PHIL 120W WEEK 1 - WEEK 15

Important Note

can be objective moral truth independent of religion

Benatar argues that the phrase "a life worth living" is

" a life worth living" is problematically ambiguous between: - a life worth starting - a life worth continuing - *meaning* that you can have a life worth continuing once it is started, even if that life was not worth starting in the beginning *he believes* the "goodness threshold" for *a life worth continuing* is lower than the threshold for *a life worth starting* *example* monopoly - the game monopoly is not worth starting, it's frustrating, takes hours, no point, but once you are committed to the game they are worth finishing

Quote Shafer-Landau

"from the face that we each have a right to our opinions, nothing at all follows about their plausibility" - making premise 1 false in the *equal rights argument*

*Green's Objection* to Sandel's Giftedness and Mastery Argument

(1) Genetic enhancements carry risks that are not justified by the attempt to improve a future child beyond correcting for diseases and disabilities. (2) (According to Green) the Principle of Procreative Beneficence is *false* - creating the best possible life for one's child is *supererogatory*. (3) (According to Green) we are not able to reliably identify "non-disease related" traits that will make an individual's life better *for these reasons*, *Green concludes* that *genetic enhancement* of embryos is *not morally obligatory*

In evaluating a *slippery slope argument* consider two things

(1) How likely is the result at the "end of the slope"? (2) How bad is the result at the "end of the slope"?

*According to Doerflinger*, allowing voluntary active euthanasia as a general rule would have very bad consequences:

(1) It would likely reduce our respect for human life. (2) It would likely lead to active killings which are clearly not morally permissible (including instances of involuntary active euthanasia). (3) It would likely cause terminally ill elderly individuals to feel pressure to opt for death

*Respecting the Autonomy of Others requires* that we both:

(1) allow (competent) others to make decisions about their own lives (2) refrain from interfering with their associated actions unless these actions would significantly harm and/or violate the rights of third parties

Expressivism or Ethical Emotivism (type of Ethical Nihilism)

(a) denies that there are any moral features in this world (b) claims that there is nothing for moral judgements to be true of (c) analyzes moral judgements as expressions of emotions, orders, or commitments - *"view that moral claims are neither true nor false; moral claims have no truth value"* - just expressing emotion or issuing a command

LaFollette Potential Special Reason #1

*(1) individuals have a moral right to raise children* - he states its a *conditional right* (right that is subject to satisfying some conditions) in this case demonstrating competence *EXAMPLE* - the right to *drive* if you have a current license and are not intoxicated A unless B is equivalent to If not B, then A

LaFollette Potential Special Reason #2

*(2)* A parent licensing requirement would deprive some individuals of the opportunity to do something they highly value - he states there could be courses (parenting classes) to help you gain your competence - he states having more than one attempt

LaFollette Potential Special Reason #3

*(3)* A parenting licensing requirement would be used in an unfairly discriminatory fashion - he responds by saying this would imply to another licensing requirements and it's not the licensing requirement its rather the individual

LaFollette Potential Special Reason #4

*(4)* A parent licensing requirement would be unenforceable - he states that people will do what they want to do and their is no way to track

Question for what makes an action pious or holy

*1. Actions are pious/holy because the gods love them.* - if true then anything randomly loved by gods will be pious/holy *2. The gods love actions because these actions are (independently) pious/holy.* - if true then there is some standard of morality which is prior to/independent of love of the gods

ALWAYS *INVALID* arguments

*1. Affirming the Consequent* If P, then Q Q Therefore, P *2. Denying the Antecedent* If P, then Q Not P Therefore, not Q

ALWAYS *VALID* arguments

*1. Modus Ponens* If P, Then Q P Therefore, Q *2. Modus Tollens* If P, then Q Not Q Therefore, not P *3. Hypothetical Syllogism* If P, then Q If Q, then R Therefore, if P then R *4. Disjunctive Syllogism* Either P or Q Not P Therefore, Q

Response Strategies for Ethical Subjectivism

*1. Relativizing to Speakers* - when a person says action "x" is morally right (or wrong), this means it is morally right (or wrong) for me to perform action "x" EXAMPLE: if I say lying is morally wrong that means it is just morally wrong for me to lie *2. Reinterpreting Moral Claims as purely Descriptive Claims* - when a person says action "x" is morally right (or wrong) this actually means "I think that action "x" is morally right (or wrong) EXAMPLE: if I say lying is morally wrong that means I think lying is morally wrong *both strategies remove contradictions from ethical subjectivism claims*

Counterexamples to Objection 8

*1. Two children are drowning in front of you* - you have the ability to save one, and only one, child - you need to choose which of the two to save. - one child is your child, and the other child is a stranger's child. - saving the stranger's child will maximize overall well-being - *according to act utilitarianism*, you are morally obligated to save the stranger's child

Claims *not made* by Act Utilitarianism

*1.* An action is morally permissible if and only if it increases well-being - merely increasing is not good enough, must maximize *2.* An action is morally permissible if and only if it promotes the well-being of the greatest number of individuals - create the most aggregate happiness possible regardless of how it is divided up - can use reducing the well-being of some people *3.* Actions which do not produce well-being are always morally wrong - you might have an unfortunate situation where all your options are bad and anything you do will reduce well-being - if this is the case you are morally obligated to do from your options the thing that reduces the well-being the least

Four Response Strategies for Cultural Relativism

*1.* Deny that cultures can every overlap *2.* Identify a plausible "ranking system" to determine which culture "wins" in cases of overlap *3* In cases of overlap, let individuals choose which culture governs the moral status of their actions *all three of these strategies are problematic* *4. The "Most Relativist Strategy* - argue that contradiction objection (unfairly) assumes that there is such a thing as "morally wrong, period" - *can be denied* by insisting that there is only morally wrong, relative to a particular culture

Rights *belong to individuals*

*1.* If I *violate* one of your rights, I do something *wrong to you*. - ethicists say I have "wronged you." *2.* most easily *understood* when contrasted with wrong actions on an *act utilitarian view* - If I significantly decrease your happiness by failing to maximize overall well-being, I have acted (morally) wrongly according to act utilitarianism. - I haven't wronged you, just was relevant simply as a location of well-being (or failed to maximize your overall well-being)

Ross's Proposed List of Prima Facie (Pro Tanto) Duties

*1.Fidelity:* - keeping our promises, being faithful to our word. *2. Reparations:* - repairing harm that we have done. *3. Gratitude:* appropriately acknowledging benefits that others have given us. *4. Justice:* - ensuring that virtue is rewarded and vice is punished. *5. Beneficence:* - enhancing the intelligence, virtue, or pleasure of others *6. Self-improvement:* - making oneself more intelligent, virtuous *7. Non-maleficence:* - preventing harm to others *this list is not exhaustive*

Support for Premise 2 of Collapse Objection

*2.* If AU and RU always yield the same moral verdicts, then RU collapses into AU. - the point of rule utilitarianism was to solve problems with act utilitarianism - *if the two views always yield the same moral verdicts*, then rule utilitarianism cannot solve any of these problems

Support for Premise 3 of Collapse Objection

*3.* But if AU and RU ever yield different moral verdicts, then RU violates the justification for utilitarianism - fundamental part of the justification for utilitarianism is that well-being is the only intrinsic good - *point of ethics* is to increase the good. - AU always requires maximizing well-being...

Two Distinctions (Negative and Positive) can intersect to yield four different categories of rights

*A*: negative legal right - the legal right to not be killed - the legal right to not be assaulted *B* negative moral rights - the moral right to not be killed - the moral right to not be assaulted *C* positive legal rights - the right to be provided with an attorney when charged with a criminal offense - the right of children to be given a primary school education *D* positive moral rights - *dispute whether these rights exist - the moral right of newborns to be provided with nutrition - the moral right of orphaned toddlers to be provided with shelter *rights in A and B* are technically two different rights - supported by the possibility that an individual could lose one without losing the other - *example*: under an unjust government one might lose one's legal right not to be killed while retaining one's moral right not to be killed *rights in D* are unlike the others because there is a disagreement whether individuals actually have any positive moral rights - philosophical libertarians believe individuals have strong/absolute negative moral rights but not positive (view that coercive redistributive taxation is morally unacceptable)

Brake's Defense to (2) Amatonormativity Privilege of Enduring Romantic Relationships is Morally Wrong

*Brake Argues* - that enduring romantic relationships are not in themselves more valuable than friendships

*Brake's Explanation* Why adding a romantic/sexual component would automatically make a relationship more valuable?

*Brake argues* this would be because *(1) the enduring romantic relationship is more valuable to its members (refers to individual well-being)* - some people flourish in friendships more than in romantic relationships (vice versa) *(2) caregiving within an enduring romantic relationship has greater moral value than caregiving within a parallel friendship (consider parallel cases)* - *example* one person caring for someone who has cancer, in one case the caregiving is a close friend and in the other it is a spouse. - her thought is that sex or romance to the relationship does not make the care more valuable *conclusion* - enduring romantic relationships are not in themselves more valuable than parallel friendships - amatonormative distinction is incorrect

Brake's Defense to (1) Amatonormativity Privileges Enduring Romantic Relationships

*Brake defends by*: - noting legal privileges connected to marriage (such as taxes, immigration, inhieratents) - noting that relationships other than enduring romantic relationships (friendships) are viewed as providing much less weighty social reasons than enduring romantic relationships. (exception are parent child relationships) *she believes that enduring romantic relationships in general benefit from amatonormativity*

Procedure for Employing the *First Formulation*

*First, you have an inclination to do something* *THEN* (1) identify the maxim on which you would be acting (2) consider a world in which everyone acts on your maxim (3) determine whether, in such a world, you would still be able to achieve your purpose. *if you can still achieve your purpose*, it is morally permissible for you to act on your maxim (maxim is universalizable)- napping or drinking coffee *if you cannot still achieve your purpose*, it is not morally permissible for you to act on your maxim - *lying problem*, lie in order to receive benefits for themselves - lie exists only against a background of truth telling

*Objections #1* to General Hedonism

*Hedonism—and thus classical (act) utilitarianism—is "a doctrine fit for swine"* - "encourages us to pursue base physical pleasures" - raised against the classical utilitarians, says that the view implausibly encourages us to pursue base, physical pleasures. *but hedonists* - typically value a wide range of pleasures—including emotional, aesthetic, and intellectual pleasures.

Objection 4 to Act Utilitarianism

*If we are to act morally according to AU, we need to obsessively focus on calculating well-being* *act utilitarianism* can make a distinction between *decision procedures* and *standards of moral rightness* - *act utilitarianism* is committed only to the view that *maximizing overall-wellbeing* is the correct standard of rightness - use "rule of thumb" as a better decision procedure

Objection 3 Act Utilitarianism

*If we are to act morally according to act utilitarianism, we need access to unavailable information about the future* *because act utilitarianism* requires us to maximize well-being for all beings capable of well-being (forever into the future) - in many cases we are not able to know enough about the future consequences of our actions to determine whether they will maximize overall well-being

Kant's Two Arguments to Support this View

*Kant's View*, it is not possible to wrong a non-human animal *Argument 1*: - many non-human animals belong to moral patients (people). Thus, if you harm a non-human animal without the permission of the person to whom it belongs, you wrong that person *example*: - it would be morally wrong for me to destroy your car without your permission even though cars are obviously not moral patients - my action wouldn't wrong the car, but it would wrong you. *Argument 2*: - Kant proposes that when we are cruel to non-human animals, this can make us more likely to be cruel to persons. - cruelty to animals "hardens one's heart" such that one has fewer qualms with harming people *is an empirical claim* - plausibility is questionable - appears to be appealing to consequences here

Kant Characterizes a *Virtuous Person* as

*Kant's view* the easiest cases of identifying morally praiseworthy action are those in which an individual acts *entirely from duty* - person *need not* be virtuous in the Aristotelian sense - as *praiseworthy Kantian may always* need to force him or herself to do the right thing

*Objections* to Kant's Categorical Imperative *Second Formulation*

*Objection 1*: - the notion of treating someone as an end (or not as a mere means) is vague, and so the principle is difficult to apply *Objection 2*: - the principle assumes that we are genuinely *autonomous*, but that assumption may be false *Objection 3*: - the principle assumes that the morality of our actions depends only on what we can autonomously control, but the existence of *moral luck* calls this into question. *Objection 4:* The principle cannot explain why those who lack rationality and autonomy are deserving of respect.

Defense to *Premise 1* of Shrage's Central Argument

*PREMISE 1* - If plural marriage is not in itself worse than dyadic marriage, then plural marriage should be legally recognized unless either it is unavoidably harmful to individuals or is unmanageable at the governmental level *defense* - idea behind this principle is that if one relationship is not in itself better than another, then these relationships should be treated legally the same unless doing so is harmful to individuals or similar legal treatment is practically unmanageable. - *simply put* if two relationships are similar in the fundamental values they produce, then the relationships should be legally treated the same unless there is a good reason to not treat the same

Defense to *Premise 1* of Brake's Concluding Argument

*PREMISE 1* 1. If a form of discrimination both is based on an incorrect evaluative distinction and burdens one group while benefiting another, then that discrimination is pro tanto morally wrong. -this principle would discrimination explains why many "ism's" (sexism, ageism, etc.) are morally wrong. - they wrongfully assume that one sex or age is better than another - these "isim" burden one group and benefit the other

Defense to *Premise 2* of Shrage's Central Argument

*PREMISE 2* - Plural marriage is not in itself worse than dyadic marriage. *defense* Shrage's idea here is that plural marriage can serve the same sort of human goods as dyadic marriage *example* plural marriage can serve the purpose of romantic companionship, emotional support, creating a child raising unit

Defense to *Premise 2* of Brake's Concluding Argument

*PREMISE 2* 2. Amatonormative discrimination both is based on an incorrect evaluative distinction and burdens one group while benefiting another *Brake has already argued separately for each part of this premise* 1. she argued that the value claim inherent in a amatonormative is incorrect 2. she argued that amatonormative benefits the group of those in enduring romantic relationships while disadvantaging those who do not fit this type of relationship

Defense to *Premise 3* of Shrage's Central Argument

*PREMISE 3* - Plural marriage is not unavoidably harmful to individuals. *defense* - "unavoidably" is important - Shrage concedes that in the actual world some plural marriages may be bad for their members - Her claim is that plural marriages can be arranged such that they are not harmful to their members - plural marriages can be in-egalitarian meaning they unfairly burden one gender as opposed to another (she claims this is not a necessary part of plural marriage)

Defense to *Premise 4* of Shrage's Central Argument

*PREMISE 4* - Plural marriage is not unmanageable at the governmental level. *defense* Shrage suggests that we could use multi-party commercial partnerships as a model for the formation/dissolution of plural marriages and the distribution of marital entitlements (such as property and inheritance) - she is not claiming at a commercial partnership is the same as a marriage, but they have things in common such as legal rules in how they are formed/dissolved and how the goods in the partnership are distributed.

Contradiction Argument (against Cultural Relativism)

*PREMISE* 1. Any view that generates a contradiction is incorrect 2. Cultural relativism generates contradictions *CONCLUSION* Therefore, cultural relativism is incorrect

Contradiction Argument (against Ethical Subjectivism)

*PREMISE* 1. Any view which generates a contradiction is incorrect 2. Ethical Subjectivism generates contradictions *CONCLUSION* Therefore, ethical subjectivism is incorrect - contradiction occurs when two individuals sincerely endorse inconsistent moral claims

Simple Cultural Differences Argument (against Cultural Relativism)

*PREMISE* 1. Different societies have different moral codes *CONCLUSION* Therefore, no moral claims are objectively true *this argument is not valid*

Moral Equivalence and Progress Argument (against Cultural Relativism)

*PREMISE* 1. If cultural relativism is correct, then moral equivalence is correct 2. If moral equivalence is correct, then significant moral progress is impossible 3. Thus, cultural relativism is correct, then significant moral progress is impossible 4. But significant moral progress is possible *CONCLUSION* Therefore, cultural relativism is incorrect *moral progress* is becoming morally better

Social Reform Argument (against Cultural Relativism)

*PREMISE* 1. If cultural relativism is correct, then the actions of social reformers are (almost always) morally wrong 2. But it is not the case that the actions of social reformers are (almost always) morally wrong *CONCLUSION* Therefore, cultural relativism is incorrect

*VALID* Cultural Differences Argument (against Cultural Relativism)

*PREMISE* 1. Societies disagree about all moral claims 2. If different societies disagree about action X, then there is no objective truth about action X *CONCLUSION* Therefore, no moral claims are objectively true *this argument is valid* - but both of the premises look implausible - premise 1 is debatable, premise 2 is false

Tolerance Argument (in favor of Cultural Relativism)

*PREMISE* 1. Tolerance is valuable only if cultural relativism is true 2. Tolerance is valuable *CONCLUSION* Therefore cultural relativism is true *if cultural relativism is correct* - then it is true that we are morally required to be tolerant only if our culture holds that we must to be tolerant *if ethical error theory or expressivism/emotivism is correct* - then it cannot be true that we are morally required to be tolerant *if ethical subjectivism is correct* - then it is true that we are morally required to be tolerant only if a speaker believes it to be the case *if ethical objectivism is correct* - then it gives us a reasons to be tolerant since we could very easily be mistaken in our moral views

LaFollette's Secondary Argument for Parent Licensing

*Premises* 1. If current competency restrictions on adoptive child-raising are morally justified, then parallel competency restrictions on child-raising in general are also morally justified 2. Current competency restrictions on adoptive child-raising are morally justified *Conclusion* Therefore, competency restrictions parallel to those in adoption cases are justified for child-raising in general *secondary argument* of LaFolletee relies on an argument from analogy between adoptive parenting and biological parenting

LaFollette's Central Argument for Parent Licensing

*Premises* *jointly sufficient conditions* *1.* Child-raising *(a)* is potentially seriously harmful to others (plausible) *2.* Child-raising *(b)* requires at least minimal competence in order to be performed safely (plausible) *3.* We *(c)* have moderately reliable procedure for identifying child-raising competence *Conclusion* Therefore, individuals ought to be subject to a licensing requirement prior to raising a child

Benatar's Visual Asymmetry Argument (Chart)

*Scenario A* X exists (1) Presence of Harm (Bad) (2) Presence of Benefit (Good) - if X exists then X will experience some harm and benefit *Scenario B* X never exists (3) Absence of Harm (Good) (4) Absence of Benefit (Not Bad) - if X does not exist then X will not experience any harm or benefit

Suppose the GOAL to end (non-human) animal suffering

*Shafer-Landau argues* - it is acceptable to include the behavior of others in the formulation of one's maxim - *given that* so many others will purchase meat that one's own purchase does no harm - one actually isn't making an illegitimate exception for oneself in making ordinary individual meat purchases

Final Consequentialist Point

*Shafer-Landau concedes* - some instances of meat-eating could be morally wrong according to *maximizing consequentialism* - specific circumstances could render a single case of meat-eating morally obligatory, according to *act consequentialism*

Virtue Ethics

*Shafer-Landau concludes by arguing* that the best defence for moral vegetarianism is *virtue ethics* *general idea behind virtue ethics as a defense* - is that factory farming is cruel and the good person would not support or participate in a cruel practice (even if individual support/participation neither causes harm nor violates rights.)

Nicomachean Ethics

*Sphere* - fear and boldness - physical pleasures - (giving/taking) money - money (expenditures) - great honors - honors - anger - pleasures in conversation - self-presentation - amusing others *Deficiency* - cowardice - nameless - avariciousness -shabbiness - littleness of soul/humility - spiritlessness/passivity - contentiousness/moroseness - self-deprecation - boorishness *Mean (Virtue)* - courage - temperance/moderation - open handedness - magnificence/munificence - greatness of soul - mildness -friendliness - truthfulness - wittiness *Excess* - rashness/foolhardiness - self-indulgence/profligacy - wastefulness -tastelessness/vulgarity - conceit/vanity - irascibility - obsequiousness/ingratiation - imposture/boastfulness - buffoonery

*Objections #2* to General Hedonism

*There are plausible intrinsic goods other than happiness* - consider Nozick's "experience machine"

Objections to LaFollette's Central Argument

*Three General Strategies for Objecting* *1. reject premise 1* - either deny that harmful activities ought to require licensing or deny his conditions are correct criteria for licensing *2. reject premise 3* - argue there is no truth about what counts as parenting competency - argue that we lack the knowledge necessary to identify parenting competency - reasonable disagreement *3. special reasons* - argue to weaken the 1st premise and the conclusion to say that parent licensing ought to be required unless there are very strong reasons against it

Lack of Moral Guidance Objection (to virtue ethics)

*What should happen when multiple moral virtues come into conflict?* - *virtue ethicist can say that* one should do whatever the "virtuous person, acting in character" would do...but this may often be quite unclear - *virtue ethicist can give a "partners in guilt" response:* none of the views we've considered are able to completely avoid worries about lack of clarity in complicated cases - *also concerns regarding cases in which a situation requires moral evaluation*, but NONE of the virtues are clearly applicable

Objection 8 to Act Utilitarianism

*act utilitarianism does not allow for sufficient partiality towards one's friends and family* *because* - maximizing overall well-being may require you to benefit others instead of your family and friends - act utilitarianism counts everyone's well-being equally, - so act utilitarianism may require you to benefit strangers even though this is very bad for your family/friends

Objection 7 to Act Utilitarianism

*act utilitarianism doesn't allow for the direct relevance of backward-looking reasons* *because* act utilitarianism is focused entirely on maximizing current and future well-being, it cannot take backward-looking considerations directly into account. - *if act utilitarianism is correct*, then backward-looking reasons are relevant only if they are relevant to current and/or future well-being maximization. *counterexamples* - "Lawn-Mowing and Child Hunger Charity" - "Lawn-Mowing and Expensive Shoes" - "Lunch with Grandma vs. Party"

Objection 9 to Act Utilitarianism

*act utilitarianism is too demanding* - the objection states that act utilitarianism requires us to always do the very best thing we can and this looks to be very demanding *according to peter singer* - argues that while we really are always required to maximize overall well-being, we tend to fool ourselves into believing that very large personal sacrifices aren't morally required. - *act utilitarianism* does not require us to do the impossible, it requires us to perform whichever action will maximize overall well-being form the actions available to us - *act utilitarianism* respects a common ethical principle called *ought implies can*

Objection 2 to Act Utilitarianism

*act utilitarianism renders insignificant, purely personal choices morally relevant* *act utilitarianism* requires us to always maximize overall well-being - it yields the result that minor choices (*ex* which breakfast to eat in the morning) are morally relevant, even if they impact only the person making the decision *counterexamples* - "toast vs. cereal" - "nap vs. Netflix

Objection 10 to Act Utilitarianism

*act utilitarianism renders supererogatory actions impossible* *because* act utilitarianism always requires us to perform the very best action available, there is simply no room to go beyond what is required *if two actions are tied as the well-being maximizers* - neither is better than what is morally required

Objection 6 to Act Utilitarianism

*act utilitarianism requires the violation of individual moral rights* *because violating someone's moral rights may maximize overall well-being in specific cases - act utilitarianism requires that we always maximize overall well-being - act utilitarianism may sometimes require the violation of individual moral rights *counterexamples* - roman gladiators - small town sheriff - everybody hates fred

Objection 5 to Act Utilitarianism

*act utilitarianism* - is inconsistent with any actions being intrinsically morally right or intrinsically morally wrong. *because act utilitarianism* focuses entirely on consequences - it can't hold that internal features of actions are ever morally relevant

Rights (General Definition)

*are claims belonging to individuals *claims either* *1.* *prohibit others* from acting in particular ways toward the individual rights-holders *2.* *require others* to act in particular ways toward the individual rights holders. - *moral rights* and *legal rights* are both instances of the general definition of rights

Aristotle (act appropriately)

*aristotle starts, one ought to act appropriately* - one acts in accordance with reason if and only if one acts appropriately. - *he believes* appropriate action must fall between to extremes *too much* and *not enough* (goldilocks apporach) *example* - What is an appropriate amount of studying for this course? (Not too much, and not too little) - What is the appropriate amount of concern to have for your children? (Not too much, and not too little.)

Objection 1 *Simple* Desire-Satisfaction View of Well-being

*desire satisfaction is not a necessary condition of something being good for you* - things are good for you eventhough you did not desire them Examples: *pleasant surprises* - involves someone not wanting it ahead of time but is beneficial for you *benefitting small children* - giving vegetables to a child benefits their health even though they do not want it *protecting suicidal individuals* - it is good to save the life of a suicidal individual enough if they actually desire to die

Objection 2 *Simple* Desire-Satisfaction View of Well-being

*desire satisfaction is not a sufficient condition to contributing to someone's well being* Examples: *desire based on false beliefs* - article about vitamin C helping you reduce weight, so you have it only for this reason, but it turns out it is false (it is not good for me) - pushes desire-satisfaction theorist towards informed desire satisfaction view (IDSV)

Objection *Informed* Desire-Satisfaction View of Well-being

*even informed (and instrumentally rational) desire satisfaction still is not a sufficient condition to make something good for you* Example: *stranger on a plane* - on a plane talking to a stranger, that tells you that they are working on a novel, you do not care about fiction or reading but you say "I hope this novel gets published and you desire that" - you get off the plane and never find out that the book gets published - publishment of the book is good for you bc you desired that it happened even though you never knew it happened - pushes the desire-satisfaction theorist to self-regarding informed desire satisfaction view (SRG-IDSV)

Examples of Aristotle's Primary GOAL

*example #1* What makes for a good knife? - a knife is a good knife if and only if it is effective at cutting. *example #2* What makes for a good U-Haul truck? - a UHaul truck is a good U-Haul truck if and only if it can effectively and efficiently move numerous or heavy objects. *example #3* What makes for a good doctor? - a doctor is a good doctor if and only if he or she effectively and regularly improves the health of his or her patients.

Francione and Charlton's Central *Back Up* Argument

*for premise 1 of the central argument* *premise* 1. If a being has any moral rights, then it has moral status. 2. Sentient animals have at least some moral rights. *conclusion* Therefore, sentient animals have at least some moral status *use Tom Regan's argument for a defense of premise 2*

Benatar on Harms and Benefits

*he cites psychological literature to argue* - that we are bad judges of whether our lives are good overall *(a) pollyannaism* - in order to get by we trick ourselves to think that things are going ok, when they are not. - pollyanna, a movie character that was an extremely cheerful person in the face of suffering *(b) accommodation/adaptation/habituation* - points to evidence that if a person says "lose a limb" and say ahead of time that life is not worth living, they will adapt *(c) comparison* (to other unfortunate humans) - our comparison on how well our lives are going is dependent on how well other people's lives are going - if your life going better than someone else's, this shows that your life is not going as badly as their (does not mean it is going well) *benatar notes* that *pleasures* tend to be less intensive, less frequent, and harder to achieve than *pains* - you have to try to avoid pain, but pleasure does not come that easy - this means that we will have more suffering then pleasure (benefits) in our live

Most Plausible Contender for Objective Component of Human Well-being

*health*

NOTE

*if rule utilitarianism* ever requires anything other than what *act utilitarianism* requires, then it requires doing something that does not maximize well-being - violating a fundamental part of utilitarianism.

Benatars Claims

*in defending this Anti-Natalist view, he makes the following 4 claims* *1*. presence of harm is bad *2*. presence of benefit is good *an asymmetrical evaluation applies to the absence of harm and absence of benefit:* *3*. absence of harm is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone *4*. absence of benefit is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation *in other words* absence of benefit is bad, only if there is someone who is not getting the benefit

Thomas Mappes Believes

*mappes argues* - it is impossible to treat a person as a mere means with her valid consent *according to mappes* - getting an individual's valid informed consent already counts as adequately considering her goals and desires

Difference Between *Moral Agents* and *Moral Patients*

*moral agents* - beings which can have moral obligation - are being that can act morally rightly or wrongly *moral patients* - beings (or things) to whom or which moral obligations can be owed - are beings (or things) which can be treated morally rightly or wrongly - *according to utilitarians*, include all, and only, beings which are capable of well-being (ex: ability to suffer) - adult humans with count as both moral patients and moral agents

Importance of Moral Justification Argument (against Ethical Subjectivism

*moral justification*: involves having reasons in support of moral views *PREMISE* 1. If ethical subjectivism is true, then having reasons in support of one's moral views is unimportant 2. But having reasons in support of one's moral views is important *CONCLUSION* Therefore, ethical subjectivism is not true - NOTE: If both premises are true, the conclusion as to be true

Principle of Consensuality

*occurs in cases where no third parties are harmed* - an individual's valid consent to a particular treatment is *always sufficient* to render that treatment *morally permissible* *supported by* - the thought that if someone (who is competent to consent) gives valid consent to an interaction, then that person has freely and autonomously chosen that interaction

Examples of Cannibalism

*passive survival cannibalism* - the donner party - morally permissible *active survival cannibalism* - dudley and stephens *passive non-survival cannibalism* - passive ritual cannibalism *active non-survival cannibalism* - jeffrey dahmer - is morally wrong, bc killing someone is morally wrong

One's Action *does no overall harm* whenever

*possibility 1* - the action results in no negative consequences, *possibility 2* - the negative consequences in which the action results are outweighed by the positive consequences of the action

Shafer Landau's Response to Reductio Argument

*premise 1 is false*. - plausible version of the claim is instead: If each ordinary meat purchase contributes zero to the overall total of meat purchases, then the aggregate of all ordinary meat purchases is zero. *plausible premise will not help the reductio argument*, the claim says nothing about harm

Sandel Rejects the Autonomy Argument

*premise 1* - given that nobody gets to choose the traits with which they are born, modifying those traits prior to birth is not an autonomy violation - *unless* implausibly, simply being born violates a newborn's autonomy

"Knock Down" defense to Argument from Disagreement

*premise 1* is not helpful to argue against ethical objectivism - "note that well-informed, open-minded people persistently disagree about ethical skepticism" - if premise 1 of argument is true, then ethical skepticism could not be objectively true

Argument from Occam's Razor

*premise* 1. A thing exists only if it is explanatorily indispensable (necessary to explain what happens in the world). 2. Neither moral facts nor moral principles are explanatorily indispensable *conclusion* Therefore, neither moral facts nor moral principles exist TERMS USED *explanatorily indispensable*: something is necessary to explain what happens in the world *moral fact*: particular instance of some moral property *moral principle*: general moral rule (ex: lying is always morally wrong) - *premise 2 is difficult to reject*, but can be rejected by arguing that moral principles are indispensable because they explain the truth of moral facts - problem is that it's mysterious what these could explain, outside of the realm of ethics

Possibility of Moral Argument Argument *example*

*premise* 1. All actions that dehumanize people are immoral 2. Torture dehumanizes people *conclusion* Therefore, torture is immoral *if expressivism is correct* - this argument cannot function as a standard valid argument - premise 1 is neither true nor false

*Equal Moral Value* Argument (Regan's Argument #2)

*premise* 1. All beings who have inherent moral value have it equally. 2. Standard adult humans have inherent moral value. 3. Many non-human animals have inherent moral value (the conclusion of argument #1) *conclusion* Therefore, many non-human animals have the same inherent moral value as standard adult humans *objection to this argument* would be through premise 1

*Subjects of an Experienced Life* Argument (Regan's Argument #1)

*premise* 1. If a being is the subject of an experienced life, then that being has inherent moral value - *inherent moral value:* meaning intrinsic value or moral value in itself and beyond usefulness to others 2. Many non-human animals are the subjects of experienced lives *conclusion* Therefore, many non-human animals have inherent moral value (morally important in itself) *his idea* is that all subjects of an experienced life have value beyond the value of their usefulness to others *he states* that it is *always morally inappropriate* to treat subjects of an experienced life as *resources* to others

*Moral Rights* Argument (Regan's Argument #3)

*premise* 1. If another species as the same inherent moral value as standard adult humans, then members of that species have moral rights. 2. Some non-human animals have the same inherent moral value as standard adult humans. (the conclusion of argument #2) *conclusion* Therefore, some non-human animals have moral rights. - or all non-human animals subject to an experienced life have moral rights - *it is at least possible* for other species to have *moral rights* without having moral rights *identical to ours* - *even if not identical to our moral rights*, non-human animals rights will still be especially weighty moral considerations - *he is not saying merely* that non-human animals are morally relevant, but is anything they actually have moral rights

*The Bad People Argument* (Objection to Ethical Error Theory)

*premise* 1. If ethical error theorist must be bad people, then ethical error theory is false 2. Ethical error theorists must be bad people *conclusion* Therefore, ethical error theory is false *premise 2 is clearly false* - some ethical error theorists may be "bad people", but ethical error theory does not ensure that they must be. (ethical error theorist could be very kind and trustworthy - just they do not think it's morally required to be) *premise 1 is false* - the character of those who endorse a view does not make that view true or false - *example* of an *ad hominem attack*

Universality Argument

*premise* 1. If ethical objectivism is correct, then moral requirements are universal. 2. But moral requirements are not universal *conclusion* Therefore, ethical objectivism is incorrect

*Possibility of Moral Argument Argument* (Objection to Expressivism)

*premise* 1. If expressivism is correct, then moral claims can never function as premises in a valid argument 2. But moral claims can function as premises in a valid argument *conclusion* Therefore, expressivism is incorrect

Divine Perfection Argument (against Divine Command Theory)

*premise* 1. If the divine command theory is true, then a morally perfect God could have created a flawless morality that required us to rape, steal, and kill, and forbade us from any acts of kindness or generosity 2. A morally perfect God could not have issued such commands—anyone who did so would be morally imperfect. *conclusion* Therefore, the divine command theory is false. - some respond by saying god would not command evil things, but if DCT is true then (moral) evil did not exist prior to god's selection of commands

*Argument from Disagreement* (Objection to Ethical Objectivism)

*premise* 1. If well-informed, open minded people persistently disagree about some claim, then that claim cannot be objectively true 2. Well-informed, open minded people persistently disagree about all ethical claims *conclusion* Therefore, no ethical claims are objectively true - is about individual disagreement and not cultural disagreement *premise 2 is doubted* - because some moral rules are shared by all cultures *premise 1 is easy to reject* - there are easy counterexamples - *ex* well informed open-minded people can persistently disagree about whether Bigfoot exists, none the less whether he exists or does not exist must be one or the other

Sandel's Giftedness and Mastery Argument

*premise* 1. It is morally wrong to treat children as a project to be mastered (rather than as a "gift"). 2. Human cloning and genetic enhancement treat children as a project to be mastered (rather than as a "gift"). *conclusion* Therefore, human cloning and genetic enhancements are morally wrong

Francione and Charlton's Central Argument

*premise* 1. Sentient (conscious) animals have at least some moral status. 2. It is pro tanto morally wrong to treat a being with moral status as property. *immediate conclusion* (3) Therefore, it is pro tanto seriously morally wrong to treat any sentient (conscious) animal as property. 4. (Of necessity) it is true that the status of "pet" treats pets as property *conclusion* Therefore, it is pro tanto morally wrong to restrict any sentient (conscious) animal to the status of a pet *the argument is valid*, you must reject a premise to disagree with the conclusion

*The Argument from Equal Rights* (Objection to Ethical Objectivism)

*premise* 1. If everyone has an equal right to an opinion, then all opinions are equally plausible 2. Everyone has an equal right to his or her moral opinion *intermediate conclusion* 3. Therefore, all moral opinions are equally plausible (could leave out of the argument and it would still be valid) 4. If all moral opinions are equally plausible, then ethical objectivism is false *conclusion* Therefore ethical objectivism is false - premise 4 is clearly true, premise 2 is highly plausible, premise 1 is clearly false *ethical objectivism is morally incompatible with moral equivalence*

Benatar's Asymmetry Argument

*premises* *1*. If an action unnecessarily harms an actual person, then that action is morally wrong unless both: (is pro tanto wrong) (a) the harm is minimal (b) the harm is adequately compensated with benefits. *2*. Bringing a person into existence always unnecessarily harms an actual person. *intermediate conclusion*- cannot reject premise 3 without rejecting 1 or 2 *3*. Therefore, bringing a person into existence is morally wrong unless both: (a) the harm is minimal (b) the harm is adequately compensated with benefits. *4*. The harm to persons brought into existence is never minimal. (Thus, (a) is not met.) *5*. And the harm to persons brought into existence is never adequately compensated with benefits. (Thus, (b) is not met- life contains more suffering than benefit) *conclusion* Therefore, bringing a person into existence is always morally wrong - if you accept premise 3, benatar only needs either premise 4 or 5, does not need both

Collapse (Fethishism) Objection

*premises* *1.* Either act utilitarianism (AU) and rule utilitarianism (RU) always yield the same moral verdicts, or they sometimes yield different moral verdicts. *2.* If AU and RU always yield the same moral verdicts, then RU collapses into AU. *3.* But if AU and RU ever yield different moral verdicts, then RU violates the justification for utilitarianism. *conclusion* Therefore, either RU collapses into AU or RU violates the justification for utilitarianism - argument is *valid* - *premise 1* cannot be false, it is a necessary truth - if *premise 2 and premise 3* are true, then the conclusion is true (bad for rule utilitarianism) *rule utilitarianism* is in trouble if it is pointless or in violation of the justification of utilitarianism

Slippery Slope Arguments take the form

*premises* - If we allow X, then this will lead to Y. - Y is morally wrong and/or very bad. *conclusion* Thus, we ought not to allow X *slippery slope* is not a formally *valid argument form*

Scientific Confirmation Argument

*premises* 1. A claim is true only if it is scientifically confirmable. 2. No objective moral claims are scientifically confirmable. *conclusion* Therefore, there are no objectively true moral claims - premise 2 is highly plausible - premise 1 is false *called the confirmation test* is self-refuting meaning that if it is true then it has to be false (bc premise one is not scientifically confirmable)

Atomic Particles (Responses to Occam's Razor Argument)

*premises* 1. A thing exists only if it is explanatorily indispensable. 2. Nothing but subatomic particles is explanatorily indispensable. *conclusion* Therefore, nothing but subatomic particles exist(s) - If premise 1 is accepted, then nothings but subatomic particles will exist. (if you believe this conclusion is false, then reject the occam's razor argument)

The Euthyphro Argument (against Divine Command Theory)

*premises* 1. Either God has reasons that support His commands, or God lacks reasons for his commands. 2. If God lacks reasons for his commands, then God's commands are arbitrary—and that renders God imperfect, undermining his moral authority. 3. If God has reasons that support his commands, then these reasons, rather than the divine commands, are what make actions right or wrong—thereby refuting the divine command theory. 4. Therefore, either God is imperfect, or the divine command theory is false. 5. God is not imperfect. *conclusion* Therefore the divine command theory is false - premise 1 is a necessary truth

Argument Against Autonomy (Objection 2)

*premises* 1. Either our choices are necessitated or they are not. 2. If they are necessitated, then we do not control them, and so we lack autonomy. 3. If they are not necessitated, then they are random, and so we lack autonomy. *conclusion* Therefore, we lack autonomy - *premise 1* is a necessary truth (one must be true, cannot reject this premise) - *premise 2 and 3* have available objections to both

Autonomy Argument (Objection)

*premises* 1. Genetic enhancement of embryos violates the autonomy of the resulting persons. 2. Violating the autonomy of a person is pro tanto seriously morally wrong *conclusion* Therefore, genetic enhancement of embryos is morally wrong *pro tanto seriously morally wrong* means that it is seriously morally wrong unless there are stronger moral reasons which override its moral badness

Doerflinger's Response to (the Autonomy Argument)

*premises* 1. If (successfully) acting on a choice would eliminate the possibility of future autonomous choice, then respecting that choice cannot be defended by appealing to respect for autonomous choice. 2. (Successfully) acting on a choice to end one's life always eliminates the possibility of future autonomous choice. *conclusion* Therefore, respecting another person's choice to end his life cannot be defended by appealing to respect for autonomous choice *this is a slippery slope argument*

Normative Facts (Responses to Occam's Razor Argument)

*premises* 1. If Occam's Razor is correct, then normative facts don't exist. 2. But normative facts do exist. *conclusion* Therefore, Occam's Razor is false *normative facts* say what ought to happen or what would be good, do not say what actually does happen

*Existence of Amoralists Argument* (Objection to Expressivism)

*premises* 1. If amoralists exist, then the correct metaethical view should be able to accommodate the existence of amoralists 2. Amoralists exist 3. Expressivism cannot accommodate the existence of amoralists *conclusion* Therefore expressivism is not the correct metaethical view

Reductio Argument

*premises* 1. If each ordinary individual meat purchases causes zero harm, then the sum harm caused by the aggregate of all ordinary individual meat purchases is zero. 2. Each ordinary individual meat purchases causes zero harm. (assumed for reductio) *conclusion* Therefore, the sum harm caused by the aggregate of all ordinary individual meat purchases is zero

Universality Argument (Sense #1 of Universal)

*premises* 1. If ethical objectivism is correct, then moral requirements are *accepted by everyone*. 2. But moral requirements are not *accepted by everyone* *conclusion* Therefore, ethical objectivism is incorrect - ethical objectivism does not require universality to be accepted by everyone (people can be wrong in objectivism) - if universal sense #1 is used *premise 1 is false* so the conclusion is false

Kant's Argument Against Happiness

*premises* 1. If happiness is intrinsically good, then each instance of happiness is (at least a little bit) good. 2. But there are instances of happiness which are not good at all. *conclusion* Therefore, happiness is not intrinsically good *intrinsically good* means that it is good in itself, independent of any consequences or side effects. - *kant states* that instead of focusing on *happiness*, only thing which is good without qualification is the *good will*

Two Worlds Argument

*premises* 1. If hedonism about well-being is true, then W1 and W2 are equally good. 2. But W1 and W2 are not equally good. *conclusion* Therefore, hedonism about well-being is false

Argument for Autonomy

*premises* 1. If hedonism about well-being is true, then autonomy contributes to a good life only as it makes us happy. 2. Autonomy sometimes directly contributes to a good life, even when it fails to make us happy. *conclusion* Therefore, hedonism about well-being is false. - if autonomy contributes to your well-being apart from how happy it makes you, then hedonism about well-being must be false

False Happiness Argument (against Hedonism about well- being)

*premises* 1. If hedonism about well-being is true, then our lives go well entirely to the extent that we are happy. 2. It's not the case that our lives go well entirely to the extent that we are happy; those whose happiness is based on false beliefs have worse lives than those whose happiness is based on true beliefs, even if both lives are equally happy *conclusion* Therefore, hedonism about well-being is false *most common objection* (marriage example) - you have two people that are equally happy - first person is happy bc they believe things are true - second person is happy bc they believe things are false - you might believe that the first person's life is going better than the second person's life

Trajectory Argument (against Hedonism about well- being)

*premises* 1. If hedonism about well-being is true, then the overall quality of a life depends entirely on the amount of happiness and unhappiness it contains. 2. The overall quality of life depends on at least one other factor: whether one's life reflects an "upward" or "downward" trajectory (distribution) *conclusion* Therefore, hedonism about well-being is false - if distribution or trajectory or happiness matters, above the amount then something else is also relevant to overall well-being

Categorical Reasons Argument

*premises* 1. If morality is real, then there are objective moral standards that supply us with categorical reasons 2. But there are no objective standards that supply us with categorical reasons *conclusion* Therefore, morality is not real *note* - ethical subjectivism and cultural relativists will reject premise 1 because they believe morality is real just not "objective" - there may also be counterexamples to premise 2 involving objective, categorical reasons regarding belief and rationality

Shrage's Central Argument on Plural Marriage

*premises* 1. If plural marriage is not in itself worse than dyadic marriage (2 person marriage), then plural marriage should be legally recognized unless either it is unavoidably harmful to individuals or is unmanageable at the governmental level. 2. Plural marriage is not in itself worse than dyadic marriage. 3. Plural marriage is not unavoidably harmful to individuals. 4. Plural marriage is not unmanageable at the governmental level. *conclusion* Therefore, plural marriage should be legally recognized. *is a valid argument, so if all 4 premises are true then plural marriage should be legally recognized*

Epistemic Parallel Argument

*premises* 1. If reasons for belief are variant, then so are moral reasons. 2. Reasons for belief are variant *conclusion* Therefore, moral reasons are variant *serious objection to each premise of this argument

Argument against Animals

*premises* 1. If the principle of humanity is true, then animals have no rights. 2. If animals have no rights, then it is morally acceptable to torture them. 3. Therefore, if the principle of humanity is true, then it is morally acceptable to torture animals. 4. It isn't morally acceptable to torture animals. *conclusion* Therefore, the principle of humanity is false *Kant claims* it is often morally wrong to be cruel to non-human animals - *Kant accepts* premises 1 and 4 - *Kant rejects* premise 2

*Argument from Contradiction* (against Absolutist Pluralism)

*premises* 1. If there is more than one absolute moral rule, then those rules are bound to conflict at some point. 2. If absolute rules ever conflict, then this generates a contradiction. 3. If a theory generates a contradiction, then it is false *conclusion* Therefore, any theory that endorses the existence of more than one absolute moral rule is false

Rachel's Active Euthanasia Argument

*premises* 1. If there is no intrinsic moral difference between killing and letting die then: in each specific case of parallel killing/letting die whichever is more benevolent is morally better. 2. There is no intrinsic moral difference between killing and letting die. *intermediate conclusion* (3) Therefore, in each specific case of otherwise parallel killing/letting die, whichever is more benevolent is morally better. 4. There are cases in which killing a terminally ill individual (upon her request) is more benevolent than letting that individual die. *conclusion* Therefore, there are cases in which killing a terminally ill individual (upon her request) is morally better than letting that individual die

*The Argument from Disastrous Results* (Objection to Ethical Error Theory)

*premises* 1. If widespread acceptance of a view would lead to disastrous results, then that view is false 2. Widespread acceptance of ethical error theory would lead to disastrous results *conclusion* Therefore, ethical error theory is false - open question whether premise 2 is true - premise 1 is clearly false

Consent Argument (Objection)

*premises* 1. It is morally wrong to bring a person into existence without his or her consent. 2. Genetically-enhanced individuals do not consent to being brought into existence. *conclusion* Therefore, it is morally wrong to bring genetically-enhanced individuals into existence *if premise 1 is true*, then procreation is always morally wrong

Laws Require Law-Makers Argument

*premises* 1. Laws require law-makers. 2. Thus objective laws require nonhuman law-makers. 3. So if there are objective moral laws, these have a nonhuman author. 4. The only available nonhuman author is God *conclusion* Therefore, if there are objective moral laws, then they are authored by God

Argument from Atheism (individuals who do not believe in god)

*premises* 1. Morality can be objective only if God exists. 2. But God does not exist. *conclusion* Therefore, morality cannot be objective - premise 2 is rejected (false and unsound) for those who think god exists - premise 2, agnostics should withhold judgement - premise 2 is accepted by agnostics - premise 1 is rejected then by agnostics bc the only reason to accept the first premise relies on the "Laws Require Law-Makers" Argument which is not a plausible argument

Shafer Landau's Inefficacy Argument

*premises* 1. One is morally free to do as one likes so long as one does no overall harm. ( consequentialist premise ) 2. Ordinary individual meat purchases do no overall harm. ( inefficacy premise ) *conclusion* Therefore, one is morally free to make ordinary individual meat purchases

Irvine's Dilemma Argument (Baby-Ranching Business though experiment)

*premises* 1. Unless there is a *significant, morally-relevant difference* between cows and humans, then either: it is morally permissible to eat the flesh of both, or it is not morally permissible to eat the flesh of either. 2. There is *no significant, morally-relevant difference* between cows and humans. *conclusion* Therefore, either: it is morally permissible to eat the flesh of both cows and humans, or it is not morally permissible to eat the flesh of either. - *premise 1* is clearly true - *baby ranching business case*, babies are being raised to be consumed just as animals - Irvine is denying that there is a morally relevant difference, not just a difference

Universality Argument (Sense #2 of Universal)

*premises* I1. f ethical objectivism is correct, then moral requirements *apply to everyone*. 2. But moral requirements do not *apply to everyone* *conclusion* Therefore, ethical objectivism is incorrect. - ethical objectivism does entail that there are objective moral requirements which apply to all moral agents - if universal sense #2 is used, premise 1 is true but premise 2 begs the question against ethical objectivists

Brake Concluding Argument

*premises* 1. If a form of discrimination both is based on an incorrect evaluative distinction and burdens one group while benefiting another, then that discrimination is pro tanto morally wrong. 2. Amatonormative discrimination both is based on an incorrect evaluative distinction and burdens one group while benefiting another *conclusion* Therefore, amatonormative discrimination is pro tanto morally wrong

Objection *Self-Regarding Informed* Desire-Satisfaction View of Well-being

*self-regarding, informed desire satisfaction still is not a sufficient condition of something being good for you* Examples: - feeling empty after getting exactly what you rationally wanted - never finding out that your self informed regarding desire was satisfied - impoverished desires

More Disagreement about specific *moral claims* then there is in *natural science claims*

*this disagreement is explained by the following:* 1. we may fail to correctly consider others' circumstances 2. we often have more "at stake" in ethical matters - individuals that have a lot at stake in resolution of scientific question, causes disagreement to increase

Objection 1 to Act Utilitarianism

*two versions of this objection* 1. *it is not possible* in practice to perfectly measure well-being. 2. *it is not possible*, even in principle, to measure well-being. - the second if correct, is a much bigger problem for Act utilitarianism

Absolutism Argument

*uses a Modus Tollen Form:* - If P then Q, but not Q therefore not P *premises* 1. If ethical objectivism is correct, then moral requirements are absolute. 2. But moral requirements are not absolute. *conclusion* Therefore, ethical objectivism is incorrect.

Question for Evaluating the Principle of Consensuality

*whether there are relevant counterexamples* - Could there be cases in which a competent person with all relevant information validly consents to a particular treatment, yet in which it would still be wrong to treat the person in that way? *connected to the question* of whether it is possible to treat a person as a *mere means*

Two Steps to Brake's Argument

- (1) Amatonormativity privileges enduring romantic relationships. - (2) The privilege in enduring romantic relationships is morally wrong. *concludes* - amatonormativity privileges enduring romantic relationships

Physician-assisted suicide

- (a physician) giving a patient the means to kill himself *example* - a physician gives a terminal patient a lethal dose of morphine, knowing that the patient intends to use it to end his life

Richard Doerflinger

- *Doerflinger argues* that even if there is no bare difference (that is, no intrinsic difference) between killing and letting die, there are not enough cases in which (all future consequences considered) killing is morally better than letting die to justify legalizing voluntary active euthanasia

Categorical Reasons Argument (*example*)

- *EX* Suppose that I believe that today is both Friday and Tuesday, and *none* of my goals or desires supports getting rid of this belief *If you do have a reason to give up your beliefs* - it looks like this would be an objective, categorical reason and a counterexample to premise 2 (of the categorical reasons argument)

Middle Ground Position of Consequentialism

- *Kant believes* that consequences are never directly morally relevant - *Utilitarians believe* that consequences are the only morally relevant considerations - *middle ground* consequences are morally relevant along with other considerations (such as intentions, action types, moral rights)

Kant's Categorical Imperative *First Formulation*

- *Kant states*, act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law - act *only* on universalizable maxims

Innocent Threat and Innocent Shield of a Threat

- *Thomson concludes* that in a limited number of cases, *nature or other people* can cause an individual to lose claims against being killed - *EXAMPLE:* the well was nature, in the tank case it was the bad guy (F) to lose the claim on being killed - *Thomson argues* that this can happen *only* when the relevant individual is a *threat* or is *shielding a threat* - in both cases the relevant person is innocent, but in the *innocent shield of a threat case* the innocent person is not himself a threat

Villainous Aggressor and Innocent Aggressor

- *Thomson notes* we might say that it is because *B and E are aggressing against someone* that they lose their claim against being killed - *important to understand that Thomson states* in these cases that killing the aggressor is the only way to survive. - *Thomson concludes that the reason why both B and E lose their claim against being killed* is that each will violate a strong claim of someone else's if not stopped.

Self Evidence

- *a claim is self-evident* if (1) it is true (2) adequately understanding it is enough to make you justified in believing it *ross denies* that propositions about what one's all things considered duty is in any situation are *self-evident*

Brake Argues in many cases that

- *amatonormative discrimination* is not justified by strong competing reasons - she concludes that in many cases *amatonormative discrimination* is all-things-considered morally wrong

Brake's Central Claim

- *amatonormativity* *wrongly* privileges the central, dyadic, exclusive, enduring amorous relationship associated with, but not limited to, marriage. - "amatonormativity wrongly privileges the general sort of relationships exemplified by a marriage" - amatonormativity disfavoring of a marriage style relationship wrongful privileges relationships of that type - using this term *amatonormativity* as a parallel to *heteronormativity*

Shrage Argument on Plural Marriage

- *consensual bigamy* should be *decriminalized* - *plural marriage* should be *legally recognized* *decriminalizing bigamy* is not the same as *legally recognizing* plural marriages

Shafer-Landau argues that neither

- *consequentialism nor deontology* is in a good position to defend a moral prohibition on what he calls "ordinary individual meat purchases"

Francione and Charlton's Central Argument *premise 1*

- *defending premise 1* does not require an appeal to animal rights. - Francione and Charlton can simply appeal to the widespread view that there is at least some moral limit to what we may permissibly do to non-human animals - *they argue* that animals are not mere things, they are *moral patients* - *they argue* that if a particular being has any moral rights at all, it is pro tanto morally wrong to treat that being as property

Benefits of Hedonism about Well-being and Desire Satisfaction Theories

- *flexible regarding "models" of the good life* (something that is good for me might not be good for you- parenting) - *individual authority over one's own well-being* (you are the best authorities to what makes you happy or unhappy) - *allows for exceptions to general claims about what contributes to individual well-being* (somethings seem good for almost everyone (ex friendship) but this view allows for the small group of people that do not favor this) BENEFIT OF ONLY DESIRE SATISFACTION - *completely avoids appeals to objective values*

Kant's View on Moral Community

- *moral community* (or moral patients and moral agents) includes all, and only, *rational agents* - moral community refers to beings that are morally important *according to Kant* - there *cannot* be moral patients that are not moral agents - moral patients and moral agents are *coextensive*, - *rational agency* is both necessary and sufficient for membership in each category - *no actual non-human animal* is a moral patient (meaning they are not rational agents)

Moral Equivalence Argument (against Ethical Subjectivism)

- *moral equivalence*: the equal (im)plausibility of all moral views *PREMISE* 1. If ethical subjectivism is true, then moral equivalence is correct 2. But moral equivalence is not correct *CONCLUSION* Therefore, ethical subjectivism is not true

Moral Infallibility Argument (against Ethical Subjectivism)

- *moral infallibility*: the impossibility of having incorrect moral views *PREMISES* 1. If ethical subjectivism is TRUE, there are nearly morally infallible 2. But we are not nearly morally infallible *CONCLUSION* Therefore, ethical subjectivism is not true - we experience a great deal of moral debate, making ethical subjectivism not true

Utilitarians View of Moral Patients

- *moral patients include* (most, if not all) nonhuman animals because non-human animals are capable of suffering - *allowing utilitarians* to explain why it is often morally wrong to seriously harm nonhuman animals - *according to act utilitarianism*, there are *moral patients* that are not *moral agents* *utilitarians take the capacity for suffering* - as a necessary and a sufficient for moral patients - do not take this condition to be sufficient for being a moral agent

Aristotle's Conclusion

- *primary goal* is to identify what it takes for someone to be a good person *he concludes* - An X is a good X if and only if it performs its function well - a person is a good person to (and only to) the extent that he or she acts well (that is, "excellently") in accordance with reason—that is, to (and only to) the extent that he or she performs his or her function well *example* - function of a knife is to cut - function of a U-Haul truck is to effectively haul things - function of a doctor is to improve patients health

James Rachels (Jones and Smith Cases)

- *rachel argues that* there is *no intrinsic moral difference* between killing and letting die - *his argument relies* on the thought that there is *no moral difference* between what Jones does and what Smith does *rachels argues that because* - the only difference between the two cases is that Jones lets the child die and Smith kills the child, the "bare difference" between killing and letting die is not morally relevant. - according to Rachels, there is no intrinsic moral difference between killing and letting die *if there were an intrinsic moral distinction* between killing and letting die, then that moral distinction would always be present in pairs of cases like these.

Objection #3 of Inefficacy Argument

- *reductio ad absurdum* *reductio ad absurdum argument:* - quite literally, "reduction to absurdity - an objection in which one argues that the claim made by one's opponent has absurd consequences

Rights Based Views

- *rights* are claims belonging to individuals which prescribe behavior of others towards the rights-holder

Autonomy Argument

- *some argue that* respect for terminal patients' *autonomy* supports the moral permissibility of both voluntary physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia

Francione and Charlton's Central Argument *premise 2*

- *they argue* that being treated as property is simply inconsistent with having moral status - *in other words* treated merely as a thing is inconsistent with being treated as a person (or moral patient- human or non-human) - *example* of what is wrong for human slavery, slaves are treated as property bc they have moral status

Francione and Charlton's Central Argument *premise 4*

- *they argue* that no matter how well we treat our pets, their very status as pets ensures that they are our legal property - *if it is your pet* it is your legal property - *they are aware* there is some legal restrictions on how we may treat our pets, but they draw an analogy here with legal restrictions on how we may treat our cars *upshot* the fact that there are legal restriction on how we treat something *does not* entail that this thing is not our property

Ethical Subjectivism (type of Ethical Relativism)

- *view that an act is morally right just because* (a) I (the speaker) approve of it (b) my commitments allow it - *view that an act is morally wrong just because* (a) I disapprove of it (b) my commitments forbid it - *"view that an act is right just because I sincerely believe that is is morally right"*

Response to Two Worlds Argument

- *we can distinguish between* what is good for people and what makes a world or situation good - their is an equal amount of well-being in both worlds available for people - the well-being is just distributed unfairly - hedonism about well-being is true, but might reject general hedonism bc fairness is intrinsically good but not as a component of well-being *only available to those who limit their view to hedonism about well-being* *not available* to those who accept general hedonism

Innocent Threat

- A sudden gust of wind blew E down a well and D is at the bottom - If D does nothing, E will survive the fall but D will die, but - or D can use his ray gun to disintegrate E in which case E dies but D lives *thomson thinks* it is clear that E loses his claim against being killed by D - *but* E isn't aggressing against D, and E is not about to wrongfully infringe any claims!

IMPORTANT STATEMENT

- ALL MORAL CLAIMS and PRUDENTIAL CLAIMS are NORMATIVE CLAIMS BUT - ALL NORMATIVE CLAIMS are NOT MORAL CLAIMS

Villainous Aggressor

- B and A are in an elevator - B has always hated A and takes this opportunity to get rid of him: - B goes for A's throat to kim him, A can save his life only by killing B *we might want to say that* B loses his claim against being killed by A in virtue of being at fault for aggressing against A - *Thomson argues* that one can cease to have a claim without being at fault

Diagram

- Culture A and Culture B have an overlap - The action "x" occurs in the overlap Culture A holds that action "x" is morally permissible Culture B holds the action "x" is morally wrong *according to cultural relativism action "x" is morally wrong and not wrong, because both cultures are correct about the moral status of action "x" and this action "x" occurs in two cultures at the same time

Innocent Shield of a Threat

- F strapped the innocent E onto the front of a computer-controlled tank that he now directs toward D to kill him. - D has only one weapon, an anti tank gun. - If D does nothing, the tank will reach and kill D and E will have time to escape - D can use his anti tank gun on the tank, in which case he destroys E along with the tank but D lives *Thomson thinks* that it is clear that E loses his claim against being killed by D - it is morally permissible for D to blow up the tank, and kill E.

Moral Philosophy

- IMPORTANT ASPECT: knowing which principles are plausible and how they relate to one another - DEFINITION: is a matter of thinking about the attractions of various ethical theories - used to find the deepest truths about a subject matter (such as how to live) - MORAL PHILOSOPHY focus on very general principles

Modus Tollen Form of Arguments

- If P then Q, but not Q therefore not P - form of a valid argument

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

- If P, then Q *antecedent: P* (Q is a necessary condition of P) *consequent: Q* (P is a sufficient condition of Q) IMPORTANT *"if P, then Q" is equivalent to "P only if Q"

The BIGGEST problem with Ethical Error Theory

- If ethical error theory is correct, then nothing whatsoever is really morally wrong

Two Worlds Thought Experiment (W.D. Ross)

- Imagine two possible worlds: W1 and W2. - two worlds contain exactly equal amounts of happiness and misery (unhappiness) *in W1* - the virtuous (good) people are happy and the vicious (bad) people are miserable *in W2* - the virtuous (good) people are miserable and the vicious (bad) people are happy - difference is in who has the happiness and unhappiness

Shafer Landau Response to Objection #4

- Is it really always morally wrong to risk harm, no matter how small the risk?

Kantain Views

- Kant holds that *consequences are morally irrelevant*, he would *reject* the causal requirement. - *according to Kant*, non-human animals are not moral patients - *shafer landau considers* whether Kant's requirement that morally acceptable maxims be *universalizable* might yield a moral prohibition on ordinary individual meat purchases

Dogmatism Argument (in favor of Cultural Relativism)

- OFTEN ARGUED that moral objectivism is problematic because it licenses dogmatic criticism of the moral view of others - moral/ethical objectivism itself does not say anything about appropriateness of dogmatism *if cultural relativism is correct* - then it is true that we are morally required not to be dogmatic only if our culture hold that we cannot be dogmatic *if ethical error theory or expressivism/emotivism is correct* - then it cannot be true that we are morally required not to be dogmatic *if ethical subjectivism is correct* - then it is true that we are morally required not to be dogmatic only if a speaker believes it to be the case

Advantages of *Rossian Pluralism (RP)*

- RP allows that we are sometimes permitted to break moral rules - RP nicely explains moral conflict - RP nicely accounts for moral regret

Objection to *Rossial Pluralism*

- RP leaves us without sufficient guidance in situations where more than on prima facie (pro tanto) duty is relevant

Alternate Asymmetry Argument

- Seana Shiffrin argues along these lines and relies on Benatar's "asymmetry" claims *premise* 1. It is always morally wrong to cause significant and unnecessary harm to a person without his or her valid consent. 2. Bringing a person into existence always causes significant and unnecessary harm to that person without his or her valid consent. *conclusion* Therefore, it is always morally wrong to bring a person into existence.

Objection #2 of Inefficacy Argument

- The law of "supply and demand" entails that every ordinary meat purchase causes some animal suffering. *Shafer Landau's Response* - this law seems capable of bending.

NOTE

- There are cases in which people appear to be making moral claims which seem not to be amenable to an expressionist reading *examples* 1. some actions fulfill moral duties but lack moral worth 2. I am not sure whether torture is acceptable, but I am sure that those who are wiser than me have the correct answer

If there is a Pro Tanto Duty to φ, then:

- There is always a strong reason to φ - The reason to φ may sometimes be outweighed by competing reasons. - If the reason to φ is the only moral reason that applies in a given situation, then φ-ing becomes one's all-things-considered duty in that situation

Three Areas of Moral Philosophy (ethics)

- Value Theory - Normative Ethics - Metaethics

Objection #4 of Inefficacy Argument

- Yes, in most cases ordinary individual meat purchases make no causal difference to (non-human) animal suffering. - But in some cases, one's individual purchase is the "tipping point" that actually makes a difference. *if so then in some cases, individual purchase actually is causally efficacious (causes harm) *pair this objection #4* with the principle, "it is always morally wrong to risk causing harm"

Example of Overdetermination Case

- You and I are exactly equally distanced from Fred. - We simultaneously each fire a bullet at the exact same spot on Fred's head, and the bullets strike exact the same spot at exactly the same time. - Either bullet was sufficient to kill Fred *counterfactual test does not apply to this sort of case*

Overdetermination Case

- a case in which there are (at least) two sufficient causes of a single result, such that if either of the two causes had not occurred, the result would still have happened as it did - *shafer landau argues* most ordinary individual meat purchases are such that, had that specific purchase not occurred, harm to (non-human) animals would still have occurred just as it did

Plausibility

- a claim is plausible if it is reasonable and has a good chance of being true - there is a possibility for a plausible claim to be false

Act Utilitarianism

- a consequentialist theory, says it is permissible to do anything to an individual so long as it maximizes overall well-being - *act utilitarianism* has the upside that very many non-human animals are moral patients, this view does not mean they have moral rights - *moral rights* are not considered in an act utilitarian view

Plural Marriage

- a marriage composed of three or more individuals

Absolute moral rule

- a moral rule that can never be morally permissible to broken the rule (no matter the case) - does not mean that an absolute moral rule cannot be broken, means that everytime a moral rule is broken it is morally wrong *EXAMPLE of a non-absolute rule* - Lying is morally wrong, some cases are morally permissible to break this rule

Prima Facie (pro tanto) Duty

- a permanent, excellent, but non-absolute reason to do (or refrain from) a certain type of action - *a pro tanto duty* is what an agent would be all-things-considered obligated to do, if no other considerations were morally relevant. *prima facie duties mean the same as pro tanto duties* - are moral duties that are *self evident*

Shafer-Landau Characterizes a *Virtuous Person* as

- a person who does not merely happen to or force him or herself to act as the virtuous person would *RATHER* this is a person who (in addition to acting appropriately) has appropriate *perceptions, thoughts, and motives*

Formal Arguments

- a philosophical argument is composed of one or more premises and a conclusion DIAGRAM: Premise Premise *(Therefore) Conclusion*

(Archard's) Principle of Consensuality

- a practice (or action), P, is morally permissible if all those who are parties to P are competent to consent, give their valid consent, and the interests of no other parties are significantly harmed *proposes* (only) a *sufficient condition* of moral permissibility, *not* a necessary condition *David Archard* - discusses and defines this principle but does not endorse it himself

Reflective Equilibrium

- a practice in ethical theory in which we try to balance our strongest moral convictions against plausible moral principles and arrive at a plausible internally-consistent set of specific moral claims and general moral principles -term created by John Rawls

Maxim

- a principle of action combining an action with a purpose/goal *example* - if I decide to drink coffee, my maxim might be "drink coffee (action) in order to stay alert (goal)"

Optimific Social Rule

- a rule whose general acceptance within a society would yield better results than any other such rule

Contradiction

- a statement in which some proposition is simultaneously affirmed and rejected - contradictions cannot be true (are the reverse of necessary truths) -*any view which generates a contradiction must be incorrect* EX: today is thursday and today is not thursday

Desire-Satisfaction Theories (of well-being)

- a view of well-being to which X's contribution to S's well-being is entirely a function of how well X satisfies S's (real or hypothetical) desires - the desires that the view satisfies real or hypothetical depends on the specific view - *satisfaction* does not indicate a feeling or emotion - *satisfaction* what you wanted actually happened - *desire* not satisfied is *frustrated*

Humans (or non-human animals) cannot be moral agents

- according to ethical objectivism, there can be beings to which moral requirements do not apply EXAMPLE - no prominent objectivist theory holds that babies or squirrels can act morally wrongly bc they can't comprehend moral requirements in the first place and thus are not moral agents

Cultural Relativism

- act is morally right if it is permitted by the ultimate conventions of the society in which it is performed - all of morality is related to individual cultures - an action could be morally right in one culture and wrong in another - can allow for a little bit of moral progress (in terms of a cultures behavior), but can not allow for improve of a culturals moral code/beliefs - is a type of ethical relativism

Kant's Categorical Imperative *Second Formulation*

- act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only - *never treat a person (yourself included) as a mere means* - *kant does not think* that an individual's consent to a particular treatment is enough to guarantee they are not being treated as mere means

Supererogatory Actions

- actions that are not morally required, but are morally excellent - are morally permissible, but not morally obligatory - "beyond the call of duty" *example* - jumping in front of a subway car in order to save a complete stranger

Shafer Landau Argues that Kantian and Contemporary Rights Based Versions of Deontology

- also are not in a good position to defend a general moral obligation to refrain from eating meat or making "ordinary individual meat purchases".

Ethics

- also known as moral philosophy - is the branch of knowledge that guides an individual in making decisions - the principles of right and wrong actions - deals PRIMARILY with good character, what does it take to be a good person - focuses on theories of individual well-being - DO NOT judge all ETHICAL VIEWS as EQUALLY PLAUSIBLE - PERSONAL or CULTURAL OPINION is not the ultimate measure of what is right and wrong - PHILOSOPHY is done at a high level of abstraction

Sound Arguments

- an argument that is valid and all of its premises are all true - are the "gold" standard of good reasoning - are "logically" valid - have both truth and logic *if a sound argument, the conclusion has to be true*

Moral Residue

- an obligation to make up for failing to act in accordance with a duty *example*: - obligations to apologize

Argument

- any chain of thought in which reasons (premises) are offered in support of a particular conclusion - meanings, "a conclusion and set of reasons supporting that conclusion" - NOT all ARGUMENTS are EQUALLY GOOD - VALIDITY is a matter of argument's structure (form) NOT actual truth or falsity (content) - VALID arguments may contain false premises and false conclusions AND - INVALID arguments may contain true conclusions *Either arguments are VALID or INVALID, not both*

IMPORTANT NOTE

- any view in metaethics is either ethical objectivism or ethical skepticism, CANNOT be both

Deontological Ethical Theories

- any view that appeal to something other than, or in addition to, consequences. - *appeal to* kinds of actions or "action types" in determining the moral status of specific instances of actions. *example* - the 10 commandments (does not have to be religious - "lying is morally wrong", is an action type

Deontological Ethical Theories

- appeal to kinds of actions or "action types" in determining the moral status of specific instances of actions - ethical theories that appeal to something other than consequences - *rights based ethical theories* are deontological - is the ethical theory that Kant follows

Speciesism

- arbitrarily giving moral priority to one's own species - if you try to say that the significant morally relevant difference just is that we are humans and that is why it is morally wrong to consume us for food, then Irvine said that that is not a morally relevant difference.

Rights Based Theories

- are a *deontological view*, whereas act utilitarianism is a consequentialist view - *focuses on* whether actions are rights infringements and rights violations - *does not focus on* consequences of actions

Pious Actions (according to Plato's Euthyphro)

- are actions that are loved by the gods

Moral Patients

- are beings (or things) to whom (or which) moral obligations can be owed - are beings (or things) which can be treated morally rightly or wrongly - we are all moral patients

Moral Agents

- are beings which can have moral obligations - beings that can act morally rightly or wrongly - we are all moral agents

Moral Rights (continued)

- are claims belonging to individuals (whether human or non-human) that dictate what others are prohibited from doing to (or required to do for) the individual rights-holder *are especially weighty moral considerations* - but this does not mean rights are absolute - *to permissibly infringe* an individual's rights one would need to have a serious and important moral justification for doing so.

Rights

- are claims that belong to individuals

Rights

- are claims that rights-holders have legitimate claims against others - if I *violate* one of your rights, you have a *legitimate complaint* against me *example* - you have the right to not be killed, then you have a claim against someone that they do not kill you

Necessary Truths

- are claims which CANNOT possibly be FALSE - these are true in every "possible world" *EXAMPLES:* 1. If you are a biological parent, then you have (or had) a biological child 2. Either today is Monday or today is not Monday

Contingent Truths

- are claims which are true in the "current world" - these could be FALSE in "other possible worlds" *EXAMPLES:* 1. It is not currently snowing in Mankato 2. Some existing dogs cannot bark

Imperatives

- are commands telling you what you ought to do - what you should or should not do *kant uses* to set up his central moral principle by distinguishing *hypothetical imperatives* from *categorical imperatives*

Thought Experiments

- are done when one describes a hypothetical situation in a way that isolates the philosophical question at hand - must be within the bounds of possibility

Intrinsic Goods

- are good considered entirely apart from any good results they may cause.

Intrinsic Goods

- are good in and of themselves, considered entirely apart from any good results they may cause *example of a non plausible intrinsic good* - "money", it is good but it is not good in and of itself, it's only good because of what you can do with it

Natural Rights

- are moral rights which individuals have simply in virtue of their nature as persons - *account* where moral rights come from - *more generally* are moral rights that a being has simply in virtue of its nature *example* negative rights - fundamental to nature is that we are alive, so we have a negative natural right to not be killed - fundamental nature is making choices and acting on them, so we have a negative natural right to liberty *example* positive rights - fundamental nature is that we get sick or injured, so we have a natural positive right to health care

Theories of Well-Being

- are not about what is fundamentally right or wrong, they are relative to normative ethics

Consequentialists

- are not in a good position to defend a general moral obligation to refrain from eating or making ordinary individual meat purchases - they hold that only morally relevant considerations are consequences *shafer-landau concedes that* 1) consequentialists can give plausible arguments against factory farming 2) widespread practice of meat-eating results in serious harm to (non-human) animals

Praise and Blame

- are not part of the definition of morality - praiseworthiness or blameworthiness are tightly connected to the moral status of one's actions - praiseworthiness means to deserve praise - blameworthiness means to deserve blame ( BOTH can be done, but your actions might not have been enough to result in either)

"Gut" Reactions to Morality

- are often influenced by non-morally relevant factors and do not automatically count as relevant moral reasons - NOT GOOD REASONS to support moral views

Impoverished Desires

- are rational desires created against unjust background conditions - related to this objection is a more extreme objection involving what we might call "brainwashed" or "implanted" desires

Positive Rights (distinction between moral/legal rights)

- are rights to be provided with something - *positive* does not mean the goodness of the right - *require* more than mere non-interference - *to respect* they must actually give you something or provide you with assistance *examples:* - the right to an education - the right to healthcare

Negative Rights (distinction between moral/legal rights)

- are rights to non-interference - the rights not to have something done to you - if everyone were to simply keep to him or herself and not interact with anyone else, then everyone's negative rights would be respected - *never require* us to do anything for others, - *require us* to "leave others alone." *examples* - the right to not be killed, - the right to not have one's property stolen - the right not to be assaulted - the right to liberty (right to not have freedom limited)

Backward-looking Reasons

- are simply reasons grounded in something that happened in the past. - *example* - promises are a paradigm example *if ignoring a backward-looking reason maximizes overall well-being* - then this backward-looking reason ought to be ignored that is, it would be wrong not to ignore it

Hedons and Utiles

- are units of happiness - *hedons* for hedonism - *utiles* for utilitarianism

Settled Dispositions

- are what Aristotle understands virtues as *example* - "white-knuckling" oneself into being kind here and there does not rise to the level of virtue. - to be virtuous, one must have an ingrained tendency to act as virtue requires

Conceptual Analysis

- area of philosophy that deals with analysis of concepts

Nozick's "Experience Machine" Thought Experiment

- asks you to imagine that you could plug into a machine that would preserve your body for a normal lifespan while it stimulated your brain so that it seems to you as though you're experiencing whatever you would most enjoy *in the machine* - all of your "outside" obligations are taken care of, such that your only concern is yourself. - you wouldn't know you were in the machine; your "experiences" would be indistinguishable from real life. - machine cannot malfunction; and it can make you literally as happy as it is possible for you to be

Begging the Question

- assuming the truth of one's conclusion in one of the premises of one's argument - "arguing on the basis of a reason that will appeal only to people who already accept the conclusion" - are often valid and sound - poor argumentative strategy bc those who reject the conclusion will also reject the question-begging premise EXAMPLE *premises* 1. Murder is morally wrong. 2. Capital punishment is murder. (begging the question) *conclusion* Therefore, capital punishment is morally wrong.

Amatonormativity (term created by Elizabeth Brake)

- assumption that a "central, exclusive, amorous relationship" is a universally-shared goal - such relationship is normative, in that it should be aimed at in preference to other relationship types *example* a marriage style relationship is better than a similarly close friendship

Ethical Particularists

- believe that *all moral reasons* are capable of *switching valence* depending on context *valence* refers to whether a consideration is positive or negative *often appeal* to analogies with reasons in non-moral contexts (especially reasons for belief) *often appeal* to putative *counterexamples* to proposed general moral rules

Shafer Landau Argument here parallels his prior inefficacy claim

- both *consequentialist views* and *rights‐based views* *cannot plausibly support* an obligation to refrain from making ordinary individual meat purchases because they are both committed to the *causal requirement for wrongness*

Important conceptual distinction made between Moral Patients and Moral Agents

- both members of the moral community - these groups are conceptually distinct bc we can have an idea of what it is to be a moral patient that is different from our idea of what it is to be a moral agent - the group of moral patients is coextensive with the group of moral agents.

Result of Using Response Strategies to Ethical Subjectivism

- both strategies remove contradiction from ethical subjectivism claims - both strategies make moral disagreement literally impossible - "relativizing to speakers" strategy makes moral advice incoherent - "reinterpreting moral claims as purely descriptive claims" strategy causes moral claims to not be about what is or is not morally wrong but they are rather about individual beliefs about what is or is not morally wrong

Moral Luck (Objection 3)

- cases in which the morality of an action or a decision depends on factors outside of our control - *Kant held that the morality of our actions depends only on factors within our control*, making his moral system incompatible with moral luck.

Descriptive Claims

- claims about what is empirically true or false - NO value implication - can have false descriptive claims - include: "ought of expectation" EXAMPLES: - the sky is blue - one gram of protein has four calories

Normative Claims

- claims about what is good/bad, right/wrong, or what agents ought to do - have a value implication - include: legal oughts, prudential oughts, rational oughts, and moral oughts EXAMPLES: - it is morally wrong to lie - you ought to be kind to others - it is good for you to eat vegetables

Defense of Ethical Error Theory

- claims that morality requires the existence of objective moral standards that supply us with *categorical reasons* (coupled with denial of such standards)

Aristotle

- contemporary *virtue ethicists* base their views on the work of *Aristotle*, who was a philosopher in ancient Greece - Aristotle was a student of Plato and he was a teacher of Alexander the Great - *he did important work in many areas of philosophy* which is still highly relevant today (including nicomachean ethics and eudemian ethics)

Internal Critiques (of a culturals moral code)

- criticism of a view which claim the view is internally inconsistent EXAMPLE: all humans have equal moral rights, yet women have more moral rights when men

External Critiques (of a culturals moral code)

- criticisms of a view which appeal to some independent standard of correctness - if cultural relativism is correct, then external critiques of other cultures moral standards are NEVER legitimate

Necessary Conditions of *Valid Consent*

- david archard's three commonly-endorsed conditions *in order for consent to be valid*, all three conditions must be met *1* The individual givings content must be competent to do so (teenagers or elderly adults) *2* The individual giving consent must be relevantly informed (they need to know the details of what they are consenting to, medical consent = informed consent) *3* The individual giving consent must do so freely (forced consent is not valid, the more pressure means the less you are to freely consent)

Applied Ethics

- deals with the application of moral criteria to specific actions or practices - aims to determine the moral (im) permissibility of specific actions EXAMPLE: is abortion morally permissible

Active Euthanasia

- directly and intentionally killing a patient *example* - a physician injects a terminal patient with a lethal dose of morphine.

Ordinary Individual Meat Purchases

- do not include large, bulk meat purchases of the sort made by restaurant chains.

*Weak* Paternalism

- does not limit liberty, but makes particular choices more costly/difficult for the purpose of the good of those who want to make those choices *example* - high taxes on tobacco products, done for the good of the people who want to smoke by making it more costly (not making it illegal)

Moral Action Diagram

- each action is either MORALLY PERMISSIBLE or MORALLY WRONG (a single action cannot be both) Morally Permissible Bubble has both: (NO OVERLAP) - morally obligatory - supererogatory - any morally obligatory action is morally permissible - any supererogatory action is morally permissible BUT - any morally permissible action is not morally obligatory - any morally permissible action is not supererogatory

Non-Survival Cannibalism

- eating the flesh of a member of one's own species for *any reason other than survival*

Survival Cannibalism

- eating the flesh of a member of one's own species when *reasonably necessary for survival*

Passive Cannibalism

- eating the flesh of a member of one's own species without contributing to the relevant being's death - does not involve killing

According to most ethical objectivists

- ethics is *not* a natural science - ethics *does not* offer nor exclusively appeals to claims which are verified by natural sciences.

Involuntary Euthanasia

- euthanasia to which a patient *dissents* *dissenting* is actively refusing to consent

NonVoluntary Euthanasia

- euthanasia to which a patient neither *validly consents* nor *dissents*

Possible to reject divine command theory while still holding that God is an infallible moral authority

- even if God doesn't make actions morally right or wrong - all-knowing and morally perfect God would be an authority on morality.

Moral Nihilism

- form of moral skepticism that says that the world contains no moral features - there is nothing for moral claims to be true of *two types* 1. ethical error theory 2. expressivism

Ethical Nihilism

- form of moral skepticism that says that the world contains no moral features and so there is nothing for moral claims to be true -*"view that there are no true moral claims"* - *rejects* that there are correct moral standards TWO FORMS: 1. Error Theory 2. Expressivism / Emotivism

David Benatar ("Why It Is Better Never to Come Into Existence")

- he argues that it is *always morally wrong* to bring a new human into existence - *bentar* supports anti-natalism - "better to have never been" - *he does believe * that once a person actually exists they have moral rights (whether their life is worth continuing or not killing them would still be morally wrong

Maximizing Consequentialists

- hold that an action is morally permissible if and only if it maximizes good consequences. - *include* utilitarians - *nearly all consequentialists* are maximizing consequentialist

Morally Obligatory (required)

- if an action is morally obligatory, then it would be morally wrong not to do it

Morally Permissible ("okay", acceptable)

- if an action is morally permissible, then it is not morally wrong to do it

Morally Wrong (prohibited)

- if an action is morally wrong, then (from the moral perspective) you should not do it

Supererogatory (excellent)

- if an action is supererogatory, then it is morally excellent: while it is not morally obligatory, doing it would be very good - goes above and beyond what is morally required

Argument is VALID

- if there is no possible situation in which the premises are all true and the conclusion is false *an argument that is NOT valid is invalid*

Occam's Razor

- in all cases, we ought to adopt the simplest/most economical ontology possible - is a commonly-accepted criterion of theoretical adequacy *ontology* is an account of what exists (includes objective moral thoughts)

Virtue Ethics 2 (more sophisticated definition)

- in order to accommodate the possibility that there might not always be one single course of action that a virtuous person would take in a particular case, there is this second definition (1) An act in a given situation is *morally required* just because all virtuous people, acting in character, would perform it. (2) An act in a given situation is *morally permitted* just because some but not all virtuous people, acting in character, would perform it. (3) An act in a given situation is *morally forbidden (wrong)* just because no virtuous person would perform it.

Enduring Romantic Relationships

- include same-sex dyadic romantic relationships - *amatonormativity* doesn't imply any evaluative judgments about same-sex vs. different-sex marriages - same as "central, dyadic, exclusive, enduring amorous relationships"

Amoralists

- individuals who make sincere moral judgments but do not care at all about living up to them - individual who has no motivation to comply with there own moral judgements *EX:* 1. amoralists can sincerely judge that there is a moral judgement to give to charity, but would not be motivated to give to charity 2. amoralist could judge that killing an innocent person is wrong, but would not refrain from doing so

Schadenfreude

- instances in which one takes pleasure directly in the misfortune/suffering of others *example* - imagine that torturing other people makes me happy. - *according to Kant*, this happiness is (clearly) not good in any respect at all - seeing someone slip in all on the ice outside, nothing you could of done to prevent and they are not able to see your reaction (this makes me laugh and provides me with happiness - *according to Kant*, this happiness is not good in any respect at all

Universal Claim

- is a claim that attributes some property to every member of a group EXAMPLE: - "All men are mortal" same as "if something is a man, then it is mortal" - universal claims can be written as equivalent condition claims (if.... then... claims)

According to Aristotle, each virtue (excellence)

- is a disposition (hexis) or "settled state" issuing in decisions.

Counterexample

- is a single example that proves a universal claim false EXAMPLE: All American paper money has the picture of a an American president on one side (counterexample: the $100 bill)

Right Holder

- is an individual who has "holds" particular rights

Non-Identity Problem

- is illustrated by the fact that so long as both Potential Child A and Potential Child B would have lives worth living, choosing Child A (who will have the better life) is not good for Potential Child B. *A and B are different potential children*

Problem with the Absolutism Argument

- is that ethical objectivism has nothing to say about the absolutism (or lack of) moral rules - ethical objectivism is about the status of moral rules (meaning that moral rules are objective, does not take a position) - *whereas absolutism* is about the stringency or the strength of moral rules

Ethical Skepticism

- is the reject of ethical objectivism TWO CLAIMS according to Ethical Skepticism: 1. are there no true moral standards 2. there are true moral standards but none of them are objective

Moral Theorizing

- is the result of a perfectly natural process of thinking - for psychologists is comes down to: self interest (egoists), how we have been conditioned (behaviorists), and our sexual impulses (freudians)

Conventional Morality

- is the set of traditional principles/standards that are widely shared and accepted in society - is the type of morality "created by us and for us" - these principles are a result of human decisions, agreements, and practices - can DIFFER from SOCIETIES

Virtue Ethics

- is the third common contemporary normative ethical view - focuses on the importance of having a morally good character - *focuses on what makes someone a good person*

Expressivism (Emotivism)

- is the type of moral nihilism that analyzes moral judgments as expressions of emotions, orders, or commitments none of which can be true or false -"moral claims are neither true or false" - *expressivists* have been persuaded by the thought that value claims simply cannot be true or false

Ethical Error Theory

- is the type of moral nihilism that says that there are: 1. no moral features in this world 2. no moral judgments are true 3. our sincere moral judgments try and always fail to describe the moral features of things 4. there is no moral knowledge -*core feature* holds all moral claims as false

Overall Well-Being

- is to be understood as the aggregate (total) well-being of everything capable of whatever well-being consists in, everywhere in the world - *includes* the well being of everything that is capable of well being in the world - *according* to this overall well-being the wellbeing of cats and dogs must be included - *well being of future beings* also counts as part of overall well-being

Primary Difficulty for Objective List Views

- is to give plausible arguments for the relevant "list" - *difficulty* is compounded by the fact that for many things that we typically think are good for people, we may be able to think of some person for whom that thing wouldn't be good

Aristotle's Primary GOAL

- is to identify what it takes for someone to be a good person *he noted* the way in which we typically identify a "good X" ("X" is simply a variable standing in for some class of thing)

Treating Something as a *Mere Means*

- is to treat it like a tool, which you are free to use however you want - fail to treat something as a rational agent - *treating someone as a means* is not morally wrong, but *treating someone as a mere means* is wrong - think of this as attempting to *bypass a person's rational autonomy*, fail to treat that person as the sort of being who makes choices based on relevant reasons

David Archard Believes

- it is possible to treat someone as a mere means with his or her valid consent (thinks the same as Kant) *according to Archard* - treating another person in a way that fails to adequately respect his goals and desires amounts to treating him as a mere means. *he claims* - it is at least possible for an individual to consent to treatment that fails to adequately respect that individuals own goals and desires

Kant Believes

- it is possible to treat someone as a mere means with his or her valid consent. - we can violate duties to ourselves

Truth is objective if

- its truth does not depend on anyone's beliefs about whether it is true - for example, it is uncontroversial that the fact that the earth is not flat is an objective truth

Active Cannibalism

- killing and eating the flesh of a member of one's own species

Types of "Oughts" or "Should" Claims

- legal ought (legally speaking you ought to stop at stop signs) - prudential ought (good for you ought, you ought to brush your teeth) - rational ought (you ought to believe that a square cannot be a circle) - moral ought (you ought to be nice to others) - "ought of expectation" (my alarm clock ought to go off very soon)

*Hard* Paternalism

- limiting the liberty (or freedom) of a competent decision-maker *purely* for his or her own good *example* - law requiring you to wear a seat belt when driving alone in a car (limits liberty but protects you) *not an example* - law that says its imperishable to murder people, bc it is not aimed at protecting murders but at protecting victims

Kant's Position *Principle of Humanity* (regarding moral patient-hood)

- makes him *vulnerable to the objection* that according to his view of moral patienthood, it is *not morally wrong* to be cruel to non-human animals

Bigamy

- marrying one individual while already married to a different individual - is a serious criminal offense in nearly all of the US, except Utah bc they removed the felony status and reduced the penalty - bigamy involving freud is not criminal, but *consensual* bigamy is a felony

Common Human Goods Friendships Serve

- material support - emotional security - frequent companionship - various types of care *all done by enduring romantic relationships*

Intuitions (views) on Morality

- may be so strong that no adequate moral theory could reject them EXAMPLE: it would be a serious problem for a moral theory to state that torturing puppies for fun is morally permissible

Laws (moral or legal) are by their nature general/universal in application

- moral or legal laws apply to all relevant individuals *example* - a "law" that says Bekka in particular is not allowed to drive without a license would hardly be a law at all - *a law apply to oneself* requires allowing that it apply to similarly-situated individuals - *it is irrational* to endorse a law for oneself well being unwilling to extend to similarly-situated others. - *Kant's view* actings *immorally* is also *irrational*

Absolute Moral Rules

- moral rules which may never be permissibly broken

Golden Rule

- normative ethical principle that says that your treatment of others is morally acceptable if you would be willing to be treated in exactly the same way.

The Priority Problem (objection to virtue ethics0

- objection is understood by considering a parallel of the *Euthyphro Dilemma* *Which of the following is the correct order of explanation?* (a) Acts are morally right *because* the virtuous person would perform them. (b) The virtuous person would perform acts *because* they are (independently) morally right. *according to virtue ethics (a) is correct* - virtue ethics takes virtuous character to be prior to morally right action *according to all other moral views (b) is correct* - take morally right action to be prior to considerations of moral character *OBJECTION* - *virtue ethicists are getting it (intuitively) backwards* *example* rape - we explain why virtuous people don't rape others by showing why rape is independently wrong. - we don't explain why rape is wrong by showing that good people will not rape others.

Jointly Sufficient Condition

- occur if 2 or more conditions when taken together (combined) are sufficient

Moral Reasoning

- offerings and evaluating reasons that are meant to support moral conclusions Involves Two Things: - a set of reasons - a conclusion that these reasons are meant to support (these two things together create an ARGUMENT)

Moral Agents

- one who can guide his or her behavior by means of moral reasoning - meaning someone who is fit for praise or blame

Note

- one's informed desires may not be the same as one's actual desires

Weaker Version of the Inefficacy Argument

- ordinary individual meat purchases do a very small amount of harm (at least some harm), but this harm can be easily outweighed by the positive consequences of these purchases (possibility 2) - *since consequentialism takes into account all relevant consequences*, these small harms will often be justified by their corresponding positive consequences.

Strong Version of the Inefficacy Argument

- ordinary individual meat purchases literally do no harm at all (possibility 1) - *relies on* the counterfactual test of causation *counterfactual test of causation:* - an event is causally efficacious only if, had it not occurred, an outcome would not have occurred just as it did

John Stuart Mill

- others hold that all pleasures are intrinsically good, but some are better than others *he believes* - it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied - bc human beings can experience better pleasures then the pig so it's better to be a slightly unhappy human then a happy pig

Hypothetical Imperatives

- oughts grounded in *desires*, they exist given that there is some desire *example* - if I want to learn how to play golf, then I ought to take golf lessons. - But if I give up my desire to play golf, then it is no longer the case that I ought to take lessons.

Categorical Imperatives

- oughts grounded in *rationality* - *apply to us* regardless of our desires, simply in virtue of our status as rational agents.

Legal Restrictions on how we treat our cars analogy

- our cars are our legal property - there are legal restriction on what we can do to our car (such as car emissions that are consistent with legal requirements)

Metaethics

- part of ethical theory that deals with the status of morality

Green's suggests that *genetic enhancement of embryos* may be *morally wrong* for these reasons

- permitting genetic enhancement could lead to a "genetic nobility". - permitting genetic enhancement could lead to a situation in which everyone "improves", but nobody's relative position improves

Francione and Charlton's Central Argument *premise 3*

- premise 3 is an intermediate conclusion, following directly from premises 1 and 2 - premise 3 is the defense of premise 1 and 2 - you cannot consistently reject premise 3 without also rejecting premise 1 and/or premise 2

Anti-Paternalism Principle

- principle that it is morally wrong to limit the liberty of a competent decision-maker purely for his or her own good

Categorical Reasons

- reasons that apply to persons regardless of their individual goals and desires - categorical reasons are the opposite of common sense reasons that apply to us

Well-Being

- refers to how well (or badly) an individual's life is going for him or her - *contributors to well being* are often said in terms of what is "good for" an individual - individual well-being is important for *normative ethical theories* appealing to maximizing (or promoting) individual or overall well-being

Maximizing Consequentialism

- require that we always perform the optimific action - the action that produces the very best consequences - *says that* we are morally required to maximize the good - *in combination with hedonism*, consequentialism yields the result that we are morally obligated to maximize overall happiness

Legal Rights

- rights created/granted by humans (or governments composed of humans). - *since legal rights* are created by humans, they *can be taken away* by humans or governments

Inalienable Rights

- rights from which an individual cannot be alienated - "right that cannot be taken away from you" - *if you have an inalienable right*, it cannot be taken from you, nor can you give away or sell that right

Moral Rights

- rights not created/granted by humans. - are the rights we have simply in virtue of beings we are - *since moral rights* are not created/granted by humans, they *cannot be taken away* by humans or governments *can be infringed or violated* by other humans - when violated, part of what explains the moral wrongness is that you still had the rights but other failed to act in accordance with them

Absolute Rights

- rights which can never be permissibly infringed (act inconsistently with that right)

NOTE

- rule utilitarianism has been quite widely rejected, due to a problem commonly known as J.J.C. Smart's "collapse" (or "fetishism") objection

Morality

- since there is a philosophical disagreement about details regarding both the STATUS and CONTENT of morality, there is NO ONE PRECISE DEFINITION -MORALITY is not a fiction - GOOD MANNERS are not the same things as MORALLY GOOD - MORAlITY is distinct from tradition - MORAL STATUS of an action is not the same as the LEGAL or traditional status of that action EXAMPLES of MORALITY: - it is (morally) wrong to cheat on ones partner - parents are (morally) required to care for their children - It is (morally) fine for same sex couples to cohabitate

Jeremy Bentham

- some of those who endorse hedonism hold that all pleasures are equally valuable once you control intensity and duration - typically better to pursue human pleasures bc the physical pleasures have more of a down side - believe each hedon is equal

Moral Exemplar

- someone of outstanding moral character; someone who can serve as a proper moral role model

All-Things-Considered Moral Wrong

- something that is morally wrong, taking into account all morally-relevant considerations in the case *example* - if I punch my innocent neighbor in the face, all things considered that is morally wrong

Pro Tanto Moral Wrong

- something that would be morally wrong unless justified by strong competing reasons *example* - if the only way I can get my dying child to the hospital is to steal a car, then stealing a car is pro tanto morally wrong - saving a child's life is a strong moral justifying reason

Divine Command Theory (DCT)

- states god is the ultimate author of morality - the view that an act is *morally required* if and only if it is commanded by God - the view that an act is *immoral* if and only if God forbids it - not only are morally permissible actions coextensive with the actions which are consistent with God's commands, it is God's commands which make these actions morally right

Moral Education

- stressed by virtue ethicists one of the *primary ways of becoming virtuous will involve* - modelling the virtuous behavior of "moral exemplars" until the modelled behavior becomes nearly automatic

Martha Nussbaum

- stresses that the *virtues and vices* are specific to "central spheres" of human life - *central spheres* are areas in which a person living a characteristically human life must make choices

Robert Nozick's description of *rights*

- stresses the distinction by describing rights as *side constraints* - *he views* rights act as constraints on our pursuit of goals. - *he claims* even if an action would have fantastic consequences that action is morally wrong if it requires violating someone's rights

Innocent Aggressor

- supports the views that one can cease to have a claim without being at fault - D and E are in an elevator - E suffers a temporary fit of insanity and goes for D's throat to kill him - D can save his life only by killing E *Innocent Aggressor is simpler to Villainous Aggressor* except that E is not at fault - *Thomson believes* that it is clear that E loses his claim against being killed by D *meanings if this is correct*, being at fault is not required for (unintentionally) losing a claim

Example Between All Things Considered Obligation and Pro Tanto Obligation

- suppose professor williams promises that she will be in her office at 12pm - most would think that because she is our professor and she promised that makes her morally obligated to be in her office - suppose that professor williams is walking to campus and does not have her phone, just witnessed a horrible accident and decides to help the victim - most would think she has a moral obligation to help - but all things considered she cannot do both things so she is not morally obligated to do both things - but she might have a pro tanto obligation to be in her office at 12pm and also to help the victim of the accident (the stronger obligation or weighter becomes the all things considered obligation)

Two Responses to Occam's Razor Argument

- take the form of *reductio ad absurdum* where you object a claim by showing it has absurd consequences 1. Atomic Particles 2. Normative Facts

LaFollette Argues

- that the State should require all child-raisers to be licensed

According to Aristotle, the *function of a thing* is

- the activity and/or purpose that is unique to persons *according to aristotle* - the function of a thing is the activity and/or purpose that *it and only it* can perform/achieve

Aristotle's View

- the activity/purpose that is unique to persons is *the activity in accordance with reason* - we act (we do various things) and we do them for reasons about which we are able to reflect. *example* - if I have an immediate inclination to eat chocolate until I lose consciousness, I can reason about this and decide not to do so

IMPORTANT NOTE

- the arguments regarding moral infallibility, moral equivalence, and important of moral justification (against ethical subjectivism) also apply to cultural relativism

Autonomy

- the capacity to make and act on decisions about one's own life that reflect one's own values - *a person can be autonomous* even if their autonomy is not respected - *dan brock argues* that respecting competent terminal patients' autonomy requires, other things being equal, that we respect their end-of life preferences

Objection #1 of Inefficacy Argument

- the counterfactual test does not apply here *Shafer Landau's Response* - cases in which the *counterfactual test is questionable* are *overdetermination cases* - cases under consideration aren't overdetermination cases

Rational Agency (Kant)

- the criterion for both moral agency and moral patient-hood - rational agency guarantees that you are a moral agent and moral patient - *rational agency* ability to act and guide your behavior on the bases of reasons - *according to Kant*, moral community (moral patients and moral agents) includes all, and only,*rational agents*

Gary Francione and Anna Charlton argue that

- the domestication of non-human animals is all-things-considered morally wrong - "keeping animals as pets is pro tanto morally wrong" - they do not necessary say it is morally wrong to have pets, but they believe it is all-things considered morally wrong to domesticate non-human animals

Universalizability

- the feature of a maxim that indicates that every rational person can consistently act on it - *maxim is universalizable* if and only if by acting in on it in a world in which everyone else acts on it as well you can still achieve the purpose of the maxim - *universalizable maxims* are ones that everyone can consistently act on

Virtue Ethics 1 (general definition)

- the normative ethical theory that says that an action is morally right just because it would be done by a virtuous person acting in character

Autonomy

- the power to guide one's life through one's own free choices - intuitive value of autonomy supports general tendency to reject *paternalistic* policies

Ought Implies Can Ethical Principle

- the principle that if an individual ought to X, then he or she can X - an individual ought to X only if he or she can X - *meaning* nobody is ever required to do the impossible

Savulescu's (and Kahane's) *Principle of Procreative Beneficence*

- the principle that prospective parents should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as a good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information - *this principle can* be used to support *genetic enhancements* - *this principle cannot* be used to support *preimplantation selection* (non-identity problem)

General Hedonism

- the view that *happiness* is the *one* and only *intrinsic good* and also takes into account instrumental goods that contribute to happiness - *does not* say that happiness (pleasure) is the only good thing - *says* that happiness (pleasure) is the one and only intrinsically good thing - *hedonists allow* that other things are good - *hedonists insist* that anything other than happiness that is good is good bc of their relationship to happiness - is a view about the "good" *not* about the "right" - is *not* in itself a view about moral rightness or wrongness - *hedonism* needs to be *combined* with an explicitly moral claim (such as consequentialism)

Rule Utilitarianism

- the view that an act is morally permissible if and only if it is permitted by the set of rules general acceptance of which would maximize overall well-being - example of *rule consequentialism*

Act Utilitarianism

- the view that an act is morally permissible if and only if it maximizes overall well-being - makes a necessary condition and sufficient condition for moral permissibility - *all actions that maximize overall well being* are permissible - *all actions that fail to maximize overall well being* are morally wrong - *goal* always morally required to maximize the number of hedons

Causal Requirement for Wrongness

- the view that an action is morally wrong only if it non‐negligibly affects a moral patient or rights‐holder

Anti-Natalism

- the view that bringing children into existence is morally wrong

Ethical Relativism

- the view that correct moral standards are relative to individual or cultural commitments -*"are correct moral standards but are not objective"* - *accepts* there are correct moral standards - *rejects* that true moral standards are independent of what anyone, anywhere, thinks of them TWO FORMS: 1. cultural relativism 2. ethical subjectivism

Impartiality

- the view that each individual's well-being should count equally in moral evaluations - idea of hedons and utils comes in handy, meaning each hedons count the same no matter who has it

General Hedonism

- the view that happiness is the one and only intrinsic good across the board NOTE - *general hedonism* entails *hedonism* about well-being - *hedonism* about well-being DOES NOT entail *hedonism in the broad sense*

Ethical Constructivism

- the view that the correct moral standards are those that would result from a particular (objectively correct) process or procedure

Ethical Pluralism

- the view that there are at least two, and possibly more, fundamental moral rules

Rossian Pluralism

- the view that there are multiple fundamental moral rules, none of which is absolute; and there is no fixed ranking procedure for these rules

Ethical Particularism

- the view that there are neither any absolute nor any prima facie moral rules - *according to this view* no feature of the world is always morally relevant or morally decisive

Ethical Skepticism

- the view that there are no objective moral standards or truths - *"the family of views that reject ethical objectivism"*

Ethical Realism

- the view that there is at least one objective moral standard, and that the truth of this standard is independent of the attitudes and choices "of any actual or idealized human agent

Ethical Objectivism

- the view that there is at least one true, objective moral standard/claims - can be a standard of a particular action or one that is general action TWO CLAIMS according to Ethical Objectivism 1. there are moral truths 2. these truths are independent of anyone's belief about whether they are true

Ethical Monism

- the view that there is only one moral rule, and that this rule is both absolute and fundamental

*Basic Objection* for both general hedonism and hedonism about well-being

- there seem to be intrinsic goods other than happiness. - ex: knowledge, friendship, having a loving partner is good for you above what happiness give you

Two groups are coextensive if

- they share all and only the same members - If all members of group A are members of group B, and all members of group B are members of group A, then A and B are coextensive *example* - group of squares is coextensive with the group of equilateral rectangles

Non-Identity Problem Example

- this is difficult when one has a choice between creating two children in the following situation: *Suppose that one can either:* (1) conceive a child now, where that child will have a relatively low level of well-being, yet still a life worth living (2) wait a few months and conceive a child who will have a very high level of well-being *many people believe* that it is obvious that it would be better for the child to choose option (2)* - if you choose the child in option (2) the child in option (1) never existed - the "better for the child" comparison doesn't apply, since the two possible children are different children - *the question* is not about one child and how high that child's level well-being will be, but rather creating one child with a lower level of well-being and another child with a higher level of well-being

*ethical questions* CANNOT be resolved solely by appeal to empirical evidence

- this is not surprising because they are normative claims

Non-Identity Problem

- this issue deals with the difficulty of evaluating the goodness/badness or rightness/wrongness of bringing persons into existence. - *problem is* if a person is merely hypothetical, it is unclear how to evaluate harms or benefits to that "person" - *focuses on* whether particular lives are "worth living"

Doctrine of Mean

- used for identifying the appropriate character and/or action in various "spheres" of life. - *central idea* is that in every significant sphere, one (morally) should "aim for the mean." *example* - Do not be too accommodating to other students in this class; but be more accommodating than the bare minimum

Hedonism (about well-being)

- view of well-being to which X is good for S to the extent that X makes S happy - view of well-being to which X is bad for S to the extent that X makes S unhappy - happiness is the one and only thing that is *intrinsically good for people* (does not take into consideration other things- just people)

*Simple* Desire Satisfaction View (of well-being) SDSV

- view that X is good for S to the extent that X *satisfies* S's *actual* desires - view that X is bad for S to the extent that X *frustrates* S's *actual* desires *definition gives both* a necessary condition and sufficient condition of something being good for an individual

*Informed* Desire-Satisfaction View of Well-being (view C)

- view that X is good for S to the extent that X *satisfies* S's *informed* desires - view that X is bad for S to the extent that X *frustrates* S's *informed* desires

*Self-Regarding Informed* Desire Satisfaction View (SRG-IDSV) (view D)

- view that X is good for S to the extent that X *satisfies* S's *informed, self-regarding desires* - view that X is bad for S to the extent that X *frustrates* S's *informed, self-regarding desires* - it restricts the relevant desires to desires about the individual's well-being we are considering

Ethical Subjectivism

- view that an act is right just because I sincerely believe that it is morally right - all of morality is relative to individuals - ethical subjectivist hold that actions can be really morally right or wrong (just not objectively right or wrong)

Cultural Relativism (type of Ethical Relativism)

- view that an action is morally right if it is permitted by the ultimate conventions of the society in which it is performed - Ex: In the US stealing is wrong

Ethical Error Theory (type of Ethical Nihilism)

- view that there are (a) no moral features in this world (b) no moral judgments are true (c) our sincere moral judgments try (d) always fail to describe the moral features of things and there is no moral knowledge - *"view that all moral claims are FALSE"*

Ethical Objectivism

- view that there is at least one objective moral standard or true moral claim - moral standards/claims are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, thinks of them - claim is objective if and only if its truth or falsity does not depend on anyone's opinion

Rule Consequentialism

- view that when evaluating the moral status of an action, the one and only relevant consideration is the consequence(s) of that action - view that an action is morally permissible if and only if it is permitted by an optimific social rule - normative view - *most consequentialist views* are *maximizing views* (require that we maximize good consequences or use the optimific action) - *can have* consequentialism that is not maximizing but they are not common

When evaluating the VALIDITY of an argument

- we DO NOT need to know whether premises are actually true - only think about what would be the case if they were true (If all premises are true does that guarantee the true of the conclusion?)

Dignity (Kant)

- we are the only things which can give importance to other things by valuing them - rationality gives us special dignity *example*: - a beautiful painting only has value because we value it *according to Kant* - *rational agents* are without price ("priceless") - all other things can be legitimately traded for some price

Pro Tanto (Prima Facie) Obligation

- what an agent *would be* all-things considered obligated to do, if no other considerations were morally relevant - at least one of your pro tanto obligation will be a all things considered obligation - could have a pro tanto obligation in some cases does not become an all things considered obligation

All Things Considered Obligation

- what an agent is obligated to do, taking into account *all* morally-relevant consideration - "have an all things considered obligation to not do it, your all things considered obligation in a particular case is what you are morally obligated to do

All Things Considered Duty

- what one is obligated to do in a specific situation, taking into account all relevant considerations

In cases where animals are already domesticated, francione and charlton hold that

- while restricting the animals to the status of pet is still *pro tanto morally wrong*, it is *all-things considered morally permissible* - *meaning* they are balancing the pro tanto wrongness of restricting an animal to pet status against the moral good of protecting already domesticated animals from death/suffering - when you have an already domesticated animal it is okay to treat it as a pet, all things considered, but is still pro tanto morally wrong or problematic

Passive Euthanasia

- withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from a patient with the result that the patient dies *example* - a physician removes a terminal patient from her ventilator, with the result that the patient dies. - the physician *merely foreseeably causes* the patient's death (no killed)

Act from Duty

- you do something because it is your duty *example* - you refrain from cheating on an exam because you know that you have a duty not to cheat - *according to Kant*, has moral worth - "doing the right thing bc you know it is the right thing" - *when you act from duty*, you are also acting in accordance with duty

Act Merely in Accordance with Duty

- you simply happen to do what the duty requires - "doing the right thing for the wrong reason, or not morally right reason" *example* - you refrain from cheating on an exam simply because you are afraid of getting caught - *according to Kant*, does not have moral worth - *when you act in accordance with duty*, you can do so without acting from duty

Maxim Regarding Meat Eating that Pass the *Universalizability Test*

1) eat meat in order to feel less hungry

3 Primary Components of Classical (Act) Utilitarianism

1. (general) hedonism 2. consequentialism 3. impartiality

Mill's Different Qualities of Pleasure

1. *higher pleasure* 2. *lower pleasure* *he argues that* - most humans are capable of both higher and lower pleasures - non-human animals are capable of only lower pleasures - some hedons are better than others, "happiness is somehow happier than other happiness" *argues the way to determine which of the two pleasures are "higher"* (hedon is better than another hedon) - is to appeal to the judgment of those who have a lot of experience of both pleasures - whichever is preferred by those with a lot of experience of each is the higher pleasure

EXAMPLES of *Sufficient Condition*

1. Being a tenured professor at MSU is a sufficient condition of having a Bachelor's Degree 2. Being in Mankato is a sufficient condition of being in Minnesota

Two Objections to Ethical Objectivism

1. Claims about Universality 2. Claims about Absolutism

Two Types of Ethical Objectivism

1. Ethical Realism 2. Constructivism

EXAMPLES of *Necessary Conditions*

1. Having no angles is a necessary condition of circles 2. Being at least 16 years old is a necessary condition of voting in the US

Mill's Response to Objection 3

1. In the case of prudence, we make confident judgments about future well-being all the time 2. We actually have all of human history on which to rely in making judgments about likely future wellbeing.

Doubters of Morality base their doubts on these considerations

1. Individuals constantly disagree about what's right and wrong and societies do too. - there is no objective truth in ethics 2. There are universally correct moral standards only if god exists. - BUT god does not exist, so ethics is "human construct" 3. Science tells us the truth about the world and science says nothing about what's right and wrong - nothing is right or wrong (ethic perspective) 4. IF there were a universal ethic, then that would make it okay for some people to impose their own views on others - there is no universal ethic 5. If there were objective moral rules, then it would always be wrong to break them - no moral rule is absolute

*Counterexamples* to Laws Require Law-Makers Argument *Premise 1*

1. Law of Gravity - atheists seem able to consistently accept this - *descriptive laws* (like gravity) do not require a law-maker - *normative laws* do require a lawmaker but some rules do not need a law-maker (ex: epistemic laws, laws of logic)

Two Main Division of Ethical Skepticism

1. Moral Nihilism (or ethical nihilism) 2. Ethical Relativism

Plausible "Starting Points" to Morality

1. Neither the law nor tradition is immune from moral criticism - law does not have the final word on what is right and wrong - actions that are legal are sometimes morally mistaken 2. Everyone is morally fallible (capable of error) - no human being is wholly wise in moral matters 3. Friendship is valuable 4. We are not obligated to do the impossible - moral standards that are impossible to meet are illegitimate - morality can demand only so much of us 5. Children bear less moral responsibility than adults - moral responsibility assumes an ability to understand options, make decisions, and let our decisions guide our behavior 6. Justice is a very important moral good - important that we get what we deserve and that we are treated fairly 7. Deliberately hurting other people requires justification 8. Equals ought to be treated equally - when this fails racist and sexist policies are enacted 9. Self-interest is not the only ethical consideration 10. Agony is bad - excruciating physical or emotional pain is bad, requires a very powerful justification 11. Might does not make right - people with power are able to get away with lots of things that we cannot, not justifying their actions 12. Free and informed requests prevent rights violations

In cases of Cultural Relativism, *contradictions will arise* in cases where BOTH of the following are true

1. Some act "x" occurs in two cultures at the same time 2. Two cultures in which action "x" occurs hold inconsistent views about moral status of action "x"

3 Steps for Assessing Moral Status of an action according to *rule consequentialism*

1. carefully describe the rule. 2. imagine what a society would be like if just about everyone in it endorsed [and followed] that rule. 3. ask this question: will that society be better off with this rule than with any competing rule? *If yes*, then you have an optimific social rule; *If no*, you do not have an optimific social rule.

Two Primary Ways of treating a person as a *Mere Means*

1. coercion (force) 2. intentional deception - example of deception is the lying promise ($20 borrowing example, but not planning on paying the money back in the future)

Classical Utilitarians Three Primary Views

1. consequentialism 2. hedonism 3. impartiality *Kant rejects* consequentialism and hedonism Kant Believes - *consequentialism* consequences are never directly relevant to the morality of an action (morally irrelevant) - *hedonism* he thought that happiness is not intrinsically good

Justify Moral Beliefs by 4 Principles (GENERAL RULES)

1. do not impose unnecessary harm 2. be nice to others 3. act justly 4. tell the truth

Three Categories of Views on How to Identify Individual Well-Being

1. hedonism about well-being 2. desire-satisfaction theories of well-being 3. "objective list" views of well-being:

Three Problems for Ethical Particularism

1. lack of unity 2. counterexamples (intuitively, at least some reasons have permanent moral importance) 3. difficulty in obtaining moral knowledge

There are multiple senses of "universal" regarding to moral requirements

1. the requirements are accepted by everyone 2. the requirements apply to everyone (applies to everyone meaning moral agents) *In order for an argument to be valid, "universal" must be used in the same sense throughout the argument*

Two Features of an Argument

1. they are logically watertight (valid) 2. all of their premises are true (known as sound arguments)

IMPORTANT NOTE

BECAUSE ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM MAKES TWO CENTRAL CLAIMS - varieties of ethical skepticism correspond to which of these two claims the specific variety of ethical skepticism rejects

Normative Ethics

DEFINITION: ethical theory focused on identifying which kinds of actions are right and wrong, examining the plausibility of various moral rules, and determining which character traits qualify as virtues and vices - deals with the content of morality (criteria for morally right action Asks Questions such as: - what are our fundamental moral duties? - which character traits count as virtues or vices? - who should our role model be? - do the ends always justify the means?

Metaethics

DEFINITION: ethical theory that ask about the status of normative ethical claims (whether the claims are true) and if personal, cultural, or divine opinion makes them true. - also considers how to gain MORAL KNOWLEDGE and what MORAL REQUIREMENTS give us reasons to obey them - deals with the status of morality Asks Questions such as: - what is the status of moral claims and advice? - can ethical theories, moral principles, or specific moral verdicts be true? - can we gain moral wisdom - do we always have good reasons to do our moral duty?

Value Theory

DEFINITION: ethics concerned with identifying what is valuable in its own right, and explaining the nature of well-being (what is good, both individually and in general) Asks Questions such as: - what is the good life? - what is worth pursuing for its own sake? - how do we improve our lot in life?

Would you *plug in* to Nozick's "Experience Machine" Thought Experiment

If you *wouldn't plug in* - you reject hedonism about well-being - because any reason you give has to appeal to some intrinsic good other than happiness. *ex* -I do not want to plug in bc I really want to have friends and not just think I have them - I do not want to plug in bc I really want to have real accomplishments and not just think I have them *non-hedonists could consistently choose to plug in* - *ex* not a hedonist about well-being bc I believe that having knowledge is intrinsically good for me but I just value happiness more so I can plug in

*EXAMPLES* of an *INVALID* argument

Premise: All dogs are brown Premise: Snow is white Therefore, today is Friday *(Special Case Affirming the Consequent)* Premise: If Bekka is an Ethics professor, then she is at least 30 years old Premise: Bekka is at least 30 years old Therefore, Bekka is an ethics professor *(Special Case Denying the Antecedent)* Premise: If Bekka is a barista at Starbucks, then she is friendly Premise: Bekka is not a barista at Starbucks Therefore, Bekka is not friendly

*EXAMPLES* of a *VALID* argument

Premise: All humans are mortal Premise: Meryl Streep is a human Therefore, (conclusion) Meryl Streep is mortal *(SPECIAL CASE, modus ponens)* Premise: If drunk driving risks serious harm to third parties, then it is morally wrong Premise: drunk driving risks serious harm to third parties Therefore, (conclusion) drunk driving is morally wrong *(SPECIAL CASE, modus tollens)* Premise: If assisted suicide is murder, then it is morally wrong Premise: Assisted suicide is not morally wrong Therefore, (conclusion) assisted suicide is not murder

*EXAMPLE* of a *SOUND* argument

Premise: Everyone who is currently a philosophy professor at MSU has taken at least 5 philosophy courses Premise: Bekka is currently a philosophy professor at MSU Therefore, (conclusion) Bekka has taken at least 5 philosophy courses

EXAMPLE

Suppose the week lecture videos are going to be delayed because Professor William's husband is sick - most students would take this to be much more compelling of an excuse then if she said her friend was sick

Objective List Views (of well-being)

a *large family of views* - according to which some things are *objectively good* for individuals regardless of whether these things are desired by the individuals or make them happy - according to which some things are *objectively bad* for individuals regardless of whether these things are desired by the individuals or make them happy *different* "objective list" views differ regarding what counts as objectively good/bad

Arbitrary Command

a command that is not supported by relevant reasons

Ethical Claims

are not scientifically verifiable - *ethical objectivism posits* the existence of facts which simply have no role in explaining what happens in the world.

Informed Desires

are those desires that you would have if you had all relevant, correct information and did not make any mistakes in instrumental reasoning *instrumental reasoning*: reasoning about how to achieve a given end

Voluntary Euthanasia

euthanasia which a patient has requested and for which the patient has given *valid consent* - *voluntary euthanasia* is possible only for individuals who are *competent* to give consent

Consent

is morally transformative *view of the importance of consent* - holds that an individual's valid consent can change the status of an intervention from *morally wrong* to *morally permissible* *example* - if i take your car that is morally wrong, but if you validly consent to me using your car or give me your car with valid consent that is not wrong.

Euthyphro Argument and the Divine Perfection Argument can be responded to by:

weakening the claim made by the divine command theory and dropping the "and because" clauses.