition emerges: 849: Position of Ahl al-hadith becomes the norm, the Caliph must uphold the sharia and the ulama (religious scholars) determine its content by means of Koran and hadith --> after 849, from this point on, the Caliph does not have ultimate religious authority: he is still important: he must uphold the sharia (the Islamic norms/society). But who decides the content of the Sharia? à that is the class of the religious scholars (ulama) IMPORTANT Key developments in Abbasid times: (under these circumstances, the Sunni and the Shiite positions we know today gradually emerge): - After Abu Bakr and Umar, also Uthman is retroactively accepted: the thesis of the 'Rightly Guided Caliphs (four in number)' à the Caliph must be a capable Muslim of the tribe of Quraysh (all these have in common is that they are from this tribe) --> They accept all 4 as legitimate rulers, so they say that the only thing until then that went wrong was the Omayyad dynasty, until then everything was legitimate This is accommodating approach becomes knows as the Sunni position. - Opposition concludes that the Imamate was never legitimate except with Ali and after him his offspring (none of whom ever rules) à the Imam is a unique being with a superior relation to God. à so they need to be related to Mohammed and Fatima (in this bloodline qualify) This notion of charismatic leadership becomes known as the Shiite position. - The Khariji position (i.e. the best Muslim should rule, and the community should revolt against him when they lose trust in him) turns into a radical fringe group. This position, for its extremity, never flourishes. -> looking at these groups today, how do you think the various Muslim groups today assess the conflicts in the Muslim world? Answer: nobody wants to be the Khariji, and everyone points to the other saying that they are the Khariji (and thereby say that they are leading Islam into harm and conflict. Classical debates about who is a Muslim? - What is the status of a sinner? - What does this mean for determining the fitness of a ruler? -> the Murji'a (those who follow the doctrine of irja) douse the flames of dispute, offer a way out of conflict and into harmony: religious conviction is in the heart Murji'a = a theological position which emerged in the 8th century as a consequence about all the discussions in the Muslim world about who was a good Muslim, who was an infidel, who was justifiably murdered, who is a good ruler etc. The Muji'a follows the theory of Irja: this theory says that these questions, are something you should postpone: you should leave that to god (in the final judgement) à because you cannot tell whether someone is a good Muslim because that is something that lies in the conviction: you cannot tell it from people's actions IS debating irjaa: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ImISgOmgY58à If a person lives or rules by the rules made by someone else than God, then that person, apparently, beliefs that those rules are superior to the rules of God (IS).Abu Umar Al Baghdadi (former IS leader): 'We are between the extremism of the kharijites and the laxism of the Murji'a. We are the middle path.' --> slippery slope argument IS?