OCS History Lesson 1-2

PRINCETON, AND DECEPTION

"All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him." --Sun Tzu --Again, Washington had not read Sun Tzu, but Princeton illustrated why one British commander called him an 'old fox.' Note on p. 71 how Washington used deception to make Cornwallis think he remained at Trenton while he actually turned Cornwallis' flank. --But burning campfires form only part of the deception story. There is also Security and Economy of Force to make sure the fake works. The four-hundred Soldiers remaining at Trenton were just enough to ensure the fires burned. Washington's main, maneuver force was under strict orders to move quietly. Wagon wheels were wrapped in rags to muffle the rumble of movement.

1780 Battle of Waxhaws

"The loss of officers and men was great on the part of the Americans, owing to a report amongst the [British & Tory] cavalry, that they had lost their commanding officer, which stimulated the soldiers to a vindictive asperity not easily restrained." = 'TARLETON'S QUARTER', & whither 'hearts and minds'? The above was British commander Banastre Tarleton's rather lame excuse for killing Patriot Soldiers who were surrendering. While recent scholarship indicates the massacre wasn't as bad as claimed, and that confusion existed about the Patriots' status (some Patriots surrendered, some changed their minds, some fought on), a commander who says he lost control of his troops admits to a grave failing. Given Tarleton's behavior in other fights and the nature of the above excuse, one still wonders if he really cared what happened or if he even ordered the killings. Whatever the circumstance, this action gave another big reason for deserting the British for the Patriots, and Patriot leaders made the most of it.

'Economy of Force

' doesn't mean being economical all the time. Instead this Principle means you use adequate force for secondary efforts to enable such Principles as Mass, Maneuver, Surprise and Security for the main effort. For example, a smaller diversionary frontal attack—economy force—helps set up a strong envelopment—the main effort (for envelopment, see diagram on later slide and definition in Vol. 1 textbook p. 13

Strategic Level

All of a nation's armed/other forces' efforts in all campaigns ('the war') to meet war aim

1815 Battle of New Orleans (forces, OAKOC)

The Lake Champlain & Baltimore setbacks spurred the British to agree to a peace treaty in late December 1814. (The terms restored the pre-war situation and boundaries with no penalties to either side.) News of the peace was slow to reach America, so British forces in the Gulf of Mexico were still trying to achieve the third objective, seizure of the mouth of the Mississippi. This would be a real prize, for so much of the central North American watershed—that is, riverine trade routes—emptied into this one outlet in the Gulf of Mexico. Strategically, New Orleans was key terrain. The British tried to achieve Surprise by landing on Lake Borgne's west shore near New Orleans and making a quick march over land to the town. However, swampy terrain, their own caution, and American spoiling attacks undid this plan. Andrew Jackson, the American commander of New Orleans defenses, had time to amass a motley crew—regulars, militia, volunteers, locals, free blacks, and pirates--for the city's defense. His stern discipline ensured that this force did its job. He placed it on an abandoned canal southeast of the city on the east bank of the Mississippi. Note how he anchored the defense with a river on one side and a swamp on the other. In so doing, he gave his own force cover while using natural obstacles to channel his enemy into an avenue of approach lacking both cover and concealment—while giving his own army maximum observation/fields of fire opportunities. --Against this strong defense the British planned to do two things in concert: (a) launch a turning movement by crossing over to the river's west bank, while (b) conducting a frontal assault on Jackson's east-bank line under cover of fog. --The turning movement bogged down due to 'friction'-related problems. Swampy terrain made a nightmare out of the seemingly easy task of building a small canal for the boats to move quickly to the river so as to cross to its west bank. British troops had to waste time hauling the boats through bogs to the east bank, and could only haul half the number needed to move the flanking force. The British also did not anticipate the river's current, which delayed the move further as the boats struggled against it. Thus the turning movement was not at all ready on time. --Friction prevailed on the east bank, too. The fog lifted on the east-bank assault, giving Jackson's Soldiers a clear field of fire. The main British force on the east bank decided to press their attack anyway. Apparently they did not respect the Americans enough; and thus they sacrificed Maneuver in favor of a headlong assault against a strong position. Friction hurt the British again as their troops neglected to take equipment designed for scaling the old canal's embankment. The result was a disastrous, costly repulse for the British main force. The British west-bank move achieved some later success; but by that time its actions were irrelevant, and those forces retreated. (Jackson also had backup positions on the east bank which probably could've handled any British west-bank advance.) --Andrew Jackson's second big victory in this war—leadership counts. --Fought after peace treaty (Treaty of Ghent, 24 Dec. 1814); the battle might thus seem inconsequential. HOWEVER, the battle repelled a British attempt to seize the mouth of the Mississippi River. It thus boosted American pride and helped demonstrate US sovereignty. A Great Britain in de facto possession of New Orleans would've been an embarrassing and awkward thing indeed. --For Britain: friction, failure of Surprise, and not enough Maneuver = failure of attack, and retreat. --British 2,600 casualties vs. US 70 casualties

Civil/guerilla war led by such men as Thomas Sumter, Andrew Pickens, and Francis "Swamp Fox" Marion

The actions of Patriot guerilla leaders like Marion, Sumter, and Pickens created a 'running sore' situation for Cornwallis, who lacked the troops to protect fully his supply trains, outposts, and Tory allies. The British Army's over-reaction to Patriot attacks drove neutrals toward the Patriot side. British commanders Ban Tarleton and John Wemyss were often indiscriminately and gratuitously brutal in their counter-raids, wrecking the lives of Patriots, neutrals and Tories alike. --For that matter, militia loyalties and discipline on both sides were fluid, and Cornwallis was frustrated with fickle and unreliable Tories. He did not share Clinton's optimism about southern hearts and minds. Over time, Cornwallis lost control of the countryside to the Patriot guerillas.

Hybrid War

The rest of the Southern Theater slides show that the British fought not only guerilla forces but also conventional forces. The U.S. assembled another army under Nathanael Greene to fight Cornwallis. The mixed conventional-unconventional threat is what modern military observers call 'Hybrid War.' --Obviously, it's not new if we're addressing it re the Revolutionary War. We'll see a few more examples in the course. Indeed, hybrid war has come to mean all actions across the spectrum of war: everything from tank battles to terrorism and cyber war. However, the good practices that yield success in each style of war still apply. --However, commanders facing enemies using 'hybrid' approaches must be discerning and judicious in how they apply their own measures. METT-TC awareness is critical.

Linear Tactics

The tactics were based upon the predominant small-arm of the time: the smoothbore flintlock musket with socket bayonet (a musket is a small arm that must be loaded by the muzzle). They completed western armies' long transition from pikes, swords, or archery to firearms as the primary infantry weapon. These muskets were just reliable enough to justify the change, and the socket bayonet provided insurance if firing failed and/or the enemy got too close. --But they were not 'user friendly.' The multi-step reload process involved priming the firing pan and then loading via the muzzle. Thus it was complex, slow and unreliable. Soldier error and bad weather made matters worse (firing rate for trained troops = about 3 rounds/minute). --Armies preferred smoothbore muskets, not rifle muskets, because of the reload. A rifle musket required a snug-fitting bullet to fit the spiral-grooved barrel, which meant that ramming the projectile down the barrel to the breach was a trickier and lengthier task. Rifle-musket rate of fire was about a round per two minutes. The weapon had greater range and accuracy, and could be good for snipers and scouts; but its firing rate was unacceptable for the rough-and-tumble battlefield. --Smoothbore musket reload was still lengthy and tricky, but a loose-fitting ball in a smooth barrel meant the rate of fire increased to three rounds per minute—a six-fold improvement over the rifle musket's firing rate. The trade-off was the smoothbore musket had poor accuracy and range (again, about 100 yards). --Armies favored the smoothbore for regular troops. So how to maximize that weapon's promise and minimize its faults? --Tight (shoulder-to-shoulder) 2-3 rank line formations of soldiers maneuvered as entire regiments (battalion minimum). Each rank could volley fire in succession, thus increasing the rate of fire of the formation, if not that of the individual musketeer. The massed volley fire ensured that the formation would hit something, and with many rounds. --For regimental commanders and their bosses, usually brigade commanders, the aim was to steer these lines so that they delivered their musket-volley combat punch in full force upon the enemy --Tight, regiment-sized linear formations also served other important functions: command, control, cohesion, courage and communication in noisy stressful circumstances. With a finicky weapon that fired a round once every twenty seconds—IF reloaded properly—how could Soldiers feel brave and follow orders unless under close control and amongst a large group of their peers? With an enemy formation visible and close by, dispersal could breed confusion, cowardice, and maybe calamity as that enemy cut down a fleeing mass of individuals. Given the circumstances of that time—finicky muskets, no radios, social and training issues, etc.--smaller units and individual Soldiers were less able to achieve decisive, positive combat results. --Thus, linear tactics provided cohesion, strict command, and massed firepower. The regimental line formation was still cumbersome, and could be a big target for accurate gunners. Further, the formation was almost helpless if an opponent flanked and enfiladed it. However, commanders drilled their men rigorously to improve its ability to move, shift orientation, and reload relatively quickly. If handled correctly, it could maneuver reasonably well and deliver a real punch. --This formation would dominate infantry tactics through the American Civil War. Slightly looser linear tactics would prevail up into WW1. But that painful transition is for later lessons. Junior officers and NCOs marched into battle as "File Closers" behind the three ranks of muskets to echo commands, prevent desertions, and to steer the formation and keep it tight. Thanks to class-based officer-enlisted social distinctions and a desire to maintain formation integrity, discipline was harsh. King Frederick the Great of Prussia once said, "If a soldier during an action looks about as if to flee, or so much as sets foot outside the line, the non-commissioned officer standing behind him will run him through with his bayonet and kill him on the spot!"

'Unity of Command'

means one person in charge. The Army wants you to understand that, as the 'Too many chefs spoil the recipe' saying signifies, leadership by committee often creates disaster because it breeds confusion about intentions, orders, leadership, etc. Even if a group of leaders work together well—say, an international coalition--such a condition would be unity of effort, not of command. Moreover, the Army wants you to recall that such multiple-leader endeavors work more by exception than by rule. It's not for nothing that Carl von Clausewitz had coalition operations in mind when he described friction in war (see slide in this lesson). Too often, candidates believe that indecisiveness, or poor planning and decisions, denote violations of Unity of Command. Not so, if the one guy in charge did those things. However, if these or other problems arose because more than one person was in charge, then that's a violation of this Principle.

GUERILLA WARFARE

military or paramilitary unconventional combat operations--ambushes, subversion, raids, robberies, assassinations, sabotage, spying, and rescue--conducted against enemy control by irregular, indigenous forces or an army's special forcesà (often associated with insurgency because insurgent rebels often lack the force to fight government power directly)

Might the colonists also use wilderness-style (e.g., Indian, 'guerilla') tactics? How & how quickly?

---Adaptation is conditional and over time—it depends on who the colonists are fighting and where. Conditions may still occasionally favor European-style linear tactics. --What weapons might be better suited for North American wilderness-style combat? (For example, see 'American Rifle,' pp. 40-41; 104) ---Hatchets are practical. Rifles are suited for the sniping in wooded areas, but their slow re-load makes them less suitable for conventional combat.

The Battle(s) of Saratoga 3

--After Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights, Burgoyne understood that his increasingly weak and outnumbered army could not move south to New York City. As mentioned, an ineffectual rescue mission from New York City could not reach Burgoyne. Nor could Burgoyne retreat back north to Canada—swarming bands of Patriot militia irregulars had made that route impassable. --Increasingly surrounded by Patriot forces, Burgoyne surrendered ten days after the Bemis Heights battle

BLACK MINGO SWAMP Battle Narrative / Result 14 September 1780

--Aggravated locals support Marion's rapid, mounted move toward the Tories' Black Mingo base. Thus his transit is undetected. --Marion plans a night, multi-axis attack on the outpost. He has massed enough troops at this time and place to improve his chances for success. His left wing will attack mounted; the center and right-wing forces will attack dismounted. --For all of the planning and stealth, some of his troops make too much noise crossing a bridge to their attack position. --The Tories are thus alerted; but Marion presses the attack.--The dismounted frontal attack fails against intense Tory fire. The dismounted right-flank attack falters, then rallies. The mounted troops on the left flank attack with vigor. --The Tories are overwhelmed by the intensity of the multi-axis night assault. They panic and run, leaving Marion to pick up Tory supplies, weapons, and valuable horses. His force then retreats back to their sanctuary --Marion launches several such successful raids during this time. They gain him more supplies, they free Patriot prisoners—and above all, they secure more local support via his success.

Sun Tzu Trenton Princeton

--All warfare is based upon deception --If [the enemy] is superior in strength, evade him . . . . If he is taking his ease, give him no rest . . . . Attack him where he is unprepared; appear where you are not expected. --If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. Washington hadn't read SunTzu, but Trenton and Princeton are good examples of Washington giving the British no rest as they took their 'ease' during the winter. Further, in this case Washington knew his troops and his enemy. The Americans needed a win badly; the enemy was taking a rest.

1813 Ontario Front

--Amphibious raids: We were supposed to take Kingston at the northeast end of Lake Ontario to control the lake and thus cut British LOCs for all points further west. This was a nice, key objective, but concerns about its defenses led us to conduct less effective, glorified raids around the lake. There were two such raids in springtime. One attacked York (Toronto) on the northwest Lake Ontario shore, where carelessness and poor discipline led to needless destruction and the death of a top US general, Zebulon Pike, in a magazine explosion. The other struck west from the Niagara River. After initial success assisted by a small amphibious turning movement, the US force's poor discipline, leadership, and Security contributed to its rout by a British night attack at the Battle of Stoney Creek. This raid failed so badly the British retook the Niagara area and raided east into Buffalo. While we raided west, the British attacked Sackett's Harbor, NY (east shore Lake Ontario), but were repulsed by Jacob Brown's stout defense. Pp. 140-141, 144

Combined Arms

--An Army FM defines combined arms as the "synchronized and simultaneous application of all elements of combat power that together achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially." --As such, using various arms and forces in concert provides synergy and mutual support to disrupt, confuse, and overwhelm via mismatches and good timing ( brings to mind such terms as "complementary," "reinforcing," "maneuver & fires") --Combined arms go back to ancient times: good commanders could orchestrate archers, mounted forces, and sword/pike men well. In the 1600s, Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus led innovations in firearm combined arms. By the 1700s, European formations used combined arms fairly well (see next slide). --Lighter cannon allowed quicker, more flexible massing of fires at the point of contact. Heavy cavalry provided a mobile, shock-force punch if applied at the right time (Note: heavy cavalry = big horses and big men with lances and swords, specially trained to crash into wavering enemy battlefield formations; light cavalry = raiding and scouting forces) --Development of such cannon and cavalry was expensive, but the rising states could afford it. And these other forces came in handy on the more open-terrain battlefields in Europe. --Candidates often believe that the mere presence of different weapons means that combined-arms operations ('ops') are happening. Many people even believe that the term itself is a cure-all--as if merely saying it explains or fixes everything. --As the combined-arms definition indicates, much thought, effort, training, effective communications, cooperation/coordination, leadership and appropriate organization must happen before good, synchronized, synergistic combined arms will work. --Combined arms is as much a state of mind as it is technology—important though technology is to combined arms. The weapons tech cannot work well if it is not employed well. --We will see many examples of good and bad combined arms. The bad combined-arms cases are often due to technological shortfalls or mismatches, but more are due to poor use.

1781 Yorktown Campaign

--Arnold (yep, that's Benedict Arnold, now commanding troops on the British side) and Cornwallis aimed to raid into Virginia so as to demoralize the Virginians, split the U.S. seaboard, and create a base for ops north or south. Clinton opposed such aggressive maneuvering, but Cornwallis had his way. --Cornwallis sparred with American forces under Lafayette in Virginia, but achieved no decisive victory. Frustrated, Cornwallis accepted Clinton's orders to establish a base on the shores of Chesapeake Bay. Given Cornwallis' actions, Washington seized an opportunity. He combined American and French forces to trap Cornwallis' tired troops against the Virginia coast, August-September 1781 --To prevent the British Army in New York City (NYC) from interfering with his big move to Virginia, Washington made sure the cautious British commander, Henry Clinton, stayed confused. --The book's p. 101 says that Washington used Economy of Force by leaving a small force to observe Clinton; but with that force, Washington also wanted Clinton to think he was still outside NYC. --Washington did more deception. He let misleading 'orders' be captured and fed misinformation to known gossipers and likely British spies. Before marching his men south, he sent them in misleading directions in the NYC area. He had some units make a big show of constructing siege works near NYC. He kept his true intentions secret for as long as possible, and enforced Security to keep it that way. --Clinton helped Washington by dithering. He could not make up his mind regarding a decisive course of action.

The Battle(s) of Saratoga 1

--As autumn neared and British supplies dwindled, Burgoyne found himself in a tightening vice. A small relief expedition from New York City failed to reach him. --On the Patriot side, area commander Philip Schuyler was replaced by Horatio Gates for political reasons. The militia who were streaming to the Patriot colors didn't like Schuyler much, but they were happy to serve under Gates. --In September and October, Burgoyne twice tried to break through Gates' lines. In both battles, subordinate commanders—especially Dan Morgan—used terrain/concealment, maneuver and long-range rifle sniping to thwart them. See next slide.

CAMDEN, 16 August 1780

--Bad: for the US, poor supplies because Gates rushed his move into South Carolina to achieve a quick, decisive result. On the morning of the battle, the Patriots have only poor food which sickens the Soldiers. Gates puts untrained, out-of-state militia all on one side of the line. They're facing British regular veterans. --Worse: Terrain and weather do not favor the Patriots. The battlefield will be a clearing between two forests/swamps. It suits the conventional linear tactics of the British regulars and not the poorly trained Patriot state militias. Fog separates US forces visually, amplifying the militia's sense of isolation. BUT, it provides no concealment and especially no cover for the militias, who certainly see the solid ranks of their enemies. --Result: 'Run away!' The militia side of the line collapses against a British assault. The British engulf the remaining US troops.

THE BATTLE OF SARATOGA September/October, 1777

--British General Burgoyne's army is defeated by militia and regular forces, and surrenders. --Impact: ---Snuffs a serious threat to NY and New England ---Boosts Patriot morale ---France sees a safe bet; and recognizes and forms military alliance with the US. THUS, --FRANCE DECLARES WAR ON BRITAIN IN 1778, --AND THEN, SPAIN AND HOLLAND JOIN FRANCE IN 1779 AND 1780. AND THIS WAR WILL BECOME A WORLD WAR FOR BRITAIN

The Battle of Bennington, 16 August 1777

--Burgoyne sends a forage raid into Vermont. It mostly consists of German mercenaries, but also includes British Regulars, Tories, and Indians. --Local militia under John Stark move to block the raid. --Alerted to these forces' presence and generally aware of their greater size, the British raiding party sets up a defensive perimeter. --Swarming local Patriot militia surround and overrun it. Militia and other forces also maul a relief force sent by Burgoyne. --Impact: Burgoyne loses supply access, a sizable chunk of his army, and Indian support—all while deep in enemy territory.

Initial Sparring of the Saratoga Campaign

--Burgoyne's New York offensive had a promising start. His part of the attack moved quickly down Lake Champlain. St. Leger commenced his advance down the Mohawk Valley toward the Patriots' Ft. Stanwix. --Burgoyne's force slowed considerably as his force advanced overland south of the lake. Opposing commander Philip Schuyler placed obstructions on this route. St. Leger's force commenced a siege of Ft. Stanwix in early August. --Burgoyne issued threatening proclamations to the locals, and he failed to control his Indian allies well. Both errors, along with the overall threat of British invasion, sparked a sharp increase in the Patriot militias' ranks. Further, poor Unity of Command and control meant that Howe in New York City had his own ideas regarding the campaign. He took his army south to Philadelphia, not north to help Burgoyne. --In the meantime, these initial moves produced two noteworthy battles in early/mid August, Oriskany and Bennington

Exterior/External Lines

--Converge upon the enemy (red star) from outside bases (blue boxes) --Can create a multi-axis threat --Longer lines (black arrows) b/t friendly forces = coordination/logistics challenges

Interior/Internal Lines

--Diverging lines from central base (blue box) --Shorter lines (yellow arrows) b/t friendly forces = easier coordination/supply --Requires coordination --Facing outside, converging threats (red stars)

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR, THIS COURSE, AND YOUR FUTURE CAREER

--Do these guarantee success? Not necessarily; you may think you covered them all well in your plan, but the opponent may do them better than you. Thus, they are not a recipe. Instead, they are a good analytical tool for plans, decisions and actions in the past, present and even the future. --Can the Principles contradict each other? Yes, and that's another reason why they're not a recipe. Maneuver can strain simplicity. Achieving Mass may entail sacrificing secrecy that supports security. --In this course, we use them as described above:a tool to analyze past events, leaders, plans, decisions, etc., to learn lessons we can apply in the future.

KING'S MOUNTAIN AFTERMATH: THE BRITISH ARMY FIGHTS THE CAROLINA GUERILLAS

--Having retreated back into South Carolina, Cornwallis tried to suppress the guerilla threats there. He sent his aggressive, marauding cav commander, Banastre Tarleton, to end Marion's control of eastern South Carolina. Tarleton forced the wily Marion to retreat deeper into the swamps, and even claimed victory, but Marion returned to conduct more guerilla ops after Tarleton left. --A similar result occurred when Tarleton chased Thomas Sumter's guerillas in north-central South Carolina. Tarleton actually caught up with Sumter at Blackstock's Farm (see next slides), but Sumter's local informants enabled him to ready his force on advantageous ground and maul Tarleton's legion as it commenced a rushed attack. Overnight, Sumter retreated and Tarleton would claim victory again; BUT he had not destroyed Sumter's force, and he had such high casualties that he retreated south away from Sumter. --While chasing these guerillas, Tarleton's force trashed local farms indiscriminately, further scuttling popular support.

Valley Forge (1777-1778)

--Howe and his army spent the winter in Philly, while Washington and his army spent the winter outside Philly at Valley Forge. It seemed like a good place, but during the Philly Campaign the armies had picked local supplies clean. The ensuing winter was not too cold, but it was cold enough. --While there, 2500 US Army soldiers died out of ~17500 = ~14% death rate: malnutrition, disease, exposure --Reasons? Winter encampments often had problems because men were cooped up in cold camps. Making things worse was the inexperienced army's failure to follow basic camp hygiene procedures. HOWEVER, the biggest problem lay not with a lack of resources in the US, but in getting those resources to Valley Forge. The textbook notes well the lack of competent commissary and quartermaster officials (commissary handled the supply, especially food; and quartermaster handled transpo). The better ones either sought civilian jobs which paid better or line units which promised greater prestige. Civilian wagon drivers preferred civilian contracts to the paltry Army contracts. Congress' initial lax attitude regarding these problems didn't help either. (pp. 85-87)

British Southern Guerilla War & COIN

--In 1780 the British won a series of spectacular victories that apparently gave them the control they sought in the South. But was the South that secure? --Waxhaws was one omen of how poor British civil affairs would ruin the advantages secured at places like Charleston and Camden. Many locals were outraged by the tales of atrocities. --At about the same time, the British went back on a promise to let Carolinian males live undisturbed. Instead, they decreed that all males were subject to British army service. --Tarleton's force consisted mostly of Tories. Tarleton detached one of them, Christian Huck, with a small force to enforce obedience to British policies. Huck and company did this so overzealously and brutally that they provoked a successful surprise attack by Patriot guerillas which killed Huck. This setback occurred before Britain's big Camden victory, but it was yet one more omen of future British problems down South. --Patriot animosities have been discussed. However, the Tories didn't like the British Army's attempts to curb their excesses. Further, British Army-colonial militia tensions still existed, even if that militia was Tory. Finally, it was hard to be neutral in the growing Patriot insurgency and Patriot-Tory civil war. Fence-sitters took a side, which was increasingly the Patriot side, thanks to bad British policies. --Worse, per pages 62-63 and a short passage on page 92, the British lacked the troops and resources to control all of South Carolina, much less the entire South.Page 92 tells us that Cornwallis had only 8000 troops—and this to secure not just a state but a region (South Carolina alone had over 120,000 people).If British policies alienated southerners enough to resist British presence, Cornwallis would be hard pressed to make firmer control measures work

Offensive

--In short, 'Offensive' is about aggressiveness and initiative—the Army wants you to take the fight to the enemy and make said enemy respond to you, not vice versa. An example is a spoiling attack, which is an attack that aims to disrupt the enemy's offensive, especially while the enemy is in the process of planning or preparing to attack.

MONTREAL FRONTS 1813

--In the fall, the US tried in vain to take Montreal. US Generals Wade Hampton and James Wilkinson were supposed to cooperate in a two-prong advance which fell apart due to atrocious logistical support, bad weather, illness, bad leadership (especially Wilkinson), and their mutual hatred. --Hampton was supposed to move directly north from Lake Champlain to Montreal, but believed he would encounter strong British defenses. Instead he shifted his advance forty miles to the west along the Chateauguay River, which also flowed north toward Montreal. Just inside the Canadian border he encountered a small fort manned by a smaller but motivated force of special troops, militia and Indians. Sending a flanking force around a swamp—which got lost along the way—he advanced directly on the fort. --The British force put up a noisy fight in this so-called Battle of Chateauguay, convincing Hampton he was outnumbered and might even be flanked himself. He beat a retreat, leaving his own flanking force to extricate itself. --Wilkinson was supposed to move from Lake Ontario east down the St. Lawrence River toward Montreal. His campaign also fizzled. Logistical support was, as usual for this war, unsatisfactory. --Another factor was Wilkinson. Perhaps the biggest scoundrel in American military history, Wilkinson "never won a battle or lost a court-martial," as historian Robert Leckie put it. Charming, intelligent, a spy for Spain, and a notorious player in various scandals since the Revolutionary War, Wilkinson bounced cleverly and cheerfully but not ethically through various high military postings for much of his career. --His leadership of the Montreal advance was apathetic, if not simply pathetic. His lack of energy and quibbling excuses had already exasperated the Secretary of War.Lacking combat acumen, he too often let his sub-commanders vote on a course of action.However, he did advance some ways along the St. Lawrence. Part of his command attacked a smaller British force at Crysler's Farm on the river's north bank, but failed to overwhelm it (Wilkinson was not present).Thusly discouraged, Wilkinsonbeat a retreat back to the US.

1781 Guilford Courthouse (Terrain use)

--Morgan rejoined Greene after Cowpens, but Cornwallis' British army still outnumbered their combined forces. In spite of the Cowpens setback, Cornwallis still wanted to fix and finish Greene's army—so much so, that he dumped most of his baggage train for the pursuit. --A superb strategist, Greene refused to accept battle until he was ready. He led Cornwallis's increasingly fatigued army on a wearying chase through central North Carolina. Cornwallis found only thin Tory support there—and his hungry soldiers' plundering did not help. --Greene knew the area well, had better local support, and was well supplied. He crossed the many Carolina river fords just ahead of and in better shape than the British. LTCOL 'Light Horse Harry' Lee's cavalry acted as an effective screen by delaying and confusing the British. He also whipped a Tory cavalry force and thus discouraged Tories even further. In the ensuing Guilford Courthouse battle, he would help keep the British cavalry at bay and assist the main force at key times and spots. Note: 'Screening' is often a cavalry function. Screening forces maintain surveillance; provide early warning to the main body; impede and harass the enemy; destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, if possible; and maintain contact, but not become decisively engaged, with the enemy's main force.

Newburgh Affair

--Most important--what did not happen. Washington dissuaded some of his disgruntled officers from threatening Congress directly over a pay issue. He DID NOT do this by promising to secure them pay somehow, but by pointing out that such an action would betray everything they had fought for. --Civil-military relationship. This little-known incident helped establish the civil authority over the military authority in the USA. Most revolutions and independence movements in history have fared a lot worse in this regard. --Leadership does make a difference. In this case, Washington resolved a short-term leadership problem; i.e., something requiring a leader's decisive action at that moment.

The Battle of Oriskany, 6 August 1777

--Mostly Americans v. Americans as a Patriot militia force tries break St. Leger's siege of Fort Stanwix. --St. Leger's Tories & Indians 'mostly win' ambush of the Patriot militia and some Indians. --Patriot militiamen retreat in fairly good order; frustration among St. Leger's Indians as Patriot raiding party from Ft. Stanwix ransacks their camp while they are away fighting the battle

KING'S MOUNTAIN, OCTOBER 1780

--Mostly Americans v. Americans: Angry Patriot militia bands attack a British-led Tory force on a low, wooded ridge near the North-South Carolina border --Self-inflicted defensive problems for the British/Tories à the Patriot militias overwhelm them --Carolina Tories are discouraged; Cornwallis must terminate his North Carolina invasion in order to see to South Carolina's growing problems. Near the North Carolina border, Ferguson's Tories established a defense on King's Mountain, which was actually a small ridge in the South Carolina woods. The position could still be a strong one, but Ferguson failed to set up a line of supply or escape route. His command also failed to clear possible avenues of approach to ensure clear fields of fire. Perhaps he thought it strong enough to handle any attack by Patriot militia, who had so far not performed well in the 1780 Carolina Campaign. However, his position became a trap. The Patriot 'Over-Mountain Men' had no formal command structure. They were a disparate group of frontier militia bands who elected a nominal leader, William Campbell, to command the attack. But they were unified in aim, spirit and action. They organized their approach well and quickly encircled Ferguson's ridge-top perimeter. The Tories' failure to set up clear fields of fire gave the Patriot militiamen ample cover and concealment in their advance uphill. Tory defenses were up near the actual crest, and some accounts note that this disposition adversely affected their marksmanship (they often shot too high). Perhaps a stronger defense further downhill, where defenders could better cover any uphill advance, might have helped. (A term for the hillside spot where defenders can best cover the terrain below them is called the 'military crest.') Further, the Tories' position denied them cover, as they were often well silhouetted against the crest. Believing that Patriot militia would panic and flee from a bayonet charge (recall the outcome at Camden), Ferguson ordered several such assaults to disrupt the Patriot attacks, which came from various directions. However, the repeated Tory charges downhill (and then back uphill to reform) did not break Patriot morale, and they exhausted the Tory troops in the bargain. After each Tory assault the Patriots regrouped, resumed their advances, and used the terrain and their hunting rifles to good effect. The 'Over-Mountain Men' eventually overwhelmed Ferguson's outnumbered, tired force. Had this spot been an open field, where classic linear tactics were appropriate, Ferguson's force might have repeated Camden, where the British routed less formally trained, less disciplined Patriot militia units. It was instead a low wilderness ridge which favored agile frontiersmen who used cover, concealment, marksmanship and determination to wear down their enemy. The British/Tory defeat stifled the southern Tory support that was the foundation of Britain's southern strategy. Indeed, Britain's top army commander in North America, General Henry Clinton, considered King's Mountain a decisive battle. Cornwallis cancelled his North Carolina operation and tried to deal with the guerillas in South Carolina.

American strategy and advantages in the Revolutionary War

--Need only to 'hold on': frustrate Britain's attempt to suppress rebellion, and thereby achieve the war aim—independence. If the British give up and recognize US independence, then that's a win for the US. --Large land, tough terrain, and 'home field advantage' --Strong leadership: Washington, et al --Seek assistance and even allies --Use mixed forces to expel British, or at least to frustrate them. The war will require Patriot success in both guerilla and conventional war American Problems: --Weak Confederation government's ability to wage war --No money; weak supply system --No real navy and no 'real' army ---Suspicions ---Enlistments ---Lower-level leadership & discipline --Popular support wavers

1781 Cowpens (METT-TC, OAKOC, combined arms)

--Note Morgan's timing of actions to lure Tarleton fully into the trap. --The book mentions a "hill" the Patriots used for cover. It is at most a slight rise—but it was just enough to conceal Morgan's key forces. Note how Morgan springs the trap. Be clear about what Morgan did. Know what a double-envelopment is and how the Principles of War, METT-TC or KOCOA apply to it. Note:Recent scholarship indicates that Washington's cavalry not only neutralized Tarleton right-flank cavalry ops, but also swung around to help rout the British left flank

Battle of Lake Erie, 10 September 1813

--Oliver Perry's naval victory secures Harrison's Lake Erie flank, and makes British advance near or west of Lake Erie very difficult. Their LOC shattered, British army forces quickly retreat east from Detroit. Tecumseh and the Indian allies are dismayed, but follow. They have no choice. Many are destitute and rely upon the British for food. --Harrison takes Detroit on 29 September, and advances rapidly east into Canada. He overtakes about 1500-2000 British and Indians (including Tecumseh) in an ad hoc defensive position on the River Thames (crossed swords on the map below).

EUROPEAN ('OLD WORLD') WARFARE AT THE TIME OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

--Population growth, rise of the state, & heavier settlement of the region favors certain tactics --Linear, close-range tactics with regimental focus; w/artillery and heavy cavalry supporting --Firearms are dominant, but with limitations --Strict discipline & officer / enlisted social distinctions (but officers are usually not professionally trained) --Royal/state power to control resources like artillery & heavy cavalry --Logistics / forts / sieges --Relatively limited, 'formalistic' wars

The French and British Fleets Join the Action

--Recognizing Cornwallis's danger as a French fleet moved to cut off his Chesapeake Bay escape route, the British sent a fleet to prevent same. --One could call the French fleet's task an interdiction mission. Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces or achieve any other objectives - put crudely, cut the enemy's LOCs and/or ability to move, communicate, shift forces.

The Battle of the Virginia Capes

--Royal Navy commanders strictly followed 'TTPs' called the 'Fighting Instructions.' In a recent war, a Royal Navy admiral had been executed for losing a battle due in part to his Fighting Instructions violations. --British Admiral Thomas Graves and his captains too rigidly followed the Instructions in their battle with French Admiral deGrasse's fleet off the Virginia Capes, and thus did not exploit chances to break the French battleship line. The French fleet retained control of the Chesapeake's mouth and even landed some heavy artillery for Allied armies to use. --Given these circumstances, Cornwallis was now truly trapped. French and US armies boxed him in against the Chesapeake at Yorktown, while the French fleet barred resupply and escape. The textbook recounts how the French and US army attacks progressively pushed Cornwallis into a tighter corner, and then bombarded him until he quit. THE WAR WINDS DOWN --Yorktown topples the British war cabinet. --Practically ends British offensive ops in the US, but the war lasts for two years afterwards. --BTW, American commerce raiding—even in England

Blackstock's Farm Battle Summary and Result

--Tarleton arrives in late PM without full awareness of Sumter's dispositions. Sumter uses skirmishers to provoke a dismounted attack by part of Tarleton's smaller force. --Tarleton's dismounts drive the skirmishers back toward a concealed Patriot rifle position, and are stopped by the Patriot guerillas' fire --Tarleton now orders a mounted charge into the same position to save the dismounted attack; is stopped again with high losses. --Sumter is as rash as Tarleton; and is wounded seriously in a counter-attack of questionable value and equally weak results. --British cease attack; Patriots slip away in the night. --But did Tarleton eliminate Sumter's force and thus eradicate the Patriot guerilla threat? No.

Southern Campaign 1780-1781

--The British Army expected strong loyalist support and also hoped to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. --In this way, the British might keep some colonies, or secure a bargaining chip, or even create a base for further ops --1775-1778: Colonists seize nominal control --1778-1779: Small British force raids Georgia/SC, excites the Tories, & later survives Patriot siege at Savannah. Once again, there are problems coordinating ops between ground forces and the French fleet. --American Patriots seized control of the South early in the war. Indeed, in 1776 Patriot militia had defeated British General Henry Clinton's attempted amphibious landing at Sullivan's Island, near Charleston South Carolina (SC). However, British leaders remained interested in the region and its rich agricultural resources. --The British also became convinced that there were many frustrated southern Tories who needed help. Encouraged by the British Foreign Office, Gen Clinton launched a southern raid in late 1778. The expedition's main force broke past Patriot defenses at Savannah, Georgia (GA) and moved inland through GA and SC. There, British forces under Archibald Campbell and Augustine Prevost encountered some support from southern Tories. For the next several months, the British and their Tory (and Cherokee) allies sparred throughout GA and SC with Continental and militia forces led by Ben Lincoln, Thomas Moultrie, and others. THE SOUTH, 1775 - Mid 1780, cont. (pp. 90-92) --The Patriot general facing Clinton, Benjamin Lincoln, lacked the forces and the intell to oppose Clinton aggressively. Further, Charleston's leaders persuaded him to fall back into the city to prevent its capture. This eased the British attempt to trap him. --Clinton commenced the formal siege in March; and by May 1780, the US Army and militia in Charleston were compelled to surrender (~5300 captured). It was one of the worst defeats the U.S. suffered in this war. --Annoyed with the length of the siege and wishing to set an example, Clinton humiliated the surrendering Americans. Further, he did not release the regulars on parole to await proper exchange (common in those days). He did release the militia in an attempt to undermine American loyalties and unity.

1813 Detroit Front: Lake Erie / Thames

--The British and Native Americans are riding high, especially after further victories (e.g., the River Raisin) in early 1813. The success impresses Indian fence-sitters, and more Indians join Tecumseh at Detroit. They create a logistical burden for the British because they lack food. But perhaps Tecumseh will achieve his aims for Indians after all. --The new British commander, Henry Procter, indulges Tecumseh's push for aggressive action. Up through summer, the British and Indians unsuccessfully attack American forts near the southern shores of Lake Erie (e.g., Fort Meigs, south of present-day Toledo, OH). Tecumseh wants even more aggressive action. Procter is skeptical. --US naval commander Oliver Perry rushes to build a small fleet to challenge British naval control of Lake Erie. Whoever owns the lake owns the LOC for the Old Northwest. --After poorly coordinated advances early in 1813 (e.g., the River Raisin), William Harrison advances on Detroit in August. He needs naval help before going east into Canada—Oliver Perry must deliver. Harrison defeats Anglo-Indian force at Battle of the Thames, 5 Oct. --U.S. ~3500 mixed infantry & 'mounted gunmen': mixed force of Kentucky volunteers and militia (yes, in this case the Kentucky governor leads some willing militia into Canada), and ~250 Indians (Shawnee, Wyandot, Delaware, Seneca) --Weak British/Indian Defense & American 'Surprise' Tactic: the British/Indian force is outnumbered and somewhat demoralized due to the rapid retreat. The American mounted gunmen aren't really cavalry, and the British assume they'll dismount to fight. They don't. The mounted charge breaks the Anglo-Indian defense. --Tecumseh is killed during the fight. This loss and the battlefield defeat stifle Indian support for the British in the Old Northwest. The US War Department does not exploit the Thames victory. It believes the distant theater is adequately secured—indeed, any serious Anglo-Indian threat to the Old Northwest is suppressed.

THE JUNE, 1775, BATTLE OF BUNKER (BREED's) HILL

--The British launched a daylight attack up an open slope into the teeth of a Patriot militia defense set up behind rock walls at the top of the slope. British commanders thus violated Maneuver and Surprise. --The Patriot militias occupied Breed's Hill near the tip of Charlestown peninsula. They were only supposed to occupy Bunker Hill, at the base of the peninsula, so as to prevent being flanked. However, they violated Security in their zeal to provoke a British attack. --Extenuating circumstances existed for the British decision to discard the Maneuver and Surprise opportunities that the Patriot move offered. Some of the terrain on the sides of the peninsula could make these avenues of approach difficult. The Royal Navy admiral in Boston Bay often did not cooperate with the British Army. The British Army commanders thought they saw flanking opportunities at the tip of the peninsula. --HOWEVER, the British still pressed a daylight attack directly into a strong defense because they thought they could—and were surprised when the attack didn't go as well as planned. --They had no respect for American militia, and assumed a disciplined assault by regular troops would rout the Patriots. Besides securing a key part of Boston Bay, the British assumed that overrunning the Patriot defense in broad daylight would emphasize the futility of Patriot resistance and so break the rebellion. --British Army forces did take the hill, but only after multiple attacks and about fifty-percent casualties. The Patriot defenders shot down many British officers --The battle was a tactical defeat and psychological victory for the Patriot cause and its militia, who believed they gave up the hill only because they were low on ammo. In their minds, the battle showed that American militia could handle British regulars. --Later battles like Camden would demonstrate this was not often so, and even Bunker Hill contained signs of how much improvement the American Patriots required re professional warfighting. Their enthusiasm for defending their Massachusetts home ground was commendable, but their leadership was more a gaggle of squabbling militia-band chieftains than an organized chain of command. One could say the militias' ammo depletion at Bunker Hill was understandable given their struggle to obtain sufficient gunpowder, but that makes more glaring their failure to anticipate ammunition demands for a direct fight with British regulars. --There was a psychological impact upon the British, too. William Howe was one of the top British officers at Bunker Hill; and when commanding British forces at New York and Philadelphia, he tried envelopments and turning movements more than frontal attacks.

The Battle(s) of Saratoga 2

--The first battle, normally called Freeman's Farm, occurred in mid September. In it, Patriot units intercepted a British move to get around the US left flank. Daniel Morgan's rifle-equipped sharpshooters inflicted high British casualties by shooting from tree lines at British columns moving across fields. The British lines repelled attempts by the enthusiastic but less conventionally adept Americans to attack them directly, but they could not advance against such fire from the woods either. Though the on-field fighting was a draw, Burgoyne had failed to turn the US flank. --Nearly three weeks later, Burgoyne probed the American left again, in a battle usually called Bemis Heights. A spirited Patriot response drove the British back to two earthworks: the Balcarres Redoubt on the British left and Breymann's Redoubt on the right. American assaults on Balcarres led by Benedict Arnold failed with high losses, but Patriot envelopments of Breymann drove the British back to their main camp.

Trenton and Princeton: Small Battles, Low Cost, Big Strategic Impact

--The immediate results for Trenton: ---German garrison surrenders; 40 KIA, 918 captured --Americans suffer 7 casualties (2 men freeze to death) --The immediate results for Princeton ---Three British regiments mauled: ~70 KIA, ~200 captured ---US suffers ~30 KIA; picks up captured supplies; goes into winter camp with two victories --BIGGER RESULTS ---Reinvigorated the American cause and foiled the British hope for a negotiated settlement. ---Washington retained an army ---Rallied American 'fence-sitters' and militia who served as informants, suppliers, enforcers, and guerillas (especially in New Jersey, which was a contested state)

Not about physical training

--The previous slide's comments about heat's effect upon Soldiers does not mean they were completely out of shape. Drills, bayonet practice, and marching instilled some physical fitness upon British and Continental regulars. At Monmouth, Soldiers were aware of the need for hydration; e,g., the original role of the battle's 'Molly Pitcher' heroine. Monmouth's conditions could challenge any Soldier of any era. --However, armies of the time did not focus upon PT the way armies do now, and modern armies would probably handle the heat better. Accounts mention that fitness issues hurt American armies occasionally up through the Civil War. Again, every Soldier was not completely unfit; and factors such as diet and hygiene also hurt fitness. --The US Army did not focus upon PT specifically until the late 1800s. Rising professional standards, and the early-1900s Progressive Era's emphasis upon fitness, helped increase PT's role in Army training. Since then, the Army has developed a systematic approach to combat fitness via such things as diet, hydration, PT, and rigorous standards.

Trenton Set up

--The situation indeed looked bad for Washington and the US in December 1776. The Army faced collapse after defeats and prolonged retreat. The British had crossed New Jersey and gained local converts due to flagging faith in the Patriot cause. Washington and his army had escaped past the Delaware River toward Philadelphia, but US leaders feared the British Army would cross the river once it froze. Congress abandoned Philadelphia in anticipation. --However, all was not as good as it seemed for the British. Grown overconfident with success, General Howe had slowed the British Army's pursuit of Washington at a critical moment. Howe also told his army to treat New Jersey's people properly, but individual units and soldiers did not do so. Mistreatment bred local support for budding guerilla attacks against the British Army. To exert control, Howe spread his forces in outposts throughout the state, with the most distant being two outposts manned by Hessian (German) mercenaries near the Delaware River. The Hessian commander at the Trenton outpost, COL Johann Rall, asked for reinforcements but was denied. Dispersed guerilla attacks in the area kept the British Army dispersed. --Nor were things quite as bad for the US side. Washington actually received reinforcements from dispersed units. Not everyone was demoralized by the New York City defeats. With his inspirational writings, Thomas Paine assisted a positive countrywide reaction which produced increased Army enlistments to meet the national crisis. Washington did not control the guerilla operations in New Jersey, but motivated leaders helped his effort with their independent attacks. --Washington and his top commanders wanted a fight before the winter became too harsh. They did not want to give American morale a chance to decline further. The choice of a Christmas attack on Trenton was not simply due to an expectation that the Hessians would be relaxed during the holiday. Actually they were on alert, but for small guerilla attacks, and not an attack by the Continental Army. Indeed, Rall dismissed such a possibility out of hand. Thus, Washington's troops would encounter some small outposts near the town and not a ready Hessian force.

The 1792 Militia Act

--These congressional acts authorized the president to call out the militia for insurrections, disorder, invasions, etc. (supplemented by a 1795 Militia Act and later confirmed by Supreme Court decisions). --The 1792 acts called for, ---enrollment of "every able-bodied white male citizen" between 18 and 45, ---organization into individual state units SOUNDS KIND OF IMPRESSIVE, BUT . . . . Recall the Constitution's charge to Congress regarding militia affairs seen on an earlier slide. Will Congress "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia . . . according to the discipline prescribed by Congress"? See the next slide. HOWEVER, this congressional act fell short in various ways, 1. Militiamen provide own "arms, munitions, and other accouterments." 2. No federal standard of training and no standard arms 3. No federal means of enforcement 4. No provision for deployment outside the U.S 5. Limited active service (3 months / year max) Items 1-3 indicate that Congress met poorly the Constitution's charge for it to organize, arm and discipline the militia. Items 4 and 5 were not specifically related to the militia clauses, but they would hurt the militia's effectiveness in future wars, like the one with Britain that would start in 1812. Further, this act was the primary guidance for militia (w/ small amendments) for over 100 years. Why the limits? In spite of the Constitution and the alarm created by St. Clair's defeat, Americans liked these restrictions. They distrusted intrusive federal government. Local citizens-militiamen wanted limits upon military control of their lives; hence, the service and geographic restrictions. And almost no one wanted to pay the tax bill incurred by tighter federal control and support.

GUERILLA ACTION IN THE 1780-1781 SOUTHERN THEATER

--This was a civil war as much as it was a rebellion. There were several Patriot guerilla militia leaders who knew a specific area and fought both British regulars and Tories in those haunts. Andrew Pickens usually worked the Carolina-Georgia border. William Davie and Thomas Sumter worked north and central South Carolina. Francis Marion earned his nickname of 'Swamp Fox' as he worked in the bayous of eastern South Carolina. --All used backwoods, hill country, or swamps as sanctuary bases to strike vulnerable Tories and British regulars with quick raids and ambushes, followed by retreat to their sanctuaries.

TWO GUERILLA-INSURGENT LEADERS, TWO STYLES: THOMAS SUMTER AND FRANCIS MARION

--Thomas Sumter and Francis Marion were the best-known southern guerilla leaders, and both generally used the tactics mentioned on the previous slide. But their contrasting styles rate discussion. --Sumter's charisma was undeniable. A self-made man, he was aggressive and could inspire men to follow him through tough times. --He had to, because he was often careless regarding Security, and favored direct attacks that his light guerilla forces could not sustain. Twice, at Fishing Creek and Fish Dam Ford, he was nearly captured by enemy raiders (at Fishing Creek he nearly lost his whole force). At Rocky Mount and Blackstock's Farm, he was too aggressive for a guerilla leader. Rather than accept the dividends achieved by initial success and then quickly breaking contact, he ordered further attacks that his guerillas could not win and which incurred needless casualties. --Still, his ability to rally Soldiers and local support, combined with his aggressiveness, meant that he was a persistent, serious problem for Tories and the British Army. --Francis Marion achieved charisma not by personality but by results. Far more circumspect than Sumter, Marion cultivated an extensive network of scouts and local informants. His often small force (at times as few as a couple dozen) did not get surprised and did not lose fights and resources needlessly. --At battles such as Great Savannah and Blue Savannah, Marion carefully set his trap, struck his foe, captured prisoners and supplies, and then quickly broke contact before trouble arose. British cav raider Banastre Tarleton once chased him for days but could not catch him. --Marion understood that his militia guerillas were usually poor and had family concerns. He did not enforce enlistments harshly, but trusted his men to return when possible. Between that and his record of success, Marion secured the support needed for victory. --Even at Black Mingo Swamp (see later slides), where he did not achieve his usual Surprise, Marion's preparation allowed him to sustain an attack with the confidence that he had a decisive Maneuver advantage and a good escape route for the attack's conclusion. --Regardless of style, both commanders had help thanks to a populace that increasingly sided with the US cause against the British and their Tory allies. Sumter and Marion got the local supplies, intell, volunteers, and sanctuary. Their enemies did not. Locals helped Sumter recover quickly from his occasional reverses. As for Marion, he worked to regain Patriot initiative in the South Carolina tidewater region in the dark weeks after Camden. The British and their Tory allies were trying to establish outposts for better control of that area. Marion used the terrain and support by many sympathetic locals to move stealthily toward the Tory outpost at Black Mingo Swamp. The ensuing attack is an example of Marion's style of military operations (see next slides)

FRIEDRICH WILHELM VON STEUBEN

--Varied background; Washington's Inspector General for Training --Teaches 'Americanized' version of European drill/tactics & use of bayonet. This is not simply 'drill & ceremonies.' Recall that in those days, close order drill and firing while in formation were considered tactics. Ability to use a bayonet—and to not be intimidated by bayonet assaults—was an important skill for such close-quarter tactics. --Teaches NCOs & junior officers leadership & management: care of equipment and men (to include proper camp hygiene and unit supply-management procedures for scarce resources) --"Blue Book" manual sets standards for drill, leadership, & organization

Wayne's Expedition 1793-1794

--Washington and his government spent a couple of frustrating years trying a mix of diplomacy and threats to get the Indians to accept their terms. Meanwhile, the US Army struggled to rebuild. When diplomatic efforts failed, Gen. "Mad Anthony" Wayne led a reformed army on a third military expedition into Ohio in 1793. --Wayne benefitted from the recent Army expansion, even if it was only a small one. Washington and his Secretary of War, Frank Knox made the small army a 'Legion,' with sub-legions that were all-arms units so they could handle themselves well on the frontier. --Wayne used federal volunteers (with longer enlistment terms) more than short-term militia. Volunteers could be and usually were enlisted by the state, but served as federal volunteers outside the limitations of the recent 1792 Militia Act. Volunteers could have problems similar to those of the militia—after all, these were still local troops raised quickly for a fixed enlistment to handle a contingency--but longer service and federal obligation usually produced greater commitment and discipline. --With volunteers predominant, Wayne could train methodically his Legion. He and the War Department hand-picked officers, and he disciplined Soldiers harshly—including executions. He trained his force away from towns and their distractions. His men used Von Steuben's Blue Book as they learned such things as linear tactics, marksmanship and field-fort construction. They also practiced wilderness-style battle tactics versus mock ambushes. --In late 1793 Wayne moved his Legion into Ohio with equal deliberation. Small enemy warrior bands tried to ambush Wayne's men, with little success. The next June a large Indian force ambushed a supply column near one of Wayne's intermediate posts, Fort Recovery, and then tried for two days to take fort itself. The attacks failed, and the Indians retreated in frustration. In these events, Wayne proved his Legion's security and discipline were better than St. Clair's. --Wayne pressed forward that summer of 1794, building more forts and methodically razing Indian villages and crops.Though many Indiansremained determined to stop Wayne, disunity split the tribes; and Indian frustration increased after the Fort Recovery reverse --Battle of Fallen Timbers. Wayne's Legion advanced further north, and his scouts detected an Indian ambush position amid tornado-damaged trees south of the British Fort Miami (and near present-day Toledo Ohio). After some see-saw fighting, Wayne's left flank overwhelmed the Indian defense via a disciplined, sustained infantry assault, as mounted troops made the Indian retreat a rout. After this resounding victory for the U.S., the British at Ft. Miami did not assist their erstwhile Indian allies. --Consequences. The United States Army crippled Northwestern Indian resistance, secured greater U.S. control of its northwestern territory, and further persuaded the British to close the northwestern forts that they were starting to remove from U.S. soil. See also the textbook's coverage of the Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne Indian campaigns on pp. 119-120.

Battle of Monmouth (June 1778) Campaign Season, 1778: With French naval involvement, Washington sees an opportunity.

--Washington's leadership saves the day in spite of botched plan. --The U.S. Army proves that it can fight a conventional, European-style battle with British troops. A draw wrested from near defeat, but a confirmation of von Steuben's reforms When France joined the U.S. in fighting Great Britain in 1778, the British had to reduce their American effort as they fought the French elsewhere. With this development the new British commander in America, Henry Clinton, had orders to detach parts of the army elsewhere while he returned the remaining force to hold New York City (NYC). The expected appearance of Count d'Estaing's French fleet in American waters also motivated Clinton to return to NYC. As Clinton's army moved eastward across New Jersey in June, Washington led his army out of Valley Forge in pursuit. Washington wanted a bold stroke. An advance force would attack Clinton's rear elements at Monmouth Courthouse in central New Jersey, while the rest of the Continental Army remained in reserve under Washington's command. Alas, command errors. Washington did not communicate his plan clearly enough. Also, no one reconnoitered the area. The situation required initiative and aggressive action by the attack-force commander; but Washington let the more senior but cautious Charles Lee lead it instead of the more bold but junior Marquis de Lafayette. --Lee's forces had to traverse ravines which disrupted his advance. Even so, he did not pursue his attack with vigor and thus lost momentum. Clinton launched a strong flanking counter-attack. Lee ordered a retreat but lost control as his troops streamed westward in disorder. Washington acted forcefully to stop the growing rout, and personally directed the retreating vanguard to form up and slow the British before they crashed into Washington's main force. --The British pushed that vanguard back slowly in heavy fighting toward a stronger American line, which then repelled multiple British linear assaults in conventional battle. This was the 'moment of truth' for Von Steuben's Valley Forge reforms and for the Continental Army regulars' ability to fight British regulars straight-on in an open field using linear tactics. --Washington and his regulars passed the test, and this on a day so hot that heat injuries prostrated hundreds and even killed dozens of Soldiers on both sides. Besides being stopped by the disciplined American ranks, the British Soldiers were exhausted by a day's worth of attacks in stifling heat. Likewise, after fighting in such conditions, the Americans were in no fit state to counterattack effectively at day's end (see next slide).' --Monmouth did not achieve Washington's aims, but it at least showed the British they must respect the Continental Army's regulars. --(BTW, Washington even put an artillery battery on the British flank to harass it, BUT the key takeaway for this fight is the US Army's ability to fight British regulars in those regulars' linear fighting style.) --Clinton's army slipped away that night, and made it to New York City, where the armies would face each other for years.

Trinity Concept

--We will use Carl von Clausewitz's 'Trinity.' Clausewitz described an interactive trinity: (a) adherence to rational war aims, policy, and/or strategy; (b) the play and impact of battle and/or chance; and © emotions, passions, and hatreds, which are often irrational and can disrupt the first item especially. Clausewitz went on to say that the trinity could apply in the same order to three entities: government, army, and people. Later, some writers interpreted Clausewitz strictly in that latter way. However, for this course the former way is preferable.

What is the definition of war

A violent conflict between organized groups with unknown resolve, each seeking to impose its will on the other. Carl von Clausewitz also reminds us that "War is a . . . continuation of politics by other means." "Policy, therefore, is interwoven with the whole action of War, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it . . . . The political view is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception. "

Second Seminole War (Dade / Challenges [+Okeechobee] / Solutions): 1835-1842

1830s Indian Removals spark Seminole / escaped-slave 'insurrection' led by Osceola, Coacoochee, and 'Billy Bowlegs,' among others. THE START OF THE WAR --Seminoles reject removal --Skirmishes & 1835 Dade Massacre --Winfield Scott and punitive campaign --Goal is Indian removal --Indians fight a 'guerilla'-style war, but have little if any external support. --Terrain: few roads, lotsa swamps, hot/disease in summer -- ~5000 troops; enlistments vary; political support wavers FOR THE SEMINOLES, HOW TO WIN? --'Goal' is to remain in Florida and discourage white settlement --Leadership has charisma, but is diffuse with poor overall control and variable internal support --About 5000 people; mostly Indians with some ex-slaves --Acclimated to, and very familiar with, the harsh environment --Good use of hunting rifles & flexible 'guerilla' tactics; but tied to subsistence off the land GUERILLA WARFARE: military or paramilitary unconventional combat operations--ambushes, subversion, raids, robberies, assassinations, sabotage, spying, and rescue--conducted against enemy control by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces à (often associated with insurgency because insurgent rebels often lack the force to fight government power directly) --At most, the U.S. massed nearly 5000 troops of various types for Seminole duty. Total Army strength was ~8000. Due to the war, Army commander Macomb secured an Army expansion to over 11000. --The first half of the war witnessed frustrating Army/militia campaigns that could not round up all of the Seminoles. Opposition to the war increased in Congress. However, enough support for the war existed to spur hard campaigning which achieved a qualified victory. 10.At first, Army forces used mostly conventional tactics, traveled on roads, and wore brightly colored uniforms—all of which was inappropriate for fighting and capturing Indian guerilla fighters. For example, the troops of the Dade Massacre knew wilderness tactics, but on the day they were ambushed they were spread out on a road, lacked a skirmisher screen, and did not have their ammo set up for either a quick or a sustained response. The massacre highlighted terrain-tactical challenges—the Seminole ambushers were not in a jungle, but tall grass concealed them in ways that Dade's men did not anticipate. Cannon were too cumbersome for easy transport in Florida conditions and the kind of small-unit irregular operations required for this war. Dade's Soldiers struggled to haul even a small six-pounder cannon, which lacked the ammo and agility to repel the ambushers. Nor could cannon blast the Seminoles' 'hammocks'--thick tree-groves in the swamps, which the Seminoles sometimes used as ad hoc forts. The environment harassed the Army in other ways. Sawgrass and water destroyed conventional uniforms. The conditions killed many horses, and the terrain often did not favor cavalry anyway. Stream crossings and attacks on Seminole hammocks were especially hard when the Seminoles remained concealed and Army units made head-on, single-axis attacks which allowed the Indians to escape. The best example of the above is the textbook's p. 171 discussion of the Battle of Lake Okeechobee. The book describes the battle as a US Army victory because COL Zachary Taylor's forces made the Seminoles abandon a fortified position. Interpreted so, it was a indeed a success. (The Army also took local Seminoles' cattle.) But the US war aim was to apprehend Seminoles and transfer them west. Seminoles retreating deeper into the swamps did not meet that aim. There is also evidence the Seminoles picked a good hammock defense to inflict serious US Army casualties before the defenders dispersed. Taylor attacked the stronghold directly with standard linear tactics because he felt he could not flank it and/or underestimated the Seminoles. His force suffered many casualties, inflicted few Seminole casualties, and failed to nab the Seminole warriors. Some contemporary assessments of the battle were less generous than the textbook's. 9. Army commanders often tried sweeps or converging-force operations to apprehend the Seminoles, but communications and transportation were primitive and prevented easy coordination. Scott's March 1836 sweep was uncoordinated, slow, and simply missed any serious contact with the elusive Seminoles. The same problem vexed several other commanders. 8. The unwillingness to campaign year-round is not really a silly thing, considering the era.The white troops were neither acclimated nor immune to the summertime heat and diseases that arose during that season.Some of the early campaigns simply fell apart due to disease and ennui.Militia and volunteers would not sign up for duty during the summer 'sickly season.'Call's 1836 operations were crippled by the bad season.However, a break in Army ops also gave the Seminoles a break 7. Gaines and Scott commanded simultaneously but not cooperatively. Scott insisted upon theater command because he was assigned as same, and Gaines claimed the same command because Florida Territory was in his department. At one point Gaines commenced an unsanctioned, uncoordinated offensive that nearly failed disastrously. Scott's criticisms of poor discipline infuriated the locals and the militia. Territorial Governor Call's imperious personality and political ambitions created dissension among subordinates and with the Navy. One item that bred command dissension was the status of brevet versus actual rank, and the status of militia versus regular rank. Scott, Gaines, and Jesup were sensitive about seniority relative to each other. Floridians didn't think much of the regulars, and vice versa. Officers such as Jesup, Macomb, and Taylor saw no need in hunting every last Seminole, and criticized Floridians' verbal bravery and combat timidity. Floridians saw the regulars as pompous but irresolute soldiers. 6. Commanders in the early fighting underestimated the logistical demands of swamp and forest ops. The Clinch, Gaines, and Call offensives basically fell apart for this reason. Call's offensive discovered it needed axes during its forest campaign, but couldn't find any. Forts nearly ran out of supplies. The early campaigns often traveled too heavy with the wrong gear. 5. President Jackson and other Democrats neither liked nor trusted regulars. Militia were supposed to be cheaper (in terms of immediate pay, they usually weren't), and the southern states' leaders especially wanted to get in on the war. However, short enlistments forced hasty operations (e.g., Clinch 1835 and Scott 1836) and denied follow-through. Militia, such as that of Alabama, had discipline problems. Regular-militia relations, especially between the respective commanders, was often poor. The regulars had their own problems. There were many immigrants and city-dwellers among the enlisted force. Re-enlistment was poor, given the poor treatment and conditions. Officers increasingly looked for other assignments, too. 4. Jesup's ops in 1836-1838 pressed the Indians hard; and thus some Seminole leaders proposed that the U.S. at least allow them to remain in southern Florida's swamps. Jesup liked the idea, but Pres. Van Buren rejected it and thus prolonged the war because: (a) distrust of the Indians, (b) credibility with other Indians with whom the U.S. struggled or might have to struggle, and © concerns about the Seminole enclave becoming a runaway-slave refuge. 3. The war required different weapons and other devices, such as maneuverable flatboats and waterproofed wagons to negotiate the many waterways in supporting outposts and tracking Seminoles. At first the Army didn't have them. The Army also needed Navy assistance for coastal and riverine maneuver and logistical support, but at first, interservice cooperation was poor. 2. The early campaigns lacked familiarity with the terrain because they often dealt with un-mapped wilderness. It took years for the Army to map the area. 1. Regular troops in the early war used bands and bugle calls during some of their marches and bivouacs, which destroyed the Surprise so critical to rounding up Seminoles. Militia wasted ammunition, and violated surprise and security, by spontaneously firing at livestock and game. The war's cost came to 1600 U.S. Army killed, mostly by disease; $20-30 million dollars spent—a lot of money in those days. CONTROVERSY AND DERISION --The slavery issue; the East & Indians. Some Northeasterners, especially abolitionists, did not support the war because they believed it aimed to seize runaway slaves from the Seminoles. Jackson's Indian-removal policy was not universally popular; and because Northeasterners no longer dealt with hostile Indians, there was some sympathy for the Seminoles. --In 1837, Colonel Thomas Jesup captured Osceola and other Indians under truce. He was frustrated with the Indians repeatedly violating promises they had made in previous truce talks, but his action sparked sharp criticism then and later for violating the honors of war. --Colonel Zachary Taylor employed bloodhounds. It did not work--bloodhounds could not track Seminoles through water. It outraged the public, who thought that bloodhounds were attack dogs which would maul Indian women and children. And Congress ridiculed the use of canine 'soldiers.' --By 1837, there were those in Congress who opposed the war and threatened to cut funding. THE SEMINOLES HAD THEIR PROBLEMS, TOO -- Tied to subsistence off the land + Disunity + mixed warrior/non-warrior population = VULNERABILITY --Poor overall control + raiding culture = critical errors, such as the 1839 Harney Massacre SUCCESSFUL COIN LATER IN THE WAR NOTE that it's not one factor—and compare these measures to the theme and tenets mentioned earlier. --'Divide & Conquer.' The US Army increasingly uses Seminole and non-Seminole Indians as scouts and even as combatant Soldiers. Army leaders also use allied Seminoles to convince the holdouts to quit. -- Appropriate Tactics. Rather than plod around in large regiments chasing elusive Seminole guerillas, the Army uses smaller, more flexible units equipped and trained for jungle/swamp fighting. --Establish and maintain posts--'oil stain.' When Thomas Jesup commands the war in Florida, he works hard to set up outposts that exert influence in the countryside, provide familiarity with same, and ease the effort to corral Seminole resisters. The effort will yield long-term success. --To make the above work better, Jesup and others improve logistics (pontoon wagons, government steamboats, flatboats) and improved cooperation with the Navy. --Aim, Focus, Will. The last two commanders, BGEN Walker Armistead and COL William Worth, practice scorched-earth policy to deny the Seminoles sustenance and thus force them to leave Florida. Further, the Army now campaigns year-round, even in the miserable summers, to give the Seminole rebels no rest (1840-1842). This does NOT look like something that promotes popular support, and we try to avoid it today. However, the aim is to remove Seminoles, not encourage their continued occupation of Florida land. The Army certainly has white Floridians' support for Indian removal --Conciliation. Through much of the war, Army leaders use negotiations, fellow Seminoles, bribes (cash awards, annuities) to persuade ~3800 Seminoles and ex-slave associates to go West peacefully. Coupled with the violence mentioned above, the Army creates compelling reasons to move west. --Terms. A few hundred Seminoles will remain in Florida. Colonel Worth declares the war 'won' in August 1842. To him and the US government, continued struggle represents diminished return for too much effort. The Army will maintain posts in the area; and there will be occasional violence and even a small but notable uprising in the 1850s. But peace mostly reigns. --However, the fact that some Seminoles remain means that the US government did not achieve its total-removal aim. Is this a US defeat, or is the Seminole presence so small and manageable that the US can indeed claim victory? Debate sometimes still arises. --Insurgencies often don't end with the rebels' definitive unconditional surrender, but has their threat has been reduced to an acceptable level? Has the government still been able to achieve its most essential aims?

--Tactical Level

: Field units -- ~armies & below ('the battle')

Guilford Courthouse Battle and Aftermath

: Greene set up his militia and regulars similar to what Morgan did at Cowpens (two separate militia lines in front of the Continental regulars). He hoped the defense-in-depth arrangement would inflict high casualties and break up Cornwallis' army while protecting his own. --Greene also placed his three lines in rolling terrain which had a few fields amidst thick woods. He wanted the terrain to break up the British regulars' linear regiments into smaller groups that Patriot militia could handle. However, the terrain also denied him the ability to time and execute movements as effectively as Morgan, who had a mostly open field at Cowpens. --During the battle, some militia units in the first two lines fought hard before retreating to the next line in good order. Others panicked and ran away. However, the terrain had broke up the cohesion of the British advance. Further, the defenders who stood firm had inflicted serious losses upon some of the advancing British units. There was an open field in front of Greene's third line. Since the previous lines had disrupted the British advance, British units crossed the field in piecemeal fashion. Even so, their attacks were spirited, and the fighting became close-in and hot as each side maneuvered for advantage. However, Greene chose to retreat in order to keep his army in good shape after having bloodied the British. A bold double envelopment was not in his plan, and the field conditions and battle's conduct did not favor it anyway. --During the melee at the third line, Cornwallis was so intent on smashing US resistance that he ordered his artillery to shoot into one part of the line to disrupt an American counter-attack. The forces were intermingled and the barrage hit British and Patriot alike, but it did stop the Americans' momentum. The British secured the field as Greene's army retreated a short ways northward. --The British won a narrow tactical victory at Guilford Courthouse, but they suffered heavy losses, lacked supplies, lacked strong local support, and faced an intact enemy army nearby. --Given these circumstances, Cornwallis and his army left the Deep South and sought better times in Virginia.

PERSEVERANCE

: Napoleon said "The moral is to the physical as three to one"; and in 'moral' he included will. Churchill observed, "Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think that he also had a chance." Wars can be long and tough, especially COIN ones. One must remain committed to tactical, operational, and strategic end states, because the enemy may be quite determined too.

BLACKSTOCK'S FARM, High ground south of Tyger River 20 NOVEMBER 1780

A rash British attempt to overtake and overwhelm guerilla militia Patriot militia leader GEN Thomas Sumter v. British LTCOL Banastre Tarleton ~1,000 Patriot militia v. ~700 British Legion BLACKSTOCK'S FARM Preliminaries --The British try to assert control in South Carolina after their King's Mountain defeat --Tarleton pursues Sumter's militia aggressively; so much so, that his cavalry and mounted infantry leave his infantry, artillery and baggage trains behind. --Sumter gets good local intell on how Tarleton's force is set up. Tarleton is less aware of Sumter's circumstances. --Sumter picks a good defensive position at Blackstock's Farm to handle Tarleton's mounted vanguard: a low ridge overlooking a road and a stream. Because it's a farm, there is a clear field of fire downslope; and most of Sumter's troops are protected by the farm's fences and by a tree line at the top of the ridge.

The US Constitution and the Military

Army Commissioning Oath: I ,________, having been appointed an officer in the Army of the United States in the grade of Second Lieutenant, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God. The Preamble We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America Article I Congress, Section 8: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States. While we're at it, let's talk about two basic congressional powers: (1) budgetary approval powers--the so-called 'power of the purse'; and (2) the power to make laws. Regarding both budget and lawmaking powers, recall the basic method for passing both. A majority vote in both the House and the Senate, followed by presidential approval, makes a bill a law. Congress can specifically, --Declare War --Grant Letters of Marque / Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; --Raise and support Armies, (no appropriation for use greater than two years); --Provide and maintain a Navy; --Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; --Provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; --To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress Note how the above so-called Militia Clauses divide authority over the militia between the states (green) and the US Congress (blue). This was a compromise between state and federal power, but it gave Congress the responsibility and power to set militia policy. --Exercise exclusive Legislation . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards; The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States. The president is commander in chief through war and peace. Does the Constitution forbid the president to commit forces to combat without Congress' prior express approval? NO. We regard such a prerogative as implied in the Constitution's executive clauses. There are also practical reasons. For example, a war emergency may arise when Congress is not in session. The level of conflict or type of enemy may not justify formal declarations of war. Less formal agreements may exist between the president and Congress. --The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States. However, the president's war prerogative doesn't mean he/she is royalty. The president is answerable via election, Congress' budgetary powers, and even impeachment. In the antiwar backlash after Vietnam, Congress passed the War Powers Act demanding that the president notify Congress prior to any potential combat action, and then to provide Congress with progress reports afterward. No president, Democrat or Republican, has ever recognized the constitutionality of that act, even though Congress has threatened to invoke it numerous times. However, presidents realize they must respect the people's concerns. Also, presidents can secure permission in other ways, such as informal agreement, budget request, authorization to use force, etc.

Center of Gravity

As translated from Clausewitz: "One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of the characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed." After Vietnam, military officers and reformers addressed flaws in the US approach to that war, especially its poor direction. They also embraced operational warfighting concepts (see Lesson 8). From these studies, many embraced the idea of a center-of-gravity objective. As one writer put it, "In simple terms the center of gravity concept is about efficiency and suggests there is some entity that if attacked, either directly or indirectly, will bring down an adversary. The idea is to attack the 'center of gravity' and avoid wasteful peripheral efforts. It is all about focusing effort to increase the likelihood of success at reasonable cost." Center-of-gravity (CG) became a focus of discussion at various service schools and also entered the doctrine manuals. During OIF and OEF, elusive insurgents and the tricky nature of counter-insurgency reinforced interest in defining an opponent's CG. A recent joint-doctrine publication describes CG thusly: "The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, the will to act." Meanwhile, many thoughtful writers criticized the concept on various grounds. It inspired intense but seemingly trivial arguments about CG criteria and examples. The concept also risked promoting shallow, panacea-oriented approaches that ignored the complexity and difficulty of war. Others said it encouraged a too-direct approach that discarded the subtleties and indirect approaches necessary in war (i.e., the enemy may be aware of his own CG and defend it quite well). The previously quoted writer even suggested a new definition: "The primary entity that inherently possesses the critical capabilities to achieve the objective." For now, we'll depart the debate and use Clausewitz' description as an analytical tool in our American Military History course.

1814 Battle of Lake Champlain (naval battle):

BRITAIN'S LAKE CHAMPLAIN CAMPAIGN (pp. 152-153, 156) --British Gen. John Prevost advances into upstate NY in August 1814. His aim is similar to Burgoyne's in the Revolutionary War's Saratoga Campaign: take New York State and isolate New England. And in the War of 1812 New England is a hotbed of antiwar and even secessionist opinion. Perhaps the British can even recover New England? --Prevost moves along—you guessed it—Lake Champlain. It is THE avenue of approach and LOC for invasions from Canada into the US. --The book discusses and candidates often make much of the land battle on the lake's west shore, but the key battle is the one between small fleets on the lake. As with Lake Erie further west, in those days whoever owned the 'lake LOC' owned the military advantage. LAKE CHAMPLAIN VALLEY from EAST CENTRAL NY up NORTH to the CANADIAN BORDER --This was the scene of several invasions and fights from the Colonial Era through the War of 1812. Lake Champlain is a long, narrow lake running north-south in northeast New York state through the mountains of that region. It's north end puts one close to the St. Lawrence River between Montreal and Quebec. It's south end puts one not too far from Albany NY and the Hudson River. --Given that waterborne transportation made the best means for moving troops and supplies in those days—especially if the alternative was mountain wilderness, as it was here--the lake was a great avenue of approach and line of communication for invading armies coming from Canada into New York/New England or going from New York into Canada and two of its largest towns. (See maps textbook pp. 33, 54.) --Note that British General John Prevost aims to advance from Canada along the west side of Lake Champlain. His aim: advance south down eastside New York state and isolate New England. ---US Army BGEN Alexander Macomb places his small army on the lake's west shore at Plattsburgh. His strong defensive position is balanced by Prevost's 2.5:1 advantage in troops. --Both sides have small fleets on Lake Champlain. While land fighting may be important, both sides understand that the fleet that owns the lake makes overland advance very difficult for its enemy. --Before attacking Macomb, Prevost waits for his small lake fleet to dispatch the small US naval force under Thomas MacDonough. As the book recounts, MacDonough wins the naval fight on 11 September. --With the Americans now in control of the lake, Prevost has no 'lake LOC' to support further advance, and is also flanked by MacDonough's ships. Impact: First, Prevost retreats. Second, New England, which is upset about the war, cannot be isolated by the British (and possibly coaxed by the British into secession). Third, the Lake Champlain defeat helps convince the British government to end the war. Last, the US does not counter-attack into Canada, but at least confirms its sovereignty by thwarting an invasion.

Battle of Brandywine

Battle during which the Continental Army unsuccessfully tried to stop the British from marching into Philadelphia (1777) --After the Brandywine defeat, Washington didn't immediately abandon Philadelphia. Instead he tried to set up one more defense west of the Schuylkill River.

A lesser-known but important Patriot success at Lake Champlain:

British General Carleton could have come down Lake Champlain, secured northeast New York State, and perhaps made things even worse for Washington just north of NYC; but Benedict Arnold's motley boat flotilla slows his advance. Thusly denied the chance to use Lake Champlain before winter, Carleton later retreats to Canada, waits for the next spring, and saves Washington and the Patriot cause further worry.

'Unity of Command,' (U of C), Continued.

Candidates will often use any faulty command-relationship situation to claim that poor Unity of Command existed. While such cases can yield U of C problems, they can also produce needless legalistic hair-splitting. You should understand that history, this course, and the Army say that simple command arrangements—that is, one person in charge--are the best ones. That's our main point regarding the Unity of Command Principle of War. However, since command-relationship issues often arise regarding U of C, here are two common scenarios and rough guidelines. What if the subordinate commanders did not execute the commander's orders? If they understood the commander was in charge and failed to execute as directed, then U of C was not the issue. If they failed to execute because they didn't think that person was their commander, then a U of C problem existed. What if the commander split key assets among subordinate commands? That would be a U of C problem if the subordinates then believed the commander had no authority over those assets. If the subordinates knew the commander was in charge and followed his/her orders regarding said assets, then U of C was not the issue—even if this setup slowed the commander's ability to control the assets.

COUNTERINSURGENCY ('COIN'):

Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes

The Invasion of New York, July-August 1776

For William Howe --Experience / Naval superiority. He can move and land anywhere he wants, and with a well-trained, experienced army. --Memory of Bunker Hill = 'Find, fix, and flank,' not head on attack; Howe repeatedly outflanks Washington and at least twice has a chance to cut him off and destroy his army, but . . . . --Howe does not exploit the opportunities aggressively. Why? ---Warfare style. Howe is too cautious and also moves in the plodding Continental style of the time. ---Underestimation of enemy resolve. Howe believes the beaten Patriots will want to negotiate. For Washington --Has no navy and cannot stop British naval moves --Is repeatedly flanked and occasionally faces being trapped at Long Island, Manhattan Island, and Harlem Heights --Inexperienced army and leaders—and a realization about 'holding on': lose the city but save the army so the rebellion can survive. =Washington loses tactical fights to British veterans and loses NYC, but escapes a worse fate. Washington hadn't read Sun Tzu, whose writings weren't translated to English until much later. However, the New York campaign taught Washington that even if his army was beaten, the rebellion had a chance if the army still existed. Thus a judicious retreat from NYC kept Washington's force alive. Washington still wanted to fight and to have an army to beat the British in direct conventional battle, but he also used more subtle tactics to ensure some success while preserving his army. Candidates sometimes conclude incorrectly that Washington 'chickened out' and abandoned NYC to protect his army from even fighting Howe. He fought hard and frequently to stop Howe's advances there—note the number of battles. But he lacked a navy to help him defend the Long and Manhattan Islands; and he and his army lacked campaign experience. He couldn't stop being turned, and thus being forced to choose between encirclement/ destruction and retreat/survival

Friction

Friction: the intangible force that makes the apparently easy task so difficult. Reducing Friction, by Sun Tzu, c. 500 B.C. --Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his head before the battle. --The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. Four ways to reduce friction, by GEN George C. Marshall, 1.Discipline that triumphs over fatigue and danger 2. A thorough grasp of the task involved 3. A real grasp of real simplicity 4.A real grasp of correct methods for maintaining control

THE LEVELS INTERACT

Further, success in one doesn't always imply success in another, and failure in one doesn't mean failure in another. Finally, note that there is no sharp borderline between the levels.We're more interested in how the levels interact, not in precise classification

METT-TC

How well does a commander assess and act upon these factors? Mission: Does the commander understand/execute the mission well? Enemy: Does the commander understand the enemy's dispositions, capabilities, and/or courses of action well? Terrain (& Weather): Does the commander understand visibility, fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and/or cover? (Does the commander anticipate/exploit weather effects?) Troops (Support): Does the commander know/use his command, its capabilities/weaknesses, and available support well? Time: Is the commander aware of time constraints, tempo, or time-related opportunities, and how well does he handle them? Civil Considerations: Does the commander know/handle the local environment, culture/politics, civilian strengths/weaknesses, events, and/or organizations well?

1777 Philadelphia Campaign, Battle of Brandywine

Howe fixes and flanks Washington yet again. However, as at NYC, Washington saves his army and retreats, leaving Philadelphia vulnerable to the British. See pp. 77-79 for battle details. NOTES: Unlike the textbook, no other source recounts a failed Patriot attempt to ambush the British envelopment. Instead, they describe Washington's desperate attempt to move forces to his right flank as he discovers almost too late that Howe is moving a large force against it. Note also that American regulars are the predominant force in this battle. They fight hard and prevent a rout, but at this stage of the war are not as proficient as the British at close-quarters linear combat.

Operational Level

In-theater forces; large tactical units (~armies & above) ops that can have strategic results ('the campaign') As a distinctly different level of war, the operational level is a relatively new concept in the history of war, and some even describe it more as a 'mind-set approach' to fighting than an actual level of war

RESTRAINT

Limit collateral damage and prevent unnecessary force. Restraint does not mean avoidance of all force; instead one avoids force that creates more problems instead of less—or problems which can promote censure for one's actions. Note the tie-in to the Legitimacy principle; excessive force can undermine it, especially in COIN ops

HOW TO ANALYZE MILITARY HISTORY: PRINCIPLES OF WAR

MASS OBJECTIVE SURPRISE SIMPLICITY MANEUVER OFFENSIVE SECURITY UNITY OF COMMAND ECONOMY OF FORCE --RESTRAINT --PERSEVERANCE --LEGITIMACY

Battle of Princeton (1777)

METT-TC: Washington knows he faces an overconfident Enemy in Lord Cornwallis, who thinks he has Washington trapped against the Delaware River at Trenton. Washington takes advantage of Terrain/Weather in his flank march because he moves through a seemingly impassable swamp made passable by a hard freeze. His Timing is impeccable, as he moves his main force quickly enough to strike Cornwallis's rear forces before Cornwallis learns of the move. For this battle, Washington must coax veteran Troops to remain in service for one more fight; and he must also lead a large group of newcomers. He does both, especially in battle when he rallies his faltering attack personally. Principles: Princeton is a classic case of using certain Principles to enable others. Washington uses Economy of Force and Security to sell the fake: just enough troops and deceptive activity to convince Cornwallis that Washington remains in Trenton. These Principles enable Washington to Maneuver to achieve Mass and Surprise with his main body against Cornwallis's rear forces at Princeton.

The Battle of Trenton

METT-TC: Washington's Mission is clear: a battlefield victory before his army and perhaps the rebellion disintegrate (Civil Considerations). Timing and Enemy work together because Washington knows a Christmas-night strike in bad weather against an overconfident Enemy has a good chance of working. Having cobbled together a small force of veterans (5000-7000), he knows his Troops and leads them physically in a miserable-weather, nighttime crossing of the Delaware River. Timing again works as he coordinates his two attacking forces well. Principles: Washington Maneuvers his force in two prongs in a bold Offensive move, which is a Surprise because it is Christmas and the German mercenaries don't expect it. The two forces converge to achieve Mass at the point of contact. Thus he achieves his clear Objective, which is to destroy the German camp.

Eve of Trenton and Princeton

MILITARY DEFEAT, COLLAPSING SUPPORT —WASHINGTON NEEDS A VICTORY NOW TO BOLSTER THE ARMY AND THE COUNTRY'S MORALE.

LEGITIMACY

Maintain legal, political and moral authority in one's operations. One must establish and maintain the government's authority, as well as the validity of its actions. This may require brute force, BUT one must act in accordance with existing laws and moral guidelines. Legitimacy helps not only in theater, especially in COIN operations, but also with homefront support.

METT-TC

Mission, Enemy, Terrain (& weather), Troops (support), Time, Civil considerations As with the Principles of War, not all items will apply to the action we analyze, but they do provide a useful tool for doing so. (See next slide for explanation of each item.)

The Battle of Paoli Tavern

On 21 Sept., Howe sent Gen. Charles Grey to hit Wayne's men via an unusual (for that time) night attack. Grey's force attacked with unloaded arms to prevent accidental firings which would nullify Surprise. Thusly prepared, the British surprised and decimated Wayne's men. (Interestingly, Wayne would conduct a similar and equally successful attack at Stony Point in 1779.)

War of 1812 Results

National unpreparedness & fortunate end --Regulars / Militia; performance by both was uneven, but overreliance on militia did not pay off --Logistics / Support: Atrocious --Poor strategic thought by both civilian and military leaders --Aims: ---Treaty resolves nothing (e.g., pre-war Royal Navy harassment) ---Canada not taken, but Indian threat to Old Northwest mostly ends ---British sea power not challenged ---But at least sovereignty is confirmed as U.S. shows late in the war that it can handle British attacks—and at least shows that British harassment of U.S. concerns incurs a stiff price. National unpreparedness & fortunate end Regulars / Militia; Logistics / Support Poor strategic thought by both civilian and military leaders Aims: Treaty resolves nothing --but at least sovereignty in confirmed

Battle of Newport August 1778

Newport, Rhode Island, August 1778, Friction in battle plans, coalition warfare, and subordinates After Monmouth Clinton continued his retreat into NYC. Washington then aimed to take NYC with French naval help; but because the French fleet under Count d'Estaing had trouble crossing into New York harbor, the new allies decided to eject the British from Rhode Island instead (not the state, but a dominant island in that state's Narragansett Bay that was also called Rhode Island). John Sullivan would command the American forces attacking Rhode Island, which consisted of mixed militia and regulars. He was to cross from the main shore to a landing on the east side of the island while the French fleet landed Marines on the island's west side. The landings were supposed to be simultaneous, but friction intervened in the form of the subordinate commanders' confused execution of the plan. Pp. 88-89 D'Estaing first had to wait while the Americans gathered their forces. Then Sullivan landed on the island in advance of the agreed-upon time, infuriating d'Estaing. Meanwhile the British commander on Rhode Island, Robert Pigot, withdrew to the island's south end at Newport to set up more secure defenses. Sullivan tried to crack the British lines with only his own forces, but could not do so. D'Estaing was about to land his Marines when Richard Howe's British fleet appeared, and the French had to withdraw to face this threat. After the two fleets spent two days maneuvering for advantage, a storm arose and d'Estaing elected to take his storm-damaged ships to Boston for repair. The dismayed Americans applied pleas, cajolery, and insults (especially from Sullivan) to get him to resume the Rhode Island operation Upset by the insults and fearing that Howe's fleet might trap his ships in Boston, d'Estaing took his outnumbered fleet south to avoid Admiral Howe and also to seize objectives in the West Indies. The French departure and the storm were too much for the American militia on Rhode Island, who were discouraged by the former and not prepared for the latter. They deserted in droves, and left Sullivan with a weakened command. As there were also rumors of a British counterattack with reinforcements, Sullivan withdrew his depleted force north up the island to defensive positions. As Sullivan retreated north, Pigot's British troops attacked the Americans in a confused running battle. Under pressure, the American retreat remained orderly and did not degenerate into a rout. To avoid being trapped by Admiral Howe's British fleet (a reverse of the situation that Pigot had so recently faced), Sullivan's forces retreated off the island and further north up into Rhode Island state. Ironically, Howe disappointed his British Army counterpart just as d'Estaing had disappointed his American allies—he withdrew to chase d'Estaing. Later, the British would abandon the island to the Americans, but this first combined, coalition assault showed that the alliance's joint military operations needed work.

OAKOC

OBSERVATION/FIELDS OF FIRE (FoF). Does the terrain confer advantages or disadvantages in detection and in directing fires? AVENUES OF APPROACH accounts for all of the above in determining the likely path of advance, whether it's one's own or the enemy's. This course also uses it to consider usable LOCs. KEY TERRAIN gives the force holding it distinct advantage. It accounts for the rest of OAKOC, among many other things. OBSTACLES can be natural or artificial. Creating an interaction between the two can disrupt, fix, turn, or block an enemy. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Roughly the converse of Observation/FoF, but note that cover deals with protection and concealment deals with stealth.

Levels of War

Strategic, Operational, Tactical

British Aims and Problems

Subdue American revolt by force --Later in the war, salvage as much influence in North America as possible Advantages: --Excellent navy --Good, if small, army --Wealthy, powerful country --'Tories' and Indians British Problems: In-Theater Disunity of Command. British commanders in America often did their own thing, even if there was a designated theater commander. --Misunderstood the 'people's war' nature of this rebellion. Thus, they pursued a flawed strategy: an evolving search for a single winning move (seize a key seaport/town, win a battle). --'War on the cheap': they did not expand their own army enough, and instead hired German mercenaries --They did search for local support, but too often misused locals, Tories and Indians --Logistics must come from England --Suppression was very tough given terrain, size, and 'people's war' -- and Britain didn't understand the nature of the war anyway

European ('Old World') Warfare in Transition

Tech improvements promoted firearm dominance which, along with society, environment and the state, was one factor in changing tactics Thus, from the early 1600s to the time of the Revolutionary War, 'boxy' mixed pike/musket formations evolved to linear all-musket formations with artillery and heavy cavalry. But whether pikes or muskets, squares or line, large, tight units & harsh discipline remained to achieve mass, cohesion, and survival, and to maximize weapon effects in order to achieve organized combat aims.

Jackson's Creek War Campaign (Offensive / lcls & outside help / HSB):

Tecumseh's Legacy: The Creek Civil War, which Becomes a War of 1812 Theater. --Recall Tecumseh's 1811 visit to the southern tribes (slides 101-102). Most of them weren't interested in his message of spiritual revival and unified resistance against white American expansion. --However, part of the Creek Confederacy was interested. The Creeks were a mostly unified group of tribes and clans that occupied most of what is modern-day Alabama and west Georgia. Those Creeks who embraced Tecumseh's message were called Red Sticks. In spring 1813, a civil war erupted between the Red Sticks and those Creeks still loyal to the U.S. --The fighting spurred local white concern; and during summer 1813 south Alabama whites and loyal Creeks built forts while a white/Loyal Creek militia unit lost a skirmish with a Red Stick band. --Reacting to the skirmish, the Red Sticks planned and executed a successful attack upon Fort Mims, north of Mobile.The Red Stick warriors took the fort and massacred many of its inhabitants. --The Ft. Mims Massacre provoked hysteria and dynamic action among southern whites, who feared an overall Indian uprising and who also suspected (incorrectly) direct British involvement. The federal government sanctioned a three-pronged campaign—from west, east, and north--into Creekland to crush the Red Sticks. --Given the Red Stick movement's small size (estimated ~8000), lack of resources, and bad tactical/operational decisions to fight directly and defend certain spots (recall spiritual influence), the US should've crushed it in a couple of months. --Instead the campaign took about nine months because the same problems that bedeviled other War of 1812 campaigns appeared here. All three prongs suffered from bad logistical support and short militia enlistments (recall the 1792 Act's limits). Both the western and eastern forces advanced into Red Stick land and defeated Red Sticks as they tried to defend fixed positions at such places as The Holy Ground and Calabee Creek; but then these forces either stalled or fell apart due to the above-mentioned shortfalls. --Andrew Jackson commanded the north prong out of Tennessee. Jackson's fierce resolution would overcome adversity, which arose early in the campaign. As he moved south, contract supplies either moved far too slowly or not at all. Unfazed, Jackson exploited good intell about Red Stick actions to move fast and beat the Red Sticks badly in two battles in northeast Alabama (the textbook's p. 145 narrative gets details and event sequence wrong). --Besides Jackson's legendary natural aggressiveness, a concern for local loyalties impelled his risky, even reckless moves. His volunteers, militiamen, and fellow citizens in Tennessee wanted quick decisive action. Delays and incompetence could breed mutiny. Though the Cherokees joined Jackson's task force, a faction in that tribe had once shown interest in the Red Stick cause—Jackson took care to retain Cherokee loyalty. Loyalties among some Creeks were unstable. The first of the two above-mentioned battles involved Jackson showing all of the above groups that he was in earnest. In the other battle, Jackson acted quickly to rescue a group of Red Sticks who switched sides and now needed protection from their erstwhile allies. --Then various problems undid Jackson's early success. His over-extended LOC across the Tennessee River and over South Appalachian ridges failed. His army lacked food, and starvation loomed. Further, both volunteer and militia service obligations were ending for many troops. Both factors bred a mutinous camp atmosphere that Jackson suppressed alternately with cajolery and bold threats of violence. --By December 1813, Jackson finally had to release those men whose terms had expired. Fortunately for him, he had a small number of loyal Tennesseans and Cherokees who continued to harass the Red Sticks, who in turn were apparently too pre-occupied with the other Army advances to deal with him. --Tennessee's governor was a Jackson political ally who answered Jackson's angry demands for replacements by sending a small, interim force of short-term volunteers. In January 1814 Jackson further showed Offensive resolve by using these troops and Indian allies--only 800 men--in a daring reconnaissance-in-force deep into Red Stick land. --The theater commander, Josiah Pinckney, rewarded Jackson's aggressiveness by sending him a regiment of regular infantry. Tennessee's governor sent Jackson more militia and volunteer levies as well as supplies. Jackson disciplined these forces harshly—to include a controversial execution of an insubordinate private—in an effort to prevent the mutinies and desertions of the previous fall. By March 1814 Jackson was ready to march on the Red Sticks' last big stronghold at Horseshoe Bend Jackson's March 1814 Battle of Horseshoe Bend 1 --Jackson's ~3000-man mixed force of militia, volunteers, regulars, and loyal Creeks and Cherokees encircled about ~1000 Red Sticks at a horseshoe-shaped bend in the Tallapoosa River. --The Red Sticks had built a formidable log wall at the base of the river peninsula, and thus defended a fortified position in a conventional manner. Since the surviving Red Sticks left no records, we don't know why they left the tip of the bend undefended and passively allowed Jackson's forces to surround them; but the nature of the Red Stick movement and previous Creek War battles suggest they believed spiritual forces would help—after all, the two other prongs into Creek land had failed. (The Red Sticks had also escaped previous defeats.) --Jackson aimed to breach the wall with artillery and have his main forces exploit same. Meanwhile other units, to include allied Cherokees and Creeks, would establish a cordon on the opposite banks of the riverbend. --The bombardment did not breach the wall, but Jackson won anyway. Rather than sit idle as a blocking force, Jackson's Cherokee allies seized the initiative, overran the undefended tip of the bend, and distracted the Red Stick warriors facing Jackson's main force at the wall. --Rather than reprimand the Cherokees for exceeding orders, Jackson exploited the chance to hit the distracted Red Sticks from two directions. His massed forces assaulted and overran the wall in pitched fighting. Thusly pressed from two sides, the Red Stick warriors fought hard but futilely in an hours-long, close-quarters melee. Nearly all Red Stick fighters refused surrender demands. Most of those who tried to escape by the river were picked off by the blocking force's sharpshooters. About 300 Red Sticks survived—mostly the non-combatants who were at the fort—but Jackson and his troops crushed the Horseshoe Bend Red Stick force and, with it, snuffed any serious remaining Red Stick resistance. --On page 146, the textbook dismisses the impact of Jackson's campaign and the Creek War. This is incorrect. Note that by spring 1814 Napoleon had been defeated in Europe, and the British could now focus more upon the US. British officials arrived in Florida to set up an Indian campaign, but discovered they were too late. Instead, they encountered only Red Stick refugees. The rest of the Creek Confederacy and the other tribes shunned the British presence. One wonders what the British might have been able to do if the Red Sticks had not been beaten. --Sidenote.This was one of the reasons why Jackson's post-Horseshoe Bend treaty with the Creeks was so harsh.In it, the Creeks had to cede a large portion of their western and southern lands to the US.Land greed was one reason for the cession.Jackson's legendary vindictiveness was another.A third was that the Creeks would be that much further removed from any British support from the Gulf coast

William Howe takes and holds Philadelphia after battles with Washington's army (pp. 77-81).

Though he has lost Philadelphia, Washington sees a chance to strike an isolated outpost just northwest of Philly at Germantown village. It's a case of Maneuver versus Simplicity, as the map shows. Washington's troops lack the training and experience to execute the plan, and the British refuse their flank by retreating a short ways and forcing the Patriots to attack head on. --After Paoli Tavern, Washington quit Philadelphia. On pp. 79-81, the book recounts his unsuccessful early-October effort to strike some of Howe's army at Germantown, northwest of Philly. --In spite of the British victory, Howe's army was still not completely secure in Philadelphia. Patriot Forts Mercer and Mifflin guarded the Delaware River just southwest of Philly, and thus threatened Howe's riverine LOC into town. --Through October and November, the British made vain attempts to take the forts, losing many men and a couple of ships in the process. By late November, however, the British finally overwhelmed the forts. --The loss hurt Patriot morale but distracted Howe long enough to allow Washington to establish a strong defensive line on hills north of Philly. --The Battle of Whitemarsh.In early December Howe fruitlessly probed this line before returning to winter quarters in Philly

Strategic Objectives of the War of 1812 for America and Britain (Britain in 1814 too)

UNITED STATES --Take Canada ---Defeat Indian threat ---Obtain bargaining chip --End Royal Navy harassment? At least use privateers . . . . --Confirm sovereignty—especially as the war goes on and the US encounters various predicaments GREAT BRITAIN: --Defeat Napoleon Bonaparte = distraction à 1814 --Hold Canada --Blockade U.S. 1814 Continued Yet Again --Peace talks underway for most of the year; Great Britain focuses upon optimizing peace terms --To optimize terms, Britain makes its own 3-prong attack: ---Invade through upstate NY (where?) ---Raid US coastal cities ---Seize mouth of the Mississippi River --With these British objectives, the American to confirm sovereignty will become urgent.

The Battle of the Clouds

Unphased, British General William Howe resolved to fix and flank Washington again; and was in the process of doing so on 16 September west of Paoli PA. Then a big rainstorm hit, which did two things: it soaked everybody's gunpowder and paper cartridges; and it turned the battlefield into a morass. The battle had to stop. The interlude allowed Washington to escape. --Washington still did not completely abandon Philly. He left a screening force led by General Anthony Wayne between Philly and the British.

INSURGENCY

organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region