Philosophy Mid-Term BSU Spring 2023

Transplant Objection

1. Simple Materialism implies that someone cannot survive an organ transplant. 2. Someone can survive an organ transplant. 3. Simple Materialism is false.

Transitivity Objection to Simple Memory Theory

1. Simple Memory Theory implies that personal identity over time is not transitive. 2. Personal identity over time is transitive. 3. Simple Memory Theory is false.

Epistemic Objection to Soul Theory

1. Soul Theory implies that we could have no knowledge of personal identity over time. 2. We can have knowledge of personal identity over time. 3. Soul Theory is false.

Leaf Argument

1. The Indiscernibility of Identicals is true. 2. The leaf in the summer is green. 3. The leaf in the fall is red. 4. The leaf in the summer ≠ the leaf in the fall.

Clay Argument

1. The Indiscernibility of Identicals is true. 2. The lump of clay can survive squashing. 3. The statue can't survive squashing. 4. The statue ≠ the lump of clay.

Epistemic Dilemma Argument

1. We could have knowledge of personal identity over time only directly or indirectly. 2. If Soul Theory is true, we could not have direct knowledge of personal identity over time, since souls are immaterial and so imperceptible. 3. If Soul Theory is true, we could have indirect knowledge of personal identity over time only by way of knowing the Correlation Principle (see below). 4. We cannot have knowledge of the Correlation Principle if Soul Theory is true, since that requires independent means of confirming the correlation, and so some kind of direct access to souls (which by premise 2 we don't have). 5. Soul Theory entails we could have no knowledge of personal identity over time.

Temporal Parts Solution

1. same 4-dimensional object but reject premise 2 & 3 since object is partly green and partly red 2. different temporal parts - AKA different leaf slices

Determinism and Free will reason 2

1. the indeterminism of quantum mechanics is pure randomness and surely free will is not purely random 2. if determinism is incompatible with free will the truth of quantum mechanics would not save the existence of free will

Two Objection to Time-indexed indiscernibility of identical

1. time travel which means that a single object can have incompatible properties at the same time (Ex: Fred(40) goes back in time to when he is 20 and he, therefore, exists with and without gray hair 2. A photon goes back in tine and crosses paths with itself but is traveling at 2 different velocities

Event Analogy

An event such as a football game can be spread out across time, but when it is, it is broken down into multiple distinct shorter events

Spatial Analogy

An object has extent across time because it has multiple distinct parts located at different regions of space (Ex: desk can be both blue and black because of spatial parts)

No Change Thesis

Change (in the sense of a single thing changing features over time) is strictly impossible. Whenever an object, as we would ordinarily put it, changes features over time, it strictly speaking ceases to exist (although it is perhaps "replaced" by something very similar).

argument by analogy

Defends a claim by noting it is relevantly analogous to some other true claim.

Incompatibilism

Free will and determinism are incompatible, i.e, if determinism if false then people could not have free will

Argument by Explanation

Generalizes from lower-level claims to higher-level claims that explain them

Indiscernability of Identicals

If a=b, then a and b have exactly the same features or properties

Coincidence theory

It is possible for there to be two distinct objects having exactly the same location at exactly the same time

the Time-Indexed Indiscernibility of Identicals

Necessarily, if a=b, then a and b, at any given time, have exactly the same features I.e., what can be truly said of objects is that they have certain features at certain times.

Sophisticated materialism

Necessarily, person X at T1 = person Y at T2 if and only if X at T1 and Y at T2 are connected by a series such that the matter in each member of the series largely overlaps the matter in the next member of the series.

Simple Materialism

Necessarily, person X at T1 = person Y at T2 if and only if the matter in X at T1 = the matter in Y at T2.

Puzzle of Change

Objects can change their properties (Ex: candle starts straight and when burns becomes bent with drips)

Psychological Discontinuity Objection

People can survive very significant and sudden psychological discontinuities (due to injury or illness or some other cause), but Psychological Continuity Theory says otherwise.

Coma Objection

People continue to exist in a coma or a dreamless sleep, but Sophisticated Memory Theory says otherwise (since then there are no experiences to remember).

Argument by False Implication

Refutes claims by pointing out false implications, often lower-level implications.

Corpse Objection

Sophisticated Materialism incorrectly claims that someone survives as her corpse (except in those cases where what causes "death" also destroys most of the body).

Intuitive Idea of Free Will

This is the idea that we freely choose what to do. We ourselves, rather than any external or alien forces, control what we do. In this way, we are importantly different from inanimate objects (such as rocks) and, perhaps, any animals who act solely on the basis of instinct.

Personal Identity Over Time

This is when "two persons" at two different times are numerically identical, so that strictly speaking there is only one person

The Principle of Best Explanation

Usually, the best explanation of a set of data is true

Correlation Principle

Wherever there is the same human body, there is the same soul

Organic Body Theory

X at T1 = person Y at T2 if and only if X at T1 = the organic body of Y at T2, no distinction between a (human) person and a human body

Justified Belief

a belief that is in accordance with reasons and evidence

Distinctiveness of Persons Response

a person is more than just a biological form and function; a person is essentially something psychology. so a person survives only just as long as enough aspects of psychology survive.

the Time-Indexed Indiscernibility of Identicals Solution

a single object can have incompatible properties at different times simply it to be false/objects have properties at a time

Good Argument

argument in which premises give good reason to believe the conclusion (justified in believing conclusion)

Psychological Continuity Theory

close psychological connectedness between pairs

Puzzle of Coincidence

coincidence in the sense of coinciding things, valid non-circular argument with intuitive premises that lead to a counter-intuitive conclusion

Argument by Application

draws lower-level implications from higher level claims

Determinism (Roughly)

every event if fully casually determines by prior events in time

Brain theory

for all human persons, person X at T1 = person Y at T2 if and only if the brain of X at T1 = the brain of Y at T2, same brain same person

Compatibilism

free will and determinism are compatible, i.e, if determinism is true, people still could have free will

Bullet Biting Solution

human organism still exists, however the person does not, it would be crazy to assume that a person strictly speaking ceases to exist while in a coma or dreamless sleep

Simple Memory Theory

identical persons are those who share at least one experience memory

Identity (by exact qualitative similarity to numerical identity)

identical things are not literally one in the same (Ex: identical twins)

Unexplained Prohibition Theory

if people cease to exist in a coma or dreamless sleep, then why would it be wrong to kill them in such a state? Since you would technically be killing an organism not a person

Brain Objection

if someone undergoes a full body transplant of the sort where their brain is moved into a new body, then they survive in the new body

Transitivity of Personal Identity over time

if x = y / y= z/ then x = z, example of transitive include taller than, ancestor of, and numerical identity

Apparent Memory Objection

more than just apparent memory, the individual has to have genuine memories of the experiences

Sophisticated Memory Theory

necessarily, person X at T1 = person Y at T2 if and only if X at T1 and Y at T2 are connected by a series such that each member of the series can remember some experiences of the previous member of the series

Temporal Parts Theory

object survives over time or can change over time without violating the indiscernibility of identicals

Argument

series of propositions, the last of which is a conclusion, all the rest being premises

the Massive Transplant Objection

sophisticated materialism incorrectly denies that someone can survive a full body transplant, or even a half body transplant

Non-circularity

the conclusion neither is, nor is presupposed by, one of the premises

Soul Theory

the view that sameness of persons across time is a matter of sameness of souls across time - AKA same soul same person

Determinism (exactly)

time > initial time: (entire state of world + laws of nature) - entire state of world at time x

Bullet Biting solution

to do something painful for the sake of a greater good, in this case the avoidance of even worse pain

Validity

truth of premises would guarantee truth of conclusion

Cogency

truth of premises would make the truth of the conclusion probable (does not guarantee truth)