Negotiation exam #3
Structural strategies to encourage cooperation in social dilemmas
Fundamental change in the way that social dilemmas are constructed, result of thoughtful problem solving and often produce a change in incentives
Less trust, more deception (e-negotiation)
People find it easier to hedge on the truth when writing emails, some mixed findings on this
Social identity
People hold a positive bias towards their in-group, people are more likely to deceive strangers, people are more suspicious of strangers
Shared vs individual identity (challenges of intergroup negotiations)
People identify with many social groups, one group may be more or less salient, negotiations among people representing different social groups are less mutually beneficial than negotiations among individuals who perceive themselves as belonging to a social organization that encompasses all those present at the table
Intergroup negotiation strategies
Separate conflict of interest from symbolic conflict, search for common identity, avoid out-group homogeneity bias, contact, GRIT strategy
Strategies for optimizing intergroup negotiations
Separate conflict of interest from symbolic conflict, search for common identity, avoid the out-group homogeneity bias, contact
Avoid escalation of commitment
Set limits, avoid decision myopia, recognize sunk costs, diversity responsibility and authority, redefine the situation
Level 2 Pyramid model of integrative agreements
Settlement demonstrably superior to other feasible settlements, higher joint value, collaborative bargaining, you and your opponent have outcomes that are superior to other outcomes
Social dilemma
Several people, costs of defection are spread out, riskier than prisoner's dilemma, provides anonymity, people have less control
Understand the problem
Share information, ask diagnostic questions, priorities and interests are the most important aspects to share
Intergroup negotiation challenges
Shared versus individual identity, in-group bias, extremism
Challenges of intergroup negotiations
Shared vs individual identity, in-group bias, extremism
Different time, same place
Shift workers who pick up the same task at different times, shared electronic documents
Optimal coalition size (coalition challenge)
Should contain the minimum number of people necessary to achieve a desired goal, difficult to maintain because people are tempted to join other coalitions and agreements are not enforceable
Contingency contracts
Should not create a conflict of interest, should be enforceable, may require a written contract, should be clear, measurable, and readily evaluated, no room for ambiguity, conditions and measurement techniques should be spelled out in advance, date or time line should be mutually agreed upon, require continued interaction among parties
How to encourage cooperation in social dilemmas when parties should not collude
Simple strategy, signal via actions, do not be the first to defect, focus on your own payoffs, not relative to others, be sensitive to egocentric bias
Implementing a shared strategy
Simulate the negotiation, assign roles to capitalize on team members' strengths and interests, establish a plan for intrateam communication
Timing
Slow down or speed up the process with certain employers so you receive offers at the same time so that you can consider them, delay an offer by asking for additional interviews
Conditions for contact to reduce prejudice
Social and institutional support, acquaintance potential, equal status, shared goal, cross-group friendships
Post-negotiation settlements
Solution appears to address problem, better than your BATNA, reconvene at a later time renegotiate based on your original settlement, the old settlement becomes your BATNA, trying to identify subsequent agreements that increase the joint value of the original agreement
Facilitate integrative negotiation
Some common goal, faith in one's problem solving ability, a belief in the validity of own position and other's perspective, and be willing to help them achieve what they want, motivation and commitment to work together
Appropriate number of coalition partners
Some people believe the more the merrier, you want only as many as you need to achieve your goals, at the end you still have to distribute the surplus
Negotiation stage, manage conflict effectively (multiparty negotiations)
Some people may be especially good at smoothing things over
Agreements should be better
Some settlements provide additional value, the bargaining surplus is increased, create all the possibilities then pick the best one
Negotiate until the end
Sometimes people let their guard down and become less focused, females are more comfortable with value creation, begin to lose value at the end when they don't claim as much, they yield too much
Cross-group friendships (Conditions for contact to reduce prejudice)
Sometimes requires real contact with one another, creates fewer negative attitudes towards out-group, not necessary for all members, works with only one member
Relationship threat
Stressors can increase trust
Acquaintance potential (Conditions for contact to reduce prejudice)
Successful contact should be sufficiently frequent, a good duration, and appropriate closeness to permit the development of meaningful relationships, leads to the discovery of similarities and disconfirms negative stereotypes
Noncooperative
Tacit, uncertainty, behaviors and actions, involuntary
Pre-negotiation stage, define member goals (multiparty negotiations)
Task roles, relationship roles, self-oriented roles
multiparty negotiations
Team negotiations and ________________ can have some overlap, team discussions will happen before negotiations begin
Information processing (team negotiating)
Team negotiations occur because no single person has the necessary knowledge, more efficient for each team member to be responsible for a particular piece of knowledge, when storage space is minimized so is the chance of successfully retrieving the desired information groups are less likely to consider and discuss information that is shared only by a subset of its members, members are not privy to the same facts and information, risk losing information if you lose group members
Team efficacy effect
Teams and solo players believe that teams have an advantage, even in situations in which teams reap greater shares than their solo counterparts, solos are still better off negotiating with a team than another solo player
Team halo effect
Teams tend not to be blamed for their failures as much as individuals, holding constant the nature of failure, teams are given a lot of credit for success but not blamed for failure, people can imagine better how an individual might have done something better than how a team might have done something better
Conflicts of interest (accountability)
Teams who report to a profit-oriented supervisor claim a greater share of the resources
Make decisions at the same time
Temporal contiguity fosters a causal illusion, the idea that our behavior can influence the behavior of others
Different place, different time
Temporal synchrony bias, exit bias, flaming, bias, sinister attribution bias
Team negotiations
Tend to go well in terms of performance, especially collaboratively, teams outperform individuals in collaborative negotiations, better at applying integrative value, teams have better judgement accuracy, not better at competitive bargaining
Avoid the equal shares bias (successful multiparty negotiations)
Tendency for groups to divide things equally among the parties involved, no fair method of allocation is universally acceptable
Flaming bias
Tendency for negotiators to adopt an adversarial negotiation style when communicating via email, rude, impulsive behavior is more common, people are 8x more likely to flame over email, performance appraisals are more negative, people feel anonymous, so they can express more negative emotion
Recognize sunk costs (avoid escalation of commitment)
water under the bridge, money previously spent cannot be recovered
Facilitates integrative negotiation
Trust- Calculus-based and interest-based
Self-blame and regret
Trustors anticipate blaming themselves if trust is violated
Relationship roles
Try to manage and develop relationships among negotiators in a multiparty negotiation, encouraging, positive, smoothing over conflicts
Interpersonal escalation dilemmas
Two or more people, competitive relationship
Resource conservation dilemma and public goods dilemma
Types of social dilemmas
Risky interpersonal behavior increases (e-negotiation)
Typically more threats are made in email negotiations, more likely to use aggressive and demanding tactics, more likely to make ultimatums, greater use of a negative emotional style where you express frustration, irritation, or anger, politeness ritual is less common in e-negotiation
Unbundling issues
Unbundle issues to create more issue to negotiate over, a way to create alternative solutions
Know who will be at the table (successful multiparty negotiations)
Understand the interests of the constituencies they represent, when negotiators share a social network they already have a basis of trust, they are more likely to follow through on commitments, power differences are not as magnified
dilemmas
Understanding how people behave in _________ makes it possible to influence people's behavior, people typically behave in the same way over time
Strive for equal participation (successful multiparty negotiations)
Uneven participation hurts information exchange in groups
Hidden table
Unwilling participants, not at the table but involved in negotiation
Don't victimize yourself
Unwillingness to move on an issue may reflect restraints you don't know about, stay in touch, be patient
Identify and define the problem
Use neutral language, simple, clean problem statement, depersonalize, don't blame anybody
Explicit negotiation
Very clear that you are trying to resolve your conflict through the process of negotiations to distribute the bargaining surplus
Status and power (information technology impact)
Weak get strong effect, higher status people talk more in face-to-face negotiations, status cues are harder to read when negotiations aren't face-to-face, if you have a weak bargaining position, e-negotiation may be beneficial, high status people can't dominate the conversation over email, overall participation is less but contributions of members is more, task takes longer
Coalition partner
Weaker people can increase their power by doing this
Tips for low power players (coalition challenge)
Weakness can be power if you can recognize and disrupt unstable coalitions, power imbalance creates more coalitions, fewer integrative agreements, greater likelihood of impasse, more competitive behavior
Critics of collaborative negotiations
What it promises is not something it can deliver, it may not actually be unique results compared to other types of negotiations
Relational accommodation
When both parties to a negotiation hold highly relational goals or views of themselves, dynamic that results in suboptimal outcomes, especially true when the organizational context focuses on egalitarian values, as opposed to hierarchal relationships
Stay at the table (successful multiparty negotiations)
When groups leave the table, coalitions are more likely to form
Communication (cooperation in social dilemmas)
When people can communicate prior to making decisions, cooperation increases, task-related communication promotes greater cooperation
Can side deals be made?
When side deals allow more issues to be added to the mix, this increases the possibility of creative conflict resolution, can create momentum for a larger settlement, can bypass litigation
Complete vs incomplete information
When the responder does not know the size of the pie and receives an offer, they are more likely to reject it, ignorance is a strength in ultimatum situations
Pre-negotiation stage participants (multiparty negotiations)
Who should be the participants? Who needs to be included for an agreement to be reached? Don't include people that may try to interfere with agreement
Compromise, even split, satisfaction, building a relationship
Win-win is not...
Technical expertise (team negotiating)
in the domain of interest
Communication (cooperation in social dilemmas)
increases group identity or solidarity, allows group members to make public commitments to cooperate, increases likelihood of reaching a mutually profitable deal
Compensation
increasingly comes in the form of stock, options and bonuses linked to personal and group performance
Strategic voting
indeterminate group choice is compounded by the temptation for members to strategically misrepresent their true preferences so that a preferred option is more likely to be favored by the group
Communication on a negotiating team
information pooling is facilitated if members are acquaintances or share a relationship
Intergroup negotiation
involves everyday life as well as complex political and international relations, nations negotiate with other nations
Keep decisions tentative
keep things fluid until the end of process, be willing to have your mind changed
Devise offers that are all of equal value to yourself
leaving yourself many ways to get what you want before making a concession
Telecommunications businesses
many social dilemmas
Generation Y
"First digitals" or "echo boom", Persian Gulf War and internet, dot-com boom and bust, self-made millionaires, influenced by the hard work of Boomers, preferred networking over hard work, value speed, use internet and apps to gather information, adaptable to change
Myth about interdependent decision making
"It's a game of chance, hope for the best"- Sometimes about negotiations in general, wing it
Myth about interdependent decision making
"It's a game of strength, show 'em who's boss": Results in competitive spiral, ups the ante in terms of non-cooperative behavior, often ends poorly
Myth about interdependent decision making
"It's a game of wits, I can outsmart them"
Framing
"taking" vs "giving", responders receive the most when it is framed as "taking", allocations are the lowest when it is framed as "giving"
Multiple offers of equivalent value simultaneously (MESOs)
1) Devise multiple-issue offers 2) Devise offers that are all of equal value to yourself 3) Make all the offers at the same time
Integrative negotiating process
1) Identify and define the problem 2) Understand the problem, identify interests and needs 3) Generate alternative solutions 4) Evaluate and select alternatives 5) Prolong and renegotiate
Work with constituents (aligning team's interests)
1) Members represent different constituencies, people don't want to let their department down, dig in on issues that are important to constituents, presenting constituents with all facts may change things, concede more ground because they see the bigger picture, some leaders form teams with those good at forming relationships across constituencies, invite important opinion leaders or decision makers to planning sessions, bargain with constituent departments, engage in reality testing (nuclear scenario), show them the worst-case outcome, corporate coordinator who can influence constituencies may join team
Assign roles to capitalize on team members' strengths and interests (implementing a shared strategy)
1) variation of good cop- bad cop, helps members feel comfortable, experts sometimes offer too much information or chime in at inopportune moments, need to be prepped on how much to say, when to speak up, teams had issues when experts were unavailable, team leader should not try to do everything, can lead to conflict, teams have higher quality outcomes, can learn more about the other party's priorities, having a lead negotiator and lead strategist is beneficial
Aligning conflicting interests of your own team and implementing a disciplined strategy at the bargaining table
2 major obstacles to a team's success
5
2-3 teammates is good, you shouldn't exceed...
Multiparty negotiation
3 or more individuals, each representing his or her own interests, attempt to resolve perceived differences of interest, complicates the situation, social situations more complex, information processing demands increase, coalitions form, groups make more accurate judgements and more readily aggregate information than do individuals
backward induction
4 chances over time to decide to cooperate or compete, best way to decide a solution is through
Priorities
A judgement about the relative importance of issues to a negotiator, increases a negotiator's surplus indirectly, more value is created via sharing priorities so there is a better chance of getting a larger slice of the pie, vitally important for maximizing the pie
Negotiate issues simultaneously, not serially
Asking for one thing initially may lead them to believe that giving it to you will get you to accept the offer, signal the relative importance
Escalation dilemmas
A person is confronted with questionable or negative outcomes, a reexamination of current course of action, examine perceived utility of current course or withdrawal, commitment to current course
Voting and majority rule
A strategy to simplify the negotiation, if not used widely it can worsen pie expansion and pie slicing, majority rule and unanimity rule
Coalitions (multiparty negotiations)
A sub-group of two or more individuals who combine their resources to affect the outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation involving at least three parties, weak group members can marshal a greater share of resources, involve cooperation to attract members and competitive to divide resources, engage in private caucusing, people receive support from coalitions if they give in to what they want, multiple audience problem
Interpersonal skills (team negotiating)
Ability to establish rapport, communicate effectively and redirect a power- or rights-based argument to one focusing on interests
Decision-making vigilance (accountability)
Accountability increases deliberate information process and decreases automatic processing, accountable people fall victim to fixed-pie assumption
Risk management
Adopt a policy of ____________ to avoid escalation of commitment
In-group bias (Challenge of intergroup negotiations)
After successful negotiations with out-group members, relations improve, downward social comparison disappears
Benefits of collaborative negotiation
Agreements should be better, promotes a problem-solving atmosphere, foster positive relationships
Agreement stage, develop an action plan (multiparty negotiations)
Agreements without an action plan aren't helpful, should lay out a list of the key steps to implementing the agreement, identify the objectives that you are trying to achieve with each step, give timelines of when it should be started and completed
How to address social dilemmas
Align incentives, monitor behavior, psychological contracts, communication, superordinate goals, social sanctions
Structural strategies to encourage cooperation in social dilemmas
Align incentives, monitor behavior, regulation, privatization, tradable permits
Critics of collaborative negotiations
All negotiations are integrative because they all create value, you recognize interdependence and you work together to make both of you better off
Face-to-face
Allows for multiple cues, body language, facial expression, tone of voice, clear preference of most negotiators, crucial to relationships, important when you meet for the first time, when norms are established, more cooperation, develops rapport and trust, better for complex negotiations, more integrative outcomes and balanced distribution of surplus, easier
Plan scheduled breaks (strategy to improve team negotiations)
Allows team members to meet privately, many teams spend too much time in private caucuses and not enough time at the table
Nice (tit-for-tat)
Always begins with cooperating, never the first to defect, avoids the mutual escalation trap
Tit-for-tat
Always start out by cooperating, send a signal to the other side that you are willing to cooperate, then with all subsequent decisions you do what the other party did in the prior decision, compete going forward, goal is to signal the other party a willingness to cooperate while also conveying a willingness to compete if your cooperation isn't reciprocated, should over time create a cooperative equilibrium, signaling of this should be clear
Shared goal (Conditions for contact to reduce prejudice)
An instrumental reason to develop better relationships, common enemy can work
Restoring broken trust
As people get older, they are less likely to seek retribution, people who believe moral character can change over time (incremental beliefs) are more likely to trust following an apology, people who believe that moral character cannot change (entity beliefs) are not
one day teleconference (improving e-negotiation)
At least match names to faces, one short phone call will do, builds rapport and overcomes communication challenges, attitudes change, less competitive and more cooperative, less likely to impasse and achieve higher joint gains
Volunteer dilemma
At least one person in a group must sacrifice his or her own interests to better the group, more common when volunteers can share the cost, feelings of obligation, expectation of extrinsic rewards, and organizational identification increase this
Allow for some points of agreement, even if only on process (successful multiparty negotiations)
Avoids negotiations feeling stalemated, don't reach agreement for the sake of progress, agree on process
Sign of win-win potential
Does the negotiation contain more than one issue? The more issues that are involved in a situation, the higher your possibility of finding integrative value
Integrative potential
Does the negotiation contain more than one issue? Can other issues be brought in? Can side deals be made? Do parties have different preferences across negotiation issues?
Finite number of interactions prisoner's dilemma
Backward induction, defection is the dominant strategy
Use subgroups to evaluate complex options
Based on expertise in your bargaining team
Lose-lose effect
Be aware of the fixed-pie perception and not assume that their interests are opposed to the other party, avoid making premature concessions to the other party (conceding on issues before being asked), develop an accurate understanding of the other party's interests
Indefinite/ infinite interactions prisoner's dilemma
Begin by cooperating, tit for tat, won a prisoner's dilemma tournament, code only 4 lines long, most you can do is get as much as your opponent, induces cooperation from your opponents
Challenges for constituent relationships
Behind-the-table barriers, accountability, conflicts of interest
Constituent relationship challenges
Behind-the-table barriers, accountability, conflicts of interest
Fixed pie perception
Belief that the other party's interests are directly and completely opposed to one's own interests, most untrained negotiators view negotiation only as pie slicing, assume interests are always incompatible, impasse is likely, and issues are settled one by one rather than as packages
tit-for-tat
Best approach in infinite/ indefinite interactions, you want to get off on the right foot in a new setting
Negotiation stage, review and manage the decision rules (multiparty negotiations)
Best if you know before the negotiations start how decisions will be made, otherwise people start to choose decision rules that are most beneficial to them based on how discussions will play out
Reciprocal trade-offs
Between two members of a larger group, more typical form of exchanging presents
Prisoners dilemma
Bi-lateral, explicit negotiation, tacit
Tacit negotiations, exploited, antagonizing
Biggest dilemma is whether to cooperate or compete, people who always cooperate are likely to be ______________, people who always compete risk _______________ other people
Binding vs nonbonding contracts
Binding contracts have a paradoxical effect on trust, trust drops when binding contracts are removed, people attribute cooperation to constraints imposed by the contract, not personal trust
Trust game
Binding vs nonbonding contracts, social networks and reputations, relationship threat, self-blame and regret
Brainstorm options (successful multiparty negotiations)
Brainwriting or solitary brainstorming is a strategy where group members independently write down ideas and later when the group meets they share the ideas, capitalizes on the fact that individuals are better at generating ideas, but groups are better at evaluating ideas
Agreement stage, select the best solution (multiparty negotiations)
Break up solutions and create new alternatives that are acceptable to the group
Simplistic view of collaborative bargaining
Building relationships can occur through accommodation, creating relationships doesn't prove that you negotiated collaboratively
Sign of win-win potential
Does the negotiation contain more than one issue? You need to determine if you value something differently than your opponent
Coalition partners
Can be unstable- once a coalition forms, it's easy to pick off coalition members, sustaining it can be as simple as a verbal agreement
Negotiation expertise (team negotiating)
Can better devise an integrative solution to a complex conflict situation, can streamline preparation, ensure that the team avoids the four major traps of negotiation, avoids destructive conflict strategies and instigates a creative problem-solving process
Escalation dilemmas
Can lead to self-perpetuating reinforcement trap, negotiation rather than outcome becomes important, saving face is a factor
Sign of win-win potential
Can side deals be made? Bridging is common, another party is not directly involved in the negotiation, but you can reach a deal with them to create additional value, multi-player trades in sports
Can you expand the pie?
Can you access any new resources that may enable us to get what we want? A lot of negotiations are regarding resource-related conflict, adding resources can help both parties achieve goals without losing anything
Generate alternative solutions
Can you expand the pie? Logrolling, pay-offs, unbundling issues
Challenges facing teams
Choosing teammates, be careful of who you are working with, somebody who has negotiation expertise, technical expertise (understand the issues more deeply and can better formulate demands), and interpersonal skills
Plot out the conflicts (aligning team's interests)
Clarify team goals, uncover personality conflicts, build unity of purpose, create matric of issues, plot own priorities and those of the team, recognize internal tradeoffs and coalesce around the highest-margin proposal
Facilitates integrative negotiation
Clear and accurate communication, you think people understand what you have told them, not always the case, you need to make sure the information being shared is understood by the parties, understand the dynamics of integrative negotiation
Win-win strategies
Commitment to reaching a win-win deal, compromise, focus on a long-term relationship, adopting a cooperative orientation, taking extra time to negotiate
Team cohesion
Common-identity groups and common-bond groups
Constituent relationship strategies
Communicate with your constituencies, do not expect homogeneity within constituencies, educate constituents on your role and limitations, help constituents do horizon thinking
Strategies for improving constituent relationships
Communicate with your constituents, do not expect homogeneity of constituent views, educate your constituents on your role and your limitations, help you constituents do horizon thinking
Multiple audience problem
Communicating in front of somebody you do not want to understand you with a secret code, better if they don't understand communication is happening
Understand the other person
Companies don't negotiate, people do, know difference between negotiating with future boss vs HR representative
Ultimatum dilemma factors
Complete vs incomplete information, framing, deadlines, feelings and emotions, social identity
Common-identity groups
Composed of members who are attracted to the group, members come and go
Diving resources (multiparty negotiations)
Concerns about dividing the pie are important, each party advocates in a self-serving fashion, multiple definitions of fairness exist
Tacit negotiations
Conducted by actions and pledges in the absence of a binding contract, negotiators are interdependent with respect to outcomes, but they make independent decisions, outcomes are determined by the actions taken by them and by the other party
Goal and strategy alignment (strategy for improving team negotiations)
Conflict between subgroups has a detrimental effect, higher level of team identification leads to lower levels of conflict
One-shot prisoner's dilemma
Dominance detection(a dominant strategy results in a better outcome for player 1 no matter what player 2 does), defection is the dominant strategy
Negotiation timing (same time, different place)
Conflicts are expressed, recognized and addressed more quickly if negotiators work in close proximity, nip problems in the bud, issues that are physically separated go unresolved and lead to an escalating cycle of destructive negotiation behavior, formality of scheduled phone meeting compels parties to prepare better, can buffer against negative non-verbal cues
Be sensitive to egocentric bias (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Consider that your opponent will see you less favorably than you view yourself
Signal via actions (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Consistent cooperation makes your next move more obvious
Do not expect homogeneity of constituent views (strategy to improve constituent relationships)
Constituencies are often composed of individuals and subgroups with different needs and interests
Educate your constituents on your role and your limitations (strategy to improve constituent relationships)
Constituents suffer from egocentric bias and want you to educate the other side with your position, clearly define your role to your constituents early on in the process, set realistic expectations, share possible outcomes, not just the favorable ones
Cooperative
Contract is explicit, mutual understanding, proposals and counterproposals, words, voluntary
Economics (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Cooperation is higher in community than wall street, people are sensitive to situational cues, people behave more competitively in social dilemmas involving economic decisions
Reasons people are more likely to confront others when a member of a group
Costs of defection are spread out, many people can be cooperative or competitive, easier to maintain anonymity, less control
Prepare together (strategy to improve team negotiations)
Creates a transactive memory system in which group members understand the information others have and how and when to access it
Negotiation stage, use and structure an agenda (multiparty negotiations)
Creates order, artificially partitions related issues (creates many single-issue negotiations)
Focus on intent, not the question
Don't assume the worst, answer what you think is the intent or ask for clarification
Avoid sequential bargaining (successful multiparty negotiations)
Don't discuss one issue at a time, cannot create win-win trade-offs among issues
Integrative negotiating process
DO NOT FALL FOR THE MYTHICAL FIXED PIE, finding out that you want the same thing when you were not expecting it is a plus, does not always seem like a typical negotiation, don't view the other side as your opponent, they are your partner, follow the steps of a typical negotiation at first
Accountability
Decision-making vigilance, impression management and face-saving, prototypical vs peripheral representativeness
Search for common identity (strategy for optimizing intergroup negotiation)
Decreases conflict and competition to the extent groups share a common identity, people may identify with their groups at different levels, shared understanding can lead to more integrative outcomes
Identify and define the problem
Define it as a common goal, identify obstacles at the beginning
Place-time model
Described four modes of interaction that vary in richness: 1) Same place + same time 2) Different place + different time 3) Same place + different time 4) Different place + same time
Differences that matter
Differences in valuation, differences in expectations, differences in risk attitudes, differences in time preferences, differences in capabilities
Assessment of differences
Differences in valuation, probability assessment, risk preferences, time constraints, and capabilities, each part should focus on its most important issues, negotiators most important issues are their interests
Structure contingency contracts by capitalizing on differences
Differences, rather than commonalities, that can be advantageous in negotiations, enlightened negotiators realize that differences in beliefs, expectations and tastes can create greater value
Differences in valuation
Different strengths of preference, trading off to capitalize on different strengths of preference is logrolling
e-negotiation
Different time, different place (can be same time, different place), considered an impoverished form of communication, all you have is what they read, you can't see their face, read body language, tone of voice, tone of email message can be deceiving
Schmoozing
Discuss things that have nothing to do with the negotiation, get to know them better, personalize the relationship
Multiparty negotiation challenges
Dividing resources, coalition formation, formulating trade-offs, voting and majority rule, consensus agreements
Multiparty negotiation challenges
Dividing resources, coalitions, formulating trade-offs, voting and majority rule
Commitment to reaching a win-win deal
Does not guarantee a win-win deal
Package deals
Don't negotiate each issue independently, that doesn't allow trade-offs between issues, capitalize on different strengths of preference, compare and contrast issues, avoid impasse, single-issue agreements lead to compromise
Ultimatums
Downplay or ignore them if you receive them
Circular logrolling
Each group member offers another member a concession on one issue while receiving a concession from a different group member on a different issue
Different place, different time
Email, some people believe they are being held captive by the internet, women do better, upset established hierarchies
Be alert to intangibles
Emotions, concepts of fairness
Differences in capabilities
Endowments and skills are different, can combine different skills in a mutually beneficial way, development of successful research collaborations is fostered by differences in skills and preferences
Negotiation stage (multiparty negotiations)
Ensure consideration of all available information
downward social comparison
Evaluate the competitor to be less attractive on a number of organizationally relevant dimensions (intelligence, competence, trustworthiness)
Status quo bias
Even when a new coalition structure that offers greater gain is possible, members are influenced by a norm of coalitional integrity and they stick with their current coalition
Negotiation stage, ensure a diversity of information and perspectives (multiparty negotiations)
Everybody should have an opportunity to present their information and perspectives about the issues being negotiated
Logrolling
Explore differences between the two parties, differences in the valuation of issues, differences in forecast of the future, differences in capabilities, differences in risk-aversion, risks are opportunities
Generation X
Fall of the Berlin Wall and mass media, self-actualization by pursuing educational and career goals, third parties provided their needs, highly transactional negotiators, short-term
Simplistic view of collaborative bargaining
Feeling good does not make it a collaborative situation
In-group bias (challenges of intergroup negotiations)
Five beliefs push groups toward conflict Superiority, injustice, vulnerability, distrust, helplessness, too much support from in-group members can create conflict, racial in-group affect
Collaborative bargaining process
Flow of information, commonalities, focus on solutions
Identify and define the problem
Focus on practicality and comprehensiveness, needs to make sense in light of what you're both able to do, should capture all key issues but shouldn't throw garbage issues in them for the sake of having them and making things complicated
focus on solutions (collaborative bargaining)
Focus on solutions that are good for both sides
Focus on your own payoffs, not your payoffs relative to others (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Focus on your profits, don't compare
tit-for-tat
Forgiving, reciprocates cooperation, not very clever, doesn't take long for somebody to figure out what the person is doing, easy to understand, eliminates uncertainty about the future
Resettlement settlements
Formal (encompass specific, binding obligations), initial (intended to be replaced by a formal agreement), partial (parties do not address or resolve all outstanding issues)
3 major challenges for coalitions
Formation, maintenance, distribution of resources
Face-to-face negotiation
Generally the best way to negotiate, - better rapport, more cooperative, greater trust, parties more in sync, a very rich form of communication, you can the body language of a person, see the facial expressions, hear the tone of your voice, you are there in real time, body language and facial expressions are extremely important for communication
Negotiation stage, strive for a first agreement (multiparty negotiations)
Get everybody on board with a tentative first agreement then work to improve on that tentative agreement, ask people to evaluate elements of the tentative agreement and make recommendations to improve it (post-settlement settlements)
Critics of collaborative negotiations
Get people to understand that relationships matter, if you can promote a more collaborative problem-solving approach, at least start the process that way, you have a better chance of maintaining or improving your relationships, advocacy for more ethical negotiations, hoping people treat each other better
Narrow the range of solution options
Get rid of the ideas that clearly nobody wants, once you have a narrower set of solutions you measure them by 2 dimensions: quality and acceptability
Strategies for improving team negotiations
Goal and strategy alignment, prepare together, plan scheduled breaks, assess accountability
Team negotiation strategies
Goal and strategy alignment, prepare together, plan scheduled breaks, assess accountability
Regulation (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Government intervention to correct market imperfections, goal is to improve social welfare, rationing, intent of regulation is to protect public (social) interests
Separation of feedback (same time, different place)
Greater distance tends to block the corrective feedback loops provided in face-to-face negotiations, no coincidental chances to detect and correct problems on a casual basis
Exit bias (e-negotiation)
Greater perception that negotiations are unstable and therefore should be terminated, "this isn't going anywhere", "never going to get a settlement", email negotiations weaken the continuation norm, hard to walk away from a face-to-face negotiation but very easy to not response to not respond to an email
Persuade with data (aligning team's interests)
Group members not having data is often the root of conflicts of interest, giving people more data isn't easy, people distrust data from other departments, suspicion of self-serving and bias, can create a task force, outside consultant, can help members discover other strengths and weaknesses of their group members
Extremism (challenge of intergroup negotiation)
Groups in conflict do not have an accurate understanding of the other party's views, exaggerate their position, people believe opponents are motivated by tearing down their values rather than building up their own, naive realism principle
Make all the offers at the same time
Hardest for most people to do, cherry picking is not an option for the other party, offers are all package deals
Restoring broken trust
Have the transgressor pay financial compensation to the victim, voluntary compensation communicates more repentance, larger compensations elicit more trust
In-group bias (Challenge of intergroup negotiations)
High status people, low status with few alternatives, and members who can improve their groups are most likely to identify with their own group, in-group bias is more prevalent in groups with lower perceived status
Postsettlement settlement strategy
Highly effective because they can revert to original agreement, parties reveal preferences without fear of exploitation if no better agreement is found, the parties can be more confident that the agreement is pareto-optimal
Public goods dilemma
How much will each person give when they are involved in a tacit group bargain? Free rider problem exists here
Resource conservation dilemma
How much will each person take when they are involved in a tacit group bargain?
5
Ideal number on a team, as teams grow in size, coordination problems increase
Negotiation stage, appoint an appropriate chair (multiparty negotiations)
Ideally somebody with less at stake, somebody who is respected by everybody involved, high level of integrity, can be somebody from the outside if there is no obvious person involved
Acceptance/ rejection decision
Identification of a minimally acceptable agreement does not necessarily mean that settlement is efficient, negotiators should continue to explore possibilities, depending on time costs and subjective assessments of the likelihood, negotiators whole set challenging goals are more likely to continue to search for integrative agreements
Pre-negotiation stage, understand the costs and consequences of no agreement (multiparty negotiations)
If an agreement can't be reached, what is your BATNA? People with strong BATNAs have more power, a settlement is less important to them, negotiator overconfidence can happen
Use unbiased-appearing rationale to divide the pie (maximize coalition effectiveness)
If one or more members regard the proposed allocation as unfair, the coalition is less stable, people are more likely to stay if they feel they are being treated fairly
Do parties have different preferences across negotiation issues?
If parties have different strengths of preference across the negotiation issues, then a win-win negotiation is possible
Challenges facing teams
If people are only responsible for certain things, you eliminate redundancies in the storage of knowledge and make the team more efficient, people only know their area of expertise, problematic if somebody leaves the team, doesn't speak up when their expertise is needed
Superordinate goals
If people believe that all of their individual decisions are going to lead to one greater goal, it will lead to greater cooperation
Pre-negotiation stage define member goals (multiparty negotiations)
If the group is intact, people have typically accepted their roles, more likely to get settlements if people accept these, facilitate finding these
Understand the problem
If there is not a lot of sharing and trust, you should ask questions, the most important question you can ask is why?
Understand constraints
If they are hiring many at once than salary may be non-negotiable, but start dates, vacation time, and signing bonuses may be
Critics of collaborative negotiations
If you take advantage of differences about things that impact the future or risk aversion, create value for both parties only if the bet you're making in that contingent contract is won
Pie-expanding errors
Illusory conflict and fixed-pie perception
False conflict
Illusory conflict, occurs when people believe that their interests are incompatible with the other party's interests when in fact, they are not
Loss of informal communication (same time, different place)
Inability to chat informally in the hall or inside offices, informal conversations important for solving difficult problems and interpersonal issues
Multiparty negotiations
Increase in social complexity, changes from 1 on 1 to a group negotiation, one thing you need to figure out is the motivational orientation of the group members, cooperative
Multiparty negotiations
Increased complexities, more issues on the table, many more perspectives on issues, perspective taking is important
Humor (improving e-negotiation)
Increased trust and satisfaction, higher joint and individual gains
Stable (tit-for-tat)
Induces opponents to cooperate
1st quarter
Influence strategies to battle for power and influence
Team negotiating
Information exchange leads to greater judgement accuracy about parties' interests, promotes integrative agreement
Mediate conflicts of interest (aligning team's interests)
Led by other team member or outside facilitator, acts as a buffer, ask why and why not questions
Manage the information and systematize proposal making (successful multiparty negotiations)
Information overload is common in multiparty negotiations, difficult to keep track of issues, alternatives and preferences of each party, develop a matrix of each party (along the rows) and each issue (along the columns), groups tend to not make proposals and explore options and alternatives in a systematic fashion
Multiparty negotiations
Informational and computational complexity, social complexity, procedural complexity, and strategic complexity
Enhancing e-negotiations
Initial face-to-face experience, one day teleconferences, schmoozing, humor
Tradable permits (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Instead of competing for scarce resources, companies buy them, treated as conventional property
Formulate tradeoffs (multiparty negotiation)
Integrative trade-offs occur through circular logrolling and reciprocal tradeoffs
In-group bias (Challenge of intergroup negotiations)
Interactions can have beneficial impacts if certain conditions are met, such as mutual dependence for goal attainment
Stay at the table
Interests and constraints change, something that isn't negotiable today, may be negotiable tomorrow
Help your constituents do horizon thinking (strategy to improve constituent relationships)
Involves making projections about future outcomes, help develop a BATNA
Resource assessment
Issue mix: Both parties' issues combined, parties specific issue mix, as well as define and clarify alternatives, ultimate set of options for each issue is a superset of both parties' alternatives Unbundling- important in negotiations that have a single issue, mutually beneficial trade-offs require more than one issue
Team effect
It is not necessary that team members privately caucus to be effective, team outperform solos in integrative negotiations, teams behave more competitively
Sublime perfect equilibrium
It is rational within each period of the game, if the game had additional periods your offer would still be rational
Do not be the first to defect (cooperation in social dilemmas)
It is too difficult to recover from
Deservedness
Justify why you deserve a raise or other benefit, thin line between likable and arrogant
Evaluate and select alternatives
Keep decisions tentative, minimize formality during solution-generating, take time to cool off, negotiate to the end
illusory conflict and fixed-pie perception
Key reasons for lose-lose outcomes are...
Multiparty negotiation strategies
Know who will be at the table, manage information and systematize proposal making, brainstorm options, develop and assign process roles, stay at the table, strive for equal participation, allow for some points of agreement, avoid the "equal shares" bias, avoid the agreement bias, avoid sequential bargaining
Strategies for successful multiparty negotiations
Know who will be at the table, manage the information and systematize proposal making, brainstorm options, develop and assign process roles, stay at the table, strive for equal participation, allow for some points of agreement, even if only in process, avoid the equal shares bias, avoid the agreement bias, avoid sequential bargaining
pie-expanding errors
Lack of time and effort do not explain ___________________, biggest detriment to integrative outcomes is the faulty assumptions we make about the counterparty and negotiation situation
Negotiation dance (e-negotiation)
Largely interrupted through e-negotiation, fewer negotiation exchanges when people negotiate through email, fewer of the back and forth exchanges of offers, less turn table, less opportunity for corrective action
Face-to-face negotiation
Leads to more integrative outcomes, more settlements that create value, more balanced distribution of surplus in the case of competitive bargaining, lower incidence of impasse works better for more complicated issues
Pre-negotiation stage, learn the issues and construct an agenda (multiparty negotiations)
Learn the bargaining mix, establish issues to be discussed so people know what is coming, define the order that things are discussed, an opportunity to present process issues, specify what decision roles will be
Critics of collaborative negotiations
Logrolling- Most common form of collaborating, you are laying one issue over the other, still recognizes the zero-sum value of issues but emphasizes tradeoffs, doesn't actually create new value, just recognizes the different value that people place on different issues
Agreement stage, evaluate the outcomes and the process (multiparty negotiations)
Look at whether outcomes you hoped to achieve are realized, how is your action plan going? Does it need to be revised?
Same time, different place
Loss of informal communication, lost opportunity, separation of feedback, negotiation timing
Coalition strategies
Make contacts early, seek verbal commitments, use unbiased-appearing rationale to divide the pie
Redefine the situation (avoid escalation of commitment)
Make it a new problem
Recovering from defection
Make promises, make situational attributions, one step at a time, get even and catch up, make decisions at the same time
Agreement stage, implement the action plan (multiparty negotiations)
Make sure everybody is following identified guidelines from the action plan, discuss what will happen if certain expectations aren't met
strategies to maximize coalition effectiveness
Make your contacts early, seek verbal commitments, use unbiased-appearing rationale to divide the pie
Keep your strategy simple (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Makes it easier for your competitor to predict behavior
Does the negotiation contain more than one issue?
Many begin as single-issue, single-issue negotiations are not integrative because whatever one party gains, the other loses, normally you can identify additional issues, differences in preferences, beliefs, and capacities that may be profitably traded off to create joint gain
Separate conflict of interest from symbolic conflict (strategy for optimizing intergroup negotiation)
Many intergroup conflicts are not rooted in resource scarcity, but in differences of values
Lost opportunity (same time, different place)
Many negotiations are about opportunity, not resources, not planned
Simplistic view of collaborative bargaining
Many people think they have negotiated collaboratively if both sides have made compromises, compromise is not a necessary condition of collaborative bargaining
Raiffa's hybrid model
Mean of the Shapley and core values
Contact
Mere contact strategy is based on the principle that greater contact among members of diverse groups increases cooperation among members, contact can exacerbate negative relations,
Generation Z
Millennials, fall of the World Trade Center, crash of world financial markets and power of the flash mob, prefer technology, personal time and work time blur, value multitasking, work anywhere at any time, public posts are common, large social networks
Align incentives (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Monetary incentives, privatization of resources, monitoring system, can be time consuming and expensive, defectors don't want to cooperate because the costs are high, reward and recognition works, increase risk associated with defection
Boomers
Moon landing, personal achievements and mastery of professions and lives, win-win, handshakes important, everything is negotiable, face-to-face and phone
MESO negotiators
More aggressive in terms of anchoring the negotiation favorably, gain better information about the other party, more persistent, signal priorities more effectively, overcome concession aversion on the part of the other side
Multiparty negotiations
More complex than bilateral negotiations, complexity comes from more people
Loss frame
More likely to accept a contingent contract
Perspective taking
More likely to avoid impasses, specifically by allowing negotiators to engage in successful logrolling, enhances problem-solving abilities and ability to claim resources and react effectively when anchoring attempts of the counterparty
Gain frame
More likely to logroll or trade off issues in a win-win fashion
Norm of commitment
People feel psychologically committed to follow through with their word, people do things at odds with their preferences for this reason
Face-to-face negotiation
More opportunities for corrective action, you can tell by the facial expression if something is not understood, leads to negotiations of opportunity, happen when you pass somebody in the hall and schedule a meeting that occurs to you in that moment
Resettlement settlements
More than a handshake or gentleman's agreement, in advance of full-scale negotiations, resolves a subset of issues on which the parties disagree, may only create a concrete framework for negotiations
Multiparty negotiations
More total information, more things are being said about more issues, data from many sources, hard to keep track of it all
Cooperation in social dilemmas
Most groups in organizations can be defined as social dilemma situations, members are expected to decide how much to give or take
Perspective
Most important part, less about negotiating right than having the right job
Risk taking (information technology impact)
Most managers are risk seeking
mixed-motive
Most negotiations are _____________ in nature, party's interests are imperfectly correlated with one another, the gains of one party do not represent equal sacrifices by the other
Clarity
Most people don't want to waste capital on a lost cause, explain why you would forego your many other options and accept an offer
Seek verbal commitments (maximize coalition effectiveness)
Most people feel obligated to follow through with promises they made to other
not true
Most people think win-win means fair division of resources, not true
Social dilemma
Multiparty explicit negotiation (3+ parties)
Gain better information about the other party
Multiple offer is based on the strategy of inductive reasoning (a negotiator can deduce what the other party's true interests are and where the joint gains are), more detective-like thinking, draw conclusions more easily
Equilibrium outcome
Mutual defection, no player can unilaterally improve her outcome by making a different choice
Level 1 Pyramid model of Integrative agreements
Mutual settlement, positive bargaining zone, achieved through competitive bargaining, claiming value
Evaluate and select alternatives
Narrow the range of solution options, justify personal preferences, be alert to intangibles, use subgroups to evaluate complex options, keep decisions tentative, minimize formality during solution-generating, take time to cool off, negotiate to the end
Critics of collaborative negotiations
Negotiating with a pessimist when you are an optimist can result in one party not getting what they wanted because they bet on the long-term and it didn't work out
E-negotition factors
Negotiation dance, exit bias, risk interpersonal behavior, sinister attribution bias, less trust, more deception, weak get strong, email communication extends the reach of people's social networks
Selecting your teammates (negotiating team challenge)
Negotiation expertise, technical expertise, interpersonal expertise
Differences in expectations
Negotiation often involves uncertainties, negotiators have different forecasts for the future
Unbundle the issues
Negotiations fail because negotiators haggle over a single issue, single issue negotiations are distributive, adding, unbundling and creating new issues can transform a distributive negotiation to an integrative negotiation, integrative agreements require two issues
Reveal information about your interests and priorities
Negotiations would not go anywhere if negotiators did not communicate their interests to the other party, negotiate as you would with your twin, assume they are as smart and motivated as you are, don't ask questions you are unwilling to answer, disclosing negotiator is not at a disadvantage if they don't reveal their BATNA or reservation price, negotiators are more likely to share information when the other party does so
Tacit negotiation
Negotiators are interdependent with respect to outcomes, but they're making independent decisions that aren't verbally or written communicated to the other side, not communicated, only acted or behaved, your fate is determined by the actions you take and the actions of others, you are deciding if you should behave competitively or to behave cooperatively
Contingency contracts
Negotiators make bets based upon different world occurrences
3rd quarter
Negotiators make offers and counteroffers and support and reject them on the basis of rational argument
Multiparty negotiations
Negotiators never think of themselves as a single entity pursuing one goal, they all have different goals
coalition
Negotiators should join a ___________ early to avoid not being in one, monitor negative emotions when joining
Ask questions about interests and priorities
Negotiators who have non-diagnostic information are more likely to terminate the search for integrative agreements prematurely, timing of information is important, active pursuit of information is more valuable than passive receipt of information
Impression management and face-saving (accountability)
Negotiators who want to save face will be more aggressive and uncompromising so they cannot be viewed as week, maintain a tough bargaining stance, fewer concessions, hold out for more favorable agreements
Ask questions about interests and priorities
Negotiators with interest in opposing viewpoints are more willing to engage in future interaction with the counterparty and are more receptive, preparing questions leads to more openness and positive attributions
4th quarter
Negotiators work toward an agreement by building on each other's offers
Set limits (avoid escalation of commitment)
Never accept an offer worse than your BATNA
Be prepared for tough questions
Never lie, don't expose leverage, prepare for questions and issues that put on you the defensive, answer honestly without looking like an unattractive candidate or giving up too much bargaining power
Adopting a cooperative orientation
Nice when negotiators have a benevolent attitude and cooperative orientation, intentions to cooperate can keep people from focusing on the right information at the right time, people cooperate by revealing their BATNA (pie slicing, not pie expanding), cooperation doesn't mean compromise, companies offer free or highly discounted products/services which leads to problems
Prisoner's dilemma
No communication before making an independent, irrevocable decision, no concern for morality or ethics, if each person pursue the course of action that is most rational from their point of view, the result is mutual disaster, the pursuit of individual self-interest leads to collective disaster
Dividing the pie (coalition challenge)
No normative method of fair allocation exists in coalitions, experienced negotiations exploit difference in relative bargaining power, novice negotiators settle for equal division
Satisfaction
Not a guarantee that money and resources have not been wasted, many "happy" negotiators do not expand the pie
Fixed pie perception
Not enough to warn negotiators of its existence, not enough to have experience, not enough to receive feedback about interests
Tit-for-tat
Not envious, nice, tough, forgiving, simple, stable
One-day teleconference
Not ideal but better than nothing
Promotes a problem-solving atmosphere
Not only issues that involve disagreements, all issues
tit-for-tat
Not trying to win, just trying to establish some relationship norms, strategy is nice, always begins by cooperating, never be the first to defect, tough, people who use it can be provoked, it will reciprocate non-cooperative behavior
Pre-negotiation stage potential coalitions (multiparty negotiations)
Not uncommon for coalitions to exist before negotiations start, you should think about whether that is likely to happen and the implications
Avoid the agreement bias (successful multiparty negations)
Occurs when negotiators focus on reaching common group with the other party and are reluctant to accept differences of interest, even when acceptance might create viable options for gain, don't assume everyone wants to say yes, sometime people are paid to break deals or stall agreement
Team negotiations
Offer opportunities for the division of labor, eliminate some of the natural complexities of team negotiations, some people prepare, some people are lead negotiators, somebody records discussions
Ultimatum dilemma
One person makes a final offer to another person, if the responder accepts the offer, then the proposer receives the demand that he or she made and the responder agrees to what was offered to him or her, if the offer is refused then no settlement is reached
Personal escalation dilemmas
One person, continue a losing course of action or cut losses, admit failure and accept a sure loss
Shapley model
One player alone, then another, then another, determines payoff based on pivotal power (ability to change a losing coalition into a winning coalition), when all players bring equal resources, all players get equal payouts
Trust (information technology impact)
Online negotiators trust less, different expectations in electronic bargaining, less desire for future relationships, less confidence in performance, less overall satisfaction
Purpose
Only negotiate what is important, don't negotiate just to negotiate
Coalition challenges
Optimal coalition size, trust and temptation, dividing the pie
Challenges for coalitions
Optimal coalition size, trust and temptation, dividing the pie, get out of the vicious circle
Integrative negotiations
Outcome of a win-win agreement, all creative opportunities are leveraged, and no resources are left on the table
Collaborative bargaining
Outcomes (you want to claim and create value, integrative problem solving)
Level 3 Pyramid model of integrative agreements
Pareto optimal, cannot be improved upon, you can't know if you achieved this, you need perfect information one very outcome
Equal status (Conditions for contact to reduce prejudice)
Participants have equal status, don't enforce stereotypes
Primary table
Parties initially involved in the negotiation, parties originally at the table
Offers and trade-offs
Parties should consider trade-offs among valuations, forecasts, risks, time preferences, and capabilities, eliminate those dominated by other alternatives
Align incentives
Peer evaluations accomplish this by making every group member want a good grade and evaluation
Getting even and catching up
People are concerned with fairness, let the other party get even and catch up, repentance of the perpetrator and forgiveness on the part of the injured, small amends are as effective as large amends in generating future cooperation
Personalize others (cooperation in social dilemmas)
People are motivated to cooperate if they believe they are negotiating with a person and that they are a cooperator, impression management
Make situational attributions
People are not out to get you, view ourselves as defensive, see the other party's behavior as a response to your actions
Framing effect
People are risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses, can lead to preference reversals, groups tend to make riskier decisions, groups are risk seeking for gains and losses over email
Trust and temptation (coalition challenge)
People are tempted to stay in a coalition even when it is not logical to do so, status quo bias
Justify personal preferences
People aren't always comfortable doing this, you should ask the other party and be willing to do it yourself
Social dilemma
People behave more competitively in groups, much harder to establish a consistent pattern of cooperation because people tend to behave more competitively in groups than they do when confronting one other person
Simple (tit-for-tat)
People can easily figure it out, uncertainty is eliminated
Simplistic view of collaborative bargaining
People claim that it's a win-win situation if there's an even split, collaborative bargaining means you create value, not that you just claim it
Public goods dilemmas
People contribute or give resources to a common pool or community, defectors or free riders exist, suckers carry the team
Cooperation in social dilemmas
People cooperate more than rational analysis would predict
Structure contingency contracts by capitalizing on differences
People don't only have different interests and preferences, they also view the world differently, different interpretations of facts may threaten already tenuous relationships, attempts to persuade may be met with skepticism, hostility and an escalating spirit of conflict, many people are uncomfortable identifying differences, instead of leveraging them, they downplay or ignore them
Social dilemma
People engage in behaviors that maximize self-interest but lead to collective disaster, bidding wars, greenhouse gases, negative campaigning
Naive realism principle
People expect others to hold views of the world similar to their own, when conflict happens, people are inclined to sway the other party with evidence, when this fails people regard dissenters as extremists who are out of touch with reality
Make your contacts early (maximize coalition effectiveness)
People feel obligated to people with whom they have made explicit or implicit agreements
Social and institutional support (conditions for contact to reduce prejudice)
People in positions of authority should be unambiguous in their endorsement of the goals of the integration policies, fosters the development of a social climate where tolerant norms emerge
Differences in time preferences
People may value events differently depending on when they occur, profits can be distributed over time or quickly
Social networks (information technology impact)
People on the periphery who communicate better electronically become more integrated in the organization, increases the resources of low-network people, data can be stored in a database
Make promises
People tend to honor verbal commitments, confirmation is a tacit message that signals willingness to cooperate
Sinister attribution bias (e-negotiation)
People that can't interpret clearly the meaning of a message so they attribute ill motives to the person that wrote it, some people don't write very friendly sending emails
Simplistic view of collaborative bargaining
People think if it took a long time then it was collaborative
Lose-lose effect
People want the same outcome, agreement seems unlikely, less optimal agreements are reached, failure to capitalize on compatible interests, negotiators fail to realize compatible issues 50% of the time, fall prey to lose-lose effect about 20% of the time
Monitor behavior (cooperation in social dilemmas)
People who are monitored often conform to group norms, including when they self-monitor, elect a leader to monitor, people are more likely to install leaders in public goods (giving) than public resources (taking) because it contradicts private property
Self-oriented roles
People who come in and behave in a very self-interested way, to the detriment of the multiparty negotiation, dominate conversation, there for the purpose of recognition-seeking, may be a naysayer
Overcome concession aversion
People who view themselves as having more choices are more likely to comply
Likability
People will only fight for you if they like you, more than being polite, about managing inevitable tensions regarding asking for what you deserve and pointing out deficiencies
Building a relationship
People with a genuine interest in the other party may not think creatively, couples often make the least integrative agreements or fail to reach agreements
93%
Percentage of communication that is nonverbal
enhancing e-negotiations
Personalize them, initial face-to-face experience, one-day teleconference, schmoozing, humor
Pie-expanding strategies
Perspective taking and asking questions about interests and priorities, reveal information about your interests and priorities, unbundle the issues, package deals, MESOs, be aggressive in anchoring, gain better information about the other party, her persistent and persuasive regarding the valuation of an offer, overcome concession aversion, structure contingency contracts by capitalizing on differences,
Aligning your team's interests
Plot out the conflicts, work with constituents, mediate conflicts of interest, persuade with data
In-group bias (challenges of intergroup negotiations)
Positive evaluations of one's own group relative to the out-group, anticipation of negotiation with an out-group member can cause this, downward social comparison
Team negotiating
Presence of at least one team at the table increases the size of the pie, negotiators exchange more information about interests and priorities when at least one team is at the table than when solos negotiate
Social sanctions
Prevent people from circumventing the real people involved in a negotiation
2nd quarter
Priority information peaks, negotiators discuss issues and share information about priorities
Multiparty negotiations
Private caucusing, coalition partner, procedural complexity, strategic preparations, logrolling (reciprocal and circular)
Focus on benefits of cooperation (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Probability of a certain choice is the function of the attraction of that choice, make cooperation the most attractive
Dictator game
Proposer makes a suggest split of money for themselves and a responder, the responder must accept the split, many dictators give nonzero allocations, motivated by desire to behave in alignment with social norms
Ultimatum dilemma
Proposers and responders act nonrationally, people are often concerned with their outcomes relative to other people
Voting and majority rule (multiparty negotiations)
Proself motives creates more distribute and less integrative behavior, hard to agree on voting method, can have an evenly split group, voting hides disagreements which threatens long term effectiveness
Psychological strategies to encourage cooperation in social dilemmas
Psychological contracts, economics, communication, personalize others, social sanctions, focus on group benefits
Social sanctions (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Punishments that are administered in a community or a group when defection occurs, come in the form of a reprimand
Privatization (cooperation in social dilemmas)
Put public resources under the control of specific individuals or groups, rationale is that public resources are better protected under the control of private groups or individuals
Impression management
Raises the question of whether people's behavior is different when it is anonymous than when it is public
Illusion of transparency
Reason that negotiators provide information that may not be understood by the counterparty, negotiators believe they are revealing more than they actually are, people feel more like an "open book" than they actually are, can lead to settlement delays and divergent expectations
One step at a time
Rebuild trust incrementally, reward the other party for cooperative behavior, graduated reduction in tension relations strategy(GRIT) encourages parties in conflict to offer small concessions, this strategy reduces the risk for the party making the concession
Forgiving (tit-for-tat)
Reciprocates cooperation, difficult to recover from defection, response to aggression is never greater than aggression received
Tough (tit-for-tat)
Reciprocates defection, conveys the message it won't be taken advantage of
Communicate with your constituents (strategy to improve constituent relationships)
Representatives need to understand their interests, not just their positions, when constituents feel heard they are less likely to take extreme action, sometimes representatives act too early to demonstrate competence
Consensus agreements
Require the consent of all parties to the negotiation before an agreement is binding, do not imply unanimity, parties agree publicly to a settlement, even if their private views are still in conflict, time consuming, lead to compromise with lowest common denominator, don't exploit potential pareto-improving trade-offs
Psychological contracts
Requires that you meet with the other members of the group to reach an informal agreement about how work is going to be divided, who is contributing what, create psychological contracts that create standards for future behavior even if they aren't explicitly stated
Strategic framework for integrative agreements
Resource assessment, assessment of differences, offers and trade-offs, acceptance/ rejection decision, prolonging a negotiation and renegotiation
Types of dilemmas in a group setting
Resource conservation dilemma and public goods dilemmas
Deadlines
Responders tend to set deadlines that are too short
Task roles
Roles that help move the negotiation along, facilitate the negotiation process, task is to negotiate
Consider the whole deal
Satisfaction comes from factors besides salary, some factors can be negotiated more easily, responsibilities, location, travel, flexibility in work hours, opportunities for growth and promotion, perks, support for continued education
Challenges that face negotiating teams
Selecting your teammates, number of teammates, communication on the team, team cohesion, information processing
Calculus-based trust
The belief that the party will follow through with its promises
Assess accountability (strategy to improve team negotiations)
The extent to which team members are accountable to others outside the team
Trust game
The first move is made by the dictator's partner (trustor), who must decide how much of their endowment to trust the dictator with, in hope of receiving some of it back, the gift the trustor makes to the tree will be increased by some factor, trustees view sending less than everything as a lack of trust, trustors focus on the
Exit bias
The perception that negotiation is unstable and should be terminated, lack of visual information and large spatial distance reduces anticipation of retaliation and prompts negotiators to exit, continuation norm
Information technology effect of social behavior
Trust, deception, status and power, social networks, risk taking, rapport and social norms, paranoia, intergenerational negotiation
Sinister attribution bias
The tendency for e-communicators to ascribe diabolical intentions to the other party, tendency for people to attribute malevolent motives to people they don't know, e-negotiators are more likely to suspect the other party of lying or deceiving them
Underlying interests
The underlying needs and reasons a negotiator has for a particular issue, revealing this information increases the likelihood of a favorable slice of the pie because negotiators who can justify their demands are better, important for reaching win-win deals, can discover overlapping interests
Ask questions about interests and priorities
These questions help negotiators determine where the value is, these questions do not tempt the other party to lie or misrepresent himself
Focusing on a long-term relationship
Think this will ensure a win-win deal, long-term relationships are good but does not guarantee a win-win outcome
Can other issues be brought in?
This allows both sides to make concessions that they weren't previously able to make
Feelings and emotions
Those who are dependent on feelings make less generous offers
Develop and assign process roles (successful multiparty negotiations)
Timekeeper, process manager, recorder of information, can rotate roles
Circular logrolling
Trade-offs that require each group member to offer another member a concession on one issue while receiving a concession from yet another group member on a different issue, typified by traditions of drawing names from hat for holiday gifts, more risky than reciprocal trade-offs
Interest-based trust
Trust that you have in somebody because they share the same values as you
Condorcet paradox
Winners of majority rule elections will change as a function of the order in which alternatives are proposed, alternatives that are proposed later are more likely to survive sequential voting
Avoid the out-group homogeneity bias (strategy for optimizing intergroup negotiation)
Within-group errors are more prevalent than between-group errors, out-group members are typically classified vaguely
Monitor behavior
Work that gets measured is work that gets done
Matures
World War 1 and 2, personal sacrifice, compromise, and persistence
Generate alternative solutions
You are not evaluating alternative ideas, you are creating new ideas
Email communication extends the reach of peoples' social networks (e-negotiation)
You don't have to be in a huge position of power or the same location to participate
Communication
You don't have to communicate with people a lot, touch base occasionally, seeing that real people are being affected can be helpful
Challenges facing teams
You don't need to know everything that everybody knows, but you need to who is supposed to know it
Critics of collaborative negotiations
You should be more forthcoming with information and trusting of the other party, highly qualified, doesn't argue for complete honesty or forthcoming, you should be honest about interests and priorities, you shouldn't give up your BATNA
6
___ key types of information in a negotiation, skilled negotiators can identify them, and which information is safe to reveal in order to reach win-win outcomes
Win-win
__________ techniques are not intuitive, people who consider themselves to be ___________ negotiators often leave money on the table without realizing it
few
_____________ conflicts are purely win or lose
Generic advertising
a common firm of interfirm cooperation, companies facing a declining trend contribute significantly more money
GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocal Initiative in Tension Reduction)
a model of conflict reduction for warring groups, originally developed as a program for international disarmament negotiations, can be used to deescalate problems on a smaller, domestic scale, increase communication and reciprocity between groups while reducing mistrust, a series of steps that call for specific communication between groups
Epistemic motivation
a personal need for structure, when negotiators have this they are more likely to reach higher joint outcomes because they ask more questions that benefit the group, likely to discover more issues
Pay-offs
adding something of value that the other party wants that you are not going to dispute, some people consider them bribes, trying to entice you to take a job assignment that you're reluctant about, cost-cutting- identify obstacles that prevent the other party from agreeing to the outcomes that you desire and getting rid of them
Team negotiations
against a single person has better results
Devise multiple-issue offers
as opposed to single-issue, avoids sequential bargaining which can cause lose-lose outcomes)
Continuation norm
belief that negotiations are worth continuing
Initial face-to-face experience (improving e-negotiation)
brainstorming is better virtually but negotiating is better face-to-face, developing rapport by meeting once diminishes uncertainty and builds trust, humanizes people, creates expectations
Multiple offers of equivalent value simultaneously (MESOs)
can be effective even with uncooperative negotiators, at least two proposals of equal value to yourself, more profitable outcomes, viewed more favorably by the other party, more flexible, more satisfied, increase the discovery of integrative solutions, more sticky anchor
Reciprocal logrolling
capitalizing on different strengths of preference
Establish a plan for intrateam communication (implementing a shared strategy)
caucusing is an option, avoid because you don't want to signal having to adjust your strategy, explicit to implicit, low tech to high tech communication strategies, better to caucus about critical issues, text messages are useful, gatekeeper to decide when to include the lead negotiator
Team negotiation challenges
choosing teammates, how many on the team, communication within the team, team cohesion, information processing
Resource conservation dilemma
collective traps, people take resources from a common pool, some people consume too much, rate of consumption cannot exceed rate of replenishment
Voting and majority rule
condorcet paradox, impossibility theorem, strategic voting, consensus agreements, majority rule, unanimity rule
Get out of the vicious circle (coalition challenge)
core solution, shapley model, raiffa's hybrid model
Prolonging a negotiation and renegotiation
decision to prolong vs decision to renegotiate, prolong when best agreement on the table fails to meet both parties' reservation points, unbundle or add issues and alternatives
Perspective taking
different from empathy, perspective taking is the cognitive ability to consider the world from another's viewpoint, empathy is the ability to emotionally connect with another person, perspective takers are better at achieving integrative outcomes, more likely to discover hidden potential, achieve maximum joint gains and secure peace
Taking extra time to negotiate
does not ensure an integrative agreement, extra time does not improve the quality of negotiated agreements
Aligning your team's interests
eams are only used when issues are political or complex and require input from various technical experts, functional groups, or geographic regions, same sides can have different priorities and different ideal outcomes, business development wants to close deal, finance is concerned with cost, legal is focused on patents and intellectual property
Initial face-to-face experience
everybody understands each other and what the task is
Integrative potential
exists in almost every negotiation situation, people often fail to see if because they do not believe that win-win is possible
Majority rule
fails to recognize the strengths of individual preferences, does not promote integrative trade-offs among issues, less efficient outcomes than unanimous rule
Constituent
on the "same side" as a principle but exerts an independent influence on the outcome through the principal, can be used to exert pressure on the other side
peripheral members
feel less sure about their position, more attentive and responsive to relevant information, more motivated to process information, recall more, more perceptive about emotional expressions of counterparties, more likely to attain win-win agreements
Prototypical members
feel secure about their position in the group
Implementing a shared strategy
gaffes happen due to different negotiation styles, lack of preparation, frustration, breakdowns in discipline sabotage a team's strategy, hard to recover from, members get emotional, irrational, reveal information, expose weakness, offer too much, defensive posturing, perceived arrogance, clashes about appropriate styles
Paranoia (information technology impact)
gender ambiguity happens via technology, uncertainty increases paranoia, paranoid people are more likely to assume the worst, new technology creates new situations creates new ways of behaving, less social awareness but social posturing and sycophancy also decline, politeness and concern for others also decline, plain text and perceived ephemerality make it easy for a person to forget or ignore their audience and ignore social boundaries
Avoid decision myopia (avoid escalation of commitment)
get several perspectives on the situation, don't bias their views
Rapport and social norms (information technology impact)
greater rapport comes from greater face-to-face contact, leads to more integrative solutions, more difficult to establish with impoverished forms of communication
Psychological contracts (cooperation in social dilemmas)
handshake deals, not binding in a court of law, create psychological pressure to commit, norm of commitment
Provides anonymity (social dilemma)
hide among the group, people feel less accountable
Deception (information technology impact)
higher, more willingness to lie over email than with pen and paper, regardless of whether their lie will be discovered (moral disengagement theory), people who are more skilled at decision making are more skilled at not being discovered
Behind-the-table barriers (challenges for constituent relationships)
how negotiators must sell deals to their own internal constituencies as well as the other party, level two barriers, formal or informal domestic ratification of traditional diplomatic agreements, example is when A helps B overcome B's internal opponents, A and B form a tactical coalition, need to agree on components of the negotiation process
Even split
how the bargaining zone is divided, maybe people don't even truly want an even split but you haven't discussed their true goals
Impossibility theorem
i. The derivation of group preference from individual preference is indeterminate, no method can combine group members' preferences in a way that guarantees group preference is maximized when groups contain three or more members are facing three or more options, even though manager's preferences are transitive, group-level preference is intransitive
Tragedy of commons
if only you take advantage, nobody is harmed, but if everybody does, then everybody suffers, people are tempted to maximize their own gain, rational pursuit of self-interest in social dilemmas leads to collective disaster
Common-bond groups
members who are attracted to particular members of the group
Face-to-face
more likely to occur, negotiations of opportunity, can include clothing and artifacts in nonverbal communication, nonverbal and paraverbal behaviors are key to building rapport, females do better with visual contact, males do better without visual contact
Tacit negotiations
more people making interrelated decisions, more negotiations within the workplace, increase decentralization, increase specialization, more dependent on others, competitions
Flow of information in collaborative bargaining
much greater, you need to share information in ways that you don't do when you're negotiating competitively, an effort to understand your opponent, you can't help your opponent achieve their goals if you don't understand what their goals are (partners, not opponents)
Social dilemma
multiparty prisoner's dilemma, people behave more competitively in a self-interested fashion when more than two players compete
intra-team negotiations
negotiations between team members, about objectives, set goals as a team, negotiations about issues to address and strategy to use, each member of the team has their own perspective
Differences in risk attitudes
negotiators agree on the probability of future events but feel differently about taking risks, gain frame vs loss frame
Postsettlement settlement strategy
negotiators agree to explore other options with the goal of finding another option that both prefer more than the current one, or that one party prefers more, and the other party is indifferent, current settlement becomes both parties' new BATNA, both parties must agree to new agreement
Accountability (challenges for constituent relationships)
negotiators at the table are the primary relationship, relationship with constituents in the second table, negotiators who are accountable to constituents make higher demands and are less willing to compromise, women are more generous when representing a group, men justify their failures and success, women only justify failures, representatives typically cannot enact agreements, "take it to my boss" ploy
Perspective taking
negotiators attempt to see the world through the counterparty's eyes, more successful in terms of social enterprises, such as coordinating with others
Not envious (tit-for-tat)
never aims to beat its opponent, can never earn more than any strategy it plays against, maximizes its own gain in the long run
Schmoozing (improving e-negotiations)
non-task-related contact between people, which has a psychological effect of having established a relationship with someone, increases liking and rapport, more profitable business deals, more realistic goals, greater optimism, build a shared social identity, low cost and high efficiency
Strategic framework for integrative agreements
obvious after the fact, but not before, prescriptive model (what negotiators should do, not what they actually do), model contains resource assessment, assessment of differences, construction of offers and trade-offs, acceptance/rejection of a decision, and renegotiation
Executive mobility
on the rise and people have increasingly diverse backgrounds
Superrationality
our need to believe that others are rational (like ourselves) and that they believe that everyone is rational
mixed-motive negotiations
parties have two incentives related to the other party, cooperation (so they can reach an agreement and avoid using their BATNA) and competition (so they can claim the largest slice of the pie), this analysis doesn't acknowledge the incentive to create value (the key to win-win negotiation)
Several people (social dilemma)
people compete more in groups
Intergenerational negotiation (information technology impact)
people in different generations ascribe to different behavior norms, can lead to unknowingly violating norms of another generation, can be eliminated by being explicit, younger generations prefer information technology over face-to-face interaction
Explicit negotiations
people seek to reach mutual agreement via binding contract
Ask questions about interests and priorities
questions about underlying interests and questions about priorities, more likely to reach integrative agreements if you ask these questions, possessing information that is irrelevant can impair a negotiator's effectiveness
Costs of defection are spread out (social dilemma)
rather than concentrated on one person, rationalizes defection
Compromise
reaching a middle ground, win-win does not pertain to how the pie is divided, but how it is enlarged
Diversify responsibility and authority (avoid escalation of commitment)
remove or replace original negotiators, external review
Multiparty negotiations
require strategic preparations for multiple parties, typically they break down to separate bilateral negotiations
Agreement stage, develop an action plan (multiparty negotiations)
resources needed to implement the agreement should be specified, should be known who has responsibility for completing each step, should be no confusion about what is supposed to happen in a multiparty negotiated settlement
Simulate the negotiation (implementing a shared strategy)
role-play ahead of time, experience is valuable, determine likely emotional responses, requires extensive knowledge of the other side and takes time
Core solution
set of alternatives that are undominated, an alternative is in the core if no coalition has both the power and desire to overthrow it
Negotiation stage, manage problem team members (multiparty negotiations)
some people are important to get a final settlement but are problematic to deal with, unprepared team members are detrimental
Take time to cool off
start to focus less on creating solutions and more on claiming value, competitive tendencies will appear now
Weak get strong (e-negotiation)
status indicators are less relevant, genders are less relevant
Humor
tasteful, self-deprecating typically works
inter-team negotiations
team vs team(s), team vs solo negotiator (s)
Same time, different place
telephone, videoconferencing, cell phones are more common than face-to-face communication, feeling far away creates a more big-picture construal in the mind of the negotiator, people act different in the absence of important cues, people are more distracted by one-sided chats than an in-person chat between two people
Temporal synchrony bias
tendency for negotiators to behave as if they are communicating synchronously when they are not, negotiation dance is disrupted, less turn-taking, less correctional behavior, interpreting impoverished information is difficult, fewer clarifying questions, more assumptions
tunnel vision
tendency for people in group negotiations to underestimate the number of feasible options available
Escalation of commitment
tendency of negotiators to persist with a losing course of action, even in the face of clear evidence that their behaviors are not working the situation is quickly deteriorating
Social networks and reputations
trust is lower when people are building networks, once they are formed they engage in higher levels of trust and trustworthiness, when trustors can evaluate the allocators' previous decisions, they are more likely to invest, group representatives are more trusting but less reciprocating, men trust based on commonalities, women trust based on relationships
Backward induction
the mechanism by which a person decides what to do in a repeated game situation by looking backward from the last stage of the game
Richness
the potential information-carrying capacity of the communication meeting, face-to-face is the most rich, formal written messages are least rich
cohesion
the strength of positive relations within a team, the sum of pressures acting to keep individuals in a group, results of all forces acting on members to remain in a group
Multiparty negotiations
three or more negotiators each representing their own interest attempt to resolve perceived differences of interest
Unanimity rule
time consuming, encourages members to consider create alternative to expand pie and satisfy the interests of all members
People have less control (social dilemma)
tit for tat doesn't exist, one group member can defect
Logrolling and value-added trade-offs
trade off issues in a win-win fashion, each negotiator makes gains on issues they regard as important in exchange for concessions on lesser-valued issues
Uneven participation
when one or two people do all of the talking, hurts information exchange in groups
Commonalities in collaborative bargaining
where you have shared interests, the fact that you recognize that you have shared interests makes this different from competitive negotiations (you assume in competitive that anything that is good for you is bad for them), allows for the possibility of tradeoffs
Compromise
win-win negotiations are not equal-concession (splitting the difference) negotiations, compromise is slicing the pie but not expanding it
Team negotiations
working toward a common goal
Riskier than prisoner's dilemma (social dilemma)
worst-case scenario is when negotiator chooses to cooperate and everyone else defects
Flow of information in competitive bargaining
you don't want to give up information, it gives your opponent the upper hand, you want to understand your opponent's weaknesses, so you can exploit them
