Module 6 - Cases

10.. Dela Rosa Liner vs Borela, G.R. No. 207286, July 29, 2015

On September 23, 2011, respondents Calixto Borela, bus driver, and Estelo Amarille, conductor, filed separate complaints4 (later consolidated) against petitioners Dela Rosa Liner, Inc., a public transport company, Rosauro Dela Rosa, Sr., and Nora Dela Rosa, for underpayment/non-payment of salaries, holiday pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, sick leave and vacation leave, night shift differential, illegal deductions, and violation of Wage Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16. In a motion dated October 26, 2011, the petitioners asked the labor arbiter to dismiss the case for forum shopping. They alleged that on September 28, 2011, the CA 13th Division disposed of a similar case between the parties (CA-G.R. SP No. 118038) after they entered into a compromise agreement5 which covered all claims and causes of action they had against each other in relation to the respondents' employment. The respondents opposed the motion, contending that the causes of action in the present case are different from the causes of action settled in the case the petitioners cited. *(Compolsory arbitration)Labor Arbiter (LA) Danna A. Castillon, in an order6 dated November 24, 2011, upheld the petitioners' position and dismissed the complaint on grounds of forum shopping *(NLRC)The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their motion, prompting them to file with the CA a petition for certiorari, *(CA)it found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC ruling that the respondents did not commit forum shopping when they filed their second complaint. The NLRC likewise held that neither was the case barred by res judicata arising from the CA judgment in the first case. #####Ruling##### The CA 15th Division committed no reversible error when it affirmed the NLRC ruling that the second complaint is not barred by the rule on forum shopping nor by the principle of res judicata. In other words, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the NLRC when it reinstated the second complaint. Contrary to the petitioners' submission, respondents' second complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 128188), a money claim, is not a "similar case" to the first complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 118038). Thus, the filing of the second complaint did not constitute forum shopping and the judgment in the first case is not a res judicata ruling that bars the second complaint. We concur with the C A that forum shopping and res judicata are not applicable in the present case. There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and the judgment rendered in the previous action will not amount to res judicata in the action now under consideration. In Yap v. Chua,17 we held that the test to determine whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence would support both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would support both actions, then they are considered the same; a judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent action. Under the circumstances of the case before us, sufficient basis exists for the NLRC's and CA's conclusions that there is no identity of causes of action between the respondents' two complaints against the petitioners. The first complaint involved illegal dismissal/suspension, unfair labor practice with prayer for damages and attorney's fees; while the second complaint (the subject of the present appeal) involves claims for labor standards benefits — the petitioners' alleged violation of Wage Orders Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16; nonpayment of respondents' sick and vacation leave pays, 13th-month pay, service incentive leave benefit, overtime pay, and night shift differential. Neither are we persuaded by petitioners' argument that "The Compromise Agreement covered all claims and causes of action that the parties may have against each other in relation to the private respondents' employment."19 The compromise agreement had been concluded to terminate the illegal dismissal and unfair labor case then pending before the CA. While the parties agreed that no further action shall be brought by the parties against each other, they pointedly stated that they referred to actions on the same grounds. The phrase same grounds can only refer to the grounds raised in the first complaint and not to any other grounds. In Pampanga Sugar Development, Co., Inc., v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.,21 the Court reminded the parties that while rights may be waived, the waiver must not be contrary to law, public policy, morals, or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.22 In labor law, respondents' claim for 13th-month pay, overtime pay, and statutory wages (under Wages Orders 13, 14, 15 and 16), among others, cannot simply be generally waived as they are granted for workers' protection and welfare; it takes more than a general waiver to give up workers' rights to these legal entitlements. Lastly, the petitioners' insinuation, that the respondents are not and should not be entitled to anything more, because they had already "received a considerable amount for the settlement"23 (P350,000.00 for Borela and P150,000.00 for Amarille), should be placed and understood in its proper context.

6-Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil. Inc.- Cebu Plant, G.R No. 198783, April 15, 2013;

Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of softdrink products. It has several bottling plants all over the country, one of which is located in Cebu City. Under the employ of each bottling plant are bottling operators. In the case of the plant in Cebu City, there are 20 bottling operators who work for its Bottling Line 1 while there are 12-14 bottling operators who man its Bottling Line 2. All of them are male and they are members of herein respondent Royal Plant Workers Union (ROPWU). The bottling operators work in two shifts. The first shift is from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and the second shift is from 5 p.m. up to the time production operations is finished. Thus, the second shift varies and may end beyond eight (8) hours. However, the bottling operators are compensated with overtime pay if the shift extends beyond eight (8) hours. For Bottling Line 1, 10 bottling operators work for each shift while 6 to 7 bottling operators work for each shift for Bottling Line 2. In 1974, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 2 were provided with chairs upon their request. In 1988, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 1 followed suit and asked to be provided also with chairs. Their request was likewise granted. Sometime in September 2008, the chairs provided for the operators were removed pursuant to a national directive of petitioner. This directive is in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of petitioner for bottling operators, wherein every bottling operator is given the responsibility to keep the machinery and equipment assigned to him clean and safe. The program reinforces the task of bottling operators to constantly move about in the performance of their duties and responsibilities. With this task of moving constantly to check on the machinery and equipment assigned to him, a bottling operator does not need a chair anymore, hence, petitioner's directive to remove them. Furthermore, CCBPI rationalized that the removal of the chairs is implemented so that the bottling operators will avoid sleeping, thus, prevent injuries to their persons. As bottling operators are working with machines which consist of moving parts, it is imperative that they should not fall asleep as to do so would expose them to hazards and injuries. In addition, sleeping will hamper the efficient flow of operations as the bottling operators would be unable to perform their duties competently. The bottling operators took issue with the removal of the chairs. Through the representation of herein respondent, they initiated the grievance machinery of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in November 2008. Even after exhausting the remedies contained in the grievance machinery, the parties were still at a deadlock with petitioner still insisting on the removal of the chairs and respondent still against such measure. As such, respondent sent a Notice to Arbitrate, dated 16 July 2009, to petitioner stating its position to submit the issue on the removal of the chairs for arbitration. Nevertheless, before submitting to arbitration the issue, both parties availed of the conciliation/mediation proceedings before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Regional Branch No. VII. They failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. *(Arbitration committee)rendered a decision in favor of the Royal Plant Workers Union (the Union) and against CCBPI *(CA)endered a contrasting decision which nullified and set aside the decision of the Arbitration Committee. #####Ruling##### Affirms CA The decision in this case rests on the resolution of two basic questions. First, is an appeal to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure a proper remedy to question the decision of the Arbitration Committee? Second, was the removal of the bottling operators' chairs from CCBPI's production/manufacturing lines a valid exercise of a management prerogative? On the second issue, the Union basically claims that the CCBPI's decision to unilaterally remove the operators' chairs from the production/manufacturing lines of its bottling plants is not valid because it violates some fundamental labor policies. According to the Union, such removal constitutes a violation of the 1) Occupational Health and Safety Standards which provide that every worker is entitled to be provided by the employer with appropriate seats, among others; 2) policy of the State to assure the right of workers to a just and humane condition of work as provided for in Article 3 of the Labor Code;8 3) Global Workplace Rights Policy of CCBPI which provides for a safe and healthy workplace by maintaining a productive workplace and by minimizing the risk of accident, injury and exposure to health risks; and 4) diminution of benefits provided in Article 100 of the Labor Code Opposing the Union's argument, CCBPI mainly contends that the removal of the subject chairs is a valid exercise of management prerogative. The management decision to remove the subject chairs was made in good faith and did not intend to defeat or circumvent the rights of the Union under the special laws, the CBA and the general principles of justice and fair play. A Valid Exercise of Management Prerogative In the present controversy, it cannot be denied that CCBPI removed the operators' chairs pursuant to a national directive and in line with its "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program, launched to enable the Union to perform their duties and responsibilities more efficiently. The chairs were not removed indiscriminately. They were carefully studied with due regard to the welfare of the members of the Union. The removal of the chairs was compensated by: a) a reduction of the operating hours of the bottling operators from a two-and-one-half (2 ½)-hour rotation period to a one-and-a-half (1 ½) hour rotation period; and b) an increase of the break period from 15 to 30 minutes between rotations. Apparently, the decision to remove the chairs was done with good intentions as CCBPI wanted to avoid instances of operators sleeping on the job while in the performance of their duties and responsibilities and because of the fact that the chairs were not necessary considering that the operators constantly move about while working. In short, the removal of the chairs was designed to increase work efficiency. Hence, CCBPI's exercise of its management prerogative was made in good faith without doing any harm to the workers' rights. No Violation of Labor Laws The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. There is no law that requires employers to provide chairs for bottling operators. The CA correctly ruled that the Labor Code, specifically Article 13211 thereof, only requires employers to provide seats for women. No similar requirement is mandated for men or male workers. It must be stressed that all concerned bottling operators in this case are men. There was no violation either of the Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefit provisions under Book IV of the Labor Code of the Philippines. As shown in the foregoing, the removal of the chairs was compensated by the reduction of the working hours and increase in the rest period. The directive did not expose the bottling operators to safety and health hazards. No Violation of the CBA The CBA15 between the Union and CCBPI contains no provision whatsoever requiring the management to provide chairs for the operators in the production/manufacturing line while performing their duties and responsibilities No Violation of the general principles of justice and fair play The Court completely agrees with the CA ruling that the removal of the chairs did not violate the general principles of justice and fair play because the bottling operators' working time was considerably reduced from two and a half (2 ½) hours to just one and a half (1 ½) hours and the break period, when they could sit down, was increased to 30 minutes between rotations. The bottling operators' new work schedule is certainly advantageous to them because it greatly increases their rest period and significantly decreases their working time. A break time of thirty (30) minutes after working for only one and a half (1 ½) hours is a just and fair work schedule. No Violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code The operators' chairs cannot be considered as one of the employee benefits covered in Article 10016 of the Labor Code. In the Court's view, the term "benefits" mentioned in the non-diminution rule refers to monetary benefits or privileges given to the employee with monetary equivalents. Without a doubt, equating the provision of chairs to the bottling operators Ds something within the ambit of "benefits'' in the context of Article 100 of the Labor Code is unduly stretching the coverage of the law. The interpretations of Article 100 of the Labor Code do not show even with the slightest hint that such provision of chairs for the bottling operators may be sheltered under its mantle.

Far East Agricultural Supply, Inc. v. Lebatique, G.R No. 162813, February 12, 2007;

Petitioner Far East Agricultural Supply, Inc. (Far East) hired on March 4, 1996 private respondent Jimmy Lebatique as truck driver with a daily wage of P223.50. He delivered animal feeds to the company's clients. On January 24, 2000, Lebatique complained of nonpayment of overtime work particularly on January 22, 2000, when he was required to make a second delivery in Novaliches, Quezon City. That same day, Manuel Uy, brother of Far East's General Manager and petitioner Alexander Uy, suspended Lebatique apparently for illegal use of company vehicle. Even so, Lebatique reported for work the next day but he was prohibited from entering the company premises. On January 26, 2000, Lebatique sought the assistance of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Public Assistance and Complaints Unit concerning the nonpayment of his overtime pay. According to Lebatique, two days later, he received a telegram from petitioners requiring him to report for work. When he did the next day, January 29, 2000, Alexander asked him why he was claiming overtime pay. Lebatique explained that he had never been paid for overtime work since he started working for the company. He also told Alexander that Manuel had fired him. After talking to Manuel, Alexander terminated Lebatique and told him to look for another job. On March 20, 2000, Lebatique filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of overtime pay. The *(LA) Lebatique was illegally dismissed, and ordered his reinstatement and the payment of his full back wages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and overtime pay. *(NLRC)reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC held that there was no dismissal to speak of since Lebatique was merely suspended. *(CA)Reveresed NLRC. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the NLRC decision, reasoned that Lebatique was suspended on January 24, 2000 but was illegally dismissed on January 29, 2000 when Alexander told him to look for another job. It also found that Lebatique was not a field personnel and therefore entitled to payment of overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay. #####Issues##### Simply stated, the principal issues in this case are: (1) whether Lebatique was illegally dismissed; and (2) whether Lebatique was a field personnel, not entitled to overtime pay. #####Ruling##### petition lacks merit. We are in agreement with the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining that of the Labor Arbiter. It is well settled that in cases of illegal dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid cause.9 In this case, petitioners failed to discharge such burden. Petitioners aver that Lebatique was merely suspended for one day but he abandoned his work thereafter. To constitute abandonment as a just cause for dismissal, there must be: (a) absence without justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee relationship.10 The records show that petitioners failed to prove that Lebatique abandoned his job. Nor was there a showing of a clear intention on the part of Lebatique to sever the employer-employee relationship. When Lebatique was verbally told by Alexander Uy, the company's General Manager, to look for another job, Lebatique was in effect dismissed. Even assuming earlier he was merely suspended for illegal use of company vehicle, the records do not show that he was afforded the opportunity to explain his side. It is clear also from the sequence of the events leading to Lebatique's dismissal that it was Lebatique's complaint for nonpayment of his overtime pay that provoked the management to dismiss him, on the erroneous premise that a truck driver is a field personnel not entitled to overtime pay. On the second issue, Article 82 of the Labor Code is decisive on the question of who are referred to by the term "field personnel." As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, Lebatique is not a field personnel as defined above for the following reasons: (1) company drivers, including Lebatique, are directed to deliver the goods at a specified time and place; (2) they are not given the discretion to solicit, select and contact prospective clients; and (3) Far East issued a directive that company drivers should stay at the client's premises during truck-ban hours which is from 5:00 to 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 to 9:00 p.m.14

6.. Jose Rizal College v. NLRC, 156 SCRA 27;

Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It has three groups of employees categorized as follows: (a) personnel on monthly basis, who receive their monthly salary uniformly throughout the year, irrespective of the actual number of working days in a month without deduction for holidays; (b) personnel on daily basis who are paid on actual days worked and they receive unworked holiday pay and (c) collegiate faculty who are paid on the basis of student contract hour. Before the start of the semester they sign contracts with the college undertaking to meet their classes as per schedule. Unable to receive their corresponding holiday pay, as claimed, from 1975 to 1977, private respondent National Alliance of Teachers and Office Workers (NATOW) in behalf of the faculty and personnel of Jose Rizal College filed with the Ministry of Labor a complaint against the college for said alleged non-payment of holiday pay, docketed as Case No. R04-10-81-72. Due to the failure of the parties to settle their differences on conciliation, the case was certified for compulsory arbitration where it was docketed as RB-IV-23037-78 (Rollo, pp. 155-156). *(LA) 1. The faculty and personnel of the respondent Jose Rizal College who are paid their salary by the month uniformly in a school year, irrespective of the number of working days in a month, without deduction for holidays, are presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays and are no longer entitled to separate payment for the said regular holidays; 2. The personnel of the respondent Jose Rizal College who are paid their wages daily are entitled to be paid the 10 unworked regular holidays according to the pertinent provisions of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code; 3. Collegiate faculty of the respondent Jose Rizal College who by contract are paid compensation per student contract hour are not entitled to unworked regular holiday pay considering that these regular holidays have been excluded in the programming of the student contact hours. (Rollo. pp. 26-27) *(NLRC)modified the decision appealed from, in the sense that teaching personnel paid by the hour are declared to be entitled to holiday pay #####Issues##### The sole issue in this case is whether or not the school faculty who according to their contracts are paid per lecture hour are entitled to unworked holiday pay. #####Ruling##### There appears to be no problem therefore as to the first two classes or categories of petitioner's workers. Subject holiday pay is provided for in the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended), which reads:xxx and in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule IV, Book III, which reads:xxx Under the foregoing provisions, apparently, the petitioner, although a non-profit institution is under obligation to give pay even on unworked regular holidays to hourly paid faculty members subject to the terms and conditions provided for therein. We believe that the aforementioned implementing rule is not justified by the provisions of the law which after all is silent with respect to faculty members paid by the hour who because of their teaching contracts are obliged to work and consent to be paid only for work actually done (except when an emergency or a fortuitous event or a national need calls for the declaration of special holidays). Regular holidays specified as such by law are known to both school and faculty members as no class days;" certainly the latter do not expect payment for said unworked days, and this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the teaching contracts. On the other hand, both the law and the Implementing Rules governing holiday pay are silent as to payment on Special Public Holidays. It is readily apparent that the declared purpose of the holiday pay which is the prevention of diminution of the monthly income of the employees on account of work interruptions is defeated when a regular class day is cancelled on account of a special public holiday and class hours are held on another working day to make up for time lost in the school calendar. Otherwise stated, the faculty member, although forced to take a rest, does not earn what he should earn on that day. Be it noted that when a special public holiday is declared, the faculty member paid by the hour is deprived of expected income, and it does not matter that the school calendar is extended in view of the days or hours lost, for their income that could be earned from other sources is lost during the extended days. Similarly, when classes are called off or shortened on account of typhoons, floods, rallies, and the like, these faculty members must likewise be paid, whether or not extensions are ordered.

3.. Pearanda v. Baganga Plywood Corp. G.R No. 159577, May 3, 2006;

Sometime in June 1999, Petitioner Charlito Peñaranda was hired as an employee of Baganga Plywood Corporation (BPC) to take charge of the operations and maintenance of its steam plant boiler.6 In May 2001, Peñaranda filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against BPC and its general manager, Hudson Chua, before the NLRC After the parties failed to settle amicably, the labor arbiter8 directed the parties to file their position papers and submit supporting documents [Peñaranda] through counsel in his position paper alleges that he was employed by respondent [Baganga] on March 15, 1999 with a monthly salary of P5,000.00 as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer until he was illegally terminated on December 19, 2000. Further, [he] alleges that his services [were] terminated without the benefit of due process and valid grounds in accordance with law. Furthermore, he was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working during holidays/rest days, night shift differentials and finally claims for payment of damages and attorney's fees having been forced to litigate the present complaint. Respondents thru counsel allege that complainant's separation from service was done pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor Code. The respondent [BPC] was on temporary closure due to repair and general maintenance and it applied for clearance with the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI to shut down and to dismiss employees (par. 2 position paper). And due to the insistence of herein complainant he was paid his separation benefits (Annexes C and D, ibid). Consequently, when respondent [BPC] partially reopened in January 2001, [Peñaranda] failed to reapply. Hence, he was not terminated from employment much less illegally. He opted to severe employment when he insisted payment of his separation benefits. Furthermore, being a managerial employee he is not entitled to overtime pay and if ever he rendered services beyond the normal hours of work, [there] was no office order/or authorization for him to do so. Finally, respondents allege that the claim for damages has no legal and factual basis and that the instant complaint must necessarily fail for lack of merit. *(LA)there was no illegal dismissal and that petitioner's Complaint was premature because he was still employed by BPC. . The temporary closure of BPC's plant did not terminate his employment, hence, he need not reapply when the plant reopened. *(NLRC)which deleted the award of overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days. According to the Commission, petitioner was not entitled to these awards because he was a managerial employee *(CA)the CA dismissed Peñaranda's Petition for Certiorari. The appellate court held that he failed to: 1) attach copies of the pleadings submitted before the labor arbiter and NLRC; and 2) explain why the filing and service of the Petition was not done by personal service. #####Ruling##### The Petition is not meritorious. Petitioner's claim that respondents filed their appeal beyond the required period is not substantiated. In the pleadings before us, petitioner fails to indicate when respondents received the Decision of the labor arbiter. Neither did the petitioner attach a copy of the challenged appeal. Thus, this Court has no means to determine from the records when the 10-day period commenced and terminated. Since petitioner utterly failed to support his claim that respondents' appeal was filed out of time, we need not belabor that point. The parties alleging have the burden of substantiating their allegations Petitioner claims that he was not a managerial employee, and therefore, entitled to the award granted by the labor arbiter. The Court disagrees with the NLRC's finding that petitioner was a managerial employee. However, petitioner was a member of the managerial staff, which also takes him out of the coverage of labor standards. Like managerial employees, officers and members of the managerial staff are not entitled to the provisions of law on labor standards. Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His work involved overseeing the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. This work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. As supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial staff.Noteworthy, even petitioner admitted that he was a supervisor. In his Position Paper, he stated that he was the foreman responsible for the operation of the boiler.36 The term foreman implies that he was the representative of management over the workers and the operation of the department.37 Petitioner's evidence also showed that he was the supervisor of the steam plant.38 His classification as supervisor is further evident from the manner his salary was paid. He belonged to the 10% of respondent's 354 employees who were paid on a monthly basis; the others were paid only on a daily basis.39 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

2.. Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco, et. al., v. NLRC

Tryco Pharma Corporation (Tryco) is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines and its principal office is located in Caloocan City. Petitioners Joselito Lariño, Vivencio Barte, Saturnino Egera and Simplicio Aya-ay are its regular employees, occupying the positions of helper, shipment helper and factory workers, respectively, assigned to the Production Department. They are members of Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco (BMT), the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees. Tryco and the petitioners signed separate Memorand[a] of Agreement2 (MOA), providing for a compressed workweek schedule to be implemented in the company effective May 20, 1996. The MOA was entered into pursuant to Department of Labor and Employment Department Order (D.O.) No. 21, Series of 1990, Guidelines on the Implementation of Compressed Workweek. As provided in the MOA, 8:00 a.m. to 6:12 p.m., from Monday to Friday, shall be considered as the regular working hours, and no overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work rendered during those hours. The MOA specifically stated that the employee waives the right to claim overtime pay for work rendered after 5:00 p.m. until 6:12 p.m. from Monday to Friday considering that the compressed workweek schedule is adopted in lieu of the regular workweek schedule which also consists of 46 hours. However, should an employee be permitted or required to work beyond 6:12 p.m., such employee shall be entitled to overtime pay. Tryco informed the Bureau of Working Conditions of the Department of Labor and Employment of the implementation of a compressed workweek in the company In January 1997, BMT and Tryco negotiated for the renewal of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but failed to arrive at a new agreement. Meantime, Tryco received the Letter dated March 26, 1997 from the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture reminding it that its production should be conducted in San Rafael, Bulacan, not in Caloocan City Accordingly, Tryco issued a Memorandum5 dated April 7, 1997 which directed petitioner Aya-ay to report to the company's plant site in Bulacan. When petitioner Aya-ay refused to obey, Tryco reiterated the order on April 18, 1997.6 Subsequently, through a Memorandum7 dated May 9, 1997, Tryco also directed petitioners Egera, Lariño and Barte to report to the company's plant site in Bulacan. BMT opposed the transfer of its members to San Rafael, Bulacan, contending that it constitutes unfair labor practice. In protest, BMT declared a strike on May 26, 1997. In August 1997, petitioners filed their separate complaints8 for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay and service incentive leave, and refusal to bargain against Tryco and its President, Wilfredo C. Rivera. In their Position Paper,9 petitioners alleged that the company acted in bad faith during the CBA negotiations because it sent representatives without authority to bind the company, and this was the reason why the negotiations failed. They added that the management transferred petitioners Lariño, Barte, Egera and Aya-ay from Caloocan to San Rafael, Bulacan to paralyze the union. They prayed for the company to pay them their salaries from May 26 to 31, 1997, service incentive leave, and overtime pay, and to implement Wage Order No. 4 In their defense, respondents averred that the petitioners were not dismissed but they refused to comply with the management's directive for them to report to the company's plant in San Rafael, Bulacan. They denied the allegation that they negotiated in bad faith, stating that, in fact, they sent the Executive Vice-President and Legal Counsel as the company's representatives to the CBA negotiations. They claim that the failure to arrive at an agreement was due to the stubbornness of the union panel. Respondents further averred that, long before the start of the negotiations, the company had already been planning to decongest the Caloocan office to comply with the government policy to shift the concentration of manufacturing activities from the metropolis to the countryside. The decision to transfer the company's production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan was precipitated by the letter-reminder of the Bureau of Animal Industry. *(LA)dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that the transfer of the petitioners would not paralyze or render the union ineffective for the following reasons: (1) complainants are not members of the negotiating panel; and (2) the transfer was made pursuant to the directive of the Department of Agriculture. *(NLRC)affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. Denied MR *(CA)denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration #####Ruling##### The petition has no merit. We have no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence Petitioners mainly contend that the transfer orders amount to a constructive dismissal. They maintain that the letter of the Bureau of Animal Industry is not credible because it is not authenticated; it is only a ploy, solicited by respondents to give them an excuse to effect a massive transfer of employees. They point out that the Caloocan City office is still engaged in production activities until now and respondents even hired new employees to replace them. We do not agree. We refuse to accept the petitioners' wild and reckless imputation that the Bureau of Animal Industry conspired with the respondents just to effect the transfer of the petitioners. Furthermore, Tryco's decision to transfer its production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan, regardless of whether it was made pursuant to the letter of the Bureau of Animal Industry, was within the scope of its inherent right to control and manage its enterprise effectively. While the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied This prerogative extends to the management's right to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the freedom to transfer and reassign employees according to the requirements of its business When the transfer is not unreasonable, or inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal Indisputably, in the instant case, the transfer orders do not entail a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges of the petitioners. Petitioners, therefore, anchor their objection solely on the ground that it would cause them great inconvenience since they are all residents of Metro Manila and they would incur additional expenses to travel daily from Manila to Bulacan. Petitioners, however, went further and argued that the transfer orders amounted to unfair labor practice because it would paralyze and render the union ineffective. To begin with, we cannot see how the mere transfer of its members can paralyze the union. The union was not deprived of the membership of the petitioners whose work assignments were only transferred to another location. More importantly, there was no showing or any indication that the transfer orders were motivated by an intention to interfere with the petitioners' right to organize. Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize. With the exception of Article 248(f) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices Finally, we do not agree with the petitioners' assertion that the MOA is not enforceable as it is contrary to law. The MOA is enforceable and binding against the petitioners. Where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking D.O. No. 21 sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of the benefits that the employees will derive from the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme, thus:xxx Moreover, the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme in the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the petitioners by their transfer to a farther workplace. Notably, the MOA complied with the following conditions set by the DOLE, under D.O. No. 21, to protect the interest of the employees in the implementation of a compressed workweek scheme:

1. David v. Macasio, G.R No. 195466, July 2, 2014;

In January 2009, Macasio filed before the LA a complaint7 against petitioner Ariel L. David, doing business under the name and style "Yiels Hog Dealer," for non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay. He also claimed payment for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Macasio also claimed payment for service incentive leave (SIL). Macasio alleged9 before the LA that he had been working as a butcher for David since January 6, 1995. Macasio claimed that David exercised effective control and supervision over his work, pointing out that David: (1) set the work day, reporting time and hogs to be chopped, as well as the manner by which he was to perform his work; (2) daily paid his salary of ₱700.00, which was increased from ₱600.00 in 2007, ₱500.00 in 2006 and ₱400.00 in 2005; and (3) approved and disapproved his leaves. Macasio added that David owned the hogs delivered for chopping, as well as the work tools and implements; the latter also rented the workplace. Macasio further claimed that David employs about twenty-five (25) butchers and delivery drivers. *(LA)concluded that as Macasio was engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis, he is not entitled to overtime, holiday, SIL and 13th month pay. *(NLRC)affirmed the LA ruling *(CA)partly granted Macasio's certiorari petition and reversed the NLRC's ruling for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.. While the CA agreed with the LAand the NLRC that Macasio was a task basis employee, it nevertheless found Macasio entitled to his monetary claims following the doctrine laid down in Serrano v. Severino Santos Transit. #####Issues##### The issue revolves around the proper application and interpretation of the labor law provisions on holiday, SIL and 13th month pay to a worker engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis. In the context of the Rule 65 petition before the CA, the issue is whether the CA correctly found the NLRC in grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Macasio is entitled to these labor standards benefits. #####Ruling##### We partially grant the petition. In insisting before this Court that Macasio was not his employee, David argues that he engaged the latter on "pakyaw" or task basis. Very noticeably, David confuses engagement on "pakyaw" or task basis with the lack of employment relationship. Impliedly, David asserts that their "pakyawan" or task basis arrangement negates the existence of employment relationship. At the outset, we reject this assertion of the petitioner. At the outset, we reject this assertion of the petitioner. Engagement on "pakyaw" or task basis does not characterize the relationship that may exist between the parties, i.e., whether one of employment or independent contractorship. Article 97(6) of the Labor Code defines wages as "xxx the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered[.]"35 In relation to Article 97(6), Article 10136 of the Labor Code speaks of workers paid by results or those whose pay is calculated in terms of the quantity or quality of their work output which includes "pakyaw" work and other non-time work. More importantly, by implicitly arguing that his engagement of Macasio on "pakyaw" or task basis negates employer-employee relationship, David would want the Court to engage on a factual appellate review of the entire case to determine the presence or existence of that relationship. This approach however is not authorized under a Rule 45 petition for review of the CA decision rendered under a Rule 65 proceeding. First, the LA and the NLRC denied Macasio's claim not because of the absence of an employer-employee but because of its finding that since Macasio is paid on pakyaw or task basis, then he is not entitled to SIL, holiday and 13th month pay. Second, we consider it crucial, that in the separate illegal dismissal case Macasio filed with the LA, the LA, the NLRC and the CA uniformly found the existence of an employer-employee relationship In other words, aside from being factual in nature, the existence of an employer-employee relationship is in fact a non-issue in this case At any rate, even if we indulge the petitioner, we find his claim that no employer-employee relationship exists baseless. Employing the control test, we find that such a relationship exist in the present case. First, David engaged the services of Macasio, thus satisfying the element of "selection and engagement of the employee." Second, David paid Macasio's wages. Third, David had been setting the day and time when Macasio should report for work. This power to determine the work schedule obviously implies power of control. Fourth, David had the right and power to control and supervise Macasio's work as to the means and methods of performing it. A distinguishing characteristic of "pakyaw" or task basis engagement, as opposed to straight-hour wage payment, is the non-consideration of the time spent in working. In a task-basis work, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that payment is reckoned in terms of completion of the work, not in terms of the number of time spent in the completion of work.45 Once the work or task is completed, the worker receives a fixed amount as wage, without regard to the standard measurements of time generally used in pay computation. In Macasio's case, the established facts show that he would usually start his work at 10:00 p.m. Thereafter, regardless of the total hours that he spent at the workplace or of the total number of the hogs assigned to him for chopping, Macasio would receive the fixed amount of ₱700.00 once he had completed his task. Clearly, these circumstances show a "pakyaw" or task basis engagement that all three tribunals uniformly found. In sum, the existence of employment relationship between the parties is determined by applying the "four-fold" test; engagement on "pakyaw" or task basis does not determine the parties' relationship as it is simply a method of pay computation. Accordingly, Macasio is David's employee, albeit engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis. As an employee of David paid on pakyaw or task basis, we now go to the core issue of whether Macasio is entitled to holiday, 13th month, and SIL pay. Under these provisions, the general rule is that holiday and SIL pay provisions cover all employees. To be excluded from their coverage, an employee must be one of those that these provisions expressly exempt, strictly in accordance with the exemption. Under the IRR, exemption from the coverage of holiday and SIL pay refer to "field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis[.]" Note that unlike Article 82 of the Labor Code, the IRR on holiday and SIL pay do not exclude employees "engaged on task basis" as a separate and distinct category from employees classified as "field personnel." Rather, these employees are altogether merged into one classification of exempted employees. Because of this difference, it may be argued that the Labor Code may be interpreted to mean that those who are engaged on task basis, per se, are excluded from the SIL and holiday payment since this is what the Labor Code provisions, in contrast with the IRR, strongly suggest. The arguable interpretation of this rule may be conceded to be within the discretion granted to the LA and NLRC as the quasi-judicial bodies with expertise on labor matters However, as early as 1987 in the case of Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople49 the phrase "those who are engaged on task or contract basis" in the rule has already been interpreted to mean as follows: in short, the payment of an employee on task or pakyaw basis alone is insufficient to exclude one from the coverage of SIL and holiday pay. They are exempted from the coverage of Title I (including the holiday and SIL pay) only if they qualify as "field personnel." The IRR therefore validly qualifies and limits the general exclusion of "workers paid by results" found in Article 82 from the coverage of holiday and SIL pay. This is the only reasonable interpretation since the determination of excluded workers who are paid by results from the coverage of Title I is "determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations." In contrast and in clear departure from settled case law, the LA and the NLRC still interpreted the Labor Code provisions and the IRR as exempting an employee from the coverage of Title I of the Labor Code based simply and solely on the mode of payment of an employee. The NLRC's utter disregard of this consistent jurisprudential ruling is a clear act of grave abuse of discretion.52 In other words, by dismissing Macasio's complaint without considering whether Macasio was a "field personnel" or not, the NLRC proceeded based on a significantly incomplete consideration of the case. This action clearly smacks of grave abuse of discretion. Entitlement to holiday pay Evidently, the Serrano ruling speaks only of SIL pay. However, if the LA and the NLRC had only taken counsel from Serrano and earlier cases, they would have correctly reached a similar conclusion regarding the payment of holiday pay since the rule exempting "field personnel" from the grant of holiday pay is identically worded with the rule exempting "field personnel" from the grant of SIL pay. To be clear, the phrase "employees engaged on task or contract basis "found in the IRR on both SIL pay and holiday pay should be read together with the exemption of "field personnel." In short, in determining whether workers engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis" is entitled to holiday and SIL pay, the presence (or absence) of employer supervision as regards the worker's time and performance is the key: if the worker is simply engaged on pakyaw or task basis, then the general rule is that he is entitled to a holiday pay and SIL pay unless exempted from the exceptions specifically provided under Article 94 (holiday pay) and Article95 (SIL pay) of the Labor Code. However, if the worker engaged on pakyaw or task basis also falls within the meaning of "field personnel" under the law, then he is not entitled to these monetary benefits. Macasio does not fall under the classification of "field personnel" Based on the definition of field personnel under Article 82, we agree with the CA that Macasio does not fall under the definition of "field personnel." The CA's finding in this regard is supported by the established facts of this case: first, Macasio regularly performed his duties at David's principal place of business; second, his actual hours of work could be determined with reasonable certainty; and, third, David supervised his time and performance of duties. Since Macasio cannot be considered a "field personnel," then he is not exempted from the grant of holiday, SIL pay even as he was engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis. Not being a "field personnel," we find the CA to be legally correct when it reversed the NLRC's ruling dismissing Macasio's complaint for holiday and SIL pay for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Entitlement to 13th month pay With respect to the payment of 13th month pay however, we find that the CA legally erred in finding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in denying this benefit to Macasio.1âwphi1 As with holiday and SIL pay, 13th month pay benefits generally cover all employees; an employee must be one of those expressly enumerated to be exempted. Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 85154 enumerates the exemptions from the coverage of 13th month pay benefits. Under Section 3(e), "employers of those who are paid on xxx task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof"55 are exempted. Note that unlike the IRR of the Labor Code on holiday and SIL pay, Section 3(e) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD No. 851 exempts employees "paid on task basis" without any reference to "field personnel." This could only mean that insofar as payment of the 13th month pay is concerned, the law did not intend to qualify the exemption from its coverage with the requirement that the task worker be a "field personnel" at the same time.

Pigcaulan v. Security and Credit Investigation, Inc., G.R No. 173648, January 16, 2012;

Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were assigned to SCII's different clients. Subsequently, however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints[7] for underpayment of salaries and non-payment of overtime, holiday, rest day, service incentive leave and 13th month pays. These complaints were later on consolidated as they involved the same causes of action. Canoy and Pigcaulan, in support of their claim, submitted their respective daily time records reflecting the number of hours served and their wages for the same. They likewise presented itemized lists of their claims for the corresponding periods served. Respondents, however, maintained that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid their just salaries and other benefits under the law; that the salaries they received were above the statutory minimum wage and the rates provided by the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO) for security guards; that their holiday pay were already included in the computation of their monthly salaries; that they were paid additional premium of 30% in addition to their basic salary whenever they were required to work on Sundays and 200% of their salary for work done on holidays; and, that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid the corresponding 13th month pay for the years 1998 and 1999. In support thereof, copies of payroll listings[8] and lists of employees who received their 13th month pay for the periods December 1997 to November 1998 and December 1998 to November 1999[9] were presented. In addition, respondents contended that Canoy's and Pigcaulan's monetary claims should only be limited to the past three years of employment pursuant to the rule on prescription of claims. *(LA)Giving credence to the itemized computations and representative daily time records submitted by Canoy and Pigcaulan, Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion awarded them their monetary claims in his Decision *(NLRC)dismissed the appeal and held that the evidence show underpayment of salaries as well as non-payment of service incentive leave benefit. *(CA)set aside the rulings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC after noting that there were no factual and legal bases mentioned in the questioned rulings to support the conclusions made. Consequently, it dismissed all the monetary claims of Canoy and Pigcaulan #####Ruling##### The assailed CA Decision is considered final as to Canoy. We have examined the petition and find that same was filed by Pigcaulan solely on his own behalf. We have examined the petition and find that same was filed by Pigcaulan solely on his own behalf. Also, under the heading "Parties", only Pigcaulan is mentioned as petitioner and consistent with this, the body of the petition refers only to a "petitioner" and never in its plural form "petitioners". Aside from the fact that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the petition was executed by Pigcaulan alone, it was plainly and particularly indicated under the name of the lawyer who prepared the same, Atty. Josefel P. Grageda, that he is the "Counsel for Petitioner Adbuljuahid Pigcaulan" only. In view of these, there is therefore, no doubt, that the petition was brought only on behalf of Pigcaulan. Since no appeal from the CA Decision was brought by Canoy, same has already become final and executory as to him. There was no substantial evidence to support the grant of overtime pay. The Labor Arbiter ordered reimbursement of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay for the year 2000 in favor of Canoy and Pigcaulan. The Labor Arbiter relied heavily on the itemized computations they submitted which he considered as representative daily time records to substantiate the award of salary differentials. The NLRC then sustained the award on the ground that there was substantial evidence of underpayment of salaries and benefits. We find that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in this regard. The handwritten itemized computations are self-serving, unreliable and unsubstantial evidence to sustain the grant of salary differentials, particularly overtime pay. Unsigned and unauthenticated as they are, there is no way of verifying the truth of the handwritten entries stated therein. Written only in pieces of paper and solely prepared by Canoy and Pigcaulan, these representative daily time records, as termed by the Labor Arbiter, can hardly be considered as competent evidence to be used as basis to prove that the two were underpaid of their salaries. We find nothing in the records which could substantially support Pigcaulan's contention that he had rendered service beyond eight hours to entitle him to overtime pay and during Sundays to entitle him to restday pay. Hence, in the absence of any concrete proof that additional service beyond the normal working hours and days had indeed been rendered, we cannot affirm the grant of overtime pay to Pigcaulan. Pigcaulan is entitled to holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and proportionate 13th month pay for year 2000. However, with respect to the award for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, we affirm and rule that Pigcaulan is entitled to these benefits. Article 94 and 95 of the Labor Code provides that:xxxx Under the Labor Code, Pigcaulan is entitled to his regular rate on holidays even if he does not work.[30] Likewise, express provision of the law entitles him to service incentive leave benefit for he rendered service for more than a year already. Furthermore, under Presidential Decree No. 851,[31] he should be paid his 13th month pay. As employer, SCII has the burden of proving that it has paid these benefits to its employees SCII presented payroll listings and transmittal letters to the bank to show that Canoy and Pigcaulan received their salaries as well as benefits which it claimed are already integrated in the employees' monthly salaries. However, the documents presented do not prove SCII's allegation. SCII failed to show any other concrete proof by means of records, pertinent files or similar documents reflecting that the specific claims have been paid. With respect to 13th month pay, SCII presented proof that this benefit was paid but only for the years 1998 and 1999. To repeat, the burden of proving payment of these monetary claims rests on SCII, being the employer. It is a rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. "Even when the plaintiff alleges non-payment, still the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment."[33] Since SCII failed to provide convincing proof that it has already settled the claims, Pigcaulan should be paid his holiday pay, service incentive leave benefits and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000.

Rodriguez v. Park N Ride Inc., G.R No. 222980, March 20, 2017

Incorporated (Vicest Phils.), Grand Leisure Corporation (Grand Leisure), and Spouses Vicente and Estelita B. Javier (Javier Spouses) to pay Lourdes C. Rodriguez (Rodriguez) service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay for 2006 to 2009, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum, from date of finality of the decision until full payment On October 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Complaint5 for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, including claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Park N Ride, Vicest Phils., Grand Leisure, and the Javier Spouses. In her Position Paper,6 Rodriguez alleged that she was employed on January 30, 1984 as Restaurant Supervisor at Vicest Phils.7 Four (4) years later, the restaurant business closed. Rodriguez was transferred to office work and became an Administrative and Finance Assistant to Estelita Javier (Estelita).8 One of Rodriguez's duties was to open the office in Makati City at 8:00 a.m. daily Sometime in 2000, the Javier Spouses established Park N Ride, a business that provided terminal parking and leasing.13 Although the company's main business was in Lawton, Manila, its personnel and administrative department remained in Makati City.14 Rodriguez handled the administrative, finance, and warehousing departments of Park N Ride.15 Every Saturday, after opening the Makati office at 8:00 a.m., Rodriguez was required to report at the Lawton office at 11:00 a.m. to substitute the Head Cashier, who would be on day-off She allegedly worked from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., Mondays to Saturdays; was on call on Sundays; and worked during Christmas and other holidays.17 She was deducted an equivalent of two (2) days' wage for every day of absence and was not paid any service incentive leave pay.18 On one occasion, Rodriguez asked the Javier Spouses if she could go home by 10:00 a.m. to attend a family reunion, but her request was denied The Javier Spouses' treatment of Rodriguez became unbearable; thus, on March 25, 2009, she filed her resignation letter effective April 25, 2009.20 The Javier Spouses allegedly did not accept her resignation and convinced her to reconsider and stay on.21 However, her experience became worse.22 Rodriguez claimed that toward the end of her employment, Estelita was always unreasonable and hot-headed, and would belittle and embarrass her in the presence of co-workers. On September 22, 2009, Rodriguez went on her usual ''pamalengke" for the Spouses.24 Later, she proceeded to open the Makati office.25 Estelita was mad at her when they finally talked over the phone, berating her for opening the office late.26 She allegedly told her that if she did not want to continue with her work, the company could manage without her Thus, Rodriguez did not report for work the next day, and on September 26, 2009, she wrote the Javier Spouses a letter28 expressing her gripes at them. She intimated that they were always finding fault with her to push her to resign On October 6, 2009, the Javier Spouses replied to her letter, allegedly accepting her resignation Rodriguez prayed for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement; full back wages; service incentive leave pay; proportional 13th month pay; moral damages of ₱l00,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱l00,000.00; and attorney's fees. *(LA)dismissing Rodriguez's Complaint for lack of merit. According to the Decision, the summary of evidence pointed to the voluntariness of Rodriguez's resignation rather than the existence of a hostile and frustrating working environment. *(NLRC)Rodriguez appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The Commission, in its Decision58 dated May 30, 2011, granted Rodriguez's appeal and modified Labor Arbiter Macam's Decision. *(NLRC)MR. However, on the Javier Spouses' Motion for Reconsideration,59 the Commission set aside its May 30, 2011 Decision and reinstated Labor Arbiter Macam's May 26, 2010 Decision. Mr by rodriguez denied #####Issue##### Petitioner maintains that she has been constructively dismissed. She points to the Affidavits66 of six (6) of her former co-workers allegedly supporting her claim of unbearable working conditions; and Estelita's statement on September 22, 2009, "Kung ayaw mo na ng ginagawa mo, we can manage! "67 Petitioner further claims that she is entitled to service incentive leave pay for her entire 25 years of service, and not only up to three (3) years.68 Finally, she adds that she should be awarded moral and exemplary damages because of the inhumane treatment of her employers. #####Ruling##### We partly grant the Petition. There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment.71 It exists where there is involuntary resignation because of the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. We have held that the standard for constructive dismissal is "whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his employment under the circumstances." However, this is not the situation in this case. The National Labor Relations Commission did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in finding that petitioner was not constructively dismissed but that she voluntarily resigned from employment. The affidavits of petitioner's former co-workers were mere narrations of petitioner's various duties. Far from showing the alleged harsh treatment that petitioner suffered, the affidavits rather reveal the full trust and confidence reposed by respondents on petitioner. Petitioner was entrusted with respondents' assets, the care and safeguarding of their house during their trips abroad, custody of company files and papers, and delicate matters such as the release, deposit, and withdrawals of checks from their personal accounts as well as accounts of their companies. Indeed, it was alleged that petitioner was treated by the respondents as part of the family. Petitioner's unequivocal intent to relinquish her position was manifest when she submitted her letters of resignation. The resignation letters dated May 1, 200873 and March 25, 200974 contained words of gratitude, which could hardly come from an employee forced to resign. These letters were reinforced by petitioner's very own act of not reporting for work despite respondents' directive. From the representation of petitioner, what triggered her resignation was the incident on September 22, 2009 when Estelita told her "Kung ayaw mo na ng ginagawa mo, we can manage! "76 These words, however, are not sufficient to make the continued employment of petitioner impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the utterance of Estelita was more a consequence of her spontaneous outburst of feelings resulting from petitioner's failure to perform a task that was long overdue, rather than an act to force petitioner to resign from work.77 It appears that petitioner was asked to finish assigned tasks and liquidate cash advances. The affidavit of Estelita was unrebutted, and further corroborated by Rhea Sienna L. Padrid, Accounting Assistant II of Park N Ride, in her Affidavit with Cash Advances Report Petitioner was neither terminated on September 22, 2009 nor was she constructively dismissed. There was no showing of bad faith or malicious design by the respondents that would make her work conditions unbearable.80 On the other hand, it is a fact that petitioner enjoyed the privilege of working closely with the Javier Spouses and having their full trust and confidence. Spontaneous expressions of an employer do not automatically render a hostile work atmosphere. The circumstances in this case negate its presence On the monetary claims, petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages considering that she was not illegally dismissed. On the other hand, with respect to service incentive leave pay, the Court of Appeals limited the award thereof to three (3) years (2006 to 2009) only due to the prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. It held It was not shown here that petitioner Rodriguez was enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five days while being employed by private respondents Spouses Javier; it was not shown that private respondents Spouses Javier were merely employing less than 10 employees (on the contrary, private respondent spouses Javier stated that they were employing less than 15 employees). Hence, the award of service incentive leave pay to petitioner Rodriguez was proper. Private respondents Spouses Javier employed petitioner Rodriguez for 25 years. Applying the prescriptive period for money claims under Article 291 of the Labor Code however, petitioner Rodriguez should only be entitled to the three years' worth of service incentive pay for the years 2006 to 2009. However, Auto Bus Transport System, Inc. v. Bautista82 clarified the correct reckoning of the prescriptive period for service incentive leave pay: Applying Article 291 of the Labor Code in light of this peculiarity of the service incentive leave, we can conclude that the three (3)-year prescriptive period commences, not at the end of the year when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his service incentive leave, but from the time when the employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of commutation or upon termination of the employee's services, as the case may be. Thus, the prescriptive period with respect to petitioner's claim for her entire service incentive leave pay commenced only from the time of her resignation or separation from employment. Since petitioner had filed her complaint on October 7, 2009, or a few days after her resignation in September 2009, her claim for service incentive leave pay has not prescribed. Accordingly, petitioner must be awarded service incentive leave pay for her entire 25 years of service-from 1984 to 2009-and not only three (3) years' worth (2006 to 2009) as determined by the Court of Appeals.

7.. Makati Haberdashery v. NLRC, 179 SCRA 448;

Individual complainants, private respondents herein, have been working for petitioner Makati Haberdashery, Inc. as tailors, seamstress, sewers, basters (manlililip) and "plantsadoras". They are paid on a piece-rate basis except Maria Angeles and Leonila Serafina who are paid on a monthly basis. In addition to their piece-rate, they are given a daily allowance of three (P 3.00) pesos provided they report for work before 9:30 a.m. everyday. Private respondents are required to work from or before 9:30 a.m. up to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. from Monday to Saturday and during peak periods even on Sundays and holidays. On July 20, 1984, the Sandigan ng Manggagawang Pilipino, a labor organization of the respondent workers, filed a complaint docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 7-2603-84 for (a) underpayment of the basic wage; (b) underpayment of living allowance; (c) non-payment of overtime work; (d) non-payment of holiday pay; (e) non-payment of service incentive pay; (f) 13th month pay; and (g) benefits provided for under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.1 During the pendency of NLRC NCR Case No. 7-2603-84, private respondent Dioscoro Pelobello left with Salvador Rivera, a salesman of petitioner Haberdashery, an open package which was discovered to contain a "jusi" barong tagalog. When confronted, Pelobello replied that the same was ordered by respondent Casimiro Zapata for his customer. Zapata allegedly admitted that he copied the design of petitioner Haberdashery. But in the afternoon, when again questioned about said barong, Pelobello and Zapata denied ownership of the same. Consequently a memorandum was issued to each of them to explain on or before February 4, 1985 why no action should be taken against them for accepting a job order which is prejudicial and in direct competition with the business of the company. 2 Both respondents allegedly did not submit their explanation and did not report for work. 3 Hence, they were dismissed by petitioners on February 4, 1985. They countered by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 2-428-85 on February 5, 1985. 4 *(LA)inding respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering them to reinstate Dioscoro Pelobello and Casimiro Zapata to their respective or similar positions *(NLRC)affirmed said decision but limited the backwages awarded the Dioscoro Pelobello and Casimiro Zapata to only one (1) year #####Issues##### I THE SUBJECT DECISIONS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN PETITIONER HABERDASHERY AND RESPONDENTS WORKERS. II THE SUBJECT DECISIONS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENTS WORKERS ARE ENTITLED TO MONETARY CLAIMS DESPITE THE FINDING THAT THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO MINIMUM WAGE. III THE SUBJECT DECISIONS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENTS PELOBELLO AND ZAPATA WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED ######Ruling###### The first issue which is the pivotal issue in this case is resolved in favor of private respondents. We have repeatedly held in countless decisions that the test of employer-employee relationship is four-fold:xxxx The facts at bar indubitably reveal that the most important requisite of control is present. As gleaned from the operations of petitioner, when a customer enters into a contract with the haberdashery or its proprietor, the latter directs an employee who may be a tailor, pattern maker, sewer or "plantsadora" to take the customer's measurements, and to sew the pants, coat or shirt as specified by the customer. Supervision is actively manifested in all these aspects — the manner and quality of cutting, sewing and ironing. Furthermore, the presence of control is immediately evident in this memorandum issued by Assistant Manager Cecilio B. Inocencio, Jr. dated May 30, 1981 addressed to Topper's Makati Tailors which reads in part:xxx From this memorandum alone, it is evident that petitioner has reserved the right to control its employees not only as to the result but also the means and methods by which the same are to be accomplished. That private respondents are regular employees is further proven by the fact that they have to report for work regularly from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. and are paid an additional allowance of P 3.00 daily if they report for work before 9:30 a.m. and which is forfeited when they arrive at or after 9:30 a.m Since private respondents are regular employees, necessarily the argument that they are independent contractors must fail. As established in the preceding paragraphs, private respondents did not exercise independence in their own methods, but on the contrary were subject to the control of petitioners from the beginning of their tasks to their completion. Unlike independent contractors who generally rely on their own resources, the equipment, tools, accessories, and paraphernalia used by private respondents are supplied and owned by petitioners. Private respondents are totally dependent on petitioners in all these aspects Coming now to the second issue, there is no dispute that private respondents are entitled to the Minimum Wage as mandated by Section 2(g) of Letter of Instruction No. 829, Rules Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1614 and reiterated in Section 3(f), Rules Implementing Presidential Decree 1713 which explicitly states that, "All employees paid by the result shall receive not less than the applicable new minimum wage rates for eight (8) hours work a day, except where a payment by result rate has been established by the Secretary of Labor. ..." 12 No such rate has been established in this case. But all these notwithstanding, the question as to whether or not there is in fact an underpayment of minimum wages to private respondents has already been resolved in the decision of the Labor Arbiter where he stated: "Hence, for lack of sufficient evidence to support the claims of the complainants for alleged violation of the minimum wage, their claims for underpayment re violation of the Minimum Wage Law under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 must perforce fall." The records show that private respondents did not appeal the above ruling of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC; neither did they file any petition raising that issue in the Supreme Court. Accordingly, insofar as this case is concerned, that issue has been laid to rest. As to private respondents, the judgment may be said to have attained finality. For it is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court-, any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. As a consequence of their status as regular employees of the petitioners, they can claim cost of living allowance. This is apparent from the provision defining the employees entitled to said allowance, thus: "... All workers in the private sector, regardless of their position, designation or status, and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid. " With respect to the last issue, it is apparent that public respondents have misread the evidence, for it does show that a violation of the employer's rules has been committed and the evidence of such transgression, the copied barong tagalog, was in the possession of Pelobello who pointed to Zapata as the owner. When required by their employer to explain in a memorandum issued to each of them, they not only failed to do so but instead went on AWOL (absence without official leave), waited for the period to explain to expire and for petitioner to dismiss them. They thereafter filed an action for illegal dismissal on the far-fetched ground that they were dismissed because of union activities. Assuming that such acts do not constitute abandonment of their jobs as insisted by private respondents, their blatant disregard of their employer's memorandum is undoubtedly an open defiance to the lawful orders of the latter, a justifiable ground for termination of employment by the employer expressly provided for in Article 283(a) of the Labor Code as well as a clear indication of guilt for the commission of acts inimical to the interests of the employer, another justifiable ground for dismissal under the same Article of the Labor Code, paragraph (c). Well established in our jurisprudence is the right of an employer to dismiss an employee whose continuance in the service is inimical to the employer's interest WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated March 30, 1988 and that of the Labor Arbiter dated June 10, 1986 are hereby modified. The complaint filed by Pelobello and Zapata for illegal dismissal docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 2-428-85 is dismissed for lack of factual and legal bases. Award of service incentive leave pay to private respondents is deleted.

6-JPL Marketing Promotions v. Court of Appeals, 463 SCRA 136;

JPL Marketing and Promotions (hereinafter referred to as "JPL") is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of recruitment and placement of workers. On the other hand, private respondents Noel Gonzales, Ramon Abesa III and Faustino Aninipot were employed by JPL as merchandisers on separate dates and assigned at different establishments in Naga City and Daet, Camarines Norte as attendants to the display of California Marketing Corporation (CMC), one of petitioner's clients. On 13 August 1996, JPL notified private respondents that CMC would stop its direct merchandising activity in the Bicol Region, Isabela, and Cagayan Valley effective 15 August 1996.3 They were advised to wait for further notice as they would be transferred to other clients. However, on 17 October 1996,4 private respondents Abesa and Gonzales filed before the National Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch (NLRC) Sub V complaints for illegal dismissal, praying for separation pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and payment for moral damages.5 Aninipot filed a similar case thereafter. *(LA)dismissed the complaints for lack of merit *(NLRC)he Second Division of the NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter's finding that when private respondents filed their complaints, the six-month period had not yet expired, and that CMC's decision to stop its operations in the areas was beyond the control of JPL, thus, they were not illegally dismissed. However, it found that despite JPL's effort to look for clients to which private respondents may be reassigned it was unable to do so, and hence they are entitled to separation pay *(CA)dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the NLRC resolution #####Issues##### The case thus presents two major issues, to wit: whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, and granting that they are so entitled, what should be the reckoning point for computing said awards. #####Ruling##### The common denominator of the instances where payment of separation pay is warranted is that the employee was dismissed by the employer.33 In the instant case, there was no dismissal to speak of. Private respondents were simply not dismissed at all, whether legally or illegally. What they received from JPL was not a notice of termination of employment, but a memo informing them of the termination of CMC's contract with JPL. More importantly, they were advised that they were to be reassigned. At that time, there was no severance of employment to speak of Furthermore, Art. 286 of the Labor Code allows the bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, wherein an employee/employees are placed on the so-called "floating status." When that "floating status" of an employee lasts for more than six months, he may be considered to have been illegally dismissed from the service. Thus, he is entitled to the corresponding benefits for his separation, and this would apply to suspension either of the entire business or of a specific component thereof. As clearly borne out by the records of this case, private respondents sought employment from other establishments even before the expiration of the six (6)-month period provided by law. As they admitted in their comment, all three of them applied for and were employed by another establishment after they received the notice from JPL.35 JPL did not terminate their employment; they themselves severed their relations with JPL. Thus, they are not entitled to separation pay. The Court is not inclined in this case to award separation pay even on the ground of compassionate justice. The Court of Appeals relied on the cases36 wherein the Court awarded separation pay to legally dismissed employees on the grounds of equity and social consideration. Said cases involved employees who were actually dismissed by their employers, whether for cause or not. Clearly, the principle applies only when the employee is dismissed by the employer, which is not the case in this instance. In seeking and obtaining employment elsewhere, private respondents effectively terminated their employment with JPL. Nonetheless, JPL cannot escape the payment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay to private respondents. Said benefits are mandated by law and should be given to employees as a matter of right. Admittedly, private respondents were not given their 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay while they were under the employ of JPL. Instead, JPL provided salaries which were over and above the minimum wage. The Court rules that the difference between the minimum wage and the actual salary received by private respondents cannot be deemed as their 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay as such difference is not equivalent to or of the same import as the said benefits contemplated by law. Thus, as properly held by the Court of Appeals and by the NLRC, private respondents are entitled to the 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. However, the Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay should be computed from the start of employment up to the finality of the NLRC resolution. While computation for the 13th month pay should properly begin from the first day of employment, the service incentive leave pay should start a year after commencement of service, for it is only then that the employee is entitled to said benefit. On the other hand, the computation for both benefits should only be up to 15 August 1996, or the last day that private respondents worked for JPL. To extend the period to the date of finality of the NLRC resolution would negate the absence of illegal dismissal, or to be more precise, the want of dismissal in this case. Besides, it would be unfair to require JPL to pay private respondents the said benefits beyond 15 August 1996 when they did not render any service to JPL beyond that date. These benefits are given by law on the basis of the service actually rendered by the employee, and in the particular case of the service incentive leave, is granted as a motivation for the employee to stay longer with the employer. There is no cause for granting said incentive to one who has already terminated his relationship with the employer.