Law Psych and Mental Health Final

Gregg v. Georgia (1976) Analysis

-Notes: Is it cruel and unusual punishment to kill someoneGood or bad for Gregg- bad because it does not violate the 8th and 14th amendments. He is going to die. We are allowed to have the death penalty•The Supreme Court broke the initial issue into two.•A) Is the death penalty for the crime of murder, under all circumstances, "cruel and unusual" in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution?•B)Can Georgia impose the death penalty on the petitioner in this case?-Notes: Care about A more.Gregg v Georgia is the Frame for every case on death penalty and how we think about it•Let's start with A (which is the more important point for us, obviously).•In Furman v. Georgia, court never answered this question, as Four justices would have held that it was not unconstitutional per se, two would have reached the opposite conclusion, while three others agreed that the statutes then before the Court were invalid as applied, which left open the question of the imposition of the question.•Under the Eighth amendment, the court has outlawed "barbarous" methods of punishment, as well as using the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" in outlawing penalties. It also notes that the penalty also "must accord with the dignity of man, which is the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment. With this, they must consider if a punishment would be "excessive".•1 - It would be excessive if the punishment would involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain•2 - The punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime-Notes: Red: what does this mean? If we think if it is okay. We evolve as a society so we believe that death penalty may be wrong at some point. Evolving or morality. And if at that point we wont have it.Must consider if it is excessive•Additionally, "in a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people."•Considering the death penalty, the Supreme Court started with a discussion of English law, which allowed death sentences. Additionally the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates the existence of capital punishment.-Notes: How do democracies demonstrate anything? Voting. Can vote on the death penalty if it comes up•Death, historically has not been seen as "cruel" (In re Kemmler) "[T]he punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of the word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."•Even now, (the court argues) American society continues to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction-Notes: it has got to be more than just your life going out. Just killing you really isnt that cruel•In response to Furman, 35 States have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result in the death of another person.•Additional to the historical and current perspective argument, the court notes that it must "comport with the basic concept of human dignity, which is at the core of the amendment.•The death penalty serves two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.-Notes: Furman: national holdWe know that society wants this because 35 states out of 50 pass laws reenacting the death penalty•Although "retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law"... "the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.•Regarding deterrence: Although some studies suggest that death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view.-Notes: Not really seeking retribution all the timeRecognize that retribution is not what we are always thinking about but we recognize that society sees some crimes as so bad that death is the only appropriate answerDeterrence: ability to not repeat it again•Therefore, "We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it."-Notes: Giant double negative. We hold that the death penalty is a form of punishment that can be imposed depending on circumstances of the offense depending on the character of the offender, and .....•Analysis PART 2 (or B): (remember there was a second question?)•"the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information."-Notes: Capricious: given to sudden and unaccountable changes of mood or behavior (cannot do this willy nilly)Best way to conduct this so that it is not in some sort of capacious or arbitrary manner is bifurcated trial.•"The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this way the jury's discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines. In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here."-Notes: Mitigating and aggravating factor.

Roper v. Simmons (2005) Analysis

-Notes: This is good. Simmins does not die. We have no juvenile capital punishment. This goes against stare decisesIn Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the Court, over a dissenting opinion joined by four Justices, referred to contemporary standards of decency in this country and concluded the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of juvenile offenders over 15 but under 18.The same day the Court decided Stanford, it held that the Eighth Amendment did not mandate a categorical exemption from the death penalty for the mentally retarded. Penry v. Lynaugh-Notes: Have to consider history, retribution, and evolving standard of decency.Reasoning 1 - The rate of change in reducing the incidence of the juvenile death penalty, or in taking specific steps to abolish it, has been slower. Five States that allowed the juvenile death penalty at the time of Stanford have abandoned it in the intervening 15 years-four through legislative enactments and one through judicial decision. Though less dramatic than the change from Penry to Atkins("telling," to borrow the word Atkins used to describe this difference, 536 U.S., at 315, n. 18), we still consider the change from Stanford to this case to be significant.The number of States that have abandoned capital punishment for juvenile offenders since Stanford is smaller than the number of States that abandoned capital punishment for the mentally retarded after Penry; yet we think the same consistency of direction of change has been demonstrated. As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this case-the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice-provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as "categorically less culpable than the average criminal."-Notes: Looked at penry v lenld in regard to atkins vHey look at all these states that got rid of the execution of mentally rRemember that trend? Lets do that again.Reasoning 2 - A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the Eighth Amendment.Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, "[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions."-Notes: Capital punishment is supposed to be saved to the worst of offenders.The second area of difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.These differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.In Thompson, a plurality of the Court recognized the import of these characteristics with respect to juveniles under 16, and relied on them to hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles below that age. 487 U.S., at 833—838. We conclude the same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders under 18.Back to Atkins:We have held there are two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: " 'retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.' "As for retribution, we remarked in Atkins that "[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution." 536 U.S., at 319. The same conclusions follow from the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender.-Notes: Retribution only works when you are fully culpable or responsible. Doesn't serve the retributive value.As for deterrence, it is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles, as counsel for the petitioner acknowledged at oral argument. To the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.-Notes: If we are considering the fact that death penalty we are not really sure- how bad is the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole... is this as bad as death?Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility. Yet at least from the time of the Court's decision in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments."-Notes: On of the few cases, that we use a global standard.The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed. The judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court setting aside the sentence of death imposed upon Christopher Simmons is affirmed.-Notes: Penry v Le; AtkinsIs toStanford; Rober v Simmons

Painter v. Bannister (1966) Issue

Which household is in the "best interest of the child?"

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993)issue

Issue: What standard should be used when determining whether to allow expert scientific testimony?

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) Issue

Does the 14th amendment require a state to license a marriage between 2 people of the same sex? Also, does the 14th amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between 2 people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) Analysis

On first point, although court's handling was tolerable, it is not ideal. The fair and efficient consideration of these appeals requires proper procedures for the handling of applications for stays of executions and development of these procedures is primarily a function of the court of appeals and the rulemaking processes of the federal courts, but here, the court put out some general guidelines (no need to know them, just know guidelines were put into place.)-1st point stay of execution (do not need to know guidelines, just cannot execute someone before their appeal)On the suggestion that no psychiatrist's testimony may be presented, Justices Steward, Powell, and Stevens responded to the argument:It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it can not be made. Indeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge's prediction of the defendant's future conduct. Any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose. For those sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be made by parole authorities. The task that a Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory question in issue is thus basically no different from the task performed countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice. What is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine. Texas law clearly assures that all such evidence will be adduced."-Not easy to predict future behavior. (does not mean that it cannot be made)Bail decisions are to be made on what we think the defendant will do in the future.So why is it okay for physiatrist to predict the future? Bc we do it for all other parts of the CJ system.Now one of the things they do not talk about here is if we do it well. It doesn't matter if we do it well, just as long as we do it.Acceptance of petitioner's position that expert testimony about future dangerousness is far too unreliable to be admissible would immediately call into question those other contexts in which predictions of future behavior are constantly made. For example, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 422 U. S. 576 (1975), we held that a nondangerous mental hospital patient could not be held in confinement against his will. Later, speaking about the requirements for civil commitments, we said:"There may be factual issues in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the inquiry. Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists."-We don't want to do this. We do not want to predict the future. We can give you a risk percentage but that doesn't really mean anythingThe whole assertion that is unreaiable throws many things that we do into question. For example civilly commit peopleOf interest here, Amicus brief filed by the APA was rejected (as it was in Estelle v. Smith).We are no more convinced now that the view of the APA should be converted into a constitutional rule barring an entire category of expert testimony. We are not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable and that the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.-They are saying that we are bad at it. We ar not really good at determining future dangerousness. What is the court saying? the court knows that it is 100% reliable. They are saying that we are not persuaded with not. Double negative. They are saying that it would be competent to uncover, recognize and take due account of its shortcomings. they are confident in the factfinder and the adversary system. They are confident tht if it is inaccurate tht the factfinder (judge or jury or the CJ system) would be able to uncover and recognize.(Expert testimony on dangerousness may not always be correct but it is admissible and the adversarial process should properly evaluate it)

In re Gault (1967)analysis

There were 6 different due process rights which were claimed to be denied, therefore the Supreme Court broke down their arguments as well (which means we will too!)Notice of the charges: "Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have described -- that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding. It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom and his parents' right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet. Nor, in the circumstances of this case, can it reasonably be said that the requirement of notice was waived."-Notes: 1: notice of charges.No one knew when he was arrested and whyRight to Counsel: Argument by State of Arizona was that the probation officer "shall look after the interest of neglected, delinquent and dependent child." The Supreme Court disagreed that this was possible, as the probation officers in Arizona were also the arresting officer and in this case the superintendent of the detention home. "A proceedings where the issue is whether the child will be found to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution." The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."Right to Counsel: "We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that, in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or, if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child.-Notes: right to counselRight against self-incrimination: "The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth... One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.Privilege against self-incrimination: "It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals, but not to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privilege is comprehensive. As MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring, stated in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964):The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory . . . it protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which-Notes: right against self-incriminationRight to confrontation and cross-examination: The consider confessions with the right to confrontation (so the arguments were made with self-incrimination), but:Absent a valid confession adequate to support the determination of the Juvenile Court, confrontation and sworn testimony by witnesses available for cross-examination were essential for a finding of "delinquency" and an order committing Gerald to a state institution for a maximum of six years."We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements.-Notes: 4 right t confrontation and cross examinationRight to a transcript of the proceedings and Right to appellate review: First, the Arizona court held that there is no right to a transcript because there is no right to appeal and because the proceedings are confidential, and any record must be destroyed after a prescribed period of time.But, let's actually read what it states in it's entirety.-Notes: 5 right to a transcript of the proceedings6 right to appellate review.

In re Lifschutz (1970)analysis

" Although we appreciate, as petitioner suggests, that because of the peculiar nature of psychotherapy, the debilitating effect of disclosure is particularly acute, the incidental infringement of the psychotherapist's economic interest in such practice does not succumb to constitutional challenge so long as the circumstances of disclosure are properly confined to serve a legitimate governmental interest. ""Inasmuch as plaintiff had already disclosed that he had consulted Dr. Lifschutz for psychotherapeutic treatment, petitioner could not properly have refused to answer at least that questions concerning the communications;" (continued)"since neither plaintiff nor the psychotherapist has as yet made any claim that the subpoenaed records are not directly relevant to the specific "mental and emotional" injuries for which plaintiff is claiming relief, Dr. Lifschutz had no right to refuse to produce the records. Thus the trial court's order requiring the production of records and the answering of questions was valid; the trial court properly adjudged Dr. Lifschutz in contempt of court for intentionally violating the valid court order.""The statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege does not apply" was spelled out in California law as follows:Where any person brings an action to recover damages for personal injuries, such action shall be deemed to constitute a consent by the person bringing said action that any physician who has prescribed for or treated said person and whose testimony is material in said action shall testify.

Lawrence v. Texas (2003) Issue

(In general) Does the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of Equal Protection and Due Process?"(specifically)1. Whether Petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law-which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples-violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws?2. Whether Petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?3. Whether Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), should be overruled?" Pet. for Cert. i.Notes: 1 Are you being treated equally under the lawIf you are doing the same thing?If the act is exactly the same how can you treat one person differently than another2 this was a consensual act in a private homethis was called in for a weapon disturbanceprivacy is under the 14th amendment3 if Bowers v Harwich should be overruled

Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger Corp (1980) Analysis

1 - Punitive damages, Court says denial is affirmed.2 - As for other damages, challenges made against Thompson: Since under established law neither plaintiff Thompson's employment nor the payment of the small fee to Amtrak by L & N constitute consideration for the free pass, Thompson was traveling gratuitously and the limitation of liability provision of that pass is valid, and Thompson is barred from all recovery.-Notes1.) not going to give punitive damages-Could not find any reason that they made a mistake in not awarding damages. No obvious error2.) why is Thompson barred from all recovery? He was traveling on a free pass. Had he paid for the train ticket he could have gotten compensatory damages3 - Compensatory damages: Since the Tennessee courts have recognized on different occasions impairment of enjoyment of life and permanent injuries, and since this Court has instructed lower courts to itemize damages, this Court cannot say the District Court erred in either itemizing the award or the categories it chose to use. (also Court states that there was no err in awarding earning capacity and loss of consortium.) Awards were also found to be not excessive.-Notes: 3.) no error in itemizing these damages. Are allowed to itemize your damages. If you are getting compensatory damages then you can say the crash caused me to have medical bills and physical therapy and if you had brain damage you can get earning capacity

Indiana v. Edwards (2008) Facts

After Indiana charged respondent Edwards with attempted murder and other crimes for a shooting during his attempt to steal a pair of shoes, his mental condition became the subject of three competency proceedings and two self-representation requests, mostly before the same trial judge. Referring to the lengthy record of psychiatric reports, the trial court noted that Edwards suffered from schizophrenia and concluded that, although it appeared he was competent to stand trial, he was not competent to defend himself at trial. The court therefore denied Edwards' self-representation request. He was represented by appointed counsel at trial and convicted on two counts. Indiana's intermediate appellate court ordered a new trial, agreeing with Edwards that the trial court's refusal to permit him to represent himself deprived him of his constitutional right of self-representation under the Sixth Amendment and Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 . Although finding that the record provided substantial support for the trial court's ruling, the Indiana Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the intermediate appellate court on the ground that Faretta and Godinez v. Moran,509 U. S. 389 , required the State to allow Edwards to represent himself.

Shannon v. U.S. (1994) Facts

At about 4 a.m. on August 25, 1990, a police officer stopped petitioner Terry Lee Shannon, a convicted felon, on a street in Tupelo, Mississippi. For reasons not explained in the record before us, the officer asked Shannon to accompany him to the station house to speak with a detective. After telling the officer that he did not want to live anymore, Shannon walked across the street, pulled a pistol from his coat, and shot himself in the chest. Shannon survived his suicide attempt and was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). At trial, he raised the insanity defense, and asked the District Court to instruct the jury that he would be involuntarily committed if the jury returned an NGI verdict. The District Court refused to give Shannon's proposed charge. Instead, it instructed the jury "to apply the law as [instructed] regardless of the consequence," and that "punishment . . . should not enter your consideration or discussion." The jury returned a guilty verdict.

Lawrence v. Texas (2003) analysis

Bowers decision sustained a Georgia Law preventing sodomy (though in this case it prevented sodomy for heterosexuals and homosexuals). Court recognizes their "failure to appreciate the extent to the liberty at stake" in making this decision. They note: "to say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse."Notes:Holding good or bad?Good bc it reversed the courts decision to convict them-Analysis:--In Bowers they decided that they sustained the Georgia law of Sodomy for everyoneWe didn't consider that there might be a bigger problem hereLiberty at stakewe might not just actually be talking about sexual conduct. The sexual intercourse has larger implications here. Essentially it is just more of the physical act. In bower they are just talking about the sexual act.--Marriage is more than sexual intercourse--Starts or courts should not define...The state/ government should not define what a relationship is.--if you have weird sexual fantasies we cannot stop them (unless you are hurting someone)If you think about any other intimate relationship the intimate conduct is only part of the relationship." This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice."-Notes:Is the gov allowed to madate a moral code of what society believes in-Supposed to based on the constitution, to represent all the people not just some.-We will take the due process liberty argumentNot taking the equal protection argument. They can change th law just like they did for Georgia and draw what they do for everyone (would not be in the interest of everyones liberty though)-The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).-As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and some amici contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument, but we conclude the instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing validity. Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.-Notes: If we protect liberty we re also going to protect equal protection as wellIf you criminally declare that a conduct is against the law you are also stigmatizing a group of ppl. (Making it illegal to have homosexual intimate conduct) demeans the lives of homosexual persons.-Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The central holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.-The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command. Payne v.Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision' ")-Notes: Doctrine of...is if someone decided earier than we have to move mountains to flip that decision. In this case they say it is not that. Instead it is just because we decided before, it doesn't mean we have to keep following it. Important to consider and think about that this case sets a lot of precedence when talking about rights of individuals Especially those of the LGBTQ community.

Tarasoff v. the Regents of the University of California (1974) issue

Did Defendants owe a duty to the victim thus making them liable for the harm that ensued?

Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) Issue

Does an involuntarily committed mentally retarded individual have substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to (1) safe conditions of confinement; (2) freedom from bodily restraints; and (3) training or "habilitation"-Notes: Why is it called habilitation: because rehabilitate means you had it to begin with. Habilitation because he didn't have it to begin withGood or bad for Romeo?-means that her concerns may have been validated but we are not really sure-usually a new standard when we do vacated.

O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) Issue

Does keeping a non-dangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment violate one's constitutional right to liberty?

Tarasoff v. the Regents of the University of California (1976) facts

Facts: Same as before, we're just re-hearing itProcedure: Same as before, but we're re-hearing it (so second time in Supreme Court of California)What happens here is that they are rehearing this case (different citation but the facts are the same) so the defendant along w other amicu curias petitioned for another hearing and the court granted (weird) heard this case bc there was an entire uproar from police and psychologists. Also in the initial case the police were blamed for the death but the police said they did exactly what they were supposed to do.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993)analysis

Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, therefore if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, an expert may testify.To summarize: "general acceptance" is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence--especially Rule 702--do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.

Painter v. Bannister (1966) Facts

Harold Painter, father, sought custody of his child after he asked grandparents to take care of child after his wife's (grandparent's daughter's) death 2 years prior. Grandparents refused.-Notes: First use of psychologist for the best interest of the child

Dusky v. U.S. (1960) Issue

Is there enough evidence to state that Dusky was Competent to Stand Trial?

Indiana v. Edwards (2008) Issue

Issue: "May States adopt a higher standard for measuring competency to represent oneself at trial than for measuring competency to stand trial?".Said he was competent to stand trial but not defend himselfSupreme court said can we do that legally?What does vacated and remanded mean:A maybe. Are they allowed to have it? PVacating is like we are pretending like none of this happened, this whole debate is completely wiped.

In re Lifschutz (1970)issue

Issue: How far does patient-client confidentiality extend to?

Tarasoff v. the Regents of the University of California (1976)issue

Issue: Surprise, Surprise, it's the sameHolding: Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for further proceedings.

Frye v. US (1923)issue

Issue: Was the exclusion of expert testimony in the case an err by the trial court?

Frye v Us Facts

James Frye convicted of murder of a white physician. He initially confessed to the murder, but repudiated his confession days before the trial.

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) Facts

Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased filed suits in Federal District Courts, claiming that respondent state officials violated the 14th amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in another state given full recognition.

Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) analysis

Notes: What does that mean for Stanford and wilkins? They dieIt is not the burden of Kentucky and Missouri, however, to establish a national consensus approving what their citizens have voted to do; rather, it is the "heavy burden" of petitioners, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 175, to establish a national consensus against it. As far as the primary and most reliable indication of consensus is concerned — the pattern of enacted laws — petitioners have failed to carry that burden.-Notes: Evolving standard of decency. Had to prove that there is a consensus to not do it.Petitioners argued that the "evolving standards of decency," "modern American society as a whole" would believe that this punishment would be both "cruel and unusual"Just like Gregg v. Georgia, they look at "statues passed by society's elected representatives. Of the 37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders. This does not establish the degree of national consesus this Court has previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.-Notes: Less than half for 16 and way less than that for 17 which means we don't have a consensus bc we do not even have the majority. Not so evolvedWilkins and Stanford argue, however, that even if the laws themselves do not establish a settled consensus, the application of the laws does. That contemporary society views capital punishment of 16- and 17-year-old offenders as inappropriate is demonstrated, they say, by the reluctance of juries to impose, and prosecutors to seek, such sentences.-Notes: Court rejects thisMore people commit capital. Murder over 18. don't have many cases of capital murderers under 18. Do not have much research.As Wilkins points out, the last execution of a person who committed a crime under 17 years of age occurred in 1959. These statistics, however, carry little significance. Given the undisputed fact that a far smaller percentage of capital crimes are committed by persons under 18 than over 18, the discrepancy in treatment is much less than might seem. Granted, however, that a substantial discrepancy exists, that does not establish the requisite proposition that the death sentence for offenders under 18 is categorically unacceptable to prosecutors and juries. To the contrary, it is not only possible, but overwhelmingly probable, that the very considerations which induce petitioners and their supporters to believe that death should never be imposed on offenders under 18 cause prosecutors and juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed.-Notes: Because it is rarely done it might still be appropriateWe discern neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age. Accordingly, we conclude that such punishment does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Dusky v. U.S. (1960) Analysis

Upon consideration of the entire record we agree with the Solicitor General that 'the record in this case does not sufficiently support the findings of competency to stand trial,' for to support those findings under 18 U.S.C. s 4244, 18 U.S.C. the district judge 'would need more information than this record presents.' We also agree with the suggestion of the Solicitor General that it is not enough for the district judge to find that 'the defendant (is) oriented to time and place and (has) some recollection of events,' but that the 'test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding— and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'Only way the initial judge decided that the person was competent is they asked them if they was oriented to the time and place and whether or not they somewhat recollect the event.If you are competent to stand trial right now- this current pointWhen can they bring that question up? At any timeDo they have some sort of logic when they are talking about itFactual understanding can be asking what the people of the court are/doRational understanding: talks about if they are going to be fair, if you know who is on what side etc.Couple of measures of competency: McArthur Measure has 3 parts-factual-hypothetical: in this, they talk about 2 individuals, and things that they have done, what would you do if you were him to check his rational understanding-third part ask about their caseIt is universal. (state/ federal/ military etc)Here we got the competency standard

Gregg v. Georgia (1976) Issue

•Is the Imposition of the sentence of death for the crime of murder under the law of Georgia violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?-Notes: Is it cruel and unusual punishment to kill someone

Hall v. Florida (2014) Analysis

•The Supreme Court notes that "Florida law defines intellectual disability to require an IQ test score of 70 or less. If, from test scores, a prisoner is deemed to have an IQ above 70, all further exploration of intellectual disability is foreclosed. This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional."•Further - "In determining whether Florida's intellectual disability definition implements these principles and Atkins' holding, it is proper to consider the psychiatric and professional studies that elaborate on the purpose and meaning of IQ scores and how the scores relate to Atkins, and to consider how the several States have implemented Atkins."-Notes: Hes not going to dieUnconstitutional rigid rule•"Florida's rule disregards established medical practice. On its face, Florida's statute could be consistent with the views of the medical community discussed in Atkins and with the conclusions reached here. It defines intellectual disability as the existence of concurrent deficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning, long the defining characteristic of intellectual disability. And nothing in the statute precludes Florida from considering an IQ test's standard error of measurement (SEM), a statistical fact reflecting the test's inherent imprecision and acknowledging that an individual score is best understood as a range, e.g., five points on either side of the recorded score. As interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, however, Florida's rule disregards established medical practice in two interrelated ways: It takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant's intellectual capacity, when experts would consider other evidence; and it relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of a defendant's abilities, while refusing to recognize that measurement's inherent imprecision.-Notes: Activities of daily living (ADL): alone, with assistance, level of functioningStandard error of measurement: + or - 5 points on either side of the score•The rejection of a strict 70-point cutoff in the vast majority of States and a "consistency in the trend," [from Roper] , toward recognizing the SEM provide strong evidence of consensus that society does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane. At most, nine States mandate a strict IQ score cutoff at 70. Thus, in 41 States, an individual in Hall's position would not be deemed automatically eligible for the death penalty. The direction of change has been consistent. Since Atkins, many States have passed legislation to comply with the constitutional requirement that persons with intellectual disability not be executed. Two of those States appear to set a strict cutoff at 70, but at least 11 others have either abolished the death penalty or passed legislation allowing defendants to present additional intellectual disability evidence when their IQ score is above 70. Every state legislature, save one, to have considered the issue after Atkins and whose law has been interpreted by its courts has taken a position contrary to Florida's.-Notes: Society does not regard strict cutoffMajority of states, fl is an outlier•Atkins acknowledges the inherent error in IQ testing and provides substantial guidance on the definition of intellectual disability. The States play a critical role in advancing the protections of Atkins and providing this Court with an understanding of how intellectual disability should be measured and assessed, but Atkins did not give them unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional protection. Clinical definitions for intellectual disability which, by their express terms, rejected a strict IQ test score cutoff at 70, and which have long included the SEM, were a fundamental premise of Atkins.•When a defendant's IQ test score falls within the test's acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits. This legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis but is informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework, which is of particular help here, where no alternative intellectual disability definition is presented, and where this Court and the States have placed substantial reliance on the medical profession's expertise.-Notes: Some states went too farIntellectual deficit and adaptive deficit that court will followCan not used strict cutoff of 70 to execute someone

ALI

American Law Institute came up with a test in 1962 after conducing an extensive study of criminal responsibility by proposing a Model Penal Code. Rule reads:--A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. (American Law Institute, 1962).(At the time of the crime. Cognitive prong (wrongfulness)and volitional prong (inability to controls one's behavior.)This combines both the cognitive and volitional prongs.See the differences?--Knowing - appreciateAlso, what does "mental disease or defect" include?--ASPDU.S. v. Brawner (to follow) embraced the ALI rule

Atkins v. Virginia (2002) Analysis

Analysis: A claim that punishment is "excessive" is judged "not by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the "Bloody Assizes" or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail. As Chief Justice Warren explained in his opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958): "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. ... The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Multiple states have, by this point, inacted laws prohibiting the execution of the mentally ill. In addition...-Notes: Past: excessive punishment, "evolving standard of decency that marks the progress of an evolving society," can not go by penry goes by evolving morals, multiple states have enacted laws prohibiting executing of mentally rGiven the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal. The evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that have addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.-Notes: Multiple states prohibit it, laws to protect to criminals and they are passing them anyway•Moreover, even in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the practice is uncommon. Some States, for example New Hampshire and New Jersey, continue to authorize executions, but none have been carried out in decades. Thus there is little need to pursue legislation barring the execution of the mentally retarded in those States. And it appears that even among those States that regularly execute offenders and that have no prohibition with regard to the mentally retarded, only five have executed offenders possessing a known IQ less than 70 since we decided Penry. The practice, therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it.•So, the court considered 2 reasons that their conclusions would be consistent to legislation-Notes: Practice of execution is uncommon in states that allow it5 have executed offenders with an IQ less than 70•Analysis: First, there is a serious question as to whether either justification that we have recognized as a basis for the death penalty applies to mentally retarded offenders. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976), identified "retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders" as the social purposes served by the death penalty. Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded person "measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it 'is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment."•the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.-Notes: They do not understand as much so they will not understand the punishment•With respect to deterrence-the interest in preventing capital crimes by prospective offenders-"it seems likely that 'capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation,' " Exempting the mentally retarded from that punishment will not affect the "cold calculus that precedes the decision" of other potential murderers. Indeed, that sort of calculus is at the opposite end of the spectrum from behavior of mentally retarded offenders.•The reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders provides a second justification for a categorical rule making such offenders ineligible for the death penalty. The risk "that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty," is enhanced, not only by the possibility of false confessions, but also by the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors-Notes: Deterrence only when it is premeditated murder and you have thought through the consequences but they and not think through the consequencesHigh risk of execution because they can not provide for their own defenseTherefore, "Our independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with the judgment of "the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter" and concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our "evolving standards of decency," we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution "places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life" of a mentally retarded offender. "-Notes: PastEvolving standardsRetributionDeterrence

Frye v. US (1923) analysis

Analysis: In short, the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court, noting that "the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made."-we did not make a mistake to get rid of the expert testimony because there wasn't enough factual basis.-Frye was called the general acceptance ruleYou can only talk about things that are generally accepted in the fieldNew technology was the problem. Not enough science behind it so it is not generally accepted

Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger Corp (1980) Issue

2 Issues, do the individuals involved deserve both punitive and compensatory damages?Notes:Tried without a juryPunitive v compensatory damages-p: punishment- no don't do this again I'm going to give you a fine-c: compensation- moneyGood or bad for Thompson-bad because he wants both compensatory and punitive damages and he got nothing.

Washington v. Harper (1990) Facts

A prisoner in a state correctional facility who had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder filed a case in state court claiming that the failure to provide a judicial hearing before the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech clauses of the Constitution.-Notes: Got forced medications but he shoudlve had a judicial hearing before

Tarasoff v. the Regents of the University of California (1974) facts

Action was brought against university regents, doctors, and campus police, to recover for murder of plaintiffs' daughter by patient of psychotherapists employed by university hospital.

Tarasoff v. the Regents of the University of California (1976)analysis

Analysis: We recognize the difficulty that a therapist encounters in attempting to forecast whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence. Obviously, we do not require that the therapist, in making that determination, render a perfect performance; the therapist need only exercise "that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of [that professional specialty] under similar circumstances."Amicus contends, however, that even when a therapist does in fact predict that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, the therapist should be absolved of any responsibility for failing to act to protect the potential victim. In our view, however, once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger. While the discharge of this duty of due care will necessarily vary with the facts of each case, in each instance the adequacy of the therapist's conduct must be measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition of reasonable care under the circumstances. The risk that unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of possible victims that may be saved. We would hesitate to hold that the therapist who is aware that his patient expects to attempt to assassinate the President of the United States would not be obligated to warn the authorities because the therapist cannot predict with accuracy that his patient will commit the crime.We recognize the public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy (see In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 432), and the consequent public importance of safeguarding the confidential character of psychotherapeutic communication. Against this interest, however, we must weigh the public interest in safety from violent assaultWe conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others.The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.(we get that it is hard to figure out if someone is dangerous or not. Obviously it cannot be done perfectly.So the amicus curiae are saying the therapist should not actually have to act to protect the system.the police are no longer liable. Therapist had a duty to warn and protect. Must call the police.Degree of reasonableness: Recognize confidentiality and mental illness is really important however we are going to way that public safety is more important.

Washington v. Harper (1990) Issue

Is a judicial hearing required before the State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will?

Roper v. Simmons (2005) issue

Is it permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States to execute a juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime.

Hall v. Florida (2014) Issue

Is the statute defining Intellectual disability as an IQ score of 70 or below unconstitutional?

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)analysis

Much of the court's reasoning is based on Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare (Known as bound to accuse himself ) had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688 and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required.Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.

Roper v. Simmons (2005) facts

At the age of 17, when he was still a junior in high school, Christopher Simmons, the respondent here, committed murder. About nine months later, after he had turned 18, he was tried and sentenced to death.

Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) facts

Barefoot convicted of capital murder of a police officer in Bell County, Texas. Separate hearing to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed, which asked 2 questions: whether the conduct casing death was "committed deliberately and with reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result" and "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Jury answered both question in the affirmative, sentencing him to death. Barefoot appealed, noting that the use of psychiatrist at the punishment hearing to make predictions about his future was unconstitutional, because psychiatrists, individually and as a class, are not competent to predict future dangerousness. Their use violated the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments-That is part of Texas's death penalty .-Can psychiatrists predict the future. Are we going to be okay with using psychological predictions?-Specifically risk assessments.

M'Naghten

Daniel M'Naghten believed he was being persecuted by Tories, and he sought to assassinate then British Prime Minister Robert Peel. Failing to accurately identify Peel from behind, he shot Edward Drummond, Peel's secretary, who died as a result. Several witnesses testified to the mental state of M'Naghten and he was found not guilty, on the grounds of insanity. The verdict created a public outcry regarding the insanity defense (we'll see a repeat of this with Hinckley), and the issue was debated in the House of Lords. What is the proper standard for insanity? What questions should be posed to the jury, what should be the role of the medical professional? This could be called the "right-wrong test" or the "cognitive prong" focusing on the "knowing." Note that this does not take into account the "volitional" prong, regarding uncontrollable or "irresistible impulse."

Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) Analysis

Does liberty interest also exist also exist in safety, freedom of movement, and training? (it does exist for adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care) The Court agreed with the Circuit court, in that "the plaintiff has a constitutional right to minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no longer a novel legal proposition." However, they noted there must be a balanced between "the liberty of the individual" (Due process) and "the demands of an organized society" (Poe v. Ullman). Based on older cases (again, Stare Decisis) they consider whether rights have been violated by determining the balance between his liberty interest against relative state interests.-Notes: Talking about liberty.•Regarding 1 and 2 (from before, remember the 3 issues?) The Supreme Court agreed with Chief Judge Seitz (from before also) and he would have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. I tis not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made."644 F. 2d, at 178. Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. At the same time, this standard s lower than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the Court of Appeals would require a State to meet to justify use of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We think this requirement would place an undue burden on the administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional judgment as to the needs of residents.-Notes: Not saying the do or don't get something, court should not be doing that. They just need to make sure there is a process-Problematic if you need a court order every time someone needs restraints. Do not really have time. (undue burden) would have to have a judge on call. Now they exercise professional judgement•Regarding 3 - In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from established principles. As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State -- it is conceded by petitioners that a duty to provide certain services and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Id. at 486-487.-Notes:The state doesn't actually have to provide thingsCertain services are provided by the state. Not sure what it needs to provide.If you are providing services you don't need to provide them allNot an all or nothing thing can provide some services.: In determining what is "reasonable" -- in this and in any case presenting a claim for training by a State -- we emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized. Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for damages against a professional in his individual capacity, however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good faith immunity would bar liability.-Notes:Should leave it up to the medical professionals rather than judges or juriesRather have the psychiatrist than a judge.Presume the psychiatrist is rightOnly time we cannot is......when your doctor is doing something way out of line that other doctors would not doIf your state has no money and does not give you the stuff that you need you cannot be punished for not being able to do the things that you really want.The record reveals that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims training related to these needs. If, as seems the case, respondent seeks only training related to safety and freedom from restraints, this case does not present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has some general constitutional right to training per se, even when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom. We... conclude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint. In view of the kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of record, we need go no further in this case.-Notes: yes you should get training but the training you are getting is only for bodily safety and restraints.Need to go no furtherPeople who are in institutions do get reasonable care and safety....Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these interests. Such conditions of confinement would comport fully with the purpose of respondent's commitment. In determining whether the State has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions of this type -- often, unfortunately, overcrowded and understaffed -- to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.-Notes: Yes we get the actual restraints that you have in society, overcrowded and understaffed. Have to make broad sweeping decisions for everyone. To do that they sholdnt have the consequence of being sued if they fit the 3 requirements. Yes the need some training but only training in liberty requirements.

In re Gault (1967) issue

Does the Arizona Juvenile code and the procedures actually used in Gerald's case unconstitutional, on the ground of denial of various procedural due process rights (Fourteenth Amendment)?

Atkins v. Virginia (2002) Issue

Does the Eighth Amendment Right against cruel and unusual punishment prohibit the execution of mentally retarded criminals?

Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) Issue

Does the imposition of capital punishment on an individual for a crime committed at 16 or 17 years of age constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment?

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)issue

Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifying them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment?

In re Lifschutz (1970) facts

Dr. Joseph E. Lifschutz, a psychiatrist practicing in California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from the custody of the Sheriff of the County of San Mateo. Dr. Lifschutz was imprisoned after he was adjudged in contempt of court for refusing to obey an order of the San Mateo County Superior Court instructing him to answer questions and produce records relating to communications with a former patient. Dr. Lifschutz contends that this underlying court order was invalid as unconstitutionally infringing his personal constitutional right of privacy, his right effectively to practice his profession, and the constitutional privacy rights of his patients. He also attacks the order, or more specifically, the statutory provisions which authorize the compulsion of his testimony in these circumstances, as unconstitutionally denying him the equal protection of the laws since, under California law, clergymen could not be compelled to reveal certain confidential communications under these circumstances.

Indiana v. Edwards (2008) analysis

Farretta doesn't apply because "it did not consider the problem of mental competency" Godinez (though close, as even the Supreme court admits it) does not fully answer the question because "In part that is because the Court of Appeals higher standard at issue. Godinez differs in a critical way from the higher standard at issue here. In Godinez, the higher standard sought to measure the defendant's ability to proceed on his own to enter a guilty plea; here the higher standard seeks to measure the defendant's ability to conduct trial proceedings. To put the matter more specifically, the Godinez defendant sought only to change his pleas to guilty, he did not seek to conduct trial proceedings, and his ability to conduct a defense at trial was expressly not at issue. Thus we emphasized in Godinez that we needed to consider only the defendant's "competence to waive the right."-Farretta: only about if you are allowed to represent oneself (6th amendment)Does not apply-Splitting ability to waive your right or your ability to conduct that right.Also, "For another thing, Godinez involved a State that sought to permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself. Godinez's constitutional holding is that a State may do so. But that holding simply does not tell a State whether it may deny a gray-area defendant the right to represent himself—the matter at issue here. One might argue that Godinez's grant (to a State) of permission to allow a gray-area defendant self-representation must implicitly include permission to deny self-representation. "On to the actual analysis: We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Duskybut who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.Secondary Questions asked by Indiana, a more specific standard that would "deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury."-Can you have a higher standard? It is on the judge. The constitution allows the judge to do so.-What is the higher standard?Analysis on second question: We are sufficiently uncertain, however, as to how that particular standard would work in practice to refrain from endorsing it as a federal constitutional standard here. We need not now, and we do not, adopt it. Indiana has also asked us to overrule Faretta. We decline to do so. We recognize that judges have sometimes expressed concern that Faretta, contrary to its intent, has led to trials that are unfair.Therefore, back to the holding:For these reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.-Indiana asked to give them standards. They didn't give them standards.A mentally ill defendant who is nonetheless competent to stand trial is not necessarily competent to dispense with a lawyer and represent himself.A mentally ill defendant who is nonetheless competent to stand trial is not necessarily competent to dispense with a lawyer and represent himself.

In re Gault (1967) Facts

Gerald Gault and his friend made a prank call. Gerald then went through a "kangaroo court"(my words, not the Supreme Court's).-Notes: 1969 lude phone call.At the time Gerald was picked up, his parents were at work, no one knew he had been arrested. Minor is under the age of 18-No recording, no transcript, but him... literally nothing. Also it was 2 months later and you cant remember anything. Spend from when you are 15-21 in an industrial school (6 year sentence for making a prank call) as an adult it would have been $15-50 or not more than 2 months of jail.

Sell v. U.S. (2003) Facts

In 1997, the Federal Government charged Charles Sell with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment. Although Sell has a long history of mental illness and was initially found competent to stand trial for fraud and attempted murder, a Federal Magistrate Judge ordered his hospitalization to determine whether he would attain the capacity to allow his trial to proceed. Subsequently, the Magistrate authorized forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. In affirming, the District Court concluded that medication was the only viable hope of rendering Sell competent to stand trial and was necessary to serve the Federal Government's interest in obtaining an adjudication of his guilt or innocence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On the fraud charges, the appellate court found that the Federal Government had an essential interest in bringing Sell to trial, that the treatment was medically appropriate, and that the medical evidence indicated that Sell would fairly be able to participate in his trial.-Notes: essentially: will he be competent to stand trial. Forced drugs to keep him competent. Liberty interest of the individual vs the government interest of continuing a trial

O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) Analysis

In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends. Since the jury found, upon ample evidence, that O'Connor as an agent of the State, knowingly did so confine Donaldson, it properly concluded that O'Connor violated Donaldson's constitutional right to freedom.-You cant just keep someone because they might be mentally ill if they can be on their own without being dangerous.Additional consideration by the court: The relevant question for the jury is whether O'Connor "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson]." The case was remanded so that the Court of Appeals (see difference from other cases) could consider whether the District Judge's failure to instruct with regard to the effect of O'Connor's claimed reliance on state law rendered inadequate the instructions as to O'Connor's liability for compensatory and punitive damages.

Godinez v. Moran (1993) Analysis

In sum, all criminal defendants--not merely those who plead guilty--may be required to make important decisions once criminal proceedings have been initiated. And while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial. (The decision to plead guilty is also made over a shorter period of time, without the distraction and burden of a trial.) This being so, we can conceive of no basis for demanding a higher level of competence for those defendants who choose to plead guilty. If the Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not guilty, it is necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty.Nor do we think that a defendant who waives his right to the assistance of counsel must be more competent than a defendant who does not, since there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights. A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial, however, is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead guilty or waive his right to counsel. In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.Saw this in Miranda.How do we check this?When someone pleads guilty they have to go through this whole thing of questions. Guilty plea colliqui. Ask do you know that you are pleading guilty to _____ then you have to ask them that these are the rights that you are waiving. Did anyone promise you something in return for this? Do you know what the consequences are? Are you sure you understand?standard for all types of competency is to be the same

O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) Facts

Kenneth Donaldson, was civilly committed to confinement as a mental patient in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in January 1957. He was kept in custody there against his will for nearly 15 years. The petitioner, Dr. J. B. O'Connor, was the hospital's superintendent during most of this period. Throughout his confinement Donaldson repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, demanded his release, claiming that he was dangerous to no one, that he was not mentally ill, and that, at any rate, the hospital was not providing treatment for his supposed illness. Finally, in February 1971, Donaldson brought this lawsuit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that O'Connor, and other members of the hospital staff named as defendants, had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty.-He is saying he should not be there. Deprived him of his right to liberty.

Sell v. U.S. (2003) Issue

May the Federal Government administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendants charged with serious, non-violent offences, in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial?

Dusky v. U.S. (1960) Facts

Milton R. Dusky, guilty under an indictment returned September 10, 1958, charging him with having, on or about August 19, 1958, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201, unlawfully transported in interstate commerce from Johnson County, Kansas, to Ruskin Heights, Missouri, a certain girl who had been unlawfully decoyed, kidnapped and carried away. He, though suffering from a mental illness, was found competent and sentenced to 45 years (reduced later to 20).Convicted of kidnapping a girl and is charged w an interstate commerce law (dk why she was considered commerce) became federal

Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) facts

Mother asked that her son be admitted into a state facility on a permanent basis due to her inability to care for her (although 33 year-old) son, who has the mental capacity of an 18-month-old, with an IQ of 8-10. Son was certified as severely retarded and unable to care for himself, and therefore, was admitted to Pennhurst State School and Hospital. After admission, mother noticed several injuries to her son, both from his own violence and from other residents. Concerned, she filed a complaint.

Godinez v. Moran (1993) facts

On August 2, 1984, in the early hours of the morning, respondent entered the Red Pearl Saloon in Carson City, Nevada, and shot the bartender and a patron four times each with an automatic pistol. He then walked behind the bar and removed the cash register. Nine days later, respondent arrived at the apartment of his former wife and opened fire on her; five of his seven shots hit their target. Respondent then shot himself in the abdomen and attempted, without success, to slit his wrists. Of the four victims of respondent's gunshots, only respondent himself survived. On August 13, respondent summoned police to his hospital bed and confessed to the killings. He then decided to discharge himself from counsel and plead guilty to prevent mitigating circumstances from appearing in court.

Hall v. Florida (2014) Facts

On February 21, 1978, Freddie Lee Hall, petitioner here, and his accomplice, Mark Ruffin, kidnaped, beat, raped, and murdered Karol Hurst, a pregnant, 21-year-old newlywed. Afterward, Hall and Ruffin drove to a convenience store they planned to rob. In the parking lot of the store, they killed Lonnie Coburn, a sheriff's deputy who at tempted to apprehend them. Hall received the death penalty for both murders, although his sentence for the Coburn murder was later reduced on account of insufficient evidence of premeditation. After Atkins v. Virginia, Hall asked Florida to vacate his sentence, pointing to his IQ score of 71. Court denied his motion, as Florida state mandated that he show an IQ score 70 or below.-Notes: Discrepancies between IQ score cut off for mental r

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) Facts

Petitioners, two minor children and their parents, alleged in their suit against respondent that the children's serious birth defects had been caused by the mothers' prenatal ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription drug marketed by respondent. During District Court summary judgment, court determined that 8 experts presented by the petitioners did not meet the applicable "general acceptance" standard (Frye) for the admission of expert testimony.

Lawrence v. Texas (2003) facts

Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered petitioner Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, petitioner Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.-Notes: Antisodomy

Shannon v. U.S. (1994) analysis

Shannon contends that an instruction informing the jury of the consequences of an NGI verdict is required under the IDRA whenever requested by the defendant. He also argues that such an instruction is required as a matter of general federal criminal practice. The court denied both arguments.IDRA requirement--Shannon asserts that an express statutory directive is not necessary because, by modeling the IDRA on D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (1981), Congress impliedly adopted the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Lyles and the practice endorsed by that decision of instructing the jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict. Supreme Court does not see it in this fashion, they claim that the decision was NOT based in D.C. Code and that Congress departed from the scheme embodied in D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301 in several significant ways (e.g. clear and convincing vs. preponderance).(Since the law that you got it from is based on this then that is what you should hold. Actually Shannon you are wrong about this bc the rule is not based on DC code. )Required as a matter of general federal criminal practice.--Even assuming Shannon is correct that some jurors will harbor the mistaken belief that defendants found NGI will be released into society immediately—an assumption that is open to debate—the jury in his case was instructed "to apply the law as [instructed] regardless of the consequence," and that "punishment . . . should not enter your consideration or discussion."An accurate instruction about the consequences of an NGI verdict, however, would give no such assurance. Under the IDRA, a postverdict hearing must be held within 40 days to determine whether the defendant should be released immediately into society or hospitalized. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 4243(c), (d). Thus, the only mandatory period of confinement for an insanity acquittee is the period between the verdict and the hearing. Instead of encouraging a juror to return an NGI verdict, as Shannon predicts, such information might have the opposite effect—that is, a juror might vote to convict in order to eliminate the possibility that a dangerous defendant could be released after 40 days or less.(It should be based on the crime not the consequences.Ex.) if a murder case look at the murder case not the consequences of the murderer.)

Sell v. U.S. (2003) Analysis

The Court held that the Constitution allows the Federal Government to administer antipsychotic drugs, even against the defendant's will, in limited circumstances. The Court reasoned that such conditions include if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the trial's fairness, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.•This standard will permit forced medication solely for trial competence purposes in certain instances. But these instances may be rare, because the standard says or fairly implies the following: First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at stake. The Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important. However, courts must consider each case's facts in evaluating this interest because special circumstances may lessen its importance, e.g., a defendant's refusal to take drugs may mean lengthy confinement in an institution, which would diminish the risks of freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious crime.-Notes: We can medicate someone for trial but only under limited circumstances.Has to be a serious offense•In addition to its substantial interest in timely prosecution, the Government has a concomitant interest in assuring a defendant a fair trial. Second, the court must conclude that forced medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests. It must find that medication is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial and substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a defense. Third, the court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests and find that alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results. Fourth, the court must conclude that administering the drugs is medically appropriate.-Notes: If I medicat somone it must have them become competent to stand trial not hinder them from standing trial .If someone was there, and they can be trained, then they cannot be medicated.

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) facts

The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances, ruled on jointly, in which defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way." In Vignera v. New York, the petitioner was questioned by police, made oral admissions, and signed an statement all without being notified of his right to counsel. Similarly, in Westover v. United States, the petitioner was arrested by the FBI, interrogated, and made to sign statements without being notified of his right to counsel. Lastly, in California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days without notification of his right to counsel. In all these cases, suspects were questioned by police officers, detectives, or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. In none of the cases were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their interrogation.(Facts: 4 cases that fell under this. All of them had to do with basically the defendant was being interrogated by police and they gave a statement of guilt and they were found guilty based upon that statement but they were never informed of their 5th amendment rights.Ruled on jointly-combining something

Washington v. Harper (1990) Analysis

The central question for the court is if there is a requirement for a judicial hearing before involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Clauses of both the federal and state constitution, as well as state tort law. There were two issues the Supreme Court considered, the substantive issue (what factual circumstances must exist before the State may administer antipsychotic drugs to the prisoner against his will) and a procedural issue (whether the State's non-judicial mechanisms used to determine the facts in a particular case are sufficient), remember Washington state has a policy.-Notes:Holding...Which means what: sticking w the initial decision that you can medicate someone. Does not have to be part of the judicial hearing. Analysis: Washington already has a policy on how they are going to do this. As long as there is a process we actually have a due process cause that suffices. Satisfies the due process argument.•Analysis continued: Respondent contends that the State, under the mandate of the Due Process Clause, may not override his choice to refuse antipsychotic drugs unless he has been found to be incompetent, and then only if the factfinder makes a substituted judgment that he, if competent, would consent to drug treatment. We disagree.•The extent of a prisoner's right under the Clause to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement. The Policy under review requires the State to establish, by a medical finding, that a mental disorder exists which is likely to cause harm if not treated. Moreover, the fact that the medication must first be prescribed by a psychiatrist, and then approved by a reviewing psychiatrist, ensures that the treatment in question will be ordered only if it is in the prisoner's medical interests, given the legitimate needs of his institutional confinement.•These standards, which recognize both the prisoner's medical interests and the State's interests, meet the demands of the Due Process Clause.-Notes:Liberty clause has limitations: because they are confined. Liberty is already confined. Lost that constitutional right. Based on that confinement we have to consider other things.Have to medicate because they can be of harm to self and other. Has to keep order and maintain everyones health.•For the procedural issue, they apply the standards set by Turner v. Safley (1987). In the decision they considered factors to determine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation - of which 3 are relevant.•"First, there must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it."•Second, a court must consider "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally."•Third, "the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation," but this does not mean that prison officials "have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint."Regarding 1 - "by definition" a prison environment "is made up of persons with "a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct"." Regarding 2 - "Prison administrators have not only an interest in ensuring the safety of prison staffs and administrative personnel, but also the duty to take reasonable measures for the prisoner's own safety. These concerns have added weight when a penal institution, like the SOC, is restricted to inmates with mental illnesses." Regarding 3 - A rule that is "in no way responsive to the State's legitimate interests is not a proper accommodation, and can be rejected out of hand. Nor are physical restraints or seclusion "alternatives that fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests."-Notes: De minimus: of minimal interest.Lastly, does due process require a judicial decision maker? Notwithstanding the risks that are involved, we conclude that an inmate's interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge. The Due Process Clause "has never been thought to require the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer."-Notes:It has to be a process- it does not have to be judicial

Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger Corp (1980) Facts

The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases are passengers who sustained injuries in the derailment of a National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) train in Tennessee on October 1, 1975. The train was being operated at the time by employees of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. (hereinafter L & N) and the derailment occurred on track owned by L & N. Amtrak stipulated that it was liable for compensatory damages to all plaintiffs except Thompson, an employee of L & N, who was traveling on a pass issued by Amtrak which contained a limitation of liability.

Shannon v. U.S. (1994) issue

Whether a federal district court is required to instruct the jury regarding the consequences to the defendant of a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity," either under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 or as a matter of general federal practice.is that good or bad for Shannon? BAD nothing changed. Which. means what for the consequences? They do not need to be talked about.

Godinez v. Moran (1993) Issue

Whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial

Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) facts

This is a consolidation of 2 cases. Case 1 - The first case, No. 87-5765, involves the shooting death of 20-year-old Barbel Poore in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Petitioner Kevin Stanford committed the murder on January 7, 1981, when he was approximately 17 years and 4 months of age. Case 2 - The second case before us today, No. 87-6026, involves the stabbing death of Nancy Allen, a 26-year-old mother of two who was working behind the sales counter of the convenience store she and David Allen owned and operated in Avondale, Missouri. Petitioner Heath Wilkins committed the murder on July 27, 1985, when he was approximately 16 years and 6 months of age.-Notes: Stanford v Kentucky And penry v lenal were decided on the same day. What is penry related to? (related to Atkins!!! In Roper v Simmons we talk about atkins.They were under 18 but over 16

Durham

This rule was first adopted by New Hampshire in 1871. It became more widespread after a 1954 U.S. Court of Appeals decision Durham v. U.S. in which the court found the existing tests for legal insanity inadequate. At the time, insanity was based on either the inability to know right from wrong or the inability to control impulses (also, both tests required a clinical diagnosis of insanity). The court decided that this approach failed to account for certain mentally defective individuals charged with crimes, suggesting the following test instead-Adopted in New Hampshire- the only state that uses Durham-Was the crime the product of a mental disorder "The question will be simply whether the accused acted because of a mental disorder, and not whether he displayed particular symptoms which medical science has long recognized do not necessarily, or even typically, accompany even the most serious mental disorder." The "product test" as it came to be known, required the jury to determine if the criminal act was causally connected to a mental disease or defect. (i.e. the crime was a "product of" the mental disease or defect)Durham rule dropped in 1972 in U.S. v. Brawner to favor the ALI rule.Currently only used in New Hampshire used in the U.S.

Gregg v. Georgia (1976) facts

Troy Gregg was convicted of armed robbery and murder. Jury sentenced Gregg to death•Procedure: Superior Court, Gwinnett County convicted of armed robbery and murder. Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions. U.S. Supreme Court granted cert.

Connecticut

Under Connecticut law, criminal insanity is an affirmative defense. The defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that, at the time he committed the act, he lacked substantial capacity as a result of a mental disease or defect to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or control it within the requirements of the law (CGS § 53a-13(a)). The insanity defense cannot be used by people whose criminal activity resulted from voluntary use of unprescribed intoxicants or compulsive gambling, or when an abnormality is demonstrated only by repeated criminal or antisocial conduct (CGS §§ 53a-13(b) and (c)).2 things constitute a crime: 1 actus rea (the act itself) 2 mens rea (intent/ mindset)Standard for guilt: unreasonable doubtAffirmative Defense: Presumed to be sane and do not have to be proved to be insane. (you have to prove your insanity)policeman on the elbow test. You see a police officer you stop speeding.Ct based on ALI

Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) Issue

Was it an improper of a stay of execution while failing to act finally on his appeal and Use of psychiatrist to determine future dangerousness-1st half if talking about the fact that the court procedures denied.....Stay of execution: you do not die. Pause to make sure he cannot die. Denied his stay. He did not get to appeal it 100% bc it's a constitutional right and there is a chance he is dead before his last appeal

Tarasoff v. the Regents of the University of California (1974)analysis

We shall explain that defendant therapists, merely because Tatiana herself was not their patient, cannot escape liability for failing to exercise due care to harm the endangered Tatiana or those who reasonably could have been expected to notify her of her peril. "therapist bears a duty to use reasonable care to give threatened persons warnings as are essential to avert foreseeable danger." "single relationship of a doctor to his patient is sufficient to support the duty to use reasonable care to warn of dangers emanating from the patient's illnessAnalysis: the therapist has the obligation to say something even though Tatiana is not his client.Reasonable care:Have to give people warning if they are in foreseeable dangerHas to be part of their mental illness?

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) Analysis

he court addresses the question about state licensing a marriage between two people first. (which, consequently, decides the 2nd question).--14th amendment's Due Process Clause extends to personal choices, central to individual's dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs.-Court has held that the right to marry is protected by the Constitution:--Loving v. Virginia - Invalidated ban on interracial unions--Turner v. Safley - Prisoners could not be denied right to marry--However, the courts recognized that these decisions applied for opposite-sex partners. Baker v. Nelson did hold that the exclusion of same-sex couples did not present a federal question.-With this in mind, the court notes Lawrence v. Texas as an example of precedent expressed for broader principles.-Notes: These only apply to opposite sex couplesWhy in this case are we bringing up Lawrence v Texas? As long you are not hurting anyone you are allowed to do what you want in the privacy of your home.-Answer: more applicable to homosexual men. WE decided they needed to see a more global picture-4 principles demonstrate why this is fundamental under the Constitution:--1 - Precedents of personal choice. Right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy, the connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. Decisions about marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. This is true for all purposes, whatever their sexual orientation.--2 - Right to marry is fundamental because it supports a 2-person union unlike any other. Griswold v. Connecticut, Turner v. Virginia, and Lawrence v. Texas have all noted marriage rights and rights for intimate association, even outside of the mere freedom from laws makign same-sex intimacy a criminal offense.-Notes: Marriage is a fundamental right-1.) getting married and the doing so is a concept of individual autonomy (we get to make the decision to decide to marry on our own as an individual)-2.) so it is a 2 person union.-3 - Protects the safeguards for children and families and draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. Without recognized marriage, children suffer from stigma of the 'lesser family,' material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, and thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples (which was discussed in Windsor). Now, this doesn't mean that the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do/cannot have children, precedent protects the right of a married couple nt to procreate, so the right to marry cannot be conditioned on capacity or commitment to procreate.-Notes: 3.) why is it a material cost? ( tax breaks, health care benefits - if your spouse has better health care, you can be included in it, can get military perks) If you are a child of an unmarried couple.. Who gets the notice for school? Who gets registered for who can do the pickup? Special list of "other" people. This specific claus is safeguarding children and families.Cant base it on procreation. People have a right to have kid or not. That has nothing to do with your sexual orientation and who you want to marry.-4 - Marriage is a keystone of the Nation's social order (Maynard v. Hill). States have linked to marriage many legal facets and elements of social order. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couple out of a central institution of the Nation's society, for too many aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage. The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.-Notes:4) Marriage is important. Marriage is a necessary factor within social order. It is something that matters for society sake. People strive to become married. How are we as the government going to restrict something that we as a society want to cherish.-Now to a constitutional argument:--The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. This dynamic is reflected in Loving, where the Court invoked both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause; and in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, where the Court invalidated a law barring fathers delinquent on child-support payments from marrying. Indeed, recognizing that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex based inequality on marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 460-461, and confirmed the relation between liberty and equality-Notes: Making the argument here that the fact that we cannot bar same sex marriage. Constitutional safeguards.§The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. (Lawrence v. Texas). This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples are denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and continuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians.-Notes: Marriage is a fundamental right- the denial of the fundamental right is against the due process and equal rights.-And now to question 2:--The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same sex marriages validly performed out of State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.-Notes: Should states allow same sex marriages from other states? All states should have same sex marriage.-But, shouldn't we have waited? Shouldn't we have litigation, debate, and further legislation? We are, in a democracy.-Notes: Windsor talked about that domestic relations was a state policy and now in this one the federal government is going to decide on domestic issues.

Painter v. Bannister (1966) Analysis

§This case is not about if there is an "unfit" parent, it's actually about what is "best" for the child. The differences between a "stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, middlewest background and an "unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating" households are taken into account.-Notes: So who gets custody? grandparents§: It is interesting to note that there are several considerations when trying to figure out which household is "best"-It is not prerogative of Supreme Court to determine custody upon court's choice of one of two ways of life within normal and proper limits, but such philosophies may be important as they relate to child and his particular needs.-Security and stability in home are more important than intellectual stimulation in proper development of child.- Notes:What does the child need at that moment. Age of the child starts to matter. If they are younger- mom is preferable bc they bond to their mothers. If you are older itll make a difference. 16 male- father will most likely be the preference.-Security and stability in home are more important than intellectual stimulation in proper development of child.-Surviving parent should be encouraged to look for help with children following death of spouse from those who love children without risk of thereby losing custody, and such fact must receive consideration in custody dispute.-Primary consideration in custody dispute is best interest of child, and if return of custody to natural parent is likely to have seriously disrupting and disturbing effect upon child's development, this fact must prevail.-Deceased parent's wishes with respect to custody of children are entitled to consideration.-Notes: Cant penalize him for giving away his child. Should be able to ask for help without consequences.Mother of child left custody to the father of the child-Age of persons claiming custody of child is to be considered in custody dispute.-Child psychologist's testimony was entitled to great deal of reliance in custody dispute.§Best interests of seven-year-old boy required that his 60-year-old maternal grandparents, who had been asked by father to take temporary charge of child after mother's death two years before and who had provided "stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, middlewest background", be awarded permanent custody as against father who had since remarried, in view of likelihood of seriously disrupting and disturbing effect upon child's development which could result from child's return to "unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating" household of father.-Notes: Took age of bannisters into consideration. Death.

Atkins v. Virginia (2002) Facts

•Atkins convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. He is sentenced to death. During penalty phase of the trial, Dr. Evan Nelson, who noted he was "mildly mentally retarded." Had fully IQ of 59.Notes: Intellectual deficit vs. mental illness in FordPenry: r man with mental age of 7 convicted of murder and sentenced to death, found to be not cruel and unusual (8th amendment allows for execution of mentally r)Can not execute the intellectually disabled