Philosophy 101 Midterm
Locke
"...are utterly inseparable from the [external] body... are the ones that a body doesn't lose, whatever force is used on it, however... it is divided... [For division can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body]."
Kuhn
"...communication between proponents of different theories is inevitably partial...what each takes to be facts depends in part on the theory he espouses...an individual's transfer of allegiance from theory to theory is often better described as a conversion than as a choice."
Locke
"...how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it, and refuse assent of very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths..."
Popper
"...in fact, the belief that we can start with pure observations alone, without anything in the nature of a theory, is absurd... Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem."
Hume
"...like other habits, our habit of believing in laws is the product of frequent repetition— of the repeated observation that things of a certain kind are constantly conjoined with things of another kind."
Descartes
"...suppose that some malicious, powerful, cunning demon has done all he can to deceive me."
Hume
"...that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those of which we have had experience..."
Popper
"...the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."
Locke
"...the power to produce an idea in our mind I call a quality of the thing that has that power."
Locke
"...through the senses external objects convey into the mind something that produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have I call SENSATION."
Popper
"A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific.
Descartes
"And the fourth was to make all my enumerations so complete, and my reviews so comprehensive, that I could be sure that I hadn't overlooked anything."
Descartes
"But any idea that has representative reality must surely come from a cause that contains at least as much intrinsic reality as there is representative reality in the idea.
Berkeley
"But from what you have said it follows that the true size of the insect's foot is the size you see it having and the size the insect sees it as having, and all the sizes it is seen as having by animals that are even smaller. That is to say, your own principles have led you into an absurdity."
Descartes
"But this faculty could not be in me, since...the ideas in question are produced without my cooperation... So the only other alternative is that it is another substance distinct from me. ...since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that he does not transmit the ideas to me either..."
Descartes
"By the word 'God' I understand a substance that is infinite, eternal, unchangeable, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, which created myself and anything else that may exist. The more carefully I concentrate on these attributes, the less possible it seems that any of them could have originated from me alone. So this whole discussion implies that God necessarily exists."
Popper
"Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions."
Popper
"Confirming evidence should not count unless it is the result of a genuine test of a theory."
Berkeley
"Consequently the same body may seem to another spirit to make its journey in half the time that it seems to you to take. (Half is just an example; any other fraction would make the point just as well.) That is to say, according to your view that both of the perceived motions are in the object, a single body can really move both very swiftly and very slowly at the same time."
Berkeley
"Esse est Percepi"
Locke
"Even if it were in fact true that all mankind agreed in accepting certain truths, that wouldn't prove them to be innate if universal agreement could be explained in some other way..."
Descartes
"Even then, if he is deceiving me I undoubtedly exist: let him deceive me all he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing while I think I am something. So after thoroughly thinking the matter through I conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, must be true whenever I assert it or think it."
Popper
"Every 'good' scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen"
Popper
"Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or refute it"
Locke
"Every man has this source of ideas wholly within himself; and though it is not sense, because it has nothing to do with external objects, it is still very like sense, and might properly enough be called 'internal sense'. But along with calling the other 'sensation', I call this REFLECTION,."
Descartes
"For the proper purpose of the sensory perceptions given me by nature is simply to inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of which the mind is a part; and to this extent, they are sufficiently clear and distinct. But I misuse them by treating them as reliable touchstones for immediate judgments about the essential nature of the bodies located outside us...an area where they provide only very obscure information."
Locke
"From where does [the mind] get...all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience."
Descartes
"Given the failure of every other candidacy for the role of cause of me and of my idea of almost perfect being, I infer that the only successful candidacy is God's. Thus I conclude that the mere fact that I exist and have within me an idea of a most perfect being—that is, God—provides a clear proof that God does indeed exist."
Berkeley
"I can pronounce the word 'motion' by itself, but how does it follow from this that I can form in my mind the idea of motion without an idea of body? Theorems about extension and shapes can be proved without any mention of large or small or any other sensible quality, but how does it follow from this that the mind can form and grasp an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or shape or ·other· sensible quality?"
Popper
"I propose to turn the tables upon this theory of Hume's. Instead of explaining our propensity to expect regularities as the result of repetition [Hume's habituation], I propose to explain the repetition-for-us as the result of our propensity to expect regularities and search for them."
Descartes
"I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely dreams that the demon has contrived as traps for my judgment. I shall consider myself as having no hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as having falsely believed that I had all these things."
Descartes
"I would have to liken myself to brain-damaged madmen who are convinced they are kings when really they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or that they are pumpkins, or made of glass."
Locke
"If anyone brought that attitude to the ordinary affairs of life, accepting nothing that hadn't been plainly demonstrated, he would be sure of nothing in this world except an early death. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink wouldn't give him reason to risk it."
Hume
"It is Impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all of these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance."
Locke
"It is by...combinations of simple ideas [complex ideas], and nothing else, that we represent particular [things] to ourselves...such only do we, by their specific names, signify to others man, horse, sun, water, iron..."
Popper
"It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory—if we look for confirmations."
Descartes
"It is no surprise that God in creating me should have placed this idea in me, to serve as a mark of the craftsman stamped on his work."
Popper
"It is therefore impossible to explain anticipations, or expectations, as resulting from many repetitions, as suggested by Hume. For even the first repetition-for-us must be based upon similarity-for-us, and therefore upon expectations—precisely the kind of thing we wished to explain."
Locke
"Let anyone examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding; and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or...objects of his reflection."
Popper
"Maintaining a theory, despite refutation, lowers its status."
Kuhn
"My point is, then, that every individual choice between competing theories depends on a mixture of objective and subjective factors, or of shared and individual criteria."
Locke
"Nobody, I think, can genuinely be so skeptical as to be uncertain of the existence of the things that he sees and feels; and if anyone can doubt as much as that, he will never have any controversy with me, for he can never be sure I say anything that he disagrees with because he can't even be sure that I exist·."
Locke
"Nothing is more commonly taken for granted than that certain principles... are accepted by all mankind. Some people have argued that because these principles are (they think) universally accepted, they must have been stamped onto the souls of men from the outset."
Descartes
"Often in my dreams I am convinced of just such familiar events—that I am sitting by the fire in my dressing-gown—when in fact I am lying undressed in bed."
Hume
"Relations of Ideas are "...in short every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain... Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe."
Locke
"Secondly, there are qualities that are, in the objects themselves, really nothing but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the size, shape, texture, and motion of their imperceptible parts. Examples of these are colours, sounds, tastes, and so on."
Berkeley
"Since I can't form abstract ideas at all, it is clearly impossible for me to form them with help from 'pure intellect', whatever faculty you mean that phrase to refer to."
Berkeley
"So isn't this supposition infected with the same absurdity as the previous one? [Endless need for support for the support]... I don't want to force any meaning onto your words; you are free to explain them as you please. But please make me understand something by them! You tell me that matter supports or stands under [qualities]. How? As your legs support your body?"
Locke
"So when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances—e.g. horse, stone, etc.—although our idea of it is nothing but the collection of simple ideas of qualities that we usually find united in the thing called 'horse' or 'stone', still we think of these qualities as existing in and supported by some common subject; and we give this support the name 'substance', though we have no clear or distinct idea of what it is. ..."
Descartes
"Strictly speaking, then, I am simply a thing that thinks—a mind, or soul, or intellect, or reason, these being words whose meaning I have only just come to know."
Hume
"The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction... The sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible... than affirmation that it will rise."
Descartes
"The first was never to accept anything as true if I didn't have evident knowledge of its truth: that is, carefully to avoid jumping to conclusions and preserving old opinions, and to include in my judgments only what presented itself to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I had no basis for calling it in question."
Locke
"The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, without something to support them..."
Descartes
"The second was to divide each of the difficulties I examined into as many parts as possible and as might be required in order to resolve them better."
Descartes
"The third was to direct my thoughts in an orderly manner, by starting with the simplest and most easily known objects in order to move up gradually to knowledge of the most complex, and by stipulating some order even among objects that have no natural order of precedence."
Hume
"These propositions are far from the same, I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar will be attended with similar effects."
Locke
"We have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit as we have of body. The latter is supposed (without knowing what it is) to be the substratum of those simple ideas that come to us from the outside, and the former is supposed (still not knowing what it is) to be the substratum of the mental operations we experience within ourselves. Clearly, then, we have as poor a grasp of the idea of bodily substance as we have of spiritual substance or spirit.
Descartes
"Well, then, where do my mistakes come from? Their source is the fact that my will has a wider scope than my intellect has so that I am free to form beliefs on topics that I don't understand. Instead of behaving as I ought to, namely by restricting my will to the territory that my understanding covers, that is, suspending judgment then I am not intellectually in control, I let my will run loose, applying it to matters that I don't understand."
Kuhn
"What the tradition sees as eliminable imperfections in its rules of choice I take to be in part responses to the essential nature of science."
Locke
"Whatever the mind perceives in itself—whatever is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding—I call an idea..."
Descartes
"When I look more closely into these errors of mine, I discover that they have two cooperating causes—my faculty of knowledge and my faculty of choice or freedom of the will. My errors, that is, depend on both (a) my intellect and (b) my will."
Descartes
"When an idea is sheerly invented, the inventor is free to fiddle with it—add a bit here, subtract a bit there—whereas my idea of God is a natural unit that doesn't invite or even permit such interference. The only remaining alternative is that my idea of God is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me."
Kuhn
"When scientists must choose between competing theories, two men fully committed to the same list of criteria for choice may nevertheless reach different conclusions
Locke
"Worse still, this argument from universal consent which is used to prove that there are innate principles can be turned into a proof that there are none; because there aren't any principles to which all mankind give universal assent."
Principle of Charity
1. Suspend your particular position on a given topic. 2. Assume a conclusion other than yours to be true, the argument strong or valid, the arguer rational and informed. 3. Interpret all evidence (existing and new) in such a way that it best supports the truth of this other view.
Justification: Coherentism
A claim to knowledge is legitimized as it coheres with some body of established claims to knowledge.
Justification: Foundationalism
A claim to knowledge is legitimized through support provided by non-inferred knowledge.
Truth: Correspondence
A claim to knowledge is true if-and-only-if a state of affairs is as the statement claims it to be.
Truth: Pragmatic
A claim to knowledge is true if-and-only-if it proves useful to hold it to be true.
Truth: Coherence
A claim to knowledge is true if-and-only-if it stands in harmony with other, already accepted truths.
Belief
A cognitive state of holding something to be true.
Sound Argument
A valid argument, with all true premises.
Unsound Argument
An invalid argument, or an argument with at least one false premise (or both).
Slippery Slope Fallacy
Arguing that some proposed action or event is just the first of a series of actions or events that will lead to some disastrous consequence, without sufficient evidence that the series of events will follow.
Bandwagon Fallacy
Attempting to convince others to accept a conclusion by using as a premise a claim that some group of people believes the conclusion, instead of providing relevant evidence that the conclusion is true.
Auxiliary Conditions
Conditions which may affect the outcome of the experiment independently of the truth of the h/t
The Strawman Fallacy
Distorting the opposition's position and then attacking the weakness of the distorted stance.
Begging the Question Fallacy
Drawing a conclusion that appears to be supported by a premise that is actually just a restatement of the conclusion, for which no other substantial support is given.
Hasty Generalization Fallacy
Drawing a conclusion that is a general rule, based on too few specific cases or exceptional specific cases.
Invalid Argument (Deductive)
If all the premises are true, then it is still possible that the conclusion be false.
Valid Argument (Deductive)
If all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true.
Generalization
Infer a truth about an entire group from the sampling of a few
Appeal to Ignorance Fallacy
Instead of providing evidence that a conclusion is true, stating (as a premise) that we don't know that the conclusion is false.
Knowledge
Justified, true belief.
Empiricism
That experience (a posteriori) is necessary for all knowledge
Rationalism
That reason, prior to experience (a priori), is a substantial source of knowledge
Auxiliary Assumptions
The assumption that auxiliary conditions are involved, which allows a theory to accommodate apparent falsifying evidence.
Solipsism
The only thing which is known with certainty is that one's own mind exists
Dogmatism
The state of a belief which is immune to counter-evidence
Justification: Skepticism
There is ultimately no justification for a claim to knowledge.
Equivocation Fallacy
Using a word or phrase as if it had one meaning throughout an argument, when it actually changes meaning, leading to an unsupported conclusion.
Epistemology
Philosophy of Knowledge
Ethics
Philosophy of Proper Conduct
Logic
Philosophy of Reasoning
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Ultimate Reality
Strong Argument (Inductive)
Provide a great deal of evidence that a conclusion is true
Weak Argument (Inductive)
Provide little evidence that a conclusion is true
Circumstantial Ad Hominem Fallacy
Rejecting a person's claim or argument by pointing out some special circumstance of the person.
Tu Quoque Ad Hominem Fallacy
Rejecting a person's claim or argument by pointing out that the person's actions are in conflict with the person's position or claim (hypocrisy).
Abusive Ad Hominem Fallacy
Rejecting a person's claim or argument by verbally attacking the person.
