MIDDLE EAST II MIDTERM

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Williams, "Environmental History of the Middle East and North Africa,"

Environmental history asks how an environmental perspective challenges or expands our understanding of historical change European imperialists tried to justify control by arguing MENA needed oversight for "environemtal stewardship"---- colonial administrators portrayed locals as responsible for environmental degradation to justify exploitation/appropration of resources In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, dam-building along major rivers in the region has provided greater assurance against drought, but has also created its own environmental complications.The ongoing sensitivity of much of the region's agricultural production to annual rainfall makes its ecological balance particularly susceptible to the effects of climate change. Large-scale enviro projects in MENA before European control were reshaping relationships between locals and Ottoman Empire BUT now these kinds of projects intertwined with histories of colonialism and nation-states; imposed national borders have constrained resource flows Mastery and management of water-related resources provided justifications for colonial occupation and national sovereignty interwar border drawings in MENA also produced states with virtually no riverine water sources and very limited freshwater resources. Environmental resource management strategies not only increased state control, but also justified foreign intervention. (OIL) Oil has not only engendered the development of distinct forms of political power, but also created the conditions for an ecological crisis as a result of the geological and technical processes involved in extracting, transporting, and distributing it as well as the environmental impacts its use has precipitated. The rapid urbanization that accompanied the increased exploitation of oil resources has produced spaces of greater socioeconomic disparity and fraught projects of urban planning while also taking a toll on other vital resources pastoralists have an important presence in the MENA region due to the suitability of ecology for that purpose—-has at times brought them into conflict with settled communities or centralizing states In particular, imperialists have claimed that pastoralists' herds were a primary contributing factor in deforestation. Characterizing local land-use practices as responsible for environmental degradation and mismanagement of the environment then justified imperial intervention and provided a pretext for appropriating land and expanding control over its exploitation. OE relied on detailed local knowledge and relationships to nature to supply essential provisions.---ottomans worked with locals to figure out how to advance agriculture in experimental farms Mandates insisted on policies characterized by less regard for local environmental specifics— unsuccessful; exacerbated droughts, made farmers struggles to meet crop taxes

"The Ottoman Empire"

~2.5 million Ottoman lives claimed in WWI (12% of the population), mostly civilian, perhaps even 5 million Literacy in single digits in Ottoman Empire at the time WWI overshadowed in the ME today by the events that came after, but at least as important if not more Ottoman Front not a sideshow — many observers from the time believed WWI was primarily a war for control of the region Tangled stories of independence movements and national liberation hopes along with tragedy Great Famine of 1915, Locusts → Arab Revolt of 1916 CUP enacts the brutal Armenian Genocide in the Anatolian Peninsula under the preemptive assumption that the area's Christians are "disloyal" Retaliation toward Europe for meddling in Ottoman affairs Muslim refugees from the Caucasus and Balkans to Anatolia increase sense of victimhood in the area that legitimized, in their eyes, violence in self-defense against the Armenians and Kurds Turkish national view: State of Turkey was triumphant, a clean break from the failed Ottoman Empire, but in reality similar policies and leadership carried over Turkish Republic established in 1923 under Mustafa Kemal Two contrasting sides: 1 Ottoman Empire as a failed state undone by its own financial missteps and oppression, European Powers needed to fill the power vacuum left by the declining "Sick man of Europe, Propagated by European voices at the time 2 Ottoman Empire as a victim of Western Imperialism and greedy European Powers always set out to partition it In the end, these two sides combined to create genocide within the Ottoman Empire — European Imperialism and the Ottoman response European diplomats encourage identity politics British promise too many things to too many people at once — a Jewish homeland in the Levant as well as Arab independence throughout the ME Sarikamis: snowy mountain pass where 80-90% of the Third Army perishes against the Russians, one of the worst Ottoman military disasters in history Many other Ottoman soldiers freeze to death, die of dysentery, famine, other disease, etc (brutal conditions) Because of this, many desert the Army → Armenians scapegoated for this, creates resentment Ottomans ally with Germany Because they feel threatened by the British, French, and Russians circling like vultures around their territory If they win the war, any concessions they give to Germany will be offset by newfound long-term security against takeover by the losers Enver Pasha: Ottoman Minister of War Islam used as a tool to mobilize populations, both by Ottomans and their opponents Ottomans declare jihad against their opponents (encouraged by Germany) Anglo-French blockade of Syria in the hopes that famine will foment Arab rebellion Jerusalem surrenders to the British December 1917

defensive developmentalism gelvin

What was the significance of the "debt administrations" in Egypt, Tunis, and the Ottoman empire?

"Defensive developmentalism": rulers of states outside EUrope copied EUropean methods of governance and imposed them on their domains; done bc these methods seemed the most effective means to protect themselves and mobilize their population; included Military reform; Expanding sources of revenue; and Augmenting their administration; legal reforms; education defensive developmetnalism often forced these countries to take on foreign loans, and when the economic crisis of the 1870s hit these countries were bankrupted Egypt: military reform was essential to consolidate control and protection from Ottomans; Mehmet Ali abolished tax farming; seized property of tax farmers and religious groups for government; encouraged cash crops (COTTON). Rise in cotton prices during US civil war caused Ali's successors to borrow too much money for Suez Canal; when CW ended Egypt economy suffered. Egypt declared bankruptcy in 1876—Europe oversaw Egyptian budget; bankruptcy led to Urrabi Revolt—>British occupation Tunisia: invested in military reform (French training and military tech); Bey overhauled tunisian tax system to pay for military reforms; invested in infrastructure; built a university, etc. Reforms so effective Bey forced the Ottomans to recognize Tunisian autonomy and right to rule. BUT Costs of defensive developmentalism also led to bankruptcy and eventually establishment of Tunisia as French protectorate OE: Military Reform: Sultan Selim III New Order; Legislated (unsuccessfully) against tax farming; restructured central bureaucracy; established provincial council based on representative principles. Also bankrupted by defensive developmentalism→European supervision of finances European control of finances meant that europeans could direct economy towards their interests For example, in Egypt, the European set up Caisse de la Dette—agency to oversee Egyptian finances and repay debts Caisse infuriated landowners (raised taxes) and elites who found foreign control difficult to stomach British encouraged cotton cultivation (to feed their textile mills); constructed railroads ; made sure Egypt did not develop domestic textile industry (to protect own industries btu lso thinking rapid economic development might undermine British control). Therefore, egyptian economy grew but Egypt couldn't maintain it because investment in education (PURPOSEFUL TOO) and industry lagged behind Eventually, foreign interference and control of finances led to much resentment and constitutnioalist movements (OE) or rebellions against imperial control (Egypt)

1808 Deed of Agreement

--agreement signed between the ayans, state officials, and Sultan, to mark commitment toward democratization and guarantee the power of the sultan --described to have marked an inflection point for Ottoman political and social order, compared to Magna Carta --deed binds sultan's authority to work in coordination with local notables in response to declining Ottoman power in light of economic changes and internal disruptions --deed criminalizes revolt, protects poor and taxpaying subjects, recaptures stability of the state through powerful military --reinvigorates power of the "Sublime State," basing empire's authority in Islam 1808 Deed of Agreement (De-centralization: "the politics of the notables"): Notables sign to guarantee and protect sultan, sultanate power, state order State commits to uphold the positions/status and the leaders of notable houses; support their descendants Deed suggests governors taxing too much in time of instability; state steps in to mediate between ppl and governors—people are ACTIVE, demanding fair treatment and state is responsive

McNeill, "The Eccentricity of MENA's Environmental History,"

-Situates SWANA's environment as eccentric, although not exceptional, for the combination of its arid climate, oil-rich, yet coal-poor reserves, and water scarcity -Eccentricities affect the region's history and social and political life and help us better understand social and cultural responses to the environment -environmental history of SWANA largley un-tapped --fish-poor waters= increased reliance on animals for protein --fheap animal power= less investment in energy technologies, contributes to orientalist ideas about "under-developed" Middle East --oil-rich=advent of nation-state, contributed to political and military development, although resulted in wealth inequality water scarcity= expertise in water management for over 1,500 years. --coal-poor=hurt MENA when coal was used to power other countries' industrializations --grasslands and fertile lands in "mosaic", forced pastoralist-farmer interactions

Anscombe, "The Balkan Revolutionary Age,"

-argues the Ottoman Balkans provide an essential account of the age of revolution, situates the revolutionary era as a global phenomenon, rather than a unique Western or French experience -revolutionary demands in various regions of the Balkans included demands to end despotic rule, but were not nationalist in nature; demands were "homegrown" and not solely influenced by French expansion --revolutionary demands included: efforts to modernize politically, called for accountabilty in government/end to european influence, tax cuts, just rule --revolutionary movements in Balkans were not the result of religious, ethnic differences/nationalism, but were responses to rapid changes in empire Anscombe: Ottomans had great religious/cultural diversity but remained very stable until late 18th century—when the empire stumbled into disastrous conflicts that bankrupted it and threatened continued existence Balkans was most important part of OE in terms of population, economic vitality, and imperial prestige (gave European aspect to an "asiatic" empire), was one of oldest parts of empire Majority-Christian part of OE; thriving—weren't oppressed, allowed to prosper and have their own institutions. NOT christians uprising against tyrannical Muslims The 1808 Deed of Agreement marked a turning point in Ottoman history, in which the new Sultan Mahmud II signed an agreement with local notables promising to cooperate with these local notables, limiting his authority by binding him to work with these notables to jointly address the issues facing the empire. Recognizing that his predecessor's actions such as the New Order military reforms had led to revolts within regions of the empire, Mahmud signed this document to both strengthen the empire and provide assurances to local notables that Mahmud was willing to make changes. This document combats Western conceptions of the Ottoman Empire as "stuck in the past" and unable to adapt, as the sultan certainly responded to concerns of the notables that were echoed throughout the empire. Balkan revolutions not a "French" phenomenon but a continental one; not Christians revolting for Muslim rule; historians have overemphasized nationalism and underemphasized policy opposition Balkan "Age of Revolution" (1789-1848); turmoil affected Muslims as well as Christians It resulted not from nationalism but from pressures within Ottoman society created by state self- strengthening efforts. Such efforts involved squeezing from the population resources needed for military reform and ruthless disciplining of anyone suspected of obstructionism. These pressures had effects as revolutionary as anywhere on the continent, because popular unrest forced fundamental change in governmental practices, pushing the Ottoman Empire onto a path of state modernization similar to that seen in countries such as post-1789 France.

McDougall, "The Emergence of Nationalism,"

Affirms that the nationalisms (yes, plural) of the MENA region were born from the experiences of imperial rule, segmented by artificial social changes and rampant inequality. Watan, nationalism tied more directly to the individual nation/homeland, and larger pan-Arabist nationalism, qamiyyah, are/were not competitive forces, but exist in an intricate, sometimes symbiotic, sometimes conflictual relationship. Contests the narrative that nationalism died with the birth of Islamism. Highlights that women played an active role in nationalistic movements across the MENA region, focusing on example of Algeria McDougall argues that while nationalism was certainly created within the context of imperialism and the challenges imposed by foreign influence, nationalism cannot be understood as an ideology exported through European imperialist structures to the Ottoman state or as purely a reaction to European imperialism. Instead, domestic reforms such as the Ottoman tanzimat as well as defensive developmental programs created widespread changes in social, political, and economic life that would combine to form the foundations of reimagining communities in terms of different social identities such as nationality. McDougall emphasizes that the meaning of nationalism differed within different historical contexts, and that different national movements contained diverse ideologies connected to constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, territorial sovereignty, religion, and more.

Gelvin primary sources 251-254

An Arab Soldier in the Ottoman Army: Ihsan Hasan al-Turjma (1893-1917) was a conscripted soldier in the Ottoman army during WWI From Palestine; Diary entries Locust Swarms Reach Baqa, May 20 1915 Locust swarms spreading everywhere, insects laying eggs---Crops have been laid to waste across country, particularly bad around Jaffa Citizens are compelled to go out in the fields and destroy the locusts, those who don't fined 1 lira for each six days (of not collecting insects) Typhus is Spreading in Jerusalem May 24, 1915 Diseases are spreading like widlfire among the population, ESPECIALLY AMONG MUSLIMS—who do not take the proper precautionw Ihsan feels dread—for the people but also for himself (live in close quarters with other soldiers, not syper hygeniec) I am Ottoman by Name Only, the World is My Country Sep 10, 1915 CEMAL PASHA ORDERED NO MEMBERS IN THE ARMED FORCES BE ALLOWED TO SERVE IN THEIR HOME REGIONS Those who are will be transferred away—-exceptions for fighting batallians, officers who disobey will be court martialed ORDER LED TO PANIC IN JERUSALEM—officers/soldiers began to seek all sorts of medical excuses to stay in Jerusalem Local leaders distraught—they would lose local staff, public works would likely stop Most soldiers hoped would not be carried out—DID NOT WANT TO BE SENT TO THE FRONT Ihsan didn't want it to happen but also would rather go to the front than lose dignity to plead for exemption BUT Ihsan could not imagine himself fighting in the desert front And why should I go? To fight for my country? I am Ottoman by name only, for my country is the whole of humanity. Even if I am told that by going to fight, we will conquer Egypt, I will refuse to go. What does this barbaric state want from us? To liberate Egypt on our backs? Our leaders promised us and other fellow Arabs that we would be partners in this government and that they seek to advance the interests and conditions of the Arab nation. But what have we actually seen from these promises? Had they treated us as equals, I would not hesitate to give my blood and my life--but as things stand, I hold a drop of my blood to be more precious than the entire Turkish state. Are We about to Have a Bread Rebellion? Dec 17 1915 IHSAN HASN"T SEEN DARKER DAYS Flour and bread have basically disappeared-many have not eaten for days "I never thought we would lack flour in our country, when we are the source of wheat" "Who is responsible but this wretched government? . If the government had any dignity, it would have saved wheat in its hangars for public distribution at a fixed price, or even have made it available from military supplies. If these conditions persist, the people will rebel and bring down this government-and then it will be too late for the leaders to atone for their sins.

Haddad, "Syria and Iraq as Proxy Colonies before Colonization"

Argues that foreign influence wasn't just affecting the sultan but also governors in provinces---Midhat Pasha, governor of Syria (1878- 1880), and Nazim Pasha, governor of Baghdad (1910-11) Both of them were "Anglophiles" initially supported by the British consuls who helped them get appointed, but eventually the two governors challenged French/British interests, particularly capitulations, and then Europeans removed their support/petitioned the Sultan to get them removed Ottoman regime had hands tied by capitulations—Ottoman governor officially had power but really British/Western consuls had power European foreign powers would switch allegiances between different governors, between governor and sultan, depending on whatever suited their interests best

Satia, "Air Control and British Idea of Arabia,

Argues that the British conceptualization of Arabia as a mysterious, dishonest, and noble region was a primary driver behind the British implementation of air control. British imaginings of Arabia were largely created by British intelligence agents who sought out Arabia for "spiritual redemption." "The South African War and the Great War had convinced many Britons that bourgeois Britain had strayed from the path of true glory." British agents began to explore Arab territories at the turn of the 20th century. Their belief that Arabia was dishonest and hard to understand, yet also a primal, noble land, led to the prioritization of "intuitive" intelligence gathering as opposed to the more empirical tactics employed by intelligence agents elsewhere. This meant utilizing "immersion" to be effective; thinking like an Arab, acting like one etc. Famous manifestation of this type of thinking is T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) This also elevated intelligence agents who were perceived to be skilled at immersing themselves as Arabs, making them extremely influential at the outbreak of World War I. The reality of the situation on the ground did not matter as much as the agents' word. Thus, they significantly shaped the post-war tactics in the region. There was a common belief that Arabia was destined for use of airpower. Middle Eastern campaigns in WW1 were uniquely mobile compared to Europe, especially in the use of military airpower. Perception that Arabia was so flat that airpower would be able to take advantage of the lack of cover on the ground Could cover the great distances of the region and reach isolated tribes Winston Churchill was very close with intelligence agents in Arabia (particularly Lawrence). They devised the air control scheme. Lawrence in particular imagined air control as paralleling the swift Bedouin warrior Depended on fear to multiply the effect of air control. Air control was also created because of a belief that the Arabs in Iraq were not genuinely resisting British control but were being manipulated by foreign powers. The fear from air control would stop that. Agents also hoped air surveillance would accomplish their dream of a region-wide intelligence web The RAF took over from the British army in Iraq in October 1922. Air control was not accurate. Commonly bombed the wrong villages or missed. British agents did not care since the system was supposed to function like a classical panopticon. The British agents also believed that because the Bedouins were culturally accustomed to warfare, it was actually a good thing to bombard them mercilessly as they would otherwise be offended about the British holding back. British agents also argued that in a biblical land, the use of air control fit perfectly with a fatalistic attitude to "acts of God."

How have Ze'evi and others approached the "origins of modernity" in MENA? Where can we place them chronologically, and what are the features and changes associated with this process?

Bernand Lewis (historian): consequence of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt was penetration of French Revolutionary ideas; "woke up" muslims from slumber and served as a wakeup call that led to attempts to modernize. FR ideas had profound influence PROBLEMATIC VIEW: lots of Islamic+ Christian exchange prior to 1798, makes modernization seem like an European import. More modern MENA scholars often seek to rectify these orientalist manifestations in the historiography of MENA Ze'evi challenges Lewis' and others' assertion that modernization was an European import. Ze'evi argues that MODERNITY is a product of interaction between MENA/Asian and European societies; both sides' confrontation —>modernity. Modernity itself a product of West's encounter with non-West, Europe became modernized through its interactions with other areas of the world (For example: silver from the new world is what helped European nations expand navies;Ottoman texts and preservation of classical European texts were introduced into Europe and prompted a rediscovery of classical antiquity) This change in framing argues against the paternalistic imperial narrative that colonization was "beneficial" for the development/modernization of MENA, or that modernity was an European import.

What role did cultural representation in the "air control" of Iraq after WWI, according to Satia?

British intelligence agents perceived Arabia as a mysterious and dishonest region, necessitating the use of intuitive intelligence tactics as opposed to empirical procedures. Therefore, agents who were believed to be blessed with the intuition necessary to "think like an Arab" gained tremendous influence after the conclusion of World War One, such as T.E. Lawrence. These agents pushed for the use of air control because they envisioned it as paralleling the swiftness of Bedouin warfare. They also believed that the Iraqi Arabs were culturally accustomed to warfare and would therefore be completely fine with the violence of air control. An additional justification was that in a biblical land, it was culturally normal for random "acts of God" to wreak havoc, and therefore the inhabitants would not be shocked by air control. Satia argues that the brutal British system of air control in Iraq was shaped and legitimated by British cultural understandings of the land of "Arabia". For British intelligence officers stationed in Iraq, Arabia was the land of the Bible where they could experience romanticized adventures "in the desert" where cultivating the skill of how to think like an Arab was more important than empirical observations. For the British, Arabia was a mystical land existing outside of law or ethics, a cultural imagination that enabled the horrific violence of the air control regime. Iraq was particularly suited for this air control regime with this British cultural imagination. Representations of Arabia enabled British air control to use tactics of terrorism and destruction and paradoxically argue that because of Arabia's unique characteristics, these tactics were a source of the "humaneness" of imperial air control.

Gelvin 117-165, 181-85

CHAP 8: THE LIFE OF THE MIND Nahda: Arabic literary renaissance; poets;/writers sought to rejuvenate Arabic literature; experimented with new techniques/languages of expression Young Turks (secular) and Sultan Abdulhammid II (Islam) used different ideologeis but both advoated for centralziation, "modernization" 18th-19th century: MENA people looked around and concluded Islam/Islamic world had fallen on hard times—many attributed to fall of Islam; believed needed to reinvigorate religion/purify from Western influence----started MANY religious mvmts such as salafism, moral reconstructionism, islamic modernists, etc YOUNG OTTOMANS: ISLAMIC MODERNISTS Tanzimat strengthened power of sultan, but left open to European imperial expansion; only by rooting social and political reform in Islamic principles could the empire neturalize the European threat Advocated for SHURA—govenrment by consultation; adopted it to argue for an Ottoman constitution and parliament CHAP 9: SECULARISM AND MODERNITY Prominent role religion plays in politics of MENA states does not means these states are not modern; rather, it means these states subscribe to an alternative form of modernity Role religion plays in contemprary MENA life emerged second half of nineteenth century—trnasformation of 19th century MENA fostered a corresponding transformation of religious institutions and doctrines OE transformation of religious institutions/doctrines occured in 2 ways: Result of state initiative Result of citizens reacting to new state structures or to European models Tanzimat period: OE attempted to foster political comunity made up of equal citizens bound together by commitment to legal norms, not religion Sultan Abdulhamid II changed this; promoted ideolgy that gave pride of place to an Ottoman/Islamic identity, new form of osmanlilik Made possible by religious mats of the time and by changing religious composition of empire—-OE retreat from EUrope during 19th century decreased number of Christians; meanwhile Muslim immigrants/refugees from EUrope and Caucuses flooded into OE Ottoman govt undertook many actions during sultan Abdulhamid's reign to standardize Islamic beleif and associate loyalty with the state with loyalty to Islam: The Islamic osmanlilk promoted by Sultan Abdulhamid II survived beyond his reign The Young Turks who deposed him initially attempted to restore secular osmanlilik of the tanzimat—but had to eventually return to Islamic one; hard to walk away from policies institutions created in last 30 years especially since had same goals of development and centralization; ALSO Islamic osmanlilik struck a chord with many in the empire—-failed counterrevolution against Young Turks Ulama (religious leaders) began advocatign for a return to traditioanl values;a argues nations could only progress if they remained true to religion and shunned foreign influences; demanded Young turk govt continue Abdulhamid's policeis of defensive deveolpemtalism to safeguard Islam from imperialsim; called for establishemnt of Islamic political party CHAP 10: CONSTITUTIONALISM Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905 Governor of Tehran had two sugar merchants beaten for price gouging; merchants argued they had to pay 20% tariff instead of 5% foreign merchants did, so had to have higher prices People enraged by the beating—-2,000 took refuge in a shrine (ritual of political protest) in a month-long bast Demands included: dismissal of governor, dismissal of Belgian whom shah had hired to reorganize customs, ALSO demanded establishment of House of Justice (parliament) Both local and international factors inspired the rise of constitutionalist movements Local: beating of merchants; crisis of legitimacy in OE; army mutiny in Egypt Internatiaonl: growing pains in world economy, consolidation of territiroal states, intensified imperialist pressure (and resentment), emergence of new social classes; global economic crises (1873-96 depression) which created popular movements PERSIA: hit hard by depression and economic crisis Constitutionalists blamed autocratic government to weak response to threats to national sovereignty (ex: european concessions) and demanded constitutional reforms to strengthen their states IN THE END—CONSTITUTONALISM FAILED IN BOTH OE AND PERSIA OE: constitutional rule replaced by triumvirate of military leaders who assumed power in 1913 Persia: constituon theoretically remained in effect, but Russian invaded and destroyed the Tabrizi experiment; dismissed the parliament Constitutnoalism in MENA important for later developments; Constitutional movements brought about a change in poltiical cultrue of the middle east,made the state a site of political contestaton—control of state apparatus became focus of politics. ALSO spread representative principle; made ideology and not dynasty the foundation for legitimacy Movements also spread and embodied mass politics Namik Kemal: Extract from the Journal Hurriyet Kemal was an Islamic modernist and member of the Young Ottomans; supporter of constitutionalism. Wrote this article defending the idea of consultation between ruler and ruled Consultation would not violate right of the sultan; right of the sultan is to govern on the basis of th will of the people and principles of freedom Consultation would not face the language barrier (all provincial councils speak Turkish) The Supplementary Fundamental Law of 7 October 1907 ^^^ this and (and the Fundamental Law of 1906)provided the foundation for the PERSIAN constitution^^^ Official religion is Islam; laws must be in accordance with Islamic principles; ulama (religious leaders) and Proofs of Islam will submit 20 names to the National Consultative Assembly, who will pick 5 to serve as religious advisors (will be recognized as members and reject any law not in accordance with ISlam) People of Persian EMpire will enjoy equal rights before law; have right to property lives honor; provisions for free public education; free press (except for books heretical/critical of Islam), foreigners can become naturalized Powers of realm derived from the people; divided into 3 categories: legislative judicial and executive (king; who must take an oath in front of Senate and NCA); powers will remain distinct and separate

Lessersohn, "An Armenian Shoemaker's Memoir,"

Cherishian: a shoemaker from late Ottoman Marash Born in Marash in 1886: Marash → Armenians made up about 50 percent of the town's population Accompanied his family when they were deported to present-day Syria and returned to Marash in 1919, where he married his first wife Forced into exodus again after which only he and one of his sisters survived to reach Islahiye Cherishian's accounts of his experiences of deportation are presented side-by-side with striking accounts of extended intercommunal interactions, affiliations, and networks characterized by intercommunal and interpersonal openness, sympathy, intimacy, and pleasure His memoirs: Contemporary, retrospective voice → a product of a time later than that about which he writes Otherhood and brotherhood → how Ottoman subjects themselves responded to and lived with this maintained difference Supra-communal affinity, whereby communal difference was elided and maintained at the same time. Refers to a Turkish or Arab contemporary in terms of family and friendship E.g. barber shop in partnership with a Turk, Huseyn Two realities — friendship and hostility/violence — coexisted The function of geographical place in Cherishian's testimony → to convey his existential and interpersonal closeness to the "other" Language: a significant way in the late Ottoman era to express identities The Ottoman state was governed by the maintenance of diversity, of which a plurality of languages was part Prophecy: a prophecy that predicted that the Ottoman Empire would end in the year 1920 Enlistment: while Cherishian says that he was waiting for Armenian liberation, he nevertheless volunteered for the Ottoman army The Bishop: "Armenians will make the Ottoman army shine" the idea of "provincial cosmopolitanism": ecosystems of interactions → mutually influencing ad mutually inscribing, gave rise to Ottoman identities that could be dynamic, multifaceted, and complex, constituted by the aggregation and accommodation in particular individuals or groups of differences Provincial cosmopolitanism: the condition in which diverse persons and communities inhabiting the same local and provincial ecosystem could interact and influence each other via interctign in lived dispositions of openness and supra-communal affinity provincial cosmopolitanism was a local cosmopolitanism, a lived disposition, affinity, and identity of indi- vidual persons and of collective groups that was the direct result of living in a demographically concentrated provincial urban environment in which individ- uals and groups of diverse and differentiated ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural composition engaged in an ecosystem of interaction. Ecosystems of interaction such as these, mutually in- fluencing and mutually inscribing, gave rise to Ottoman identities that could be dynamic, multifaceted, and complex, constituted by the aggregation and ac- commodation in particular individuals or groups of differences which we would not today expect to find maintained in a single identity.

Thompson, Urabi and Kermani

Colonel Ahmed Urabi leads a revolution against the British, declaring the British-supporting monarch "unfit to rule" and electing a people's government in Cairo Britain destroys Urabi's army and locks him up. Thompson says Urabi's movement "united a spectrum of political groups around the goal of obtaining a written document to limit the power of the monarch and set out the rights of citizens." Liberal principles of sovereignty, representation, equality "Popular constitutionalism was a reaction to foreign intervention and the social change it caused." During American Civil War, Egypt was huge cotton supplier, but dropped off after, causing economic damage "Popular constitutionalism was also a response to the growing power of the state over citizens." Urabi and his fellow officers were pissed about the Turkish-French favoritism displayed by the monarch in the military, making it hard for them to get the promotions they deserved. Thompson says that the Russian invasion of Iran post-revolution "secured the interest of the Shah, religious conservatives, and their landowning allies." Like the Young Ottomans/Young Turks, Urabi promoted Egyptian national identity as part of his revolution Urabi and his boys eventually surround the presidential palace in 1882. Wanted change but not complete overthrow of the monarch. Idea of justice important here like in the Sohrabi Urabi goes after the presidential palace AGAIN after they try to arrest him. Confronts the monarch (Khedive Tawfik) in the courtyard and demands reform and the re-establishment of Chamber of Deputies Chamber of Deputies passes new constitution and forms new cabinet Britain and France feel threatened by new constitutional regime, British bomb Alexandria under pretext that "Urabi planned a muslim massacre of Christians." After capturing Urabi, British rule Egypt "as a virtual colony" Nazem Al-Islam Kermani was a cofounder of a revolutionary group in Iran called the "Secret Society" "Iranian revolutionaries likely saw no contradiction in a constitutionalism that resonated with religious values and respected the authority of mujtahids" Thompson says civil war was kickstarted by Shah bombing the National Assembly building Powerful clerics felt threatened by socialist and constitutionalist radicals, planting the seed of the still-prevalent idea that Islam opposes democracy Nazem al-Islam gets worried, becomes kind of a counterrevolutionary "The trauma of World War I brought the era of popular constitutionalism to an end."

Rifaat, Distant view of a minaret

Discusses stigma surrounding female pleasure in Egypt Narrator feels obligated to demonstrate more piety than husband

Lecture 1

Edward Said/Orientalism: representation of the Orient/East/Islamic world by the West as backwards, precarious, uncivilized, underdeveloped, dangerous and exotic Establishes dichotomy between the "Orient" and the "Occident" Knowledge of Eastern world justified colonial interests Said argues all sources carry narratives The Snake Charmer: orientalist painting by French artist Jean Leon-Gerome reflecting, cover of Said's first edition of Orientialism Depicts european vision of islam as sensual, questions validity of Islam Naked boy depicts Muslims as uncivilized Historiography: the past is never "repeated," history reviews change over time Answers to historical problems change over time based on situated knowledges

Sohrabi, "Constitutional Revolutions and State Formation, Iran and Turkey,"

Early 20th century revolutions in both Iran and the Ottoman Empire loosely inspired by French and Russian Revolutions (wouldn't overemphasize European influence tho) 1905 Persian Constitutional Revolution, 1908 Ottoman Revolution Sohrabi argues that both revolutions can be compared through their shared constitutionalism and the way both led to autocratic strongmen (Ataturk after Ottoman Revolution, Reza Shah after Persian Revolution) Young Ottoman revolution re-instituted constitutionalism after it had been interrupted by Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1878. Sohrabi says Ottoman constitutionalism was "focused on [the] promise of an orderly, law-bound, and centralized state that ushered in material progress, resolved lingering injustices, and staved off political challenge." He also calls it "rule of law constitutionalism" Young Ottoman movement was suppressed, leading dissidents to move abroad and found the CUP (Committee for Union and Progress). Sohrabi calls the CUP "professional revolutionaries," and they took control by infiltrating the Ottoman military and mobilizing a rebellion in 1908 After taking power, CUP ethnicized Ottoman politics and purged the military and old guard, inspiring a counterrevolution which was more or less crushed. CUP became more authoritarian and would eventually commit the Armenian Genocide. Ataturk as an "heir to the constitutional movement and the CUP" Iranian Constitutional Revolution was a response to the failures of the Qajar Monarchy Revolution was split between secular constitutionalists and clerical leadership, who would eventually come to blows with each other. Revolutionary committee called the National Assembly, started to form armed groups throughout the country Religious and secular revolutionaries started beefing over how to reorganize the state and how big the state should be, with constitutionalists seeking a larger state and clerics looking for a smaller state closer to the old Qajar Monarchy. Clerics eventually pushed towards the shah, rejecting constitutionalism altogether. Shah was able to appeal towards their Islamism. Finally in 1908 war breaks out between loyalists and constitutionalists, who capture Tehran in July 1909 By remaking the state, revolution weakens it, opening the door for Britain and Russia to intervene, and Bakhtiari militias shut down the assembly in 1911 Reza Khan declares himself the new shah, co-opting some of the constitutionalists' demands while maintaining autocratic and corrupt rule. Built a stronger state though.

What is Orientalism? What is its significance? How has it shaped historiography?

Edward Said described Orientalism as a representation of the Orient/East/Islamic world by the West as backwards, precarious, uncivilized, underdeveloped, dangerous and exotic. It was significant in justifying Western imperialism and colonialism by positing that the Orient required the enlightened values and knowledge of the West to progress forward. Edward Said, Orientalism: argued British/French knowledge about MENA and Muslim societies were shaped/informed by imperialism, desires to control MENA. this "knowledge" was a way of justifying colonialism Additionally, according to Said, this viewpoint significantly colored the historiographical outlook on the Islamic world, as historians relied overwhelmingly on Western sources who operated from an Orientalist perspective and thus incorporated their Orientalist bias into their scholarship on the Islamic world. Williams: colonizers made argument these societies did not take care of environment, necessitated colonial control Satia: orientalist cultural imaginations of Arabia used to justify brutal air control regime Orientalism: Western knowledge is shaping how we view MENA societies (not MENA knowledge) "Middle East" itself being a term coined by imperialists; external perception defines the region

Hamed-Troyansky, "Circassian Refugees and the Making of Amman,"

Examined the process of settlement of Circassian refugees-turned-immigrants and the integration of Amman into local networks of capital Three arguments: North Caucasian muhajirs actively utilized an Ottoman land registry and the court to register land, thus entrenching a new property regime The opening of the Damascus-Amman section of the Hijaz Railway in 1903 accelerated the influx of Syrian and Palestinian capital The convergence of muhajir labor, Levantine capital, Ottoman infrastructure, and access to the bedouin economy led the transformation of the village of amman into an important economic outpost on the nomadic frontier Muhajirs → imperial pawns or instruments of Ottoman centralization Ottoman Land Code 1858: gave peasants the right to register the lands they worked on as private property (to increase tax accountability): peasants suspicious would be used to increase taxes or conscript sons into military; many fled their lands or signed it over to notables/lost it to loans etc REDUCED PEASNATS TO LANDLESS TENANT FARMERS; created landlords

Provence, "The Levant Mandates,"

France and Britain were determined to show that imperial glory meant that World War I wasn't in vain France believed a Mediterranean empire was a matter of national destiny Wilson and Lenin had set out a global argument for self-determination which fueled national movements around the world. However, "French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929) and British Prime Minister Lloyd George (1863-1945) had already met and secretly arranged the partition of the Ottoman realms." The Paris Conference established the League of Nations and the mandate system where victorious powers would take what amounted to legal trusteeship of mandates from the former Ottoman territories. Article 22 of the League of Nations charter-- Keeping with historical Ottoman tradition of petitions, many former Ottoman citizens petitioned the League of Nations; the League of Nations had nothing to do with assigning the supervising powers and ignored them "In August 1921, former Ottoman parliamentarian Shakib Arslan organized and convened the 1st Syrian-Palestinian Congress with a group of ten Arab Ottoman intellectuals at a Geneva hotel" The congress criticized the racial/religious hierarchy that justified the mandate system (why are the new Eastern European countries independent but not the new states in the former Ottoman Empire?) Britain and France viewed the mandates as colonies and conquered territories. Mandates typically devolved from direct rule to indirect rule due to cost and unpopularity. "High commissioners in British Palestine and Iraq, and in French Syria and Lebanon, canceled and voided elections, dismissed and jailed politicians, and had veto power over all laws, including every constitutional draft law." Zionists endorse the Palestine mandate system and participated within it. The League of Nations and mandate authority accepted the Zionist Agency as the official rep of the Jews in Palestine. No such recognition for non-Jews in Palestine. Palestinian mandate authorities made a constitution; however, participation required acknowledging the Balfour Declaration which Palestinians refused to do The repression of the Iraqi revolt of 1920 led Churchill to put Faysal on the Iraqi throne and his brother Abdallah as the prince of the new British protectorate of Transjordan. Iraq was a constitutional monarchy was perceived as successful, leading to similar establishments in other mandates Transjordan, by contrast with the other mandates, had no large cities, little water and settled agriculture, and a sparse, mostly nomadic population British intelligence was worried Abdallah would help foment resistance in the region and gave him Transjordan as consolation. Given independence after the Second World War in 1946. French mandates in Syria and Lebanon started and ended as military rule. "The mandate government identied educated Ottoman Muslim Arabs of the cities as its main enemies, and the sectarian minorities and rural populations as its potential allies in subduing and ruling the country. The members of the minorities were arranged in a hierarchy with Lebanese Maronite Christians in alliance with Jesuit priests at the top, followed by the other Christian rites, Alawite and Druze Muslims, and Bedouins." France divided the Syrian state into five microstates to try to separate out "troublesome" cities from rural areas. Each microstate had a sectarian majority France also created Greater Lebanon by expanding the borders of the autonomous Ottoman governate of Mount Lebanon. France enacted Syrian and Lebanese constitutions that allowed France to intervene in each state's affairs. They withdrew after the Second World War

"Holy War Made in Germany?"

From the beginning the 1914 Ottoman jihad proclamation was portrayed by the Allies as the linchpin of a German scheme to revolutionize Muslim populations in the territories of Berlin's enemies: in British Egypt and India, in French North Africa, and in the Russian Caucasus and Central Asia. This article questions the cliché of the German jihad by situating the 1914 declaration in its deeper Ottoman historical context. Did the Ottomans need Berlin's blandishments to convince them of the advantages of issuing a jihad (jiha ̄d) declaration in 1914? almost every scholar in the field has come to think of the Ottoman jihad (jihād) declared in 1914 as a 'Holy War Made in Germany'---ordered by " Kaiser Hajji Muhammud Wilhem II" By reading the 1914 declaration in its previ- ously missing Ottoman context, this article reverses our 95-year-old picture of this controversial measure. Unearthing such Ottoman roots not only provides a better context for the declaration itself but also opens new windows on Ottoman international and domestic politics, and on the crucial intersection between the two. The Ottomans did not need German blandishments to convince them of the advantages of issuing a jihad declaration in 1914. By employing jihad the state was mobilizing the support of its Muslim subjects in a time of war. This policy was aimed in particular at the empire's Arab inhabitants, whose leaders the British courted and whose allegiance the state sought to secure.11 Contrary to what Entente propaganda was wont to argue, the declaration stemmed neither from an Ottoman desire for a global Muslim empire nor from a German gambit. Ottoman history shows us that the centralized state, along with its religious authorities, military and political leaders, understood and employed the powerful ideological energies that 'jihad' could mobilize. They also understood the dangers of such an ideology. could also SPeed up the disin- tegration of the multi-confessional empire by sparking hostilities between its Muslim and non-Muslim subject In the Ottoman world one did not even have to be Muslim to wage 'jihad', the meaning of 'jihad' went beyond any one legal-doctrinal definition and signified a generic call for marshalling all-out effort in the face of great challenges Jihad's use for WWI demonstrates the erasure of the line between the individual's and the state's efforts in the age of anti-colonial mass move- ments and total war. The erasure between the personal and the official, the internal and the external, amounted to the 'secularization of jihad', But if 'jihad' became secularized through its employment for secular, political ends, then the reverse also became true and resulted in the 'Islamization of politics' or, put differently, the 'politicization of Islam'.24 Both framings point to a new type of convergence of politics and religion in the nine- teenth century. What was new was not the convergence itself but the extent to which it was employed by the state in a new era of mass society and universal conscription armies. By 1826 the rhetoric used for the mobilization of the army by military leaders and state bureaucrats increasingly cast non-Muslims and non-Turks as 'politically or mili- tarily' unreliable. Tanzimat tried to change this but prev- alent attitudes associated with Islam, and jihad, pushed the other way, and they played a central role in the way the state and its elites, and increasing segments of the Muslim public, defined themselves. In the Ottoman lands, reli- giously far more heterogeneous, national cleavages were reinforced rather than undercut by religious identities. The dilemmas of the multinational state that was also multi- confessional could not have been demonstrated more starkly. The Ottoman state was well aware of the self-destructive poten- tial built into instrumentalizing Islam. Sense of victimization that could legitimize oppression of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. From 1912 to 1924 the percentage of non-Muslims in Ottoman Asia Minor plummeted from roughly 20% to less than 2%. Only a portion of this reduction can be accounted for by the forced emigration in spring 1914 of 200,000 Greeks or the 192,000 refugees that left Asia Minor after the official population-exchange agreement signed between Greece and Turkey in 1923.70 Nor can it be explained away by the food shortages and disease that hit Christians and Muslims alike. the Ottomans had scored a major diplo- matic victory by signing an alliance with Germany, the great power of their choice, on 2 August. They had used the July crisis to break out of an international isolation which they believed was slowly strangling them. Once they had signed the alliance, however, they strove to stay out of the war while salvaging the alliance with Germany into the postwar period, during which they hoped to reform the empire under the relative interna- tional security that would be provided by the alliance with Berlin. During the summer of 1914 and throughout the war, moreover, the Ottomans were able to draw on an enormous amount of German military aid. Berlin DID press hard for the jihad declaration in 1914. After all, the Kaiser's faith in jihad - or, in 'war by revolution' - was long-standing, and it made perfect geo-strategic sense. But the manifold presence of jihad in Ottoman international and domestic politics throughout the nineteenth century down to 1914, and its presence in both popular and state publications, and in the internal correspondence among Ottoman officials, moreover, makes a strong case that jihad would have been an important aspect of Ottoman warfare in 1914 without Wilhelm II and the German orientalists. The Ottomans, as a sovereign state and empire, were certainly wary in employing this tactic them- selves, because for much of the nineteenth century they sought to become a member of the European state system. When they did embrace jihad, however, they did so for domestic reasons, to mobilize the loyalty of a majority Muslim society behind an Islamic empire

Gelvin primary sources 177-181

GELVIN 177-181 Huda Shaarawi: A New Mentor and Her Salon for Women Women also participated in the salon culture of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century MENA. Egyptian feminist Huda Shaarawi describes her experiences at one such salon in Cairo. Eugenie Le Brun, (Mme rusd9i) French wife of Husain Rushdi Pasha, met Shaarawi at a wedding and hit it off; soon became dear friend and valued mentor; guided Shaarawi in her first steps in society and looked out for her reputation ALSO nourished her mind and spirit. Directed her reading in French and helped her perfect the language At her request Shaarawi began attending her Saturday salon during the hours set aide for women As mistress of the salon, Mme Rushdi guided the discourse from issue to issue; debates about social practices like veiling She confessed that although she admired the dress of Egyptian women, she thought the veil stood in the way of their advancement. It also gave rise to false impressions in the minds of foreigners. They regarded the veil as a convenient mask for immoral-ity. Plenty of lurid tales were circulated by ignorant outsiders about Egyptian morals. Mme rushdi believed people that had children never died, as their children were extensions of themselves who kept their memories alive Mme rushdi would be kept alive through her books; EMBRACED ISLAM AFTER MARRIAGE, will be buried in Muslim cemetery next to husband so won't be separated in afterlife Speaking of her books, she said, "I have signed them, as I have written them-Niva Salima (In Good Faith'). My purpose in Harem et les musulmanes (The Harem and Muslim women) was to describe the life of the Egyptian woman, as it really is, to enlighten Europeans. After it appeared in Europe, | received many letters saying my book had cleared up false impressions of life in Islamic countries. They said it had corrected outsiders' images of Egyptians. In fact, they said Egyptians seemed not unlike themselves." That restored her peace of mind, she said. She had been very upset when she heard that many Egyptians had thought she had criticized the condition of women in Egypt. "However," she continued, "my second book is different. I decided to attack the problem of the backwardness of Egyptian women, demonstrating it arose from the persistence of certain social customs, but not from Islam, as many Europeans believe. Islam, on the contrary, has granted women greater justice than previous religions. While working on the book I attended sessions of the Shariah Courts (re-ligious courts where personal status or family law cases are heard) to find out for myself how women fared. I was aghast to see the blatant tyranny of men over women. My new book will be called, Les Repudiées (The Divorcees)." Mme Rushdi read me portions of the book as she completed them, asking for my reactions. Rifaa Rafi al-Tahtawi: The Extraction of Gold or an Overview of Paris Mehmet ALi sent Rifaa Rafi al-Tahtawi to Paris as the head of the first Egyptian educational mission. On his return, he became head of the School of Languages, where he developed his ideas based on expireicnes in Europe and Egypt. IN THIS PASSAGE discusses patriotism and the responsibility of citizenship Patriots who are faithful in their love of homeland redeem their country with all their means, and serve it by offering all they possess. Protect it like a father would protect his child Intentions of the children of the country must always be directed toward the country's virtue and honor, what brings it benefit and goodness Likewise, The country protects its children form all that harms them Love of homeland and promotion of public welfare are beutiful characteristics that get inculcated into each person The quality of patriotism requires humans to demand the rights they are owed by their homeland AND to carry out obligations toward the country (must earn the rights otherwise these entitlements will be lost) Roman nation (pledge of allegiance and oath to their country)—firmly adhered to the love of country, and THAT is the reason it reigned over the world When patriotism was removed, failure beset members of this nations and it disintegrated Muhammad Abduh: The Theology of Unity Egyptian Islamic modernist Abduh sought to make Islam compatible with the dogmas and doctrines of nineteenth-century rationalism. IN THIS PASSAGE he argues that Muslims cannot simply rely on the authoritative interpretations of texts handed down from medieval clerics (procedure known as taqlid); rather, they must use reason to keep up with changing times Islam will have no truck with traditionalism, against which it campaigns relentlessly, to break its power over men's minds Underlying bases of taqlid in the beliefs of the nations have been shattered by Islam—it has alerted and aroused the powers of reasons Islam boldly declared that man was not created to be led by a bridle; endowed with intelligence to take his guidance with knowledge and to consider the signs and tokens in the universe and events Proper role of teachers is to alert and guide (NOT dictate) Friends of truth are those "who listen to what is said and follow its better way" (Quran); characterizing them as those who RATIONALLY weigh all options to follow what they know to be true and good and reasonable Islam threw its weight against the religious authorities, bringing them down from the dominance whence they uttered commands; made them answerable to those who dominated, so that these could scrutinize their claims according to reason and reach conclusions based on conviction Islam encouraged men to move away from attachment to the world of their fathers and legacies; our ancestors were not necessarily wiser than us. Modern descendants have an advantage in that he is able to study the past and examine (and exploit) consequences of past actions. Islam CRITICIZES religious leaders' slavish imitations of the ancestors Authority of reason was liberated from all kinds of TAQLID enslaving it and restored to its proper dignity to do Goldy work Man has entered fully into the two great possessions relating to religion: independence of will and independence of thought and opinion By these his humanity was perfected and can attain happiness God has prepared for him A certain western philosopher of the recent past has said that the growth of civilisation in Europe rested on these two principles. People were not roused to action, nor minds to vigour and speculation until a large number of them came to know their right to exercise choice and to seek out facts with their own minds. Such assurance only came to them in the sixteenth century AD-a fact which the same writer traces to the influence of Islamic culture and the scholarship of Muslim peoples in that century. Islam through its revealed scripture took away impediment by which religious leaders had prevented rational understandings of the heavenly books Namik Kemal: Extract from the Journal Hürriyet Kemal (1840-1888) was an Islamic modernist and, as a member of the Young Ottomans, an avid supporter of constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire. He wrote this article defending the idea of consultation between ruler and ruled for Hurriyet (Liberty), a journal he and other exiles published in London Imagined detrimental effects from method of consultation have no basis. It is said establishment of council of people would violate the rights of the sultan, BUT the right of the sultan is to govern ON THE BASIS OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE and principles of freedom Sultan is "one charged with kingship", not "owner of kingship" (which is God) It is said the religious and cultural heterogeneity of the Ottoman lands and the ignorance of the people are reasons against consultation (how would an assembly with 72 language work?)BUT this kind of assembly is already happening in provincial councils! Members of all denominations meet; they converse in the official language (Turkish) AND in terms of ignorance—egypt, montenegro, and serbia have councils of the people—-why would ignorance prevent us from consultation if it did not in these lands? Are we at a lower level than the savages of Montenegro? "O Ottoman liberals! Do not give an credit to such deceptive superstitions" Seriously consider the dangerous situation in which the nation finds itself Take into consideration the accomplishments the opposition has already achieved It will be obvious that the salvation of the state today is DEPENDENT on adopting the method of consultation; and upon continuni the opposition aimed at achieving this The works of all the authors in the Gelvin primary sources capture changes occurring within Middle Eastern and North African societies. Huda Shaarawi describes how women participated in salon culture and how she and her friends, including European Madame Rushdi, grappled with issues such as veiling, European perceptions of Muslim societies, the status of women, and religion. In this work, we can both see how women were grappling with political questions and how increased globalization entered into the political issues being discussed. al-Tahtawi's ideas about patriotism and the duties of the citizen also reflect the political moment. al-Tahtawi describes the relationship between one's country and state as being almost reciprocal, saying that patriots must serve their country with all their means and that the country will protect its citizens in return. Abduh argues that Islam needs to involve more rational engagement with holy texts and that Muslims should not rely on traditions or religious leaders' interpretations. In his challenge of taqlid, Abduh is trying to emphasize that Islam can be compatible with rationalism and can adapt to society's changes. Finally, Kemal argues that consultation between the sultan and the people would be beneficial, a member of the Young Ottoman constitutionalist movement that was concerned that the sultan was vulnerable to foreign manipulation and needed the supervision of the legislature. Kemal addresses challenges raised by anti-constitutionalists and argues that the sultan's right to govern is based on the will of the people, who could let the sultan know their will via consultation, and that the Ottomans already have experience with creating effective and diverse representative bodies in the provincial councils.

Granara, "The Mediterranean in Colonial North African Literature"

Granara argues that the North African literature produced in Tunisia in the 1930s and 1940s reflects both the Arabic and Mediterranean aspects of the Tunisian identity. Focuses on three works written by Sanūsī, who directly confronted French imperialism and French efforts to stifle Tunisian culture and national identity through his literature. Sanūsī utilizes Mediterranean history and values of multiculturalism as well as the Mediterranean as a geographic setting to claim the Mediterranean as a space that North Africans have existed in for its long history, challenging French justifications of imperialism. Sanūsī also draws upon Arabic literary history within his works to show a Tunisia that is simultaneously a Mediterranean nation but made stronger by its Arabic history and the impacts of Islam Three stories: "Al-Muhājir": Tunisian man gets stranded on an island, has a family on island, when French ship "comes to the rescue" and tells him Tunisia is now French protectorate, man refuses to go back and stays on island Bint Qasr al-Jamm: prince meets girl in wilderness who ends up knowing a lot about the land and how to survive etc, she's also Christian Fath Ifriqiya: female characters tell most important part of story, challenging French and Arab Muslim patriarchy Granara contrasts Sanūsī's literature with Bertrand's Le Sang des Races, in which Bertrand justifies France's imperialism and contains themes of white supremacy. Bertrand tries to claim European sovereignty over the Mediterranean and North Africa, an idea directly challenged by Sanūsī's literature. French interfered, shut down, and censored Tunisian press; dominated literature and language

Greene, "The Ottoman Experience,"

Greene, The Ottoman Experience Ottoman Empire able to find people who will be friendly to rule in every territory Administration could figure out how local communities operated EXTREMELY sensitive to local conditions—allowed them to build such a major empire GREENE ARGUES: "undue emphasis on the ottoman war machine has deflectied our attention rom an appreciation" of how the Ottomans SUSTAINED their empire Used scribes, not janissaries——scribes who noted local customs to best figure out how to rule/tax/etc——turned conquests into tax-producing provinces Ottomans used an imperial style that relied heavily on LOCALS to run things for Istanbul Often incorporated local leaders into imperial bureaucratic government Timariots—Sultan's soldiers—would be assigned villages to collect revenue from and resided in these places when not seeing in army—state supported army and gained a class of administrators in same stroke Ottoman bureaucrats ironed out and smoothed over local differences which gave empire effectiveness and uniformity EUROPEAN MANDATES (colonies) NOT AS ATTUNED TO LOCAL REALITIES—would spell disaster Ottomans drew on a rich diversity of political cultural traditions Ottoman claims of legitimacy had several sources—islamic tradition only one; used many different legitimizing ideolgoies Provision of justice (to peasantry) was CENTRAL to sultan legitimacy Duty of sultan to provide justice and embody imperial benevolence Through the skillful co-optation of military and financial leaders, the Ottomans had achieved a form of rule that was stable tho required bargaining

Gelvin WWI AND THE MIDDLE EAST STATE SYSTEM

Historians estimate OE and Persia had highest per capita losses in WWI—estimated 12-25% of their population; 4 out of every 5 casualties noncombatants (Armenians, famine caused by Brit/French naval blockade) "World War I was the single most important political event in the history of the modern Middle East" Brought about a new political order that has lasted to this day Four aspects of order particularly significant: 1. Creation of the current state system 2. Nationalism—no longer Osmanlilik but separate nationalisms 3. Success of Zionism (Jewish nationalism)--British recognized the movement, inflow of Jewish immigrants to Palestine in interwar period 4. Political transformation in Persia—Reza Khan established political dynasty that lasted into 1979—authoritarian developmentalist strategy Reasons OE joined the Central Powers: Germany unlikely to ally with Russia (OE's enemy) Germany had extensive economic and poltiicla influence in OE Austrains wanted OE alliance (to control Ottoman ambitions in Balkans) Russia was greedy for pathway to warm water port in Turkish Straits and Ottoman Palestine (orthodox christians) 1915—British contacted Arab power broker i Mecca, Sharif Hussayn Hussayn promised to send son Amir Faysal to launch rebellion against OE; Britain promised gold, guns, and the right to establish Arab state(s) once WWI ended ^^^led to the Arab Revolt 1917—Balfour Declaration: Britain endorsed Zionist goal of establishing a national home for Jews in Palestine YET—changed circumstances further muddied waters of vague, contradictory postwar settlements.Bolsheviks were anti-imperialists and atheist (no interest in Jerusalem); Wilson self-determination; Turkish revolt Article 22 of League of Nations charter directly established the mandates system in Middle East After WWi—France got mandate for territory now including Syria, Lebanon while Britain got mandate for territory now including Israel, Palestinian territoires, Jordan, and Iran THESE STATES NEVER EXISTED BEFORE—FRANCE AND BRITAIN CREATED THEM Mandatory powers had absolute administrative control over their mandates—could draw borders how they wished (Anti-imperialist struggles created: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt) Previously british-backed Sharif Husayn's family were in Syria—France now could depose of King Amir Faysal; Britain let it happen to keep France's friendship; but other family members (Hashemites, Amir Abdallah) threatened war and started marching to Syria. Cairo Conference of 1921: Britain divided Palestinian mandate in two and offered Abdallah territory east of Jordan River—called Trans-Jordan; closed it from Zionist immigration (now Jordan-got independence in 1945). Descendants of Abdallah have ruled Jordan ever since —Also granted Faysal throne of Iraq Mandatory powers rarely gave thought to ensuring new territories created were both economically and politically viable—invention of Jordan solved political problem but created economic nightmare—has no resources Iraq was created for economic viability but had no political/gorup cohesion—-many different groups sought independence; Britain realized their control was shaky but interests could be protected by supporting nationalist groups aligned with them—-gave Iraq independece in 1932; Sunni elites friendly to Britain in charge Thinly disguised colonialism that underlie the mandates system and led to creation of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq initially affected the legitimcayc of those states as well Many arabs saw division of the Levant and Mesopotamia into separate nations as unnatural—emergence of pan-Arabism, which stresses the unity of Arabs and cals for the obliteration of national boundaries Ethnicity, tribe, sectarian affiliation etc were factors considered by foreign powers drawing these borders (EX: inventing Lebanon as a Christain enclave) HOWEVER, this factor NOT as important as other considerations: political expediency, divide-and-rule strategies

Gelvin: Imperialism

Imperialism: a process whereby agents of an expanding society gain inordinate influence or control over the vitals of weaker societies... by diplomacy, ideological suasion, conquest and rule, or by planting colonies abroad European imperialism in Ottoman empire/Persia: ---Economic pentration through investments, concessions, loans, creation of spheres of influence ---Diplomactic coercion—>capitulatory rights or forced treateis favorable to their interests Imperial power set up informal empires: economic penetration and diplomacy; not war and conquest Informal empires require people abroad who are willing to voluntarily work with imperial power (political elites, merchants, etc) ALGERIA: a settler plantation (French) colony (FORMAL IMPERIALISM) Had virtual autonomy within OE Algeria mad at French debts for its grain; France eventually invaded and integrated Algeria into France as a province (NOT a colony—-Algeria WAS France) Colonial outposts provided lucrative investment opportunities "Civilizing mission"/Christianizing; French actions made emergence of (Muslim) Algieran nationalism much more likely—increased after WWI (Algeirnas moved to France to work in factories, fought in war, etc) EGYPT: Bankruptcy and Occupation (British) FORMAL IMPERIALISM Britain occupied Egypt and controlled affairs, but did not incorporate into empire or move British civilains there Cotton prices fell—hurt Egypt; who went bankrupt bc borrowed too much to finance internal improvements European govts set up Caisse de la Dette—agency to oversee Egyptian finances and repay debts Caisse infuriated landowners (raised taxes) and elites who found foreign control difficult to stomach MIlitary harbored grievances: Turkish=speaking elites (ottomans) dominated Egyptian society rather than Arabic-speaking Egpytian natives—- discriminated against; eventually MUTINIED led by colonel Urabi in 1881; British invaded soon after (to protect Suez canal access; repayment of debt;) British encouraged cotton cultivation (to feed their textile mills); constructed railroads ; made sure Egypt did not develop domestic textile industry (to protect own industries btu lso thinking rapid economic development might undermine British control) Therefore, egyptian economy grew but Egypt couldn't maintain it because investment in education (PURPOSEFUL TOO) and industry lagged behind MOUNT LEBANON: Military and Political Intervention (INFORMAL IMPERIALISM) European powers supervsied administrative reogranization fo Mount Lebanon and guaranteed its autonomy; tried to put end to sectarian/interreligious conflict between maronite Christians and their Muslim and Druze neighbors BUT—EUropean intervention etched these differences^^ into stone Sectarian identites emerge from POLITICAL circumstances, ie when a religious communtiy is treated differently than others by another party ( imperial power) Christians in Ottoman empire were increasingly prosperous while OE integrated into world economy—European powers used them as merchants, had capitualroty protections; etc Mixture of religious and poliical identity had dangerous consequences—Druze-Maronite conflict, VIOLENCE SPREAD; Christians massacred; European representatives imposed a solution on OE in 1861—saw problem exclusively as Muslism preying on non-Muslim communities; stepped in to protect Christians of Mount Lebanon They insisted that the Ottomans grant Mount Lebanon autonomy and placed the region under the protection of all European powers acting in concert. Mount Lebanon became a special administrative district,

Kahlenberg, "The Tarbush,"

In her piece, Kahlenberg seeks to relate the "de-tarbush-ification" (the noticeable visual decline of the tarbush) to the larger early twentieth century context Boundaries between Jews and Arabs were not as hermetic as they may be today, as Jews wore the tarbush alongside their Arab and other ethnoreligious kinsmen as a "connective tissue" of the Ottoman identity. As tensions rose with the creation of Israel, European Jews grew culturally influential, and the Ottoman identity fractured, however, many Jews abandoned the tarbush in their daily dress, now rather using it as a broader symbol of the Middle Eastern region. Kahlenberg argues that tracking the patterns of Oriental Jewish men who chose to wear the tarbush can provide valuable insights into how Jewish men perceived their identity and the challenges facing the Jewish community in Palestine during British Mandate rule. During Ottoman rule, many Oriental Jewish men chose to wear the tarbush to signify Ottoman unity and loyalty. During British rule, the political boundaries between Jews and Arabs became increasingly rigid and the tarbush came to signify an Arab, non-Jewish identity. Many Jews removed their tarbush and instead opted for more "modern" clothing adopted by European Zionists as well as British imperialists. However, some Oriental Jewish men continue to wear the tarbush for decades, claiming their shared heritage with Arabs and blurring the boundaries between the two groups. Kahlenberg also discusses "clothes-switching" and emphasizes that often, the decision to wear or remove the tarbush was due to violence in the region, especially during the Arab Revolt.

Resolution of the Syrian General Congress at Damascus, 2 July 1919

In the aftermath of WWI, the Syrian General Congress met and agreed on a program for the future of a Syrian nation. In violation of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the entente power ignored this resolution. (class notes): To counter language and proposed plan of LoN, organized a diverse body (to prove capable of self-govt); appealing to US/wilsonian self-determination) Desire full political independence of Syria Want govt to be constitutional monarchy, Sharif Husayn's son Amir Faysal to be king; decentralized democracy Protests Article 22 for regulating Arabs to standing of insufficiently developed races; don't need mandates If can't get mandates, send advisors from US for less than 20 years If can't have US, want UK DON'T want France and do not recognize any french power (of course they do get Frane Reject zionist claims to south syria/palestine

Bajalan "End of the Ottoman Empire and Question of Kurdish Statehood,"

Main argument: "the failure of Kurdish nationalists in the immediate aftermath of the war can in large part be explained by developments that occurred over the four years of conflict" Tensions amongst Kurds between those wanting statehood and those wanting more independence within the Ottoman Empire British deemed Kurdistan outside of their sphere of influence Russia: rather hands-off, supported independence during the Trasrist regime but after the bolshevik revolution (1917), they aligned themselves with Kemal and Turkish nationalism "the end of the First World War and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire were far from the 'opportunity' for Kurdish nationalists as it has often been portrayed" Bajalan argues that instead of viewing World War One as a "missed opportunity" for the Kurdish statehood movement, the war's geopolitical legacy actually presented the Kurds with new challenges and obstacles in the international arena. While the 1920 Treaty of Sevres did include a potential path to Kurdish independence, the war altered the international balance of power and limited incentives for foreign intervention and support for Kurdish statehood. Bajalan discusses how Britain was largely ambivalent towards Kurd self-rule and had little military presence in the region. Bajalan argues the loss of Russia as an ally after the Bolshevik revolution was even more detrimental to the Kurdish cause. Ultimately, Bajalan argues the reason the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne did not mention Kurdish self-rule was that the Great Powers thought Kurdish statehood would give them no benefit, not because Kurdish nationalists missed an opportunity.

What was the nizam-i cedid? What was its purpose? In what ways was it successful? In what ways was it unsuccessful?

Nizam-I Cedid, or New Order, was the series of reforms conducted by Ottoman Sultan Selim III to catch up to a perceived gap in military and political modernization with European powers. The reforms were momentarily successful in importing new European military tactics that emphasized different perspectives on discipline and organization by bringing in foreign military advisers. This led to the creation of the more westernized New Order Army. The reforms also helped slightly boost tax revenue by levying new taxes and closing some preexisting tax loopholes. However, the reforms largely ended up failing due to the financial inability of the Ottoman Empire to execute most of the reforms to the fullest extent. Additionally, the reforms provoked backlash from more traditional elements of Ottoman society, such as the janissaries, who instigated a rebellion that saw the overthrow of the Ottoman Sultan Selim III and the dismantling of the New Order army in the short-term. The New Order: nizam-i cedid: Reorganized military (hired European experts), imported European techniques of warfare, weapons (VERY EXPENSIVE—>conflict, especially in balkans) 1792—sultan selim III adopted New Order military modernization program—attempted to model Western/Christian European. Aroused STRONG opposition (everyone against military/war at this point); created turmoil in Balkans it was the urban tradesmen and the poor who were most directly threatened by the financial burdens of Selim's moderniza- tion plan. Already heavily taxed and reeling from the costly disruptions caused by campaigns launched from, and frequently fought in, the Balkan provinces, the guild-based economy struggled under the further weight of the new excise duties on commodities. OE: Military Reform: Sultan Selim III New Order; Legislated (unsuccessfully) against tax farming; restructured central bureaucracy; established provincial council based on representative principles. Also bankrupted by defensive developmentalism→European supervision of finances AND AS ANSCOMBE ARGUES, pressures within Ottoman society created by the New Order and state self- strengthening efforts led to Balkan Revolutionary age.

gelvin 1-55

Safavid Empire: 1501-1722 centered in Persia (Iran), reached into Iraq and north; overthrown by Afghanistan army. Safavid empire —->Qajar dynasty: 1796-1925—> Iran; Ottomans/Safavids actually auctioned off the right to collect taxes to upper classes; competitive bidding meant they could potentially get tax revenue basically upfront, known as "tax farming" Religious minorities could organize many of their own affairs (education, charities, even law)/ Each minority community in Ottoman empire eventually represented in Istanbul—-millet system (religious communities known as millets) By 17th century, OE in great crisis: unable to maintain authority within territories The "great inflation" of 17th century: prices of everything in Europe rose; likely caused by the population increase/unusual dependence of empires on cash; started "debasing" precious metal coins with less precious metal→inflation; Spanish conquest of the New World (and gold/silver found there) "Crisis of 17th century" likely was the "birth pains of the modern world system/economy"--- transition from world empires to nation-states etc 17th-18th century: shift in power favoring Europe due to commercial revolution; Europe developed new technologies, new ways of financial organizing (stocks, insurance); Europe also figured out how to sail around Cape Hope (Africa) and bypass Ottoman/Safavid customs/taxes ^^while allt his was still happening, Ottomans and Safavids doing all the things empires would normally be doing to deal with 17th century crisis, just were working with an outdated system compared to Europe Ultimately ME would be integrated into world system periphery Produced cash crops not subsistence, market economies not local markets for own consumption Capitulations: clauses in treaties that granted special economic /legal/religious rights to reps of foreign powers in the ottoman empire (could construct churches, be exempt from taxes, other things); major tool to gain christian allies Europeans used capitulations to penetrate Ottoman markets; Ottoman merchants felt like they were at disadvantage bc didn't have these privileges 17th century: ottomans put on the defensive by Europe; European problem became not how to defend themselves but what to do with sick man of Europe 1800s: internal frgmentation of Ottoman Empire (Egypt, Balkans); British helped "prop up" Ottoman empire to protect its trade route to India (from Russia) by either supporting them or taking over (Egypt, Cyprus, etc)

What was the "Balkan Revolutionary Age"? In what ways has Anscombe sought to redraw historiographical lines and shift paradigms?

The Balkan Revolutionary Age refers to the period of revolutionary upheaval in the Balkan region in the late 19th and 20th centuries against the Ottoman Empire. Anscombe pursues several arguments intended to push back against prevailing historiographical narratives, including the assertions that the age of revolution was isolated to western Europe and that revolutions in the Balkans were primarily driven by nationalism. Placing the age of revolution in a global context, Anscombe points out that many of the grievances in the Balkans were comparable to those found in western Europe, including ineffective rule of law and political repression. He thus reveals that many of the spontaneous revolutionary movements in western Europe were not unique to just that region. In addition, Anscombe argues that nationalism was not a major factor in the Balkan Revolutionary Age as national identities in the Balkans were still underdeveloped at the time, and many of the grievances in the region were more driven by Ottoman state-strengthening initiatives. This explains why the unrest settled briefly during the Tanzimat reform era when local concerns were better addressed by the Ottoman state. Balkan "Age of Revolution" (1789-1848); turmoil affected Muslims as well as Christians It resulted not from nationalism but from pressures within Ottoman society created by state self- strengthening efforts. Such efforts involved squeezing from the population resources needed for military reform and ruthless disciplining of anyone suspected of obstructionism. These pressures had effects as revolutionary as anywhere on the continent, because popular unrest forced fundamental change in governmental practices, pushing the Ottoman Empire onto a path of state modernization similar to that seen in countries such as post-1789 France. Balkan revolutions not a "French" phenomenon but a continental one; not Christians revolting for Muslim rule; historians have overemphasized nationalism and underemphasized policy opposition revolutionary demands in various regions of the Balkans included demands to end despotic rule, but were not nationalist in nature; demands were "homegrown" and not solely influenced by French expansion --revolutionary demands included: efforts to modernize politically, called for accountabilty in government/end to european influence, tax cuts, just rule

What was the "Deed of Agreement"? What was its significance?

The Deed of Agreement was a legal document signed between the ayans, state officials, and Sultan Mahmud II, to guarantee the power of the sultan and formalize the role of the ayans, powerful local notables, in the Ottoman state. It bound the sultan's authority to work in coordination with the ayans, as they were the primary enforcement mechanism for anything the sultan would want enacted. The document was significant for recognizing the reality of the political situation at the time. As the sultan had gradually withdrawn from exercising central authority and leading active military campaigns, the ayans had stepped into the power vacuum and established local dynasties throughout the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the new Grand Vizier, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, who was a former ayan himself, sought to stabilize the Ottoman Empire through the Deed of Agreement to formalize a relationship between the sultan and the ayans. 1808 Deed of Agreement (De-centralization: "the politics of the notables"): Notables sign to guarantee and protect sultan, sultanate power, state order State commits to uphold the positions/status and the leaders of notable houses; support their descendants The 1808 Deed of Agreement marked a turning point in Ottoman history, in which the new Sultan Mahmud II signed an agreement with local notables promising to cooperate with these local notables, limiting his authority by binding him to work with these notables to jointly address the issues facing the empire. Recognizing that his predecessor's actions such as the New Order military reforms had led to revolts within regions of the empire, Mahmud signed this document to both strengthen the empire and provide assurances to local notables that Mahmud was willing to make changes. The document agrees on many important matters, such as working towards an orderly military draft, increasing state revenues, and how to respond to a janissary rebellion. This document combats Western conceptions of the Ottoman Empire as "stuck in the past" and unable to adapt, as the sultan certainly responded to concerns of the notables that were echoed throughout the empire. Deed suggests governors taxing too much in time of instability; state steps in to mediate between ppl and governors—people are ACTIVE, demanding fair treatment and state is responsive

Two key documents of the Tanzimat

The Hatt-i Sharif of Gulhane: part of the tanzimat; set out an agenda for Ottoman administrative reform and defined the rights of Ottoman citizenship. equality of all subjects (ex; religion); direct collection of taxes; unverisal military conscription (all serve) The Islahat Fermani: Reinforces Muslim-Chsirtian equality; all forms of religion shall be freely practiced; Equality of taxes—-(also equality of draft) Tanzimat Reforms (1839-1876) Principles/goals: equality of all subjects (ex; religion); direct collection of taxes; unverisal military conscription (all serve) Overall—drive for greater centralization (no longer local govts collect taxes, provide security/safety, etc)

What is democratic autonomy, according to Vali? How does it relate to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I?

Vali, "Crisis of Sovereignty"

Vali states that democratic autonomy refers to non-sovereign self-government in a particular region within a sovereign state. More specifically, this type of democratic autonomy would heavily emphasize communal participation in policy-making, gender equality, and caring for the community and environment. Democratic autonomy represents a critical alternative to the concept of a sovereign nation-state for Kurds in the Middle East, as the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire led to the establishment of nation-states that utilized its sovereignty, often in an Arab context, to oppress and malign Kurds. For example, Syria's independence was gained through the triumph of Arab nationalism, and the Arab nationalist elites forged the notion of Syrian sovereignty as meaning Arab sovereignty. This meant denying and suppressing Kurdish identity to prevent any erosion of Arab national sovereignty. Consequently, engaging in democratic autonomy would decentralize power away from a sovereign context into a system that cannot be utilized to oppress the Kurds or any other group. (Basically, sovereign nation-states that emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire bad bc they oppressed Kurds; therefore the entire idea of sovereign nation-states bad; only way to make life not bad for the Kurds is to decentralize governance into democratic autonomy within sovereign states so that there can be no oppression) Syria, this chapter argues, is gripped by a crisis of sovereignty, signified by a rupture in the structure of domination necessary to ensure the reproduction of state power and the working of the apparatuses created to sustain its effective exercise and application. the concept of democratic autonomy essentially signifies a quest for self-government within the legal-political framework of sovereign states. The concept of democratic autonomy refers to forms of non-sovereign self-government within the territorial framework of a sovereign state. The autonomous rule may or may not be territorial, but it always eschews modern political sovereignty and its characteristic institutional form for strategic or political-moral considerations. The existence of a democratic federal republic is an essential condition of possibility of democratic autonomy in post-crisis Syria. As long as a democratic federal order is absent in Syria, only the crisis of sovereignty and the rupture in the structure of sovereign domination can ensure the continuation of the democratic autonomy project in Rojava. Vali argues that the Syrian government's crisis of legitimacy is inherently intertwined with the violent foundation of the state in creating a state and the suppressed stateless, and has profound implications for the Kurdish movement for democratic self-rule. Vali argues that the "Kurdish question" should be truly understood as Kurdish questions in Iraq or Syria, as the formation of states ruptured Kurdish unity and the stateless within different territorial borders have historically specific and diverse experiences of violence, identity suppression, and resistance. The Syrian crisis of sovereignty has enabled a Kurdish democratic autonomy project in Rojava, but Vali argues only a democratic federal future for post-crisis Syria will allow this self-rule to continue.

Gelvin: Wasif Jawhariyyeh and the Great Nineteenth-Century Transformation

Wasif Jawhariyyeh: Jerusalem musician who kept diaries (1904-1968); describe social/cultural life of Jerusalem NOT a political elite's perspective 1904—Jerusalem unimportant to OE; witnessed transformation Wasif's father prominent member of Eastern Orthodox community; lawyer on the municipal council Municipal councils established in 1863—-allowed cities to start taxing, building infrastructure, etc independently; also allowed absentee landowners to gain positions of power and enrich themselves further (Like Tammany Hall) Wasif's education demonstrates fluidity of boundaries in Ottoman Jerusalem—-religious identities were not as fixed; even gender roles were less rigid than they are today Wasif took "Quranic studies for Christians" in school—-demonstrates that by early 1900s QUran had not only a religious function but became part of shared cultural heritage that distinguished culture of the region from the West; studied many other cultures/classes RIch and poor lived side-by-side in urban settings During Wasif's youth—bourgeois culture began to emerge in Jerusalem, mimicked Europe. Wasif earned a living playing at the parties of bachelor men from notable families MANY IN MENA saw aping of Western ways among elites as just another aspect of Western imperialism; some chose to fight by esposuing a new Islamic orthodoxy, which attempted to standardize and enforce rules for proper Islamic conduct (shut down dance hall in Damascus; questioned women's dress) Saw Western concerns about the status of MENA women as part of imperialist conspiracy against Islam (STILL TRUE TODAY) New cosmopolitan culture and new orthodoxy disputed over: who would control the nw public sphere? What would the sphere include and who would it disallow? (imperial politics, role of women)\ Emergence of the modern public sphere caused by: print revolution (allowed circulation of ideas); reconstruction of cities (new infrastructure, new municipal councils); coffeehouses; new tech (phonographs, movies, cars, airplanes)

Robison

Works at US consulate in beirut; 1884-5 Discusses how turkish authorities are closing schools and places of worship important to Americans—trying to roll back capitulations and foreign influence, hostility towards Americans and US interests Discusses the "general impression" that Europe will divide up Turkey (OE), Turkey is bankrupt and people upset at govt; "It is believed by many Turks that the unwise and illegal actions of this Government to all Foreigners will hasten the downfall of the Ottoman Empire"

Pehlivan, "El Niño and the Nomads,"

although El Niño is a global phenomenon, understanding its unique impacts within the Ottoman region in relation to social and political changes helps historians account for "environmentally-nuanced" explanations of Ottoman climate history drought brought by El Niño reduced cattle weight and milk production, lead to lead to loss of pastoralists' wealth/status, famine, and violence and instability between pastoralists and agriculturalists Pastoralists sought to feed animals in peasants' farmland, leading to instability violence and instability between pastoralists and peasants was not the result of poor Ottoman policy, but consequence of environmental changes, which dispels orientalist myths about the ottoman empire's weakness or backwardness Pastoralists eventually resistance environmental changes

Wilson, The Damascus Affair

investigates why a story of Jewish ritual murder was offered to explain Thomas' disappearance. argues that French consul Ratti-Menton was a critical actor in supporting this ritual murder narrative. Ratti-Menton directed the investigation towards the Jewish quarter and did not truly consider alternative suspects, also suspiciously held key suspects at the consulate for days (torture) before sending them to the governor for questioning, where confessions first started to follow the ritual murder story. Ratti-Menton's control over the investigation shows how much power French consul had in the Ottoman Empire Ratti-Menton thought Christians in the region favored France and wanted to be free from Muslim rule. By creating a story of ritual murder, and by placing himself at the forefront of the investigation, he could show France's ability and willingness to protect the Catholic community. The Jewish community was just a scapegoat for this larger imperial aim

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