PHIL 181 (FIRST EXAM)

Aristotle (Why Happiness is Highest Good)

1. We choose it for its own sake, not for the sake of anything beyond it 2. Everything else we seek is in order to gain happiness 3. It is self-sufficient 4. It is not counted as just one good among many 5. Nothing can be added to happiness to make it more worthy of choice

JSM (Utilitarianism Ch 4)

-"Proving" the Principle -"Ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted as good without proof" -But here is "a larger meaning of the word proof" according to which we CAN "prove" the principle of utility: "Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof" -What is Required for Proof? -The first premises of knowledge are "matters of fact," and can be verified by "direct appeal to the faculties which judge of fact- namely, our senses and our internal consciousness" -The first premises of moral judgments or reasonings are "practical ends." How do we verify them? -"The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it." (35) -To find out what one finds desirable or desires, the only means to find out is to ask them -Is Happiness the Only Desideratum? -Happiness is obviously, as a matter of fact, desired, and desired by almost all people -But this is not enough... -Main Objection: The Desire for Virtue -People commonly desire virtue, even when (sometimes, especially when) it is opposed to happiness -Mill: of course! But this is due to a psychological process: there is no "original desire" for virtue, no motive to it, "save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain" -"Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature by which things originally indifferent but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures..." -Virtues are just effective patterns of behavior in order to get the primitive ends that we seek (food, shelter, etc; vices= ineffective) -Human nature changes over time -Other similar phenomena: love of money/power/fame; "What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness has come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness" -Second Objection: Will -"The will is a different thing from desire; a person of confirmed virtue or any other person whose purposes are fixed carries out his purposes without any thought of the pleasure he has in contemplating them or expects to derive from their fulfillment, and persists in acting on them, even though these pleasures are much diminished..." -Mill: true, but will is "originally an offshoot from desire," "entirely produced by" desire; only later does it pass "out of dominion of its parent" -This is necessary bc "the influence of pleasurable and painful associations which prompt to virtue is not sufficiently to be depended on for unerring constancy of action until it has acquired the support of habit"

Aristotle (Involuntary and Nonvoluntary Actions)

-An action is involuntary if: 1. Its principle (origin, cause) of action is completely outside the agent OR 2. The agent acts in ignorance of the particulars of the case, and, upon learning of them later, feels pain and regret for what he has done -An action is nonvoluntary if: 1. It is caused by ignorance of any kind.

Aristotle (Defining Virtue of Character)

-Genus: a state of the soul -not just a feeling, like appetite, anger, fear, love, envy, etc. (We are praised or blamed for being virtuous or vicious, not for having feelings) -Not just a capacity either (again, we are not praised or blamed for being capable of virtue or vice, but for actually being virtuous or vicious) -Differentia: that decides, consisting in a mean, relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason as a prudent person would define it -"Relative to us" - some people need more, some people less, but always something moderate

Aristotle (Can We Be Happy in Our Lifetimes?)

-If we need to wait until the end of a person's life to see whether he or she is happy, we cannot call him or her happy when happiness is actually being experienced -Doing well or badly does not rest with fortunes, but with our souls: "Activities in accord with virtue control happiness, and the contrary activities control its contrary." -Thus no happy person can ever become miserable, since actions control happiness, and "no happy person can ever do hateful and base actions."

Aristotle (Achieving Happiness)

-Is it sent by the gods? (He is mute on this. He doesn't say that it isn't. He says that if there's anything that should be sent by the gods, it's happiness) -Is it learned or cultivated? If so, widely shared among all who are not deformed by accident ("Whatever is natural is naturally in the finest state possible." -By fortune or luck? NO. "It would be seriously inappropriate to entrust what is greatest and finest to fortune." The highest good is the product of a non-random cause

Aristotle (How Can We Best Hit the Mean?)

-It's hard work: it requires practical wisdom ("prudence") -Steer clear of the more contrary extreme -"Know thyself" (Delphic Oracle): correct for our own known tendencies -Beware of pleasure and its sources, and the biases they induce

JSM (Utilitarianism Ch 5)

-Justice vs Utility? Organization of the Chapter 1. Setting up the problem; 2. Survey of the different common uses of "injustice" and "justice"; 3. The etymology of "justice"; 4. Identification of the central "meaning" of the idea of justice; 5. Investigation of the origin of the feeling that accompanies the idea of justice; 6. The utility of justice: security; 7. Justice no less uncertain than utility: examples; 8. Justice not the same as expediency and conclusion -The Idea & Feeling of Justice -"Justice seems to argue strongly against the greatest happiness principle:" The powerful sentiment and apparently... -Method of Inquiry 1. Identify the distinguishing character or trait of justice; 2. Determine whether it can... -Survey of the Usage of the Terms "Justice" and "Injustice" -Unjust to deprive someone of his or her legal rights -Unjust to deprive someone of his or her moral rights -Just that everyone should get what he or she deserves -Unjust to break faith with another -Unjust to be partial in judgment -Unjust to apply laws (legal or moral) unequally -Etymology of Justice -Latin: from jussum, "what has been commanded;" Greek: from diakon, "lawsuit;" German: Recht, "law;" French: la justice, "judicature" -"The primitive element in the formation of the notion of justice was conformity to law" -Also attached: the idea of constraint, or "penal sanction" (sanction=punishment) -Morality (Generally) and Justice (Specifically) -Morality is distinguished from mere expediency: "it is part of the notion of duty in every one of its forms that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfill it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt." -Justice is specifically distinguished from morality as perfect duties are from imperfect ones: perfect duties are those "in virtue of which a correlative right exists..." -The Feeling of Justice -Two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice: 1) "The desire to punish the person who has done harm." 2) The knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals to whom this harm has been done -The desire to punish is itself in turn "the spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments": 1) "The impulse of self-defense." 2) "The feeling of sympathy" -The desire to punish is "the natural feeling of retaliation or vengeance" that has been "moralized by the social feeling" -General Utility and "Security" -To have a right is "to have something society ought to defend me in the possession of" -Why should society so defend me? General utility -The "extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned: security"

Aristotle (Ignorance)

-One can be ignorant in several ways: • Acting in ignorance brought about by some other cause (drunkenness, illness) • Ignorant of the "universal" (of the correct end or rule to be sought) • Ignorant of the particulars: who is doing the action (agent); what she is doing; about what or to what the action is being done; what it is being done with; for what result; in what manner -Of these, the first may or may not be blameworthy; the second always is; the third seldom is.

Aristotle (Book I)

-The highest good for human beings (and cities) is happiness -Happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and most complete virtue

Aristotle (Virtue of Character: Habit)

-Virtue comes in two "flavors": -Of thought (acquired by teaching) -Of character (acquired by habituation) -Virtue of character is acquired by being trained by someone with that virtue in accordance with correct reason -That correct reason involves judging a mean between two extremes; such judgments are particular to the agent & the circumstances -We must be habituated to be pleased by the virtuous and pained by the vicious, since pleasure allied to vice is hard to fight -Virtuous actions must come from a character is fixed

Aristotle (Praiseworthy and Blameworthy Actions)

-We can only really be praised (and rewarded) or blamed (and punished) for actions that are voluntary, i.e, willingly done -An action Is voluntary if, and only if: 1. The principle (origin, cause) of the action is within the agent herself 2. It is not done in or by cause of ignorance

Aristotle (Deliberation and Decision)

-We deliberate only about what is in our power -We deliberate about what is uncertain or cannot be known with exactness -We do not deliberate about ends but only about means -Deliberation involves others when & if we cannot figure out on our own what to do -We begin our deliberation from the end and work backwards until we arrive at where are we at present -Decision is "deliberative desire to do an action that is up to us" (36)

Aristotle (Mixed Action)

-What about actions caused by coercion or by the strong attraction to a "fine" or "noble" end? -The principle of action is within the agent, but the agent is under strong external pressure -Such actions are "mixed"; they have characteristics of both the voluntary & the involuntary, but they more strongly resemble the former -Some acts should never be done, or excused even on the basis of coercion or very great expected good (e.g. murder, mass murder, rape, treachery, etc.)

Aristotle (3 Kinds of Good)

1. External goods a. Money, power, connections, luck, etc. 2. Goods of the body a. Health, fitness, good children, etc. 3. Goods of the soul a. The highest kind of good, since soul is more perfect than body

JSM (Pleasure Too Base an End)

1st objection •But "human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites and, when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification" (8) •Important difference in pleasure is not quantity, but quality: "Of two pleasure, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure" (8) •"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their side of the question." (10) •You must be exposed to all pleasures in order to feel a desire to re-experience them

JSM (Happiness Not the End)

2nd objection • "Because it is unattainable:" only "the present wretched education and wretched social arrangements" prevent it from being attained by "almost all." (13) o Social arrangements= things like inequality, laws that govern class rank, etc. • Happiness: "An existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasure, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing" (13) • "It is possible to do without it:" Yes, but why? Abnegation of one's own happiness is not good in itself, but worthwhile only for the sake of the happiness of others. • "All honor to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world; but he who does it or professes to do it for any other purpose is no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be inspiring proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should." (16)

JSM (Too High for Humanity)

3rd objection • People cannot be expected to act always from the motive of promoting the general welfare of society. • "But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals and confound the rule of action with the motive for it" (18) • Only those actions which are ethical need to be considered; only those whose actions have wide influence (e.g. public officials) need so calculate

JSM (Ignores Role of Character)

4th objection • True, utilitarians evaluate acts, not characters • Aspects of character that are outside the ethical are not disprized by utilitarians • But they are "of the opinion that in the long run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them unpopular with many people" (20). Other Objections • Utilitarianism is: o "Godless" (22) o "Expedient" (22-3) o "Too time-consuming" (23-5)

Pleasure

According to Aristotle oSome people say ____ really is the supreme good, but we should present it publically as being base and to be avoided, so as to lead people away from it so they don't become slaves to it oBut this only causes those so taught contempt for argument oEudoxus taught that ____ was the good because it alone is what we choose for its own sake oBut this can't be true, since (as Plato pointed out) a pleasant life plus prudence or wisdom is better than just _____ alone. Thus ____ alone can't be the supreme good. oPlus, there are things we desire even if there were no ____ to them (like having the virtues) (One word fills all these blanks)

Theoretical Wisdom

According to Aristotle, the best and most complete virtue is ________.

JSM (Ultimate Ends)

Also the proof of principle of utility • "Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof," that is, of "what is commonly understood as proof" • But knowledge of the ultimate end is not a matter of "blind impulse" or "arbitrary choice" either. There is a "larger meaning of the word 'proof': "Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or to withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof"

Aristotle (Book III)

Decision is deliberative desire to do an action that is up to us

Kant (Ch 1)

Kant was inspired by Hume •Kant: The Basis of Knowledge is Experience and the A Priori o The notion of law: the causation or determination of a thing (law of nature) or the will (moral law) which is universal, binding, and exceptionless o But if knowledge is as Hume describes it (knowledge comes from experience), it can never give us knowledge of the kind that the concept of law requires; how could we know natural laws if knowledge comes from experience? o Therefore, knowledge cannot be as Hume describes it, the merely passive reception and association of ideas based upon sense impressions. The faculty of knowledge of all rational beings must bring something of its own to experience which serves to structure and organize knowledge and which thus actively shapes knowledge. Kant call this "pure" power to shape all possible experience the "a priori" (independent of experience; experience is actively organized by us; it does not just come to us) •Moral "Law" o "Everyone must admit that if a law is to be morally valid, i.e., is to be valid as a ground of obligation, then it must carry with it absolute necessity. He must admit that the command, 'Thou shalt not lie,' does not hold only for men, as if other rational beings had no need to abide by it, and so with all the other moral laws properly so called. And he must concede that the ground of obligation here must therefore be sought not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which man is placed, but must be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason; he must grant that every other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience- even a precept that may in certain respects be universal- inso far as it rests in the least on empirical grounds- perhaps only its motive- can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law." •The Grounding: Its Structure o "Ordinary rational knowledge of morality" (7-16) o Transition o "Metaphysics of morals o "Transition o "Critique of practical reason" •The Only Unqualified Good o Opening line of the Grounding: "There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will." o "A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some proposed, end; it is good only through its willing, i.e., it is good in itself." o It is your intentions that count, not how successful you are in attempting to act on them. Kant is not concerned with achieving a certain end. •Happiness Not the Final Good o Assume that: 1. "In the natural constitution of an organized being... no organ is to be found for any end unless it be the most fit and the best adapted for that end." 2. The real end of nature, in the case of a being with reason and will, is that being's "preservation, welfare, or in a word its happiness." o BUT: reason and will do not conduce as effectively to happiness as an implanted, subrational and involuntary instinct or drive would o FURTHER: Reason & will even make it harder for those beings who possess it to achieve happiness o THEREFORE: (2) above must be false (since (1) cannot be) If (2) is false, what is the real end of nature in endowing us with reason and a will? Since reason is a practical faculty (i.e., has an influence on the will), its end must be to produce a will that is good in itself, and not just as a means to some further end (e.g. happiness) •Actions: Four Cases o Contrary to duty (stealing, murdering, lying, etc) o In accordance with duty, but which we do not for the sake of duty or even because we desire to, but for fear of a worse consequence (e.g. not cheating at a casino to avoid jail; not plagiarizing to avoid an "F") o In accordance with duty, but which we really do for an ulterior motive (e.g. helping save the life of someone we are in love with) o In accordance with duty, and which we do even though we have a strong desire to avoid doing it (e.g. carrying out a painful obligation because we had promised to do so) •3 Propositions of Morality o An action must be done from duty in order to have any moral worth o "An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined." o "Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the [moral] law" • The Categorical Imperative o 1. "The moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it nor in any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from this expected effect." (Because these effects could all have been produced, and more efficiently, by other nonrational/involuntary causes) o 2. "Therefore the pre-eminent good which is called moral can consist in nothing but the representation of the law in itself... [as] the determining ground of the will." o 3. "Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that might arise for it form obeying any particular law, there is nothing left to serve the will as principle except the universal conformity of its actions to law as such, i.e., I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." • The Simple Principle o "I need no far-reaching acuteness to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world and incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself whether I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." o BUT: "Man feels within himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of a duty...his needs and inclinations, whose total satisfaction is summed up under the name of happiness." o Yet "reason irremissibly commands its precepts, without thereby promising the inclinations anything" o There thus arises "a natural dialectic, i.e., a propensity to quibble with the strict laws of duty" o Thus ordinary reason must seek help in philosophy to defend the moral claims of rational duty.

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T or F: According to Aristotle, to be most fully happy (i.e., "blessed") we need external goods and goods of the body. But they are not the central or highest aspect of happiness/ good

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T or F: In Aristotle's view, virtue is not the polar opposite of vice. Instead, virtue is a point in between two vices: one of excess and one of deficiency.

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T or F: John Stuart Mill is an empiricist • Thinks that knowledge of any kind comes from sense experience; we use our senses to experience life

Aristotle (The Soul)

The human soul is divided into a non-rational part and a rational part -The non-rational part is divided into two parts 1. Vegetative part (unresponsive to reason) -ex. We cannot tell our intestines to digest 2. Desiring and appetitive part (can respond to reason)

Aristotle (Book II)

Virtue of character is a state of the soul that decides, consisting in a mean, relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason as a prudent person would define it

Aristotle (Goods and Ends)

i. "Every craft and every line of inquiry, and likewise every action and decision, seems to seek some good." (1) ii. Those activities which produce something outside of themselves vs. those which don't and are done for their own sake iii. Hierarchies of ends and activities: highest or most important are the most good iv. Two types of activities: 1. End lies outside of the activity done= Productive (ex. Craft OR an architect plans and builds and the building as the end result) 2. End inside of the activity= He calls it action (ex. Dancing; the goal of dancing is to dance, and this is done in the process) a. In some instances, action is better than craft v. Human beings are political animals

Aristotle (How Much We Can Know in Ethics)

i. Each science can have only the degree of accuracy & certainty appropriate to its subject matter; it is foolish to expect the same standards in geometry and in politics ii. Besides, there is much more disagreement about the good than about nature or mathematics or astronomy iii. Much of the subject matter of ethics and politics can only be learned by experience

Aristotle (Defining Happiness)

i. First we discover human function: what humans are & do that is unique and special and characteristic of them & of no other beings ii. This is: reasoning, an activity of the soul iii. Life is both a potentiality and an activity; activity is better than potentiality iv. The soul has at least two parts: one is reason, the other a power which can either go along with or disobey reason. v. "Virtue" is an excellence of function vi. Thus: "Happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and most complete virtue."

Aristotle (Candidates for Highest Good)

i. Pleasure or gratification (favored by "the many," "the most vulgar") ii. Honor (favored by the "cultivated people," those active in political life) iii. Study or contemplation iv. A fourth, moneymaking, cannot be the highest good, since it is only instrumental

Aristotle (The Highest Good)

i. So (a) if there is some end that we wish for in itself, and for the sake of which we wish other things, and (b) we don't desire things one after another, without limit (since then desire would be "empty and futile"), then this is the highest end and thus the highest good ii. The kind of science of knowledge that tells us of this good is political science, since that science understands and legislates what must be known and done in a city. (The good of a city is higher & more complete than that of an individual)

Aristotle (Different Kinds of Pleasure)

o Different pleasures complete different activities; each has its own, 'proper' pleasure o Pleasures can interfere with and destroy one another as much as pain can o Pleasures proper to excellent activities are decent , those to base ones are vicious o "What is really so is what appears so to the excellent person." The good person, insofar as s/he is good, is the measure of each thing, so what appears to her as pleasant will be the true pleasure o Pleasures that complete the activities of the completely happy person will thus be the fully human pleasures to the fullest extent

Aristotle (Pleasure's True Nature)

o In any given instant, it is formally complete in itself o It is not a process; it has no parts different from the whole o "Every perceptual capacity is active in relation to its perceptible object, and completely active when it is in good condition to the finest of its perceptible objects... hence for each capacity the best activity is the subject in the best condition in the presence of the best object of the capacity." o Pleasure completes this activity "as a sort of consequent end, like the bloom on youths" o From the moment pleasure begins to the moment it ends, it is complete in itself. Therefore, it is whole, not a development or a process.

Aristotle (Theoretical Study (Fullest Human Happiness))

o It is supreme, since wisdom is the supreme virtue concerned with the most perfect objects o It is the most continuous: we can study longer than any other activity o It is self-sufficient - requiring the fewest resources o It is good & desirable for its own sake, not just for a further end (unlike much action & all production) o Its pleasures are firm, enduring, and intense o It is what is most divine in human beings, and thus most to be striven for

Aristotle (Prudence, Good Deliberation, and Virtue of Character)

oIn scientific thought, we begin with principles and end with conclusions (the "last things"). In science, the principles are the axioms and the conclusions are the theorems of the science. oBut rational calculation (deliberation) is directed mainly at the "last things" (the particular means to the final end). The end is the principle: a prudent person knows it, as opposed to a merely clever person. oTo become prudent we must first be trained in virtue of character, so that the "eye of the soul" which sees the true end (such as happiness) may be opened

Kant (End)

• "Solution:" The Two Worlds o The circle would arise only if I thought of myself in the same way as 1. Being free of natural necessitation 2. Being able to act according to the categorical imperative and having an effect in the world of nature o But I do not think of myself in the same way in each case. In the first, I think of myself as a member of the "world of understanding;" in the second, as belonging to the "world of sense" (52-3) • Breaking the Circular Argument o "When we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and know the autonomy of the will together with its consequence, morality; whereas when we think of ourselves as obligated, we consider ourselves as belonging o the world of sense and yet at the same time to the intelligible world" (54). o But the intelligible world "contains the ground of the world of sense and therefore also the ground of its laws; consequently, the intelligible world is ... directly legislative of my will (which belongs wholly to the intelligible world" (53). • "The Extreme Limit of All Practical Philosophy" o Freedom is an IDEA OF REASON, not a concept of nature, and so can never be proven in experience as such. In the world of appearances, where "whatever happens [is] determined without any exception according to laws of nature" (56) o Thus the idea of freedom "holds only as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being who believes himself conscious of a will, i.e.,... a faculty of determining himself to action as intelligence and hence in accordance with laws of reason independently of natural instincts" (59) • "Nothing Remains but Defense" o WE cannot explain how we are free. "We can explain nothing but what we can reduce to laws whose objects can be given in some possible experience... But where determination according to laws of nature ceases, there likewise ceases all explanation and nothing at all remains but defense, i.e., refutation of the objections of those who profess to have seen deeper into the essence of things and thereupon boldly declare freedom to be impossible" (58-9) o Nor can we explain how we can take an interest in and submit ourselves to the moral law, to the point of sacrificing all other satisfactions. "Even though we do not indeed grasp the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative, we do nevertheless grasp its inconceivability" (62).

JSM (Defining Utilitarianism)

• "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness" • "By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure." -The "theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded": that "pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends," and that "all desirable hings... are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain."

JSM (Summum Bonum)

• "There are few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge more unlike what might have been expected or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still linger, than the little progress which has been made in the decision of the controversy respecting the criterion of right and wrong." (1) • "From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the ______, or what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought" (1) • Means "the highest good" in Latin • On one hand, we want to know about nature, but unless we know why and for what purpose this knowledge is, this may be very harmful.

Kant (Ch 3)

• 'Proving' a prior that there is a Categorical Imperative o The will is the faculty of "determining itself to action in accordance with the representation of certain laws." The objective ground of the will's self-determination is called an END. The subjective ground of desire is called an INCENTIVE; the objective ground, a MOTIVE. Thus, subjective willing rests on incentives which are private & particular to me; objective ends rest on motives valid for every rational being (35) o If there exists something which can have intrinsic worth- i.e., be an end in itself- then in it alone would be the ground of a categorical imperative. o "Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will" (35). o Thus: Every rational being is her- or himself the ground of the categorical imperative: "Always act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never as a means." • "Persons" and "Things" o There are two kinds of beings: (1) those whose existence depends on our will and (2) those whose existence depends on nature. From the viewpoint of practical philosophy, there are two kinds of (2): non-rational beings and rational ones o All artificial beings (1) and all non-rational ones "have only a relative values as means and are therefore called things" (35-36) o Rational beings are called PERSONS "and hence there is imposed thereby a limit on all arbitrary use of such beings, which are thus objects of respect"(36) o If there is a categorical imperative, it must be based on the existence of some being which is an end in itself and thus an end for every rational being: of a PERSON. • The Third Practical Principle o "The ground of all practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and form of universality... [and] subjectively... in the end" (the 1st principle) o "The subject of all ends Is every rational being as an end in himself" (the 2nd principle) o Thus: "The idea of the will of every rational being [is that it is] a will that legislates universal law" (37-38). • How Is This Possible? o But isn't being a SUBJECT of a law to be just a means to that law's end? If another being imposes a law upon me (i.e., legislates my behavior), I am under that being's will, and thus only a means. Thus if I live under the will of another, I am a mere THING. And if I legislate universal law, all other beings are nothing but THINGS to me. Paradox! • The "Kingdom of Ends" o A "kingdom" is "a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws" (39). o If one abstracts from the personal differences among individual beings, and from the material content of their private ends, and considers them purely as rational beings, we can think of a whole of all ends in systematic connection o "A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a MEMBER when he legislates in it universal laws while also being himself subject to those laws. He belongs to it as SOVEREIGN, when as legislator he is himself subject to the will of no other" (40). o A person can be a MEMBER if he has freedom of the will; SOVEREIGN only if "he is a completely independent being without needs and with unlimited power adequate to his will" (40). o Duty does not apply to a sovereign, but does apply to every member, in the kingdom of ends. (But a sovereign will still will according to the categorical imperative) o Thus: duty can be defined as "the practical necessity of acting in such a way as o regard oneself as legislating universal law in a kingdom of ends" (40). o Therefore, if rational beings have freedom of the will, they are "autonomous," i.e., self-legislating. o Autonomy is thus "the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature" (41). • The Supreme Principle of Morality: Autonomy of the Will o "Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to itself (independently of any property of the objection of volition)" (44). o Thus the principle of autonomy is the final and supreme, principle of morality: "Always choose in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law" (44). • Heteronomy of the Will: Source of All Spurious Principles of Morality (45-7) o Empirical sources: 1. Physical feeling (my own happiness) 2. Moral feeling (an "alleged special sense") o Rational sources 1. Ontological concept of perfection 2. Theological concept of perfection • Autonomy o Autonomy is "the property that the will has of being a law to itself (independently of any property of any property of the objects of volition)" (44) o Heteronomy of the will is the "source of all spurious principles of morality"

JSM (Sciences and Practical Arts)

• A hard science (and mathematics) arrives at its "first principles" only after a theoretical effort, a lengthy "metaphysical analysis practiced on the elementary notions" of that science (2). It doesn't need to be clear about them in order to BEGIN its work of understanding its corner of reality, only to COMPLETE that work. • But in a "practical art, such as morals or legislation," one must know from the outset the first principle, the end: "All action is for the sake of some end" (2). • Therefore, ethics can be a science.

St. Paul (Sin, Grace, and Righteousness)

• All (Jews & gentiles) are "under the power of sin" • Sin comes into the world through Adam, but until the Law is given to Israel lies dormant, causing only bodily death • After the giving of the Law on Sinai, we are inflamed into rebellion; sin takes over the soul, especially intellect & will • Only Christ's grace can save us from destruction • "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good. So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the veil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not what, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.

JSM (Ethics and Law)

• Ethics, the "science of morals," is a deductive (demonstrative) system based upon evident first principles • The moral faculty of human beings informs us, NOT of particular rights and wrongs, but ONLY of general principles. It is a faculty of REASON, not of SENSATION. • The morality of an individual action is thus not understood by intuition but by the "application of a law to an individual case": it is juridical (relating to judicial proceedings/the administration of law).

St. Paul

• The word "philosophy" appears only once in the New Testament, in Paul's Colossians: "See to it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the universe, and not according to Christ." • Ephesians 4:17-19: "Now this I affirm and testify in the Lord that you must no longer lives as the Gentiles do, in the futility of their minds; they are darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them, due to their hardness of heart; they have become callous and have given themselves up to licentiousness, greedy to practice every kind of uncleanness. • Romans 1:21-22: "although they knew God they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking...." • Jews claim justification is by membership in the people of Israel alone ("circumcision" and the keeping of the Law) • But "circumcision" is inward, not outward; if anything, it is keeping the precepts of the Law that counts • Abraham was justified because of his faith, and was thereby made patriarch of Israel; the Law followed from his faith • Any Gentiles who have a similar faith may also be attached to the Covenant, therefore. The Law does not justify (being a gift of God consequent upon faith) • Intentions and inward attitude is what counts when evaluating someone's morality or goodness; unlike what Aristotle says

JSM (Impartiality/Equality Rule)

•"The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own conduct but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator"(17)

Kant Ch 4

•Analytic & Synthetic Propositions oAn analytic proposition is one in which the predicate can be shown to be contained in the subject (e.g., "A square (an equilateral rectangle) is a rectangle"): the predicate may be deduced from the subject oA synthetic proposition is one in which the predicate cannot be deduced from the subject (e.g., "Hugh Miller is a professor") oAccording to most of Kant's contemporary thinkers, the truth of only analytic propositions can be grasped a priori (before/independent of experience). The truth of all synthetic propositions must be grasped on the basis of experience ("a posteriori") oKant disagreed. All expressions of laws of nature are synthetic: "The force of attraction between two point masses is proportional to the product of the two masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the point masses." Yet their truth cannot be founded in experience, since experience yields only PROBABILITY of truth, never NECESSITY. Yet the law of gravity is NECESSARILY true. oThe only way to grasp the truth of a statement whose predicate is NECESSARILY related •Moral Laws: Synthetic and A Priori (Like all other laws) oBut MORALITY (understood as a duty which commands universally, bindingly, exceptionlessly) must a.sl be a law, and its principle would therefore also be a synthetic a priori statement: "An absolutely good will is one whose maxim can always have itself as content when such a maxim is regarded as a universal law" (49). oSuch a proposition is possible only if there is some third cognition in which both the subject and the predicate are both to be found. This concept is that of FREEDOM. (49) •Freedom o"The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it independent of any determination by alien causes" (49). oProblem: this definition of freedom is only negative, and does not tell us positively what freedom is oBut we do learn something from "causality" here: causality involves "laws according to which something that we call cause must entail something else - namely, the effect" (49). oTherefore, freedom is not LAWLESS but is a kind of willing in accordance with immutable laws, although NOT the laws of nature, which are heteronomous. •"Now I Say That..." oIn order to prove that the supreme principle of morality is true and binding, we must prove that freedom is a property of all rational beings endowed with a will. 1. "Now I say that every being which cannot act in any way other than under the idea of freedom is for this very reason free from a practical point of view" (50). 2. "Now I claim that we must necessarily attribute to every rational being who has a will also the idea of freedom, under which only can such a being act" (50). 3. "Therefore as practical reason or as the will of a rational being must reason regard itself as free" (50). • A Circular Argument? o The argument is: 1. The will is free. 2. Therefore, the will is autonomous (i.e., it is a law to itself, independent of alien, heteronomous grounds). 3. Since (2) the will is autonomous, it is therefore subject to the moral law, the categorical imperative. o The sequence is: 1) Freedom => 2) Autonomy => 3) Bound by moral law o BUT: we think of ourselves as free from natural necessitation BECAUSE we want to think of ourselves as subject, not to natural law, but to the moral law; o AND at the same time, we think of ourselves as subject to the moral law BECAUSE we have attributed freedom of the will to ourselves. o This is a petitio principii (a circular argument, "begging the question").

Kant (Ch 2)

•Duty and Inclination o"When we pay attention to our experience of the way human beings act, we meet frequent and- as we ourselves admit- justified complaints that there cannot be cited a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure duty." o"In fact there is absolutely no possibility by means of experience to make out with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action that may in other respects conform to duty has rested solely on moral grounds and on the representation of one's duty... We can never, even by the strictest examination, completely plumb the depth of the secret incentives of our actions." oWe can't tell if any action (neither our own nor that of others) is done purely from duty; part of our consciousness is sealed off from this •"The Dear Self" oBut just because evidence of acting purely from duty is lacking, and because everywhere we look we come upon "the dear self" making exceptions for itself, this is no reason to claim that morals must be founded on experience (i.e., empirically, a posteriori) oNot only does experience not prove that we have ever actually been moral purely from duty; it cannot provide any evidence that such a pure moral will is even possible oWe must therefore prove (1) that willing purely from duty is possible; and (2) that it is necessary- both completely a priori, from the pure concept of a rational will (NOT by means of experience) •What is the source of our notion of duty? oFrom empirical (experiential) sources? No: anthropological sources such as 'happiness,' 'perfection,' 'moral feeling,' even 'fear of God' cannot ground universality oFrom pure practical reason wholly a priori? Yes: only possible source of exceptionless commands binding for all rational beings •Deduction of the Concept of Duty oImperatives: Hypothetical (represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one may possibly want) •Problematic (X is good for some possible purpose): Imperatives of skill •Assertoric (X is good from some actual purpose): Counsels of prudence Categorical (represent the practical necessity of a possible action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end) •Commands (laws) of morality •Kant doesn't say that seeking happiness is bad; he says that it is wrong only if we seek happiness before doing our duty •1st Form of the Categorical Imperative o"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become universal law (or law of nature)." •What has been proven thus far? o 1. "If duty is a concept which is to have significance and real legislative authority for our actions, then such... o 2. "We have exhibited clearly and definitely for every application... o 3. "We have not yet advanced far enough to prove a priori that there is actually an imperative of this kind, that there is a practical law which of itself commands absolutely and without any incentives, and that is following this law is duty."